The document discusses the US counter-IED strategy in Afghanistan and concludes it was a failure. It notes that establishing large military bases in Helmand province, where much of the opium poppy was grown, did little to curb the drug trade. Both the US and Pakistan were suspected of protecting certain drug trafficking groups for financial and strategic reasons. The document questions why the US chose to focus military efforts in Helmand, which strengthened the Taliban's logistical lines through Pakistan and increased IED attacks against US forces. It concludes the US failed to achieve its objectives of destroying the Taliban or curbing the drug trade.

1. US COUNTER IED STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN WAS A FAILURE
WE CARRIED OUT A SMALL CONSULTANCY ASSIGNMENT FOR A CLIENT.
RESULTS CANNOT BE DISCLOSED DUE TO NON DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT BUT SOME
CONCLUSIONS ARE DISCUSSED IN MY BOOK -IED DRONES AND SUICIDE BOMBIN IN
AFANISTAN
AGHA H AMIN
It is a great mystery why the US/NATO decided to take the war to Helmand. A better option would have been to simply
defoliate the poppy crops using chemical agents and to concentrate on mining and fencing the Afghan Pakistan and Afghan
Iran Border in Helmand and Kandahar provinces. A far cheaper , economical and cost effective option than building Camps
Leatherneck ,Dwyer etc and wasting valuable military lives in Helmand and Kandahar ? It is beyond the scope of this short
work to research why the US went into Helmand . Was it to monopolise and control the vast drug country which Taliban linked
drug mafia was controlling or was it to inflict a decisive military defeat on Taliban. Drugs were not eliminated as this was never
a US objective . Taliban were not annihilated as US force ratios were too low and the US failed to severe the Talibans strategic
line of logistics based in Pakistan. It is a great mystery why the US military established huge military presence right in the
heart of drugs in Helmand and did nothing to eradicated drugs.Interestingly both US and Pakistan protected select drug mafia
groups as both in all probability used narcotics to finance part of the war. Drug seizures declined radically after 9/11 in both
Afghanistan and Pakistan and the period 2001-13 was the best era of life for the drug barons of all religions and ethnicities in
Af Pak,UAE and Europe. In 2008 the US went in Helmand in force by establishing Camp Leatherneck. A US military contractor
contacted me for boring wells in Helmand and in the process sent me an excellent map marking US camps in Helmand. It
appears that establishment of Camp Leatherneck near Khanishin was viewed with extreme suspicion by the Pakistani military
and 2008 saw a major surge in Taliban activity in targeting US troops with IEDs. It appears that the Pakistani military thought
that if the Taliban did not exert greater pressure on the US troops in Helmand , US alleged support to Baloch insurgents would
multiply as well as alleged US support to the Pakistani Taliban in FATA.These were seen as a NATO proxy to punish Pakistan
for its covert support to Afghan Taliban.
IED,Drones and Suicide Bomber Warfare in Afghanistan and
PakistanPaperback – September 21, 2013
by Agha Humayun Amin (Author)
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6. IED,DRONES AND SUICIDE
BOMBER WARFARE IN
AFGHANISTAN AND
PAKISTAN
Reflections of one who saw events from close quarters

7. Agha Humayun Amin
Dedication
Dedicated to all foot soldiers and fighters on all
sides who fought these wars in vain and to the
ordinary people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who
suffered and will suffer
Introduction

8. With friend and co author Colonel David Osinski in front of NATO Headquarters Kabul , 29 June 2010
This is narrative of a soldier who identifies with all soldiers all over the world regardless of race , religion or
class and seeds soldiers as a class misused by crafty politicians for furthering personal ambitions and narrow
agendas.
An attempt has been made to present things as I saw them without any axe to grind.
While warfare has seen many changes the human actor remains the constant factor.
IEDs became famous in Iraq War of 2003 and later acquired greater notoriety in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Main impact of IEDs is that they have immensely increased the cost of war for bigger states and states in
general and made waging war more effective at a lower cost for non state actors as well as smaller states.
According to Peter Singer writings posted on Brookings the United States has spent roughly $17 billion on various anti-IED
gear over the last decade, and that’s not counting the $45 billion spent on mine-resistant vehicles.
More than the cost IEDs have shattered the basic confidence that any soldier has in himself and in the environment in which he
operates.
Many NATO soldiers who I met in Afghanistan regretted the fact that they were fighting against an enemy who they rarely ever
saw with their own eyes !
This narrative is a personal narrative also because of a many centuries old family connection with Afghanistan and my
personal connection with Afghanistan since 1978 and with Pakistan since birth.
Many of the events that I discuss in this narrative have a direct connection with what I saw as a contractor in Afghanistan ,
particularly from 2004 till to date.
Chapter One
IEDs in Afghanistan and the Opposing Strategic Debates in NATO Command and Pakistani
Military Command circles’
According to the icasualties.org data the first IED attack victim in Afghanistan was US Army Staff Sergeant Brian.T
Craig killed by an IED at Kandahar on 15 April 2002 alongwith three other US personnel i.e Staff Sergeant Galewski, Justin
J , Sergeant Maugans, Jamie O , and Sergeant First Class Romero, Daniel A.
...................................................................
...................................................
Chapter Ten
Conclusion
While US invasion of Afghanistan was a strategic act which placed the US in a central position from where it could strike a wide variety of objectives
, US strategy after 2001 invasion degenerated into a directionless river which peters out into a sandy desert and cannot produce anything useful ,
productive or palatable.
The US failed in all of the following objectives in Afghanistan :--
1. Destroy the Afghan Taliban and various Islamist groups with an extremist agenda.
2. Dominate the Central Asian Republics from where the US was simply kicked out or contained by the Russians despite initial successes in
Uzbekistan and Kirgizistan.
3. Make any offensive progress against Iran where the Iranian Baloch were an ideal strategic asset that the US could have exploited.
4. Arm twist and pressurize Pakistan into not providing sanctuary and logistic support to Taliban , other Islamist groups etc.
5. Fence and block the Afghan Pakistan border opposite Pakistani Balochistan province and interdict Taliban logistics using which maximum
casualties were inflicted on the US troops deployed in Afghanistan.
6. Create alternative states in Afghanistan or Pakistan which could replace existing Pakistani and Afghanistan states as a better and more reliable
US ally despite the fact that many ethnic groups in both Af Pak were pro US and looked at the US as a savior and benefactor.
On the Islamist side following lessons stand out :--
1. Non state actors cannot win wars without support of a major state actor which was non existent in this case. Although Pakistan at the covert level
supported Afghan Taliban , the very secrecy and discreteness of the support made its impact limited.
2. IED warfare could discourage a major state actor from waging war but could not win a war itself. What would follow a US withdrawal from
Afghanistan would be a new civil war and greater chaos.
3. Suicide bombings are a failed method od waging low intensity conflict. They are difficult to execute

9. EUROPE
U.S. and Russia Discuss Olympic Security
By THOM SHANKERJAN. 21, 2014
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Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Gabriella Demczuk for The New York Times
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BRUSSELS — Even as Russia imposes the most intensive security apparatus in Olympic history, the top
military officers from the United States and Russia have opened discussions about using sophisticated
American electronic equipment in a new effort to help secure the Winter Games in Sochi next month.
The Russian delegation first raised the prospect of gaining access to the American technology, developed by the
Pentagon to counter improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan and Iraq, Defense Department officials said
on Tuesday. They emphasized that no decisions had been made yet.
The potential for a technological exchange was part of an extensive discussion here on Tuesday, when Gen.
Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, held his first face-to-face meeting with his
Russian counterpart, Gen. Valery V. Gerasimov, chief of the general staff.
President Obama and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia also discussed security at the Games in a phone
conversation on Tuesday, Reuters reported.

10. Launch media viewer
Gen. Valery V. Gerasimov of Russia. RIA Novosti, via Reuters
Few details were disclosed. General Dempsey said the Defense Department would be willing to provide
equipment designed to detect and disrupt cellphone or radio signals used by militants to detonate improvised
explosives from a distance. But he cautioned that technical experts from both nations first needed to make sure
that the American systems could be integrated into the communications networks and security systems being
set in place by Russia.
In discussing the Pentagon’s technology to counter improvised explosives, General Dempsey noted that this
was “something that we’ve become extraordinarily familiar with.” Homemade bombs planted by militants have
been the leading cause of deaths and injuries to American service members in Afghanistan and Iraq.
But the decision on whether to share the equipment is not a simple one. Especially during the early use of the
technology, the American military found that it had created a muddle of electronic signals in which competing
and overlapping systems canceled out the effectiveness of other systems in use at the same time and in the
same area.
“If you’re not careful, you can actually degrade capability, not enhance it,” General Dempsey said.
During their meetings here, the American and Russian military chiefs sought to advance an agenda of
exchanges and continued cooperation on counterterrorism and antipiracy operations, despite the fact that
diplomatic relations between Washington and Moscow swing between caustic disagreement and cautious
cooperation.
Even with their extensive agenda on bilateral security issues, the question of safety at the Olympics was
thoroughly discussed, including a description by General Gerasimov of the close cooperation between the
Russian military and its civilian law enforcement and intelligence services to provide security for the Games.
General Gerasimov described in detail how Russian authorities “have in place the intelligence apparatus as
well as the response apparatus to deal with the threats,” General Dempsey said.
Generals Dempsey and Gerasimov met one day after Pentagon officials disclosed that the United States
European Command was drawing up plans to have two Navy warships in the Black Sea at the time of the
Games, should they be needed in case of emergency.
In addition to deploying tens of thousands of police officers and military reinforcements to the Sochi area, the
Russian government has tightened control inside the city ahead of the opening of the Games on Feb. 7,
banning vehicles that are not registered in the region and requiring even Russians who visit to register with the
police within three days, as foreigners must do.
The threat of terrorism has become a grim reality of major sporting events, and Russian officials are acutely
aware that these Games are being held near a region festering with Islamist separatists.
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11.  Watch: How to make oatmeal sandwich cookies
Both the American and Russian generals — who share a history of having commanded large tank and armored
units — emphasized the importance of improving communication between their armed forces.
RECENT COMMENTS
TeX Dieguez
2 hours ago
Unfortunately, we're all in the same 'little lifeboat' (when comes to terrorism) either we cooperate with each other or we
will sink. Of...
Robert J. Paquin
2 hours ago
HOW ABOUT THIS? Tell our young people we are sorry but putting them in the way of a war is just stupid. So you will
be staying home where...
Pierre Anonymot
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Obama, Clapper, Alexander & the NSA are listening to every communication in the world. If there is any terrorist action
at Sochi it will be...
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“I think we have an opportunity to advance the relationship on areas of common interest,” General Dempsey
said.
He noted in particular that Moscow remains a vital partner for supply lines for the NATO mission in
Afghanistan, agreeing to allow the movement of nonlethal material to and from the war zone through Russian
territory; that rail and road network is becoming increasingly important as protests in Pakistan choke efforts to
use the more convenient supply line there.
General Dempsey said his Russian counterpart was concerned about the potential for further instability in
Afghanistan after the NATO combat mission there officially ends this year. General Gerasimov has asked for
updates on the American and NATO effort to train, advise and equip Afghan National Security Forces, General
Dempsey said, as well as Afghanistan’s ability to maintain and control transportation lines in and out of the
country.
54COMMENTS
“He is absolutely concerned, as I would be in his place,” General Dempsey said.
In brief remarks welcoming General Dempsey to the Russian mission to NATO in suburban Brussels, General
Gerasimov endorsed “regular contacts” between the militaries as “quite useful.”
General Dempsey, in an interview, said it was important for the two militaries “not to foreclose on
conversations, even if at some points there are disagreements that prevent the forward movement” in other
parts of the relationship, whether political or diplomatic

12. The Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59, reinterpreted by Agha Humayun Amin (1998)
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Agha H Amin-01 December 2010 Assessment
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zx=60a5415301e90af4
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