SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 37
Download to read offline
SESSION ID:
#RSAC
Konstantinos Karagiannis
Rise of the Hacking Machines
AIR-W05
Chief Technology Officer
Security Consulting
BT Americas
@konstanthacker
#RSAC
The question…
2
Will AI allow machines to wreak hacking devastation
worldwide?
#RSAC
Probably won’t be this bad
We missed the original Skynet date of April 19, 2011 at least.
#RSAC
Quick note on “hacking machines”
This futurism talk will look at HW/SW
systems that may soon emulate human
hackers
We will not be focusing on:
Botnets/DDoS
Malware
APTs
This talk is really “near futurism”: the
machines covered currently exist in
some form!
The basics of AI
#RSAC
AI compared to wetware
“The goal of AI is to develop machines that behave as
though they were intelligent.” – John McCarthy, 1956
A more timeless definition: “Artificial Intelligence is
the study of how to make computers do things at
which, at the moment, people are better.” – Elaine
Rich, 1983
Machines win at computations and data slicing
We win at the majority of both simple and advanced
tasks, and are creative
#RSAC
Narrow and general types of AI
7
Narrow (or “weak”) AI:
Non sentient
Focused on one task
General (or “strong”) AI:
Sentient
Can apply intelligence to any task
#RSAC
The history of AI
1930s Alonzo Church and Alan Turing show limits
of traditional first-order logic
1940s McCulloch and Pitts design neural networks
ahead of necessary computing power
1950s Turing creates famous Test; Minsky
simulates 40 neurons with 3000-tube neural
network; Samuel (IBM) creates learning chess
program; AI term introduced; McCarthy (MIT)
invents LISP language and self-modifying programs
1960s General Problem Solver imitates human
thought; McCarthy founds AI Lab at Stanford; Eliza
converses in natural language
#RSAC
The history of AI (continued)
1970s Alain Colmerauer invents logic programming language PROLOG; systems for
diagnosing acute abdominal pain and infectious diseases developed
1980s Japanese build PROLOG “Fifth Generation Project”; DEC saves millions a year
with R1 system that configures computers; neural network research continues,
with Nettalk learning to read text aloud
1990s Bayesian Networks are born; RoboCup initiative to build soccer-playing
autonomous robots; IBM’s Deep Blue defeats the chess champ Gary Kasparov
2000s Service robotics; Japan makes lifelike movements
2011 Watson beats Jennings and Rutter on Jeopardy
2016 Machines will face off in a special Defcon Capture the Flag!
Historical scanner weaknesses
#RSAC
Security scanning without much AI
1995—Security Administrator Tool for
Analyzing Networks (SATAN) detected
network problems by “fingerprints,” relying
on banners and basic checks
Nessus appeared 1998, eventually taking
over with NASL security checks
Metasploit, Immunity Canvas, and Core
Impact point-and-click “hacking”
Web app scanners try to interpret custom-
written applications without the real ability
to think—generous to call it “narrow AI”
#RSAC
Web Scanner Design Flaws
12
Authentication handling
Inability to complete
multistep functions
Misunderstanding of
functions and statements
Poor spidering/site
coverage
Use of mostly simplistic attack
vectors
Weak support for newer
tech such as Web 2.0
#RSAC
Roaches scanning your apps?
Web app scanners like collision-detection
(cockroach intelligence) robot programs
Can spot glaring obstacles; can’t determine if
obstacle can be turned into entry point
Deep analysis by Watson-like systems will allow
future web scanners to fare better
Much as Watson spots key words in complicated
questions, future scanners may spot patterns and
logic flows in applications
#RSAC
Threat monitoring
Threat monitoring can spot automated attacks and even human hacking
Systems can learn how a network typically behaves, what kind of traffic is expected
Anomalous events gathered by devices can be analyzed via dashboard
IBM’s Watson and new ways of “thinking”
#RSAC
Watson beats the Jeopardy! champs
Feb 14-16, 2011 we witnessed on TV a
seeming evolutionary leap in AI
Watson beat all-time leading money
winner, Brad Rutter, and longest streak
holder, Ken Jennings
Critics irked by Watson’s fast trigger
“finger” can’t dispute the
demonstrated ability to dissect
complex language in clues
#RSAC
How Watson works
90 IBM Power 750 servers, each with a 3.5-GHz POWER7 eight-core processor. 16 TB of RAM total. Massively
parallel processing.
IBM DeepQA software, on Linux, processes 500 GB of data (a million books) per second. 100 techniques analyze
natural language, identify sources, generate hypotheses, score evidence, and merge and rank answers.
Watson uses multiple general info sources, but can use specialized ones…
#RSAC
Watson goes to work—inspires clones
Watson adapted to cancer
treatment decision making at
Memorial Sloane-Kettering
Horsepower available as IBM
Watson Analytics
DARPADeepDive, OpenCog and
other open source technologies
arrive
Can Watson or a descendant be
dedicated to, say, computer
hacking?
DeepMind and neural networks
#RSAC
DeepMind attacking your apps?
Google bought DeepMind for $400 million
Company had been working on reducing
intelligence to an algorithm
Used neural networks to simulate short
term memory, and get better at video
games (Atari to Doom)—will play Go
against human grandmaster Mar. 9!
Neural networks “learn”/reinforce success
Imagine a security scanner that could use
such techniques to identify intricate flaws
#RSAC
Neural networks
21
Often called Artificial Neural
Networks (ANNs)
Input nodes gather data, hidden
nodes apply a function and weight
results, and output node activates
Neural Turning Machines like
DeepMind couple this with massive
external memory
Even modest hardware can impress—
check out Seth Bling’s MarI/O
#RSAC
About that Go game next week
22
Lee Sedol will play 5 games against
DeepMind’s AlphaGo from Mar 9-15 for $1
million
To consider how powerful neural nets can
be:
Checkers has 1020 possible positions
Chess has 10120
Go has 10761 positions! (on 19x19 board)
Only 1080 particles in observable universe
Clearly evolving from Atari to Go shows that
we are reaching human-like ability to
strategize, perhaps out-think defenses…
#RSAC
Toys and fears of the wealthy
Facebook made big news with its
Big Sur system relying on GPUs—
which excel at neural net
processing
Company also unleashed M, an AI
that learns from its pool of a
billion users
Billionaires love AI sometimes, and
Amazon also joined in
Some, like Tesla’s Elon Musk fear
the end is near with AI—he’s not
alone (notably Hawking)
#RSAC
Optimization going … quantum?
24
D-Wave’s quantum computer has
taken a lot of heat for not being
“universal”—can’t run legendary
algorithms like Shor’s or Grover’s
Can’t crack encryption!
Its optimization has been called 100s
of millions of times faster than
traditional computing gear
Google promises a strong boost to AI
DARPA's Cyber Grand Challenge
#RSAC
Traditional capture the flag
26
Popular event at Defcon
where teams of hackers:
find flaws in new software
protect against other
teams
Nessus and other
scanners useless as this is
NEW software
#RSAC
True hacking machines
27
Cyber Grand Challenge (Aug 4, 2016,
Las Vegas Paris Hotel)
DARPA event where teams will have
their machine creations play Capture
the Flag
Running DECREE (DARPA Experimental
Cyber Research Evaluation
Environment), fully automated systems
will, in real time:
reverse engineer unknown software
locate and heal weaknesses in software
#RSAC
Important notes on DECREE
28
Built on Linux, but a limited
extension
Linux has hundreds of system calls,
but DECREE has seven
DECREE has its own
binary/executable format—not
compatible with other software
Ideal for research only … for now
#RSAC
Visualizing flaws and fixes
29
Elegant, patch—initial
“jump” to error handle
code, then final non-crash
output.
Made by a machine!
#RSAC
Not always elegant…
30
Looking ahead…
#RSAC
Look closely at the DARPA requirements
32
A scary list of autonomous,
machine-only “hacking” and
defense actions
Due to setup and
environment, machines can’t
be unleashed immediately
Still, this list covers almost all
our jobs, right?
#RSAC
Within this year
33
Expect threat monitoring and
analytics to get a little better—smart
networks a MUST
Automated scanning may stagnate
DECREE likely to catch fire in open
source community—new, more
flexible development coming?
Facebook, Microsoft, and Google
have open sourced some AI
#RSAC
Within 5 years
34
Expect neural networks similar to DeepMind
to be probing applications and services/ports
Commercial automated scanning should
improve—may have difficulty keeping up
against constant barrage
Optimizing (not universal) quantum
computers should have impact on coding
Monitoring will be the wild card
can its narrow AI evolve fast enough?
can self-repairing networks (like in CGC contest)
take off?
#RSAC
Within 10 years
35
Singularity date may change—still 2045
Human hackers/defenders unlikely to be
able to keep up with “bulk” work by this
point—we’ll have to be useful for
creativity!
Universal quantum computers?
Australia claims within 3 years actually
Some government may get there first
Within 10 years PK encryption useless
#RSAC
Preparing for Tomorrow
36
Even if it remains narrow AI for a couple
decades, the technology is here to make
machines that can hack fast and effectively
With the exception of quantum computers,
the hardware to run advanced AI will not be
cost prohibitive to criminals or even the
curious
Dumb networks not an option currently—
bleeding edge smart networks will
increasingly be mandatory. Too easy to fall
behind curve in coming years
Questions?
Konstantinos.Karagiannis@bt.com
@konstanthacker

More Related Content

What's hot

Soc 2030-socs-are-broken-lets-fix- them
Soc 2030-socs-are-broken-lets-fix- themSoc 2030-socs-are-broken-lets-fix- them
Soc 2030-socs-are-broken-lets-fix- themPriyanka Aash
 
Aspirin as a Service: Using the Cloud to Cure Security Headaches
Aspirin as a Service: Using the Cloud to Cure Security HeadachesAspirin as a Service: Using the Cloud to Cure Security Headaches
Aspirin as a Service: Using the Cloud to Cure Security HeadachesPriyanka Aash
 
Insights from-NSAs-cybersecurity-threat-operations-center
Insights from-NSAs-cybersecurity-threat-operations-centerInsights from-NSAs-cybersecurity-threat-operations-center
Insights from-NSAs-cybersecurity-threat-operations-centerPriyanka Aash
 
Predicting exploitability-forecasts-for-vulnerability-management
Predicting exploitability-forecasts-for-vulnerability-managementPredicting exploitability-forecasts-for-vulnerability-management
Predicting exploitability-forecasts-for-vulnerability-managementPriyanka Aash
 
The Rise of the Purple Team
The Rise of the Purple TeamThe Rise of the Purple Team
The Rise of the Purple TeamPriyanka Aash
 
Cloud Breach – Preparation and Response
Cloud Breach – Preparation and ResponseCloud Breach – Preparation and Response
Cloud Breach – Preparation and ResponsePriyanka Aash
 
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly of the Ultrasonic Communications Ecosystem
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly of the Ultrasonic Communications EcosystemThe Good, the Bad and the Ugly of the Ultrasonic Communications Ecosystem
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly of the Ultrasonic Communications EcosystemPriyanka Aash
 
Designing Virtual Network Security Architectures
Designing Virtual Network Security ArchitecturesDesigning Virtual Network Security Architectures
Designing Virtual Network Security ArchitecturesPriyanka Aash
 
Agile Security—Field of Dreams
Agile Security—Field of DreamsAgile Security—Field of Dreams
Agile Security—Field of DreamsPriyanka Aash
 
BlueHat v18 || software supply chain attacks in 2018 - predictions vs reality
BlueHat v18 || software supply chain attacks in 2018 - predictions vs realityBlueHat v18 || software supply chain attacks in 2018 - predictions vs reality
BlueHat v18 || software supply chain attacks in 2018 - predictions vs realityBlueHat Security Conference
 
LIFT OFF 2017: Transforming Security
LIFT OFF 2017: Transforming SecurityLIFT OFF 2017: Transforming Security
LIFT OFF 2017: Transforming SecurityRobert Herjavec
 
(SACON) Wasim Halani & Arpan Raval - Practical Threat Hunting - Developing an...
(SACON) Wasim Halani & Arpan Raval - Practical Threat Hunting - Developing an...(SACON) Wasim Halani & Arpan Raval - Practical Threat Hunting - Developing an...
(SACON) Wasim Halani & Arpan Raval - Practical Threat Hunting - Developing an...Priyanka Aash
 
BlueHat v18 || Modern day entomology - examining the inner workings of the bu...
BlueHat v18 || Modern day entomology - examining the inner workings of the bu...BlueHat v18 || Modern day entomology - examining the inner workings of the bu...
BlueHat v18 || Modern day entomology - examining the inner workings of the bu...BlueHat Security Conference
 
Soc analyst course content
Soc analyst course contentSoc analyst course content
Soc analyst course contentShivamSharma909
 
Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?)
Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?) Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?)
Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?) MITRE ATT&CK
 
Anomali Detect 19 - Nickels & Pennington - Turning Intelligence into Action w...
Anomali Detect 19 - Nickels & Pennington - Turning Intelligence into Action w...Anomali Detect 19 - Nickels & Pennington - Turning Intelligence into Action w...
Anomali Detect 19 - Nickels & Pennington - Turning Intelligence into Action w...Adam Pennington
 
Kent King - PKI: Do You Know Your Exposure?
Kent King - PKI: Do You Know Your Exposure?Kent King - PKI: Do You Know Your Exposure?
Kent King - PKI: Do You Know Your Exposure?centralohioissa
 
CrowdStrike Webinar: Taking Dwell-Time Out of Incident Response
CrowdStrike Webinar: Taking Dwell-Time Out of Incident ResponseCrowdStrike Webinar: Taking Dwell-Time Out of Incident Response
CrowdStrike Webinar: Taking Dwell-Time Out of Incident ResponseBrendon Macaraeg
 

What's hot (20)

Soc 2030-socs-are-broken-lets-fix- them
Soc 2030-socs-are-broken-lets-fix- themSoc 2030-socs-are-broken-lets-fix- them
Soc 2030-socs-are-broken-lets-fix- them
 
Aspirin as a Service: Using the Cloud to Cure Security Headaches
Aspirin as a Service: Using the Cloud to Cure Security HeadachesAspirin as a Service: Using the Cloud to Cure Security Headaches
Aspirin as a Service: Using the Cloud to Cure Security Headaches
 
Insights from-NSAs-cybersecurity-threat-operations-center
Insights from-NSAs-cybersecurity-threat-operations-centerInsights from-NSAs-cybersecurity-threat-operations-center
Insights from-NSAs-cybersecurity-threat-operations-center
 
Predicting exploitability-forecasts-for-vulnerability-management
Predicting exploitability-forecasts-for-vulnerability-managementPredicting exploitability-forecasts-for-vulnerability-management
Predicting exploitability-forecasts-for-vulnerability-management
 
The Rise of the Purple Team
The Rise of the Purple TeamThe Rise of the Purple Team
The Rise of the Purple Team
 
Cloud Breach – Preparation and Response
Cloud Breach – Preparation and ResponseCloud Breach – Preparation and Response
Cloud Breach – Preparation and Response
 
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly of the Ultrasonic Communications Ecosystem
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly of the Ultrasonic Communications EcosystemThe Good, the Bad and the Ugly of the Ultrasonic Communications Ecosystem
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly of the Ultrasonic Communications Ecosystem
 
Designing Virtual Network Security Architectures
Designing Virtual Network Security ArchitecturesDesigning Virtual Network Security Architectures
Designing Virtual Network Security Architectures
 
Agile Security—Field of Dreams
Agile Security—Field of DreamsAgile Security—Field of Dreams
Agile Security—Field of Dreams
 
BlueHat v18 || software supply chain attacks in 2018 - predictions vs reality
BlueHat v18 || software supply chain attacks in 2018 - predictions vs realityBlueHat v18 || software supply chain attacks in 2018 - predictions vs reality
BlueHat v18 || software supply chain attacks in 2018 - predictions vs reality
 
LIFT OFF 2017: Transforming Security
LIFT OFF 2017: Transforming SecurityLIFT OFF 2017: Transforming Security
LIFT OFF 2017: Transforming Security
 
(SACON) Wasim Halani & Arpan Raval - Practical Threat Hunting - Developing an...
(SACON) Wasim Halani & Arpan Raval - Practical Threat Hunting - Developing an...(SACON) Wasim Halani & Arpan Raval - Practical Threat Hunting - Developing an...
(SACON) Wasim Halani & Arpan Raval - Practical Threat Hunting - Developing an...
 
Zero-Trust SASE DevSecOps
Zero-Trust SASE DevSecOpsZero-Trust SASE DevSecOps
Zero-Trust SASE DevSecOps
 
BlueHat v18 || Modern day entomology - examining the inner workings of the bu...
BlueHat v18 || Modern day entomology - examining the inner workings of the bu...BlueHat v18 || Modern day entomology - examining the inner workings of the bu...
BlueHat v18 || Modern day entomology - examining the inner workings of the bu...
 
Soc analyst course content
Soc analyst course contentSoc analyst course content
Soc analyst course content
 
Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?)
Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?) Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?)
Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?)
 
Anomali Detect 19 - Nickels & Pennington - Turning Intelligence into Action w...
Anomali Detect 19 - Nickels & Pennington - Turning Intelligence into Action w...Anomali Detect 19 - Nickels & Pennington - Turning Intelligence into Action w...
Anomali Detect 19 - Nickels & Pennington - Turning Intelligence into Action w...
 
Kent King - PKI: Do You Know Your Exposure?
Kent King - PKI: Do You Know Your Exposure?Kent King - PKI: Do You Know Your Exposure?
Kent King - PKI: Do You Know Your Exposure?
 
CrowdStrike Webinar: Taking Dwell-Time Out of Incident Response
CrowdStrike Webinar: Taking Dwell-Time Out of Incident ResponseCrowdStrike Webinar: Taking Dwell-Time Out of Incident Response
CrowdStrike Webinar: Taking Dwell-Time Out of Incident Response
 
Splunk for Security
Splunk for SecuritySplunk for Security
Splunk for Security
 

Similar to Rise of the Hacking Machines

Artificial intelligency & robotics
Artificial intelligency & roboticsArtificial intelligency & robotics
Artificial intelligency & roboticsSneh Raval
 
"Imaging + AI: Opportunities Inside the Car and Beyond," a Presentation from ...
"Imaging + AI: Opportunities Inside the Car and Beyond," a Presentation from ..."Imaging + AI: Opportunities Inside the Car and Beyond," a Presentation from ...
"Imaging + AI: Opportunities Inside the Car and Beyond," a Presentation from ...Edge AI and Vision Alliance
 
Artificial intelligency & robotics
Artificial intelligency & roboticsArtificial intelligency & robotics
Artificial intelligency & roboticsSneh Raval
 
Evolution of-ai-bots-for-real-time-adaptive-security
Evolution of-ai-bots-for-real-time-adaptive-securityEvolution of-ai-bots-for-real-time-adaptive-security
Evolution of-ai-bots-for-real-time-adaptive-securityDESMOND YUEN
 
Evolution of AI Bots for Real-Time Adaptive Security
Evolution of AI Bots for Real-Time Adaptive SecurityEvolution of AI Bots for Real-Time Adaptive Security
Evolution of AI Bots for Real-Time Adaptive SecurityPriyanka Aash
 
Why mobile-should-stop-worrying-learn-love-root-andrew-hoog-viaforensics-rsa-...
Why mobile-should-stop-worrying-learn-love-root-andrew-hoog-viaforensics-rsa-...Why mobile-should-stop-worrying-learn-love-root-andrew-hoog-viaforensics-rsa-...
Why mobile-should-stop-worrying-learn-love-root-andrew-hoog-viaforensics-rsa-...viaForensics
 
Security Analytics: The Promise of Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning,...
Security Analytics: The Promise of Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning,...Security Analytics: The Promise of Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning,...
Security Analytics: The Promise of Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning,...Cybereason
 
Artificial intelligence
Artificial intelligenceArtificial intelligence
Artificial intelligencesaloni sharma
 
20240411 QFM009 Machine Intelligence Reading List March 2024
20240411 QFM009 Machine Intelligence Reading List March 202420240411 QFM009 Machine Intelligence Reading List March 2024
20240411 QFM009 Machine Intelligence Reading List March 2024Matthew Sinclair
 
Predictive modelling with azure ml
Predictive modelling with azure mlPredictive modelling with azure ml
Predictive modelling with azure mlKoray Kocabas
 
CERT Data Science in Cybersecurity Symposium
CERT Data Science in Cybersecurity SymposiumCERT Data Science in Cybersecurity Symposium
CERT Data Science in Cybersecurity SymposiumBob Rudis
 
Combating Cyber Security Using Artificial Intelligence
Combating Cyber Security Using Artificial IntelligenceCombating Cyber Security Using Artificial Intelligence
Combating Cyber Security Using Artificial IntelligenceInderjeet Singh
 
Tokens and Complex Systems
Tokens and Complex SystemsTokens and Complex Systems
Tokens and Complex SystemsTrent McConaghy
 
A stark moral choice
A stark moral choiceA stark moral choice
A stark moral choicermvvr143
 
Hacking Exposed: The Mac Attack
Hacking Exposed: The Mac AttackHacking Exposed: The Mac Attack
Hacking Exposed: The Mac AttackPriyanka Aash
 
Hacking Exposed: The Mac Attack
Hacking Exposed: The Mac AttackHacking Exposed: The Mac Attack
Hacking Exposed: The Mac AttackPriyanka Aash
 
Technology and AI sharing - From 2016 to Y2017 and Beyond
Technology and AI sharing - From 2016 to Y2017 and BeyondTechnology and AI sharing - From 2016 to Y2017 and Beyond
Technology and AI sharing - From 2016 to Y2017 and BeyondJames Huang
 

Similar to Rise of the Hacking Machines (20)

Artificial intelligency & robotics
Artificial intelligency & roboticsArtificial intelligency & robotics
Artificial intelligency & robotics
 
"Imaging + AI: Opportunities Inside the Car and Beyond," a Presentation from ...
"Imaging + AI: Opportunities Inside the Car and Beyond," a Presentation from ..."Imaging + AI: Opportunities Inside the Car and Beyond," a Presentation from ...
"Imaging + AI: Opportunities Inside the Car and Beyond," a Presentation from ...
 
Artificial intelligency & robotics
Artificial intelligency & roboticsArtificial intelligency & robotics
Artificial intelligency & robotics
 
Evolution of-ai-bots-for-real-time-adaptive-security
Evolution of-ai-bots-for-real-time-adaptive-securityEvolution of-ai-bots-for-real-time-adaptive-security
Evolution of-ai-bots-for-real-time-adaptive-security
 
Evolution of AI Bots for Real-Time Adaptive Security
Evolution of AI Bots for Real-Time Adaptive SecurityEvolution of AI Bots for Real-Time Adaptive Security
Evolution of AI Bots for Real-Time Adaptive Security
 
Why mobile-should-stop-worrying-learn-love-root-andrew-hoog-viaforensics-rsa-...
Why mobile-should-stop-worrying-learn-love-root-andrew-hoog-viaforensics-rsa-...Why mobile-should-stop-worrying-learn-love-root-andrew-hoog-viaforensics-rsa-...
Why mobile-should-stop-worrying-learn-love-root-andrew-hoog-viaforensics-rsa-...
 
Serguei Beloussov - Future of computing
Serguei Beloussov - Future of computingSerguei Beloussov - Future of computing
Serguei Beloussov - Future of computing
 
Security Analytics: The Promise of Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning,...
Security Analytics: The Promise of Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning,...Security Analytics: The Promise of Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning,...
Security Analytics: The Promise of Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning,...
 
Artificial intelligence
Artificial intelligenceArtificial intelligence
Artificial intelligence
 
20240411 QFM009 Machine Intelligence Reading List March 2024
20240411 QFM009 Machine Intelligence Reading List March 202420240411 QFM009 Machine Intelligence Reading List March 2024
20240411 QFM009 Machine Intelligence Reading List March 2024
 
Predictive modelling with azure ml
Predictive modelling with azure mlPredictive modelling with azure ml
Predictive modelling with azure ml
 
CERT Data Science in Cybersecurity Symposium
CERT Data Science in Cybersecurity SymposiumCERT Data Science in Cybersecurity Symposium
CERT Data Science in Cybersecurity Symposium
 
Combating Cyber Security Using Artificial Intelligence
Combating Cyber Security Using Artificial IntelligenceCombating Cyber Security Using Artificial Intelligence
Combating Cyber Security Using Artificial Intelligence
 
Tokens and Complex Systems
Tokens and Complex SystemsTokens and Complex Systems
Tokens and Complex Systems
 
A stark moral choice
A stark moral choiceA stark moral choice
A stark moral choice
 
Hacking Exposed: The Mac Attack
Hacking Exposed: The Mac AttackHacking Exposed: The Mac Attack
Hacking Exposed: The Mac Attack
 
Hacking Exposed: The Mac Attack
Hacking Exposed: The Mac AttackHacking Exposed: The Mac Attack
Hacking Exposed: The Mac Attack
 
Technology and AI sharing - From 2016 to Y2017 and Beyond
Technology and AI sharing - From 2016 to Y2017 and BeyondTechnology and AI sharing - From 2016 to Y2017 and Beyond
Technology and AI sharing - From 2016 to Y2017 and Beyond
 
Serguei Seloussov - Future of computing and SIT MSc program
Serguei Seloussov - Future of computing and SIT MSc programSerguei Seloussov - Future of computing and SIT MSc program
Serguei Seloussov - Future of computing and SIT MSc program
 
Beekman5 std ppt_17
Beekman5 std ppt_17Beekman5 std ppt_17
Beekman5 std ppt_17
 

More from Priyanka Aash

Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Practical Approach For CISOs
Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Practical Approach For CISOsDigital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Practical Approach For CISOs
Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Practical Approach For CISOsPriyanka Aash
 
Verizon Breach Investigation Report (VBIR).pdf
Verizon Breach Investigation Report (VBIR).pdfVerizon Breach Investigation Report (VBIR).pdf
Verizon Breach Investigation Report (VBIR).pdfPriyanka Aash
 
Top 10 Security Risks .pptx.pdf
Top 10 Security Risks .pptx.pdfTop 10 Security Risks .pptx.pdf
Top 10 Security Risks .pptx.pdfPriyanka Aash
 
Simplifying data privacy and protection.pdf
Simplifying data privacy and protection.pdfSimplifying data privacy and protection.pdf
Simplifying data privacy and protection.pdfPriyanka Aash
 
Generative AI and Security (1).pptx.pdf
Generative AI and Security (1).pptx.pdfGenerative AI and Security (1).pptx.pdf
Generative AI and Security (1).pptx.pdfPriyanka Aash
 
EVERY ATTACK INVOLVES EXPLOITATION OF A WEAKNESS.pdf
EVERY ATTACK INVOLVES EXPLOITATION OF A WEAKNESS.pdfEVERY ATTACK INVOLVES EXPLOITATION OF A WEAKNESS.pdf
EVERY ATTACK INVOLVES EXPLOITATION OF A WEAKNESS.pdfPriyanka Aash
 
Cyber Truths_Are you Prepared version 1.1.pptx.pdf
Cyber Truths_Are you Prepared version 1.1.pptx.pdfCyber Truths_Are you Prepared version 1.1.pptx.pdf
Cyber Truths_Are you Prepared version 1.1.pptx.pdfPriyanka Aash
 
Cyber Crisis Management.pdf
Cyber Crisis Management.pdfCyber Crisis Management.pdf
Cyber Crisis Management.pdfPriyanka Aash
 
CISOPlatform journey.pptx.pdf
CISOPlatform journey.pptx.pdfCISOPlatform journey.pptx.pdf
CISOPlatform journey.pptx.pdfPriyanka Aash
 
Chennai Chapter.pptx.pdf
Chennai Chapter.pptx.pdfChennai Chapter.pptx.pdf
Chennai Chapter.pptx.pdfPriyanka Aash
 
Cloud attack vectors_Moshe.pdf
Cloud attack vectors_Moshe.pdfCloud attack vectors_Moshe.pdf
Cloud attack vectors_Moshe.pdfPriyanka Aash
 
Stories From The Web 3 Battlefield
Stories From The Web 3 BattlefieldStories From The Web 3 Battlefield
Stories From The Web 3 BattlefieldPriyanka Aash
 
Lessons Learned From Ransomware Attacks
Lessons Learned From Ransomware AttacksLessons Learned From Ransomware Attacks
Lessons Learned From Ransomware AttacksPriyanka Aash
 
Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities In 2022 (Chennai)
Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities In 2022 (Chennai)Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities In 2022 (Chennai)
Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities In 2022 (Chennai)Priyanka Aash
 
Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities In 2022 (Mumbai)
Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities In 2022 (Mumbai)Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities In 2022 (Mumbai)
Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities In 2022 (Mumbai)Priyanka Aash
 
Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities in 2022 (Bangalore)
Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities in 2022 (Bangalore)Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities in 2022 (Bangalore)
Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities in 2022 (Bangalore)Priyanka Aash
 
Cloud Security: Limitations of Cloud Security Groups and Flow Logs
Cloud Security: Limitations of Cloud Security Groups and Flow LogsCloud Security: Limitations of Cloud Security Groups and Flow Logs
Cloud Security: Limitations of Cloud Security Groups and Flow LogsPriyanka Aash
 
Cyber Security Governance
Cyber Security GovernanceCyber Security Governance
Cyber Security GovernancePriyanka Aash
 

More from Priyanka Aash (20)

Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Practical Approach For CISOs
Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Practical Approach For CISOsDigital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Practical Approach For CISOs
Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Practical Approach For CISOs
 
Verizon Breach Investigation Report (VBIR).pdf
Verizon Breach Investigation Report (VBIR).pdfVerizon Breach Investigation Report (VBIR).pdf
Verizon Breach Investigation Report (VBIR).pdf
 
Top 10 Security Risks .pptx.pdf
Top 10 Security Risks .pptx.pdfTop 10 Security Risks .pptx.pdf
Top 10 Security Risks .pptx.pdf
 
Simplifying data privacy and protection.pdf
Simplifying data privacy and protection.pdfSimplifying data privacy and protection.pdf
Simplifying data privacy and protection.pdf
 
Generative AI and Security (1).pptx.pdf
Generative AI and Security (1).pptx.pdfGenerative AI and Security (1).pptx.pdf
Generative AI and Security (1).pptx.pdf
 
EVERY ATTACK INVOLVES EXPLOITATION OF A WEAKNESS.pdf
EVERY ATTACK INVOLVES EXPLOITATION OF A WEAKNESS.pdfEVERY ATTACK INVOLVES EXPLOITATION OF A WEAKNESS.pdf
EVERY ATTACK INVOLVES EXPLOITATION OF A WEAKNESS.pdf
 
DPDP Act 2023.pdf
DPDP Act 2023.pdfDPDP Act 2023.pdf
DPDP Act 2023.pdf
 
Cyber Truths_Are you Prepared version 1.1.pptx.pdf
Cyber Truths_Are you Prepared version 1.1.pptx.pdfCyber Truths_Are you Prepared version 1.1.pptx.pdf
Cyber Truths_Are you Prepared version 1.1.pptx.pdf
 
Cyber Crisis Management.pdf
Cyber Crisis Management.pdfCyber Crisis Management.pdf
Cyber Crisis Management.pdf
 
CISOPlatform journey.pptx.pdf
CISOPlatform journey.pptx.pdfCISOPlatform journey.pptx.pdf
CISOPlatform journey.pptx.pdf
 
Chennai Chapter.pptx.pdf
Chennai Chapter.pptx.pdfChennai Chapter.pptx.pdf
Chennai Chapter.pptx.pdf
 
Cloud attack vectors_Moshe.pdf
Cloud attack vectors_Moshe.pdfCloud attack vectors_Moshe.pdf
Cloud attack vectors_Moshe.pdf
 
Stories From The Web 3 Battlefield
Stories From The Web 3 BattlefieldStories From The Web 3 Battlefield
Stories From The Web 3 Battlefield
 
Lessons Learned From Ransomware Attacks
Lessons Learned From Ransomware AttacksLessons Learned From Ransomware Attacks
Lessons Learned From Ransomware Attacks
 
Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities In 2022 (Chennai)
Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities In 2022 (Chennai)Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities In 2022 (Chennai)
Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities In 2022 (Chennai)
 
Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities In 2022 (Mumbai)
Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities In 2022 (Mumbai)Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities In 2022 (Mumbai)
Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities In 2022 (Mumbai)
 
Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities in 2022 (Bangalore)
Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities in 2022 (Bangalore)Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities in 2022 (Bangalore)
Emerging New Threats And Top CISO Priorities in 2022 (Bangalore)
 
Cloud Security: Limitations of Cloud Security Groups and Flow Logs
Cloud Security: Limitations of Cloud Security Groups and Flow LogsCloud Security: Limitations of Cloud Security Groups and Flow Logs
Cloud Security: Limitations of Cloud Security Groups and Flow Logs
 
Cyber Security Governance
Cyber Security GovernanceCyber Security Governance
Cyber Security Governance
 
Ethical Hacking
Ethical HackingEthical Hacking
Ethical Hacking
 

Recently uploaded

Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...Patryk Bandurski
 
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
AI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
AI as an Interface for Commercial BuildingsAI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
AI as an Interface for Commercial BuildingsMemoori
 
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for PartnersEnhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for PartnersThousandEyes
 
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 3652toLead Limited
 
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding ClubUnleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding ClubKalema Edgar
 
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptxThe Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptxMalak Abu Hammad
 
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmaticsKotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmaticscarlostorres15106
 
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | DelhiFULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhisoniya singh
 
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountBreaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountPuma Security, LLC
 
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)Allon Mureinik
 
Understanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC ArchitectureUnderstanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC ArchitecturePixlogix Infotech
 
Unlocking the Potential of the Cloud for IBM Power Systems
Unlocking the Potential of the Cloud for IBM Power SystemsUnlocking the Potential of the Cloud for IBM Power Systems
Unlocking the Potential of the Cloud for IBM Power SystemsPrecisely
 
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...shyamraj55
 
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions
 
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesUnblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesSinan KOZAK
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsMark Billinghurst
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
 
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
 
AI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
AI as an Interface for Commercial BuildingsAI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
AI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
 
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for PartnersEnhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
 
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
 
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding ClubUnleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
 
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptxThe Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
 
Vulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptx
Vulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptxVulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptx
Vulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptx
 
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmaticsKotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
 
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | DelhiFULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
 
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountBreaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
 
The transition to renewables in India.pdf
The transition to renewables in India.pdfThe transition to renewables in India.pdf
The transition to renewables in India.pdf
 
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
 
Understanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC ArchitectureUnderstanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
 
Unlocking the Potential of the Cloud for IBM Power Systems
Unlocking the Potential of the Cloud for IBM Power SystemsUnlocking the Potential of the Cloud for IBM Power Systems
Unlocking the Potential of the Cloud for IBM Power Systems
 
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
 
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
 
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesUnblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
 
E-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptx
E-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptxE-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptx
E-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptx
 

Rise of the Hacking Machines

  • 1. SESSION ID: #RSAC Konstantinos Karagiannis Rise of the Hacking Machines AIR-W05 Chief Technology Officer Security Consulting BT Americas @konstanthacker
  • 2. #RSAC The question… 2 Will AI allow machines to wreak hacking devastation worldwide?
  • 3. #RSAC Probably won’t be this bad We missed the original Skynet date of April 19, 2011 at least.
  • 4. #RSAC Quick note on “hacking machines” This futurism talk will look at HW/SW systems that may soon emulate human hackers We will not be focusing on: Botnets/DDoS Malware APTs This talk is really “near futurism”: the machines covered currently exist in some form!
  • 6. #RSAC AI compared to wetware “The goal of AI is to develop machines that behave as though they were intelligent.” – John McCarthy, 1956 A more timeless definition: “Artificial Intelligence is the study of how to make computers do things at which, at the moment, people are better.” – Elaine Rich, 1983 Machines win at computations and data slicing We win at the majority of both simple and advanced tasks, and are creative
  • 7. #RSAC Narrow and general types of AI 7 Narrow (or “weak”) AI: Non sentient Focused on one task General (or “strong”) AI: Sentient Can apply intelligence to any task
  • 8. #RSAC The history of AI 1930s Alonzo Church and Alan Turing show limits of traditional first-order logic 1940s McCulloch and Pitts design neural networks ahead of necessary computing power 1950s Turing creates famous Test; Minsky simulates 40 neurons with 3000-tube neural network; Samuel (IBM) creates learning chess program; AI term introduced; McCarthy (MIT) invents LISP language and self-modifying programs 1960s General Problem Solver imitates human thought; McCarthy founds AI Lab at Stanford; Eliza converses in natural language
  • 9. #RSAC The history of AI (continued) 1970s Alain Colmerauer invents logic programming language PROLOG; systems for diagnosing acute abdominal pain and infectious diseases developed 1980s Japanese build PROLOG “Fifth Generation Project”; DEC saves millions a year with R1 system that configures computers; neural network research continues, with Nettalk learning to read text aloud 1990s Bayesian Networks are born; RoboCup initiative to build soccer-playing autonomous robots; IBM’s Deep Blue defeats the chess champ Gary Kasparov 2000s Service robotics; Japan makes lifelike movements 2011 Watson beats Jennings and Rutter on Jeopardy 2016 Machines will face off in a special Defcon Capture the Flag!
  • 11. #RSAC Security scanning without much AI 1995—Security Administrator Tool for Analyzing Networks (SATAN) detected network problems by “fingerprints,” relying on banners and basic checks Nessus appeared 1998, eventually taking over with NASL security checks Metasploit, Immunity Canvas, and Core Impact point-and-click “hacking” Web app scanners try to interpret custom- written applications without the real ability to think—generous to call it “narrow AI”
  • 12. #RSAC Web Scanner Design Flaws 12 Authentication handling Inability to complete multistep functions Misunderstanding of functions and statements Poor spidering/site coverage Use of mostly simplistic attack vectors Weak support for newer tech such as Web 2.0
  • 13. #RSAC Roaches scanning your apps? Web app scanners like collision-detection (cockroach intelligence) robot programs Can spot glaring obstacles; can’t determine if obstacle can be turned into entry point Deep analysis by Watson-like systems will allow future web scanners to fare better Much as Watson spots key words in complicated questions, future scanners may spot patterns and logic flows in applications
  • 14. #RSAC Threat monitoring Threat monitoring can spot automated attacks and even human hacking Systems can learn how a network typically behaves, what kind of traffic is expected Anomalous events gathered by devices can be analyzed via dashboard
  • 15. IBM’s Watson and new ways of “thinking”
  • 16. #RSAC Watson beats the Jeopardy! champs Feb 14-16, 2011 we witnessed on TV a seeming evolutionary leap in AI Watson beat all-time leading money winner, Brad Rutter, and longest streak holder, Ken Jennings Critics irked by Watson’s fast trigger “finger” can’t dispute the demonstrated ability to dissect complex language in clues
  • 17. #RSAC How Watson works 90 IBM Power 750 servers, each with a 3.5-GHz POWER7 eight-core processor. 16 TB of RAM total. Massively parallel processing. IBM DeepQA software, on Linux, processes 500 GB of data (a million books) per second. 100 techniques analyze natural language, identify sources, generate hypotheses, score evidence, and merge and rank answers. Watson uses multiple general info sources, but can use specialized ones…
  • 18. #RSAC Watson goes to work—inspires clones Watson adapted to cancer treatment decision making at Memorial Sloane-Kettering Horsepower available as IBM Watson Analytics DARPADeepDive, OpenCog and other open source technologies arrive Can Watson or a descendant be dedicated to, say, computer hacking?
  • 20. #RSAC DeepMind attacking your apps? Google bought DeepMind for $400 million Company had been working on reducing intelligence to an algorithm Used neural networks to simulate short term memory, and get better at video games (Atari to Doom)—will play Go against human grandmaster Mar. 9! Neural networks “learn”/reinforce success Imagine a security scanner that could use such techniques to identify intricate flaws
  • 21. #RSAC Neural networks 21 Often called Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) Input nodes gather data, hidden nodes apply a function and weight results, and output node activates Neural Turning Machines like DeepMind couple this with massive external memory Even modest hardware can impress— check out Seth Bling’s MarI/O
  • 22. #RSAC About that Go game next week 22 Lee Sedol will play 5 games against DeepMind’s AlphaGo from Mar 9-15 for $1 million To consider how powerful neural nets can be: Checkers has 1020 possible positions Chess has 10120 Go has 10761 positions! (on 19x19 board) Only 1080 particles in observable universe Clearly evolving from Atari to Go shows that we are reaching human-like ability to strategize, perhaps out-think defenses…
  • 23. #RSAC Toys and fears of the wealthy Facebook made big news with its Big Sur system relying on GPUs— which excel at neural net processing Company also unleashed M, an AI that learns from its pool of a billion users Billionaires love AI sometimes, and Amazon also joined in Some, like Tesla’s Elon Musk fear the end is near with AI—he’s not alone (notably Hawking)
  • 24. #RSAC Optimization going … quantum? 24 D-Wave’s quantum computer has taken a lot of heat for not being “universal”—can’t run legendary algorithms like Shor’s or Grover’s Can’t crack encryption! Its optimization has been called 100s of millions of times faster than traditional computing gear Google promises a strong boost to AI
  • 25. DARPA's Cyber Grand Challenge
  • 26. #RSAC Traditional capture the flag 26 Popular event at Defcon where teams of hackers: find flaws in new software protect against other teams Nessus and other scanners useless as this is NEW software
  • 27. #RSAC True hacking machines 27 Cyber Grand Challenge (Aug 4, 2016, Las Vegas Paris Hotel) DARPA event where teams will have their machine creations play Capture the Flag Running DECREE (DARPA Experimental Cyber Research Evaluation Environment), fully automated systems will, in real time: reverse engineer unknown software locate and heal weaknesses in software
  • 28. #RSAC Important notes on DECREE 28 Built on Linux, but a limited extension Linux has hundreds of system calls, but DECREE has seven DECREE has its own binary/executable format—not compatible with other software Ideal for research only … for now
  • 29. #RSAC Visualizing flaws and fixes 29 Elegant, patch—initial “jump” to error handle code, then final non-crash output. Made by a machine!
  • 32. #RSAC Look closely at the DARPA requirements 32 A scary list of autonomous, machine-only “hacking” and defense actions Due to setup and environment, machines can’t be unleashed immediately Still, this list covers almost all our jobs, right?
  • 33. #RSAC Within this year 33 Expect threat monitoring and analytics to get a little better—smart networks a MUST Automated scanning may stagnate DECREE likely to catch fire in open source community—new, more flexible development coming? Facebook, Microsoft, and Google have open sourced some AI
  • 34. #RSAC Within 5 years 34 Expect neural networks similar to DeepMind to be probing applications and services/ports Commercial automated scanning should improve—may have difficulty keeping up against constant barrage Optimizing (not universal) quantum computers should have impact on coding Monitoring will be the wild card can its narrow AI evolve fast enough? can self-repairing networks (like in CGC contest) take off?
  • 35. #RSAC Within 10 years 35 Singularity date may change—still 2045 Human hackers/defenders unlikely to be able to keep up with “bulk” work by this point—we’ll have to be useful for creativity! Universal quantum computers? Australia claims within 3 years actually Some government may get there first Within 10 years PK encryption useless
  • 36. #RSAC Preparing for Tomorrow 36 Even if it remains narrow AI for a couple decades, the technology is here to make machines that can hack fast and effectively With the exception of quantum computers, the hardware to run advanced AI will not be cost prohibitive to criminals or even the curious Dumb networks not an option currently— bleeding edge smart networks will increasingly be mandatory. Too easy to fall behind curve in coming years