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Web Application Firewalls:
                                    Detection, Bypassing and
                                    Exploitation


                                              Sandro Gauci and Wendel
                                              Guglielmetti Henrique
                                              EnableSecurity and Trustwave
                                              sandro@enablesecurity.com
                    OWASP
                    December 2nd, 2009

                                         Copyright © The OWASP Foundation
                                         Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document
                                         under the terms of the OWASP License.




                                         The OWASP Foundation
                                         http://www.owasp.org

Friday, 4 December 2009
$ whois WendelGH

      PT Consultant at Trustwave's SpiderLabs
      Over 7 years in the security industry
      Vulnerability discovery Webmails, AP, Citrix, etc
      Spoke in YSTS 2.0, Defcon 16, H2HC and others
      Affiliated to Hackaholic team




                                                OWASP      2



Friday, 4 December 2009
$ whois SandroGauci

      Founder and CSO EnableSecurity
      From .mt
      Security software
            VOIPPACK (CANVAS addon)
            Surfjack - insecure cookies
            SIPVicious
      Security research papers
      Been around for > 9 years



                                           OWASP   3



Friday, 4 December 2009
Introduction

      WAF - Web Application Firewall
      next generation protection
      what can we do?
            can be identified, detected
            bypassing the rules
            exploit WAFs




                                           OWASP   4



Friday, 4 December 2009
What is WAF?

      Attack signatures or abnormal behavior based
      WAFs products: software or hardware appliance.
      Flavors:
            a reverse proxy
            embedded
            connected in a switch (SPAN or RAP)
      WAF products detect both inbound
      Some also detect outbound attacks



                                                   OWASP   5



Friday, 4 December 2009
Who uses WAFs?

      Many banks around the world
      Companies which need high protection
      Many companies in compliance with PCI DSS
       (Payment Card Industry - Data Security
       Standard)




                                            OWASP   6



Friday, 4 December 2009
Operation Modes

      Negative model (blacklist based)
      Positive model (whitelist based)
      Mixed / Hybrid




                                          OWASP   7



Friday, 4 December 2009
The negative model

      Relies on a database of known attacks
      Eg. XSS strings like <script>, </script>,
       String.fromCharCode, etc.
      Often regular expressions




                                                   OWASP   8



Friday, 4 December 2009
Whitelist model

      Whitelist based
      Learning mode to create a security policy of
       known “good” HTTP traffic
            Known as dynamic profiling technology by some
      Example:
       Page news.jsp, the field "id" only accept
       numbers [0-9] and starting at 0 until 65535
            news.jsp?id=-1 would not be allowed




                                                      OWASP   9



Friday, 4 December 2009
Common Weaknesses

      Design issues
            WAFs have to be similar to the web apps and http
             servers that they need to protect
            Blacklists are by design “flawed”
      Bad implementation
            Parsing issues
      Again - a WAF needs to do a lot of things that
       the web app and http server does
            ergo they can have similar security flaws!


                                                          OWASP   10



Friday, 4 December 2009
Detection

      A number of products can be detected
            sometimes by design
      Detection is not a big deal but
            ... sometimes we’re told that WAFs are ‘invisible’
            the better you know your enemy (or client), the
             better
            helps in a penetration test or targeted attack
            shows that stealth attacks are possible




                                                           OWASP   11



Friday, 4 December 2009
Detection

      Cookies
            Reason: some WAFs are also load balancers
      Headers
            Header rewriting
            Most obvious would be "Server"
            Sometimes is a feature called “server cloaking”
            “Connection” header might be changed to Cneonction
             or nnCoection
      Response codes
            404 error codes for existent scripts
            and 403 for non existent ones
                                                         OWASP    12



Friday, 4 December 2009
Detection via response codes

      404 error codes for existent scripts
      Different error codes (404, 400, 401, 403, 501,
       etc) for hostile parameters (even non existent
       ones) in valid pages.




                                                OWASP    13



Friday, 4 December 2009
Friday, 4 December 2009
Friday, 4 December 2009
Automating WAF detection

      WAFW00F
            Detect 20 different WAF products
                   the number keeps changing thanks to contributions :-)
            Options to detect multiple WAFs in place
            Generic detection methods included!
      Get your copy
            waffit.googlecode.com
            Please contribute




                                                                    OWASP   16



Friday, 4 December 2009
Friday, 4 December 2009
Bypassing a WAF

      Fingerprint the rules
      Detect allowed / denied strings
      Combinations of allowed or denied strings
      Modify your attack to not match the blacklist




                                                OWASP   18



Friday, 4 December 2009
More on bypassing WAFs

      Encoding and language support, character sets
      Spaces, comments, case sensitive mutation,
       Unicode (%uc0af and %c0%af), etc
      The web server may parse, decode and interpret
       and HTTP request differently from the WAF
      HTML and JS is very flexible
      Various methods to split and encode your strings




                                               OWASP      19



Friday, 4 December 2009
Bypassing rules

      “Our Favorite XSS Filters and how to Attack
       Them” by Eduardo Vela & David Lindsay
            Bypass the rules by splitting the attack
             (eval('al'%2b'lert(0)')
      “Shocking News in PHP Exploitation” by Stefan
       Esser
            Using “malformed” multipart/form-data to bypass
             most Modsecurity rules
            F5 BIG-IP ASM could be bypassed by sending it
             multipart/form-data that was interpreted differently
             by PHP than ASM
                                                          OWASP     20



Friday, 4 December 2009
OWASP   21



Friday, 4 December 2009
The positive model

      It’s well known that the negative model is
       broken
      What about positive model?
      They are really secure?
      If we find a positive model should we give up?




                                               OWASP    22



Friday, 4 December 2009
Friday, 4 December 2009
Testing WAFs for bypasses is a tedious job

      Which is why we automate it :-)
      WAFFUN - works in progress
            Checks if the script echos back (esp in the case of
             xss)
            Can check if error suppression is supported
            Finds out how the WAF responds when a it reacts to
             an attack
            Goes through a list of well known blacklisted strings
            If any were blocked, it tries different encoding
             methods, null characters, unicode


                                                          OWASP      24



Friday, 4 December 2009
Friday, 4 December 2009
WAFFUN: XSS constructor

      Tries a number of tags to find out which are
       allowed through
      Tries a number of DHTML event handlers
      Tries a number of Javascript methods




                                               OWASP   26



Friday, 4 December 2009
OWASP   27



Friday, 4 December 2009
WAFs may be vulnerable too!

      Security software is not necessarily secure
      Web Application specific issues: XSS, SQLi
      Overflows
      DoS




                                                OWASP   28



Friday, 4 December 2009
Known issues

      ModSecurity 2.5.9
            addresses 2 vulnerabilities
                   "Fixed PDF XSS issue where a non-GET request for a PDF file
                    would crash the Apache httpd process."
                   "Fixed parsing multipart content with a missing part header
                    name which would crash Apache."
      Profense 2.6.3
            Profense Web Application Firewall Cross-Site Scripting
             and Cross-Site Request Forgery
      DotDefender 3.8-5 (this week)
            Command Execution in dotDefender Site Management
                   (requires authentication)
                   seems like it is vulnerable to XSRF             OWASP         29



Friday, 4 December 2009
Friday, 4 December 2009
Thank you

      Do you have ideas / resources to improve our
       tools?
      wsguglielmetti [em] gmail [ponto] com
      sandro [em] enablesecurity [ponto] com
      Questions?




                                              OWASP   31



Friday, 4 December 2009

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Web Application Firewalls Detection, Bypassing And Exploitation

  • 1. Web Application Firewalls: Detection, Bypassing and Exploitation Sandro Gauci and Wendel Guglielmetti Henrique EnableSecurity and Trustwave sandro@enablesecurity.com OWASP December 2nd, 2009 Copyright © The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the OWASP License. The OWASP Foundation http://www.owasp.org Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 2. $ whois WendelGH PT Consultant at Trustwave's SpiderLabs Over 7 years in the security industry Vulnerability discovery Webmails, AP, Citrix, etc Spoke in YSTS 2.0, Defcon 16, H2HC and others Affiliated to Hackaholic team OWASP 2 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 3. $ whois SandroGauci Founder and CSO EnableSecurity From .mt Security software VOIPPACK (CANVAS addon) Surfjack - insecure cookies SIPVicious Security research papers Been around for > 9 years OWASP 3 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 4. Introduction WAF - Web Application Firewall next generation protection what can we do? can be identified, detected bypassing the rules exploit WAFs OWASP 4 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 5. What is WAF? Attack signatures or abnormal behavior based WAFs products: software or hardware appliance. Flavors: a reverse proxy embedded connected in a switch (SPAN or RAP) WAF products detect both inbound Some also detect outbound attacks OWASP 5 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 6. Who uses WAFs? Many banks around the world Companies which need high protection Many companies in compliance with PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry - Data Security Standard) OWASP 6 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 7. Operation Modes Negative model (blacklist based) Positive model (whitelist based) Mixed / Hybrid OWASP 7 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 8. The negative model Relies on a database of known attacks Eg. XSS strings like <script>, </script>, String.fromCharCode, etc. Often regular expressions OWASP 8 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 9. Whitelist model Whitelist based Learning mode to create a security policy of known “good” HTTP traffic Known as dynamic profiling technology by some Example: Page news.jsp, the field "id" only accept numbers [0-9] and starting at 0 until 65535 news.jsp?id=-1 would not be allowed OWASP 9 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 10. Common Weaknesses Design issues WAFs have to be similar to the web apps and http servers that they need to protect Blacklists are by design “flawed” Bad implementation Parsing issues Again - a WAF needs to do a lot of things that the web app and http server does ergo they can have similar security flaws! OWASP 10 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 11. Detection A number of products can be detected sometimes by design Detection is not a big deal but ... sometimes we’re told that WAFs are ‘invisible’ the better you know your enemy (or client), the better helps in a penetration test or targeted attack shows that stealth attacks are possible OWASP 11 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 12. Detection Cookies Reason: some WAFs are also load balancers Headers Header rewriting Most obvious would be "Server" Sometimes is a feature called “server cloaking” “Connection” header might be changed to Cneonction or nnCoection Response codes 404 error codes for existent scripts and 403 for non existent ones OWASP 12 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 13. Detection via response codes 404 error codes for existent scripts Different error codes (404, 400, 401, 403, 501, etc) for hostile parameters (even non existent ones) in valid pages. OWASP 13 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 16. Automating WAF detection WAFW00F Detect 20 different WAF products  the number keeps changing thanks to contributions :-) Options to detect multiple WAFs in place Generic detection methods included! Get your copy waffit.googlecode.com Please contribute OWASP 16 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 18. Bypassing a WAF Fingerprint the rules Detect allowed / denied strings Combinations of allowed or denied strings Modify your attack to not match the blacklist OWASP 18 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 19. More on bypassing WAFs Encoding and language support, character sets Spaces, comments, case sensitive mutation, Unicode (%uc0af and %c0%af), etc The web server may parse, decode and interpret and HTTP request differently from the WAF HTML and JS is very flexible Various methods to split and encode your strings OWASP 19 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 20. Bypassing rules “Our Favorite XSS Filters and how to Attack Them” by Eduardo Vela & David Lindsay Bypass the rules by splitting the attack (eval('al'%2b'lert(0)') “Shocking News in PHP Exploitation” by Stefan Esser Using “malformed” multipart/form-data to bypass most Modsecurity rules F5 BIG-IP ASM could be bypassed by sending it multipart/form-data that was interpreted differently by PHP than ASM OWASP 20 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 21. OWASP 21 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 22. The positive model It’s well known that the negative model is broken What about positive model? They are really secure? If we find a positive model should we give up? OWASP 22 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 24. Testing WAFs for bypasses is a tedious job Which is why we automate it :-) WAFFUN - works in progress Checks if the script echos back (esp in the case of xss) Can check if error suppression is supported Finds out how the WAF responds when a it reacts to an attack Goes through a list of well known blacklisted strings If any were blocked, it tries different encoding methods, null characters, unicode OWASP 24 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 26. WAFFUN: XSS constructor Tries a number of tags to find out which are allowed through Tries a number of DHTML event handlers Tries a number of Javascript methods OWASP 26 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 27. OWASP 27 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 28. WAFs may be vulnerable too! Security software is not necessarily secure Web Application specific issues: XSS, SQLi Overflows DoS OWASP 28 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 29. Known issues ModSecurity 2.5.9 addresses 2 vulnerabilities  "Fixed PDF XSS issue where a non-GET request for a PDF file would crash the Apache httpd process."  "Fixed parsing multipart content with a missing part header name which would crash Apache." Profense 2.6.3 Profense Web Application Firewall Cross-Site Scripting and Cross-Site Request Forgery DotDefender 3.8-5 (this week) Command Execution in dotDefender Site Management  (requires authentication)  seems like it is vulnerable to XSRF OWASP 29 Friday, 4 December 2009
  • 31. Thank you Do you have ideas / resources to improve our tools? wsguglielmetti [em] gmail [ponto] com sandro [em] enablesecurity [ponto] com Questions? OWASP 31 Friday, 4 December 2009