1. Presentation to the RAND Insurgency Board, June 2012
Steven Metz
U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

2. Enduring Nature
A strategy of violence used by the weak against a power
structure
Shifts decisiveness across domains
Core functions: survive; weaken power structure;
strengthen self
Changing Character
Organization
Objectives
Connections
Role and form of violence
Operational methods

3. Driving forces are inherent innovation and emulation
of success
In the modern era, emulation has surpassed inherent
innovation in importance
20th century: Maoist, proto-state model became the
gold standard
Simultaneously strengthen selves, weaken state
Ultimate success when insurgency had become state like
21st century: dispersed, networked, swarming,
terrorism-focused, transnational

4. Improved state security systems
The decline of state sponsorship
New technology and systems for using the
technology which make the dispersed,
networked, swarming, terrorism-focused,
transnational model of insurgency more viable
and effective
Especially the Internet/new media

5. Technology
Internet, laptops and tablet computers, image capture and
editing, mobile communication, GPS
Systems
Web pages, email, file sharing, chat, blogs, microblogs, IM,
SMS, cloud storage
Culture
Vastly expanded connectivity
Creation of new communities and identities
Anti-authoritarianism
Depersonalization
Blurring distinction reality and virtual
New basis for credibility
Wiki knowledge development

6. How insurgents use it
Recruiting, network building, mobilizing support
Training
Intelligence collection
Operational planning and strategy development
Financing
Psychological offensive operations/amplification
Why insurgents use it
Low entry cost in terms of training and money
Low risk
From "amongst the people" to inside the matrix
Facilitates a shift to the psychological domain
Immense increase in potential audience, recruits,
supporters, partners

7. The dispersed, networked, swarming, terrorism-focused,
transnational model of insurgency is more viable and effective
Dense information flows and cheap/rapid
communication facilitate networked organization and
swarming techniques
Insurgents can aggregate broad currents of anger,
frustration, and resentment
This can spark insurrection which can be a precursor to
insurgency, i.e. insurgents have a surge capability
Insurgencies composed of diverse nodes may not need a
unifying ideology
Multiple connections allow the creation of complex,
even conflicting narratives
Survival of the fittest--reinforce the narrative that seems to
work

8. Reliance on the Internet/new media propels an
insurgency toward terrorism focused methods
The commitment of online, tech savvy recruits
has a short lifespan
Terrorism is a "use them or lose them" method
Terrorism is easier to plan and train for online or
with limited physical interaction
The Internet and new media amplify the
psychological effects of terrorism by greatly
expanding the audience and bypassing traditional
media for explanation

9. al Qaeda
Egypt 2.0 Taliban
Libya al Qaeda
1.0
Traditional, proto-state
"Pure" Internet/new media insurgencies which
based insurgencies adopt the Internet/new
media as an applique

10. The bad news: dispersed, networked, swarming,
terrorism-focused, transnational insurgencies are very
hard to eradicate
Because they are transnational and virtual based, they can
pop up somewhere else if quashed in one place
It's nearly impossible to eradicate anger, frustration, and
anti-authoritarianism
The good news: dispersed, networked, swarming,
terrorism-focused, transnational insurgencies are
unlikely to attain decisive success in the absence of
major outside intervention if the initial insurrection
fails

11. Much of what we think we know about insurgency may
be approaching obsolescence
The universality of the Maoist, proto-state model
The concepts of legitimacy, building state capacity, winning
popular support
The ability of states to succeed at creating and sustaining a
viable counterinsurgent narrative
The ability of states to destroy networks