This document provides context for analyzing the rhetoric of nationalist leaders in the US, UK, and France regarding international organizations. It discusses the rise of nationalist sentiment in these countries through figures like Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, and Brexit. The research question examines how these leaders rhetorically address international organizations in speeches. It hypothesizes some cultural differences but similar views in support of nationalism. The document reviews literature on nationalist movements and political communication to provide background and establish the analytical framework.

1. WORDS ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION:
A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF NATIONALIST LEADERS IN THE UNITED STATES,
THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE
Kirstin Anderson
Dr. Toppen
12/8/17
POL-351

2. 1
Introduction
The ever-forward march of the liberal international order has seen, in recent years, the
first true threat to its authority since its induction. There exists in modern-day politics a global
trend of increased in nationalist sentiment in individual countries. These nationalist movements
are most clearly seen in the U.S., through the 2016 campaign and election of Donald Trump, in
France, through the 2016 candidacy of Marine Le Pen and the rising strength of the Front
National party, and in the U.K., through the 2015 Brexit movement and Theresa May’s elevation
to the Prime Ministry following the referendum.
In each of these three countries, nationalism has largely been shaped by rhetoric, with this
rhetoric helping the creation of the individual idealism and standards by which each movement
operates. Rhetoric refers to the way in which an object is discussed; and the way in which an
object is discussed frequently has profound impacts on the object itself (Weaver 1948).
Particularly, this research uses the case studies of Donald Trump in the U.S., Marine Le Pen in
France, and the Theresa May in U.K. to better analyze the way in which international
organization is discussed by nationalist leaders within the rhetorical context of each movement,
and what role this discussion may play in the development of organized movement stances on
international organization.
Research Question and Hypothesis
The questions at the heart of this research are as follows: using speeches as primary data,
how do nationalist leaders within the U.S., U.K., and France rhetorically address the idea of
international organization, both on the campaign trail and in office? And subsequently, what are
the key differences and similarities within these case studies? Hypothetically, in the case studies

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regarding Le Pen, Trump, and May on the campaign trail, this research will serve to show some
cultural differences between the nationalist movements of each country, although each of the
three leaders will theoretically express relatively similar views on international organization. In
the case studies regarding Trump and May post-election, the research will hypothetically show a
difference in their rhetoric regarding international organizations that reflects their elected status.
Literature Review
In reviewing the relevant literature for this topic, I ruminated on two distinct bodies of
research. The first regards nationalist movements, their development and growth. The second
addresses political communication, both in America and abroad, and within a growing, changing
world.
Bart Bonikowski of Harvard University and Paul DiMaggio of New York University
authored a quintessential work on the topic of modern American nationalism in 2016 with the
publication of their article “Varieties of American Popular Nationalism”. Bonikowski and
DiMaggio use latent class analysis (LAC), which allows the researcher to evaluate a variety of
beliefs within individuals, in their work to identify subsets of Americans in relationship to their
nationalistic tendencies and attitudes.
Through this analysis, the researchers’ conclusions diverged from a host of previous
studies that unequivocally assumed a neat association between nationalism and other ideological
associations. Rather, this research differentiates between two types of nationalism—civic and
ethnocultural—and distinguishes between types of nationalism and nationalist thought within the
United States, refusing to cage nationalist sentiment into one neat box of ideological simplicity.
Bonikowski and DiMaggio divide American adults into four broad categories: “restrictive” and

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“creedal” nationalists, the middle-ground identifiers, who together make up 60% of the
population, and “ardent” nationalists and “the disengaged”, the spectrum bookends, which they
lump together to form the other 40% of the population. Restrictive nationalism refers to
respondents who “expressed only moderate levels of national pride but defined being ‘truly
American in particularly exclusionary ways” (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016). In this way,
restrictive nationalists are more ethnocultural nationalists than civic nationalists. Creedal
nationalism refers to responders with high levels of national pride but a relatively low perception
of out-groups who cannot claim “true” Americanism—more civic nationalists than ethnocultural
nationalists. Ardent nationalism refers to nationalists who exhibit high levels of both civic and
ethnocultural nationalism, believing strongly in what might be described as “traditional
American values” and linking those inextricably to certain ethnocultural in-groups. Finally, the
group described as “the disengaged” is referred to as the least nationalistic within the study,
those who “professed particularly low levels of pride in state institutions” and “appeared to
refrain from wholesale engagement with a national identity” (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016).
These definitions, and this study as a whole, provides an excellent backdrop for understanding
American nationalist identification. It is for this reason that Bonikowski and DiMaggio’s
research is the canvas upon which my analysis of American nationalism must be painted. In
2016, the populist nationalist movement led by Donald Trump seemed to transcend historic
ideological associations. To better understand the machinations underlying this unlikely victory,
it is imperative to consult this omnipresent division of American nationalist thought.
A relatively limited set of literature exists in reference to the prominence of nationalist
movements in Europe within the past two years, primarily because of the recent nature of such
incidents as Brexit in Britain and Le Pen campaign in France. Christina Pazzanese’s article

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entitled in the Harvard Gazette “In Europe, Nationalism Rising” neatly analyzes these
movements, paying specific attention to the interplay between populism and ethno-nationalism.
Key in this distinction is the idea that populism is more a form of political discourse than an
ideology, and thus is often associated with a particular ideology in order to give it purpose.
Populism refers to discourse in which the virtuous masses are juxtaposed to the corrupt elites, a
la Donald Trump’s cries to “drain the swamp”, whereas ethno-nationalism is an ideology that
views the “nation” as a set of in-groups from which out-groups are unequivocally excluded.
Pazzanese sees the current state of nationalist movements throughout Europe as fueled by a
combination of both populism and ethno-nationalism. These populist nationalist movements,
Pazzanese argues, have been brought to the forefront by a variety of factors, most notably the
global economic crisis of 2008 and 2009, as well as the perceived threat of the refugee crisis in
recent years. However, Pazzanese also notes that nationalist movements have been a staple of
European politics for years, if a relatively small staple (Pazzanese 2017). However, the global
political climate has allowed for these movements to take center-stage, and it is important to
understand the setting for this shift when studying the recent work of these nationalist
movements in Europe.
In terms of literature on political communication, the bulk of this review focuses mainly
on two influential works, one of which, “Political Communication in America”, by Robert E.
Denton and Gary C. Woodward, deals specifically with political communication in the American
context and one, “An Introduction to Political Communication”, that addresses the future of
political communication in a fashion unrelated to region.
Denton and Woodward, in their critical work “Political Communication in America”,
define political communication as “pure discussion about the allocation of public resources

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(revenues), official authority (who is given the power to make legal, legislative and executive
decision), and official sanctions (what the state rewards or punishes)” (Denton). Denton and
Woodward regard four core characteristics of political communication as well, those being short-
term orientation, communication based on objectives, importance of mass media, and politics as
audience-centered (Denton and Woodward 1990).
Brian McNair expands upon these ideas in his work “An Introduction to Political
Communication”. In the tradition of Denton and Woodward, McNair emphasizes the
intentionality of political communication, which he defines as “purposeful communication about
politics” (McNair 2011), and which includes communication by political actors in order to
achieve specific objectives; communications addressed to political actors by civilians; and
communication regarding political actors and political activities (McNair 2011). McNair
examines political communication on varying levels of interaction, developing the flowchart as
seen in Figure 1. When examining the rhetorical strategies of these nationalist movements and
their leaders, an understanding of the basics of political communication and discourse is vital.
One must adequately understand the ways in which political communication is classified and
used in order to develop an accurate contextual background for rhetorical analysis. All in all, this
(McNair 2011)

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speaks to the notion that political communication and political rhetoric is intentional—an
important truth if one is to believe Weaver’s fundamental above-mentioned understandings that
rhetoric affects reality and that ideas have consequences.
Methodology
The analysis of nationalist rhetoric on international organization shown in this research is
a culmination of a three-part methodology. First, in order to locate instances of discussion
regarding international organization within my texts of interest, I developed a matrix of specific
“key words” used to cue that topic, and searched for these words in each speech. These words
were as follows:
global globalist globalism
international internationalist internationalism
European Union (EU) NATO United Nations (UN)
international organization sovereign sovereignty world
After using this word bank to identify proper and prominent areas of discussion regarding
international organization, I then analyzed the textual use of words relating to international
organization. I evaluated the location of these words on the pages in juxtaposition to other words
and read the preferred sections for tone and feeling in order to ascertain the ways in which
international organization was viewed within the texts themselves. Finally, I used the
conclusions drawn from these textual analyses to formulate contextual analyses that assessed

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how these specific texts fit into the larger bodies of rhetoric regarding each individual nationalist
movement.
International Organizations in Leader Rhetoric on the Campaign Trail
Campaign rhetoric is an entity in and of itself under the classification of political
communication. Brasher and bolder and more idealistic than most political communication,
campaign rhetoric is more likely to take hardline and polarizing stances on specific issues. For
nationalist movements across the world, this is evident in the discussion of international
organizations by nationalist candidates while on the campaign trail.
Marine Le Pen came to the forefront of French politics early in 2017, amidst a campaign
trail that heavily featured populist candidates. The chosen candidate for the highly nationalistic,
relatively minor Front National party, Le Pen is the daughter of the party’s founder and holds
firm anti-globalist and anti-immigration attitudes. She positioned herself in direct opposition to
international organizations, particularly the European Union, from the very beginning. In
examining Le Pen’s rhetoric on the campaign trail, there are few better places to start than the
launch speech for her presidential campaign, delivered on February 5, 2017.
Within this speech, Le Pen begins her discussion of international organization by
examining the refugee crisis of the time, criticizing both the E.U. and the French government for
allowing what she perceives as underregulated immigration of (primarily Muslim) foreigners
into France. She says, “Our leaders have chosen deregulated globalization. They wanted a happy
outcome, but the result is frightful” (Le Pen 2017), from the start taking a hardline stance on
globalization, leaving no room for further extrapolation of her opinions. Her decision to describe
this globalization as “deregulated” and “frightful” brings to mind a particular and deliberate

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sense of chaos that Le Pen seems to hold quite forcefully in tandem with the idea of international
organization. A particularly anti-European Union politician, Le Pen widely views globalism and
international organization to be part and parcel of one another, with international organizations
threatening national sovereignty while pushing for an ever more global society.
Le Pen goes on to name what she perceives as France’s two most dangerous political
enemies, the first of which she defines as “economic and financial globalism, of which the
European Union, the financiers and the domesticated political class are its zealous servants” (Le
Pen 2017). Here, Le Pen use rhetoric that describes the European Union, among other political
actors who are pro-international organization, as almost religiously subjugated to economic
globalism. While this language hearkens to images of weakness and humiliated deference, Le
Pen also refers to economic globalism and its proponents as the “enemy”, revealing that she also
views these entities as insidious to her country’s cause. She goes on to warn her listeners that this
financial globalism enforced by the European Union “kills by asphyxia” (Le Pen 2017).
Le Pen’s rhetoric in regard to globalism and international organization is fierce. The
words she uses in the same breath as “globalism” reflect her disdain for international
organization. Indeed, Le Pen sees globalism as deeply anti-French, the antithesis of the country
as a whole, stating “globalism is based, as we see, on the negation of the values on which France
was built and on the principles in which the immense majority of French people still recognize
themselves: the pre-eminence of the person and therefore its sacred character, individual freedom
and therefore individual consent, national feeling and therefore national solidarity, equality of
persons and therefore the refusal of situations of submission” (Le Pen 2017). Within this
campaign-launching speech, Le Pen strikes to the heart of one of her most fundamental beliefs.

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She details globalism as immovably juxtaposed to French nationalism, the two utterly
irreconcilable, with globalism positioned as the ultimate enemy of all things truly French.
Predating the emergence of Le Pen’s movement by just months, Donald Trump’s
surprisingly successful primary and presidential campaigns in the United States represented
another facet of the populist nationalist movement. In his acceptance speech for the Republican
presidential nomination, Trump addressed the issue of international organization primarily in
respect to the role of the United States in juxtaposition to international trade organizations,
stating in no uncertain terms that “Americanism, not globalism, will be our credo” (Trump
2016). Trump is particularly critical of the handling of terrorism by international organizations,
believing the international community has taken to soft of an approach in dealing with terrorist
organizations such as ISIS. He specifically mentions NATO in this vein, saying “NATO was
obsolete, because it did not properly cover terror, and also, that many of the member countries
were not paying their fair share” (Trump 2016).
In this speech, Trump appeals directly to his most solidified support base, made up of
middle-class, blue-collar citizens from America’s flyover states, those affected most personally
by the lost of manufacturing jobs within the United States. He targets NAFTA, other
international trade deals, and their supporters as the villains in this narrative, stating “America
has lost nearly one-third of its manufacturing jobs since 1997, following the enactment of
disastrous trade deals supported by Bill and Hillary Clinton. Remember, it was Bill Clinton who
signed NAFTA, one of the worst economic deals ever made by our country” (Trump 2016). He
also points toward the entrance of China into the WTO, the development of the TPP, and South
Korea trade deal as having damaging effects on the American economy.

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In very much the same vein as Le Pen, Trump particularly rejects economic globalism.
Trump uses harsh rhetoric in relationship to these organizations, describing them in his
trademark articulate and insightful fashion as “job-killing”, “destructive”, “colossal mistakes”,
and “the worst”. No international trade union is immune from the verbal dissection of Donald
Trump. This appeal to the working classes in opposition of “job-killing” trade deals creates an
excellent scapegoat for blue-collar unrest that meshes perfectly with Donald Trump’s nationalist
cry to “Make America Great Again”. Trump juxtaposes the natural interests of the United States
with those of international trade organizations, making a statement similar to Le Pen’s that the
mission and values of the nation are immovably opposed to those held by international
organizations. While Trump does not go so far as to refer to international organizations as “the
enemy”, he does call at least for the reformation and renegotiation of some of these in order to
more effectively serve what he sees as the advancement of American national interests.
The U.K.’s Theresa May ascended to Downing Street following David Cameron’s 2016
resignation, a response to the passing of the British referendum for independence from the
European Union—a political event fraught with nationalist implications that has come to be
commonly known as “Brexit”. May represents a period within the British Conservative Party that
identified with nationalist perspectives more strongly than any period in recent history, including
the one in existence just thirteen months before that elected the pro-E.U, Cameron to office. She
frequently spoke directly to this growing nationalist sentiment during her time on the campaign
trail. This is most evidently seen in her delivery of a speech on June 5, 2017 commonly referred
to as her “Strong Leadership” speech.
Within this oration, May addresses Britain’s referendum and the subsequent inevitable
invocation of Article 50. Particularly, May focuses on three main criticism of international

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organization, which she gives as reasons to “take back” British sovereignty. The first criticism is
that of the E.U,’s economic power, with May declaring that Britain would “no longer pay huge
sums to the European Union every year but spend that money on our priorities here at home”
(May 2017). The second highlights the E.U.’s control of borders, and the third focuses on the
practice of international law within the European Court of Justice. The descriptions of each of
these criticisms form a rhetorical strategy in which May paints Britain as oppressed and stifled
by the weight of the E.U. By exiting the E.U., then, May sees Britain as reclaiming its national
sovereignty, throwing the yoke of European Union control of economic policy, border control,
and law.
May’s plan for Britain does not exclude the possibility of some form of international
organization, however. In contrast with Le Pen and Trump, May did not wholly disdain all
international organizations so much as the particular international organization of the European
Union. Rather, May advocated in this address for an independent Britain to engage in
international cooperation on its own terms. She suggested that Britain “will forge a new deep and
special partnership with Europe – allowing us to trade and cooperate with our nearest neighbors
– but we will also reach out beyond Europe to strike new trade deals for our goods and services
with old allies and new friends around the world too” (May 2017). This form of nationalist
rhetoric espoused by May has far less to do with isolationist or protectionist themes present in
the rhetoric of Le Pen and Trump, and far more to do with a desire to separate Britain from what
May views as the oppressive and manipulative umbrella of the European Union, which would
allow Britain the opportunity to engage in international organization on its own.

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International Organizations in Leader Rhetoric in Office
While Marine Le Pen did not win the 2017 French election, falling instead to the
populism of Emmanuel Macron and the En Marche party, Donald Trump won the American
presidency in November 2016 and Theresa May won the British prime ministry in July 2016.
Following their elections, both Trump and May delivered speeches that directly addressed
matters relating to international organizations. An analysis of these speeches is necessary in
order to compare and contrast post-election rhetoric with campaign rhetoric in reference to
international organization.
Donald Trump delivered his first address to the United Nations on September 19, 2017.
His oratory was rife with nationalist rhetoric, as he petitioned the individual member states of the
United Nations to uphold their individual sovereignties against all opposition. In this, Trump
played into what he views as the interconnectedness between nationalist ideology and the power
of international organizations. Trump espoused the idea that only individually strong nations can
equate a strong international organization. While Trump held true to his America-first language,
stating “I will always put America first, just like you, as the leaders of your countries will
always, and should always, put your countries first” (Trump 2017), he also took a softer
approach to the idea of international organization than he did in his acceptance speech for the
Republican nomination, promising that “The United States will forever be a great friend to the
world, and especially to its allies” (Trump 2017).
Trump clearly had some constructive criticism to offer the U.N., for his part, needling the
assembly to stop “taking advantage” of the United States and also singling out the U.N. Security
Council for allowing the participation of member states with long track records of human rights
violations, among other gripes. However, despite these blunt dissentions, Trump’s discussion of

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international organization within the United Nations was actually surrounded by positive
rhetoric. In many instances, words with positive connotations, such as “friend”, “join”, “good”,
“appreciate”, “partner”, and “applaud” accompany mention of words indicative of the
international community of the U.N. Trump even goes so far as to directly compliment some of
the work done by this international organization, saying in once instance “I want to salute the
work of the United Nations in seeking to address the problems that cause people to flee from
their homes” (Trump 2017) in regards to the refugee crisis. It is clear that, while Trump is
critical of the U.N. and its relationship to the U.S., favors reformation and renegotiation of the
U.S. role in within the U.N., he holds far less contempt for this international organization than
the likes of NAFTA or the TPP, which he discussed at length in his earlier speech.
This speech does not see Trump take a hardline approach on American nationalism vs.
international organization. While Trump’s nationalist tendencies emerge in his discussion of
sovereignty and his petition for the renegotiation of the U.S.’s relationship the U.N., Trump (and
by extension, his nationalism) is not anti-U.N. Rather, this speech shows Trump attempting
toward a world order in which some degree of international organization can exist alongside its
individualistic, nationalistic members. International organization in this instance is not the enemy
for Trump, but a deal in need of renegotiation in order to be mutually beneficial.
Perhaps one of the most important speeches in recent history on the theme of
international organization came on September 22, 2017, in Florence. In this speech, Theresa May
fully addressed her plans for the Britain’s role in international organizations post-Brexit for the
first time since her election to the prime ministry. She began by re-affirming the decision of the
referendum, noting that “The British people have decided to leave the EU; and to be a global,
free-trading nation, able to chart our own way in the world. For many, this is an exciting time,

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full of promise; for others it is a worrying one.” Moving past this toward the main thesis of her
speech, May then elaborated on her plans for the shifting relationship between a post-Brexit
Britain and the rest of the European Union. In this section, much of the ire May expressed in
regards to the E.U. earlier in the year dissolves into hopeful affectations of future partnership and
cooperation between independent Britain and the E.U. Alongside key words indicating
international organization are words such as “partnership”, “shared interests”, “cooperation”, and
“benefits”. May has little to criticize in respect to the E.U. in this speech, a very different rhetoric
than was used in parts of her “Strong Leadership” speech months before.
May does hearken back to that “Strong Leadership” speech in some ways in her Brexit
speech, however. She upholds her previous statements that an independent Britain would attempt
to form a special, tight-knit relationship with the E.U. However, it is clear from her rhetoric in
the Brexit speech that May has little to gain from continually airing her grievances on the
European Union. There is certainly a parallel here between May’s speeches and Trump’s. While
both nationalist leaders took severe, hardline approaches to international organizations that
threatened their sense of sovereignty on the campaign trail, neither seemed quite as harsh when
delivering important addresses on international organization once elected.
Conclusions
Nationalist rhetoric, as delivered by leaders of nationalist movements, within the U.S.,
France, and the U.K. is most vehemently opposed to international organization when nationalist
candidates take to the campaign trails. In a campaign environment, regardless of nationality,
nationalist candidates were shown to use rhetoric that positions international organization as the
natural rival of national interest. While campaigning, these leaders paint nationalism and

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international organization as existing in a zero-sum plane in which coexistence is impossible.
This hardline opposition, in two of the three case study for which there is viable data, seems to
lessen in intensity once candidates are elected to office, at which point these figures use language
which more comfortably allows for the coexistence of both nationalism and international
organization in some respect.
Additionally, the most robust arguments against international organization by nationalist
leaders in the U.S., U.K., and France come in response to international organizations that impact
the economies of each individual country. One of Le Pen’s three greatest protests against the
E.U. focused on the Union’s economic policies, which Le Pen and her Front National movement
see as stifling French progress. Similarly, financial independence from the European Union was
a key factor espoused by Theresa May for the Brexit. And finally, Donald Trump’s rhetoric on
international trade agreements such as NAFTA and the TPP is downright vitriolic compared to
his relatively soft treatment of international organizations such as the U.N. This is particularly
witnessed in his Republican nomination acceptance speech.
Areas for Further Study
If given the opportunity for further pursue this topic, I would like to incorporate some
research on party platforms and manifestos. I believe these underlying party beliefs, in some
cases (Le Pen and the Front National come to mind), carry immense weight in the minds of their
respective candidates. In other cases (I think particularly of the U.S. Republican Party and
Donald Trump), party manifestos seem to play less of a role in the development of leader
rhetoric. Either way, a cross-reference between the rhetoric used in the party manifesto and the

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rhetoric used in public by leadership could perhaps illuminate the broader scope of nationalist
rhetoric on a large scale, not simply within the context of individual leaders.
A second potential area of study could relate to the ways in which these nationalist
movements are tied to economic ideology. As described in the conclusion above, nationalist
rhetoric is at its most bold in regards to the protection of the national economies of each nation.
A study on this interplay could reveal some interesting underlying drivers of these individual
nationalist movements and their ideologies.

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References
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Weaver, Richard M. Ideas Have Consequences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948.