SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 53
Download to read offline
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
Turning Intelligence into Action with
MITRE ATT&CK™
Katie Nickels @likethecoins
Adam Pennington @_whatshisface
MITRE ATT&CK @MITREattack
| 1 |
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
What is
?
A knowledge base of
adversary behavior
Ø Based on real-world observations
Ø Free, open, and globally accessible
Ø A common language
Ø Community-driven
Summiting the Pyramid
Source: David Bianco, https://detect-respond.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-pyramid-of-pain.html
David Bianco’s Pyramid of Pain
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
TTPs
Tools
Network/
Host Artifacts
Domain Names
IP Addresses
Hash Values
•Tough!
•Challenging
•Annoying
•Simple
•Easy
•Trivial
Impact
Data Destruction
Data Encrypted for Impact
Defacement
Disk Content Wipe
Disk Structure Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Firmware Corruption
Inhibit System Recovery
Network Denial of Service
Resource Hijacking
Runtime Data Manipulation
Service Stop
Stored Data Manipulation
Transmitted Data
Manipulation
Command and Control
Commonly Used Port
Communication Through
Removable Media
Connection Proxy
Custom Command and
Control Protocol
Custom Cryptographic
Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Domain Fronting
Domain Generation
Algorithms
Fallback Channels
Multiband Communication
Multi-hop Proxy
Multilayer Encryption
Multi-Stage Channels
Port Knocking
Remote Access Tools
Remote File Copy
Standard Application Layer
Protocol
Standard Cryptographic
Protocol
Standard Non-Application
Layer Protocol
Uncommonly Used Port
Web Service
Exfiltration
Automated Exfiltration
Data Compressed
Data Encrypted
Data Transfer Size Limits
Exfiltration Over Other
Network Medium
Exfiltration Over Command
and Control Channel
Exfiltration Over Alternative
Protocol
Exfiltration Over
Physical Medium
Scheduled Transfer
Collection
Audio Capture
Automated Collection
Clipboard Data
Data from Information
Repositories
Data from Local System
Data from Network
Shared Drive
Data from Removable Media
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man in the Browser
Screen Capture
Video Capture
Lateral Movement
AppleScript
Application Deployment
Software
Distributed Component
Object Model
Exploitation of
Remote Services
Logon Scripts
Pass the Hash
Pass the Ticket
Remote Desktop Protocol
Remote File Copy
Remote Services
Replication Through
Removable Media
Shared Webroot
SSH Hijacking
Taint Shared Content
Third-party Software
Windows Admin Shares
Windows Remote
Management
Credential Access Discovery
Network Sniffing
Account Manipulation Account Discovery
Bash History Application Window
DiscoveryBrute Force
Credential Dumping Browser Bookmark
DiscoveryCredentials in Files
Credentials in Registry Domain Trust Discovery
Exploitation for
Credential Access
File and Directory Discovery
Network Service Scanning
Forced Authentication Network Share Discovery
Hooking Password Policy Discovery
Input Capture Peripheral Device Discovery
Input Prompt Permission Groups Discovery
Kerberoasting Process Discovery
Keychain Query Registry
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning
and Relay
Remote System Discovery
Security Software Discovery
Password Filter DLL System Information
DiscoveryPrivate Keys
Securityd Memory System Network
Configuration Discovery
Two-Factor Authentication
Interception
System Network
Connections Discovery
System Owner/User
Discovery
System Service Discovery
System Time Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox
Evasion
Execution Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion
Scheduled Task Binary Padding
Launchctl Access Token Manipulation
Local Job Scheduling Bypass User Account Control
LSASS Driver Extra Window Memory Injection
Trap Process Injection
AppleScript DLL Search Order Hijacking
CMSTP Image File Execution Options Injection
Command-Line Interface Plist Modification
Compiled HTML File Valid Accounts
Control Panel Items Accessibility Features BITS Jobs
Dynamic Data Exchange AppCert DLLs Clear Command History
Execution through API AppInit DLLs CMSTP
Execution through
Module Load
Application Shimming Code Signing
Dylib Hijacking Compiled HTML File
Exploitation for
Client Execution
File System Permissions Weakness Component Firmware
Hooking Component Object Model
HijackingGraphical User Interface Launch Daemon
InstallUtil New Service Control Panel Items
Mshta Path Interception DCShadow
PowerShell Port Monitors Deobfuscate/Decode Files
or InformationRegsvcs/Regasm Service Registry Permissions Weakness
Regsvr32 Setuid and Setgid Disabling Security Tools
Rundll32 Startup Items DLL Side-Loading
Scripting Web Shell Execution Guardrails
Service Execution .bash_profile and .bashrc Exploitation for
Privilege Escalation
Exploitation for
Defense Evasion
Signed Binary
Proxy Execution
Account Manipulation
Authentication Package SID-History Injection File Deletion
Signed Script
Proxy Execution
BITS Jobs Sudo File Permissions
ModificationBootkit Sudo Caching
Source Browser Extensions File System Logical Offsets
Space after Filename Change Default
File Association
Gatekeeper Bypass
Third-party Software Group Policy Modification
Trusted Developer Utilities Component Firmware Hidden Files and Directories
User Execution Component Object
Model Hijacking
Hidden Users
Windows Management
Instrumentation
Hidden Window
Create Account HISTCONTROL
Windows Remote
Management
External Remote Services Indicator Blocking
Hidden Files and Directories Indicator Removal
from ToolsXSL Script Processing Hypervisor
Kernel Modules
and Extensions
Indicator Removal on Host
Indirect Command Execution
Launch Agent Install Root Certificate
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition InstallUtil
Login Item Launchctl
Initial Access
Drive-by Compromise
Exploit Public-Facing
Application
External Remote Services
Hardware Additions
Replication Through
Removable Media
Spearphishing Attachment
Spearphishing Link
Spearphishing via Service
Supply Chain Compromise
Trusted Relationship
Valid Accounts
Breaking Down ATT&CK
Tactics: the adversary’s technical goals
Techniques:howthegoalsare
achieved
| 4 |
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
Procedures: Specific technique implementation
Technique: Spearphishing Attachment
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 5 |
Technique: Spearphishing Attachment
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 6 |
Technique: Spearphishing Attachment
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 7 |
Technique: Spearphishing Attachment
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 8 |
Group: APT29
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 9 |
Group: APT29
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 10 |
Group: APT29
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 11 |
ATT&CK Use Cases
| 12 |
Threat Intelligence
processes = search Process:Create
reg = filter processes where (exe == "reg.exe" and parent_exe
== "cmd.exe")
cmd = filter processes where (exe == "cmd.exe" and
parent_exe != "explorer.exe"")
reg_and_cmd = join (reg, cmd) where (reg.ppid == cmd.pid and
reg.hostname == cmd.hostname)
output reg_and_cmd
Detection
Adversary Emulation
Assessment and Engineering
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
Use ATT&CK for Adversary Emulation and Red Teaming
The best defense is a well-tested defense. ATT&CK provides a common adversary
behavior framework based on threat intelligence that red teams can use to emulate
specific threats. This helps cyber defenders find gaps in visibility, defensive tools, and
processes—and then fix them.
Legend
Low Priority
High Priority
Finding Gaps in Defense
Spearphishing Attachment
Spearphishing Link
Spearphishing via Service
Supply Chain Compromise
Trusted Relationship
Valid Accounts
Dynamic Data Exchange
Execution through API
Execution through Module Load
Exploitation for Client Execution
Graphical User Interface
InstallUtil
Launchctl
Local Job Scheduling
LSASS Driver
Mshta
PowerShell
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvr32
Rundll32
Scheduled Task
Scripting
Service Execution
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
Source
Space after Filename
Third-party Software
Trap
Trusted Developer Utilities
User Execution
Windows Management
Instrumentation
Windows Remote Management
XSL Script Processing
Application Shimming
Authentication Package
BITS Jobs
Bootkit
Browser Extensions
Change Default File Association
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Create Account
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
External Remote Services
File System Permissions Weakness
Hidden Files and Directories
Hooking
Hypervisor
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Kernel Modules and Extensions
Launch Agent
Launch Daemon
Launchctl
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition
Local Job Scheduling
Login Item
Logon Scripts
LSASS Driver
Modify Existing Service
Netsh Helper DLL
New Service
Office Application Startup
Path Interception
Plist Modification
Port Knocking
Port Monitors
Rc.common
Re-opened Applications
Redundant Access
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Scheduled Task
Screensaver
Security Support Provider
Service Registry Permissions
Weakness
Setuid and Setgid
Shortcut Modification
SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
Startup Items
System Firmware
Systemd Service
Time Providers
Trap
Valid Accounts
Web Shell
Windows Management
Instrumentation Event Subscription
Winlogon Helper DLL
Bypass User Account Control
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Extra Window Memory Injection
File System Permissions Weakness
Hooking
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Launch Daemon
New Service
Path Interception
Plist Modification
Port Monitors
Process Injection
Scheduled Task
Service Registry Permissions
Weakness
Setuid and Setgid
SID-History Injection
Startup Items
Sudo
Sudo Caching
Valid Accounts
Web Shell
CMSTP
Code Signing
Compile After Delivery
Compiled HTML File
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Control Panel Items
DCShadow
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or
Information
Disabling Security Tools
DLL Search Order Hijacking
DLL Side-Loading
Execution Guardrails
Exploitation for Defense Evasion
Extra Window Memory Injection
File Deletion
File Permissions Modification
File System Logical Offsets
Gatekeeper Bypass
Group Policy Modification
Hidden Files and Directories
Hidden Users
Hidden Window
HISTCONTROL
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Indicator Blocking
Indicator Removal from Tools
Indicator Removal on Host
Indirect Command Execution
Install Root Certificate
InstallUtil
Launchctl
LC_MAIN Hijacking
Masquerading
Modify Registry
Mshta
Network Share Connection
Removal
NTFS File Attributes
Obfuscated Files or Information
Plist Modification
Port Knocking
Process Doppelgänging
Process Hollowing
Process Injection
Redundant Access
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvr32
Rootkit
Rundll32
Scripting
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
Software Packing
Space after Filename
Template Injection
Timestomp
Trusted Developer Utilities
Valid Accounts
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Web Service
XSL Script Processing
Credentials in Registry
Exploitation for Credential Access
Forced Authentication
Hooking
Input Capture
Input Prompt
Kerberoasting
Keychain
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and
Relay
Network Sniffing
Password Filter DLL
Private Keys
Securityd Memory
Two-Factor Authentication
Interception
Network Service Scanning
Network Share Discovery
Network Sniffing
Password Policy Discovery
Peripheral Device Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Process Discovery
Query Registry
Remote System Discovery
Security Software Discovery
System Information Discovery
System Network Configuration
Discovery
System Network Connections
Discovery
System Owner/User Discovery
System Service Discovery
System Time Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Pass the Hash
Pass the Ticket
Remote Desktop Protocol
Remote File Copy
Remote Services
Replication Through Removable
Media
Shared Webroot
SSH Hijacking
Taint Shared Content
Third-party Software
Windows Admin Shares
Windows Remote Management
Data from Network Shared Drive
Data from Removable Media
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man in the Browser
Screen Capture
Video Capture
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Domain Fronting
Domain Generation Algorithms
Fallback Channels
Multi-hop Proxy
Multi-Stage Channels
Multiband Communication
Multilayer Encryption
Port Knocking
Remote Access Tools
Remote File Copy
Standard Application Layer Protocol
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
Standard Non-Application Layer
Protocol
Uncommonly Used Port
Web Service
Control Channel
Exfiltration Over Other Network
Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Scheduled Transfer
Endpoint Denial of Service
Firmware Corruption
Inhibit System Recovery
Network Denial of Service
Resource Hijacking
Runtime Data Manipulation
Service Stop
Stored Data Manipulation
Transmitted Data Manipulation
AppleScript
Application Deployment
Software
Distributed Component
Object Model
Exploitation of
Remote Services
Logon Scripts
Pass the Hash
Pass the Ticket
Remote Desktop Protocol
Remote File Copy
Remote Services
Replication Through
Removable Media
Shared Webroot
SSH Hijacking
Taint Shared Content
Third-party Software
Windows Admin Shares
Windows Remote
Management
Commonly Used Port
Communication Through
Removable Media
Connection Proxy
Custom Command and
Control Protocol
Custom Cryptographic
Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Domain Fronting
Domain Generation
Algorithms
Fallback Channels
Multiband Communication
Multi-hop Proxy
Multilayer Encryption
Multi-Stage Channels
Port Knocking
Remote Access Tools
Remote File Copy
Standard Application Layer
Protocol
Standard Cryptographic
Protocol
Standard Non-Application
Layer Protocol
Uncommonly Used Port
Web Service
Automated Exfiltration
Data Compressed
Data Encrypted
Data Transfer Size Limits
Exfiltration Over Other
Network Medium
Exfiltration Over Command
and Control Channel
Exfiltration Over Alternative
Protocol
Exfiltration Over
Physical Medium
Scheduled Transfer
Data Destruction
Data Encrypted for Impact
Defacement
Disk Content Wipe
Disk Structure Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Firmware Corruption
Inhibit System Recovery
Network Denial of Service
Resource Hijacking
Runtime Data Manipulation
Service Stop
Stored Data Manipulation
Transmitted Data
Manipulation
Audio Capture
Automated Collection
Clipboard Data
Data from Information
Repositories
Data from Local System
Data from Network
Shared Drive
Data from Removable Media
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man in the Browser
Screen Capture
Video Capture
Drive-by Compromise
Exploit Public-Facing
Application
External Remote Services
Hardware Additions
Replication Through
Removable Media
Spearphishing Attachment
Spearphishing Link
Spearphishing via Service
Supply Chain Compromise
Trusted Relationship
Valid Accounts
AppleScript
CMSTP
Command-Line Interface
Compiled HTML File
Control Panel Items
Dynamic Data Exchange
Execution through API
Execution through
Module Load
Exploitation for
Client Execution
Graphical User Interface
InstallUtil
Mshta
PowerShell
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvr32
Rundll32
Scripting
Service Execution
Signed Binary
Proxy Execution
Signed Script
Proxy Execution
Source
Space after Filename
Third-party Software
Trusted Developer Utilities
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Image File Execution Options Injection
Plist Modification
Valid Accounts
Accessibility Features
AppCert DLLs
AppInit DLLs
Application Shimming
Dylib Hijacking
File System Permissions Weakness
Hooking
Launch Daemon
New Service
Path Interception
Port Monitors
Service Registry Permissions Weakness
Setuid and Setgid
Startup Items
Web Shell
.bash_profile and .bashrc
Account Manipulation
Authentication Package
BITS Jobs
Bootkit
Browser Extensions
Change Default
File Association
Component Firmware
BITS Jobs
Clear Command History
CMSTP
Code Signing
Compiled HTML File
Component Firmware
Component Object Model
Hijacking
Control Panel Items
DCShadow
Deobfuscate/Decode Files
or Information
Disabling Security Tools
DLL Side-Loading
Execution Guardrails
Exploitation for
Defense Evasion
File Deletion
File Permissions
Modification
File System Logical Offsets
Gatekeeper Bypass
Group Policy Modification
Hidden Files and Directories
Hidden Users
Exploitation for
Privilege Escalation
SID-History Injection
Sudo
Sudo Caching
Scheduled Task Binary Padding Network Sniffing
Launchctl
Local Job Scheduling
LSASS Driver
Trap
Access Token Manipulation
Bypass User Account Control
Extra Window Memory Injection
Process Injection
Account Manipulation
Bash History
Brute Force
Credential Dumping
Credentials in Files
Credentials in Registry
Exploitation for
Credential Access
Forced Authentication
Hooking
Input Capture
Input Prompt
Kerberoasting
Keychain
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning
and Relay
Password Filter DLL
Private Keys
Securityd Memory
Two-Factor Authentication
Interception
Account Discovery
Application Window
Discovery
Browser Bookmark
Discovery
Domain Trust Discovery
File and Directory Discovery
Network Service Scanning
Network Share Discovery
Password Policy Discovery
Peripheral Device Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Process Discovery
Query Discovery
Remote System Discovery
Security Software Discovery
System Information
Discovery
System Network
Configuration Discovery
System Network
Connections Discovery
System Owner/User
Discovery
System Service Discovery
System Time Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox
Evasion
Use ATT&CK for Cyber Threat Intelligence
Cyber threat intelligence comes from many sources, including knowledge of past incidents,
commercial threat feeds, information-sharing groups, government threat-sharing programs,
and more. ATT&CK gives analysts a common language to communicate across reports and
organizations, providing a way to structure, compare, and analyze threat intelligence.
Use ATT&CK to Build Your Defensive Platform
ATT&CK includes resources designed to help cyber defenders develop analytics that
detect the techniques used by an adversary. Based on threat intelligence included in
ATT&CK or provided by analysts, cyber defenders can create a comprehensive set of
analytics to detect threats.
Get Started with ATT&CK
Legend
APT28
APT29
Both
Comparing APT28 to APT29
we've chosen 12 of those data sources to show the techniques each of them might be able to detect with the right colle
analytics. Check out our website at attack.mitre.org for more information on how each technique can be detected, and
adversary examples you can use to start detecting adversary behavior with ATT&CK.
You can visualize how your own data sources map to adversary behavior with ATT&CK. Read our blog post at bit.ly/ATT
learn how we generated this diagram, check out the code, and begin building your own diagrams from ATT&CK conten
Initial Access
Drive-by Compromise
Exploit Public-Facing Application
External Remote Services
Hardware Additions
Replication Through Removable
Media
Spearphishing Attachment
Spearphishing Link
Spearphishing via Service
Supply Chain Compromise
Trusted Relationship
Valid Accounts
Execution
AppleScript
CMSTP
Command-Line Interface
Compiled HTML File
Control Panel Items
Dynamic Data Exchange
Execution through API
Execution through Module Load
Exploitation for Client Execution
Graphical User Interface
InstallUtil
Launchctl
Local Job Scheduling
LSASS Driver
Mshta
PowerShell
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvr32
Rundll32
Scheduled Task
Scripting
Service Execution
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
Source
Space after Filename
Third-party Software
Trap
Trusted Developer Utilities
User Execution
Windows Management
Instrumentation
Windows Remote Management
XSL Script Processing
Persistence
.bash_profile and .bashrc
Accessibility Features
Account Manipulation
AppCert DLLs
AppInit DLLs
Application Shimming
Authentication Package
BITS Jobs
Bootkit
Browser Extensions
Change Default File Association
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Create Account
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
External Remote Services
File System Permissions Weakness
Hidden Files and Directories
Hooking
Hypervisor
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Kernel Modules and Extensions
Launch Agent
Launch Daemon
Launchctl
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition
Local Job Scheduling
Login Item
Logon Scripts
LSASS Driver
Modify Existing Service
Netsh Helper DLL
New Service
Office Application Startup
Path Interception
Plist Modification
Port Knocking
Port Monitors
Rc.common
Re-opened Applications
Redundant Access
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Scheduled Task
Screensaver
Security Support Provider
Service Registry Permissions
Weakness
Setuid and Setgid
Shortcut Modification
SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
Startup Items
System Firmware
Systemd Service
Time Providers
Trap
Valid Accounts
Web Shell
Windows Management
Instrumentation Event Subscription
Winlogon Helper DLL
Privilege Escalation
Access Token Manipulation
Accessibility Features
AppCert DLLs
AppInit DLLs
Application Shimming
Bypass User Account Control
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Extra Window Memory Injection
File System Permissions Weakness
Hooking
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Launch Daemon
New Service
Path Interception
Plist Modification
Port Monitors
Process Injection
Scheduled Task
Service Registry Permissions
Weakness
Setuid and Setgid
SID-History Injection
Startup Items
Sudo
Sudo Caching
Valid Accounts
Web Shell
Defense Evasion
Access Token Manipulation
Binary Padding
BITS Jobs
Bypass User Account Control
Clear Command History
CMSTP
Code Signing
Compile After Delivery
Compiled HTML File
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Control Panel Items
DCShadow
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or
Information
Disabling Security Tools
DLL Search Order Hijacking
DLL Side-Loading
Execution Guardrails
Exploitation for Defense Evasion
Extra Window Memory Injection
File Deletion
File Permissions Modification
File System Logical Offsets
Gatekeeper Bypass
Group Policy Modification
Hidden Files and Directories
Hidden Users
Hidden Window
HISTCONTROL
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Indicator Blocking
Indicator Removal from Tools
Indicator Removal on Host
Indirect Command Execution
Install Root Certificate
InstallUtil
Launchctl
LC_MAIN Hijacking
Masquerading
Modify Registry
Mshta
Network Share Connection
Removal
NTFS File Attributes
Obfuscated Files or Information
Plist Modification
Port Knocking
Process Doppelgänging
Process Hollowing
Process Injection
Redundant Access
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvr32
Rootkit
Rundll32
Scripting
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
Software Packing
Space after Filename
Template Injection
Timestomp
Trusted Developer Utilities
Valid Accounts
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Web Service
XSL Script Processing
Credential Access
Account Manipulation
Bash History
Brute Force
Credential Dumping
Credentials in Files
Credentials in Registry
Exploitation for Credential Access
Forced Authentication
Hooking
Input Capture
Input Prompt
Kerberoasting
Keychain
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and
Relay
Network Sniffing
Password Filter DLL
Private Keys
Securityd Memory
Two-Factor Authentication
Interception
Discovery
Account Discovery
Application Window Discovery
Browser Bookmark Discovery
Domain Trust Discovery
File and Directory Discovery
Network Service Scanning
Network Share Discovery
Network Sniffing
Password Policy Discovery
Peripheral Device Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Process Discovery
Query Registry
Remote System Discovery
Security Software Discovery
System Information Discovery
System Network Configuration
Discovery
System Network Connections
Discovery
System Owner/User Discovery
System Service Discovery
System Time Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Lateral Movement
AppleScript
Application Deployment Software
Distributed Component Object
Model
Exploitation of Remote Services
Logon Scripts
Pass the Hash
Pass the Ticket
Remote Desktop Protocol
Remote File Copy
Remote Services
Replication Through Removable
Media
Shared Webroot
SSH Hijacking
Taint Shared Content
Third-party Software
Windows Admin Shares
Windows Remote Management
Collection
Audio Capture
Automated Collection
Clipboard Data
Data from Information Repositories
Data from Local System
Data from Network Shared Drive
Data from Removable Media
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man in the Browser
Screen Capture
Video Capture
Command And Control
Commonly Used Port
Communication Through
Removable Media
Connection Proxy
Custom Command and Control
Protocol
Custom Cryptographic Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Domain Fronting
Domain Generation Algorithms
Fallback Channels
Multi-hop Proxy
Multi-Stage Channels
Multiband Communication
Multilayer Encryption
Port Knocking
Remote Access Tools
Remote File Copy
Standard Application Layer Protocol
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
Standard Non-Application Layer
Protocol
Uncommonly Used Port
Web Service
Exfiltration
Automated Exfiltration
Data Compressed
Data Encrypted
Data Transfer Size Limits
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Exfiltration Over Command and
Control Channel
Exfiltration Over Other Network
Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Scheduled Transfer
Impact
Data Destruction
Data Encrypted for Impact
Defacement
Disk Content Wipe
Disk Structure Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Firmware Corruption
Inhibit System Recovery
Network Denial of Service
Resource Hijacking
Runtime Data Manipulation
Service Stop
Stored Data Manipulation
Transmitted Data Manipulation
Initial Access
Drive-by Compromise
Exploit Public-Facing Application
External Remote Services
Hardware Additions
Replication Through Removable
Media
Spearphishing Attachment
Spearphishing Link
Spearphishing via Service
Supply Chain Compromise
Trusted Relationship
Valid Accounts
Execution
AppleScript
CMSTP
Command-Line Interface
Compiled HTML File
Control Panel Items
Dynamic Data Exchange
Execution through API
Execution through Module Load
Exploitation for Client Execution
Graphical User Interface
InstallUtil
Launchctl
Local Job Scheduling
LSASS Driver
Mshta
PowerShell
Persistence
.bash_profile and .bashrc
Accessibility Features
Account Manipulation
AppCert DLLs
AppInit DLLs
Application Shimming
Authentication Package
BITS Jobs
Bootkit
Browser Extensions
Change Default File Association
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Create Account
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
Privilege Escalation
Access Token Manipulation
Accessibility Features
AppCert DLLs
AppInit DLLs
Application Shimming
Bypass User Account Control
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Extra Window Memory Injection
File System Permissions Weakness
Hooking
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Launch Daemon
New Service
Path Interception
Defense Evasion
Access Token Manipulation
Binary Padding
BITS Jobs
Bypass User Account Control
Clear Command History
CMSTP
Code Signing
Compile After Delivery
Compiled HTML File
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Control Panel Items
DCShadow
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or
Information
Disabling Security Tools
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Credential Access
Account Manipulation
Bash History
Brute Force
Credential Dumping
Credentials in Files
Credentials in Registry
Exploitation for Credential Access
Forced Authentication
Hooking
Input Capture
Input Prompt
Kerberoasting
Keychain
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and
Relay
Network Sniffing
Password Filter DLL
Discovery
Account Discovery
Application Window Discovery
Browser Bookmark Discovery
Domain Trust Discovery
File and Directory Discovery
Network Service Scanning
Network Share Discovery
Network Sniffing
Password Policy Discovery
Peripheral Device Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Process Discovery
Query Registry
Remote System Discovery
Security Software Discovery
System Information Discovery
Lateral Movement
AppleScript
Application Deployment Software
Distributed Component Object
Model
Exploitation of Remote Services
Logon Scripts
Pass the Hash
Pass the Ticket
Remote Desktop Protocol
Remote File Copy
Remote Services
Replication Through Removable
Media
Shared Webroot
SSH Hijacking
Taint Shared Content
Third-party Software
Windows Admin Shares
Collection
Audio Capture
Automated Collection
Clipboard Data
Data from Information Repositories
Data from Local System
Data from Network Shared Drive
Data from Removable Media
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man in the Browser
Screen Capture
Video Capture
Command And Control
Commonly Used Port
Communication Through
Removable Media
Connection Proxy
Custom Command and Control
Protocol
Custom Cryptographic Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Domain Fronting
Domain Generation Algorithms
Fallback Channels
Multi-hop Proxy
Multi-Stage Channels
Multiband Communication
Multilayer Encryption
Port Knocking
Remote Access Tools
Exfiltration
Automated Exfiltration
Data Compressed
Data Encrypted
Data Transfer Size Limits
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Exfiltration Over Command and
Control Channel
Exfiltration Over Other Network
Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Scheduled Transfer
Impact
Data Destruction
Data Encrypted for Impact
Defacement
Disk Content Wipe
Disk Structure Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Firmware Corruption
Inhibit System Recovery
Network Denial of Service
Resource Hijacking
Runtime Data Manipulation
Service Stop
Stored Data Manipulation
Transmitted Data Manipulation
ob
stan
Use ATT&CK to Build Your Defensive Platform
ATT&CK includes resources designed to help cyber defenders develop analytics that
detect the techniques used by an adversary. Based on threat intelligence included in
ATT&CK or provided by analysts, cyber defenders can create a comprehensive set of
analytics to detect threats.
Legend
APT28
APT29
Both
Legend
Low Priority
High Priority
Comparing APT28 to APT29
Finding Gaps in Defense
Drive-by Compromise
Exploit Public-Facing Application
External Remote Services
Hardware Additions
Replication Through Removable
Media
Spearphishing Attachment
Spearphishing Link
Spearphishing via Service
Supply Chain Compromise
Trusted Relationship
Valid Accounts
AppleScript
CMSTP
Command-Line Interface
Compiled HTML File
Control Panel Items
Dynamic Data Exchange
Execution through API
Execution through Module Load
Exploitation for Client Execution
Graphical User Interface
InstallUtil
Launchctl
Local Job Scheduling
LSASS Driver
Mshta
PowerShell
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvr32
Rundll32
Scheduled Task
Scripting
Service Execution
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
Source
Space after Filename
Third-party Software
Trap
Trusted Developer Utilities
User Execution
Windows Management
Instrumentation
Windows Remote Management
XSL Script Processing
.bash_profile and .bashrc
Accessibility Features
Account Manipulation
AppCert DLLs
AppInit DLLs
Application Shimming
Authentication Package
BITS Jobs
Bootkit
Browser Extensions
Change Default File Association
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Create Account
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
External Remote Services
File System Permissions Weakness
Hidden Files and Directories
Hooking
Hypervisor
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Kernel Modules and Extensions
Launch Agent
Launch Daemon
Launchctl
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition
Local Job Scheduling
Login Item
Logon Scripts
LSASS Driver
Modify Existing Service
Netsh Helper DLL
New Service
Office Application Startup
Path Interception
Plist Modification
Port Knocking
Port Monitors
Rc.common
Re-opened Applications
Redundant Access
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Scheduled Task
Screensaver
Security Support Provider
Service Registry Permissions
Weakness
Setuid and Setgid
Shortcut Modification
SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
Startup Items
System Firmware
Systemd Service
Time Providers
Trap
Valid Accounts
Web Shell
Windows Management
Instrumentation Event Subscription
Winlogon Helper DLL
Access Token Manipulation
Accessibility Features
AppCert DLLs
AppInit DLLs
Application Shimming
Bypass User Account Control
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Extra Window Memory Injection
File System Permissions Weakness
Hooking
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Launch Daemon
New Service
Path Interception
Plist Modification
Port Monitors
Process Injection
Scheduled Task
Service Registry Permissions
Weakness
Setuid and Setgid
SID-History Injection
Startup Items
Sudo
Sudo Caching
Valid Accounts
Web Shell
Access Token Manipulation
Binary Padding
BITS Jobs
Bypass User Account Control
Clear Command History
CMSTP
Code Signing
Compile After Delivery
Compiled HTML File
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Control Panel Items
DCShadow
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or
Information
Disabling Security Tools
DLL Search Order Hijacking
DLL Side-Loading
Execution Guardrails
Exploitation for Defense Evasion
Extra Window Memory Injection
File Deletion
File Permissions Modification
File System Logical Offsets
Gatekeeper Bypass
Group Policy Modification
Hidden Files and Directories
Hidden Users
Hidden Window
HISTCONTROL
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Indicator Blocking
Indicator Removal from Tools
Indicator Removal on Host
Indirect Command Execution
Install Root Certificate
InstallUtil
Launchctl
LC_MAIN Hijacking
Masquerading
Modify Registry
Mshta
Network Share Connection
Removal
NTFS File Attributes
Obfuscated Files or Information
Plist Modification
Port Knocking
Process Doppelgänging
Process Hollowing
Process Injection
Redundant Access
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvr32
Rootkit
Rundll32
Scripting
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
Software Packing
Space after Filename
Template Injection
Timestomp
Trusted Developer Utilities
Valid Accounts
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Web Service
XSL Script Processing
Account Manipulation
Bash History
Brute Force
Credential Dumping
Credentials in Files
Credentials in Registry
Exploitation for Credential Access
Forced Authentication
Hooking
Input Capture
Input Prompt
Kerberoasting
Keychain
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and
Relay
Network Sniffing
Password Filter DLL
Private Keys
Securityd Memory
Two-Factor Authentication
Interception
Account Discovery
Application Window Discovery
Browser Bookmark Discovery
Domain Trust Discovery
File and Directory Discovery
Network Service Scanning
Network Share Discovery
Network Sniffing
Password Policy Discovery
Peripheral Device Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Process Discovery
Query Registry
Remote System Discovery
Security Software Discovery
System Information Discovery
System Network Configuration
Discovery
System Network Connections
Discovery
System Owner/User Discovery
System Service Discovery
System Time Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
AppleScript
Application Deployment Software
Distributed Component Object
Model
Exploitation of Remote Services
Logon Scripts
Pass the Hash
Pass the Ticket
Remote Desktop Protocol
Remote File Copy
Remote Services
Replication Through Removable
Media
Shared Webroot
SSH Hijacking
Taint Shared Content
Third-party Software
Windows Admin Shares
Windows Remote Management
Audio Capture
Automated Collection
Clipboard Data
Data from Information Repositories
Data from Local System
Data from Network Shared Drive
Data from Removable Media
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man in the Browser
Screen Capture
Video Capture
Commonly Used Port
Communication Through
Removable Media
Connection Proxy
Custom Command and Control
Protocol
Custom Cryptographic Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Domain Fronting
Domain Generation Algorithms
Fallback Channels
Multi-hop Proxy
Multi-Stage Channels
Multiband Communication
Multilayer Encryption
Port Knocking
Remote Access Tools
Remote File Copy
Standard Application Layer Protocol
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
Standard Non-Application Layer
Protocol
Uncommonly Used Port
Web Service
Automated Exfiltration
Data Compressed
Data Encrypted
Data Transfer Size Limits
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Exfiltration Over Command and
Control Channel
Exfiltration Over Other Network
Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Scheduled Transfer
Data Destruction
Data Encrypted for Impact
Defacement
Disk Content Wipe
Disk Structure Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Firmware Corruption
Inhibit System Recovery
Network Denial of Service
Resource Hijacking
Runtime Data Manipulation
Service Stop
Stored Data Manipulation
Transmitted Data Manipulation
Initial Access
Drive-by Compromise
Exploit Public-Facing Application
External Remote Services
Hardware Additions
Replication Through Removable
Media
Spearphishing Attachment
Spearphishing Link
Spearphishing via Service
Supply Chain Compromise
Trusted Relationship
Valid Accounts
Execution
AppleScript
CMSTP
Command-Line Interface
Compiled HTML File
Control Panel Items
Dynamic Data Exchange
Execution through API
Execution through Module Load
Exploitation for Client Execution
Graphical User Interface
InstallUtil
Launchctl
Local Job Scheduling
LSASS Driver
Mshta
PowerShell
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvr32
Rundll32
Scheduled Task
Scripting
Service Execution
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
Source
Space after Filename
Third-party Software
Trap
Trusted Developer Utilities
User Execution
Windows Management
Instrumentation
Windows Remote Management
XSL Script Processing
Persistence
.bash_profile and .bashrc
Accessibility Features
Account Manipulation
AppCert DLLs
AppInit DLLs
Application Shimming
Authentication Package
BITS Jobs
Bootkit
Browser Extensions
Change Default File Association
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Create Account
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
External Remote Services
File System Permissions Weakness
Hidden Files and Directories
Hooking
Hypervisor
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Kernel Modules and Extensions
Launch Agent
Launch Daemon
Launchctl
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition
Local Job Scheduling
Login Item
Logon Scripts
LSASS Driver
Modify Existing Service
Netsh Helper DLL
New Service
Office Application Startup
Path Interception
Plist Modification
Port Knocking
Port Monitors
Rc.common
Re-opened Applications
Redundant Access
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Scheduled Task
Screensaver
Security Support Provider
Service Registry Permissions
Weakness
Setuid and Setgid
Privilege Escalation
Access Token Manipulation
Accessibility Features
AppCert DLLs
AppInit DLLs
Application Shimming
Bypass User Account Control
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Extra Window Memory Injection
File System Permissions Weakness
Hooking
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Launch Daemon
New Service
Path Interception
Plist Modification
Port Monitors
Process Injection
Scheduled Task
Service Registry Permissions
Weakness
Setuid and Setgid
SID-History Injection
Startup Items
Sudo
Sudo Caching
Valid Accounts
Web Shell
Defense Evasion
Access Token Manipulation
Binary Padding
BITS Jobs
Bypass User Account Control
Clear Command History
CMSTP
Code Signing
Compile After Delivery
Compiled HTML File
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Control Panel Items
DCShadow
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or
Information
Disabling Security Tools
DLL Search Order Hijacking
DLL Side-Loading
Execution Guardrails
Exploitation for Defense Evasion
Extra Window Memory Injection
File Deletion
File Permissions Modification
File System Logical Offsets
Gatekeeper Bypass
Group Policy Modification
Hidden Files and Directories
Hidden Users
Hidden Window
HISTCONTROL
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Indicator Blocking
Indicator Removal from Tools
Indicator Removal on Host
Indirect Command Execution
Install Root Certificate
InstallUtil
Launchctl
LC_MAIN Hijacking
Masquerading
Modify Registry
Mshta
Network Share Connection
Removal
NTFS File Attributes
Obfuscated Files or Information
Plist Modification
Port Knocking
Process Doppelgänging
Process Hollowing
Credential Access
Account Manipulation
Bash History
Brute Force
Credential Dumping
Credentials in Files
Credentials in Registry
Exploitation for Credential Access
Forced Authentication
Hooking
Input Capture
Input Prompt
Kerberoasting
Keychain
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and
Relay
Network Sniffing
Password Filter DLL
Private Keys
Securityd Memory
Two-Factor Authentication
Interception
Discovery
Account Discovery
Application Window Discovery
Browser Bookmark Discovery
Domain Trust Discovery
File and Directory Discovery
Network Service Scanning
Network Share Discovery
Network Sniffing
Password Policy Discovery
Peripheral Device Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Process Discovery
Query Registry
Remote System Discovery
Security Software Discovery
System Information Discovery
System Network Configuration
Discovery
System Network Connections
Discovery
System Owner/User Discovery
System Service Discovery
System Time Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Lateral Movement
AppleScript
Application Deployment Software
Distributed Component Object
Model
Exploitation of Remote Services
Logon Scripts
Pass the Hash
Pass the Ticket
Remote Desktop Protocol
Remote File Copy
Remote Services
Replication Through Removable
Media
Shared Webroot
SSH Hijacking
Taint Shared Content
Third-party Software
Windows Admin Shares
Windows Remote Management
Collection
Audio Capture
Automated Collection
Clipboard Data
Data from Information Repositories
Data from Local System
Data from Network Shared Drive
Data from Removable Media
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man in the Browser
Screen Capture
Video Capture
Command And Control
Commonly Used Port
Communication Through
Removable Media
Connection Proxy
Custom Command and Control
Protocol
Custom Cryptographic Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Domain Fronting
Domain Generation Algorithms
Fallback Channels
Multi-hop Proxy
Multi-Stage Channels
Multiband Communication
Multilayer Encryption
Port Knocking
Remote Access Tools
Remote File Copy
Standard Application Layer Protocol
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
Standard Non-Application Layer
Protocol
Uncommonly Used Port
Web Service
Exfiltration
Automated Exfiltration
Data Compressed
Data Encrypted
Data Transfer Size Limits
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Exfiltration Over Command and
Control Channel
Exfiltration Over Other Network
Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Scheduled Transfer
Impact
Data Destruction
Data Encrypted for Impact
Defacement
Disk Content Wipe
Disk Structure Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Firmware Corruption
Inhibit System Recovery
Network Denial of Service
Resource Hijacking
Runtime Data Manipulation
Service Stop
Stored Data Manipulation
Transmitted Data Manipulation
malwarerever
net
work device logs
network intrusion detection system
ssl/tls inspection
system
calls
windowseventlogs
ocol
compromise
point denial of service
network denial of service
obfuscated files or information
remote access tools
spearphishing attachment
standard non-application layer protocoltemplate injection
domain fronting
drive-by compromise
endpoint denial of service
install root certificate
obfuscated files or information
spearphishing link
spearphishing via service
standard cryptographic protocol
web service
applescript
application shimming
browser extensions
bypass user account control
exploitation for client execution
hypervisor
kernel modules and extensions
keychain
rootkit
account manipulation
bits jobs
cm
stp
em
s
ATT&CK Threat Intelligence Use Cases
§ Structuring threat intelligence with ATT&CK allows us to
– Compare behaviors
– Communicate in a common language
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 5 |
Compare Groups to Each Other
| 6 |
*from open source
reporting we’ve mapped
APT28*
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
Compare Groups to Each Other
| 7 |
APT29
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
Compare Groups to Each Other
| 8 |
APT28
APT29
Both groups Prioritize!
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
Compare Groups to Defenses
| 9 |
Overlay known defensive gaps
APT28
APT29
Both groups
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
Compare Groups Over Time
| 10 |
Notional group in 2018
Same group in 2019…why did
we not see these techniques?
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
Communicate to Defenders
| 11 |
CTI
Analyst Defender
Registry Run Keys
/ Startup Folder
(T1060)
THIS is what the
adversary is doing!
The Run key is
AdobeUpdater.
Oh, we have
Registry data, we
can detect that!
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
Communicate Across the Community
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 12 |
CTI Consumer
Registry Run Keys
/ Startup Folder
(T1060)
Oh, you
mean T1060!
APT1337 is
using autorun
FUZZYDUCK
used a Run key
Company
A
Company
B
...but how do I structure intel in ATT&CK so
I can apply it to these use cases?
| 21 |
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
Process of Mapping to ATT&CK
0. Understand ATT&CK
1. Find the behavior
2. Research the behavior
3. Translate the behavior into a tactic
4. Figure out what technique applies to the behavior
5. Compare your results to other analysts
Two key sources for where you get information:
1. Finished reporting
2. Raw data
| 22 |
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
0. Understand ATT&CK
§ You need to know what to look for before you can do this
§ To get analysts started:
– Watch an ATT&CK presentation
– Read the Philosophy Paper and Getting Started page
– Read ATT&CK 101 Blog Post
– Read the Tactic descriptions
– Skim the Technique list (there are 252+…)
§ Encourage ongoing learning and discussion
– Have analysts present a technique a week in your team training
| 23 |
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
1. Find the Behavior
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
§ Different mindset from looking for indicators
§ Look for what the adversary or software does
§ Focus on initial compromise and post-compromise details
– Info that may not be useful for ATT&CK mapping:
§ Static malware analysis
§ Infrastructure registration information
§ Industry/victim targeting information
1. Find the Behavior
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation_doubletap.html
Tactic? Technique? Tactic? Technique?
2. Research the Behavior
| 26 |
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
§ CTI analysts may not be familiar with adversary/software behavior
§ Encourage them to do additional research:
– Of your own team or organization (defenders/red teamers)
– Of external resources
§ Time-consuming, but builds better analysts
§ Understanding of core behavior helps with next steps
2. Research the Behavior
| 27 |
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SOCKS
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
2. Research the Behavior
| 28 |
https://www.speedguide.net/port.php?port=1913?
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
3. Translate the Behavior into a Tactic
§ What is the adversary trying to accomplish?
§ Often requires domain expertise
– Finished intel can give you context
| 29 |
§ Only 12 options:
– Initial Access
– Execution
– Persistence
– Privilege Escalation
– Defense Evasion
– Credential Access
– Discovery
– Lateral Movement
– Collection
– Command and Control
– Exfiltration
– Impact
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
3. Translate the Behavior into a Tactic
§ “When executed, the malware first establishes a SOCKS5
connection to 192.157.198.103 using TCP port 1913. … Once
the connection to the server is established, the malware
expects a message containing at least three bytes from the
server. These first three bytes are the command identifier. The
following commands are supported by the malware … “
– A connection in order to command the malware to do something
à Command and Control
| 30 |
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
4. Figure Out What Technique Applies
§ Often the toughest part
§ Not every behavior is necessarily a technique
§ Key strategies:
1. Look at the list of Techniques for the identified Tactic
2. Search attack.mitre.org
§ Try key words
§ Try “procedure”-level detail
§ Try specific command strings
| 31 |
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
4. Figure Out What Technique Applies
| 32 |
Protocol vs.
Port
à 2 techniques?
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
4. Figure Out What Technique Applies
| 33 |
“the malware first establishes a SOCKS5 connection”
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
4. Figure Out What Technique Applies
| 34 |
“establishes a SOCKS5 connection to
192.157.198.103 using TCP port 1913”
“CTRL+ F” FTW
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
Rinse and Repeat
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation_doubletap.html
Privilege Escalation - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068)
Execution - Command-Line Interface (T1059)
Discovery - System Owner/User Discovery (T1033)
Persistence – Scheduled Task (T1053)
Command and Control - Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol (T1095)
Command and Control -
Uncommonly Used Port (T1065)
Technique Mapping Work Available from ATT&CK
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 14 |
“Procedure Examples” for Techniques
“Techniques Used” for Software and Groups
5 years of reviewing and mapping
~400 report sources
Only freely-available public reporting
Biases in ATT&CK’s Mapped Data
§ Important to understand and state our biases in CTI
§ Two kinds of bias in technique examples in ATT&CK
– Bias introduced by us
– Bias inherent in the sources we use
§ Understanding these is the first step in properly leveraging this data
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 15 |
Security
Vendors
92%
Press
Reports
5%
Publicly-
available
Government
Reports
3%
Our Biases: Sources We Select
| 16 |
From reports used
for technique examples
in ATT&CK Groups
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
Our Biases: Availability Bias
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 17 |
All Possible
Techniques
Techniques
We
Remember
Our Biases: Novelty Bias
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 18 |
Yet another
FUZZYDUCK
using Powershell
report
APT1337
Using
Transmitted
Data
Manipulation
Source Biases: Availability Bias
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 19 |
All Possible
Behaviors/
Groups
Familiar
Behaviors/
Groups
Source Biases: Novelty Bias
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 20 |
Another APT1337
Report
APT1338
Report!!!
Source Biases: Victim Bias
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 21 |
Victim 4
Victim 5Victim 3
Victim 2
Victim 1
Source Biases: Visibility Bias
| 22 |
Visible
Disk
Forensics
Network
Flows
Process
Execution
Powershell
Registry
Monitoring
Decoded
C2
Not Seen
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
Source Biases: Production Bias
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 23 |
Operation Snakepit
APT1337 Report
Operation Brown Fox
APT1338 Report
Ducks in the Wild
FUZZYDUCK Report
Source 1 Source 2
How Do We Deal With These Biases?
§ Know that they exist
– Once you know them, you can
better determine what is real
data vs. your biases
§ Be honest and explain them
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 24|
Tenor.com
Hedging Our Biases
§ Work together
– Diversity of thought makes for stronger teams
§ Adjust and calibrate your data sources
§ Add different data sources (including your own)
§ Remember we’re prioritizing the known over the unknown
– As opposed to absolute comparison
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 25 |
Now that you know those biases, here’s
your imperfect data!
| 26 |
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
1. Remote File Copy
2. Standard App Layer Protocol
3. System Information Discovery
4. Command-Line Interface
5. Obfuscated Files or Information
6. File and Directory Discovery
7. Registry Run Key/Startup Folder
8. File Deletion
9. Process Discovery
10. System Network Config Discovery
11. Scripting
12. Screen Capture
13. System Owner/User Discovery
14. Input Capture
15. Credential Dumping
16. Commonly Used Port
17. PowerShell
18. Standard Crypto Protocol
19. Masquerading
20. Scheduled Task
Top 20 Techniques from ATT&CK Group/Software Data
Why are certain techniques listed? --> Calibrate by source
| 27 |
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
Where is Spearphishing? Know your biases + work with others
Process for Making Recommendations from Techniques
| 29 |
5. Make recommendations
4. Determine what tradeoffs are for org on specific options
3. Research organizational capability/constraints
2. Research defensive options related to technique
1. Research how techniques are being used
0. Determine priority techniques
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
Initial Access Execution Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Credential Access Discovery Lateral Movement Collection Command and Control Exfiltration Impact
Drive-by Compromise Scheduled Task Binary Padding Network Sniffing AppleScript Audio Capture Commonly Used Port Automated Exfiltration Data Destruction
Exploit Public-Facing
Application
Launchctl Access Token Manipulation Account Manipulation Account Discovery Application Deployment
Software
Automated Collection Communication Through
Removable Media
Data Compressed Data Encrypted for Impact
Local Job Scheduling Bypass User Account Control Bash History Application Window
Discovery
Clipboard Data Data Encrypted Defacement
External Remote Services LSASS Driver Extra Window Memory Injection Brute Force Distributed Component
Object Model
Data from Information
Repositories
Connection Proxy Data Transfer Size Limits Disk Content Wipe
Hardware Additions Trap Process Injection Credential Dumping Browser Bookmark
Discovery
Custom Command and
Control Protocol
Exfiltration Over Other
Network Medium
Disk Structure Wipe
Replication Through
Removable Media
AppleScript DLL Search Order Hijacking Credentials in Files Exploitation of
Remote Services
Data from Local System Endpoint Denial of Service
CMSTP Image File Execution Options Injection Credentials in Registry Domain Trust Discovery Data from Network
Shared Drive
Custom Cryptographic
Protocol
Exfiltration Over Command
and Control Channel
Firmware Corruption
Spearphishing Attachment Command-Line Interface Plist Modification Exploitation for
Credential Access
File and Directory Discovery Logon Scripts Inhibit System Recovery
Spearphishing Link Compiled HTML File Valid Accounts Network Service Scanning Pass the Hash Data from Removable Media Data Encoding Exfiltration Over Alternative
Protocol
Network Denial of Service
Spearphishing via Service Control Panel Items Accessibility Features BITS Jobs Forced Authentication Network Share Discovery Pass the Ticket Data Staged Data Obfuscation Resource Hijacking
Supply Chain Compromise Dynamic Data Exchange AppCert DLLs Clear Command History Hooking Password Policy Discovery Remote Desktop Protocol Email Collection Domain Fronting Exfiltration Over
Physical Medium
Runtime Data Manipulation
Trusted Relationship Execution through API AppInit DLLs CMSTP Input Capture Peripheral Device Discovery Remote File Copy Input Capture Domain Generation
Algorithms
Service Stop
Valid Accounts Execution through
Module Load
Application Shimming Code Signing Input Prompt Permission Groups Discovery Remote Services Man in the Browser Scheduled Transfer Stored Data Manipulation
Dylib Hijacking Compiled HTML File Kerberoasting Process Discovery Replication Through
Removable Media
Screen Capture Fallback Channels Transmitted Data
ManipulationExploitation for
Client Execution
File System Permissions Weakness Component Firmware Keychain Query Registry Video Capture Multiband Communication
Hooking Component Object Model
Hijacking
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning
and Relay
Remote System Discovery Shared Webroot Multi-hop Proxy
Graphical User Interface Launch Daemon Security Software Discovery SSH Hijacking Multilayer Encryption
InstallUtil New Service Control Panel Items Password Filter DLL System Information
Discovery
Taint Shared Content Multi-Stage Channels
Mshta Path Interception DCShadow Private Keys Third-party Software Port Knocking
PowerShell Port Monitors Deobfuscate/Decode Files
or Information
Securityd Memory System Network
Configuration Discovery
Windows Admin Shares Remote Access Tools
Regsvcs/Regasm Service Registry Permissions Weakness Two-Factor Authentication
Interception
Windows Remote
Management
Remote File Copy
Regsvr32 Setuid and Setgid Disabling Security Tools System Network
Connections Discovery
Standard Application Layer
ProtocolRundll32 Startup Items DLL Side-Loading
Scripting Web Shell Execution Guardrails System Owner/User
Discovery
Standard Cryptographic
ProtocolService Execution .bash_profile and .bashrc Exploitation for
Privilege Escalation
Exploitation for
Defense EvasionSigned Binary
Proxy Execution
Account Manipulation System Service Discovery Standard Non-Application
Layer ProtocolAuthentication Package SID-History Injection File Deletion System Time Discovery
Signed Script
Proxy Execution
BITS Jobs Sudo File Permissions
Modification
Virtualization/Sandbox
Evasion
Uncommonly Used Port
Bootkit Sudo Caching Web Service
Source Browser Extensions File System Logical Offsets
Space after Filename Change Default
File Association
Gatekeeper Bypass
Third-party Software Group Policy Modification
Trusted Developer Utilities Component Firmware Hidden Files and Directories
User Execution Component Object
Model Hijacking
Hidden Users
Windows Management
Instrumentation
Hidden Window
Create Account HISTCONTROL
Windows Remote
Management
External Remote Services Indicator Blocking
Hidden Files and Directories Indicator Removal
from ToolsXSL Script Processing Hypervisor
Kernel Modules
and Extensions
Indicator Removal on Host
Indirect Command Execution
Launch Agent Install Root Certificate
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition InstallUtil
Login Item Launchctl
Logon Scripts LC_MAIN Hijacking
Modify Existing Service Masquerading
Netsh Helper DLL Modify Registry
Office Application Startup Mshta
Port Knocking Network Share Connection
RemovalRc.common
Redundant Access NTFS File Attributes
Registry Run
Keys / Startup Folder
Obfuscated Files
or Information
Re-opened Applications Port Knocking
Screensaver Process Doppelgänging
Security Support Provider Process Hollowing
Shortcut Modification Redundant Access
SIP and Trust Provider
Hijacking
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvr32
Many Types of Recommendations
Legend
High Confidence of Detection
Some Confidence of Detection
Low Confidence of Detection
© 2019 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.
Prioritized Technique
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
We’ll tackle Spearphishing Attachment and
Spearphishing Link via new user training
Supply Chain Compromise and Component Firmware
are beyond our capability and resources to stop or detect,
so we’ll accept the risk
None of our existing tools have visibility into
Command-Line Interface so we’ll need to
obtain something new
Takeaways
§ Use ATT&CK for cyber threat intelligence to help you…
– Compare behaviors
– Communicate in a common language
§ Know the biases involved with mapping CTI reporting to ATT&CK
§ Hedge those biases and use ATT&CK-mapped CTI to improve defenses
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
| 30 |
| 31 |
https://attack.mitre.org
attack@mitre.org
@MITREattack
Adam Pennington
@_whatshisface
Katie Nickels
@likethecoins
©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
These slides available at: http://bit.ly/kcnagp-d19

More Related Content

What's hot

Introduction to MITRE ATT&CK
Introduction to MITRE ATT&CKIntroduction to MITRE ATT&CK
Introduction to MITRE ATT&CKArpan Raval
 
Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK: Enhancing Operations Through the Tracking of Interac...
Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK: Enhancing Operations Through the Tracking of Interac...Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK: Enhancing Operations Through the Tracking of Interac...
Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK: Enhancing Operations Through the Tracking of Interac...MITRE ATT&CK
 
0wn-premises: Bypassing Microsoft Defender for Identity
0wn-premises: Bypassing Microsoft Defender for Identity0wn-premises: Bypassing Microsoft Defender for Identity
0wn-premises: Bypassing Microsoft Defender for IdentityNikhil Mittal
 
The difference between Cybersecurity and Information Security
The difference between Cybersecurity and Information SecurityThe difference between Cybersecurity and Information Security
The difference between Cybersecurity and Information SecurityPECB
 
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting season
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting seasonThreat hunting - Every day is hunting season
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting seasonBen Boyd
 
Evolution of Offensive Testing - ATT&CK-based Adversary Emulation Plans
Evolution of Offensive Testing - ATT&CK-based Adversary Emulation PlansEvolution of Offensive Testing - ATT&CK-based Adversary Emulation Plans
Evolution of Offensive Testing - ATT&CK-based Adversary Emulation PlansChristopher Korban
 
Threat Exposure Management - Reduce your Risk of a Breach
Threat Exposure Management - Reduce your Risk of a BreachThreat Exposure Management - Reduce your Risk of a Breach
Threat Exposure Management - Reduce your Risk of a BreachRahul Neel Mani
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Hunters ATT&CKing with the Data, Roberto Rodriguez, Spe...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Hunters ATT&CKing with the Data, Roberto Rodriguez, Spe...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Hunters ATT&CKing with the Data, Roberto Rodriguez, Spe...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Hunters ATT&CKing with the Data, Roberto Rodriguez, Spe...MITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
Threat hunting 101 by Sandeep Singh
Threat hunting 101 by Sandeep SinghThreat hunting 101 by Sandeep Singh
Threat hunting 101 by Sandeep SinghOWASP Delhi
 
TA505: A Study of High End Big Game Hunting in 2020
TA505: A Study of High End Big Game Hunting in 2020TA505: A Study of High End Big Game Hunting in 2020
TA505: A Study of High End Big Game Hunting in 2020MITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
Network security - Defense in Depth
Network security - Defense in DepthNetwork security - Defense in Depth
Network security - Defense in DepthDilum Bandara
 
MITRE ATT&CK framework
MITRE ATT&CK frameworkMITRE ATT&CK framework
MITRE ATT&CK frameworkBhushan Gurav
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: ATT&CK as a Teacher, Travis Smith, Tripwire
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: ATT&CK as a Teacher, Travis Smith, TripwireMITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: ATT&CK as a Teacher, Travis Smith, Tripwire
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: ATT&CK as a Teacher, Travis Smith, TripwireMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITRE
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITREMITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITRE
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITREMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
The ATT&CK Latin American APT Playbook
The ATT&CK Latin American APT PlaybookThe ATT&CK Latin American APT Playbook
The ATT&CK Latin American APT PlaybookMITRE ATT&CK
 
MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01
MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01
MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01Michael Gough
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Lessons in Purple Team Testing with MITRE ATT&CK; Daniel...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Lessons in Purple Team Testing with MITRE ATT&CK; Daniel...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Lessons in Purple Team Testing with MITRE ATT&CK; Daniel...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Lessons in Purple Team Testing with MITRE ATT&CK; Daniel...MITRE - ATT&CKcon
 

What's hot (20)

Introduction to MITRE ATT&CK
Introduction to MITRE ATT&CKIntroduction to MITRE ATT&CK
Introduction to MITRE ATT&CK
 
Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK: Enhancing Operations Through the Tracking of Interac...
Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK: Enhancing Operations Through the Tracking of Interac...Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK: Enhancing Operations Through the Tracking of Interac...
Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK: Enhancing Operations Through the Tracking of Interac...
 
0wn-premises: Bypassing Microsoft Defender for Identity
0wn-premises: Bypassing Microsoft Defender for Identity0wn-premises: Bypassing Microsoft Defender for Identity
0wn-premises: Bypassing Microsoft Defender for Identity
 
The difference between Cybersecurity and Information Security
The difference between Cybersecurity and Information SecurityThe difference between Cybersecurity and Information Security
The difference between Cybersecurity and Information Security
 
MITRE ATT&CK Framework
MITRE ATT&CK FrameworkMITRE ATT&CK Framework
MITRE ATT&CK Framework
 
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting season
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting seasonThreat hunting - Every day is hunting season
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting season
 
Evolution of Offensive Testing - ATT&CK-based Adversary Emulation Plans
Evolution of Offensive Testing - ATT&CK-based Adversary Emulation PlansEvolution of Offensive Testing - ATT&CK-based Adversary Emulation Plans
Evolution of Offensive Testing - ATT&CK-based Adversary Emulation Plans
 
Threat Exposure Management - Reduce your Risk of a Breach
Threat Exposure Management - Reduce your Risk of a BreachThreat Exposure Management - Reduce your Risk of a Breach
Threat Exposure Management - Reduce your Risk of a Breach
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Hunters ATT&CKing with the Data, Roberto Rodriguez, Spe...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Hunters ATT&CKing with the Data, Roberto Rodriguez, Spe...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Hunters ATT&CKing with the Data, Roberto Rodriguez, Spe...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Hunters ATT&CKing with the Data, Roberto Rodriguez, Spe...
 
Threat hunting 101 by Sandeep Singh
Threat hunting 101 by Sandeep SinghThreat hunting 101 by Sandeep Singh
Threat hunting 101 by Sandeep Singh
 
Evolving Cybersecurity Threats
Evolving Cybersecurity Threats  Evolving Cybersecurity Threats
Evolving Cybersecurity Threats
 
TA505: A Study of High End Big Game Hunting in 2020
TA505: A Study of High End Big Game Hunting in 2020TA505: A Study of High End Big Game Hunting in 2020
TA505: A Study of High End Big Game Hunting in 2020
 
Network security - Defense in Depth
Network security - Defense in DepthNetwork security - Defense in Depth
Network security - Defense in Depth
 
MITRE ATT&CK framework
MITRE ATT&CK frameworkMITRE ATT&CK framework
MITRE ATT&CK framework
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: ATT&CK as a Teacher, Travis Smith, Tripwire
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: ATT&CK as a Teacher, Travis Smith, TripwireMITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: ATT&CK as a Teacher, Travis Smith, Tripwire
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: ATT&CK as a Teacher, Travis Smith, Tripwire
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITRE
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITREMITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITRE
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITRE
 
The ATT&CK Latin American APT Playbook
The ATT&CK Latin American APT PlaybookThe ATT&CK Latin American APT Playbook
The ATT&CK Latin American APT Playbook
 
MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01
MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01
MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Lessons in Purple Team Testing with MITRE ATT&CK; Daniel...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Lessons in Purple Team Testing with MITRE ATT&CK; Daniel...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Lessons in Purple Team Testing with MITRE ATT&CK; Daniel...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Lessons in Purple Team Testing with MITRE ATT&CK; Daniel...
 
Zero Trust Model Presentation
Zero Trust Model PresentationZero Trust Model Presentation
Zero Trust Model Presentation
 

Similar to Turning Intelligence into Action with MITRE ATT&CK

Slideshare.net rh-isac summit 2019 - adam pennington - leveraging mitre at ta...
Slideshare.net rh-isac summit 2019 - adam pennington - leveraging mitre at ta...Slideshare.net rh-isac summit 2019 - adam pennington - leveraging mitre at ta...
Slideshare.net rh-isac summit 2019 - adam pennington - leveraging mitre at ta...Robert Brandel
 
Pennington - Defending Against Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
Pennington - Defending Against Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CKPennington - Defending Against Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
Pennington - Defending Against Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CKAdam Pennington
 
RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...
RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...
RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...Adam Pennington
 
Update from the MITRE ATT&CK Team
Update from the MITRE ATT&CK TeamUpdate from the MITRE ATT&CK Team
Update from the MITRE ATT&CK TeamAdam Pennington
 
Getting Bear-y Cozy with PowerShell
Getting Bear-y Cozy with PowerShellGetting Bear-y Cozy with PowerShell
Getting Bear-y Cozy with PowerShellJamieWilliams130
 
MITRE-Module 1 Slides.pdf
MITRE-Module 1 Slides.pdfMITRE-Module 1 Slides.pdf
MITRE-Module 1 Slides.pdfReZa AdineH
 
Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?)
Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?) Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?)
Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?) MITRE ATT&CK
 
Threat-Based Adversary Emulation with MITRE ATT&CK
Threat-Based Adversary Emulation with MITRE ATT&CKThreat-Based Adversary Emulation with MITRE ATT&CK
Threat-Based Adversary Emulation with MITRE ATT&CKKatie Nickels
 
MITRE_ATTACK_Enterprise_11x17.pdf
MITRE_ATTACK_Enterprise_11x17.pdfMITRE_ATTACK_Enterprise_11x17.pdf
MITRE_ATTACK_Enterprise_11x17.pdfAisyiFree
 
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CKSymantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CKSymantec
 
State of the ATT&CK - ATT&CKcon Power Hour
State of the ATT&CK - ATT&CKcon Power HourState of the ATT&CK - ATT&CKcon Power Hour
State of the ATT&CK - ATT&CKcon Power HourAdam Pennington
 
Which Came First: The Phish or the Opportunity to Defend Against It
Which Came First: The Phish or the Opportunity to Defend Against ItWhich Came First: The Phish or the Opportunity to Defend Against It
Which Came First: The Phish or the Opportunity to Defend Against ItJamieWilliams130
 
Emulating an Adversary with Imperfect Intelligence
Emulating an Adversary with Imperfect IntelligenceEmulating an Adversary with Imperfect Intelligence
Emulating an Adversary with Imperfect IntelligenceAdam Pennington
 
Cloud Security Primer - F5 Networks
Cloud Security Primer - F5 NetworksCloud Security Primer - F5 Networks
Cloud Security Primer - F5 NetworksHarry Gunns
 
Keynote: Which way is the SolarWind Blowing? Techniques are changing…are you ...
Keynote: Which way is the SolarWind Blowing? Techniques are changing…are you ...Keynote: Which way is the SolarWind Blowing? Techniques are changing…are you ...
Keynote: Which way is the SolarWind Blowing? Techniques are changing…are you ...JamieWilliams130
 
Adversary Emulation - DerpCon
Adversary Emulation - DerpConAdversary Emulation - DerpCon
Adversary Emulation - DerpConJorge Orchilles
 
MITRE-Module 4 Slides.pdf
MITRE-Module 4 Slides.pdfMITRE-Module 4 Slides.pdf
MITRE-Module 4 Slides.pdfReZa AdineH
 

Similar to Turning Intelligence into Action with MITRE ATT&CK (20)

Slideshare.net rh-isac summit 2019 - adam pennington - leveraging mitre at ta...
Slideshare.net rh-isac summit 2019 - adam pennington - leveraging mitre at ta...Slideshare.net rh-isac summit 2019 - adam pennington - leveraging mitre at ta...
Slideshare.net rh-isac summit 2019 - adam pennington - leveraging mitre at ta...
 
Pennington - Defending Against Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
Pennington - Defending Against Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CKPennington - Defending Against Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
Pennington - Defending Against Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
 
RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...
RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...
RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...
 
Update from the MITRE ATT&CK Team
Update from the MITRE ATT&CK TeamUpdate from the MITRE ATT&CK Team
Update from the MITRE ATT&CK Team
 
Getting Bear-y Cozy with PowerShell
Getting Bear-y Cozy with PowerShellGetting Bear-y Cozy with PowerShell
Getting Bear-y Cozy with PowerShell
 
MITRE-Module 1 Slides.pdf
MITRE-Module 1 Slides.pdfMITRE-Module 1 Slides.pdf
MITRE-Module 1 Slides.pdf
 
Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?)
Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?) Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?)
Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?)
 
Threat-Based Adversary Emulation with MITRE ATT&CK
Threat-Based Adversary Emulation with MITRE ATT&CKThreat-Based Adversary Emulation with MITRE ATT&CK
Threat-Based Adversary Emulation with MITRE ATT&CK
 
MITRE_ATTACK_Enterprise_11x17.pdf
MITRE_ATTACK_Enterprise_11x17.pdfMITRE_ATTACK_Enterprise_11x17.pdf
MITRE_ATTACK_Enterprise_11x17.pdf
 
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CKSymantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
 
State of the ATTACK
State of the ATTACKState of the ATTACK
State of the ATTACK
 
State of the ATT&CK - ATT&CKcon Power Hour
State of the ATT&CK - ATT&CKcon Power HourState of the ATT&CK - ATT&CKcon Power Hour
State of the ATT&CK - ATT&CKcon Power Hour
 
Which Came First: The Phish or the Opportunity to Defend Against It
Which Came First: The Phish or the Opportunity to Defend Against ItWhich Came First: The Phish or the Opportunity to Defend Against It
Which Came First: The Phish or the Opportunity to Defend Against It
 
Putting the PRE into ATTACK
Putting the PRE into ATTACKPutting the PRE into ATTACK
Putting the PRE into ATTACK
 
Emulating an Adversary with Imperfect Intelligence
Emulating an Adversary with Imperfect IntelligenceEmulating an Adversary with Imperfect Intelligence
Emulating an Adversary with Imperfect Intelligence
 
Cloud Security Primer - F5 Networks
Cloud Security Primer - F5 NetworksCloud Security Primer - F5 Networks
Cloud Security Primer - F5 Networks
 
Keynote: Which way is the SolarWind Blowing? Techniques are changing…are you ...
Keynote: Which way is the SolarWind Blowing? Techniques are changing…are you ...Keynote: Which way is the SolarWind Blowing? Techniques are changing…are you ...
Keynote: Which way is the SolarWind Blowing? Techniques are changing…are you ...
 
API security
API securityAPI security
API security
 
Adversary Emulation - DerpCon
Adversary Emulation - DerpConAdversary Emulation - DerpCon
Adversary Emulation - DerpCon
 
MITRE-Module 4 Slides.pdf
MITRE-Module 4 Slides.pdfMITRE-Module 4 Slides.pdf
MITRE-Module 4 Slides.pdf
 

More from Adam Pennington

State of the ATT&CK May 2023
State of the ATT&CK May 2023State of the ATT&CK May 2023
State of the ATT&CK May 2023Adam Pennington
 
The Adversaries We've Met Along the Way
The Adversaries We've Met Along the WayThe Adversaries We've Met Along the Way
The Adversaries We've Met Along the WayAdam Pennington
 
Leveraging Campaigns to Untangle the Threat Group Ship of Theseus
Leveraging Campaigns to Untangle the Threat Group Ship of TheseusLeveraging Campaigns to Untangle the Threat Group Ship of Theseus
Leveraging Campaigns to Untangle the Threat Group Ship of TheseusAdam Pennington
 
Picking Up the Pieces: How Campaigns Can Help Us Better Track Groups
Picking Up the Pieces: How Campaigns Can Help Us Better Track GroupsPicking Up the Pieces: How Campaigns Can Help Us Better Track Groups
Picking Up the Pieces: How Campaigns Can Help Us Better Track GroupsAdam Pennington
 
Becoming a Yogi on Mac ATT&CK with OceanLotus Postures
Becoming a Yogi on Mac ATT&CKwith OceanLotus PosturesBecoming a Yogi on Mac ATT&CKwith OceanLotus Postures
Becoming a Yogi on Mac ATT&CK with OceanLotus PosturesAdam Pennington
 

More from Adam Pennington (7)

State of the ATT&CK May 2023
State of the ATT&CK May 2023State of the ATT&CK May 2023
State of the ATT&CK May 2023
 
The Adversaries We've Met Along the Way
The Adversaries We've Met Along the WayThe Adversaries We've Met Along the Way
The Adversaries We've Met Along the Way
 
State of ATT&CK
State of ATT&CKState of ATT&CK
State of ATT&CK
 
Leveraging Campaigns to Untangle the Threat Group Ship of Theseus
Leveraging Campaigns to Untangle the Threat Group Ship of TheseusLeveraging Campaigns to Untangle the Threat Group Ship of Theseus
Leveraging Campaigns to Untangle the Threat Group Ship of Theseus
 
Picking Up the Pieces: How Campaigns Can Help Us Better Track Groups
Picking Up the Pieces: How Campaigns Can Help Us Better Track GroupsPicking Up the Pieces: How Campaigns Can Help Us Better Track Groups
Picking Up the Pieces: How Campaigns Can Help Us Better Track Groups
 
Becoming a Yogi on Mac ATT&CK with OceanLotus Postures
Becoming a Yogi on Mac ATT&CKwith OceanLotus PosturesBecoming a Yogi on Mac ATT&CKwith OceanLotus Postures
Becoming a Yogi on Mac ATT&CK with OceanLotus Postures
 
ATT&CK BINGO
ATT&CK BINGOATT&CK BINGO
ATT&CK BINGO
 

Recently uploaded

From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .Alan Dix
 
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024Lonnie McRorey
 
Unraveling Multimodality with Large Language Models.pdf
Unraveling Multimodality with Large Language Models.pdfUnraveling Multimodality with Large Language Models.pdf
Unraveling Multimodality with Large Language Models.pdfAlex Barbosa Coqueiro
 
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your BrandWordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brandgvaughan
 
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
Commit 2024 - Secret Management made easy
Commit 2024 - Secret Management made easyCommit 2024 - Secret Management made easy
Commit 2024 - Secret Management made easyAlfredo García Lavilla
 
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and ConsThe Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and ConsPixlogix Infotech
 
Advanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
Advanced Computer Architecture – An IntroductionAdvanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
Advanced Computer Architecture – An IntroductionDilum Bandara
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsMark Billinghurst
 
"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan
"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan
"ML in Production",Oleksandr BaganFwdays
 
Leverage Zilliz Serverless - Up to 50X Saving for Your Vector Storage Cost
Leverage Zilliz Serverless - Up to 50X Saving for Your Vector Storage CostLeverage Zilliz Serverless - Up to 50X Saving for Your Vector Storage Cost
Leverage Zilliz Serverless - Up to 50X Saving for Your Vector Storage CostZilliz
 
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck PresentationConnect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck PresentationSlibray Presentation
 
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?Mattias Andersson
 
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLDeveloper Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLScyllaDB
 
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test SuiteTake control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test SuiteDianaGray10
 
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptxSAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptxNavinnSomaal
 
How to write a Business Continuity Plan
How to write a Business Continuity PlanHow to write a Business Continuity Plan
How to write a Business Continuity PlanDatabarracks
 
Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 3652toLead Limited
 

Recently uploaded (20)

From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
 
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
 
Unraveling Multimodality with Large Language Models.pdf
Unraveling Multimodality with Large Language Models.pdfUnraveling Multimodality with Large Language Models.pdf
Unraveling Multimodality with Large Language Models.pdf
 
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your BrandWordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
 
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
 
Commit 2024 - Secret Management made easy
Commit 2024 - Secret Management made easyCommit 2024 - Secret Management made easy
Commit 2024 - Secret Management made easy
 
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and ConsThe Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
 
Advanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
Advanced Computer Architecture – An IntroductionAdvanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
Advanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
 
DMCC Future of Trade Web3 - Special Edition
DMCC Future of Trade Web3 - Special EditionDMCC Future of Trade Web3 - Special Edition
DMCC Future of Trade Web3 - Special Edition
 
"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan
"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan
"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan
 
E-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptx
E-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptxE-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptx
E-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptx
 
Leverage Zilliz Serverless - Up to 50X Saving for Your Vector Storage Cost
Leverage Zilliz Serverless - Up to 50X Saving for Your Vector Storage CostLeverage Zilliz Serverless - Up to 50X Saving for Your Vector Storage Cost
Leverage Zilliz Serverless - Up to 50X Saving for Your Vector Storage Cost
 
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck PresentationConnect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
 
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
 
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLDeveloper Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
 
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test SuiteTake control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
 
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptxSAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
 
How to write a Business Continuity Plan
How to write a Business Continuity PlanHow to write a Business Continuity Plan
How to write a Business Continuity Plan
 
Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
 

Turning Intelligence into Action with MITRE ATT&CK

  • 1. ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. Turning Intelligence into Action with MITRE ATT&CK™ Katie Nickels @likethecoins Adam Pennington @_whatshisface MITRE ATT&CK @MITREattack | 1 |
  • 2. ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. What is ? A knowledge base of adversary behavior Ø Based on real-world observations Ø Free, open, and globally accessible Ø A common language Ø Community-driven
  • 3. Summiting the Pyramid Source: David Bianco, https://detect-respond.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-pyramid-of-pain.html David Bianco’s Pyramid of Pain ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. TTPs Tools Network/ Host Artifacts Domain Names IP Addresses Hash Values •Tough! •Challenging •Annoying •Simple •Easy •Trivial
  • 4. Impact Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Defacement Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Resource Hijacking Runtime Data Manipulation Service Stop Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Command and Control Commonly Used Port Communication Through Removable Media Connection Proxy Custom Command and Control Protocol Custom Cryptographic Protocol Data Encoding Data Obfuscation Domain Fronting Domain Generation Algorithms Fallback Channels Multiband Communication Multi-hop Proxy Multilayer Encryption Multi-Stage Channels Port Knocking Remote Access Tools Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Data Compressed Data Encrypted Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Scheduled Transfer Collection Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Email Collection Input Capture Man in the Browser Screen Capture Video Capture Lateral Movement AppleScript Application Deployment Software Distributed Component Object Model Exploitation of Remote Services Logon Scripts Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Remote Desktop Protocol Remote File Copy Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Shared Webroot SSH Hijacking Taint Shared Content Third-party Software Windows Admin Shares Windows Remote Management Credential Access Discovery Network Sniffing Account Manipulation Account Discovery Bash History Application Window DiscoveryBrute Force Credential Dumping Browser Bookmark DiscoveryCredentials in Files Credentials in Registry Domain Trust Discovery Exploitation for Credential Access File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Forced Authentication Network Share Discovery Hooking Password Policy Discovery Input Capture Peripheral Device Discovery Input Prompt Permission Groups Discovery Kerberoasting Process Discovery Keychain Query Registry LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay Remote System Discovery Security Software Discovery Password Filter DLL System Information DiscoveryPrivate Keys Securityd Memory System Network Configuration Discovery Two-Factor Authentication Interception System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Execution Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Scheduled Task Binary Padding Launchctl Access Token Manipulation Local Job Scheduling Bypass User Account Control LSASS Driver Extra Window Memory Injection Trap Process Injection AppleScript DLL Search Order Hijacking CMSTP Image File Execution Options Injection Command-Line Interface Plist Modification Compiled HTML File Valid Accounts Control Panel Items Accessibility Features BITS Jobs Dynamic Data Exchange AppCert DLLs Clear Command History Execution through API AppInit DLLs CMSTP Execution through Module Load Application Shimming Code Signing Dylib Hijacking Compiled HTML File Exploitation for Client Execution File System Permissions Weakness Component Firmware Hooking Component Object Model HijackingGraphical User Interface Launch Daemon InstallUtil New Service Control Panel Items Mshta Path Interception DCShadow PowerShell Port Monitors Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationRegsvcs/Regasm Service Registry Permissions Weakness Regsvr32 Setuid and Setgid Disabling Security Tools Rundll32 Startup Items DLL Side-Loading Scripting Web Shell Execution Guardrails Service Execution .bash_profile and .bashrc Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Exploitation for Defense Evasion Signed Binary Proxy Execution Account Manipulation Authentication Package SID-History Injection File Deletion Signed Script Proxy Execution BITS Jobs Sudo File Permissions ModificationBootkit Sudo Caching Source Browser Extensions File System Logical Offsets Space after Filename Change Default File Association Gatekeeper Bypass Third-party Software Group Policy Modification Trusted Developer Utilities Component Firmware Hidden Files and Directories User Execution Component Object Model Hijacking Hidden Users Windows Management Instrumentation Hidden Window Create Account HISTCONTROL Windows Remote Management External Remote Services Indicator Blocking Hidden Files and Directories Indicator Removal from ToolsXSL Script Processing Hypervisor Kernel Modules and Extensions Indicator Removal on Host Indirect Command Execution Launch Agent Install Root Certificate LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition InstallUtil Login Item Launchctl Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Replication Through Removable Media Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Supply Chain Compromise Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Breaking Down ATT&CK Tactics: the adversary’s technical goals Techniques:howthegoalsare achieved | 4 | ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. Procedures: Specific technique implementation
  • 5. Technique: Spearphishing Attachment ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 5 |
  • 6. Technique: Spearphishing Attachment ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 6 |
  • 7. Technique: Spearphishing Attachment ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 7 |
  • 8. Technique: Spearphishing Attachment ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 8 |
  • 9. Group: APT29 ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 9 |
  • 10. Group: APT29 ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 10 |
  • 11. Group: APT29 ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 11 |
  • 12. ATT&CK Use Cases | 12 | Threat Intelligence processes = search Process:Create reg = filter processes where (exe == "reg.exe" and parent_exe == "cmd.exe") cmd = filter processes where (exe == "cmd.exe" and parent_exe != "explorer.exe"") reg_and_cmd = join (reg, cmd) where (reg.ppid == cmd.pid and reg.hostname == cmd.hostname) output reg_and_cmd Detection Adversary Emulation Assessment and Engineering ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. Use ATT&CK for Adversary Emulation and Red Teaming The best defense is a well-tested defense. ATT&CK provides a common adversary behavior framework based on threat intelligence that red teams can use to emulate specific threats. This helps cyber defenders find gaps in visibility, defensive tools, and processes—and then fix them. Legend Low Priority High Priority Finding Gaps in Defense Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Supply Chain Compromise Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Dynamic Data Exchange Execution through API Execution through Module Load Exploitation for Client Execution Graphical User Interface InstallUtil Launchctl Local Job Scheduling LSASS Driver Mshta PowerShell Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Rundll32 Scheduled Task Scripting Service Execution Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution Source Space after Filename Third-party Software Trap Trusted Developer Utilities User Execution Windows Management Instrumentation Windows Remote Management XSL Script Processing Application Shimming Authentication Package BITS Jobs Bootkit Browser Extensions Change Default File Association Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Create Account DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking External Remote Services File System Permissions Weakness Hidden Files and Directories Hooking Hypervisor Image File Execution Options Injection Kernel Modules and Extensions Launch Agent Launch Daemon Launchctl LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Local Job Scheduling Login Item Logon Scripts LSASS Driver Modify Existing Service Netsh Helper DLL New Service Office Application Startup Path Interception Plist Modification Port Knocking Port Monitors Rc.common Re-opened Applications Redundant Access Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Scheduled Task Screensaver Security Support Provider Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid Shortcut Modification SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Startup Items System Firmware Systemd Service Time Providers Trap Valid Accounts Web Shell Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Winlogon Helper DLL Bypass User Account Control DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Extra Window Memory Injection File System Permissions Weakness Hooking Image File Execution Options Injection Launch Daemon New Service Path Interception Plist Modification Port Monitors Process Injection Scheduled Task Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid SID-History Injection Startup Items Sudo Sudo Caching Valid Accounts Web Shell CMSTP Code Signing Compile After Delivery Compiled HTML File Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Control Panel Items DCShadow Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Disabling Security Tools DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Execution Guardrails Exploitation for Defense Evasion Extra Window Memory Injection File Deletion File Permissions Modification File System Logical Offsets Gatekeeper Bypass Group Policy Modification Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window HISTCONTROL Image File Execution Options Injection Indicator Blocking Indicator Removal from Tools Indicator Removal on Host Indirect Command Execution Install Root Certificate InstallUtil Launchctl LC_MAIN Hijacking Masquerading Modify Registry Mshta Network Share Connection Removal NTFS File Attributes Obfuscated Files or Information Plist Modification Port Knocking Process Doppelgänging Process Hollowing Process Injection Redundant Access Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Rootkit Rundll32 Scripting Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Software Packing Space after Filename Template Injection Timestomp Trusted Developer Utilities Valid Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Web Service XSL Script Processing Credentials in Registry Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Hooking Input Capture Input Prompt Kerberoasting Keychain LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay Network Sniffing Password Filter DLL Private Keys Securityd Memory Two-Factor Authentication Interception Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Remote Desktop Protocol Remote File Copy Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Shared Webroot SSH Hijacking Taint Shared Content Third-party Software Windows Admin Shares Windows Remote Management Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Email Collection Input Capture Man in the Browser Screen Capture Video Capture Data Encoding Data Obfuscation Domain Fronting Domain Generation Algorithms Fallback Channels Multi-hop Proxy Multi-Stage Channels Multiband Communication Multilayer Encryption Port Knocking Remote Access Tools Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Control Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Scheduled Transfer Endpoint Denial of Service Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Resource Hijacking Runtime Data Manipulation Service Stop Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation AppleScript Application Deployment Software Distributed Component Object Model Exploitation of Remote Services Logon Scripts Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Remote Desktop Protocol Remote File Copy Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Shared Webroot SSH Hijacking Taint Shared Content Third-party Software Windows Admin Shares Windows Remote Management Commonly Used Port Communication Through Removable Media Connection Proxy Custom Command and Control Protocol Custom Cryptographic Protocol Data Encoding Data Obfuscation Domain Fronting Domain Generation Algorithms Fallback Channels Multiband Communication Multi-hop Proxy Multilayer Encryption Multi-Stage Channels Port Knocking Remote Access Tools Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Automated Exfiltration Data Compressed Data Encrypted Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Scheduled Transfer Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Defacement Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Resource Hijacking Runtime Data Manipulation Service Stop Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Email Collection Input Capture Man in the Browser Screen Capture Video Capture Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Replication Through Removable Media Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Supply Chain Compromise Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts AppleScript CMSTP Command-Line Interface Compiled HTML File Control Panel Items Dynamic Data Exchange Execution through API Execution through Module Load Exploitation for Client Execution Graphical User Interface InstallUtil Mshta PowerShell Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Rundll32 Scripting Service Execution Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution Source Space after Filename Third-party Software Trusted Developer Utilities DLL Search Order Hijacking Image File Execution Options Injection Plist Modification Valid Accounts Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Dylib Hijacking File System Permissions Weakness Hooking Launch Daemon New Service Path Interception Port Monitors Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid Startup Items Web Shell .bash_profile and .bashrc Account Manipulation Authentication Package BITS Jobs Bootkit Browser Extensions Change Default File Association Component Firmware BITS Jobs Clear Command History CMSTP Code Signing Compiled HTML File Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Control Panel Items DCShadow Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Disabling Security Tools DLL Side-Loading Execution Guardrails Exploitation for Defense Evasion File Deletion File Permissions Modification File System Logical Offsets Gatekeeper Bypass Group Policy Modification Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Exploitation for Privilege Escalation SID-History Injection Sudo Sudo Caching Scheduled Task Binary Padding Network Sniffing Launchctl Local Job Scheduling LSASS Driver Trap Access Token Manipulation Bypass User Account Control Extra Window Memory Injection Process Injection Account Manipulation Bash History Brute Force Credential Dumping Credentials in Files Credentials in Registry Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Hooking Input Capture Input Prompt Kerberoasting Keychain LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay Password Filter DLL Private Keys Securityd Memory Two-Factor Authentication Interception Account Discovery Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Process Discovery Query Discovery Remote System Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Use ATT&CK for Cyber Threat Intelligence Cyber threat intelligence comes from many sources, including knowledge of past incidents, commercial threat feeds, information-sharing groups, government threat-sharing programs, and more. ATT&CK gives analysts a common language to communicate across reports and organizations, providing a way to structure, compare, and analyze threat intelligence. Use ATT&CK to Build Your Defensive Platform ATT&CK includes resources designed to help cyber defenders develop analytics that detect the techniques used by an adversary. Based on threat intelligence included in ATT&CK or provided by analysts, cyber defenders can create a comprehensive set of analytics to detect threats. Get Started with ATT&CK Legend APT28 APT29 Both Comparing APT28 to APT29 we've chosen 12 of those data sources to show the techniques each of them might be able to detect with the right colle analytics. Check out our website at attack.mitre.org for more information on how each technique can be detected, and adversary examples you can use to start detecting adversary behavior with ATT&CK. You can visualize how your own data sources map to adversary behavior with ATT&CK. Read our blog post at bit.ly/ATT learn how we generated this diagram, check out the code, and begin building your own diagrams from ATT&CK conten Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Replication Through Removable Media Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Supply Chain Compromise Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Execution AppleScript CMSTP Command-Line Interface Compiled HTML File Control Panel Items Dynamic Data Exchange Execution through API Execution through Module Load Exploitation for Client Execution Graphical User Interface InstallUtil Launchctl Local Job Scheduling LSASS Driver Mshta PowerShell Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Rundll32 Scheduled Task Scripting Service Execution Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution Source Space after Filename Third-party Software Trap Trusted Developer Utilities User Execution Windows Management Instrumentation Windows Remote Management XSL Script Processing Persistence .bash_profile and .bashrc Accessibility Features Account Manipulation AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Authentication Package BITS Jobs Bootkit Browser Extensions Change Default File Association Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Create Account DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking External Remote Services File System Permissions Weakness Hidden Files and Directories Hooking Hypervisor Image File Execution Options Injection Kernel Modules and Extensions Launch Agent Launch Daemon Launchctl LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Local Job Scheduling Login Item Logon Scripts LSASS Driver Modify Existing Service Netsh Helper DLL New Service Office Application Startup Path Interception Plist Modification Port Knocking Port Monitors Rc.common Re-opened Applications Redundant Access Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Scheduled Task Screensaver Security Support Provider Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid Shortcut Modification SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Startup Items System Firmware Systemd Service Time Providers Trap Valid Accounts Web Shell Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Winlogon Helper DLL Privilege Escalation Access Token Manipulation Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Bypass User Account Control DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Extra Window Memory Injection File System Permissions Weakness Hooking Image File Execution Options Injection Launch Daemon New Service Path Interception Plist Modification Port Monitors Process Injection Scheduled Task Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid SID-History Injection Startup Items Sudo Sudo Caching Valid Accounts Web Shell Defense Evasion Access Token Manipulation Binary Padding BITS Jobs Bypass User Account Control Clear Command History CMSTP Code Signing Compile After Delivery Compiled HTML File Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Control Panel Items DCShadow Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Disabling Security Tools DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Execution Guardrails Exploitation for Defense Evasion Extra Window Memory Injection File Deletion File Permissions Modification File System Logical Offsets Gatekeeper Bypass Group Policy Modification Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window HISTCONTROL Image File Execution Options Injection Indicator Blocking Indicator Removal from Tools Indicator Removal on Host Indirect Command Execution Install Root Certificate InstallUtil Launchctl LC_MAIN Hijacking Masquerading Modify Registry Mshta Network Share Connection Removal NTFS File Attributes Obfuscated Files or Information Plist Modification Port Knocking Process Doppelgänging Process Hollowing Process Injection Redundant Access Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Rootkit Rundll32 Scripting Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Software Packing Space after Filename Template Injection Timestomp Trusted Developer Utilities Valid Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Web Service XSL Script Processing Credential Access Account Manipulation Bash History Brute Force Credential Dumping Credentials in Files Credentials in Registry Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Hooking Input Capture Input Prompt Kerberoasting Keychain LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay Network Sniffing Password Filter DLL Private Keys Securityd Memory Two-Factor Authentication Interception Discovery Account Discovery Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Lateral Movement AppleScript Application Deployment Software Distributed Component Object Model Exploitation of Remote Services Logon Scripts Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Remote Desktop Protocol Remote File Copy Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Shared Webroot SSH Hijacking Taint Shared Content Third-party Software Windows Admin Shares Windows Remote Management Collection Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Email Collection Input Capture Man in the Browser Screen Capture Video Capture Command And Control Commonly Used Port Communication Through Removable Media Connection Proxy Custom Command and Control Protocol Custom Cryptographic Protocol Data Encoding Data Obfuscation Domain Fronting Domain Generation Algorithms Fallback Channels Multi-hop Proxy Multi-Stage Channels Multiband Communication Multilayer Encryption Port Knocking Remote Access Tools Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Data Compressed Data Encrypted Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Scheduled Transfer Impact Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Defacement Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Resource Hijacking Runtime Data Manipulation Service Stop Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Replication Through Removable Media Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Supply Chain Compromise Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Execution AppleScript CMSTP Command-Line Interface Compiled HTML File Control Panel Items Dynamic Data Exchange Execution through API Execution through Module Load Exploitation for Client Execution Graphical User Interface InstallUtil Launchctl Local Job Scheduling LSASS Driver Mshta PowerShell Persistence .bash_profile and .bashrc Accessibility Features Account Manipulation AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Authentication Package BITS Jobs Bootkit Browser Extensions Change Default File Association Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Create Account DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking Privilege Escalation Access Token Manipulation Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Bypass User Account Control DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Extra Window Memory Injection File System Permissions Weakness Hooking Image File Execution Options Injection Launch Daemon New Service Path Interception Defense Evasion Access Token Manipulation Binary Padding BITS Jobs Bypass User Account Control Clear Command History CMSTP Code Signing Compile After Delivery Compiled HTML File Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Control Panel Items DCShadow Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Disabling Security Tools DLL Search Order Hijacking Credential Access Account Manipulation Bash History Brute Force Credential Dumping Credentials in Files Credentials in Registry Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Hooking Input Capture Input Prompt Kerberoasting Keychain LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay Network Sniffing Password Filter DLL Discovery Account Discovery Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery Lateral Movement AppleScript Application Deployment Software Distributed Component Object Model Exploitation of Remote Services Logon Scripts Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Remote Desktop Protocol Remote File Copy Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Shared Webroot SSH Hijacking Taint Shared Content Third-party Software Windows Admin Shares Collection Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Email Collection Input Capture Man in the Browser Screen Capture Video Capture Command And Control Commonly Used Port Communication Through Removable Media Connection Proxy Custom Command and Control Protocol Custom Cryptographic Protocol Data Encoding Data Obfuscation Domain Fronting Domain Generation Algorithms Fallback Channels Multi-hop Proxy Multi-Stage Channels Multiband Communication Multilayer Encryption Port Knocking Remote Access Tools Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Data Compressed Data Encrypted Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Scheduled Transfer Impact Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Defacement Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Resource Hijacking Runtime Data Manipulation Service Stop Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation ob stan Use ATT&CK to Build Your Defensive Platform ATT&CK includes resources designed to help cyber defenders develop analytics that detect the techniques used by an adversary. Based on threat intelligence included in ATT&CK or provided by analysts, cyber defenders can create a comprehensive set of analytics to detect threats. Legend APT28 APT29 Both Legend Low Priority High Priority Comparing APT28 to APT29 Finding Gaps in Defense Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Replication Through Removable Media Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Supply Chain Compromise Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts AppleScript CMSTP Command-Line Interface Compiled HTML File Control Panel Items Dynamic Data Exchange Execution through API Execution through Module Load Exploitation for Client Execution Graphical User Interface InstallUtil Launchctl Local Job Scheduling LSASS Driver Mshta PowerShell Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Rundll32 Scheduled Task Scripting Service Execution Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution Source Space after Filename Third-party Software Trap Trusted Developer Utilities User Execution Windows Management Instrumentation Windows Remote Management XSL Script Processing .bash_profile and .bashrc Accessibility Features Account Manipulation AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Authentication Package BITS Jobs Bootkit Browser Extensions Change Default File Association Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Create Account DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking External Remote Services File System Permissions Weakness Hidden Files and Directories Hooking Hypervisor Image File Execution Options Injection Kernel Modules and Extensions Launch Agent Launch Daemon Launchctl LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Local Job Scheduling Login Item Logon Scripts LSASS Driver Modify Existing Service Netsh Helper DLL New Service Office Application Startup Path Interception Plist Modification Port Knocking Port Monitors Rc.common Re-opened Applications Redundant Access Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Scheduled Task Screensaver Security Support Provider Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid Shortcut Modification SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Startup Items System Firmware Systemd Service Time Providers Trap Valid Accounts Web Shell Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Winlogon Helper DLL Access Token Manipulation Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Bypass User Account Control DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Extra Window Memory Injection File System Permissions Weakness Hooking Image File Execution Options Injection Launch Daemon New Service Path Interception Plist Modification Port Monitors Process Injection Scheduled Task Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid SID-History Injection Startup Items Sudo Sudo Caching Valid Accounts Web Shell Access Token Manipulation Binary Padding BITS Jobs Bypass User Account Control Clear Command History CMSTP Code Signing Compile After Delivery Compiled HTML File Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Control Panel Items DCShadow Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Disabling Security Tools DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Execution Guardrails Exploitation for Defense Evasion Extra Window Memory Injection File Deletion File Permissions Modification File System Logical Offsets Gatekeeper Bypass Group Policy Modification Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window HISTCONTROL Image File Execution Options Injection Indicator Blocking Indicator Removal from Tools Indicator Removal on Host Indirect Command Execution Install Root Certificate InstallUtil Launchctl LC_MAIN Hijacking Masquerading Modify Registry Mshta Network Share Connection Removal NTFS File Attributes Obfuscated Files or Information Plist Modification Port Knocking Process Doppelgänging Process Hollowing Process Injection Redundant Access Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Rootkit Rundll32 Scripting Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Software Packing Space after Filename Template Injection Timestomp Trusted Developer Utilities Valid Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Web Service XSL Script Processing Account Manipulation Bash History Brute Force Credential Dumping Credentials in Files Credentials in Registry Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Hooking Input Capture Input Prompt Kerberoasting Keychain LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay Network Sniffing Password Filter DLL Private Keys Securityd Memory Two-Factor Authentication Interception Account Discovery Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion AppleScript Application Deployment Software Distributed Component Object Model Exploitation of Remote Services Logon Scripts Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Remote Desktop Protocol Remote File Copy Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Shared Webroot SSH Hijacking Taint Shared Content Third-party Software Windows Admin Shares Windows Remote Management Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Email Collection Input Capture Man in the Browser Screen Capture Video Capture Commonly Used Port Communication Through Removable Media Connection Proxy Custom Command and Control Protocol Custom Cryptographic Protocol Data Encoding Data Obfuscation Domain Fronting Domain Generation Algorithms Fallback Channels Multi-hop Proxy Multi-Stage Channels Multiband Communication Multilayer Encryption Port Knocking Remote Access Tools Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Automated Exfiltration Data Compressed Data Encrypted Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Scheduled Transfer Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Defacement Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Resource Hijacking Runtime Data Manipulation Service Stop Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Replication Through Removable Media Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Supply Chain Compromise Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Execution AppleScript CMSTP Command-Line Interface Compiled HTML File Control Panel Items Dynamic Data Exchange Execution through API Execution through Module Load Exploitation for Client Execution Graphical User Interface InstallUtil Launchctl Local Job Scheduling LSASS Driver Mshta PowerShell Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Rundll32 Scheduled Task Scripting Service Execution Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution Source Space after Filename Third-party Software Trap Trusted Developer Utilities User Execution Windows Management Instrumentation Windows Remote Management XSL Script Processing Persistence .bash_profile and .bashrc Accessibility Features Account Manipulation AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Authentication Package BITS Jobs Bootkit Browser Extensions Change Default File Association Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Create Account DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking External Remote Services File System Permissions Weakness Hidden Files and Directories Hooking Hypervisor Image File Execution Options Injection Kernel Modules and Extensions Launch Agent Launch Daemon Launchctl LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Local Job Scheduling Login Item Logon Scripts LSASS Driver Modify Existing Service Netsh Helper DLL New Service Office Application Startup Path Interception Plist Modification Port Knocking Port Monitors Rc.common Re-opened Applications Redundant Access Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Scheduled Task Screensaver Security Support Provider Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid Privilege Escalation Access Token Manipulation Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Bypass User Account Control DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Extra Window Memory Injection File System Permissions Weakness Hooking Image File Execution Options Injection Launch Daemon New Service Path Interception Plist Modification Port Monitors Process Injection Scheduled Task Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid SID-History Injection Startup Items Sudo Sudo Caching Valid Accounts Web Shell Defense Evasion Access Token Manipulation Binary Padding BITS Jobs Bypass User Account Control Clear Command History CMSTP Code Signing Compile After Delivery Compiled HTML File Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Control Panel Items DCShadow Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Disabling Security Tools DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Execution Guardrails Exploitation for Defense Evasion Extra Window Memory Injection File Deletion File Permissions Modification File System Logical Offsets Gatekeeper Bypass Group Policy Modification Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window HISTCONTROL Image File Execution Options Injection Indicator Blocking Indicator Removal from Tools Indicator Removal on Host Indirect Command Execution Install Root Certificate InstallUtil Launchctl LC_MAIN Hijacking Masquerading Modify Registry Mshta Network Share Connection Removal NTFS File Attributes Obfuscated Files or Information Plist Modification Port Knocking Process Doppelgänging Process Hollowing Credential Access Account Manipulation Bash History Brute Force Credential Dumping Credentials in Files Credentials in Registry Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Hooking Input Capture Input Prompt Kerberoasting Keychain LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay Network Sniffing Password Filter DLL Private Keys Securityd Memory Two-Factor Authentication Interception Discovery Account Discovery Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Lateral Movement AppleScript Application Deployment Software Distributed Component Object Model Exploitation of Remote Services Logon Scripts Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Remote Desktop Protocol Remote File Copy Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Shared Webroot SSH Hijacking Taint Shared Content Third-party Software Windows Admin Shares Windows Remote Management Collection Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Email Collection Input Capture Man in the Browser Screen Capture Video Capture Command And Control Commonly Used Port Communication Through Removable Media Connection Proxy Custom Command and Control Protocol Custom Cryptographic Protocol Data Encoding Data Obfuscation Domain Fronting Domain Generation Algorithms Fallback Channels Multi-hop Proxy Multi-Stage Channels Multiband Communication Multilayer Encryption Port Knocking Remote Access Tools Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Data Compressed Data Encrypted Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Scheduled Transfer Impact Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Defacement Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Resource Hijacking Runtime Data Manipulation Service Stop Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation malwarerever net work device logs network intrusion detection system ssl/tls inspection system calls windowseventlogs ocol compromise point denial of service network denial of service obfuscated files or information remote access tools spearphishing attachment standard non-application layer protocoltemplate injection domain fronting drive-by compromise endpoint denial of service install root certificate obfuscated files or information spearphishing link spearphishing via service standard cryptographic protocol web service applescript application shimming browser extensions bypass user account control exploitation for client execution hypervisor kernel modules and extensions keychain rootkit account manipulation bits jobs cm stp em s
  • 13. ATT&CK Threat Intelligence Use Cases § Structuring threat intelligence with ATT&CK allows us to – Compare behaviors – Communicate in a common language ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 5 |
  • 14. Compare Groups to Each Other | 6 | *from open source reporting we’ve mapped APT28* ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 15. Compare Groups to Each Other | 7 | APT29 ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 16. Compare Groups to Each Other | 8 | APT28 APT29 Both groups Prioritize! ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 17. Compare Groups to Defenses | 9 | Overlay known defensive gaps APT28 APT29 Both groups ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 18. Compare Groups Over Time | 10 | Notional group in 2018 Same group in 2019…why did we not see these techniques? ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 19. Communicate to Defenders | 11 | CTI Analyst Defender Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1060) THIS is what the adversary is doing! The Run key is AdobeUpdater. Oh, we have Registry data, we can detect that! ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 20. Communicate Across the Community ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 12 | CTI Consumer Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1060) Oh, you mean T1060! APT1337 is using autorun FUZZYDUCK used a Run key Company A Company B
  • 21. ...but how do I structure intel in ATT&CK so I can apply it to these use cases? | 21 | ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 22. Process of Mapping to ATT&CK 0. Understand ATT&CK 1. Find the behavior 2. Research the behavior 3. Translate the behavior into a tactic 4. Figure out what technique applies to the behavior 5. Compare your results to other analysts Two key sources for where you get information: 1. Finished reporting 2. Raw data | 22 | ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 23. 0. Understand ATT&CK § You need to know what to look for before you can do this § To get analysts started: – Watch an ATT&CK presentation – Read the Philosophy Paper and Getting Started page – Read ATT&CK 101 Blog Post – Read the Tactic descriptions – Skim the Technique list (there are 252+…) § Encourage ongoing learning and discussion – Have analysts present a technique a week in your team training | 23 | ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 24. 1. Find the Behavior ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. § Different mindset from looking for indicators § Look for what the adversary or software does § Focus on initial compromise and post-compromise details – Info that may not be useful for ATT&CK mapping: § Static malware analysis § Infrastructure registration information § Industry/victim targeting information
  • 25. 1. Find the Behavior ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation_doubletap.html Tactic? Technique? Tactic? Technique?
  • 26. 2. Research the Behavior | 26 | ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. § CTI analysts may not be familiar with adversary/software behavior § Encourage them to do additional research: – Of your own team or organization (defenders/red teamers) – Of external resources § Time-consuming, but builds better analysts § Understanding of core behavior helps with next steps
  • 27. 2. Research the Behavior | 27 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SOCKS ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 28. 2. Research the Behavior | 28 | https://www.speedguide.net/port.php?port=1913? ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 29. 3. Translate the Behavior into a Tactic § What is the adversary trying to accomplish? § Often requires domain expertise – Finished intel can give you context | 29 | § Only 12 options: – Initial Access – Execution – Persistence – Privilege Escalation – Defense Evasion – Credential Access – Discovery – Lateral Movement – Collection – Command and Control – Exfiltration – Impact ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 30. 3. Translate the Behavior into a Tactic § “When executed, the malware first establishes a SOCKS5 connection to 192.157.198.103 using TCP port 1913. … Once the connection to the server is established, the malware expects a message containing at least three bytes from the server. These first three bytes are the command identifier. The following commands are supported by the malware … “ – A connection in order to command the malware to do something à Command and Control | 30 | ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 31. 4. Figure Out What Technique Applies § Often the toughest part § Not every behavior is necessarily a technique § Key strategies: 1. Look at the list of Techniques for the identified Tactic 2. Search attack.mitre.org § Try key words § Try “procedure”-level detail § Try specific command strings | 31 | ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 32. 4. Figure Out What Technique Applies | 32 | Protocol vs. Port à 2 techniques? ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 33. 4. Figure Out What Technique Applies | 33 | “the malware first establishes a SOCKS5 connection” ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 34. 4. Figure Out What Technique Applies | 34 | “establishes a SOCKS5 connection to 192.157.198.103 using TCP port 1913” “CTRL+ F” FTW ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 35. Rinse and Repeat ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation_doubletap.html Privilege Escalation - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) Execution - Command-Line Interface (T1059) Discovery - System Owner/User Discovery (T1033) Persistence – Scheduled Task (T1053) Command and Control - Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol (T1095) Command and Control - Uncommonly Used Port (T1065)
  • 36. Technique Mapping Work Available from ATT&CK ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 14 | “Procedure Examples” for Techniques “Techniques Used” for Software and Groups 5 years of reviewing and mapping ~400 report sources Only freely-available public reporting
  • 37. Biases in ATT&CK’s Mapped Data § Important to understand and state our biases in CTI § Two kinds of bias in technique examples in ATT&CK – Bias introduced by us – Bias inherent in the sources we use § Understanding these is the first step in properly leveraging this data ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 15 |
  • 38. Security Vendors 92% Press Reports 5% Publicly- available Government Reports 3% Our Biases: Sources We Select | 16 | From reports used for technique examples in ATT&CK Groups ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 39. Our Biases: Availability Bias ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 17 | All Possible Techniques Techniques We Remember
  • 40. Our Biases: Novelty Bias ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 18 | Yet another FUZZYDUCK using Powershell report APT1337 Using Transmitted Data Manipulation
  • 41. Source Biases: Availability Bias ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 19 | All Possible Behaviors/ Groups Familiar Behaviors/ Groups
  • 42. Source Biases: Novelty Bias ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 20 | Another APT1337 Report APT1338 Report!!!
  • 43. Source Biases: Victim Bias ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 21 | Victim 4 Victim 5Victim 3 Victim 2 Victim 1
  • 44. Source Biases: Visibility Bias | 22 | Visible Disk Forensics Network Flows Process Execution Powershell Registry Monitoring Decoded C2 Not Seen ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 45. Source Biases: Production Bias ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 23 | Operation Snakepit APT1337 Report Operation Brown Fox APT1338 Report Ducks in the Wild FUZZYDUCK Report Source 1 Source 2
  • 46. How Do We Deal With These Biases? § Know that they exist – Once you know them, you can better determine what is real data vs. your biases § Be honest and explain them ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 24| Tenor.com
  • 47. Hedging Our Biases § Work together – Diversity of thought makes for stronger teams § Adjust and calibrate your data sources § Add different data sources (including your own) § Remember we’re prioritizing the known over the unknown – As opposed to absolute comparison ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 25 |
  • 48. Now that you know those biases, here’s your imperfect data! | 26 | ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 49. 1. Remote File Copy 2. Standard App Layer Protocol 3. System Information Discovery 4. Command-Line Interface 5. Obfuscated Files or Information 6. File and Directory Discovery 7. Registry Run Key/Startup Folder 8. File Deletion 9. Process Discovery 10. System Network Config Discovery 11. Scripting 12. Screen Capture 13. System Owner/User Discovery 14. Input Capture 15. Credential Dumping 16. Commonly Used Port 17. PowerShell 18. Standard Crypto Protocol 19. Masquerading 20. Scheduled Task Top 20 Techniques from ATT&CK Group/Software Data Why are certain techniques listed? --> Calibrate by source | 27 | ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. Where is Spearphishing? Know your biases + work with others
  • 50. Process for Making Recommendations from Techniques | 29 | 5. Make recommendations 4. Determine what tradeoffs are for org on specific options 3. Research organizational capability/constraints 2. Research defensive options related to technique 1. Research how techniques are being used 0. Determine priority techniques ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10.
  • 51. Initial Access Execution Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Credential Access Discovery Lateral Movement Collection Command and Control Exfiltration Impact Drive-by Compromise Scheduled Task Binary Padding Network Sniffing AppleScript Audio Capture Commonly Used Port Automated Exfiltration Data Destruction Exploit Public-Facing Application Launchctl Access Token Manipulation Account Manipulation Account Discovery Application Deployment Software Automated Collection Communication Through Removable Media Data Compressed Data Encrypted for Impact Local Job Scheduling Bypass User Account Control Bash History Application Window Discovery Clipboard Data Data Encrypted Defacement External Remote Services LSASS Driver Extra Window Memory Injection Brute Force Distributed Component Object Model Data from Information Repositories Connection Proxy Data Transfer Size Limits Disk Content Wipe Hardware Additions Trap Process Injection Credential Dumping Browser Bookmark Discovery Custom Command and Control Protocol Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Disk Structure Wipe Replication Through Removable Media AppleScript DLL Search Order Hijacking Credentials in Files Exploitation of Remote Services Data from Local System Endpoint Denial of Service CMSTP Image File Execution Options Injection Credentials in Registry Domain Trust Discovery Data from Network Shared Drive Custom Cryptographic Protocol Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Firmware Corruption Spearphishing Attachment Command-Line Interface Plist Modification Exploitation for Credential Access File and Directory Discovery Logon Scripts Inhibit System Recovery Spearphishing Link Compiled HTML File Valid Accounts Network Service Scanning Pass the Hash Data from Removable Media Data Encoding Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Network Denial of Service Spearphishing via Service Control Panel Items Accessibility Features BITS Jobs Forced Authentication Network Share Discovery Pass the Ticket Data Staged Data Obfuscation Resource Hijacking Supply Chain Compromise Dynamic Data Exchange AppCert DLLs Clear Command History Hooking Password Policy Discovery Remote Desktop Protocol Email Collection Domain Fronting Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Runtime Data Manipulation Trusted Relationship Execution through API AppInit DLLs CMSTP Input Capture Peripheral Device Discovery Remote File Copy Input Capture Domain Generation Algorithms Service Stop Valid Accounts Execution through Module Load Application Shimming Code Signing Input Prompt Permission Groups Discovery Remote Services Man in the Browser Scheduled Transfer Stored Data Manipulation Dylib Hijacking Compiled HTML File Kerberoasting Process Discovery Replication Through Removable Media Screen Capture Fallback Channels Transmitted Data ManipulationExploitation for Client Execution File System Permissions Weakness Component Firmware Keychain Query Registry Video Capture Multiband Communication Hooking Component Object Model Hijacking LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay Remote System Discovery Shared Webroot Multi-hop Proxy Graphical User Interface Launch Daemon Security Software Discovery SSH Hijacking Multilayer Encryption InstallUtil New Service Control Panel Items Password Filter DLL System Information Discovery Taint Shared Content Multi-Stage Channels Mshta Path Interception DCShadow Private Keys Third-party Software Port Knocking PowerShell Port Monitors Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Securityd Memory System Network Configuration Discovery Windows Admin Shares Remote Access Tools Regsvcs/Regasm Service Registry Permissions Weakness Two-Factor Authentication Interception Windows Remote Management Remote File Copy Regsvr32 Setuid and Setgid Disabling Security Tools System Network Connections Discovery Standard Application Layer ProtocolRundll32 Startup Items DLL Side-Loading Scripting Web Shell Execution Guardrails System Owner/User Discovery Standard Cryptographic ProtocolService Execution .bash_profile and .bashrc Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Exploitation for Defense EvasionSigned Binary Proxy Execution Account Manipulation System Service Discovery Standard Non-Application Layer ProtocolAuthentication Package SID-History Injection File Deletion System Time Discovery Signed Script Proxy Execution BITS Jobs Sudo File Permissions Modification Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Uncommonly Used Port Bootkit Sudo Caching Web Service Source Browser Extensions File System Logical Offsets Space after Filename Change Default File Association Gatekeeper Bypass Third-party Software Group Policy Modification Trusted Developer Utilities Component Firmware Hidden Files and Directories User Execution Component Object Model Hijacking Hidden Users Windows Management Instrumentation Hidden Window Create Account HISTCONTROL Windows Remote Management External Remote Services Indicator Blocking Hidden Files and Directories Indicator Removal from ToolsXSL Script Processing Hypervisor Kernel Modules and Extensions Indicator Removal on Host Indirect Command Execution Launch Agent Install Root Certificate LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition InstallUtil Login Item Launchctl Logon Scripts LC_MAIN Hijacking Modify Existing Service Masquerading Netsh Helper DLL Modify Registry Office Application Startup Mshta Port Knocking Network Share Connection RemovalRc.common Redundant Access NTFS File Attributes Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Obfuscated Files or Information Re-opened Applications Port Knocking Screensaver Process Doppelgänging Security Support Provider Process Hollowing Shortcut Modification Redundant Access SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Many Types of Recommendations Legend High Confidence of Detection Some Confidence of Detection Low Confidence of Detection © 2019 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. Prioritized Technique ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. We’ll tackle Spearphishing Attachment and Spearphishing Link via new user training Supply Chain Compromise and Component Firmware are beyond our capability and resources to stop or detect, so we’ll accept the risk None of our existing tools have visibility into Command-Line Interface so we’ll need to obtain something new
  • 52. Takeaways § Use ATT&CK for cyber threat intelligence to help you… – Compare behaviors – Communicate in a common language § Know the biases involved with mapping CTI reporting to ATT&CK § Hedge those biases and use ATT&CK-mapped CTI to improve defenses ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. | 30 |
  • 53. | 31 | https://attack.mitre.org attack@mitre.org @MITREattack Adam Pennington @_whatshisface Katie Nickels @likethecoins ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 19-01075-10. These slides available at: http://bit.ly/kcnagp-d19