The latest outbreak of High Pathogen Avian Influenza in the USA and Canada in the spring of this year and the inability to avoid animal welfare catastrophes ultimately proves that new emergency response strategies are needed. Strategies that are based on taking away the source of infection instead of killing as many animals as possible within 24 hours, regardless the consequences. The statement that “It’s possible that human infections with these viruses may occur” and that “these viruses have not spread easily to other people” is confusing. Humans can become infected without showing clinical signs. They can become the major carrier of the infection. Especially during depopulation activities, viruses easily transmit through responders. Tasks like taking layers out of their cages and transport the birds manually through the narrow walkways between the cages, and disposal of infected animals are specific risks that need to be avoided. Simply switching of the electricity so that sick birds don’t have to be handled is not the solution. Although humans are supposed to be less susceptible, they can become carrier of the virus. Only the highest level of biosecurity could prevent the transmission through the humans and materials that have been in direct contact with infected animals and materials. Simply switching of the electricity so that sick birds don’t have to be handled is not the solution. Avoid killing animals is always the better option and in Germany, the discussion on the strategy based on neutralizing risks and is in the making. Avoiding situations demands a proactive role of the poultry industry.

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• Contact between migratory birds and poultry
• Wind-borne spreading between farms, via dust and feathers
• Absence of bio security protection at the farm level
• Contact between humans and infected birds
Pathways for transmission

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• “Estimating the Per-Contact Probability of Infection by Highly
Pathogenic Avian Influenza (H7N7) Virus during the 2003 Epidemic
in The Netherlands” (2012)
• “Avian influenza transmission risks: Analysis of biosecurity
measures and contact structure in Dutch poultry farming”
(September 2012)
• “Modelling the Wind-Borne Spread of Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza Virus between Farms” (February 2012)
• “Genetic Data Provide Evidence for Wind-Mediated Transmission
of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza” (March 2013)
Wageningen University is leading in research
on spreading of avian Influenza transmission:

4. What happened in Holland
during the outbreak of H7N7, March 2003?
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• 270 million Euro direct costs
• 29 786 804 birds culled
• 1.134 farms
• € 238.000/ farm; € 9,31/ bird
5.4%
10.7%
72.8%
11.2%
Infected
Suspected
Preventive
Welfare

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85%
15%
Infected poultry species
Chickens
Turkeys
Mixed poultry

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3%
97%
Infections under small farming (free range)
and hobby farming
Infected/suspected
Preventive

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23%
68%
9%
Infected farm type
Chickens
Turkeys
Mixed poultry

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79.2%12.0% 8.7%
Type of farms infected during the H7N7 outbreak in Holland
Labor-intensive farms
(Layers/parent stock)
Labor-extensive farms
(broiler/breeders)
Turkey farms

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All current culling techniques were developed during the outbreak in
Holland without prior testing:
• Stable gassing with CO2 en CO
• Container gassing
• Electrocution (waterbath method)
Because of its labor intensity, large-scale culling most likely
contributed to the intensity of the outbreak
Responders became spreaders of the virus: 50% of all responders
showed antibodies and most likely became carrier of the virus
Large-scale culling contributed to the spreading

10. Each farm type needs a
specific culling method
Labour intensive farms were culled
using container gassing and
electrocution
 Layers
 Biological farms
 (Grand)Parent stock
 Breeders
 Ducks
Labour extensive farms were culled
by stable gassing
 Turkeys
 Broilers
 Pullets
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11. All culling methods are
extremely labour intensive
 Poultry was caught or taken out
of the cage by hand and carried
out to the culling equipment
outside the house
 Large packages of gas bottles,
containers, power generators,
frond loaders etc., needed to be in
place before the culling procedure
could start
 In case of stable gassing, large
numbers of responders needed to
enter the infected house and take
out the carcasses and bring these
to the disposal containers
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Labour intensive farms are extremely vulnerable to get infected
• 4 727 124 of in total 29 370 427 birds were infected/suspected
• More than 79% of all farms with the notification
Infected/suspected were labour intensive farms, indicating
that poultry workers were most likely responsible for the
infection of the flocks, due to the lack of following strict bio
security protocols
• Only 12% of labour-extensive farms with young birds got
infected, indicating that farms with a high-level of bio security
and limited contact between humans and poultry are better
protected against infections
• Only 3% of the small Free range and hobby farms got infected,
indicating that direct contact between migratory birds and
poultry plays only a marginal role
We do know that animal-to-human contact
is the key transmitter of the infection

13. To summarize
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1. Layer farms and turkey farms are extremely at risk
2. More than 79% of all farms with the notification
Infected/suspected were labour intensive farms, indicating
that poultry workers were most likely responsible for the
infection of the flocks, due to the lack of following strict bio
security protocols
3. Only 12% of labour-extensive farms with young birds got
infected, indicating that farms with a high-level of bio
security and limited contact between humans and poultry
are better protected against infections
4. Only 3% of the small Free range and hobby farms got
infected, indicating that direct contact between migratory
birds and poultry plays only a marginal role

14. To summarize
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5. Depopulation of broiler farms and hobby farms around
infected layer farms turned out to be a destruction of
resources
6. Complex culling methods are extremely costly
7. Stamping-out as a strategy is ineffective
8. Stamping-out caused distribution and spreading of the virus

15. What happened in Iowa
during AI outbreak in the USA spring 2015?
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16. Stamp it out!
Within 24 hours:
 Kill all animals
 Destruction all carcasses
 Clean and disinfect the establishments
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17. Stamp it out!
 71 farms were infected, of witch 35 caged layer farms
 33.1 million birds were killed, of witch 32 million layers
were caged layers
 average layer farm-size is 913.000 layers
 Total costs in Iowa: 1 billion USD (total costs USA 8
billion USD
 $ 27,4 million per layer farm/ $30 per layer
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18. Stamp it out!
 Approx. 1,000 to 1,500 workers involved with
Stamping- Out activities per farm
 Total costs in Iowa: 1 billion USD (total costs USA 8
billion USD
 Loss of nearly 8,500 jobs
 Nearly $427 million in lost additional value, more than
half of which is income
 Per layer farm, in average 1.188 tons of carcasses
(average weight 1,3 kg/layer) were disposed
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19. Complete failure of Stamping out strategy
 Per September 18, 2015: Ventilation Shutdown
method is allowed in the USA
 Emergency response by the flip of a switch
 Unprecedented financial Government support for the
poultry industry
 breach of OIE Terrestrial Code
 Economic advantage for the US poultry industry on
the international market
 Total defeat for animal welfare friendly production
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Concentrate on the different drivers
• Introduction of the infection into the farm
• Onward-spread between farms
• Transmission through contact structure between farms
• Wind-mediated spread
• Transmission via rodents and farm dogs
Neutralize the risks of spreading
• Isolate risks
• Avoid direct contact
• Avoid large scale operations
Emergency Response on a National level:
Focus on epidemiology and the risks of spreading

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• Seal off the area completely and isolate all who are
living/working on the farm
• Reduce number of responders to an absolute minimum
and if possible, use the farmers’ own labour force to
depopulate the farm
• Prevent contact between responders and infected
birds, carcasses and contaminated materials as much
as possible
• Neutralize virus loads on carcasses before handling
• Avoid the use complex culling & disposal techniques
Focus on Neutralising
infection/contamination risks

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• Create a farm-based emergency response plan
• Make an inventory of all possible transmission routes
• Possible introduction routes
• Possible contamination risks
• Possible routes for further spreading
• Use this plan as the basis for the farms’ bio security plan
• Define what would be the most appropriate culling & disposal
technique
• Compensate and reward animal owners and farmers based on
their active involvement
Emergency Response on local level:
Focus on active involvement of animal owner and farmer

23. Neutralize risks instead of stamping-out
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