University master on cargo transport rpas 2017 ver 1

SEMINAR ON REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (RPAS)

PRESENTATION SCOPE AND INTRODUCTORY NOTES
This Seminar/Instruction Presentation Consists of two (2) Main Parts, namely:
PART A : provides an overview of the Key Technical, Critical Operational and Regulatory issues which will
potentially drive the future Civil Aviation Cargo Transport RPAS Design, Development, Production and Life-Cycle
Support.
Furthermore such key issues will dictate the CT-RPAS’s successful and safe operational insertion into the Non-
Segregated Airspace under a specific set of Rules compatible to those of Manned Aircraft Operations into
current and future Air Traffic Management (ATM) systems worldwide.
PART B: provides an overview of the ongoing PARTNERSHIP ALLIANCE ATI (U-AVITALIA, PIAGGIO
AEROSPACE, BCUBE) and ENAC Cargo Transport RPAS R&D Project which aims to obtain a detailed technical
database through trade-off studies and experimental work for the development of a Regulatory Frame by ENAC
which will potentially regulate the insertion and operation of the Civil Air-Cargo Transport RPASs of over 150kg
TOW into the non-segregated airspace, using the Piaggio Aerospace P.1HH RPAS prototype platform ( apprx.
MTOW 6000kg) as a test bed.
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PART A: UAS/RPAS INTRODUCTION AND FUNDAMENTALS
A.1) UAS/RPAS Basics
A.2) Basic RPAS Functional and Operational Definitions and Terminology
A.3) UAS/ RPAS Categorization, Missions and Airspace Class Insertion Basics
A.4) RPAS General Functional Architecture and Critical Enabling Technologies Issues
A.5) Overview of a Typical RPAS Operational Scenario and Critical Regulatory Issues
PART B : THE CARGO TRANSPORT R&D RPAS PROJECT OVERVIEW
B.1) The Partnership Alliance and ENAC Cargo Transport R&D Project Overview
B.2) Cargo Transport RPAS Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Integration into Airspace
PRESENTATION CONTENTS
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PART A
UAS/RPAS INTRODUCTION AND FUNDAMENTALS

WHAT IS A REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM OR REMOTELY PILOTED AIRBORNE SYSTEM (RPAS) ?
In accordance with the ICAO Doc. No. 10019 AN/507 a Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) is a major subset
category of the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) family.
RPAS is an integrated aerial system which is composed of an aircraft without a human pilot aboard (RPA), a
ground-based controller or Ground Control Station (GCS) or Remote Pilot Station (RPS), and a link system of
Command, Control and Communications (C3 Link) Data/Voice between the RPA-RPS-ATC/ATM.

 In accordance with ICAO the Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) as an aircraft shall be piloted by a licensed
Remote Pilot (RP) who operates at a Remote Pilot Station (RPS) located external to the aircraft (i.e. ground).
 The RP controls and monitors the aircraft most of the time of flight and can respond to instructions issued by
Air Traffic Control (ATC) under an Air Traffic Management (ATM) system in a regulated airspace environment as
at least manned aircraft do.
 The RP communicates via Voice /Data Link during the operations, and has direct responsibility for the safe
functional and operational conduct of the RPA throughout the flight envelope of its mission profile.
Command, Control & Communication
Link (C3 LINK)RPA RPS
ATC/ATM
AND SO…………

A data/voice link is supporting the interactive functions between the airborne system and the
ground system. This link may also carry information between air traffic services (ATS) and
the RPAS. It is expected that RPASs are compatible with the way “manned aviation”
operations are carried out, while interacting with ATS and with other aircraft (Manned and/or
Unmanned), and maintain the current and foreseen safety levels in aviation.
C3 LINK (FOR LOS & BLOS OPS)
RPA RPS
NOTE : The types of UAS and RPAS that are currently flown or that are under development will always have a
pilot in the loop. This means that the pilot will always be in control of the aircraft. Civil autonomous unmanned
aircraft, which are not a part of the majority of the RPAS family, are not being considered by the international
and national organizations that are working on integration into controlled airspace.

NOW LET’S CLEAR UP SOME MYTHS AND MISCONCEPTIONS SURROUNDING THE REMOTELY PILOTED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (RPAS)
MYTH 1 : RPAS ARE DRONES
Historically, DRONES are Conceived and are in Use by the Military as dedicated AERIAL TARGETS for Combat
Training since 1936. Drones can be deployed once and after they have been targetted are completely destroyed
and cannot be re-used while UAS/RPAS are Re-demployable as any other Manned Aerial System in the inventory
of an operator . Some Drone examples are:
Firebee BQM-34A MD QF-4E LM QF- 16CNORTHROP AT
Where obviously an RPAS is an Aerial System that Performs Missions and Operates in an
Environment in a Similar Manner as a Manned Aircraft

MYTH 3: RPAS ONLY SUPPORT INFORMATION, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS
RPAS, In Both Military and Civilian Operations Support all Known Manned Aircraft Missions with the exception (for
the time being) of Passenger/Personnel Transportation.
MYTH 4: OPERATING AN RPA IS LIKE A VIDEO OR VIRTUAL REALITY GAME
The RPA is Flown exactly as a Manned Aircraft and can be subjected to all kinds of complex Mission
Modifications, Flight Replanning and Emergency Conditions at any time and under a variety of different
parameters not forseen during the original Flight Planning. In Virtual Reality Games, such as air simulations, the
embedded program and its scenarios are using fixed and simpler parameters than an RPAS and of course safety
of beings and means isn’t the issue for the player.
MYTH 2 : RPAS DOESN’T ADHERE TO THE SAME RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MANNED AIRCRAFT
The RPASs Operate in the same Airspace Categories as Manned Aircraft do and must respect the same Rules of
the Air and sometimes they will fly under more stringent Regulations than Manned Aircraft. In general RPAS
follows all technological guidelines and evolutions of Manned Aircraft in order to be inserted in a Regulated Traffic
and not Visa Versa. The only difference, from the pilot point of view, is that of a fatal accident of a RPA where the
Remote Pilot won’t be among the victims !!!! but bares exactly the same responsibilities as manned aircraft
operators do. These issues are also the main subject of this Presentation.

As already stated before, the RPAS is called to
operate within the present and future non-
segregated airspace environments and inserted in
the various classes of such environment, in
accordance with the ICAO airspace classification.
Particularly the CT-RPAS will be integrated into the
Air Traffic Management (ATM) systems around the
Globe under current and/or future common Rules
as specifically undertaken by the EU’s Single
European Sky effort, the US Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NextGen) into the NAS
(National Airspace System) and the Joint
Undertaking of EU and US in this field.
According to the current regulatory approach, the
main fixed objective for any category of RPAS is to
fulfill its overall operational envelope in safety
conforming the current and future regulations and
not visa-versa.
RPAS Integration into Airspace (ICAO Circular 328-AN/190)
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A.2 Basic RPAS Functional/Operational Definitions and Terminology
The following are some RPAS Standard Functional and Operational Definitions and
Terminology in accordance with the ICAO Doc. No. 10019 AN/507 that will be used
throughout this presentation. Whatever term isn’t included herein but used in this
presentation will be explained ad hoc. The terms herein are mostly directed to those
attendees who aren’t familiar with such terms.

Air Traffic Control (ATC). A generic term meaning variously, area control center, approach control unit or
aerodrome control tower.
Availability of OCT it is the probability that an Operational Communication Transaction can be initiated when
needed
Automatic Dependent Surveillance — Broadcast (ADS-B). A means by which aircraft, aerodrome
vehicles and other objects can automatically transmit and/or receive data such as identification, position and
additional data, as appropriate, in a broadcast mode via a data link.
Autonomous Operation. An operation during which a remotely-piloted aircraft is operating without pilot
intervention in the management of the ﬂight.
BRLOS (Beyond Visual Line-Of-Sight) Operations When neither the remote pilot nor RPA observer(s) can
maintain direct unaided visual contact with the RPA, the operations are considered BRLOS. Minimum equipment
requirements to support BRLOS operations increase significantly as the range and complexity of such operations increase,
as does the cost involved in ensuring the robustness of the C3 link.

Command and Control Link. The data link which is part of the C3 Link and transmits/receives data between
the remotely-piloted aircraft and the remote pilot station for the purposes of managing all phases of the ﬂight
operations envelop.
Conspicuity. Quality of an aircraft (e.g. lighting or paint scheme), allowing it to be easily seen or noticed by
others (e.g. by pilots, ATCOs, aerodrome personnel).
Continuity of OCT the minimum portion of Operational Communication Transactions to be completed within
the specified Required Link Performance (RLP) transaction time, given that the service was available at the start
of the transaction.
Control Area. A controlled airspace extending upwards from a specified limit above the earth.
Controlled Aerodrome. An aerodrome at which air traffic control service is provided to aerodrome traffic.
Controlled Airspace. An airspace of defined dimensions within which air traffic control service is provided in
accordance with the airspace classification.

Controlled Flight. Any flight which is subject to an air traffic control clearance.
Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC). A means of communication between controller
and pilot, using data link for ATC communications.
Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) Link. a link that is the carrier of all logical data
flows associated with the command and control of the RPA flight and the health and usage monitoring of all RPA
systems, subsystems and components and the management of the CNPC link.
Data Link Communications. A form of communication intended for the exchange of messages via a data
link.
Data Integrity Data that has integrity is identically maintained during the transfer operation by the link.
Data Confidentiality The guarantee that the data transfer into the link will not be disclosed.
Data Authenticity Means The use of some technology to prove the data is authentic, i.e. generated by an
authorized source.

Detect and Avoid (DAA). The capability to see, sense or detect conﬂicting traffic or other hazards and take
the appropriate action to comply with the applicable safety and rules of ﬂight.
Extended Visual Line Of Sight (ERLOS) Operations. relates to the operating method whereby the
Remote Pilot in command (PIC) relies on one or more Remote Observers to keep the unmanned aircraft in visual
sight at all times, relaying critical flight information via radio and assisting the Remote Pilot in maintaining safe
separation from other aircraft [manned or unmanned].
Flight Plan. Specified information provided to air traffic control, relative to an intended flight or portion of a
flight of an aircraft.
Handover. The act of passing piloting control from one remote pilot station to another.
Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). Meteorological conditions expressed in terms of visibility,
distance from cloud, and ceiling, less than the minima specified for visual meteorological conditions.
Integrity of OCT the required probability that an operational communication transaction is completed with no
undetected errors.

Jitter The measure of the variability over time of the data packet latency across the link. A link communication
with constant latency has no variation (no jitter)
Latency (Delay) The time required for a data packet to travel from a specific source to a specific destination and
back again.
Link Availability The ratio of the expected value of the uptime of the communication link divided by the sum of
the expected values of up and expected values of down time.
A = E (uptime)/(E(uptime)+E(downtime)).
Lost Link. The loss of command and control link contact with the remotely-piloted aircraft such that the remote
pilot can no longer manage the aircraft’s flight.
Operational Control The exercise of authority over the initiation, continuation, diversion or termination of a
flight in the interest of safety of the aircraft and the regularity and efficiency of the flight.
Pilot-in-Command. The pilot designated by the operator, or in the case of general aviation, the owner, as being
in command and charged with the safe conduct of a flight.

Radio Line-of-Sight (RLOS). A direct electronic point-to-point contact between a transmitter and a receiver.
Required Communication Performance (RCP). A statement of the performance requirements for
operational Required Communication Performance Type (RCP type). A label (e.g. RCP 240) that represents the
values assigned to RCP parameters for communication transaction time, continuity, availability and integrity
communication in support of specific ATM functions.
Required Link Performance (RLP) it is an indicator summarizing the class of performance of a Command,
Control and Communication (C3) link for an RPAS.
RPAS Area of Operation It is the area where an RPA is intended to operate in a given airspace and complies
with the requirements of that airspace, (e.g. certifications, approvals and equipment. Irrespective of these
certifications, approvals or equipment requirements, RPA may be prohibited from operating in certain areas,
such as above heavily populated areas, if so determined by the civil aviation authority).

Segregated Airspace or Special Use Airspace (SUA) is an area designated for operations of a nature
such that limitations may be imposed on aircraft not participating in those operations. Often these operations are
of a military nature. The designation of SUAs identifies for other users the areas where such activity occurs,
provides for segregation of that activity from other users, and allows charting to keep airspace users informed of
potential hazards. Most SUAs are depicted on aeronautical charts and as such may include: restricted airspace,
prohibited airspace, military operations areas (MOA), warning areas, alert areas, temporary flight restriction
(TFR), national security areas, and controlled firing areas, typically up to FL180 or 18,000 ft above sea level. On
the other hand the Non-Segregated Airspace is an air traffic environment in which most aircraft operate. Non-
segregated airspace is further classified into seven types; from Class A to Class G, as currently defined by (ICAO
Annex 2, 1990) although this may change in the future as part of the Single European Sky initiative.
Traffic Avoidance Advice. Advice provided by an ATC specifying maneuvers to assist a pilot to avoid a
collision.
Traffic Information. Information issued by an ATC to alert a pilot to other known or observed air traffic which
may be in proximity to the position or intended route of flight and to help the pilot avoid a collision.

Transaction Time The minimum portion of operational communication transactions to be completed within the
specified RLP transaction time, given that the service was available at the start of the transaction.
RLOS (Visual Line-Of-Sight) RPAS Operations when the remote pilot or RPA observer must maintain direct
unaided visual contact with the remotely piloted aircraft. LOS operations can be performed in a larger horizontal
range when one or more RPA observer/controller supports the pilot in keeping the RPA clear of other traffic and
obstacles. The vertical range may also be increased depending on the location of the RPA observer (e.g. on board
another aircraft).

A.3 UAS/ RPAS Categorization, Missions
and
Airspace Insertion Basics

TYPICAL CIVIL AVIATION RPAS FLIGHT DESIGN CONFIGURATION CLASSIFICATION
Remotely Piloted Airborne System (RPAS) currently maybe be encompassed in the following Flight
Design Configuration Classification which are intrinsic to their development, qualification and operation
(peculiar machines will be sub-classes of these main classifications):
FIXED WING
ROTARY WING
HYBRID ROTORCRAFT
(TILT ROTOR)
AIRSHIPS
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Typical Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Grouping
SIGNIFICANT
REGULATORY
GAP
COMPARED TO
MANNED A/C
HIGH
REGULATORY
GAP
MODERATE TO
LOW
REGULATORY
GAP
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Some Examples of UAV/RPAS Missions
MILITARY
 Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR);
 Weapons Platform;
 Cargo Transport and Logistics Management
 Natural Disaster Support
STATE
(Non-Military)
 Border Surveillance;
 Police and Security support;
 Rescue Support;
 Fisheries Patrol;
 Meteorological Research and hurricane/typhoon monitoring;
 Natural disaster support: land/forestry management; oceanic research;
volcano monitoring; climate monitoring;
 State Special Transport
 Air Cargo Transport and Logistics (incl. Dual Use)
 Advertising; Aerial Photography; Cinema/Media applications;
 Agricultural Monitoring; insecticide and Fertiliser application;
 Forest Fire Operations; wildlife census;
 Critical infrastructure inspection; terrain mapping;
 Oil and Gas Pipeline Monitoring
 Emergency Medical Support 24

UAV/RPAS Operational Designations by Altitude and Endurance
25

Advantages of RPAS
The advantages of using an RPAS, relative to use of a manned aircraft, are that the RPAS:
 does not contain, or need, a qualified pilot on board
 can enter environments that are dangerous to human life
 reduces the exposure risk of the aircraft operator
 can stay in the air for up to 30 hours, performing an aerial work day-after-day, night-after-night in
complete darkness, or, in fog, under computer control
 performing a variety of missions as manned aircraft do but with more operational cost-effectiveness
 can be programmed to complete the mission autonomously even when contact with its RPS is lost.
Disadvantages of RPAS
 May cause the collateral damage such as killing the civilians and damaging the civilian property
 Loss of Link
 Subjected to Cyber Attack
 Costly Technology to substitute human abilities and interactions on board of the aircraft (manned A/C)
 Complex Infrastructure to satisfy Aviation Safety Requirements

Will all the previous groups of RPAS Fly Together With Manned Aircraft?
Not all RPAS grouping Categories will be formally allowed to fly integrated with other
aerial traffic because there are several technical requirements and rules that RPAS will
need to meet in order to be allowed to fly in the same airspace as manned aircraft and a
number of them will not be capable of meeting such requirements in terms of physical,
functional and operational characteristics. ICAO, EUROCONTROL with other international
entities like EASA, FAA, EUROCAE, JARUS, RTCA and others in EU, and the USA are
developing these requirements. Only the RPAS that can meet these requirements will be
allowed to fly in airspace together with manned aircraft.

Airspace Classes in Accordance with ICAO Annex 11, Appendix 4

Current European States Airspace Allocation and Usage (Source: EUROCONTROL)

Example of RPASs Operating in Various Airspace Classes Related Challenges
30

ATC and Collision Avoidance issues in the Various
Airspace Classes
31

RPAS Integration to Airspace- Separation Provisions Summary

RPAS Integration Principles
In accordance with the EUROCONTROL, the overall approach towards integration is that
RPAS will have to fit into the ATM system and not that the ATM system needs to significantly
adapt to enable the safe integration of RPAS. RPAS will have to prove to be as safe as
current manned operations, or safer. RPAS behavior in operations will also have to be
equivalent to manned aviation, in particular for the air traffic control (ATC), as it will not be
possible for the ATC to effectively handle many different types of RPAS with different
contingency procedures.
RPAS Airspace Insertion Basics

High Level Operational Requirements (I/A/W EUROCONTROL)
The integration of RPAS shall not imply a significant impact on the current users of the airspace;
 RPAS shall comply with existing and future regulations and procedures;
 RPAS integration shall not compromise existing aviation safety levels, nor increase risk: the way RPAS
operations are conducted shall be equivalent to manned aircraft, as much as possible;
 RPAS shall comply with the SESAR trajectory management process;
 All RPAS shall be able to comply with air traffic control rules/procedures;
 RPAS shall comply with the capability requirements applicable to the airspace within which they are intended to
operate.

Operations Classification (I/A/W EUROCONTROL)
It is envisaged that RPAS will operate in the airspace and ATM environments, mixed with a
variety of manned aircraft (e.g. from gliders to large airliners) under instrument flight rules
(IFR) or visual flight rules (VFR) adhering to the requirements of the specified airspace in
which they are operating. While commercial air transport (CAT) normally flies to move
passengers, freight or mail from aerodrome ‘A’ to aerodrome ‘B’, following a profile
including a climb phase, en-route at relatively high altitude composed by essentially
straight segments, descent and landing, RPAS comprise a much wider range of possible
operations, and in many ways similar to the operations of General Aviation, Rotorcraft, and
Military missions including:

1. Very low level (VLL) operations (alias non-standard VFR or IFR operations) below the typical
IFR and VFR altitudes for manned aviation: i.e. not to exceed 500 ft. above ground level; they
comprise:
 Visual line of sight (RLOS) in a range not greater than 500 meters from the remote pilot, in
which the remote pilot maintains direct unaided visual contact with the remotely piloted
aircraft;
 Extended Visual Line of Sight (E-RLOS) where, beyond 500 meters, the pilot is supported
by one or more observers, in which the crew maintains direct unaided visual contact with
the remotely piloted aircraft;
 Beyond RLOS (B-RLOS) where the operations are also below 500 ft., but beyond visual line
of sight requiring additional technological support.

2. RPAS operations in VFR or IFR, above 500 ft. and above minimum flight altitudes; they
comprise:
A. IFR (or VFR) operations in radio line-of-sight (RLOS) of the RPS in non-segregated airspace where manned
aviation is present. The key capability of ‘detect and avoid’ (D&A) is required in relation to cooperative and
non-cooperative nearby traffic (otherwise specific procedures and restrictions would apply);
B. IFR (or VFR) operations beyond radio line-of-sight (BRLOS) operations, when the RPA can no longer be in
direct radio contact with the RPS and therefore wider range communication (COM) services (including via
satellite) are necessary. In this case COM would typically be offered by a COM service provider.
NOTE: The altitudes that are identified for the above mentioned operations are of a generic
nature not taking into consideration National differences and exemptions.

Integration Phases(I/A/W EUROCONTROL)
The RPAS integration is a phased and gradual introduction of RPAS operations, based on the 5 types of
operations identified above, and three subsequent levels of integration. It provides a detailed plan for initial
operations of RPAS for all types of scenarios. Operations will still be subject to limitations, not only in terms of
accessible airspace classes, but also over densely populated areas and in particular in the vicinity of
aerodromes. The Roadmap suggests realizing further integration, partially alleviating any restrictions/
limitations. This evolution would lead to full integration of RPAS.
1. Initial Operations (BY 2018)
At this first level of integration, operations are conducted under restrictions defined by the CAAs. In this phase,
a significant volume of cross-border operations is not expected. Integration into non-segregated airspace will
only be possible under strict conditions. At the same time, the development of the necessary regulation will
have started. When national competences exist, rules will be developed by CAAs with the greatest possible
degree of voluntary harmonization.

2. Integration (2019-2023)
In this second integration step, RPAS start conducting their operations according to harmonized regulations,
alleviating a number of restrictions/limitations. Operation of RPAS < 150 kgs are progressively based on
common rules, which would alleviate some of the restrictions to access non-segregated airspace ( controlled
and non-controlled) and to operate at aerodromes. Mutual recognition of certificates or licenses, based on
common rules, facilitate cross border operations. Harmonization on a worldwide scale will however continue to
be pursued mainly through ICAO..
3. Evolution (2024-2028)
Further evolution would allow to achieve the ultimate goal, where appropriately certified and approved RPAS,
flown by licensed remote pilots and under the legal responsibility of certified RPAS operators will be able to
operate cross-border, in non-segregated airspace and over any populated territory. In other words, complete
integration into the European and global civil aviation system. However, some restrictions may still apply in
congested terminal areas and at aerodromes.

ATC Participating Airborne Operational Environment View (Ref. Report ITU-R M.2171)

Non-ATC Participating Airborne Operational View (Ref. Report ITU-R M.2171)

Towards RPAS Integration in the European Aviation System – The SESAR Joint Undertaking Program

A.4 Cargo Transport RPAS General Functional Architecture
and
Critical Enabling Technologies Issues

CARGO TRANSPORT RPA OVERALL PHYSICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE
(EXAMPLE USED PIAGGIO AEROSPACE P.1HH RPAS PLATFORM FUTURE CARGO TRANSPORT)
The P.1HH CT-RPAS overall architecture shown is composed of
the following main subsystems:
 Command/Control System (Platform C2 and VCMS).
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (RPA) platform.
 Links System (Ground and Airborne Segment).
 Voice Communication System (Ground and Airborne Segment).
 Mission System (Ground and Airborne Segment).

CARGO TRANSPORT RPA
CARGO TRANSPORT RPA PHYSICAL AND FUNCTIONAL COMPOSITION
P.1HH RPA STRUCTURAL CUTAWAY AND SURFACES
MAIN SIDE CARGO DOOR
LOWER CARGO DOOR FOR AIR DROP OPERATIONS POWER PLANT
The P.1HH RPA is a three-lifting surface, twin turboprop, all weather, Automatic Take-Off and Landing (ATOL) platform,
optimized for goods transportation at Max Take-Off Weight MTOW 6,146 Kg [13,550 lbs.]. It can climb up to 47.000 ft, with a
maximum speed of 395 KTAS at 31000 ft and a maximum payload of 500 kg. The P.1HH RPAS is a Group 6-(Large) Category
representative RPAS which also satisfies the ICAO RPAS architectural definition as MALE RPAS.
CARGO TIE-DOWN FLOOR

CARGO TRANSPORT RPA POTENTIAL AVIONICS EQUIPMENT (BASED ON THE P.1HH RPAS PLATFORM)
NOTE: Shown Equipment are indicative and may be subjected to changes

CARGO TRANSPORT RPS
CARGO TRANSPORT RPS PHYSICAL AND FUNCTIONAL COMPOSITION
The Cargo Transport RPS (example based on P.1HH Ground Control Station) can manage up to
three aircraft: two airplanes in Line of Sight (LOS) or Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) or one in
LOS and the second one in BLOS and a third one in transferring phase, in Line of Sight (LOS),
to substitute one of the two platforms. Maximum two RPAs for each datalink type (LOS or
BLOS) are supportable at the same time.
Example of RPS Layout

The P.1HH CT-RPAS GCS (RPS) includes the following Work Station Consoles
1) POP (Pilot Operator) console, dedicated to the RPA’s command and control (C2). The POP is in charge of the RPA during
the operational mission. His main duties are the following:
 Prepare the flight plans and control the RPA. 5.10.2 Multifunctional Display (MFD)
 Communicate with ATC (Air Traffic Control).
 Supervise the Automatic Take-Off and Landing (ATOL) function.
 Perform the initial failure classification and the needed effort when malfunction occurs during the mission.
 Assist the SOP during payload operations by maneuvering or by selecting automated maneuvers.
 Accomplish LM responsibilities when he is not present.
CARGO TRANSPORT RPS PHYSICAL AND FUNCTIONAL COMPOSITION-Continue
POP Multifunctional Display (MFD)

2) DOP (Datalink Operator) console, devoted to control all the Datalinks available in the GCS. The DOP main duties are:
 Set up the Datalink (frequency, Antenna setup, Signal power and etc.).
 Communicate to the POP the Datalink health status during the RPA mission.
 Perform the initial failure classification and the needed effort when the Datalink malfunction occurs during the mission.
CARGO TRANSPORT RPS PHYSICAL AND FUNCTIONAL COMPOSITION-Continue
3) LM (Load Master) console, which is a multipurpose console able to show all the RPAs C2 Data details including the
capability to control the Datalinks (as backup purpose). The Load Master responsibilities are:
 Verify that the cargo is correctly and safely stored inside the RPA cargo bay and/or fuselage bay.
 Verify that the release system correctly operates.
 Verify the status of the cargo during the whole mission.
 Supervise and manage the release maneuver.

CARGO
TRANSPORT RPAS
C3 AND PAYLOAD
LINK
CARGO TRANSPORT RPAS DATA AND VOICE LINK CONCEPT COMPOSITION
COMMAND AND CONTROL
DATA (C2) LINK (RPS/RPA)
(Telecommand & Telemetry)
COMMUNICATIONS LINK
(RPAS/ATC)
RPAS CARGO PAYLOAD
DATA LINK (RPA/RPS)
C3 OR CNPC* LINK
* CNPC= Control and Non-Payload Communications
Cargo Payload Monitoring
Cargo Payload Release
Cargo Payload Handling
 TERRESTRIAL SYSTEMS/SERVICES
 AIRBORNE EQUIPMENT
 SPACE-BORNE SYSTEMS/SERVICES
LOS OPERATIONS
ERLOS OPERATIONS
BLOS OPERATIONS
RPA
RPS

COMMAND AND
CONTROL DATA (C2)
LINK (RPS/RPA)
COMMUNICATIONS
LINK
(RPAS/ATC)
RPAS CARGO
PAYLOAD DATA LINK
(RPA/RPS)
The CNPC Link Carries all Logical Flows Related to the RPA’s Flight Control in the entire Mission Profile
and its Health and Usage Management (HUM) in all Operational Phases including the CNPC Link
Management itself.
The Communications Element is a main component of the CNPC since the Remote Pilot (RP) will interact
with the ATC in the various phases of the flight. The Comms Link doesn’t carry any payload related
information. The CNPC Link is expected to be relatively Narrowband with the potential exception the
Situational-Awareness-Enhancing video streams (if it is installed in the RPA). The CNPC link will be under
protected spectrum management so as to enhance the RPAS overall safety and security while data is
received and transmitted. The CNPC Link is decomposed into the following logical elements:
 RP/ATC Communications (Voice and Data between the pilots and ATC/other Airspace Users).
 RPAS Command and Control into 1) Telecommand Uplink ( From the RP to RPA related information for
the RPA Flight Trajectory and Systems Control) 2) Telemetry Downlink ( from RPA to the RP related flight
safety information such as RPA GPS, NAV, DAA , Surveillance Systems, Inertial, Performace and
Functional Data.
 Uplink and Downlink Data to support flight data recording and RPS handover,
 Detect and Avoid (DAA) 1) DAA Uplink: sensor selection/control and, if applicable, auto response state
select (on/off) and override (remote pilot option to cancel the maneuvers) 2) DAA downlink: sensor data
and processed sensor information (related to traffic, weather, terrain, airport visual data, etc.), conflict
alert and terrain/obstacle alert and maneuver advisories (MA) and, if applicable, DAA automatic
response (initiation and description), etc.
CARGO TRANSPORT RPAS LINK MAIN FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS
The Cargo Payload Data Link carries all logical flows of information required to the RP during all RPAS
Cargo Air Transport Mission Operational Phases. Such information includes Cargo Status Monitoring,
Handling (including Loading and Unloading, Tie Down and Securing) and Release (in case of Air Drop).

CARGO TRANSPORT RPAS LINK MAIN FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS - Continue
Traditional Aeronautical Telemetry
 Used to provide air vehicle status (largely for flight test applications)
 Used for test data downlink
 Primarily used on ranges or other controlled airspace
 Use coordinated in the flight test community
Traditional Tele-Command
 Used for Drone Control
 Used for flight termination
 Used to control aircraft test equipment from the ground

EXAMPLE - P.1HH CT-RPAS LOS and BLOS Operations Capability
Datalinks allow data exchange between the RPA and the
RPS performing the following functions:
 Uplink of commands to control the RPA.
 Downlink of RPA’s telemetry (position, speed, altitude,
direction etc.).
 Uplink of commands to control the payloads.
 Downlink of payload video/data.
 Downlink of cameras videos.
The Datalinks operate when the RPS is both within and
beyond the RPA’s Line Of Sight (namely LOS and BLOS
operating scenarios).
The Data Link Operator (DOP) is able to control at least:
 Frequency Hand Over between two RPAs (LOS and BLOS mode).
 Band selection, BER (Bit Error Rate) signal status, DL Speed selection, Antennas gain control etc.
 Secure/Non secure Data communications.

A.5 Overview of a Typical RPAS Operational Scenario
and
Critical Regulatory Issues

TYPICAL UAS/RPAS FLIGHT PHASES WITHIN A
GENERIC CONOPS FROM AN AERODROME A TO
AN AERODROME B
RPS
RPA
ATC ATC
AERIAL WORK
55

RPAS Air Traffic Insertion C3 Link Architecture and Overall Operational Concept in ATM Environment
(In Line with ATM CESAR Concept)
56

Notional Altitude Profile Illustrating in General Terms the Flight Phases Trajectory Model
A Trajectory Model in all Flight Phases is used during in assessing the operational performance in the
subject scenario, taking also into account the following main characteristics for the RPA:
1) Speed;
2) Climb, Descent or Turn Rates;
3) Wake Turbulence;
4) Endurance;
5) Latency; and
6) Effect of bank angle on C3 link and ATC communications link capability, reliability and availability

RPAS OPERATIONAL SCENARIO- REGULATORY ASPECTS OVERVIEW

From regulatory point of view, the Cargo Transport RPAS must satisfy a set of highly
integrated (among them), Major Regulatory Requirement Domains to a degree
dictated by the existing Regulations for manned aircraft operations in terms of
commonalities and gap solutions (for the non-commonalities) among Manned Aircraft
Systems (MAS) and RPAS. In addition, the continuing growth of aviation increasing
demands on airspace capacity, it emphasizes the need for the optimum utilization of
the available airspace.
RPAS REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS MAIN DOMAINS

Poor performance in the communications between the RP and the RPA would, for example, lead to
increased separation and reduced airspace capacity to maintain the current safety levels. These factors,
allied with the requirement for operational efficiency within acceptable levels of safety, have resulted in
the need for a performance-based aviation system. The transition to a performance-based aviation system
is a critical aspect of the evolution to a safe and efficient global air traffic management (ATM)
environment. In the context of a Cargo Transport RPAS Command, Control and Communications (C3), it will
be necessary to ensure acceptable operational performance, taking into account changing technologies.
C3 LINK
RPAS REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
RPA
RPS

Category Description
Operational Scenario Flight phases, RPAS segments, airspace, flight envelope, coverage
area, air traffic density.
Performance Availability, latency, continuity, integrity, capacity, rendering.
Security Confidentiality, authentication, integrity, availability.
Aeronautical Earth Station Certification, design characteristics, coexistence with on-board
electronics/avionics.
Regulatory Spectrum, Equivalent Isotropic Radiated Power (EIRP) limits, out of
band emissions, coordination with /protection of other in band
systems.
RPAS General Categorization of Requirements for LOS and BLOS Operations

Work by Institutions and Industry Bodies to Manage the ATM Aspects of RPAS
■ ICAO: a Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (Doc 10019) was published in 2015 and SARPs are under
development. The first Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) release is envisaged for 2018 but is not expected to
include collision avoidance. ICAO has also released a web based RPAS iKit providing access to material produced by ICAO,
international and national organizations (http://cfapp.icao.int/tools/ikit/rpasikit/story.html) .
■ European Commission: a roadmap for the integration of civil RPAS into the European Aviation System has been
published. The recent European Commission Declaration on UAS can be accessed at :
(www.ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/news/2015-03-06-drones_en.htm).
■ JARUS: the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems is a worldwide group of experts from the National
Aviation Authorities and regional aviation safety organizations. Its purpose is to recommend a single set of technical, safety
and operational requirements for the certification and safe integration of UAS into airspace and at aerodromes, and provide
guidance material aiming to facilitate each authority to write their own requirements. (http://jarus-rpas.org/publications).
■ EASA: is responsible for regulating RPAS when used for civil applications and with an operating mass of 150kg or more,
and also chairs JARUS. EASA recently published a ‘Concept of Operations for Drones’ that proposes regulating RPAS in
three categories – ‘open’, ‘specific’ and ‘certified’. These categories take into account factors such as purpose/complexity of
use, operating height, if the RPAS is being operated Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BRLOS) etc.
(https://www.easa.europa.eu/unmanned-aircraft-systems-uas-and-remotely-piloted-aircraft-systems-rpas)

Work by Institutions and Industry Bodies to Manage the ATM Aspects of RPAS- Continue
■ EUROCONTROL: has responsibility for the ATM part of RPAS integration across Europe and it is supporting its
Member States on how to integrate RPAS operations. (https://www.eurocontrol.int/rpas)
■ SESAR: Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) is a collaborative project to completely overhaul European
airspace and its air traffic management (ATM). The actual program is managed by the SESAR Joint Undertaking as a
public–private partnership (PPP). It is addressing the R&D requirements related to RPAS integration into the European civil
aviation system. This currently includes 9 demonstration projects. (http://www.sesarju.eu/)
■ EUROCAE: has developed performance specifications and other documents exclusively dedicated to the Aviation
community. EUROCAE documents are widely referenced as a means of compliance to European Technical Standard Orders
(ETSOs) and other regulatory documents. Working groups 73 (large RPAS) and 93 (light RPAS operations) are working on
industry standards. (https://www.eurocae.net/)
■ National Regulatory Institutions : A number of National Aviation Regulators have developed RPAS regulations.
For example, ENAC of Italy, UK CAA, US FAA, etc.
ENAC Website on RPAS ( https://www.enac.gov.it/Servizio/Info_in_English/Courtesy_translations/info-1220929004.html )

RPAS INITIAL AND CONTINUOUS AIRWORTHINESS MAIN CRITICAL ISSUES

RPAS INITIAL AND CONTINUOUS AIRWORTHINESS MAIN CRITICAL ISSUES
Airworthiness is the measure of an aircraft's suitability for safe
flight, equipped and maintained in condition to fly. Certification of
airworthiness is initially conferred by a certificate of airworthiness from
a national aviation authority, and is maintained by performing the
required maintenance actions.
MIL-HDBK-516C defines airworthiness as “the ability of an aircraft
system/vehicle to safely attain, sustain and terminate flight in
accordance with an approved usage and limitation”.
Thus, Airworthiness is a basic requirement for any aircraft system,
manned or unmanned, to enter the airspace.
MAIN REFERENCES:
 ICAO Doc 9760 Airworthiness Manual, 3rd Edition-2014
 ICAO Doc. 10019 AN/507 Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft
Systems (RPAS), First 1 Edition — 2015
 MIL-HDBK-516C Airworthiness Certification Criteria

RPAS INITIAL AND CONTINUOUS AIRWORTHINESS MAIN CRITICAL ISSUES-Continue
RPAS Airworthiness Certification - Additional Issues (ICAO)
 RPAS Design Monitoring, Demonstration and Validation
 RPAS Design Organization Approval
 RPAS Production Facilities, Processes and Organization Approvals
 RPAS Product Integration
 RPAS Configuration Management
 RPAS Continuing Validity Of Certificates
 RPAS Operation and Continuous Airworthiness
 RPAS Maintenance
 RPAS Responsibility of Design Authority, Manufacture, Registry and the Operator

RPAS Airworthiness Certification Governing Principles (ICAO)
 Only the RPA is recorded on the Aircraft Register
 The RPA is issued a Certificate of Airworthiness by the State of Registry
- Encompasses all required components of the RPAS (RPA, RPS, C3 link)
 RPS should not control more than one RPA at a given time
 Remote pilot-in-command is expected to have continuous control over the RPA
- Interruption of the C2 link is considered an abnormal operating condition
- RPAS Design should take into account potential interruption of the C2 link and failure consequences
from the perspective of safety
- Duration of the interruption or the phase of flight may elevate the situation to an emergency
 The RPAS as a system, comprised of the RPA, approved RPS(s) and the C3 link(s),
provided an implicit design approval through a Type Certificate issued to the RPA

RPAS Airworthiness Certification Governing Principles (ICAO)
 RPA considered airworthy, when RPAS demonstrates conformity to approved type
design and compliant with instructions for continuing airworthiness
– Regulatory inspections and applicable Airworthiness Directives should ensure the RPAS is
maintained in a condition for safe operation.
 RPA equipped in accordance with applicable operational equipage requirements
for operations in the type and class of airspace and flight rules e.g. VFR or IFR
 RPA receives an individual Certificate of Airworthiness which includes the RPS(s)
and C3 link(s)

RPAS Airworthiness Type Certification (ICAO)
 Issuance of an aircraft Type Certificate (CT) by the State of Design
– Provides evidence that the design has been found to comply with applicable design standards
 Major components (e.g. engines, propellers) may also hold type certificates
– RPS may hold a Type Certificate
 RPA TC holder is responsible for fully integrating all components
 The application for TC should be accompanied by all necessary documentation
– Design documentation
– Flight manual
– Instructions for continued airworthiness
– Normal and emergency procedures
– Applicable handover procedures between RPS
– Details of the required C3 link
 The C3 link is not a “product” - it will not be independently type certificated

RPAS Airworthiness Certificates (ICAO)
The RPA is the airborne component of the RPAS
Certificate of Airworthiness required for Aircraft conducting international operations
– Article 31 of the Chicago Convention
The State of Registry issues Certificate of Airworthiness to the RPA
– Conditional on demonstration that RPA, RPS(s) and other components conform to the type design and are
in a condition for safe operation
Configuration Management Record defines all components of the RPAS
– Provides traceability of reconfigurations or part changes
– May require extension of existing processes to capture RPAS components and their integration

RPAS Airworthiness Certification-Flight Manual (ICAO)
The RPA flight manual should contain all necessary information for operation of the
RPAS. In addition to those required for manned aviation, the following procedures shall
be included:
a) RPA handover procedures from one RPS to another;
b) C3 link specifications and procedures to respond to interruption or loss of the C3 link;
c) Flight termination procedures, if applicable; and
d) Security procedures unique to RPAS (e.g. RPS security, C3 link)

RPAS Airworthiness Certification-Reliability Monitoring and Reporting (ICAO)
The reporting of failures, malfunctions and defects for RPAS should comprise the overall
system; therefore, it applies to all States and organizations at their respective level of
responsibility. With the Certificate of Airworthiness framework as described herein, the
following may help in identifying those aspects surrounding the RPAS continued
operational safety to be considered with respect to manned aviation:
a) identification of reportable failures, malfunctions or defects which could affect the airworthiness status
and continuing safe operation of the RPAS;
b) identification of critical components for the RPA and RPS; and
c) establishment of RPAS accident and incident taxonomy

RPAS Airworthiness Type Certification Criticalities for Future Consideration (ICAO)
 ICAO Doc. 10019 AN/507 Chapter 4 does not provide specific guidance on procedures for
type design and airworthiness certification (compliance demonstration and data)
– Lack of sufficient operational service history and certification experience with RPAS
 States are encouraged to establish procedures which may be reflected by ICAO in future
certification guidance and Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
The complexity of the distributed RPAS system will be difficult to manage from both the
operational and regulatory oversight requirements
– Configuration management focused at the aircraft level
 Expect that developing RPAS industry will demand greater flexibility
– Need may arise to enable configuration management and maintenance management of RPS across multiple
States based on international principles and standards.

RPAS OPS FLIGHT CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS MAIN CRITICAL ISSUES

The safe operation of an aircraft necessitates compliance with a number of requirements which are established in
the Annexes to the Chicago Convention. These requirements apply equally to RPAS operations and are intended
to mitigate risk to persons and property on the ground and other airspace users. Critical issues are related to:
RPAS FLIGHT CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS MAIN CRITICAL ISSUES
 RPAS OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PLANNING Operational flight planning should include provisions similar to
those in manned operation.
 RPAS FLIGHT ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
 Meteorological Conditions
 Impacts on Radio Frequencies (RFs) ( Disturbing effects e.g. solar flares, volcanic ash, ionospheric activity)
 RPAS OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
 Visual line-of-sight operations (RLOS) and RLOS Operations at Night
 Beyond RLOS Operations (BRLOS)
 RPA Flights Over Populated Areas
 RPA Take-off and Landing Conditions and Limitations Considerations by the RP
 RPA Diversion to Alternate Aerodromes
 RPS Handover and Handover Coordination Between RPS

 RPAS OPERATIONAL EMERGENCIES AND CONTINGENCIES
 RPA Emergency Landing/Ditching Locations
 Loss of C3 link
 RPA PERFORMANCE OPERATING LIMITATIONS
 For Remotely Piloted Fixed Wing Aircraft ( i/a/w ICAO Annex 6)
 REMOTE FLIGHT CREW
 Duties of the Remote Pilot-In-Command (PIC)
 RPAS ACCIDENTS AND SERIOUS INCIDENTS
 Flight and Ground Recorder Data (i/a/w ICAO Annex 13)
 Downlinking RPA Recorded Data
 Accident and Incident Investigation
 RPAS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
 Threats, Vulnerability and Survivability (i/a/w (ICAO Annex 17 - Security).
 SAFE TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS BY AIR
Provisions of ICAO Annex 18 and Article 35 of the Chicago Convention
RPAS FLIGHT CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS MAIN CRITICAL ISSUES-Continue

RPAS FLIGHT CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS MAIN CRITICAL ISSUES
The safe operation of an aircraft necessitates compliance with a number of requirements
which are established in the Annexes to the Chicago Convention. These requirements apply
equally to RPAS operations and are intended to mitigate risk to persons and property on the
ground and other airspace users.
 RPAS OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PLANNING Operational flight planning should include provisions similar to
those in manned operation. In addition, specific needs for RPAS such as:
 No. of Remote Pilots and Crew duty time planning
 RPS Operational Availability
 RPAS Operator to ensure a continuous and uninterrupted operation throughout the duration of the flight.
 Remote Pilots Identification who can carry out the responsibilities for the different phases of the flight such
as take-off, climb, cruise, approach and landing, all of which should be included in the operations manual.

 Meteorological Conditions The Remote Pilot should review all available meteorological information pertaining
to the operation and performance limitations of the RPAS. Particular attention should be given to such conditions
as:
a) Surface visibility;
b) Wind direction/speed;
c) Hazardous meteorological conditions including cumulonimbus, icing and turbulence; and
d) Upper air temperature.
Flight into known or expected icing conditions should not be conducted unless the system is certified and
equipped for flight into those conditions, with the icing protection systems operational and the remote pilot(s)
qualified for cold weather operations.
RPAS FLIGHT ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
 Impacts on Radio Frequencies (RFs) Electromagnetic (EM) interference (e.g. solar flares, volcanic ash,
ionospheric activity) may affect performance of C3 links and GPS reception and should be considered by the
Remote Pilot prior to, and during, flight including intentional or inadvertent electronic interference. Operations in
areas of high RF transmission/interference (e.g. radar sites, high tension wires) should be avoided unless
engineering testing has confirmed that operations in these areas will not impact safe operation of the RPAS.

RPAS OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
 Visual line-of-sight operations (RLOS)
The pilot requires real-time communication capability with any RPA observers and, if a handover will occur,
with the other remote pilot(s). In some situations, the remote pilot will also need real-time communications
with the local ATC unit. If the remote pilot cannot visually monitor the RPA and is relying on RPA observers,
numerous additional factors need to be considered including:
a) Remote pilot and RPA observer training and competence;
b) Communication delays between RPA observer and remote pilot;
c) Simultaneous communication from multiple RPA observers or conflicting instructions;
d) Communication failure procedures between the RPA observer and remote pilot;
e) Remote pilot’s ability to determine the optimum CA maneuver when not in visual contact with the RPA or the conflicting
traffic; and
f) Remote pilot response time.
Predetermined maneuvers and phraseology for use by RPA observers and remote pilots to change the flight
trajectory may contribute to reduce exposure to conflicting traffic or obstacles and to restore normal flight
after carrying out a plan to avoid or mitigate each threat.

 RLOS Operations at Night
The Remote Pilot and/or RPA observer will have an additional challenge at night to judge distance, relative
distance and trajectory. RLOS operations should not be conducted at night unless adequate means to mitigate
the different possible threats have been established and can be met. The use of Night Vision Equipment for the
RP/RPAO and RPA lighting maybe one of the solutions to mitigate night flight difficulties.
 Beyond RLOS Operations
To conduct flights beyond RRLOS of the remote pilot or RPA observer, a means to DAA traffic and all other
hazards such as hazardous meteorological conditions, terrain and obstacles must be available to the remote
pilot. Prior to conducting a controlled BRLOS operation, coordination should be effected with the ATC unit(s)
involved regarding:
a) Any operational performance limitations or restrictions unique to the RPA (e.g. unable to perform standard rate
turns);
b) Any preprogrammed lost C3 link flight profile and/or flight termination procedures; and
c) Direct communication between the RPS and the ATC unit(s) for contingency use, unless otherwise approved
by the ATC unit(s) involved.

 Communication between the RPS and the ATC unit(s) should be as required for the class of airspace in
which operations occur and should utilize standard ATC communications equipment and procedures,
unless otherwise approved by the ATC unit(s) involved.
 C3 link transaction time should be minimized so as not to inhibit the remote pilot’s ability to interface
with the RPA compared to that of a manned aircraft.
 The nature of the C3 link (whether RLOS or BRLOS) will also influence the design of the RPAS. From an
operational perspective, the main difference between an RLOS operation and a BRLOS operation of a
BRLOS RPAS will be the delays associated with control and display information and the design features
selected to accommodate the available C3 link capacity.
 BRLOS C3 links in general are expected to have lower data capacity (due to cost and bandwidth
limitations) and higher message delays than RLOS C3 links. BRLOS RPS will be designed to match the
performance of the type of C3 link (BRLOS/RLOS) with which they will be used.

 BRLOS operations conducted under VFR should only be considered when the following conditions are met:
a) The State of the Operator and the State in whose airspace the operation occurs have approved the operation;
b) The RPA remains in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) throughout the flight; and
c) A DAA capability or other mitigation is used to assure the RPA remains well clear of all other traffic; or
d) The area is void of other traffic; or
e) The operation occurs in specifically delimited or segregated airspace.
 RPA Flights Over Populated Areas
Operations over heavily populated areas may require special considerations and should consider the following:
a) Altitudes for safe operation;
b) Consequences of uncontrolled landing;
c) Obstructions;
d) Proximity to airports/emergency landing fields;
e) Local restrictions regarding RPAS operations over heavily populated areas; and
f) Emergency termination of an RPA flight.

 UA/RPA Take-off Conditions and Limitations Considerations by the GCS/RPS
Take-off/Landing from/to Aerodromes
a) Regulations pertaining to UAS/RPAS operations on or near an aerodrome;
b) Complexity and density of aircraft operations;
c) Ground operations (e.g. taxiway width, condition, other ground traffic);
d) C3 link continuity;
e) Payload considerations;
f) Wake turbulence;
g) Performance and capability related to take-off distance/run available and minimum
obstruction climb requirements, departure procedures and any flight restricting conditions
associated with operations to or from the aerodrome; and
h) Availability of emergency recovery areas
Take-off/Landing from/to Other
Than Aerodromes
a) Take-off area and condition;
b) Location and height of all obstructions that could hinder launch and recovery;
c) Performance and capability related to obstacle clearance, departure procedures
(if applicable) and any flight-restricting conditions;
d) Availability of emergency recovery areas;
e) ATC communications, if required;
f) Link continuity;
g) Density and proximity of overflight traffic.

 UA/RPA Landing Conditions and Limitations Considerations by the GCS/RPS
Landing at Aerodromes
Landing at
Other Than Aerodromes
a) Regulations pertaining to RPAS operations on or near an aerodrome;
b) Complexity and density of aircraft operations;
c) Performance and capability related to landing distance available and obstacle clearance, arrival
procedures and any flight-restricting conditions;
d) Wake turbulence;
e) Ground operations (e.g. taxiway width, condition, other ground traffic);
f) C3 link continuity;
g) Payload considerations; and
h) Availability of emergency recovery areas.
a) Landing/recovery area and condition;
b) Location and height of all obstructions that could hinder landing or recovery (e.g. cables,
towers, trees);
c) Performance and capability related to obstacle clearance, arrival procedures (if applicable) and
any flight-restricting conditions;
d) Availability of emergency recovery areas;
f) ATC communications, if required;
g) C3 link continuity;
h) Payload considerations; and
i) Density and proximity of overflight traffic.

 RPA Diversion to Alternate Aerodromes
Pre-flight planning should include consideration of alternate aerodromes/recovery sites, as appropriate, in the
event of an emergency or meteorological-related contingency. Adequate fuel reserves should be included in pre-
flight preparation such that the RPA can deviate from a landing/recovery at the planned location, proceed safely to
the alternate aerodrome/recovery site, and execute an approach and landing. Before selecting an alternate
recovery/landing location, the remote pilot should consider, at a minimum, the adequacy of fuel reserves, the
reliability of C3 links with the RPA, ATC communications capability as necessary and meteorological conditions at
the alternate.
 RPS Handover
Handover of the RPA from one RPS to another is used for many reasons, including to extend the operational range or to
permit precision control such as for a terminal area or for maintenance reasons. RPS handovers may happen in two common
scenarios:
a) Handover of piloting control to a collocated, but not coupled, RPS. This handover may be to a second remote pilot or, in
the event of an RPS malfunction, the remote pilot moving to a standby RPS; or
b) Handover of piloting control to an RPS at another location.

Handover Coordination Between RPS
All handovers must be planned and coordinated as per the procedures in the operations and/or flight
manual. Handover considerations should include:
a) Confirmation of the availability of a reliable voice communication link between the transferring and
receiving remote pilots in the RPS to support coordination of the handover (it is recommended that
this communication is not relayed through the RPA);
b) Status of the receiving RPS (e.g. its readiness and availability, its software configuration and
compatibility with the RPA to be handed over);
c) Compatibility of the C2 link (e.g. IP address, frequency);
d) Coordination between the respective remote pilots; and
e) ATC coordination (e.g. emergency contact telephone number), as necessary.

Before transferring an RPA, a handover briefing must be conducted between the transferring and receiving
remote pilots to ensure the status of the RPA is understood:
a) confirmation by the receiving remote pilot that the RPA is within the accepting RPS C2 link range;
b) current status of the RPAS and location of the RPA;
c) faults/system failures with the RPAS;
d) status of fuel/energy and other consumables;
e) C3 link configuration; and
f) changes or limitations to the intended flight or RPA performance.
The receiving remote pilot should be satisfied with all of the above before accepting responsibility for the safe
continuation of the flight.
Handover Coordination Between RPS -Continue

 RPAS OPERATIONAL EMERGENCIES AND CONTINGENCIES
 RPA Emergency Landing/Ditching Locations
RPAS flight planning should include provisions for emergency landing of the RPA in locations that minimize the
safety risks to people or property on the ground. When selecting emergency landing locations, the remote pilot
should consider the following conditions:
a) Terrain, ground obstructions, population density, open air assemblies of people; and
b) Landing/ditching areas including accessibility for recovery or fire suppression.
 Loss of C3 link
Flight planning should include provisions for loss of the C3 link and should be in accordance with guidance
contained in the RPAS flight manual and/or operations manual. Procedures for the loss of the C3 link for RPA
conducting controlled flights should be pre-approved by the ATC units involved in each portion of the flight
planned route. Remote pilots must notify the ATC unit immediately upon the procedures being activated for any
flight under ATC control or any flight that may affect other ATC controlled flights, manned or unmanned.
(Additional information on procedures for the loss of C3 link will be treated later in this presentation)

 RPA PERFORMANCE OPERATING LIMITATIONS
 Remotely Piloted Fixed Wing Aircraft
For remotely piloted airplanes, the performance and operating limitations should be consistent with provisions
contained in ICAO Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft, Part I — International Commercial Air Transport — Airplanes
or Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft, Part II — International General Aviation — Airplanes
 REMOTE FLIGHT CREW
 Duties of the Remote Pilot-In-Command (PIC)
a) The Remote PIC is fully responsible for the entire operation and safety of the RPA (Flight Phases) and RPS
for the respective segment of flight assigned by the RPAS operator.
b) The Remote PIC is responsible for terminating the flight, in the event such an action is deemed necessary.
c) The remote PIC is assigned the responsibility by the RPAS operator for ensuring that any handover from
one RPS to another is completed in accordance with the procedures contained in the operations manual
and/or flight manual, as applicable.
d) The remote PIC(s) is responsible for updating all documents for the respective segment of the flight (e.g.
the journey log book, maintenance logs).

 RPAS ACCIDENTS AND SERIOUS INCIDENTS
a) ICAO Annex 13 — Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation requires that accidents and incidents involving RPAs be
investigated. According to Annex 13, Chapter 5, 5.1.2, Note 3, only RPAS with a design and/or operational approval
need to be considered. It is anticipated that RPAS flight recorders will be installed in the near future.
b) Adequate recording of RPAS operations will be required to support accident and incident investigations as well as for
flight data analysis. It is anticipated that this will apply particularly for BRLOS operations in the near future and
perhaps for RLOS operations.
c) Procedures to support handover of piloting control from one RPS to another must include definition of any specific
data or communications that need to be recorded to ensure that the event can be properly reconstructed.
 Flight and Ground Recorder Data
 Downlinking RPA Recorded Data
a) Recording of all data on the RPA and RPS may be required to ensure data collection is not affected by a C3 link loss.
b) During extra-long duration missions, the RPA flight recorder should have data storage capacity capable to store
information for all the anticipated duration of the flight

 Accident and Incident Investigation
a) Adequate recording of RPAS flight command, trajectory and systems will be essential in determining events leading up
to an accident or incident. Investigations where an RPAS was involved in an international operation could involve
multiple States with the location of wreckage and the RPS locations in different States. The State of Occurrence, or if
the investigation is delegated to another State or regional organization, the State responsible for investigating, must
have access to all the data as per the provisions of ICAO Annex 13, including data from the RPS.
b) For accident investigation and flight data recovery purposes, the accident site of an RPA may need to be established
within a 6 NM radius. In this case, the RPA will need to be fitted with a system that can automatically transmit or
broadcast positional information. Depending on the size of the RPA, this may be accomplished by means of a triggered
emergency data transmission/broadcast method which includes positional information, a locator transmitter or an
automatic deployable flight recorder.

 RPAS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
1) Security is a vital issue for RPAS with aspects that are both similar and unique when compared with manned
aircraft. As an RPS is similar in purpose and design to a cockpit, it must likewise be secure from sabotage or
unlawful malicious interference. ICAO Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 13, contains SARPs to secure the flight crew
compartment. However, due to the fixed and exposed nature of the RPS (as opposed to the restricted nature of a
commercial aircraft where the intrusion and use of heavier weapons is less likely) further consideration should
be given to the potential vulnerability of the premises against unlawful interference.
2) The RPA should be stored and prepared for flight in a manner that will prevent and detect tampering and
ensure the integrity of vital components. The Aviation Security Manual (ICAO Doc 8973) provides further details
concerning protection of aircraft.
3) Systems for controlling access to the RPS should be at least of equal standard to those already in place in the
commercial aviation industry. Identification technologies such as the use of biometrics for access control
systems may offer a high degree of security for the RPS.

 SAFE TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS BY AIR
For a Cargo Transport RPA utilized for the air transportation of goods internationally, the provisions of
ICAO Annex 18 and Article 35 of the Chicago Convention will be applicable.
4) Remote pilots should be subjected, at a minimum, to the same background check standards as persons
granted unescorted access to security restricted areas of airports (ICAO Annex 17 - Security).
5) The C2 link provides functions as vital as traditional wiring, control cables and other essential systems.
These links may utilize diverse hardware and software that may be provided and managed by third parties.
Safety and security of these links and services are equally important as those for the RPA and RPS. They must
be free from hacking, spoofing and other forms of interference or malicious hijack. ICAO Doc 9985 may
provide general reference material when addressing the unique nature of the C2 link.
 RPAS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS- Continue

RPAS REMOTE PILOT STATION (RPS) MAIN CRITICAL ISSUES

As a general principle, the RPS functions in the same manner
as the cockpit/flight deck of a manned aircraft and should
therefore offer the remote pilot an equivalent capability to
command/manage the flight of the RPA.
While the basic functions are similar to those of a manned
cockpit/flight deck, the specific shape, size, contents and
layout of any RPS will vary due to aspects such as the:
a) Type of operation conducted (RLOS or BRLOS);
b) Complexity of the RPAS;
c) Type of control interface used;
d) Number of remote pilots required to operate the RPA; and
e) Location of the RPS — fixed position on the ground or
within another vehicle/platform (e.g. ship or aircraft)

RPAS REMOTE PILOT STATION (RPS) MAIN CRITICAL ISSUES-Continue
 RPS FUNCTIONAL ISSUES
 RPS CONSIDERATIONS FOR DIFFERENT OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS
BRLOS Category A — Direct Control (PIC full RPA Control)
BRLOS Category B — Autopilot Control (Partial PIC Control of RPA)
BRLOS Category C — Waypoint Control ( Limited or Essential PIC Control of RPA)
RLOS Control for Take-off and/or Landing with Handover to BRLOS
 DISPLAY AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS FOR BRLOS CAPABLE RPS
Equivalent to Manned Aircraft Flight Deck
 RPS CAPABLE OF OPERATING RPA OF ONE OR MORE TYPES
RPAS Crew Workload issues
Man-Machine Interface
 RPS HUMAN PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS
 DISPLAY OF INFORMATION FOR DAA
obtaining information provided by aerodrome signs, markings and lighting; by visual signals (e.g.
interception)
identifying and avoiding terrain and obstacles; identifying and avoiding hazardous meteorological conditions;
maintaining at least the minimum applicable distances from cloud when operating under VFR;
remaining well clear of other aircraft or vehicles; and avoiding collisions.

 RPS FUNCTIONAL ISSUES
As mentioned previously in this Presentation, the RPS provides the means for the RPs of the RPAS to monitor
and control the operation of the RPA both on the ground and in the air. However, the interface between the
RP/RPS and the RPA is via a C2 link. The RPAS must therefore be designed to provide the RP with the necessary
means to effectively manage the flight. This may result in controls, displays and alarms that are different from
those of manned aircraft with consequences for remote flight crew procedures, training and licensing as well as
the airworthiness requirement of the components.

 the design of the controls and control systems must be such as to minimize the possibility of mechanical
jamming, inadvertent operations and unintentional engagement of control surface locking devices;
 the design of the RPS must be such as to minimize the possibility of incorrect or restricted operation of the
controls by the remote flight crew due to fatigue, confusion or interference. Consideration must be given at
least to the following:
1) layout and identification of controls and instruments;
2) rapid identification of emergency situations;
3) sense of controls; and
4) ventilation, heating and noise;
Notwithstanding the potential differences, the fundamental requirements of the RP/RPS interface remain the
same as for manned aircraft and can be summarized as follows:

 For BRLOS RPS adequate information on the environment in which the RPA is operating to provide the
remote pilot sufficient situational awareness to enable the safe operation of the RPA. These displays
should include those necessary to support the DAA functions.
 Controls and displays provided within the RPS must meet appropriate human performance
principles/requirements.
 Information on the quality of the C2 link must be available to the remote pilot, particularly if the quality of
service is degrading to a level at which remedial action must be taken.
 means must be provided which will either automatically prevent or enable the remote pilot to deal with
emergencies resulting from foreseeable failures of equipment and systems, the failure of which would
endanger the aircraft; and
 markings and placards on instruments, equipment, controls, etc., must include such limitations or
information as necessary for the direct attention of the remote pilot during flight;

 RPS components exposed to the elements should be secured, typically the antenna and other masts, as
these can suffer damage due to lightning and severe winds.
 RPS CONSIDERATIONS FOR DIFFERENT OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS
BRLOS Category A — Direct Control
Category A control provides the greatest level of remote pilot control of the RPA, allowing inputs equivalent to a
control stick, rudder pedals and throttle to actuate flight control surfaces and power settings, or via autopilot.
BRLOS Category B — Autopilot Control
Category B control provides less control of the RPA, still allowing speed, altitude, heading and vertical speed to
be controlled, although changes are only effected through autopilot entries.
BRLOS Category C — Waypoint Control
Category C control provides limited control by the remote pilot of the RPA during flight. The flight planned route
can only be altered through waypoint entries and/or deletions into the programmed flight plan.

 RLOS Control for Take-off and/or Landing with Handover to BRLOS
When RLOS control is used during take-off or landing, with handover to BRLOS control for the en-route
segment, for example, when automatic take-off or landing is not available or approved by the aerodrome
operator, the following points should be considered:
a) Operational requirements may necessitate use of an RPA observer or additional remote pilot to maintain
visual contact with the RPA; and
b) RLOS operation of a BRLOS RPA may require use of a different RPS than for the en-route segment.

 DISPLAY AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS FOR BRLOS CAPABLE RPS
 The RPS must be equipped with controls and displays which will enable
the remote pilot to control the flight path of the RPA, carry out any
required maneuvers and deal with emergencies while observing
operating limitations.
 All warnings and alerts currently provided for manned aircraft should
be considered for inclusion in the RPS.
 Any payload-related displays or controls must be designed and positioned so as not to distract the remote pilot from
the primary task of maintaining safe flight.
 The RPS is equivalent to the flight deck of a manned aircraft. Security of the station and the remote pilot are therefore
of paramount concern to overall air navigation system safety. Access to an RPS should be restricted commensurate
with the size and capability of the RPAS.
 Handovers between non-collocated RPS may necessitate additional verifications and controls to assure the process
is not interfered with by unauthorized individuals.

 RPS CAPABLE OF OPERATING RPA OF ONE OR MORE TYPES
 An RPS can be designed to control one or more types of RPA. However, an individual RPS should not have
piloting control of more than one RPA at a given time.
 If a RLOS RPS is used to control multiple types of RPA, common control and display interfaces will be
needed to minimize remote pilot workload and confusion. This may therefore limit the types of RPA that
may be effectively controlled by the RPS.
 If a BRLOS capable RPS is used to control multiple types of RPA, common control and display interfaces
will be needed to minimize remote pilot workload and confusion. This may, therefore, limit the types of RPA
that may be effectively controlled by the RPS. Furthermore, the remote pilot must have clear indication of
the model of RPA currently being controlled.

 RPS HUMAN PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS
 The human performance implications of the lack of sensory information resulting
from the remote pilot not being on board the aircraft must be considered and,
where necessary, adequately substituted. The following items, including substitute
means based on hazard cause analysis of the sensory information, should be
considered as a minimum:
a) visual sensory information (e.g. light and flash);
b) auditory sensory information (noise environment including engine and
airframe noise);
c) proprioceptive sensory information (e.g. vibration and acceleration);
d) olfactory sensory information (smell);
e) tactile sensory information (e.g. heat and vibration); and
f) other sensory information (e.g. heat and pressure).
 When RPS are located on mobile platforms, such as aircraft or ships, the human
performance issues of being located on a moving platform, such as conflicting
inputs from equipment-based sources versus from sensory sources (e.g.
instruments indicating the RPA is turning right while the RPS platform is turning
left), are criticalities that should be taken into account.

Varying levels of automation result in many different levels of control and control
interfaces being proposed. Remote pilots will have to adapt to the RPS in use,
executing tasks in different ways and adjusting to the level of automation provided.
These differences will have human performance implications for the remote pilot.
This implies that:
a)adequate, potentially continuous, display of essential information and access to all
secondary information that may contribute to the remote pilot’s decision-making
process is required;
b) the data provided must be clear and unambiguous;
c) control of aircraft systems and functions should:
1) be intuitive;
2) induce direct RPA response;
3) provide appropriate feedback; and
4) respond within an acceptable time; and
d) the controls and switches must not be open to inadvertent operation.

 DISPLAY OF INFORMATION FOR DAA
Providing RPAS capabilities to replace visual capabilities traditionally performed by pilots of manned aircraft
may require the use of sensors and RPS displays. The following capabilities include those required to support
DAA, as noted, and other capabilities that may be required to enhance the efficiency and flexibility of RPAS
operations:
a) obtaining information provided by aerodrome signs, markings and lighting;
b) obtaining information provided by visual signals (e.g. interception)
c) identifying and avoiding terrain and obstacles;
d) identifying and avoiding hazardous meteorological conditions;
e) maintaining at least the minimum applicable distances from cloud when operating under VFR;
f) remaining well clear of other aircraft or vehicles; and
g) avoiding collisions.

The RPS should have the ability to display the location of all other traffic in the vicinity. In addition to the display,
audible and visual alerts should be provided to warn the remote pilot of any significant traffic. Human
performance issues should be assessed to determine the optimum methods to support the remote pilot’s
requirement to RWC of traffic and avoid collisions. Remote pilots must be trained to interpret the display of
traffic and all guidance and alerting required to DAA other aircraft.
The remote pilot should be provided with the means to identify proximity to terrain and obstacles unless the
approved use of auto-flight systems and planned flight trajectories mitigates the risk from these hazards. The
information could be provided by a moving map with terrain overlay enhanced with alerts indicating rapid
descent rate and close proximity to the ground. Such systems are well established for manned aircraft and
typically use standard digital elevation models for the terrain information. However, as the remote pilot is not on
board the aircraft, the necessary information, e.g. horizontal position, barometric altitude, height above ground,
would need to be downlinked to the RPS at a suitable rate for the situation to be displayed and alerts generated.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RPAS OPERATOR
AND HUMAN FACTORS MAIN CRITICAL ISSUES

The role and responsibilities of an RPAS operator will be based upon provisions contained in ICAO Annex 6 -
Operation of Aircraft, Part I - International Commercial Air Transport – Airplanes and related documents. An
operator is defined as a person, organization or enterprise engaged in or offering to engage in an aircraft
operation. In the context of RPA, an aircraft operation includes the RPAS. Due to the distributed nature of RPAS
components, RPAS operations can be more complex than those of manned aircraft. This leads to the requirement
that RPAS operators must hold an RPAS Operator Certificate (ROC). When granting an ROC, the regulator should
consider the RPAS operator’s ability to meet specified responsibilities in the following areas:
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RPAS OPERATOR MAIN CRITICAL ISSUES
 RPAS OPERATOR CERTIFICATE (ROC)
 A ROC to an Operator should be issued in a manner that is consistent with the provisions of ICAO Annex 6.
 The ROC grants the RPAS operator authority to conduct operations in accordance with the conditions and
limitations detailed in the operations specifications attached to the ROC.
 The ROC issuing Authority should establish a system for both the certification and the continued surveillance
of the RPAS Operator to ensure that the required standards of operations are maintained.
 The system for the certification and the continued surveillance of an RPAS operator can be based on the
process described in ICAO Doc 8335, the Manual of Procedures for Operations Inspection, Certification and
Continued Surveillance, for commercial air transport operators.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RPAS OPERATOR MAIN CRITICAL ISSUES-Continue
Contents of the ROC
a) the State of the Operator and issuing authority;
b) the ROC number and its expiration date;
c) the RPAS operator name, trading name (if different) and address of the principle place of business;
d) the date of issue and the name, signature and title of the authority representative;
e) the location where the contact details of operational management can be found;
f) the description of the types of operations authorized;
g) the type(s) or model(s) of RPA authorized for use;
h) the models and locations of RPS authorized for use; and
i) the authorized areas of operation or routes.

 PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
Staff Positions and Requirements
Competence of Personnel on RPAS Operations Management
Operator RPAS Management Record-keeping
Operator Contracted Services Other than C3
Contractual Agreements Between RPAS Operators
 OVERSIGHT OF COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS
The RPAS operator should demonstrate to the State of the Operator that:
 the C3 service provider is under safety oversight of a recognized State civil aviation authority, or the safety
aspects of the C3 link are included in the SMS of the RPAS operator;
 in the case that the C3 service provider has its own SMS, procedures are established to exchange safety
information with the RPAS operator; and
 the C3 system complies with the performance requirements specified in the type design of the RPA.

 DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS
Documents held by the RPAS Operator should be as minimum the following:
a) ROC;
b) operations specifications relevant to the RPA and RPS models, associated with the ROC;
c) operations manual, including the RPAS operating manual and the RPS manual;
d) RPA/RPAS flight manual;
e) maintenance control manual (MCM);
f) third party liability insurance certificate(s);
g) certificate of registration of each RPA;
h) Certificate of Airworthiness of each RPA;
i) certificates of any additional RPAS components, if applicable;
j) all radio station license(s), if applicable;
k) all noise certificates, if applicable;
l) notification of special loads, if applicable; and
m) cargo manifests, if applicable.

Documents at the RPS(s)
a) Operations Manual including the RPAS operating manual and RPS manual;
b) RPA/RPAS Flight Manual;
c) Operations Specifications relevant to the RPA and RPS models associated with the ROC;
d) Journey log book for the RPA;
e) Maintenance log book and technical log for the RPA; Maintenance log book and technical log for the RPS;
g) Details of the filed, current, ATS and operational flight plans, if applicable;
h) Current and suitable aeronautical charts for the route of flight and all routes along which it is reasonable to expect that
the flight may be diverted, including departure, arrival and approach charts for all relevant aerodromes;
i) Information concerning search and rescue services for the area of the intended flight;
j) Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) and aeronautical information service (AIS) briefing documentation;
k) Meteorological information;
l) Fuel requirements, fuel load and records;
m) Cargo manifests and information on dangerous goods, if applicable;
n) Mass and balance documentation; and
o) Any other documentation that may be pertinent to the flight or required by the State(s) involved in the operation.

Documents On Board the RPA
a) ROC (certified true copy);
b) Certificate of registration of the RPA (certified true copy);
c) Certificate of Airworthiness of the RPA (certified true copy);
d) Licenses of each remote pilot involved in the current flight (certified true copies);
e) Journey log book;
f) Operations specifications;
g) Cargo manifests and information on dangerous goods, if applicable;
h) Noise certificate, if applicable; and
i) Aircraft radio station license (certified true copy).

 OPERATING FACILITIES
Consistent with the provisions of ICAO Annex 6, the RPAS Operator must ensure that a flight will not be commenced unless it
has been ascertained by every reasonable means available that the ground, space, air and/or water facilities available and
directly required on such flight, for the safe operation of the RPAS, are adequate for the type of operation under which the
flight is to be conducted and are adequately operated for this purpose. An RPAS operator must ensure that any inadequacy of
facilities observed in the course of operations is reported, including to the concerned ATS provider, if applicable, without
undue delay.
 RPAS OPERATOR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CONTINUING AIRWORTHINESS
 RPAS Operator’s Maintenance and Maintenance Program Responsibilities
 RPAS Operator’s Maintenance Control Manual (MCM)
The maintenance program must contain, but is not limited to, the following:
a) Maintenance tasks and the intervals at which these are to be performed based on the RPA, RPS, C3, and other components
of the RPAS;
b) A continuing Structural Integrity Program (SIP);
c) Procedures for deviating from a) and b) above for tasks that do not have mandatory designations from the State of Design;
d) Condition Monitoring and Reliability Program descriptions for RPA, RPS, launch/recovery equipment and other essential
components.

Maintenance Records
The following maintenance records should be kept by the RPAS operator for a minimum period of 90 days after
the unit to which they refer has been permanently withdrawn from service:
a) the total time in service (hours, calendar time and cycles, as appropriate) of the RPA and all life-limited
components;
b) the current status of compliance with all mandatory continuing airworthiness information;
c) appropriate details of modifications and repairs;
d) the time in service (hours, calendar time and cycles, as appropriate) since the last overhaul of the RPA or its
components subject to a mandatory overhaul life;
e) the current status of the RPA’s compliance with the maintenance programme.

 Continuing Airworthiness Information
The RPAS Operator must ensure that all RPAS are maintained and operated in accordance with the State of
Registry requirements and are in a condition for safe operation at any time during their service life.
 Modifications and Repairs
a) The RPAS Operator must ensure that all modifications and repairs carried out on the RPAS components are
in compliance with airworthiness requirements acceptable to the State of Registry.
b) The RPAS Operator must establish procedures to ensure that the substantiating data supporting
compliance with the airworthiness requirements are retained in accordance with State regulations.
 RPAS Maintenance and Release to Service
a) The RPAS operator must not operate the RPAS unless it is maintained and released to service by a
maintenance organization.
b) In accordance with Annex 6, a maintenance release must be completed and signed, as prescribed by the
State of Registry. In the case of RPAS, this may involve the use of separate log books for each RPA and
RPS.
c) The RPAS operator must ensure that the maintenance of the RPAS is performed in accordance with the
maintenance program.

 REMOTE FLIGHT CREW AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL
In manned aviation, a flight crew member is a licensed crew member charged with duties essential to the
operation of an aircraft during a flight duty period. The terms “remote flight crew” and “remote flight crew
member” have been developed as a means of referring to licensed remote pilots who are charged with duties
essential to the operation of an RPAS during a flight duty period.
 Composition and Duties of the Remote Flight Crew
 Operator’s RPAS Personnel Training Qualification
 Remote PIC Qualification and Licensing
 Transfer of Remote PIC Responsibility during Flight
 Remote Flight Crew Member Training Programs
 Remote Flight Crew Fatigue Management
 RPAS Support Personnel

An RPAS operator should establish and maintain an RPAS training program, approved by the State of the Operator, which
ensures that all remote flight crew members acquire and maintain the competencies to perform their assigned duties in
terms of knowledge, skills and attitude. The training program should consist of training in the RPS model(s) from which the
remote pilot will fly the specific RPA type(s) and should include:
a) knowledge and skills related to the RPA operational procedures for the intended area of operation and in the transport of
dangerous goods;
b) remote flight crew coordination and handover procedures, if applicable;
c) abnormal and emergency situations or procedures (e.g. loss of C3 link, flight termination);
d) methods to maintain situational awareness of the RPA’s environment; and
e) human performance aspects related to crew resource management, threat and error management (TEM) and automation
or human-machine interface (HMI) which are unique to unmanned aviation.
 Remote Flight Crew Member Training Programs

 RPAS SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
RPAS Safety Management Program includes State Aviation
Authority, Operators, contracted service providers
operating under the Safety Risk Management of the RPAS
Operator’s Safety Management System (SMS). These
responsibilities are directly linked to provisions contained
in ICAO Annex 19 - Safety Management and to guidance
material in the Safety Management Manual (SMM) (ICAO
Doc 9859). However, the Total SSM Program will be
attributed to:
 State Aviation Authority Safety Program (SSP)
 RPAS Operator’s Safety Management System (SMS)
 Safety Responsibilities and Accountabilities

SAFETY RISK. The state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and
maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety
risk management.
 AVIATION SAFETY- HAZARD SEVERITY CATEGORIES
Description Severity Category Mishap Result Criteria
Catastrophic 1 Could result in one or more of the following: death, permanent total disability,
irreversible significant environmental impact, or monetary loss.
Critical 2 Could result in one or more of the following: permanent partial disability,
injuries or occupational illness that may result in hospitalization of at least
three personnel, reversible significant environmental impact, or monetary
loss.
Marginal 3 Could result in one or more of the following: injury or occupational illness
resulting in one or more lost work day(s), reversible moderate environmental
impact, or monetary loss.
Negligible 4 Could result in one or more of the following: injury or occupational illness not
resulting in a lost work day, minimal environmental impact, or monetary loss
122

Standard Aviation Safety Hazard Risk Probability levels Classification

 RPAS HUMAN FACTORS MAIN CRITICAL ISSUES
Safe and efficient aviation requires that human performance be considered at all stages of the system
lifecycle, from design, construction, training of personnel, operation and maintenance. In developing
standards and recommended practices for RPAS, it is important to recognize that the people in the system
can have both negative and positive contributions to system performance. In general, human interactions
regard the following four main areas:
1) Human interaction with Machines (also called “hardware”). Examples include the interface between the RPS and
pilots, support technicians, and maintenance personnel.
2) Operational Procedures, Including checklists, policies, and procedures for pilots and air traffic control.
3) Environment, Including lighting, time of day, and the presence or absence of noise, vibration or other sensory
cues.
4) Interactions with other People, Examples include crew coordination, and communication between pilots and air
traffic control.

Special considerations of RPAS with implications for human factors guidelines
1. Loss of natural sensing
2. Control and communication via radio link
3. The unique environment of the remote pilot station
4. In-flight transfer of control
5. Unique flight characteristics of remotely piloted aircraft
6. Flight termination
7. Reliance on automation
8. Widespread use of interfaces based on consumer products

OTHER AIRCRAFT AND PROXIMATE
TRAFFIC
ATC
RPA
LOGISTICS SUPPORT SEGMENT
ANCILLARY SERVICES
SEGMENT CONTROL
NAVIGATE
COMMUNICATE COMMUNICATE
COMMUNICATE
COMMUNICATE
LEVELS OF HUMAN
INVOLVEMENT
Control and Communication Responsibilities
of a RPAS Pilot Operating in the Airspace.

Responsibilities of the Remote Pilot

RPAS HUMAN FACTORS MAIN CRITICAL ISSUES

RPAS Operational Scenario-Problem Areas Reported by Remote Pilots

 LICENSING AND COMPETENCIES
Remote pilots are fundamental to the safe operation of RPAS. They have the same basic responsibilities as
pilots of manned aircraft for the operation of the RPA in accordance with the rules of the air, and the laws,
regulations and procedures of those States in which operations are conducted. However, the competencies of
these individuals will have to be carefully reviewed to ensure that the knowledge, skills and attitude are
relevant for these new types of operations.
Multiple types of pilot licenses (private pilot license (PPL), commercial pilot license (CPL), multi-crew pilot
license (MPL) and airline transport pilot license (ATPL)) are currently the known typologies for Certified Pilots.
The Remote Pilot is a new category of aviation professional. Unlike manned aviation, a single remote pilot
license which covers all types of scenarios is expected to be developed. This license will be annotated with
ratings, limitations and endorsements, as appropriate.
Licensing of Air Traffic Controllers will not be affected by the introduction of RPAS. However, when RPAS are
introduced within an ATC environment, additional training requirements specific to different types of RPAS
characteristics could be required for ATC personnel including, inter alia, performance, behavior,
communication, operating limitations and emergency procedures.

University master on cargo transport rpas 2017 ver 1

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