The politics of identity and wars of fragmentation of states stern from broken promises by political leaders and state authorities to respect the convenants reached by founding fathers of most modern states thereby leading to increasing ethno/cultural nationalism and wars of identity. We have seen these across the literature from former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, Rwanda, Sudan, Cameroon, Togo, Ghana, Central African Republic, Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Ivory Coast.. The application of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in its pre UN non approval in Europe to the post application by UN in Lybia has given us the reason to believe that sustainable peace in each state must respect the foundation doctrine of which each country was created, else Africa in particular will continue to witnessed endless wars in age when drone technology and assymetric warfare has gained currency.

1. By Dr. Daniel Ekongwe
Director with the Pan African Institute for Development PAID International
PAID Publications: No. 5 2019
Title: UNITY, BETRAYAL AND FAILED STATES IN MODERN TIMES
OH FATHERLAND…..beware of wars of identity and fragmentation of states
In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic the then president of Serbia refused to recognize the autonomy of Kosovo which
was guaranteed under the Yugoslavian constitution of 1974. Kosovo Albanians responded by proclaiming a
governing structure and carried out non-violent protests against the Serb government to regain its autonomous
status. Later, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was created and conducted systematic attacks against
Yugoslavian security forces beginning in 1997. In retaliation the Serb army engaged a brutal and systematic
campaign of ethnic cleansing against Kosovo Albanians.
The UN Security Council failed to authorize the use of force or intervention to halt the ethnic cleansing because
Russia warned that it would oppose any resolution authorizing the use of force. Despite the Security Council’s
Resolution 1199 in 1988 which called for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of the Yugoslavian forces the Serbian
security machine continued in their ethnic cleansing campaign. On January 29, 1999, NATO engineered
negotiations between the Serbs and Kosovo Albanian at Rambouillet where the two parties discussed:
 Disarmament of the KLA
 Withdrawal of Yugoslav forces, and
 Kosovo’s status.
However, the negotiation failed due to the refusal of the Serb government to sign the agreement. To halt the
ethnic cleansing, on March 24 NATO without Security Council authorization initiated an air campaign against
Yugoslavia… a 78 day campaign.
Reasons for NATO Intervene in Kosovo
Javier Solana stated the then Secretary General of NATO said that:
The objective of NATO was to prevent more human suffering and more repression and violence against the
civilian population in Kosovo and that NATO must halt the violence and bring an end to the humanitarian
catastrophe that was unfolding in Kosovo. More NATO has a moral duty to do so.
At the Security Council the US delegate stated that the intervention was necessary to respond to:
 Belgrade’s brutal persecution of Kosovo Albanians,
 Violations of international law,
 Excessive and indiscriminate use of force,
 Refusal to negotiate to resolve the issue peacefully and
 Military build-up in Kosovo.
 Canadian emphasized the humanitarian nature of the intervention
The Canadian position was stated that humanitarian considerations underpin their action and Canada could not
stand by while innocent children are murdered and entire population is displaced the burning of villages and
looting and a population is denied its basic rights. The intervention was driven by the humanitarian concerns of
NATO member states which can be explained through the liberal lens. The concerned was that the conflict in
Kosovo could spread and produce refugee flows that could bring stability in the region. The proximity of Europe
to the conflict zone and the fear of its spread motivated some European states to intervene and to support the
intervention for their own security….national security interest.
President Clinton stated that one of the purposes of the intervention was to ensure the credibility of NATO in
Europe. NATO is the US tool to maintain its hegemony around the globe. By intervening in a conflict in
faraway Eastern Europe, aim of the US was to prevent Russia from becoming influential in the region. NATO
had since 1994 increased its membership in the region by admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
Some scholars have observed that the expansion gave NATO the role to preserve order in Eastern Europe in the
absence of Soviet threat.

2. In the post-Cold War era and with emphases to stakes in Africa the US perceives Russia and China as a potential
threat to Western interest. The US can justify its actions by exaggerating “the Russian and Chinese threat.
Although ignoring humanitarian interests of NATO might be wrong, security concerns of European states and
US’s power-seeking nature justifies her greater explanatory power for the politics of interventionism.
Establishing the Doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
Most interventions in the internal affairs of independent states are not based purely on humanitarian concerns but
are driven by the national interests of the states or organizations steering the campaign. Holzgrefe defines
humanitarian intervention as: the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed
at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other
than its citizens, without permission of the state within the territory where force is applied. Like we have just
seen above.
After facing criticism from the intervention in Kosovo as an interest-driven intervention the international system
propelled by Western interest has turned to promote one focusing on civilian protection in humanitarian crises.
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), established by the Canadian
government proposed the notion of the responsibility to protect (R2P).
R2P is defined as the responsibility of states as well as of the international community to protect civilians from
human rights violations. After unanimously adopted at the 2005 World Summit, R2P was said to be the basis of
the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. As in the case of Kosovo the intervention in Libya was based on
national interests of Western states.
NATO intervention in Kosovo was the “pre-R2P” case and the NATO intervention in Libya was the “post-R2P”
case.
In the 1990s, the UN Security Council failed to respond timely and decisively to several gross human rights
violations including genocide in Rwanda (1994) and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo due to the application of the
Westphalia doctrine:
 Principle of non-interference of sovereignty
 Principle of Autonomy and
 Principle of Territoriality.
Responding to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s call for reconciling the dilemma between sovereignty and
human rights, the Canadian government took initiatives to establish the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 which the bases of the “responsibility to protect”
(R2P). According to the ICISS’s report “Responsibility to Protect,” R2P consists of three pillars:
 States have the primary responsibility to protect their citizens from crimes against humanity, ethnic
cleansing, genocide, and war crimes,
 The international community has the responsibility to assist states in fulfilling their responsibility to
protect citizens, and
 The international community has the responsibility to react to human rights violations if states are
unable or unwilling to fulfil their responsibility through political or economic sanctions, and
 The use of force as a last resort.
R2P was established based on the idea of sovereignty as responsibility. According to the UN sovereignty
embraces a dual responsibility:
 Externally to respect sovereignty of other states and
 Internally to respect and protect human rights of citizens within the state.
The ICISS report argues that state sovereignty implies responsibility and the primary responsibility for the
protection of its people lies with the state itself. With the redefined sovereignty, a state would lose the right
to sovereignty when it is unable or unwilling to protect citizens, and the responsibility to protect them
should be borne by the international community of states. Thus, the ICISS challenged traditional
understanding of sovereignty as right by emphasizing the responsibility of a state as a holder of sovereignty to
manage its internal affairs.

3. From thence we see a shift of ICISS language from “the right to intervene” to “the responsibility to
protect.” The shift of language suggests that the focus is now placed on victims who suffer from violence rather
than on intervening states that pursue national interests. Gareth Evans, a co-chair of the ICISS, states:
“The whole point of embracing the new language of the responsibility to protect is that it is capable of generating
an effective, consensual response to extreme, conscious-shocking cases in a way that “right to intervene”
language simply could not.
The report stipulates six criteria for military intervention including:
 Right authority,
 Just cause,
 Right intention,
 Last resort,
 Proportional means, and
 Reasonable prospects.
First, military intervention must be authorized by the right authority – the UN Security Council. To make the
Security Council a more competent body that can respond to humanitarian crises, the ICISS encourages
Council’s permanent members to refrain from exercising the veto when “quick and decisive action is needed to
stop or avert a significant humanitarian crisis.
Second, just cause refers to whether there is large scale loss of life or large scale killing with genocidal intention
or ethnic cleansing.
Third, the intervention should be driven by the right intention – humanitarian interests, not by national
interests.
Fourth, military intervention is only justified as a last resort after all preventive measures, such as political and
economic sanctions are attempted and failed, and a state continuously is failing to protect citizens.
Fifth, use of force should be proportional, meaning that it should be “the minimum necessary to secure the
humanitarian objective in question.
Sixth, military intervention is only regarded as a success if it achieved humanitarian objectives. Thus, the ICISS
clarified in detail when and how states can militarily intervene.
Although the doctrine of R2P was established outside the UN framework it has become an UN agenda.
In 2005 R2P was unanimously adopted by the heads of state at the World Summit. Global leaders agreed that
states have the primary responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. If states fail to fulfil their responsibility, the responsibility to protect will yield to the
international community through various means including use of force.
The specific provisions for R2P were stipulated in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome
Document:
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their
incitement, through appropriate and necessary mean.
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to
help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities
manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity.
How and why did NATO Intervene in Libya (2011)
The Arab spring for political reforms led to an uprising in Libya against the Muammar el-Gadhafi. Libyan
protesters were killed by security forces in Benghazi and other eastern cities in February 2011. On February 26,

4. the Security Council adopted Resolution 1970, establishing an arms embargo and imposed sanctions on Gadhafi
and his family. In March, the UN also dispatched some officials to Libya to persuade Libyan government
officials to end the violence. Also, Ban Ki-moon the then UN Secretary General personally spoke with Gadhafi
on the phone to persuade his compliance with the resolution. However, every effort at diplomacy failed. On
March 17, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, authorizing “all necessary measures…to protect
civilians…” the next day, NATO air forces initiated bombing on Libya.
Just as in Kosovo’s case, NATO claimed that the intervention saved Libyan civilians from Gadhafi’s
aggression. NATO also successfully collapsed the Gadhafi regime, though the purpose of the intervention was
not regime change.
NATO member states expressed humanitarian concerns about the imminent threat in Libya. President Obama
stated that the world could not stand idly when a tyrant tells his people there will be no mercy. French President
Sarkozy also claimed that in Libya, the civilian population that is demanding nothing more than the right to
choose their own destiny is in mortal danger. The UN Security Council on its part concluded that attacks of pro-
Gadhafi forces amounted to crimes against humanity.
NATO intervention in Kosovo was illegal due to lack of Security Council authorization, whereas the
intervention in Libya was legal because the Security Council in Resolution 1973 provided the coalition with the
legitimate authority to intervene. NATO recognizes the Security Council as the legitimate authority that can
authorize intervention, which is stipulated in ICISS’s report.
The international community has become more responsive to humanitarian crisis with the responsibility to
protect doctrine in high gear. While it took almost a decade for the international community to mobilize the
coalition in Kosovo’s case, it took only a month for the Security Council to authorize the use of force in Libya
International community has become more responsive to humanitarian crises.
Both interventions were not fully supported by the international community. In Kosovo’s case Russia warned
that it would use its veto against any resolution authorizing the use of force. In Libya’s case, the Security
Council’s authorization of the use of force was not fully supported also. Brazil, China, Germany, India, and
Russia abstained from voting expressing opposition of use of force.
 Brazil stated that they were not convinced that the use of force would lead to the realization of the
common objectives which was the immediate end to violence and the protection of civilians.
 China argued she is always against the use of force in international relations
 Russia and China abstained because as Russia stated, they did not want to prevent the adoption of the
resolution.
First pillar of R2P calls for states’ responsibility to protect and defend its population is mentioned in Resolution
1973,
Second pillar that the international community has the responsibility to assist the state to fulfil its primary
responsibility
Third pillar of R2P the international community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures.
Done 15 June 2019