Working paper 1 2013 police-military interaction

1 ACMC Paper 1/2013 > Police–military interaction in international peace and stability operations
Police–military interaction in
international peace and stability
operations
Working towards guidelines for action
when on operations.4
The research deliberately focuses
only on the relationship between civilian police and military
personnel, although mention is made of the specific role of
military police. It does not deal with the role formed police
units or constabulary-type forces might play or the role of
private security companies; both of these subjects remain
important areas for future research.5
In this document, therefore, the focus is on the interaction
between the civilian police forces and the militaries of
countries with Anglo–Peelian traditions of civilian policing,
with a strong consent-based tradition and a tradition
of professional volunteer military forces; examples are
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom.6
The document identifies the appropriate divisions of
responsibility for the various forces, taking into account
the hostility of the environment, in order to show areas
where coordination, cooperation or collaboration might
be beneficial and to point to ways in which such interaction
might be profitably pursued.
> Paper 01/2013
BK Greener and WJ Fish – Massey University, New Zealand
Introduction
Policing is an increasingly important part of peace and
stability missions.1
The word ‘policing’ suggests that it is
civilian police who carry out the task, but recent practice
has seen a marked rise in the use of more militarised
formed police units, as well as indications that there is
some acceptance of the use of military police or other
military personnel in policing or policing-type tasks.
Although some new academic work has been done on the
militarisation of law enforcement, broader theoretically
informed research into what has been termed ‘third-
generation civil–military affairs’ remains fledgling.2
In
addition, there is a dearth of doctrine and guidelines relating
to police–military interaction in the field. In 2009 the United
Nations developed pre-deployment training guidelines that
describe generic roles for police and military personnel in
peace operations, but the guidelines are fairly general and
more detailed documentation dealing with the relationship
between the police and the military in operations does not
appear to exist.3
The aim of this project was to help fill the gap between
operationally specific reference documents and abstract
academic arguments in order to provide some general
guidelines for formulating how police and military personnel
should interact and decide on the division of responsibilities

Methodology
The project involved three main activities:
>> more than 60 semi-informal interviews with serving
and retired police and military personnel in Australia,
New Zealand, Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste
>> analysis of policy documents and academic commentary
>> the bringing together of selected Australian Defence
Force, Australian Federal Police, New Zealand
Defence Force and New Zealand Police personnel for
a day-long workshop in June 2011 to discuss various
themes in greater detail so as to elucidate the main
principles and develop recommendations for action.
The people with whom discussions were held came from
a wide range of backgrounds; for example, those from the
Defence Forces were from the Navy, the Air Force, the Army
and the military police and were non-commissioned officers
as well as high-ranking officers. The people chosen also
represented a wide range of operational experience; for
example, policing participants had been involved in police
training and reform in Afghanistan, executive policing in
Solomon Islands, election monitoring in Mozambique, post-
tsunami victim identification in Indonesia, disaster response
in New Zealand, and close protection in Timor-Leste. All
were asked to describe their experience of working with the
police or military in these contexts and were encouraged
to speak about things that worked well and where tensions
arose. The discussions were conducted in an open-ended
manner, and points of commonality and divergence were
noted.
The primary policy documents relating to activities in peace
and stability operations—such as those obtained from the
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the European
Union, Australia and New Zealand—were collated in order
to establish what guidelines for practice exist and what
recommendations have previously been made. The amount
of secondary source material on the subject of police and
military roles and interaction in peace operations is growing
and is to be found in academic journals such as Armed
Forces and Society, International Peacekeeping and Policing
and Society, as well as in reports from institutions such as
the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces,
the US Strategic Studies Institute, the Lowy Institute, the
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, the US Naval
Post Graduate School’s Center for Civil–Military Relations,
and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Finally, the project leaders, Dr Greener and Dr Fish, are
indebted to those who participated in the discussions
and, in particular, those who attended and contributed
to the June 2011 workshop—Senior Sergeant Peter Davis,
Inspector Mal Schwartfeger, Major Tim Hind, Colonel Brian
Cox, Wing Commander Wendy Horder, Major Josh Wineera,
Lieutenant Colonel Nick Floyd, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew
Combes, Dr Jim Rolfe and Dr Tony Murney. The workshop
focused on roles, agents and situations and when and
how various tasks should or can be performed by different
agents. It is predominantly the work of this group, as well as
the interviews and research, additional commentary from
Lieutenant Ken Coombes and Superintendent Jason Byrnes,
and much appreciated support from Inspector Roly Williams,
Inspector Paul Sindlin and Lieutenant Colonel Vern Bennett
that resulted in what follows and the recommendations
made. Any mistakes are, however, the authors’ alone.
Background
During the Cold War policing efforts in peacekeeping
operations typically concentrated on the support,
monitoring, advising and training of local police forces.
This range of roles reflected the peacekeeping norms of the
day, norms that emphasised neutrality and consent-based
operations. The post–Cold War era, however, has seen
policing in peace operations become increasingly complex.
At the beginning of the 1990s UN civilian police monitored
and verified the demobilisation of ex-combatants in Angola,
while in Croatia they were expected to ensure that basic
human rights in UN-protected areas were upheld and in
Mozambique they oversaw the retraining of local police.
From this their policing role broadened and deepened
further. In El Salvador in 1992 the UN became involved in
police reform efforts to an unprecedented degree, and
during the Cambodia mission UN civilian police began to
adopt executive policing roles (that is, having the ability to
arrest and detain) as the mission evolved. By the turn of
the century the situation in Kosovo and East Timor initially
warranted full UN administration of those territories,
meaning the full suite of policing roles was needed to help
restore security, uphold law and order, and help provide
justice for the local people.
The policing role in contemporary peace operations can
involve both stability-related tasks and capacity-building
tasks. In the case of the first category, police personnel
deployed to peace missions can potentially take a more
‘active’ role in the earlier phases of an operation, when an
executive policing mandate grants external police the power
of arrest if there has been a breakdown of law and order.
In the case of the second category, police can be used for

monitoring, training, mentoring and capacity building or
in programs designed to ‘reform, rebuild and restructure’
existing police capabilities.
The ideal scenario of using police to perform these functions
in peace and stability operations is, however, complicated by
a number of factors. Important among these is the difficulty
of deploying police abroad both in sufficient number and
sufficiently quickly. The result is that there might well be
situations, particularly during the early phases of a mission,
in which police officers are simply unavailable to perform the
necessary tasks. This leads to a so-called capability gap, and
in the United States some commentators have described the
use of military units for policing as ‘the least-worst option’
for filling the gap.7
Military personnel have thus been used in
roles such as close protection, detention, traffic control, site
investigation and—particularly controversially—the training
and mentoring of civilian police, as in Iraq and Afghanistan;
for example, the US 2nd Stryker cavalry unit has mentored
the Afghan National Police in Kabul for years. Although
latterly there has been an increase in the number of police
deployed abroad, the problem of insufficient numbers at
present means that military personnel might still be required
to perform some police tasks.
There are a number of reasons for thinking that the potential
blurring of police and military roles in such operations
could be problematic. Upholding the distinction between
the police and the military in democracies is considered
vital to retaining civilian control over the use of force within
state boundaries and in this way is a touchstone of liberal
democratic politics.8
Separation and demilitarisation of
police are recommended in order to keep military forces out
of internal security and to ensure the successful functioning
of democratic practices.9
Police are a vital part of a state’s
capacity to provide for both security and justice, and in
liberal democratic states they play a fundamental role in
the protection of citizens’ rights. Police services and military
forces in liberal democratic countries—particularly those
with Anglo–Peelian traditions of policing—are therefore
deliberately distinct entities, with a different ethos, training,
skill set, outlook and attitude.10
The use of military personnel
to perform policing functions in peace and stability
operations is thus not ideal in terms of concerns about
possible military involvement in internal security, distraction
from core competencies, and a mismatch of ‘troops to
tasking’—something both the police and the military
appear to agree on. Nor is it ideal in that any regular use of
the military to carry out frontline policing in post-conflict
environments runs the risk of making the population feel
as though they are under occupation.
In particular, the question of legitimacy is crucial when it
comes to the likelihood of a local police force persisting
in situ, since policing relies on legitimacy and consent
in transforming power into authority.11
The question
of legitimacy is therefore also central to the ability of
interveners to leave peace operations. The chances for a
lasting and sustainable peace are considerably diminished
if this legitimacy is threatened by a confusion of military and
policing roles and functions in a post-conflict society—on
the part of the interveners and the host government, or
both.12
In post-conflict situations it is also important that
militaries are not tasked to help redress societal problems,
whereas police can potentially do so. Militaries are designed
to be instruments of the political executive; police are
designed to be instruments of law and order. These
fundamentally different starting points have flow-on effects
for determining how such institutions might or might not be
used in different situations. What is key here, then, is not just
what the military can do in peace and stability operations:
it is what they cannot be seen to be doing, or simply should
not do, in such operations.
But even if the problem of the capability gap could be solved
by increasing police numbers, a second important factor
to consider is the hostility of the environments in which
policing work might be required. It might simply be too risky
for police to perform the necessary tasks. What is more, the
fluid nature of the security environment for most peace and
stability missions—which can switch from relatively safe to
dangerous quite quickly—means that, even when police are
available, they may very well still need the support of the
military in order to safely perform the required tasks. This
question of permissibility will greatly affect policy makers,
planners and practitioners seeking to understand how best
to create an ideal division of responsibility between the
police and the military on operations.
Findings and recommendations
Police and military personnel engage in operations in
response to government directives and, these days, are
typically part of much broader peace- or state-building
efforts. In such operations multiple sites of coordination,
cooperation and even collaboration can be required at a
number of levels. One such site concerns a combination of
agencies of a contributing state, as reflected in the current
mantra of ‘whole-of-government’ approaches. Another
might concern cooperation between government and
national or international non-government agencies, as
sometimes suggested by the expression ‘a comprehensive
approach’. Yet another concerns the case of the need for

interstate cooperation in multinational operations, and
another still between agencies of the contributing and
host states.
The primary focus of this project is the first of these sites
of interaction—cooperation and coordination of the police
and the military of a contributing state that is deploying
these personnel to help provide security in a peace or
stability operation. We note a number of recommendations
throughout this document to try to help consolidate best
practice for police-military interaction. In doing so, we
recognise that the Australasian entities examined in this
study might already pursue some or potentially all of
these practices or are working towards them. The findings
of this study will help underline the importance of these
practices in our neighbourhood, but we also consider these
recommendations to be of broader relevance to other
global, regional or national institutions.
Pre-deployment
Project participants’ descriptions of their experiences in the
field revealed some general pre-deployment considerations
that are required to set the scene for functional police–
military interaction in the field. Solid preparatory work
should be done before deployment to help facilitate better
relations in operations. In particular, at the more ‘macro’
level of government, where institutional design and strategic
frameworks are formulated, there needs to be an initiation
of suitable policies and well-directed resourcing to support
and encourage multi-agency liaison. This could range from
broader memorandums of understanding between agencies
to policies that allow for and support the creation of specific
training schedules that outline the police and military roles
and procedures in different projected situations.
Recommendation
It is recommended that governments direct agencies
involved or likely to be involved in peace and stability
operations to develop generic strategic frameworks and
broad policies on inter-agency interaction, independently
of any specific deployments.
Mission-specific policies should be implemented when a
particular deployment is embarked upon. In particular, the
operational pattern of interaction between commanding
officers and political leaders for a particular mission
should be set out clearly and agreed to by all concerned in
advance—especially in relation to command and control
in different phases of the operation and in relation to the
determination of risk. To this end, a regular schedule of
meetings or a system of updating should be arranged early
in the piece. Escalation procedures in particular should be
developed and understood by commanding officers from
both police and military units.
Military forces often have the resourcing and institutional
arrangements to allow them to take the lead in outlining
mission-specific policies. But this does not necessarily mean
they should be the lead agencies in developing such policies.
Military-heavy policies will of their nature be somewhat
skewed by the institutional culture. It would therefore be
preferable that knowledgeable or specialist personnel from
a civilian agency—such as the Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade in Australia or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade in New Zealand—who have sound knowledge
of police and military capabilities act as the coordinating
pivot between police and military advice on these matters.
This is in large part to ensure that policies are made with an
eye to the long-term requirements of peace and stability
operations, rather than being captive to shorter term or
partial needs, although the personnel working in this area
must also understand the capabilities and limitations of
both the police and the military.
Recommendation
It is recommended that before a deployment knowledgeable
or specialist staff based in a civilian agency, and advised
by the military and police, be responsible for coordinating
the development of mission-specific policies to enrich the
broader policies that apply more generally.
Finally, all subject matter expert sources consistently
recommended that there be a considerable degree of
inter-agency interaction during pre-deployment training
and preparation. Desk-based exercises working with all
arms of government need to be established to ensure the
smooth running of whole-of-government approaches before
deployment. Knowledge of what different agencies can and
cannot do in such operations is important so that players in
the relevant sectors of government are able to respond well
to questions or problems that arise.
Recommendation
It is recommended that pre-deployment training and
preparation be conducted with as much cross-over as is
possible or desirable given the different operational needs
of each agency.

Assessing risk and the roles that need to be
played to provide security in operations
One of the primary requirements at the initial planning stage
of an operation is an assessment of risk for the contributing
country. Workshop participants in particular were of the
view that the use of agents less suited to particular roles
potentially increases that risk. An understanding of the roles
of the police and the military in the provision of security is
therefore fundamentally important. In assessing the roles
that need to be played in order to contribute to security
in a peace or stability operation, most participants in the
discussions also asserted that engagement with the local
context is vitally important—particularly in undertaking
an initial needs assessment. Workshop participants were
especially concerned that before deployment contributing
agencies should know what is broken, why, and what can
be done in what time and with what resources. In the light
of this concern and in order to try to establish what an ideal
division of responsibility might be between such agencies
on operations, the various roles that need to be played in
providing security are outlined here and then who might play
these roles is considered.
The following types of roles need to be played in order to
provide security in peace and stability and other operations:
>> strategic planning and decision making
in relation to security priorities
>> governance and the rule of law
>> intelligence
>> special operations
>> targeting
>> protection of civilians
>> securing assets
>> force protection
>> maintenance of public order
>> patrolling
>> responding
>> investigative capability
>> education, PR and liaison
>> training of local police
>> training of local military
>> mentoring of local police
>> mentoring of local military.
A number of discussion participants stressed that many
of these matters are broader than ‘just’ police or ‘just’
military. The centrality of good governance and the rule of
law repeatedly came up in discussions and in the workshop.
Many personnel had been disappointed by experiences
that had seen successful investigations or raids undone by,
among other things, the lack of a functioning justice and
corrections system.
Recommendation
It is recommended that in planning for the policing elements
of peace and stability operations, in particular, civilian lead
agencies give consideration to ensuring the functioning of
the general justice sector of which that policing is a part.
Who plays the roles?
As noted, there can be situations in which police are simply
unable to play the roles asked of them because of either
deployment difficulties or the relative impermissibility of
the environment. This has the consequence that matching
players to roles is not as simple as deciding which agency
should ideally play each role. To try and respect this
consideration, while providing a classification that is simple
enough to be functional, we found it useful to break the tasks
down into the following four categories, which emerged
from discussions with personnel about how they perceived
the desirability of specific roles being played by specific
personnel:
Police only. These are tasks that it is appropriate only for
police to perform. If police are unavailable or incapable of
performing these tasks for any reason, it is better that the
tasks go unperformed. This said, it is assumed that in the
performance of police-only tasks the police might need to
call on the support of the military. An example of this type
of limited supporting role for the military would be use of
military personnel as a general deterrent to resisting arrest
in the case of high-risk arrests.
Police first. These are tasks that police should do, if this is
appropriate, but that could be performed by other agencies
under police guidance and supervision. Again, it is assumed
that the police might need to call on the support of the
military in the performance of these tasks.
Collaborative. These tasks could be performed by either the
police or the military—or possibly even by both agencies
together. The lead agency would need to be determined
case by case.
Military only. These are tasks that are suitable only for
military forces. Reciprocally, however, there could be

situations in which the military might call for support
from the police in performing the tasks. An example of
such limited support would be for police to be ready to
take custody of those suspected of crimes after instances
of military contact.
We found no requirement for a distinct ‘military-first’
category on the grounds that if the military is unable to
perform a certain military task no alternative agency will
be in a position to perform this task in the military’s stead.
As noted, however, this is not to say that the military would
not benefit from the support of other agencies in the
performance of these tasks.
Police-only tasks
A recurrent theme in both the discussions and the workshop
concerned ways in which the police and the military
differ. Such differences influence the ways they tackle the
various tasks assigned to them. (See Appendix A for further
information about the differences between the police and
military roles.)
Although some discussion participants from the military
asserted that they ‘could’ perform policing tasks if asked to
do so, many other military and all police personnel we talked
with felt that the various cultural, educational, material,
legal, organisational and operational differences between
the services meant that there were certain core policing
tasks that simply should not be performed by military
personnel. It was stressed numerous times that skill sets
and mind-sets differ and that military personnel have the
‘wrong optics’ for carrying out a significant proportion of
general police duties. One example was that military training
freely encompasses the use of lethal force and the control
of elements within a given mission space, whereas policing
relies much more on consent and prevention and these are
underpinned by a legitimacy held only by police.
For these reasons the power of arrest is most definitely
considered a police officer’s domain only (although the
power to detain was seen as a more common phenomenon).
Criminal investigations were also thought to be best
performed by civilian police. Nevertheless, some aspects of
this function—such as site preservation for later specialist
investigation or site investigation by military police during
periods of conflict—were seen as tasks that could involve
military input; these are explained in more detail shortly.
It was also evident that most discussion participants
believed that only police should train the local police,
since training is the initial point at which ethos and values
as well as skills are transmitted. Use of the military to
train police has the potential to reinforce trends towards
the militarisation of law enforcement and involvement of
the military in civil affairs at precisely the point where this
should be discouraged.13
Recommendation
It is recommended that the power of arrest, primacy in
criminal investigations and the training of local police
come solely within the purview of ‘police-only’ tasks.
Police-first tasks
Although members of the military often suggested they
were capable of performing a number of policing tasks,
our research made it clear that there was among military
as well as police personnel a level of discomfort about this
possibility. Military personnel were concerned that there
is plenty to train for already and that policing was not and
would not be a core task: personnel commented on the
broader political and social ramifications of any involvement
in such a task. Despite this unease, however, all military
personnel said they were comfortable working with police
and that the experience of RAMSI (the Regional Assistance
Mission in Solomon Islands), in particular, has led to
increased willingness to work in support of police objectives.
With this in mind, a number of areas were identified as
tasks where the military could support police or, if it was
unsafe for police to perform those tasks, perform them
in their stead. The maintenance of public order is already
well established as a police-first task, yet most military
personnel we spoke with had taken part in exercises or
operations where the need to ramp up or ramp down
responses had been central, and since 1999 military
training in maintaining public order has also become more
commonplace, particularly for South Pacific deployments.
Other tasks that were deemed to be ideally performed
by police yet potentially performable by the military were
community liaison and the mentoring of local police forces.
In relation to the first of these, discussions highlighted how
the community engagement work done by military personnel
returning to Timor-Leste in 2006 helped set the scene for
civilian police to follow up with closer liaison efforts. In the
latter case—mentoring—although it was deemed essential
that the police do the initial training of police personnel,
discussion participants generally suggested that if the police
were unable to mentor local police forces for some reason
the military could potentially perform this task under police
guidance. In Afghanistan, for example, police have typically
not been allowed out from ‘behind the wire’ to mentor
their Afghan National Police colleagues in the field. In such
instances military personnel have provided that support.

There are problems with using such a model for mentoring,
however, because of the possibility of sending the ‘wrong
message’ to host states.
We would therefore stress that, for the present, using the
military for police mentoring is to be a last resort and, if
such mentoring must occur, it is a task for military police.
An alternative solution might, however, be to identify
police with military reservist or strong tactical experience
to be classified in such a way as to allow them into the
field. Current operational decision-making procedures do
not expressly allow for direct police input into the choice
of military personnel for such tasks. We would suggest,
however, that it is worth military commanders seeking such
input, both to maximise resources and to minimise risk.
Recommendation
It is recommended that the maintenance of public order
and community liaison be designated ‘police-first’ tasks.
Similarly, for now, the mentoring of local police forces should
be designated ‘police-first’, such mentoring being carried
out by military police if civilian police indicate they are
unable to perform this role. It is further recommended that
alternative options for facilitating police mentoring of local
police in non-permissive environments be investigated by
police agencies.
In this regard we note that military police appear to have
increasingly oriented themselves towards the potential
for policing in less permissive environments. Consider,
for example, the Australian First Military Police Battalion’s
assertion:
The foundations of 1 MP Bn proficiency are the technical
aspects of policing, and the combat survivability
required to execute policing tasks where the operational
uncertainty precludes or restricts operations by civilian
police.14
[emphasis added]
In considering the ramifications of this, discussion
participants acknowledged that military police have fairly
competent levels of police training and that they might
have specialist capabilities—for example, in functioning in
a non-permissive environment, close protection and dog
handling—that civilian police lack, which could make them
potential agents in the performance of police tasks. It was
also noted, however, that military police are not sworn
officers of the law, owe allegiance to the political executive
rather than the law, are bound by hierarchy more than
civilian police, work within a military law framework, have
different methods for interrogating suspects, and have less
experience in dealing with general public matters day to day.
Despite this, most participants considered that, although
not ideal, they would prefer to have (Australian and New
Zealand) military police rather than infantry or other military
personnel performing policing-type tasks were this the
choice presented to them, although they were still cautious
about treating military police as if they were civilian police.
Recommendation
It is recommended that, when civilian police indicate that
they are unable to perform ‘police-first’ tasks, mission
planners consider the use of military police in the first
instance and ensure that provision is made for civilian
police guidance and supervision of those tasks.
For this to work successfully, however, who is ‘supporting’,
who is ‘supported’ and in what phases of an operation need
to be clearly outlined and understood, as do the political and
operational consequences of those decisions.
Recommendation
It is recommended that, once a non–civilian police agency
is deployed, all strategic planning be clearly laid out by
the lead agency and clearly relayed to military and police
leaders. Command and decision-making structures should,
as much as is feasible, be known by all involved in the
mission—civilian, police and military.
Significantly, too, although civilian police were of the
strong view that policing skills and know-how accrue
over time—and most agreed that these are things that
need to be exercised regularly so as to be reinforced—
there were situations where they thought some skills
might usefully be transferred to military personnel. In
particular, site preservation and basic investigative skills
required for evidence collection were seen to be relatively
straightforward, fairly fundamental skills that military
personnel could train for. These were thought to be of
particular use in cases where it was likely that war crimes or
other major criminal activity had occurred and demanded a
response but civilian police were not yet in situ to carry this
out. In fact, the military already has some useful capabilities
in this area. Military police, force protection and explosive
ordnance device personnel have particularly relevant skill
sets. For example, force protection could provide security
through cordons, access control and checkpoints; military
police have some forensic capability; and explosive ordnance
device personnel can provide explosives analysis.
Broader dissemination of a more general awareness of
such matters would, however, be helpful for operational
effectiveness and improved police–military relations.

Recommendation
It is recommended that military personnel receive basic
training in site preservation and evidence collection,
especially when deploying on missions that are likely to
require such skills.
Collaborative tasks
Discussion participants noted that some activities, such
as patrolling, were regularly engaged in by both police and
military—although often motivated by different factors.
For example, both organisations use patrolling to gather
intelligence but do so for different reasons: the police might
seek to interpret the criminal environment and to allocate
resources to resolving problems; the military might seek
to gather intelligence in order to accomplish the mission
at hand. Establishing the utility and desirability of various
patrolling options (for example, joint patrols or police patrols
supported by the military) is an important task given the
impact of such decisions on local perceptions and options
for action. It is also important to note that there are different
types of patrolling. For example, military personnel can
be deployed on security, clearance, listening, fighting,
community engagement, presence, reconnaissance, convoy
escort, and many other types of patrol. Many of these are
solely military in function or purpose and would not be
suitable for police involvement. Similarly, traffic control
through road blocks and cordons and border control
activities are tasks that can at times be performed by either
the police or the military, but it should be noted that the use
of different agents might signal a difference of approach or
attitude towards the purpose of such activities
Other operational activities that have been explicitly joint
in nature are the repatriation of internally displaced people
and preparation for elections, where military personnel
were responsible for securing the perimeter and police were
responsible for searching and maintaining order within the
perimeter.
Most discussion participants agreed that these efforts
generally worked well as long as a fairly clear division of
responsibility had been decided on beforehand. They were
concerned that there must be a clear policy- and decision-
making lead in the mission and that, before being assigned
a particular role on operations, representatives of agencies
should be at the table in the early phases of a mission to
ensure clarity about available capacity and the requirements
of their respective institutions. This recommendation has
already been noted.
Military-only tasks
The remaining tasks—such as force protection, the securing
of assets, and the training and mentoring of local military
forces—were seen as appropriate and desirable for the
military to perform. In the case of training and mentoring,
the reasoning is not so much to do with operational capacity
but more about a general principle that like should train
like—military to train military and police to train police.
Other matters
Cultural differences
As noted, there are major differences between the culture
of the police and that of the military. Misunderstandings
based on these differences emerged time after time in
discussions. For example, members of the police forces
often expressed frustration at the highly systematic planning
of the military, while military members were taken aback by
the tendency of police personnel to ‘plan’ on the way to an
incident, making decisions quickly and with a high degree
of individual responsibility and discretion. This difference
in planning, at the strategic level and particularly the
operational level, causes friction, especially if the rationale
for such a planning style is not known. As with many of the
other concerns raised, familiarity tended to be seen as the
best solution to working through problems connected with
differing planning methods or priorities. It is important for
police to understand, for example, that the detailed planning
required in a military context is not just a result of the risks
involved: it is also a result of the sheer logistics of dealing
with such an organisation. Organisational inertia is inherent
in agencies dealing with large numbers of people, equipment
and machines and is something police might not be familiar
with. The embedding of Australian Federal Police personnel
as liaison officers in AusAID and the Australian Defence
Force appears to have been highly successful in terms of
‘firefighting’ before problems begin and is something other
agencies should consider.
Recommendation
It is recommended that more permanent interaction
between the police and the military be facilitated by
secondments or exchanges of personnel, as well as shared
training, education, liaison and exercises to increase
interoperability and mutual understanding.

Ranking
Another problem that has arisen at times is caused by the
fact that police ranks are not easily translated into military
ranks. Police personnel on early deployments to RAMSI
commented on the difficulty of conveying their seniority to
military personnel because of the relative ‘flatness’ of police
ranking structures. Pleas were made for a constable with
12 years’ experience to be seen as equivalent in ‘worth’ to
a platoon, rather than being seen as an individual private.
This problem of ranking recognition and equivalence
has been mitigated to some extent by experiments with
brevet ranking (moving inspectors up to superintendent,
for example, for the duration of an overseas operation) or
by the actual removal of ranking altogether in some cases
(with AFP officers at times simply having ‘agent’ status).
Such mechanisms have allowed for flexibility, but each has
attendant problems. Brevet ranking causes difficulties when
‘real’ rankings become known, while the lack of ranking
can add to confusion about who is in charge during a crisis.
Most discussion participants seemed to suggest, however,
that such problems were fairly minor in that leadership and
respect provide for seniority.
Recommendation
It is recommended that consideration be given to the
question of ranking on a case-by-case basis.
Mission complementarity
Additional difficulties have arisen in relation to
incommensurability of levels of pay, benefits such as
accommodation arrangements, rotation length, working
hours when in the field and, in particular, leave when on
an international deployment. Military personnel often
commented that police seemed to have a much better
‘package deal’—although they also recognised that they
had signed up for international deployments under known
conditions while police might not have come into the job
with such a task in mind. Some particular concerns, such
as the military being ‘dry’ when police could drink alcohol,
were significant despite their specificity and were handled
with variable levels of success. Many of these matters have
been dealt with more directly in recent years or a greater
understanding has developed, helping to alleviate some of
the tensions that can arise, as they did after RAMSI in 2003.
One important factor that seems to help shape how such
differences are ridden out in the field is the personalities
of the commanding officers and how well they can work
together to establish a strong working relationship between
the police and the military.
Recommendation
It is recommended that authorities reconsider the
complementarity of operational matters relating to leave,
pay and other aspects of deployment where possible. It will
be necessary for differences to remain between police and
military personnel in some areas, but in other areas greater
complementarity will help to ease tensions and improve
operational effectiveness. Where differences do need to
remain, personnel should be told why.
We also note that this awareness goes hand in hand with a
deeper understanding between personnel of all agencies
that remuneration and conditions will vary not just between
agencies within a country, but also between personnel from
other countries.15
Deployment length and handovers
Deployment length was a consistent concern among police
personnel: deployments of six months were seen as far too
short to gain any ground in an operation; nine months was
generally viewed as the minimum time frame needed. Most
police called for 12-month deployments—or two years for
specialist roles. Handover periods were also identified as
crucial to mission success. Staggering the rolling of major
appointments for both police and military personnel allows
for additional continuity in the provision of security, as does
the allocation of time for senior personnel to provide advice
to incoming officers.
Recommendation
It is recommended that authorities reconsider the length of
deployments, the pattern of handovers, and the effects of
high tempo and rotation on overall mission goals in both the
police and the military sectors.
Conclusion
Finally, it is important to note that police–military
interaction in places such as Solomon Islands, Timor-
Leste and Afghanistan has been very much dependent on
personalities—that is, the willingness and ability of key
personnel to engage productively with one another. Although
it might be difficult to do much about the compatibility of
senior personnel in a mission, increased organisational
awareness of the complementarity of roles available, as
well as of the differing priorities that will apply to the police
and the military in the field, is vital for helping to pin down
general operating principles. The best policy and guidelines
can describe options, but mutually beneficial and symbiotic
functioning can occur only if the people concerned respond
willingly to directives designed to improve cooperation. This

in turn requires that all agencies understand the value an
effective combination of police and military personnel can
bring to peace operations.
Summary of recommendations
The recommendations noted in this document are general
guidelines intended to help consolidate best practice.
We note that a number of institutions—including those
Australasian entities examined in this study—might
already pursue some or potentially all of these practices
or are working towards them. We would also suggest,
however, that these recommendations are of broader
relevance to institutions outside the trans-Tasman context.
1. It is recommended that governments direct agencies
involved or likely to be involved in peace and stability
operations to develop generic strategic frameworks
and broad policies on inter-agency interaction,
independently of any specific deployments.
2. It is recommended that before a deployment
knowledgeable or specialist staff based in a
civilian agency, and advised by the military
and police, be responsible for coordinating the
development of mission-specific policies to enrich
the broader policies that apply more generally.
3. It is recommended that pre-deployment training
and preparation be conducted with as much
cross-over as is possible or desirable given the
different operational needs of each agency.
4. It is recommended that in planning for the policing
elements of peace and stability operations, in
particular, civilian lead agencies give consideration
to ensuring the functioning of the general justice
sector of which that policing is a part.
5. It is recommended that the power of arrest, primacy in
criminal investigations and the training of local police
come solely within the purview of ‘police-only’ tasks.
6. It is recommended that the maintenance of public order
and community liaison be designated ‘police-first’ tasks.
Similarly, for now, the mentoring of local police forces
should be designated ‘police-first’, such mentoring being
carried out by military police if civilian police indicate
they are unable to undertake that role. It is further
recommended that alternative options for facilitating
police mentoring of local police in non-permissive
environments be investigated by police agencies.
7. It is recommended that, when civilian police indicate
that they are unable to perform ‘police-first’ tasks,
mission planners consider the use of military police in
the first instance and ensure that provision is made for
civilian police guidance and supervision of those tasks.
8. It is recommended that, once a non–civilian police
agency is deployed, all strategic planning be clearly laid
out by the lead agency and clearly relayed to military
and police leaders. Command and decision-making
structures should, as much as is feasible, be known by
all involved in the mission—civilian, police and military.
9. It is recommended that military personnel
receive basic training in site preservation and
evidence collection, especially when deploying on
missions that are likely to require such skills.
10. It is recommended that more permanent interaction
between the police and the military be facilitated by
secondments or exchanges of personnel, as well as
shared training, education, liaison and exercises to
increase interoperability and mutual understanding.
11. It is recommended that consideration be given to
the question of ranking on a case-by-case basis.
12. It is recommended that authorities reconsider the
complementarity of operational matters relating to
leave, pay and other aspects of deployment where
possible. It will be necessary for differences to remain
between police and military personnel in some
areas, but in other areas greater complementarity
will help to ease tensions and improve operational
effectiveness. Where differences do need to
remain, personnel should be told why.
13. It is recommended that authorities reconsider the length
of deployments, the pattern of handovers, and the
effects of high tempo and rotation on overall mission
goals in both the police and the military sectors.
Notes
1. See Pfaff (2007) and Sedra (2006).
2. Rosen (2009) claims that we are in a third generation of
civil–military relations: the first was a domestic debate
about the military and the soldier’s role in relation to
the state; the second was the literature on the military
contribution to humanitarian interventions or complex
humanitarian emergencies; and the third is a deeper
look at the multi-agency roles played in international
operations. One of the few considerations of this is
provided by Rasmussen (1999), who considered the
response to the Los Angeles riots as well as British
involvement in Ulster in suggesting some more general

guidelines for the possible use of armed forces in
internal security roles. The main recommendations
dealt with the following: planning for public order
emergencies in advance; police to train to deal with
public order in a way that does not exacerbate the
situation; police to always be accountable; police to
develop procedures and techniques that make them
legitimate; and if use of reinforcement (including
military) is needed there must be ‘well established
procedures and societally approved criteria’.
3. UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (2009a, 2009b, 2008).
4. We owe the use of the term ‘division of responsibility’
to Lieutenant Colonel Nick Floyd, Australian
Defence Force, who suggested it in the stead of
‘division of labour’ to highlight the significance
of work done in planning and preparation, not
just in operational ‘boots on the ground’.
5. For more on the role of formed police units as part of
the spectrum dealing with capability gaps in particular,
see Dziedzic (2003); De Weger (2009); Wiatrowski,
Pino & Pritchard (2008); and Zimmerman (2005).
6. The focus here is on policing models used in
Great Britain rather than Northern Ireland.
7. Keller (2011).
8. Dunlap Jr (1991) and Gray (2008).
9. Watts (2001).
10. For an overview of literature debating
the contemporary relationship between
police and military, see Weiss (2011).
11. Turk (1982, p. 115).
12. As noted by Last, coercive capacity in particular ‘raises
questions about consent, legitimacy and the public
interest in international missions’ (2010, p. 34).
13. Friesendorf & Penska (2008).
14. 1st Military Police Tactical Policing Conops
Brief 2010, Powerpoint for ADF.
15. Thanks to Superintendent Jason Byrnes for this point.
Appendix A Police and military roles
Police principles—1829 Soldiers’ rules—1947, 1993
1. Prevent crime rather than repressing it. 1. Fight only enemy combatants.
2. Depend on public approval. 2. Harm none who surrender.
3. Secure willing observance of laws. 3. Do not torture or kill POWs.
4. Cooperation reduces the need for physical force. 4. Collect and care for all wounded—friend or enemy.
5. Offer impartial service to law, rather than pandering to public
opinion, friendly good humour and courtesy.
5. Do not attack medical personnel, facilities or equipment.
6. Use force only as a last resort, and use only the minimum amount
of force necessary.
6. Destroy no more than the mission requires.
7. All citizens have police responsibilities. 7. Treat all civilians humanely.
8. Do not judge guilt or innocence. 8. Respect private property and possessions.
9. The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder. 9. Prevent and report violations of the law of war.
Source: Reith (1956), Friedland (1996), as cited in Last (2010).
Military component Traditional peacekeeping operations.
Multi-dimensional operations
Monitor or supervise military arrangements that
parties to a conflict have agreed on.
Create a secure and stable environment for other
elements of the peace process to be implemented.
Police component Can be deployed either as individual UNPOL or as
formed police units to either traditional or multi-
dimensional peace operations.
Play a role in establishing public safety and
preventing crime as well as facilitating rule of law.
Collaborate closely with civilian components
such as human rights, judicial and civil affairs and
corrections.
Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2009a).

Friesendorf (2012) characterises the differences between
military and police tasks thus:
>> material characteristics—equipment
and technology used
>> educational characteristics—a focus on
combat and concept of ‘friend and foe’ versus
persuasion of citizens and criminals
>> cultural characteristics—language,
appearance, place of living, beliefs
>> legal characteristics—military laws and
statutes and international humanitarian law
versus civil, criminal and police law
>> organisational characteristics—emphasis
on hierarchy and secrecy in large units
versus discretion and smaller units
>> operational characteristics—combat versus
prevention and investigation of crime
and reply to service requests.
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