The physical protection of knowledge, assets and personnel is key to any security system. Closely associated with physical security ar the technical security safeguards needed to guard sure facilities against intelligence assortment or observation and security procedures adopted to observe and management physical access to facilities and material. Government rules for {cover|for defense} of classified info cover construction and storage necessities (facilities, locks, alarms, guards), technical security necessities obligatory on facilities storing classified info (surveillance countermeasures, TEMPEST, audio attenuation), and procedures moving the conduct of operations at intervals these facilities (inspections, document management, visit certification, and badges). The Commission\'s focus was totally on the domestic setting wherever there\'s the best potential for value savings, a lower level of threat, and since it lends itself additional without delay to uniformity than do facilities at overseas locations. Our review was restricted to the protection of classified info and material. It didn\'t embrace protection of weapons, munitions, or nuclear devices that ar ruled by separate rules. Recently there are important policy changes moving physical security at intervals the intelligence service. However, it seems that cross-program management for physical, technical, and procedural security countermeasures isn\'t uniform. The relationships with industrial contractors vary from relatiative compliance inspections to problem-solving recommendation and help. additionally, several of our physical security policies ar out of date, don\'t seem to be supported actual threat, conflict with one another, and haven\'t been enforced in an exceedingly uniform fashion. As a result, the top user is moon-faced with a patchwork of multiple standards, exaggerated prices as a result of facilities can\'t be shared, and irrational things wherever info classified at a lower level (Confidential and Secret) is usually additional strictly protected than our government\'s most sensitive technologies and operations. The large choice of physical, technical and procedural security necessities obligatory on trade is that the principal concern that cause the event of the National Industrial Security Program (NISP). For Confidential and Secret info, the Defense Industrial Security Program needs that contractors be inspected each six months, that guards physically check safes that hold classified material, which tight document management audits and inventories be maintained. Director of Central Intelligence representatives ordinarily examine facilities housing Sensitive compartmentalized info once each 2 years, need alarms instead of valuable guards, and recently have born strict document handling necessities. The Commission seeks to use physical, technical, and procedural security in line with a similar basic risk management principles suggested throughout this report. Securit.

1. The physical protection of knowledge, assets and personnel is key to any security system.
Closely associated with physical security ar the technical security safeguards needed to guard
sure facilities against intelligence assortment or observation and security procedures adopted to
observe and management physical access to facilities and material. Government rules for
{cover|for defense} of classified info cover construction and storage necessities (facilities, locks,
alarms, guards), technical security necessities obligatory on facilities storing classified info
(surveillance countermeasures, TEMPEST, audio attenuation), and procedures moving the
conduct of operations at intervals these facilities (inspections, document management, visit
certification, and badges).
The Commission's focus was totally on the domestic setting wherever there's the best potential
for value savings, a lower level of threat, and since it lends itself additional without delay to
uniformity than do facilities at overseas locations. Our review was restricted to the protection of
classified info and material. It didn't embrace protection of weapons, munitions, or nuclear
devices that ar ruled by separate rules.
Recently there are important policy changes moving physical security at intervals the intelligence
service. However, it seems that cross-program management for physical, technical, and
procedural security countermeasures isn't uniform. The relationships with industrial contractors
vary from relatiative compliance inspections to problem-solving recommendation and help.
additionally, several of our physical security policies ar out of date, don't seem to be supported
actual threat, conflict with one another, and haven't been enforced in an exceedingly uniform
fashion. As a result, the top user is moon-faced with a patchwork of multiple standards,
exaggerated prices as a result of facilities can't be shared, and irrational things wherever info
classified at a lower level (Confidential and Secret) is usually additional strictly protected than
our government's most sensitive technologies and operations. The large choice of physical,
technical and procedural security necessities obligatory on trade is that the principal concern that
cause the event of the National Industrial Security Program (NISP).
For Confidential and Secret info, the Defense Industrial Security Program needs that contractors
be inspected each six months, that guards physically check safes that hold classified material,
which tight document management audits and inventories be maintained. Director of Central
Intelligence representatives ordinarily examine facilities housing Sensitive compartmentalized
info once each 2 years, need alarms instead of valuable guards, and recently have born strict
document handling necessities.
The Commission seeks to use physical, technical, and procedural security in line with a similar
basic risk management principles suggested throughout this report. Security standards ought to
offer 2 uniform degrees of protection for classified info. selections to adopt special protection

2. safeguards ought to be primarily based upon risk management analysis of the worth of the
quality, the threats and vulnerabilities, and therefore the prices of protection. the connection
between government and trade ought to be a tangle resolution partnership that maximizes
reciprocity. New procedural mechanisms ought to be instituted to terminate unnecessary controls
and facilitate simple reassigning cleared personnel.
Today's physical security policies evolved within the context of the conflict once it had been
usually assumed the enemy would try penetration and it had been necessary to stay them out at
virtually any value. Organizations began to severally adopt completely different rules governing
the protection of classified info. As a result there's no single facility commonplace. Facilities
cleared for DoD Special Access Programs have rules which can vary from facility to facility and
from program to program. Facilities housing Sensitive compartmentalized info (SCI) ar ruled by
the Director of Central Intelligence Directives. Facilities holding collateral info follow differing
standards looking on that organization is that the sponsor. Application of those differing
standards by individual government agencies is additionally uneven, ensuing often in one bureau
being unwilling to share house with another agency although they each seemingly use a similar
commonplace.
A facility's security might embrace alarms, guards, security containers (safes), access
management devices, television system, locks, special construction necessities, and a bunch of
different countermeasures. It additionally might embrace a demand for 2 individuals to be in shut
proximity in the slightest degree times therefore on deter the unauthorized removal or repeating
of classified material. With total risk turning away because the goal, the addition of every of
those measure is even by presumptuous that the measure can offer an extra live of protection.
value isn't an element.
The physical security countermeasures at one industrial facility embrace a fence, roving guards,
and automatic building access controls. within the power, there's additionally a specially created
area to that access is controlled by cipher and combination door locks. Moreover, the program
manager of a special access program needed that the five-drawer safe accustomed store program
material have every drawer afraid although the safe was within a region already afraid.
Yet the good majority of past compromises have concerned insiders, cleared persons with
licensed access World Health Organization may circumvent physical security barriers, not
outsiders breaking into secure areas. we've had varied incidents of classified info being removed
by cleared personnel, however no documented proof leading U.S. to believe Associate in
Nursing agent of a far off power has ever broken into a classified space within the us.
In reviewing the prevailing standards for physical security and their implementation in apply, the
Commission found that the quantity of physical security provided to guard classified info in
facilities at intervals the us is usually excessive.

3. The Commission acknowledges the many and current policy changes moving physical, technical,
and procedural security necessities that ar being developed, particularly through the
administrator Security Forum and therefore the National Industrial Security Program task forces.
several enhancements have already been introduced and a few value savings already realised. as
an example, the recent administrator policy call to drop the two-person rule has allowable force
savings in some contracts. different parts, like the military SAPs, still enforce this demand. Not
solely do these inconsistencies turn out confusion, they seriously erode the user's religion in
legitimate security practices. Despite some positive efforts, the Commission concludes that
several of the foundations governing physical and technical protection of classified info keep at
intervals the us have nonetheless to realistically replicate the particular threat.
Solution
The physical protection of knowledge, assets and personnel is key to any security system.
Closely associated with physical security ar the technical security safeguards needed to guard
sure facilities against intelligence assortment or observation and security procedures adopted to
observe and management physical access to facilities and material. Government rules for
{cover|for defense} of classified info cover construction and storage necessities (facilities, locks,
alarms, guards), technical security necessities obligatory on facilities storing classified info
(surveillance countermeasures, TEMPEST, audio attenuation), and procedures moving the
conduct of operations at intervals these facilities (inspections, document management, visit
certification, and badges).
The Commission's focus was totally on the domestic setting wherever there's the best potential
for value savings, a lower level of threat, and since it lends itself additional without delay to
uniformity than do facilities at overseas locations. Our review was restricted to the protection of
classified info and material. It didn't embrace protection of weapons, munitions, or nuclear
devices that ar ruled by separate rules.
Recently there are important policy changes moving physical security at intervals the intelligence
service. However, it seems that cross-program management for physical, technical, and
procedural security countermeasures isn't uniform. The relationships with industrial contractors
vary from relatiative compliance inspections to problem-solving recommendation and help.
additionally, several of our physical security policies ar out of date, don't seem to be supported
actual threat, conflict with one another, and haven't been enforced in an exceedingly uniform
fashion. As a result, the top user is moon-faced with a patchwork of multiple standards,
exaggerated prices as a result of facilities can't be shared, and irrational things wherever info
classified at a lower level (Confidential and Secret) is usually additional strictly protected than

4. our government's most sensitive technologies and operations. The large choice of physical,
technical and procedural security necessities obligatory on trade is that the principal concern that
cause the event of the National Industrial Security Program (NISP).
For Confidential and Secret info, the Defense Industrial Security Program needs that contractors
be inspected each six months, that guards physically check safes that hold classified material,
which tight document management audits and inventories be maintained. Director of Central
Intelligence representatives ordinarily examine facilities housing Sensitive compartmentalized
info once each 2 years, need alarms instead of valuable guards, and recently have born strict
document handling necessities.
The Commission seeks to use physical, technical, and procedural security in line with a similar
basic risk management principles suggested throughout this report. Security standards ought to
offer 2 uniform degrees of protection for classified info. selections to adopt special protection
safeguards ought to be primarily based upon risk management analysis of the worth of the
quality, the threats and vulnerabilities, and therefore the prices of protection. the connection
between government and trade ought to be a tangle resolution partnership that maximizes
reciprocity. New procedural mechanisms ought to be instituted to terminate unnecessary controls
and facilitate simple reassigning cleared personnel.
Today's physical security policies evolved within the context of the conflict once it had been
usually assumed the enemy would try penetration and it had been necessary to stay them out at
virtually any value. Organizations began to severally adopt completely different rules governing
the protection of classified info. As a result there's no single facility commonplace. Facilities
cleared for DoD Special Access Programs have rules which can vary from facility to facility and
from program to program. Facilities housing Sensitive compartmentalized info (SCI) ar ruled by
the Director of Central Intelligence Directives. Facilities holding collateral info follow differing
standards looking on that organization is that the sponsor. Application of those differing
standards by individual government agencies is additionally uneven, ensuing often in one bureau
being unwilling to share house with another agency although they each seemingly use a similar
commonplace.
A facility's security might embrace alarms, guards, security containers (safes), access
management devices, television system, locks, special construction necessities, and a bunch of
different countermeasures. It additionally might embrace a demand for 2 individuals to be in shut
proximity in the slightest degree times therefore on deter the unauthorized removal or repeating
of classified material. With total risk turning away because the goal, the addition of every of
those measure is even by presumptuous that the measure can offer an extra live of protection.
value isn't an element.
The physical security countermeasures at one industrial facility embrace a fence, roving guards,

5. and automatic building access controls. within the power, there's additionally a specially created
area to that access is controlled by cipher and combination door locks. Moreover, the program
manager of a special access program needed that the five-drawer safe accustomed store program
material have every drawer afraid although the safe was within a region already afraid.
Yet the good majority of past compromises have concerned insiders, cleared persons with
licensed access World Health Organization may circumvent physical security barriers, not
outsiders breaking into secure areas. we've had varied incidents of classified info being removed
by cleared personnel, however no documented proof leading U.S. to believe Associate in
Nursing agent of a far off power has ever broken into a classified space within the us.
In reviewing the prevailing standards for physical security and their implementation in apply, the
Commission found that the quantity of physical security provided to guard classified info in
facilities at intervals the us is usually excessive.
The Commission acknowledges the many and current policy changes moving physical, technical,
and procedural security necessities that ar being developed, particularly through the
administrator Security Forum and therefore the National Industrial Security Program task forces.
several enhancements have already been introduced and a few value savings already realised. as
an example, the recent administrator policy call to drop the two-person rule has allowable force
savings in some contracts. different parts, like the military SAPs, still enforce this demand. Not
solely do these inconsistencies turn out confusion, they seriously erode the user's religion in
legitimate security practices. Despite some positive efforts, the Commission concludes that
several of the foundations governing physical and technical protection of classified info keep at
intervals the us have nonetheless to realistically replicate the particular threat.