This document discusses the difficulty of determining if a computer system is compromised. It outlines several checks that could be done to verify control, such as verifying signatures on software binaries, firmware, and scripts. However, it finds that all of these checks ultimately fail due to issues like a lack of transparency, lack of standardization, and the potential for signing keys to be stolen without detection. It argues that fundamental changes are needed to infrastructure and practices to enable determining control, such as reducing the number of trusted code signing authorities, increasing transparency in software updates and signing processes, and reducing opacity in firmware and coprocessors.
This is a presentation of mine and my classmate Begüm about the changing makeup patterns of Turkish women and how could L'oreal create a product for that changing environment. This presentation was made to Özlem Hesapçı, Associate Professor of Marketing at Boğaziçi University.
Consumers value brand experience more and more when they purchase a product or service. Read our brand experience best practices to learn how to build your brand in a way that will resonate with the people whom you want to reach.
This is a presentation of mine and my classmate Begüm about the changing makeup patterns of Turkish women and how could L'oreal create a product for that changing environment. This presentation was made to Özlem Hesapçı, Associate Professor of Marketing at Boğaziçi University.
Consumers value brand experience more and more when they purchase a product or service. Read our brand experience best practices to learn how to build your brand in a way that will resonate with the people whom you want to reach.
Leroy J. Ebert DipM MCIM, Chartered Marketer, MSLIM
Manager Marketing and Business Development – Logiwiz Ltd.
Presentation Developed as course material for the SLIM Diploma in Brand Management
Content Extracted from “Strategic Brand Management” 3rd Edition
Authors: Kevin Lane Keller
M.G. Parameswaran
Issac Jacob
Presentation developed from SLIM Diploma In Brand Management Students
Presentation developed by Leroy J. Ebert (9th May 2014)
An overview presentation about LVMH holding with some brief financial information. Initially prepared as you have to guess what the company is during first few slides based on given information.
This workshop was delivered to the Brand Consortium of ISBM. It helped identify the key variables in framing a brand portfolio strategy, including customer segments, product categories, customer end benefits, and price/value tiers. The workshop also helped participants identify the pros and cons associated with various brand portfolio strategies and architectures, and the circumstances where each makes sense. Best practices, guiding principles, case studies and interactive exercises are leveraged throughout…all with a heavy skew toward B2B examples.
A group project and presentation that focused on Absolut Vodka. The results compared the brand\'s stated identity, the perceived brand image by consumers (through a focus group and survey), with analysis and recommendations based on the Customer Based Brand Equity Model (CBBE)
Brief: Choose a traditional/iconic French product and analyse it regarding German Culture
Issue: IS THE BIRKIN BAG CONGRUENT WITH THE GERMAN CULTURE?
● Analysis of the product
● Analysis of the home culture (France)
● Analysis of the target culture (Germany)
● Marketing Concept: product, price, place, promotion
Ceci est un projet fictif réalisé par Blandine DARRIEUTORT, Victoire ELLES, Louise GILLOT, Gladys PORTHAULT et Mustafa YILMAZ dans le cadre du cours Stratégies de distribution à l'INSEEC. Ce document est donc protégé par le droit de la propriété intellectuelle. Aucun plagiat ne sera toléré.
Preventing hard disk firmware manipulation attack and disaster recovery by Da...CODE BLUE
In this talk I will explain strategies prior to and after a hard disk has lost its ability to be used as a storage device due to human manipulation or natural disaster that will allow a high possibility of data recovery. The clicking sound of the hard disk's head is synonymous with hard disk failure , however its is not widely know that this clicking sound can happen even when there is nothing wrong with the head. Changing the hard disk's head merely because it is acting up is a very risky action because it can increase the dangers of damaging the clean insides of a hard disk. So what is causing the hard disk's head clicking sound? The answer is a damaged firmware. At this talk I will explain how to utilize the firmware to control the device and use in a disaster recovery situation.
Dai Shimogaito
CEO of Osaka Data Recovery Founded in 1998. Director of Data Recovery Association Japan.
Wanting to perfect data recovery methods conducts research and information exchange with engineers domestically and internationally.
Trainings : Data Recovery Trainings for NPA and IDF Seminars etc.,
Lectures : Digital Forensic Study Groups, NTT Secure Platform Laboratories, and privately for companies and governments
Leroy J. Ebert DipM MCIM, Chartered Marketer, MSLIM
Manager Marketing and Business Development – Logiwiz Ltd.
Presentation Developed as course material for the SLIM Diploma in Brand Management
Content Extracted from “Strategic Brand Management” 3rd Edition
Authors: Kevin Lane Keller
M.G. Parameswaran
Issac Jacob
Presentation developed from SLIM Diploma In Brand Management Students
Presentation developed by Leroy J. Ebert (9th May 2014)
An overview presentation about LVMH holding with some brief financial information. Initially prepared as you have to guess what the company is during first few slides based on given information.
This workshop was delivered to the Brand Consortium of ISBM. It helped identify the key variables in framing a brand portfolio strategy, including customer segments, product categories, customer end benefits, and price/value tiers. The workshop also helped participants identify the pros and cons associated with various brand portfolio strategies and architectures, and the circumstances where each makes sense. Best practices, guiding principles, case studies and interactive exercises are leveraged throughout…all with a heavy skew toward B2B examples.
A group project and presentation that focused on Absolut Vodka. The results compared the brand\'s stated identity, the perceived brand image by consumers (through a focus group and survey), with analysis and recommendations based on the Customer Based Brand Equity Model (CBBE)
Brief: Choose a traditional/iconic French product and analyse it regarding German Culture
Issue: IS THE BIRKIN BAG CONGRUENT WITH THE GERMAN CULTURE?
● Analysis of the product
● Analysis of the home culture (France)
● Analysis of the target culture (Germany)
● Marketing Concept: product, price, place, promotion
Ceci est un projet fictif réalisé par Blandine DARRIEUTORT, Victoire ELLES, Louise GILLOT, Gladys PORTHAULT et Mustafa YILMAZ dans le cadre du cours Stratégies de distribution à l'INSEEC. Ce document est donc protégé par le droit de la propriété intellectuelle. Aucun plagiat ne sera toléré.
Preventing hard disk firmware manipulation attack and disaster recovery by Da...CODE BLUE
In this talk I will explain strategies prior to and after a hard disk has lost its ability to be used as a storage device due to human manipulation or natural disaster that will allow a high possibility of data recovery. The clicking sound of the hard disk's head is synonymous with hard disk failure , however its is not widely know that this clicking sound can happen even when there is nothing wrong with the head. Changing the hard disk's head merely because it is acting up is a very risky action because it can increase the dangers of damaging the clean insides of a hard disk. So what is causing the hard disk's head clicking sound? The answer is a damaged firmware. At this talk I will explain how to utilize the firmware to control the device and use in a disaster recovery situation.
Dai Shimogaito
CEO of Osaka Data Recovery Founded in 1998. Director of Data Recovery Association Japan.
Wanting to perfect data recovery methods conducts research and information exchange with engineers domestically and internationally.
Trainings : Data Recovery Trainings for NPA and IDF Seminars etc.,
Lectures : Digital Forensic Study Groups, NTT Secure Platform Laboratories, and privately for companies and governments
Secret of Intel Management Engine by Igor SkochinskyCODE BLUE
Intel Management Engine ("ME") is a dedicated microcontroller embedded in all recent Intel motherboard chipsets. It works independently from the main CPU, can be active even when the rest of the system is powered off, and has a dedicated connection to the network interface for out-of-band networking which bypasses the main CPU and the installed OS. It not only performs the management tasks for which it was originally designed, but also implements features such as Intel Identity Protection Technology (IPT), Protected Audio-Video Path, Intel Anti-Theft, Intel TPM, NFC communication and more. There is not much info available about how exactly it works, and this talk aims to fill the gap and describe the low-level details.
Igor Skochinsky
Igor Skochinsky is currently one of the main developers of the world-famous Interactive Disassembler and Hex-Rays Decompiler. Even before joining Hex-Rays in 2008 he had been interested in reverse engineering for a long time and had brief periods of Internet fame after releasing a dumper for DRM-ed iTunes files (QTFairUse6) and hacking the original Amazon Kindle. He spoke previously at Recon, Breakpoint and Hack.LU.
This paper talks about algorithms to do database joins on a GPU. Some interesting work here, that will someday lead to implementing databases on a GPGPU like CUDA.
http://cs264.org
Abstract:
High-level scripting languages are in many ways polar opposites to
GPUs. GPUs are highly parallel, subject to hardware subtleties, and
designed for maximum throughput, and they offer a tremendous advance
in the performance achievable for a significant number of
computational problems. On the other hand, scripting languages such as
Python favor ease of use over computational speed and do not generally
emphasize parallelism. PyOpenCL and PyCUDA are two packages that
attempt to join the two together. By showing concrete examples, both
at the toy and the whole-application level, this talk aims to
demonstrate that by combining these opposites, a programming
environment is created that is greater than just the sum of its two
parts.
Speaker biography:
Andreas Klöckner obtained his PhD degree working with Jan Hesthaven at
the Department of Applied Mathematics at Brown University. He worked
on a variety of topics all aiming to broaden the utility of
discontinuous Galerkin (DG) methods. This included their use in the
simulation of plasma physics and the demonstration of their particular
suitability for computation on throughput-oriented graphics processors
(GPUs). He also worked on multi-rate time stepping methods and shock
capturing schemes for DG.
In the fall of 2010, he joined the Courant Institute of Mathematical
Sciences at New York University as a Courant Instructor. There, he is
working on problems in computational electromagnetics with Leslie
Greengard.
His research interests include:
- Discontinuous Galerkin and integral equation methods for wave
propagation
- Programming tools for parallel architectures
- High-order unstructured particle-in-cell methods for plasma simulation
System hacking is the way hackers get access to individual computers on a network. ... This course explains the main methods of system hacking—password cracking, privilege escalation, spyware installation, and keylogging—and the countermeasures IT security professionals can take to fight these attacks.
Open Source Software Licence Compliance: Art or science? Shane Coughlan
These are the slides from the keynote entitled 'Open Source Software Licence Compliance: Art or science?' at the OpenChain Summit 2022, presented by Andrew Katz, CEO, Orcro Limited and Partner, Moorcrofts LLP.
iOS Code Signing Certificate that must have iOS developers to ensure integrity of software code, applications, .exe, etc. Easy guide on iOS code signing security.iOS Code Signing Certificate that must have iOS developers to ensure integrity of software code, applications, .exe, etc. Easy guide on iOS code signing security.
Cisco forecasts that by 2020 there will be 50 billion connected devices on the planet spanning everything from entertainment and information to the industrial and medical markets. The benefits are obvious. The risks are significant with catastrophic consequences. Internet of Things (IoT) security is a broad issue with many dimensions.
Security experts from RTI, Texas Instruments, Thingworx, and Wibu-Systems describe risks and solutions for securing IoT devices.
Topics include:
• Secure software updates via integrity protection
• Data centric security for the IoT
• Protecting Internet communications in IoT devices
• Secure IoT deployments
Watch webinar recording: https://youtu.be/ra0Ii7Y2EyA
Introduction to the legal aspects and pitfalls of open source and software licensing in general, with a walkthrough (and code snippets) of how to successfully apply a license to an open source project.
Similar to Halvar Flake: Why Johnny can’t tell if he is compromised (20)
Ange Albertini and Gynvael Coldwind: Schizophrenic Files – A file that thinks...Area41
As file format specs leave room for interpretation and sometimes are misunderstood or ignored by the programmers, some well-formed files may be interpreted inconsistently by different tools and libraries. As a result, this can be (ab)used for simple jokes, anti-forensics or to bypass sanitizers which might lead to data exfiltration.
Ange Albertini: Reverse Engineer, author of Corkami
Gynvael Coldwind: His main areas of interest are low-level security (kernel, OS, client), web security and reverse-engineering. Captain of Dragon Sector CTF team :) Currently working as an Information Security Engineer at Google.
Juriaan Bremer und Marion Marschalek: Curing A 15 Year Old DiseaseArea41
Visual Basic P-code executables have been a pain for a digital eternity and even up until today reverse engineers did not come up with a helpful painkiller. So 15 years after the era of VB6 we present a tool that fully subverts the VB6 virtual machine, thus intercepting and instrumenting the VB P-code in real time. Through dynamic analysis we show that our tool aims at intercepting relevant information at runtime, such as plaintext strings in memory, and which APIs were called. Even more, with our tool an analyst could instrument the execution of byte code on-the-fly, allowing modification of the virtual machine state during execution.
With this fancy gadget it is possible to ease an analyst's life significantly. Having described all ins and outs of our tool we will demonstrate various possible use cases, concluding our talk by the profit gain for researchers, what we got from it, and possible future use-cases.
Jurriaan is a freelance security researcher and software developer from the Netherlands interested in the fields of reverse engineering, malware analysis, mobile security, and the development of software to aid in security analysis. Jurriaan occasionally plays so-called Capture The Flag games as a member of Eindbazen CTF Team, he’s a member of The Honeynet Project, and he’s also one of the Core Developers of Cuckoo Sandbox.
Marion Marschalek is a malware researcher at is a malware researcher at Cyphort Inc. based in Santa Clara. Marion is working as malware analyst and in incident response, but has also done research in the area of automated malware analysis and vulnerability search. Besides that she teaches basics of malware analysis at University of Applied Sciences St. Pölten. Marion has spoken at international hacker conferences such as Defcon Las Vegas and POC Seoul. In March 2013 she won the Female Reverse Engineering Challenge 2013, organized by RE professional Halvar Flake. "
Marc Ruef: Adventures in a Decade of Tracking and Consolidating Security Vuln...Area41
The talk discusses the approach, possibilities and difficulties that a vulnerability database maintainer is handling. It will offer real-world insight into almost 15 years of vulnerability database management and a database that covers more than 12.000 entries today. The task didn't get any easier as more and more vulnerabilities get published with increasing complexity but much less information is provided in most original advisories. Correlating this data and compiling the best for the users is a complex task that requires a solid processing and a deep understanding of the technical background.
Marc Ruef is co-founder and member of the board at scip AG in Zürich (http://www.scip.ch). The Swiss company provides consulting services covering security testing and forensic analysis, primarily in the financial sphere. He has written several books, whereas "Die Kunst des Penetration Testing" (The Art of Penetration Testing) is the most well-known (http://www.computec.ch/mruef/?s=dkdpt). He launched and joined several projects, discussing and improving the broad field of information technology. One of these projects is scip VulDB, a free vulnerability database which is covering more than 12.000 entries since 2003.
This talk was originally titled “I'm tired of defenders crying”, but thought better of it. This talk is about the tidbits that I've seen piecemeal across the multitude of businesses big and small that were innovated and highly effective, yet free, or mostly free and stopped me dead in my tracks. Going over a number of free, or nearly free methods, tactics, and software setups that will cut down intrusions significantly that you can deploy or start deployment of the hour after the talk is done.
Mubix is a Senior Red Teamer. His professional experience starts from his time on active duty as United States Marine. He has worked with devices and software that run gambit in the security realm. He has a few certifications, but the titles that he holds above the rest is FATHER, HUSBAND and United States Marine.
This talk shows the possibilities of reversing Android applications. After an introduction about Android issues in the past, Tobias Ospelt explains how he managed to download several thousand Android applications from the Google Market, and which security issues are present in various apps. Apps can be decompiled, altered and recompiled, which means that for most apps it is very easy to steal code or to include malware. Some of the apps use obfuscation to disguise the code, but for example encryption keys can easily be extracted. Small game developers, as well as big companies are not aware of the risk that their code can be decompiled to java and disassembled to smali code. This is how a lot of protection mechanisms can be circumvented, such as licensing (cracking a Game) or corporate solutions (enforcing policies on the mobile). The talk shows how easy everybody can reverse android apps and how encryption keys can be extracted, even when the code is obfuscated. The material is a nice follow-up to the Android talk of Jesse Burns from last year at #days, although this talk is more focused on the apps and shows some more hacks/code/encryption/obfuscation/reversing.
Bio: Tobias Ospelt is working as a security expert and tester for Dreamlab Technologies AG in Bern. He is mainly involved in web application and mobile security penetration tests. Tobias Ospelt joined Dreamlab after having achieved his Master Degree focusing IT-Security, and after having worked as a Research Assistant at the Zurich University of Applied Sciences.
hashdays 2011: Felix 'FX' Lindner - Targeted Industrial Control System Attack...Area41
The talk will show you the techical details of Stuxnet in their full glory and make you appreciate this work of engineering more. Based on a code-level analysis of the Stuxnet PLC payload, the presentation will explain techniques therein that can be used for industrial espionage and sabotage by copycat attackers against competitor's production facilities. Currently recommended defenses, their shortcomings and alternative approaches will also be discussed.
Bio: Felix 'FX' Lindner is founder and technical lead of the Recurity Labs GmbH consulting and research team. He is also the leader of the Phenoelit group and loves to hack pretty much everything with a CPU and some communication, preferably networked. He looks back at 15+ years of (legal) hacking with only a couple Cisco IOS and SAP remote exploits, tools for hacking HP printers and protocol attacks lining the road.
hashdays 2011: Sniping Slowloris - Taking out DDoS attackers with minimal har...Area41
Request delaying attacks like slowloris or RUDY made it clear that killing a webserver via HTTP is trivial. No, it is not trivial. It's even easier than that. One netbook, probably a smartphone, is enough to consume all the threads a big iron server has to offer. In this age of super-smart AJAX services with fat backend application servers exposed on the internet, this is bad news. When the anonymous network attacked, VISA, Mastercard and Swiss Post got a bloody nose out of it. This talk will teach you some basics and then fairly advanced defense methods. This is a hands on guide on configuring the standard defense techniques on Apache including ModSecurity recipes. Furthermore, a custom script will be presented that helps you monitor your server's incoming connection and throw out the attackers. Some of the infos are useful for other server types as well. Along the line you will also pick up useful information on the defense of medieval castles, but that is not the main focus of the talk. Really.
Bio: Christian Folini studied History and Computer science at the Universities of Fribourg, Switzerland and Bern. His postgraduate studies took him to Bielefeld and Berlin. Christian Folini holds a PhD in Medieval History and has ten years of experience with Unix and Webservers in particular.
Christian Folini works as a security consultant and webserver engineer for netnea.com, a contracting Company based in Berne, Switzerland. His customers include Swiss Post, Federal Office of Information Technology (BIT), IBM, Novartis, Cornerbank and Swiss TV. He has several years of experience with ModSecurity installations and developed REMO, a graphical rule editor for ModSecurity. He gave ModSecurity classes at OWASP conferences and contributed to the latest editions of the Center for Internet Security (CIS) Apache Benchmark. Recently, he started to write a series of tutorials on secure enterprise-level Apache deployments with a purely Open Source approach. These tutorials are all in German. See http://www.netnea.com. Christian Folini started to do research on request delaying or slowloris-type DoS/DDoS in 2006, but never published his findings beyond the Apache/ModSecurity mailinglists until Slowloris was released by RSnake in June 2009. Christian Folini's analysis of Slowloris appeared in Linux Weekly News the day his first son was born (and I tell you, finishing the article in time was a tough race). http://lwn.net/Articles/338407/
hashdays 2011: Christian Bockermann - Protecting Databases with TreesArea41
Though publicly known for a long time, SQL injection attacks do not yet seem to have reached their peak – the LulzSec activities in mid 2011 showed the overall presence of applications vulnerable to SQL attacks. Organizations like OWASP and Mitre rank SQL injections as the most dangerous threats to our (web) infrastructures and even SQL injections in SMS text messages have been reported. Vendors of Web Application Firewalls spend enormous e?orts to create patterns to detect SQL injections at the application protocol layer, but attackers spend even more e?orts ?nding evasions of these patterns using various encodings or polymorphic substitutions within SQL. In this talk we will have a look at SQL injections from the syntax level perspective of the SQL language. We exploit the parser component of the database system to produce a syntax tree of the command that has been passed to the database by the web frontend. The resulting tree provides a representation of the command that can be compared to a set of known commands expected to be used by the deployed web application.
Bio: Starting with Linux/network security in 1996, Christian Bockermann has been working in computer security for over 10 years. While working as a Java web-application developer for several years he started concentrating on web-security as primary subject. Since he graduated with a MSc in computer science with an emphasis on Anomaly Detection in Web-Applications, he is currently working on his Ph.D. combining methods of machine learning and artificial intelligence in web-application firewalls and system monitoring. A proposal of his intelligent web-application firewall project has been elected among the top-10 projects of the 2nd GermanIT-Security Award. Alongside to this Ph.D. research, Christian is working as a freelancer in web-security consulting, mostly focused on Apache and ModSecurity. He is also author of several Java tools supplementary to ModSecurity, most prominent being the AuditConsole log-management server for ModSecurity.
hashdays 2011: Ange Albertini - Such a weird processor - messing with x86 opc...Area41
Whether it's for malware analysis, vulnerability research or emulation, having a correct disassembly of a binary is the essential thing you need when you analyze code. Unfortunately, many people are not aware that there are a lot of opcodes that are rarely used in normal files, but valid for execution, but also several common opcodes have rarely seen behaviours, which could lead to wrong conclusions after an improper analysis.
For this research, I decided to go back to the basics and study assembly from scratch, covering all opcodes, whether they're obsolete or brand new, common or undocumented. This helped me to find bugs in all the disassemblers I tried, including the most famous ones. This presentation introduces the funniest aspects of the x86 CPUs, that I discovered in the process, including unexpected or rarely known opcodes and undocumented behavior of common opcodes.
The talk will also cover opcodes that are used in armored code (malware/commercial protectors) that are likely to break tools (disassemblers, analyzers, emulators, tracers,...), and introduce some useful tools and documents that were created in the process of the research.
Bio: Ange Albertini is a reverse-engineering and assembly language enthusiast for around 20 years, and malware analyst for 6 years. He has a technical blog, where he shares experimental sources files, and some infographics that are useful in his daily work.
hashdays 2011: Jean-Philippe Aumasson - Cryptanalysis vs. RealityArea41
Cryptanalysts publish a tremendous number of research articles presenting attacks on ciphers, hash functions, or authentication protocols. However, not all academic attacks pose a threat to the real-world applications where the attacked crypto is deployed. In this talk, we’ll explain why attacks are not always attacks by going through technical subtleties of state-of-the-art cryptanalysis research, which we’ll illustrate with concrete ?eld examples. The topics discussed include related-key attacks, the real security of AES, as well as the role of the human factor.
Bio: Jean-Philippe Aumasson is a cryptographer at Nagravision SA, a world leader in
digital security and conditional access systems. He received a PhD from EPFL in 2009 and authored more than 20 research papers in the ?eld of cryptanalysis. He was co-awarded prizes for his cryptanalysis results, and is the co-inventor of new attacks such as cube testers, zero-sum attacks, tuple attacks, and banana attacks. He is the principal designer of the hash function BLAKE, one of the 5 finalists in NIST’s SHA-3 competition.
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...James Anderson
Effective Application Security in Software Delivery lifecycle using Deployment Firewall and DBOM
The modern software delivery process (or the CI/CD process) includes many tools, distributed teams, open-source code, and cloud platforms. Constant focus on speed to release software to market, along with the traditional slow and manual security checks has caused gaps in continuous security as an important piece in the software supply chain. Today organizations feel more susceptible to external and internal cyber threats due to the vast attack surface in their applications supply chain and the lack of end-to-end governance and risk management.
The software team must secure its software delivery process to avoid vulnerability and security breaches. This needs to be achieved with existing tool chains and without extensive rework of the delivery processes. This talk will present strategies and techniques for providing visibility into the true risk of the existing vulnerabilities, preventing the introduction of security issues in the software, resolving vulnerabilities in production environments quickly, and capturing the deployment bill of materials (DBOM).
Speakers:
Bob Boule
Robert Boule is a technology enthusiast with PASSION for technology and making things work along with a knack for helping others understand how things work. He comes with around 20 years of solution engineering experience in application security, software continuous delivery, and SaaS platforms. He is known for his dynamic presentations in CI/CD and application security integrated in software delivery lifecycle.
Gopinath Rebala
Gopinath Rebala is the CTO of OpsMx, where he has overall responsibility for the machine learning and data processing architectures for Secure Software Delivery. Gopi also has a strong connection with our customers, leading design and architecture for strategic implementations. Gopi is a frequent speaker and well-known leader in continuous delivery and integrating security into software delivery.
Pushing the limits of ePRTC: 100ns holdover for 100 daysAdtran
At WSTS 2024, Alon Stern explored the topic of parametric holdover and explained how recent research findings can be implemented in real-world PNT networks to achieve 100 nanoseconds of accuracy for up to 100 days.
LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...DanBrown980551
Do you want to learn how to model and simulate an electrical network from scratch in under an hour?
Then welcome to this PowSyBl workshop, hosted by Rte, the French Transmission System Operator (TSO)!
During the webinar, you will discover the PowSyBl ecosystem as well as handle and study an electrical network through an interactive Python notebook.
PowSyBl is an open source project hosted by LF Energy, which offers a comprehensive set of features for electrical grid modelling and simulation. Among other advanced features, PowSyBl provides:
- A fully editable and extendable library for grid component modelling;
- Visualization tools to display your network;
- Grid simulation tools, such as power flows, security analyses (with or without remedial actions) and sensitivity analyses;
The framework is mostly written in Java, with a Python binding so that Python developers can access PowSyBl functionalities as well.
What you will learn during the webinar:
- For beginners: discover PowSyBl's functionalities through a quick general presentation and the notebook, without needing any expert coding skills;
- For advanced developers: master the skills to efficiently apply PowSyBl functionalities to your real-world scenarios.
Welcome to the first live UiPath Community Day Dubai! Join us for this unique occasion to meet our local and global UiPath Community and leaders. You will get a full view of the MEA region's automation landscape and the AI Powered automation technology capabilities of UiPath. Also, hosted by our local partners Marc Ellis, you will enjoy a half-day packed with industry insights and automation peers networking.
📕 Curious on our agenda? Wait no more!
10:00 Welcome note - UiPath Community in Dubai
Lovely Sinha, UiPath Community Chapter Leader, UiPath MVPx3, Hyper-automation Consultant, First Abu Dhabi Bank
10:20 A UiPath cross-region MEA overview
Ashraf El Zarka, VP and Managing Director MEA, UiPath
10:35: Customer Success Journey
Deepthi Deepak, Head of Intelligent Automation CoE, First Abu Dhabi Bank
11:15 The UiPath approach to GenAI with our three principles: improve accuracy, supercharge productivity, and automate more
Boris Krumrey, Global VP, Automation Innovation, UiPath
12:15 To discover how Marc Ellis leverages tech-driven solutions in recruitment and managed services.
Brendan Lingam, Director of Sales and Business Development, Marc Ellis
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf91mobiles
91mobiles recently conducted a Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey in which we asked over 3,000 respondents about the TV they own, aspects they look at on a new TV, and their TV buying preferences.
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...sonjaschweigert1
Rapid and secure feature delivery is a goal across every application team and every branch of the DoD. The Navy’s DevSecOps platform, Party Barge, has achieved:
- Reduction in onboarding time from 5 weeks to 1 day
- Improved developer experience and productivity through actionable findings and reduction of false positives
- Maintenance of superior security standards and inherent policy enforcement with Authorization to Operate (ATO)
Development teams can ship efficiently and ensure applications are cyber ready for Navy Authorizing Officials (AOs). In this webinar, Sigma Defense and Anchore will give attendees a look behind the scenes and demo secure pipeline automation and security artifacts that speed up application ATO and time to production.
We will cover:
- How to remove silos in DevSecOps
- How to build efficient development pipeline roles and component templates
- How to deliver security artifacts that matter for ATO’s (SBOMs, vulnerability reports, and policy evidence)
- How to streamline operations with automated policy checks on container images
SAP Sapphire 2024 - ASUG301 building better apps with SAP Fiori.pdfPeter Spielvogel
Building better applications for business users with SAP Fiori.
• What is SAP Fiori and why it matters to you
• How a better user experience drives measurable business benefits
• How to get started with SAP Fiori today
• How SAP Fiori elements accelerates application development
• How SAP Build Code includes SAP Fiori tools and other generative artificial intelligence capabilities
• How SAP Fiori paves the way for using AI in SAP apps
The Metaverse and AI: how can decision-makers harness the Metaverse for their...Jen Stirrup
The Metaverse is popularized in science fiction, and now it is becoming closer to being a part of our daily lives through the use of social media and shopping companies. How can businesses survive in a world where Artificial Intelligence is becoming the present as well as the future of technology, and how does the Metaverse fit into business strategy when futurist ideas are developing into reality at accelerated rates? How do we do this when our data isn't up to scratch? How can we move towards success with our data so we are set up for the Metaverse when it arrives?
How can you help your company evolve, adapt, and succeed using Artificial Intelligence and the Metaverse to stay ahead of the competition? What are the potential issues, complications, and benefits that these technologies could bring to us and our organizations? In this session, Jen Stirrup will explain how to start thinking about these technologies as an organisation.
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and SalesLaura Byrne
Clients don’t know what they don’t know. What web solutions are right for them? How does WordPress come into the picture? How do you make sure you understand scope and timeline? What do you do if sometime changes?
All these questions and more will be explored as we talk about matching clients’ needs with what your agency offers without pulling teeth or pulling your hair out. Practical tips, and strategies for successful relationship building that leads to closing the deal.
Free Complete Python - A step towards Data Science
Halvar Flake: Why Johnny can’t tell if he is compromised
1. Why Johnny can’t tell if
he is compromised
...and what you can do about it.
Keynote Area41
2nd of June 2014, Zurich, Switzerland
thomas.dullien@googlemail.com
http://goo.gl/3NphRw
2. Robert Morris Sr.
Fundamental rules for IT security - a cynical
view from more than 20 years ago:
Do not own a computer
Do not power it on
Do not use it
Situation does not seem to have gotten better
3. Hacking is addictive
Transitive trust relationships everywhere
Start to hack almost anywhere - compromise
boundary grows exponentially
Only limit: Size of net, admin infrastructure
4. The now
All major nation states / global powers want to
have “dominance”
Almost nobody is any good at defense
In the limit: Everything compromised (or on
compromise boundary) by multiple parties
5. What does compromise mean?
Somewhat fuzzy concept
Installing malware is clearly a compromise
Illicitly obtaining authentication credentials is
also a compromise
Compromise is about “control”
6. Ownership vs. possession
Legal distinction between ownership and
possession of an object
I am the owner of my car, even if I have lent it
to a friend and it is not in my possession
Networked computing devices have a third
dimension: “Control”
7. Possession vs. control
Neither possession nor ownership of a
networked computing device imply control
Being hacked is loss of control without change
of ownership or possession
“Getting 0wned” = loss of control over your own
computing infrastructure
8. Who is in control?
Establishing who is control of your computer is
nearly impossible
This talk: Exploration of all the ways we can’t
tell if we are in control, and how to fix it.
9. Given a computer ...
… try to establish who is in control
For the exercise: Assume Windows
Where to start ?
All highly-privileged code is in control
Code running with user privileges is partially in
control
10. Control and software
Clearly, someone else is in control (third-party
OS, various bits of third-party software)
This is OK - we have decided to trust these
third parties and say “yes” to their software
We trust (some) software vendors to not
backdoor us intentionally
11. Baseline checks
Verify signatures
on all userspace
binaries
Verify signatures
on all kernel
space binaries
Verify signatures
on all BIOS
components
Verify signatures
on all device
firmwares
Verify signatures
on the Intel ME
code
Verify that the signers
know about their
signatures
Verify origin of
privileged scripts
12. Check 1: Userspace Code
Problem: Vendors don’t sign their executables
Problem: If they do, they don’t sign their DLLs
Problem: If they sign both executables and
DLLs, they don’t sign executable extensions
Problem: 100+ trusted root CAs?
13. Baseline checks
Verify signatures
on all userspace
binaries
Verify signatures
on all kernel
space binaries
Verify signatures
on all BIOS
components
Verify signatures
on all device
firmwares
Verify signatures
on the Intel ME
code
Verify that the signers
know about their
signatures
Verify origin of
privileged scripts
FAILURE
14. Check 2: Kernel Code
Number of CAs that can sign drivers much smaller
than user-space
Irrelevant: Attacker use signed driver with known
vulnerability to bootstrap code
Failure to sign userspace means failure to sign
kernel space
Not theoretical: Uroburos
15. Baseline checks
Verify signatures
on all userspace
binaries
Verify signatures
on all kernel
space binaries
Verify signatures
on all BIOS
components
Verify signatures
on all device
firmwares
Verify signatures
on the Intel ME
code
Verify that the signers
know about their
signatures
Verify origin of
privileged scripts
FAILURE FAILURE
16. Check 3: BIOS Code
Per-vendor code signing (DELL, HP etc.)
No public documentation or third-party analysis
about the way this works
No way for third parties to verify signatures
Even if possible to verify, can’t read relevant
regions
17. Baseline checks
Verify signatures
on all userspace
binaries
Verify signatures
on all kernel
space binaries
Verify signatures
on all BIOS
components
Verify signatures
on all device
firmwares
Verify signatures
on the Intel ME
code
Verify that the signers
know about their
signatures
Verify origin of
privileged scripts
FAILURE FAILURE FAILURE
18. Check 4: Device Firmwares
HDD controllers: Nobody knows how to verify
code inside, but we know attackers can
backdoor them
GPU firmware: People are flashing them for
overclocking, no way to do third-party validation
Completely stranded
19. Baseline checks
Verify signatures
on all userspace
binaries
Verify signatures
on all kernel
space binaries
Verify signatures
on all BIOS
components
Verify signatures
on all device
firmwares
Verify signatures
on the Intel ME
code
Verify that the signers
know about their
signatures
Verify origin of
privileged scripts
FAILURE FAILURE FAILURE
FAILURE
20. Check 5: Intel ME
ARC core on modern mainboards that can
execute signed Java applets etc.
Communicates with host OS via PCI shared
mapped region
Highly opaque, no way to verify code running in
ME from host OS
21. Baseline checks
Verify signatures
on all userspace
binaries
Verify signatures
on all kernel
space binaries
Verify signatures
on all BIOS
components
Verify signatures
on all device
firmwares
Verify signatures
on the Intel ME
code
Verify that the signers
know about their
signatures
Verify origin of
privileged scripts
FAILURE FAILURE FAILURE
FAILURE FAILURE
22. Check 6: Stolen Keys
Attackers have compromised software signing
keys and CAs in the past
People with software signing keys can silently
“lose” them without this ever being noticed
There is no equivalent of “Certificate
Transparency” for code signing
23. Check 6: Stolen Keys
All PKI architecture assume an invincible CA
and invincible signers
Reality has shown that this is a wrong
assumption
No way to verify if a file signed with a key was
signed by the person the key was issued to
24. Check 6: Stolen Keys
After breaches of the last years, only safe
assumption is:
Code signing keys of many software vendors
and CAs have been silently stolen
No good way of detecting this
25. Baseline checks
Verify signatures
on all userspace
binaries
Verify signatures
on all kernel
space binaries
Verify signatures
on all BIOS
components
Verify signatures
on all device
firmwares
Verify signatures
on the Intel ME
code
Verify that the signers
know about their
signatures
Verify origin of
privileged scripts
FAILURE FAILURE FAILURE
FAILURE FAILURE FAILURE
26. Check 7: Scripts
Lots of interpreters run code with privileges on
your typical host
Javascript-based extensions to your browser
Java-based background tasks
Python and other interpreted languages
27. Check 7: Scripts
No good infrastructure exists to tie running
interpreted code back to the scripts from which
it was compiled
No good way to determine where the code
running inside java.exe or python.exe is coming
from
28. Baseline checks
Verify signatures
on all userspace
binaries
Verify signatures
on all kernel
space binaries
Verify signatures
on all BIOS
components
Verify signatures
on all device
firmwares
Verify signatures
on the Intel ME
code
Verify that the signers
know about their
signatures
Verify origin of
privileged scripts
FAILURE FAILURE FAILURE
FAILURE FAILURE FAILURE
FAILURE
29. Failure on all levels
Given modern infrastructure, it is nearly
impossible to determine if a machine is
compromised
It is also nearly impossible to “un-infect” a
machine once it has been infected
What needs to change?
30. Long-term view
Proposed measures will take many years to
build
Fundamentally easy, though - no rocket
science required
Hardest things to overcome: Organisational
inertia, complacency, politics, broken incentive
structures, cost
31. Step 0: Check trust
IT departments do not ask themselves enough
questions about who they trust
Someone well-intentioned but securitywise
incompetent will be the weak link that attackers
exploit
This applies to vendors and suppliers !
32. Control and Power of attorney
Giving “control” over your compute
infrastructure is the same as giving a delegable
power-of-attorney over your compute
infrastructure to a third party
This encompasses trusting a CA, allowing auto-
update of software, and much more.
33. Control and Power of attorney
Legal departments are rightfully hesitant to
issue powers of attorney to third parties
Delegable powers of attorney to random third
parties are virtually unheard of
IT industry needs to learn from this
34. Step 1: Undo CA proliferation
Trusting a code-signing CA is equivalent to a
delegable power-of-attorney over your compute
assets
There are way too many code-signing CAs
Only trust a CA that you know very well - which
at the moment will be none
35. Step 2: Trust by-vendor
Most likely, arbitrarily delegable power-of-
attorneys are a broken idea
Trust for executable code should be by vendor,
not by CA
CA-based trust only for sandboxed web-pages /
javascript
36. Step 3: Update transparency
All software vendors roll their own update
mechanism
Allowing someone to update software is also a
delegatable power-of-attorney
Software updates need to come in
standardized packages and via standardized
protocols
37. Step 4: Signing transparency
Given likelihood of stolen signing keys, “code
signing transparency” is needed
Vendors need to run a public ledger where they
explicitly avow “yes, I have signed this binary”
Ideally with information about the exact SVN
tag / git hash that was used to produce the
binary
38. Step 4: Signing transparency
When signed file is encountered, public ledger
can be checked
“Dear Vendor, are you aware that file XYZ has
been signed with your key?”
Probably the only way to engineer “detectability
of key theft” into our systems
39. Step 5: Reduce firmware opacity
Firmware blobs for devices need to be readable
by the main CPU without physical possibility of
interference from the device firmware
Purchasers of hardware need to insist on this
transparency
They also need to realize they have a right to
demand this
40. Step 6: ME transparency
There is no excuse for a coprocessor on your
mainboard whose code can’t be validated by
you from your main CPU
Purchasers of hardware need to realize that
they have a right to demand transparency from
the code running on ME
41. Step 7: Signed interpreters
In order to run a script with high privileges in an
interpreter, the script needs to be signed and
the interpreter needs to be able to tie back the
executable form to the original script
For non-privileged code (JS in a tight sandbox
etc.) we may be able to make an exception
42. Transparency vs.
tamperproofing
Systems need to be engineered to be easily
verified by the owner
Centralization of trust is a failed experiment,
especially given government desire to
“dominate cyber”
Demand systems whose integrity you can verify
43. Paradigm shift
“Security” hardware has opted for more opacity
in the past
Fear of side-channel attacks, fear of physical
attacks
Prioritized tamperproofing, sacrificed
transparency and verifiability
44. Paradigm shift
Side-channel and physical attacks are a lesser
concern than remote attacks provided you are
in possession of your hardware
Remote attacks that you can never tell
happened are the bigger threat
Re-prioritize verifiability
45. Will this give us security?
The proposed measures will not yield 100%
security
Will give defenders a fighting chance to deny
persistence to the attacker
Will give defenders a fighting chance to detect
compromised suppliers
46. Will this give us security?
Hopefully, this will force attackers into
exploiting & re-exploiting for persistence
Better software engineering can then slowly
root out bugs
Move from cheap, stealthy mass compromise
to individually tailored compromise: Costly
47. How to pay for it ?
None of the proposed steps are “free”
None are terribly costly, either
Standardized software updating, better signing
& verification will actually reduce IT
maintenance costs
48. Stop buying snake oil?
Huge revenues are generated in our industry
with colored appliances that only work as long
as the attacker hasn’t looked at them
Often, these boxes want to be dropped onto
privileged points in your infrastructure
Just say no. Spend your money wisely.