the-real-hero-of-1965-war

THE REAL HERO OF 1965 WAR
AGHA H AMIN
DR HAMID HUSSAIN , A PASHTUN INTELLECTUAL BASED IN THE US IS A
GREAT FRIEND AND A BENEFACTOR WHO HAS ALSWAYS HELPED ME IN
CRISIS SITUATIONS.
IT WAS A MATTER OF PRIDE AND HONOUR FOR ME THAT DR HAMID
HUSSAIN WROTE THE FOREWORD OF OUR BOOK DEVELOPMENT OF
TALIBAN FACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN PUBLISHED BY
EDWIN MELLEN PRESS IN FEBRUARY 2010.
SINCE 2011 DR HAMID HUSSAIN HAS PROMISED TO ANALYSE 24
BRIGADE BATTLE TO ARRIVE AT THE CONCLUSION OF PAKISTANI
HISTORYS MOST DISTORTED AFFAIR ?
IT IS SINCE MORE THAN ONE YEAR THAT I AM WAITING FOR HIS
VERDICT ON 24 BRIGADE BATTLE AND WHO WAS THE REAL HERO OF
BATTLE OF CHAWINDA ?
A.H AMIN

In March 2001 my book Pakistan Army till 1965's
chapter on Battle of Chawinda was published in
Defence Journal Karachi.This started a controversy
about the eal hero of Battle of Chawinda as far as
the most decisive day 8th September was

concerned.Below are the series of letters then
exhanged.The controversy has raged on from
March 2001 till September 2008.
Agha H Amin
EX MAJOR FAROUK ADAMS LETTER TO DEFENCE JOURNAL AND MY
REBUTTAL OF 2001:---
Farouk Adams Letter to Editor Defence Journal and A.H Amin's Reply Defence
Journal August 2001
The Battle of Chawinda
I refer to Agha Humayun Amin’s article on the Battle of Chawinda, and also being
“direct participant, would like to share with your readers, some of my knowledge on
the subject. Since I am writing from memory, I will touch only upon those incidents
and aspects of the battle, of which I am certain.
About a week before the war started, an A. K officer from the Gibraltar Force,
exfiltrated, and brought to HQ 24 Brigade, certain Indian Army documents. These
purported to show the presence of the 1st Indian Armoured Division opposite us. Brig
Abdul Ali Malik accordingly informed the higher HQ, and GHQ detailed Maj.
Mahmud of the Army Aviation to physically carry these documents to GHQ for
evaluation. GHQ’s assessment was that these documents were part of an Indian
deception plan. Brig Malik disagreed with this assessment. So it is incorrect to say
that he had no idea what he had against him, though it is correct that when the attack
came, he had no way of knowing that this was the main effort of the enemy. But
neither did anyone else.
When the Jassar fiasco took place, Brig Malik advised 15 Div. not to move him,
because he expected a strong attack against his positions. HQ 15 Div. did not agree.
HQ 15 Div. ordered 24 Brigade to clear the imaginary enemy bridgehead at Jassar.
Brig Malik tasked 2 Punjab Regiment (my unit) to do the needful. The Commanding

Officer, Lt Col Jamshed MC Bar, SJ, suggested an attack at first light, instead of a
night attack, because we had no idea about the enemy location, terrain etc etc. But 15
Div. orders were clear and inflexible, and so Col Jamshed, decided to lead the attack
in person. But before this could be done, the actual situation in Jassar became clear,
and the attack was called off.
At about first light on 08 September, an NCO of the Engineers came into our
positions. He told of a heavy Indian attack that had severely mauled 3 F.F Regiment
which was deployed as screen. He was immediately taken to the Brigade HQ, where
Brig Malik questioned him in the presence of Col Jamshed and Major Aslam Shah,
who was the B.M.
If Brig Malik had any doubt about a serious enemy thrust in his sector, that was now
removed. It took him about a minute to take, what many consider, the most important
decision of the war i.e. to advance on a broad front and engage the attacking enemy
forces. This decision was entirely Brig Malik’s, and it saved Pakistan. Had it gone
wrong, he would have been court martialled. Since he suspected that HQ 15 Div. was
prone to panic, he ordered Maj. Aslam Shah to break wireless contact with the Div.
HQ (which was re-established when the enemy had been engaged, and Tikka Khan
had taken over 15 Div). Brig Malik then gave the operation orders to his unit
commanders, including Lt Col Nisar, CO 25 Cavalry. It is, therefore, absolutely
incorrect to say that Brig Malik “abdicated” his command to a unit commander.
Indeed, after that first day, 25 Cavalry was not involved in operations as regiment,
because the situation warranted squadron actions in support of infantry. And this
support these squadrons unstintingly and heroically provided. But this by no stretch of
the imagination can be taken to mean the de facto command of the Chawinda Battle
was at any time exercised by Co 25 Cavalry. This remained firmly in Brig Malik’s
hands who remained unswerving and steadfast and central to the battle, right till the
very end.
After the first three days of almost continuous battle we had suffered serious depletion
in numbers, and had suffered extreme exhaustion both physically and mentally. And
so we were withdrawn from the FDLs to recover, but that same evening the situation
at the front became so alarming that we were thrust right back into the battle. It is a
fair comment on the morale of 24 Brigade group that despite our bedraggled state and
the mauling we had received, there was no hesitation on the part of anyone to rejoin
battle. From then, to the end of the war, 24 Brigade held its position and survived —
but barely. It is difficult to explain what extreme weariness really is.
There is mention in the article under reference, of Brig Malik’s request to be moved to
the “rear”, which was refused by Gen Abrar. If a Brigade Commander is to make such

a suggestion, he cannot just say “rear”. He has to give an alternate plan of operations
which he must work out with his staff. Gen Aslam Shah (then B.M) denies that any
such suggestion was ever made, and this fits into the experience of people like me,
who were quite clearly told that for 24 Brigade, this was to be a “last man last round
battle”. Therefore, if such a suggestion is recorded, either its context is missing, or it
is the result of a misunderstanding. When we were suddenly pulled out of
recuperation and sent back into battle (refer sub-para above) we were told that we will
be pulled back for refitment at the first possible opportunity. Perhaps this could be the
context.
2. And now I would like to make few general comments as under:-
Anyone reading the article under reference is bound to come away with the
impression that the Battle of Chawinda was fought exclusively by Brig Amjad
Chaudhry, Lt Col Nisar, Maj. Muhammad Ahmed, and the “direct participant” Maj.
Shamshad. The infantry, it seems was just not there. As authentic history, therefore,
this article will be seen as trifle lop-sided. The truth is that by sheer coincidence some
very brave and steadfast men got thrown into what was 24 Brigade. With the courage
of these men, came a good deal of luck by providence — and the combination made
for quite a number of gallant actions by all arms, and all ranks.
Brig Muhammad Ahmed was heroic, and so was Lt Col Nisar, but how can the rest of
25 Cavalry be put into the dustbin of anonymity? Indeed I can’t think of one officer or
tank commander who did not perform.
Yes, General Abrar was a good commander. He was calm and poised and did not foist
needless interference on 24 Brigade. Brig Amjad Chaudhry too had a reputation of a
good artillery officer, though I would have to be a very brave man to declare him the
best gunner officer in the sub-continent. These officers held their nerve, and did not
panic. And nor did they need to. They were never within the sights of the enemy. But
people like Lt Col Shinwari, Lt Col Jamshed and Maj. Aslam Shah constantly were,
and yet they kept their calm. And last but not the least the composure of Brig Abdul
Ali Malik deserves to be saluted. Throughout the battle his HQ was either in the FDLs
or not more than 400 yds in the rear. He kept his cool in the face of direct enemy fire
for days at end — comparison between him and the others is like comparing a fighter
in the ring with the audience. When Lt Gen (Retd) Tariq, S. J came on PTV two years
ago on the occasion of Defence Day, he talked of his experiences of the Battle of
Chawinda. He was generous in his praise of many gallant actions. But he singled out
Brig Malik beyond all the rest as the man whose battle it really was, while all the rest
of us revolved around him. Having seen him at close quarters, I cannot disagree with
this assessment.

3. Lastly, to call a respected senior officer “a VCO type” General, was not in very
good taste.
Farouk Adam Khan S. J
27 June 001
REPLY OF A.H AMIN TO EX MAJOUR FAROUK ADAM PUBLISHED
ALONG SIDE FAROUK ADAMS LETTER IN DEFENCE JOURNAL :---
I refer to Ex Major Farouk Adam Khan’s S.J letter on my article “ Battle of
Chawinda” .
I have only touched “incidents and aspects” of the battle about which “I could be
certain” based on the “authority of tangible concrete and precise” records in the form
of “ official sources of the Pakistan Army” like Major General Shaukat Riza’s “The
Pakistan Army-War 1965” sponsored and published by the Pakistan Army and printed
by the Pakistan Army Press in 1984 , The Pakistan Army Green Book-1992 the
official yearbook of the Pakistan Army published by the Pakistan Army’s General
Headquarters and accounts of direct participants like Major Shamshad. I had the
opportunity of meeting other participants like Brigadier Ahmad in 1982 , Lieutenant
Colonel Raza in 1993 and Major Shamshad in 2000. In addition, I met a large number
of participants while serving in 11 Cavalry from 27th March 1983 till 9th April 1985.
l Firstly the assertion by the worthy critic that the Indian mailbag was captured by an
exfiltrating element of Gibraltar Force. The Gibraltar Force was a fiasco of
magnanimous proportions and very few exfiltrated in good shape what to talk of
capturing a mail bag. The mail bag was captured by a deliberate ambush launched
under the direction of Headquarter 15 Division under direction of Col S.G Mehdi. The
official account on this episode is clear. Thus Shaukat Riza states “Lt Col Sher Zaman
(MI Directorate) ordered Col S.G Mehdi (15 Division) to lay an ambush on the road
(Samba-Kathua), and get some prisoners. At 0100 hours night 3rd/4th September,
Zaman had a call from an excited Mehdi. An Indian despatch rider had been captured.
His message bag contained mail for HQ Squadron 1 Indian Armoured Division. The
bag was immediately flown to Rawalpindi.” (Refers-Pages-133 & 134-The Pakistan
Army-War 1965-Shaukat Riza-Army Education Press-1984).
l What happened after this at least on paper was a mystery till Gen N.U.K Babar
cleared this point on paper in an interview conducted by this scribe and published in
DJ April 2000 issue by stating that the mail box was dismissed as an Indian deception
by the then DMI Brigadier Irshad.

l In paragraph 1 the worthy critic states about Brigadier Malik i.e “It took him about a
minute to take the most important decision of the war i.e to advance on a broad front
and engage the attacking enemy forces”. Now this is a figment of the worthy critics
imagination. In “Summer 1997“ issue of “Pakistan Army Journal“ Brigadier Nisar the
Commanding Officer of 25 Cavalry gave his version of the Battle of Gadgor-
Chawinda. Nowhere in the article did Nisar state that Brigadier Malik gave him any
order on the decisive 8th of September “to advance on a broad front and engage the
enemy”. On the other hand this point has been treated very clearly by Shaukat Riza in
the Pakistani GHQ’s officially sponsored account. Shaukat describes the initial
situation on the crucial morning of 8th September 1965 in the following words “At
about 0600 hours 24 Brigade received the news that 3 FF had been overrun. Brigadier
Ali Malik got on to Col Nisar and ordered 25 Cavalry to do something”. (Refers Page
- 148-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit) That was the only order Malik gave. All the subsequent
deployment was done by Nisar and the brunt of the Indian attack was borne by “Bravo
Squadron” of 25 Cavalry commanded by Major Ahmad. It was Col Nisar and Nisar
alone who did the broad front deployment without any orders to resort to any broad
front deployment from Brigadier Malik.
l In paragraph 1 the worthy critic states that Brigadier Malik never made a request for
a withdrawal on 16th September. My source for stating that Brigadier Malik made a
request for withdrawing from Chawinda position is none other than a major direct
participant staff officer of the battle i.e Major K.M Arif the then GSO-2 (Operations)
6th Armoured Division at Chawinda. It was 6th Armoured Division Headquarters
which controlled the battle after 9th September. It is very strange that the critic finds
my narration odd rather than contesting the authority which I quoted to support my
assertion. In an article published in Pakistan Army Green Book-1992-Year of the
Senior Field Commanders, General K.M Arif (Retired) made the following assertion
i.e “The battle raged with considerable intensity on September 16. After its failure to
capture Chawinda the enemy failed to envelop it by a two pronged attack. In the
process the villages of Sodreke fell and Buttur Dograndi came under attack. The
severe fighting resulted in many casualties. The situation was confused and the
outcome uncertain .So fluid the situation became that at 1630 hours 24 Brigade
Commander requested permission to take up a position in the rear.Abrar told the
brigade commander on telephone, “You know what is there in the kitty. There is no
question of falling back.We shall fight till the bitter end from our present positions.”
His words proved a timely tonic. 24 Brigade fought gallantly. Soon the danger
subsided.” (Refers -Page -6-” Abrar’s Battlefield Decisions”-Pakistan Army Green
Book-Year of Senior Commanders-Pakistan Army-General Headquarters-Rawalpindi-
1992). This assertion was made by one of the principal staff officers of the 6th

Armoured Division who was present on the scene and not a figment of my
imagination.
l Even 6th Armoured Division’s War Diary contains a record of the above mentioned
telephone call.
l As to the worthy critic’s assertion in paragraph 1 about de facto command of
Chawinda Battle remaining in Brigadier Malik till the end. All that I stated was that
during the most decisive encounter of the whole battle at Gadgor on 8th September it
was Nisar and Nisar alone who exercised coup d oeil deploying his regiment entirely
on his own without any orders from 24 Brigade about “any broad front deployment”
or any “specific orders to deploy in any particular disposition”. After this decisive
encounter at Gadgor the Indians did not do anything till 11th September. From 10th
September 6th Armoured Division entered the scene and controlled the Chawinda
battle, 24 Brigade being one of the many brigades that it commanded.
l Refers the criticism in paragraph 2 that “the battle was fought exclusively by Amjad
Chaudhry,
Lt Col Nisar, Major Mohammad Ahmad and the direct participant Major Shamshad”
all I can say is that the critic did not read my article but only scanned through it.On
map opposite Page-40 it is written that C squadron i.e Shamshad’s squadron arrived
opposite Gadgor area at 1130 hours after the situation had been stabilised. On various
pages I have stated eg “ 25 Cavalry was to Pakistan Army’s good luck, a newly raised
but extremely fine tank regiment” (Refers-Page-43). The same point is repeated on
various pages.
l About Abdul Ali Malik’s command qualities Gen Fazal Muqeem notes in his
“Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership” “The few counterattacks which 8 Division tried
during the war were most noticeable by their lack of planning.The units were hurled
into battle without having been given enough time for planning and preparations .The
worst example of this attack was on December 17 when against all protestations of its
very gallant commanding officer , 35 FF was sent into battle for almost certain
massacre” (Refers-Page-215 and 216-Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership-Major General
Fazal Muqeem Khan (Retired)-National Book Foundation-Lahore-1973).
l Chawinda was an armour battle and this is proved by casualties suffered by tank and
infantry units. How many infantry units except 3 FF could match the casualties of 11
Cavalry in 1965 i.e 34 killed. As a matter of fact the direct participant Major
Shamshad has referred to one counter attack in which an infantry company of 2
Punjab had Nil killed and two officers got the SJ. Even in Chamb during Grand Slam

11 Cavalry lost 19 killed on 1st September 1965 alone while 14 Punjab lost a total of
3 killed in the entire Grand Slam. (Refers-Page-108 1 & 109-Pak Bharat Jang-Colonel
Mukhtar Gillani -Rawalpindi-April -1998). As a matter of fact 11 Cavalry suffered
more casualties in Grand Slam than all ten infantry units except one i.e 13 Punjab
which had lost 24 killed as against 11 Cavalry’s 19 killed.But then the strength of an
armoured regiment is around 400 vis-a-vis 800 of infantry.
l Lastly the reference to VCO. This was purely symbolic and had nothing to do with
rank or status in the literal sense. Sher Bahadur’s efforts to divide and distribute the 4
Corps Artillery Headquarter before the 1965 War have been discussed by an authority
no less eminent than Pakistan Army’s last C in C, Gul Hassan.This if done would
have seriously compromised chances of Pakistani success in Grand Slam and
Chawinda.Without concentrated artillery at Grand Slam or in Chawinda none
including Abrar or Malik could have defeated the Indians.
Kind Regards
A.H Amin (pavocavalry@hotmail.com)
-------------------------------------------------------------
BRIGADIER KAMAL ALAMS AND COLONEL ANWARS LETTERS TO
DEFENCE JOURNAL AND MY REBUTTAL AS ASSISTANT EDITOR
DEFENCE JOURNAL OF JANUARY 2002:---
Brig Kamal Alam and Colonel Anwars Criticism of Chawinda and A.H Amin's Reply
Defence Journal January 2002
Dear Major Sehgal,
In his letter in Defence Journal of Aug 2001, Mr . Amin says that in the Pak Army
Journal (Summer 97) Brig Nisar does not mention any order coming his way from his
Brigade Comd on 8 Sept 1965. I am no historian but some questions immediately
come to mind viz. Does Col Nisar also mention that the Brigade Commander told him
to “do something”? If not who is to be believed, Brig Nisar or Gen Riza. And if he
was not told to “do something“, what major event galvanized him into taking this
unilateral action against the enemy advance? Did he get information about the enemy
advance himself, or did someone give it to him, and if so who? When he got his
information, was he in the presence of the Brigade Commander , or was in wireless
contact with him? And when he decided to strike out on his own, did he at least

inform the Brigade? And if so what transpired; or did the rest of the Brigade merely
follow 25 Cav through guess-work?
The point I want to make is that in order to be classified as “history“ we have to first
establish whether 25 Cav was a part of a larger formation, or was acting in a vacuum.
And if it was subordinate to
24 Brigade, did it take itself out of the Brigade ORBAT on its own, or did if take the
Brigade under its own command. This relationship can only be settled by the
communication between the two. So far it has been considered a settled fact beyond
any controversy, that this Brigade and all its components fought an outstanding action.
After all there have been M Ds and presentation on the subject for the last 36 years
and most officers have had a chance to take part in one or another of these. And no
adverse comment has come to tarnish the reputation of any officer of the brigade.
It is only recently that through one sentence of Maj Gen Shaukat Riza ‘s Book almost
all infantry actions of this battle seem to have been nullified, and the brave conduct of
the Bridge Commander has been found fit to be relegated to those who functioned
below par.
I am afraid that Gen Riza’s Book is primarily the amalgam of various war diaries,
with very little original research , “officially sponsored” to give the “official view“. A
very good insight into its historical value and credibility lies in what it has to say
regarding the change of command in Chamb, which is a scandal that has refused to be
hushed up despite the best official efforts. On page 121 of the book Gen Riza blatantly
states that change of Command in Chamb was pre-planned. And then he goes on to
brazenly assert that this was confirmed by most officers in GHQ and 12 Div. He
forgot that this was a deliberate, set-piece attack, the operation orders for which per
force would have to be attended by GOC 7 Div, if the command was to change, and
all the lower formations would have known about it, and at least some shred of
documentary evidence of this effect would have survived, at least in GHQ. But there
is not a word extant to corroborate this cover-up. And what is worst is that
immediately after the war in Staff College under, Gen Riza was serving “a 12 Div
officer” who was the GOC of this Division. He was Gen Akhtar Malik. At a time
when even subalterns like me could question Gen Malik on this subject and get a
candid reply, it is impossible to believe that Gen Riza did not know all details of this
change from the horse’s mouth. And knowing this and then wilfully distorting history
is deserving of the strongest opprobrium. And then DJ takes one line of this “history”
and knocks out all infantry actions, and goes further to malign the commander of
Chawinda Brigade! And now this is to pass for history?

Brig (Retd) Kamal Alam, TJ
14 Dec 2001
To : The Editor Defence Journal
Karachi
Sir,
I refer to letter by Mr. Farouk Adam and Mr. Amin on the Battle of Chawinda
(Defence Journal Aug 2001). In 1972, in company of some regimental at officers I
met Gen A .A Malik in Mangla. The question of 3 F F came up. He said the heaviest
attacks seemed to come wherever this unit was deployed. As such at one point he had
to ask the Div HQ if there was any possibility for this unit to be relieved and rested.
The Div HQ said this was not possible. War diaries are often not written immediately
. There are often inaccuracies in them. Is it possible that this event is being referred to
by both writers? At any rate 24 Brigade War Diary should also be consulted.
Mr. Amin quotes Gen Riza’s Book i.e. Brig Malik got on to ...............” From this it is
obvious that it means the communication was by wireless or telephone. But I have
attended an M D on this battle and also heard its narration from Brig Shinwari. Both
were nearer to Farouk Adam’s explanation of events of
8 Sept. Mr. Amin says he has referred to “official sources” and “officially sponsored”
GHQ account of this Battle. This is its weak point. Our “officially sponsored
accounts” unfortunately have been cover-ups. Gen Riza wrote about such an
important battle without interviewing any infantry CO, or any officer of the Brigade
HQ, when they were all alivel! What sort of history is this?
I heard the talk by Lt Gen Tariq S. J to which Farouk Adam has referred. I have also
heard him on the subject in person. He said that all units gave their very best but also
that the Brigade Commander’s conduct, whose HQ was often in line of direct fire, was
most inspiring.
After reading the original article one gets the impression that the whole battle was
fought by Col Nisar and Maj Ahmed ably supported by Brig Amjad Chowdhry’s
guns. It seems infantry was non-existant! Granted it was a tank battle and very well
done by 25 Cav. But I can’t recall any DEFENSIVE tank battle over two weeks
duration without an infantry firm base. And if Chawinda base did not hold, that would
be the end of the tank battle also. But the infantry did hold, better than any infantry
brigade on either side. And the Brigade Commander showed more pluck than any
officer of his rank, also on either side. I am willing to stand corrected on this. And if
not corrected, will not this make these units and Brig Malik deserving of credit?

Lt Col Mohammad Anwar
5 Dec 2001
REPLY TO CRITICISM OF BRIG ALAM AND COL ANWAR ON ARTICLE
“BATTLE OF CHAWINDA” AND SUBSEQUENT LETTERS PUBLISHED IN
DJ MARCH 2001 ISSUES AND AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 2001 ISSUES
It is amusing as well as encouraging to note that this scribe’s article on Chawinda
Battle of 1965 published in Defence Journal March 2001 issue continues to attract
flak from critics!
The latest in the series are two letters , both written by retired officers . First of all I
must clarify that my sole motivation in all writing has been to endeavour to write
“what men did” rather than what “they ought ideally to have done” or what “someone
later with the benefit of hindsight tried to portray , what they had done”. Thus the
analysis of Chawinda Battle done with pure loyalty to service without any inter arm
rivalry or nationalistic motivation. Pure and unadulterated military history filtered
dispassionately separating fact from fiction and myth from reality. How far I
succeeded is for readers to judge.
History as Frederick the Great once said can be well written only in a free country and
ours has been continuously under civil or military dictators since 1958. Enters
Defence Journal which in its resurrected form from 1997 picked up the gauntlet of
serving as a medium of intellectual honesty and forthright criticism and published
facts which were unpalatable for some and welcomed by the vast multitude. A breath
of fresh air in a country reduced to intellectual stagnation because of years of
censorship and intellectual persecution! I had written for the Pakistan Army Journal
and Citadel but had left military history writing when in 1998 through a dear friend I
discovered that there is a new Defence Journal in Karachi which is open to some
critical writing!
I maintain as one great master of English prose said that “all history so far as it is not
supported by contemporary evidence is romance”! Battle of Chawinda published in
DJ March 2001 was thus not romance! What many in this country wrote and was
outwardly military history was essentially “Romance”! Inspiring, superhuman but a
myth promiscuously mixed with reality!
Chance plays a key role in battle and at Chawinda chance played a very important
role! Nisar, when he deployed 25 Cavalry did not know what was in front of him ! KK

Singh Commander 1st Indian Brigade also did not know what was in front of him!
This mutual ignorance saved Pakistan on that crucial day ! Later heroes were created!
I repeat “Heroes were created” ! This was what the article was all about !
What were the key facts? Most important tangible fact was “casualties” ! These were
deliberately hidden since these would have let the cat out of the bag! Everyone would
have discovered who really fought and who got gallantry awards on
parochial,regimental or old boy links !How many were killed in the biggest military
blunder “Operation Gibraltar”! This is Top Secret ! How many infantry men died at
Chawinda? Again no mention of any figures! The real motivation here is not national
interest but to preserve or more important to “guard reputations”
Brigadier Kamal Alam’s Letter
a. I stick to the assertion that the “broad front deployment” was done by Nisar and
Nisar alone and Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik had no role in it. It is another matter that
Nisar also did not know what was in front of him. It was like Jutland when both
contending fleets were running towards each other at express train speed. Why Nisar
behaved as he did and what actually happened even today is hard to understand,
whatever anyone may claim now with the benefit of hindsight! Brigadier Alam offers
no tangible proof that the actions of 25 Cavalry had anything to do with what Brig
A.A Malik told Nisar. Nisar was told to “do something” and Nisar did something
without the least clue of what was in front of him. The important thing is that Nisar
did something rather than getting paralysed into inertia and inaction! I may add a
personal note here. I understand that Alam’s elder brother Brig Mujahid Alam COS
31 Corps while this scribe was commanding 5 Independent Armoured Squadron was a
fine soldier.
b. Alam raises the question about the controversial “Do Something” order by Brig
A.A Malik to Lt Col Nisar CO 25 Cavalry. The same words were repeated by Nisar in
his article published in Pakistan Army Journal in 1997. Then Alam raises the question
about 25 Cavalry functioning in a vacuum. 24 Brigade had two infantry units, one
which had been overrun and dispersed on 8th September i.e 3 FF and 2 Punjab which
was at Chawinda. The crucial action took place at Gadgor few miles north of
Chawinda in which 25 Cavalry faced the entire Indian 1st Armoured Division. This
was an extraordinary situation and Nisar acted on his own best judgement since Malik
had abdicated to Nisar by stating that he should do something. It is another thing that
Nisar also did not know what was in front of him and acted boldly and
unconventionally. Had he known what was in front of him he may have been
paralysed by inertia and inaction! But this is speculation and some part of history
always remains unfathomed and hidden! Nisar acted through sheer reflex and

deployed his unit in an impromptu manner. The fire fight which took place at Gadgor
between 0900 hours and 1200 hours was a pure tank versus tank affair. 25 Cavalry
versus two leading tank regiments of Indian 1st Armoured Division! Thus the Indian
Armoured Corps historian stated “The Armoured Brigade had been blocked by two
squadrons of Pattons and in the first encounter had lost more tanks than the enemy
had...the worst consequence of the days battle was its paralysing effect on the minds
of the higher commanders. It took them another 48 hours to contemplate the next
move. This interval gave Pakistanis time to deploy their 6th Armoured Division...in
fact the golden opportunity that fate had offered to the 1st Armoured Division to make
worthwhile gains had been irretrievably lost” (Refers-Pages-393 & 394-History of
Indian Armoured Corps-Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi-1990). Thus
the Indians acknowledged “This regiment’s (25 Cavalry) performance was certainly
creditable because it alone stood between the 1st Indian Armoured division and its
objective, the MRL canal”.
(Refers-Page-395-Ibid).
c. At Gadgor on 8th September it was 25 Cavalry and 25 Cavalry alone which saved
the day. Major Shamshad a direct participant has already stated on record that SJs
were awarded to some officers for an attack in which not a single man was killed on
both sides!
d. 25 Cavalry was part of 24 Brigade but all that Nisar its CO did on the crucial 8th
September at Gadgor was based on his own judgement. On 9th and 10th September
no fighting took place as Indians had withdrawn their armoured division to the
crossroads. On 10th September, 6 Armoured Division took over and 24 Brigade was a
part of 6 Armoured Division. On 8th September there was a vacuum and Nisar acted
in a sitaution which can be classified as one characterised by “absence of clear and
precise orders”!
e. Shaukat Riza’s book is basically a compilation of existing facts. It has historical
value since Riza was allowed access to official records.
f. The change of command aspect about which Alam asserts is correct and was
officially hushed up but why should Shaukat Riza have any sympathy for the
armoured corps of 1960s which was arrogant and looked down on artillery as I
personally witnessed right till 1980s as a young officer in Kharian and Multan?
Artillery officers were never welcomed in armoured corps unit messes unless real
exceptions based on personal ties and armour officers rarely visited artillery messes.

g. Chawinda was a tank battle, thus armour suffered more casualties. On the other
hand Lahore was an infantry battle where the indomitable 1st Baluch lost something
like around 30 killed in battle , more casualties than most infantry units in the much
trumpeted Grand Slam.
h. Now I offer some figures for the readers to form their own conclusions.
KILLED-CASUALTIES GRAND SLAM
UNIT KILLED CASUALTIES
6 PUNJAB 9
9 PUNJAB 15
13 PUNJAB 24
14 PUNJAB 3
15 PUNJAB 8
8 BALOCH 10
11 CAVALRY 19
13 LANCERS 14
REFERS-PAGE-109-PAKISTAN BHARAT JANG-1965-COL MUKHTAR
GILLANI-RAWALPINDI-JULY 1998 AND UNIT SOURCES 13 LANCERS AND
11 CAVALRY
The above casualties prove that Grand Slam was both an infantry and armour battle
yet armour suffered proportionately more casualties since the effective battle strength
of a tank unit is half that of an infantry unit. 14 Punjab lost just 3 killed while 10
Guides Cavalry at Chawinda lost 3 killed in officers alone apart from 12 OR/JCOs
killed! 11 Cavalry lost more in killed casualties in 1965 War than any of the above
units of the Grand Slam i.e 34 killed. No fault of infantry since Chawinda was an
essentially a tank battle.
i. Brigadier Alam does not give any figures which prove that infantry suffered more
casualties at Chawinda. I have already admitted in my letter that the only infantry unit
which bore the brunt of Indian assault was 3 FF on the 8th September. 3 FF aside the
brunt of the attack at Chawinda was borne by armour units since Chawinda was a tank
battle. At Lahore, the brunt of the attack was faced by infantry since Lahore i.e 10
Division battle was an essentially infantry battle. Thus, there were units like 1st
Baloch and 16 Punjab which suffered tremendous casualties.1st Baloch suffering
casualties of 31 killed in 10 Division Area (Refers-Page-139-Col Gillani-Op Cit). 16
Punjab suffering casualties of 106 killed and 70 missing most of whom were killed
(more than total of all regular infantry units in Grand Slam) (Refers-Page-138-Col
Gillani). On the other hand there were formations which in words of Colonel Mukhtar

Gillani exaggerated the fighting and suffered nominal casualties like the 103 Brigade
in 10 Division area (Refers Page-143-Col Gillani).
j. Even at formation level Chawinda was not a big battle in terms of casualties since
the Indian 1 Corps suffered less casualties than 11 Indian Corps in Ravi Sutlej
Corridor.
k. Brigadier Alam has mixed inter arm rivalry with operational leadership and
personalities. Infantry had a role in Chawinda. Every arm and service had a role. If I
have not discussed infantry actions in detail it is not because infantry did nothing at
Chawinda but simply because Chawinda was a tank dominated battle with artillery
playing a crucial role. Had I been biased I would not have stated in various articles
that the greatest tank commander of Pakistan Army at operational level was Maj Gen
Iftikhar who was an infantry man. Similarly Ibrar whose conduct I pointed out as most
decisive was again an infantry man .
l. If Brigadier Alam wants to highlight the infantry side of the battle he is free to write
an article on the “Role of Infantry at Chawinda”.
m. I have also compiled some casualty figures of armour units in 1965 which will give
the reader a fair idea of who did what and who suffered more or less:—
UNIT Killed casualties Battle area Remarks
4 CAVALRY 17 KHEM KARAN
5 HORSE 5 KHEM KARAN
6 LANCERS 20 KHEM KARAN
GUIDES 15 CHAWINDA Including 3 Officers
11 CAVALRY 34 CHAMB
CHAWINDA Including 1 Officer
12 CAVALRY 8 KHEM KARAN Did Traffic Control / Flank Protection etc. being
Recce Regiment
13 LANCERS 14 CHAMB
JAURIAN
AKHNUR Including 3 Officers
15 LANCERS 8 KHEM KARAN
19 LANCERS 18 CHAWINDA Including 2 Officers
20 LANCERS Nil SIALKOT
22 CAVALRY 1 CHAWINDA
23 CAVALRY 18 10 DIVISION Including 2 Officers
24 CAVALRY 14 KHEM KARAN Including 2 Officers
25 CAVALRY 16 CHAWINDA

30 TDU 3 RAVI-SUTLEJ
CORRIDOR
31 TDU 7 SIALKOT
32 TDU 7 RAVI-SUTLEJ
CORRIDOR
33 TDU 9 JASSAR
Note:—These casualties were compiled personally and may not be wholly or totally
accurate.
n. Lastly, Alam’s assertion that DJ is distorting history. A bit naive since articles
published in journals are opinions of individual writers and not of the management.
This is true for all journals whether it is Pakistan Army Journal or Command and Staff
College Citadel.
o. Finally, Brigadier Alam’s letter was crude and lacked common courtesy that one
would associate or expect from one holding the rank of a brigadier.
Lt Col M. Anwar’s Letter:—
a. I was not referring to 3 FF when I discussed Brig A.A Malik’s withdrawal request
of 16 September. Hence, Col Anwar has misunderstood the point. Brig A.A Malik had
requested permission to withdraw when Indian tanks had crossed the railway line on
16th September and occupied Buttur Dograndi and Sodreke. This fact was brought to
light not by the much criticised Shaukat Riza but by the then GSO-2 of 6 Armoured
Division Major (later General K.M Arif), first more bluntly in Pakistan Army Green
Book-1993 and again a little tactfully in his recently published book Khaki Shadows.
Thus no connection with 3 FF, an infantry unit which as far as I know suffered more
casualties than any other infantry unit at Chawinda. 3 FF fought admirably but was
launched thoughtlessly as brought out by Major Shamshad in his letter published in
Sept 2001 DJ and consequently suffered enormous casualties at Sodreke-Buttur
Dograndi area. Shamshad was the tank troop leader in support of 3 FF when it
disastrously attacked Buttur Dograndi. In opinion of Shamshad, the attack had failed
not due to any fault of 3 FF but because of poor planning by Commander 24 Brigade.
b. About the assertion of Col Anwar that official sources are cover ups, all that one
can state is that if these are cover ups why don’t experts like Brigadier Alam and
Farouk Adam or Col Anwar or Lt Gen Tariq devote some time to writing serious
military history.

c. In my writings I have relied on official, unofficial and personal as well as Indian
accounts. If someone has better knowledge of facts he is most welcome to apply his
intellect and come out with a better account.
d. Anwar has a point that infantry was holding a firm base. I have not denied this
anywhere. My emphasis, however, was on the real battle, the armour battle which was
fought at Chawinda. It is up to a reader to form subjective conclusions.
e. Anwar states that infantry has been ignored, I contend that the real fact which has
not been favourably received by some is that Brig A.A Malik has not been projected
as much in my article as he had been before. Infantry, is an arm and I have great
respect for it , A.A Malik was an individual who did well and rose to three star rank
despite launching poorly planned counter attacks as brought out by
Gen Fazal i Muqeem in 1971 War as a GOC .
Lastly I want to quote a great captain of war :—
“ I am not publishing my memoirs, not theirs and we all know that no three honest
witnesses of a brawl can agree on all the details. How much more likely will be the
differences in a great battle covering a vast space of broken ground, when each
division, brigade, regiment and even company naturally and honestly believes that it
was the focus of the whole affair! Each of them won the battle. None ever lost. That
was the fate of the old man who unhappily commanded”.
“Memoirs of General Sherman”
Lastly my humble submission; Chawinda was about operational leadership, not small
unit actions or projecting individuals or maligning them. If someone feels otherwise it
is his subjective opinion.
Kind regards
A.H Amin
--------------------
MAJOR SHAMSADS SEPTEMBER 2001 LETTER PUBLISHED IN
DEFENCE JOURNAL REBUTTING FAROUK ADAM AND KAMAL ALAM
AND COLONEL ANWAR:---

Major Shamshads Rebuttal of Farouk Adams Account of Chawinda-Defence Journal
September 2001
The Editor
Defence Journal
Karachi.
Dear Sir,
Brig (Retd) Muhammad Ahmed
The May 2001 edition of your esteemed magazine carries a letter by Brig (Retd)
Mohammed Ahmed which mentions as under,
“Major Shamshad is right, in a way, when he says only Charlie Squadron went up to
Pasrur. The little difference being that only Charlie Squadron went up to Pasrur the
others were turned back half way when the Jassar fiasco was discovered.
I would like to correct the record here.
The entire action of night 7/8 and 08 Sept has been covered in a single article
appeared in Oct 1997 edition of DJ. I have nowhere stated or recorded what Brig
Ahmed has ascribed to me. An editing error has appeared in the March 2001 edition
of DJ which the Brig should have corrected rather than confirming it.
The fact is that entire regiment moved to Pasrur on its way to Jassar. The regiment
was detained at Pasrur while Charlie Squadron was despatched to Jassar which
reached Narowal at 0300 hours and turned about to reach Pasrur at 0500 hours.
BATTLE OF CHAWINDA
The August issue of DJ carries a letter by Farooq Adam SJ on the subject and another
by Mr A H Amin who is on the panel of D J. Both the gentlemen have made reference
to me. I, therefore, feel obliged to put in my word to keep the record straight.
Farooq Adam, as a direct participant appears to have reservations about the
description of the battle by A H Amin who was not a participant. He has merely
conducted research and has adequately defended his point of view by quoting his
source of knowledge. A H Amin has quoted Gen Fazle Moqeem who has reflected
upon command quality of Brig Ali and how 35 FF was massacred in Nawa Pind in
1971. To support the opinion of Gen Fazle Moqeem I can quote one out of several ill
planned attacks which fizzled out in initial stages, ordered by Brig Ali in 1965. On the
morning of 17 Sept 3rd FF were ordered to attack Jassora with a company. A detailed
discription has been published in May 1998 issue of DJ. For those who could not

reach that edition and also to prove inanity of command I shall describe the attack
precisely. The company was commanded by Capt Raheem Shah and was supported by
my troop of three tanks.
I submitted to CO 3FF that before attacking Jassoran, which was 2000 yards away
from Railway line, we had to clear Buttardograndi half way between Railway line and
Jassoran. I also informed him that area Jassoran-Buttardograndi is occupied by a tank
regiment supported by an infantry battalion which I faced on 16 Sept and eventually
my troop was shot up by that force. It was impossible to dislodge an armoured brigade
by attacking with a company and three tanks. My plea was brushed aside with remark
that Butterdograndi had been cleared during the night. As we formed up behind
railway line heavy artillery fire was dropped on us causing casualties to our infantry.
In the FUP we located a centurian in Battalion one which was destroyed. Finally we
attacked without artillery. Capt Raheem Shah and his company displayed tremendous
courage.
8 Gharwal was entered in the middle of 5 feet high maze crop. As our men reached
the trenches they were fired at from point blank range. Many of them fell other turned
and went to ground. They were surprised: I saw this massacre standing in cupola from
a distance of 50 yards. I moved the tank up and mounted the trenches. By this time I
had reached the killing range of enemy tanks deployed in Jassoran. My tank was shot
up and went into flames. My second tank was also hit and damaged. The third tank
turret # 1, tank commanded by LD Kamal prudently did come up and was saved. In
this swift action two enemy tanks were also destroyed. Here the attack fizzled out.
It is now for the reader to assess the competence of higher command. In my opinion it
was callous act to launch a company and three tank against an armoured brigade. To
further illustrate my point of view, a quotation from a book (Guns of August by
Barbara Tuchman) will be in place.
Quote “When the moment of live ammunition approaches, the moment to which his
professional training is directed, the issue of the combat, even the fate of the campaign
may depend on his decision. What is happening in the heart and vitals of a
commander. Some are made bold by the moment, some irresolute, some carefully
judicious, some paralyzed and powerless to act” Unquote. I place ours higher in the
last category.
After having gone through the letter of Farooq Adam and his two earlier scripts, on
the subject (“Hero of Chawinda” published in daily The News in April/ May 1992 and
“THE ALI OF CHAWINDA”published in UNIFORM Sept 1994 issue) I can say that
his writing is more of fiction than honest description of the events on the battlefield.

On reading his script of 1992, I expressed my views which have been published in
daily THE NEWS of May 1992. I reproduce below the opening paragraph of the
article which delivers goods to those who are interested to know the facts.
Quote”On the outset I shall mention here that I have never served in the direct
command of Brig Ali. Hence there is no possibility of having ill will or malice
towards him. However, I feel that both the writers have tried to aggrandize the revered
general out of proportion. I hold this opinion as I have first hand knowledge about the
Battle of Chawinda. I was a troop leader and squadron commander in 25 cavalry
which was a part of Brig Ali’s brigade. Mr Agha Babar should show Adam’s article to
his literary friends in Newyork to be appreciated as a good piece of literature. Anyone
with little knowledge about army matters and warfare will confront him with awkward
questions such as, Why should Brig Ali ask Col Nisar as to how many tanks did he
have? Was he ignorant of the organisation and deployment of his only tank regiment?.
Why did Farooq Adam leave his defensive position when enemy tanks were still more
than a mile away? Why did he not wait for the tanks to destroy once they reached the
killing zone of his ante tank weapons? Why was Chobara captured and abandoned
time and again?. Was a pitched battle fought at Chobara? If so what was the score of
casualties? And many more such questions.’Unquote.
The knowledge which Farooq Adam wants to share with the readers is of no
consequence unless he first fixes his position in a fighting unit. Was he a platoon
/company commander or a staff officer. I have gone through his three scripts
mentioned above. Only at one place (UNIFORM Sept 1994) he said that he was
attached to Major Mohammad Hussain whose company was to follow 25 cavalry
tanks on the morning of 8 Sept. Was he attached to Major Mohammad Hussain to
advise him.
I will not go in details here, which of course I have, to prove that whatever Farooq has
written is all truth. Only one example is enough to prove what I state.
On page 59 of the periodical UNIFORM of Sept 1994 he writes while describing the
dialogue between Brig Ali and Col Nisar. “How many tanks do you have? One
squadron of tanks right here, another dismounting from transporters nearby”. He
claims that these words were exchanged at Chawinda in the morning at Chawinda on
8 Sept. This is totally untrue. The whole regiment was concentrated at Pasrur. Col
Nisar was called by Brig and told “enemy had come think about it”. He must have
also told him that enemy tanks were advancing on Charwa-Cawinda track. What
happened thereafter has been recorded by me in the form of 8 articles in D J starting
from Oct 1997 to May 1998. 9th and concluding article will appear in near future. My

suggestion to Farooq is to write an account of 17 days as he saw the battle moving day
by day, mere eulogy is not welcomed.
Passing orders is a simple affair.The quality of effort a commander makes to insure
the implementation of the order is what that matters. The extent of personal
involvement, his control and direction of the events, his presence at the place and time
where the fate of the battle is being decided are the factors which go in to assess the
competence of a commander. In this light I found our leader wanting.
Maj (Retd) Shamshad Ali Khan
-----------------------
BRIGADIER SIMONS LETTER OF 2008 BASED ON HIS DISCUSSION
WITH VARIOUS DIRECT PARTICIPTANTS:---
AGHA AMIN AND BATTLE OF SIALKOT-1965
JUL 24, 2008 THU 12:07 PM
I KNOW THE URGENCY AGHA AMIN HAD IN CONTACTING ME
REPEATEDLY ABOUT HIS ILOG ON CHOWINDA, BUT I WANTED CERTAIN
CONFIRMATIONS BEFORE PUTTING MY VIEWS. IN THE COURSE, I
TRACED AND TALKED TO SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF THIS BATTLE
AND AGREE THAT AGHA AMIN’S ACCOUNT IS MOST ACCURATE.
FIRST, HATS OFF AND A TRIBUTE TO THOSE SOLDIERS WHO FOUGHT
BRAVELY IN THE BATTLE OF CHOWINDA DESPITE THE CONFUSION
GENERATED BY THE PAPER TIGER COMMANDERS LIKE GEN. ISMAIL,
SAHIBZADA YAKOOB ALI KHAN AND MANY MORE WHO EARNED
LAURELS OVER THE DEAD BODIES OF THEIR SOLDIERS.
1. INDIAN PLANS. YES IT WAS AN FIU OPERATION SUPPORTED BY AN
INFANTRY AMBUSH PARTY THAT CAPTURED AN INDIAN DESPATCH
RIDER. THOUGH THE INDIAN OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS COINCIDED
WITH GEN. YAHYA’S LEADING HYPOTHESES OF AN INDIAN MAIN
OFFENSIVE IN THIS SECTOR, THESE DESPATCHES WERE RUBBISHED AS
DECEPTION BY THE MASTER PAKISTANI THINK TANK. THE ORIGINAL
HYPOTHESIS WAS DOWNGRADED BY THE NEW GOC 15 DIVISION MAJOR

GENERAL ISMAIL, DEPUTY DIVISION COMMANDER BRIGADIER RIAZ UL
KARIM, CORPS COMMANDER LT. GEN BAKHTIAR RANA, AND DEPUTY
CORPS COMMANDER DESIGNATE SAHIBZADA YAKOOB ALI KHAN ONCE
INDIAN’S ATTACKED JASSAR.
“HOWA KE PEHLEY HE JHONKEY PE HAAR MAN GAI
WOHI CHIRAGH JO HUM NE JALA KE RAKHAY THAY”
2. JASSAR ENCLAVE. IT IS AN ENCLAVE WHERE MAJOR OPERATIONS
FROM NEITHER SIDE WERE POSSIBLE AS THE TERRAIN IS DIVIDED BY
RIVER RAVI. YET WHEN AN INFANTRY BRIGADE WAS DESPATCHED IN
HASTE TO DEFEND THE BRIDGE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE RIVER, THE
LEADING UNIT HAD VERY LITTLE DEFENSIVE POWER IN TERMS OF
PREPARATION AND DEFENCE STORES. CONSEQUENTLY, SOME OF ITS
ELEMENTS WERE OVER RUN IN DOUBLE QUICK TIME BY A
DIVERSIONARY ATTACK OF AN INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE PRIOR TO
THE MAIN ATTACK ON LINE CHARWA- CHOBARA- PHILORA. BRIGADIER
MUZAFFAR MADE A VERY BIG BLUNDER OF JUDGEMENT IN HIS
ASSESSMENT AND REPORTED IN PANIC THAT AN INDIAN MAIN HAD
BEEN LAUNCHED.. AS A RESULT THE ENTIRE DEFENCE OF SIALKOT
SECTOR WAS UNHINGED IN PANIC AND 24 BRIGADE MINUS 3FF IN
SCREENS AND 25 CAVALRY WERE MOVED IN HASTE TOWARDS JASSAR.
THE DEFENCE HAD TAKEN A 90 DEGREE TURN. IN THIS VACUUM WHAT
REMAINED BETWEEN INDIA AND SIALKOT WERE THE SCREEN
POSITIONS OF 3FF. ON THE EVENING OF 7TH SEPTEMBER, GOC 15
DIVISION ORDERED 24 BRIGADE AND 25 CAVALRY TO LAUNCH A
COUNTER ATTACK ON JASSAR. THE RESERVES WERE NEAR NAROWAL
AND THE DIVISION HEADQUARTER PREPARING FOR A WHITE LINEN
DINNER, WHEN INDIAN DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY BEGAN POUNDING 3FF
POSITIONS. MAJOR MEHMOOD OF AVIATION THEN TOOK THE RISK OF
FLYING OVER JASSAR ONLY TO REPORT THAT THE BRIDGE OVER RIVER
RAVI WAS IN TACT AND IN PAKISTANI OCCUPATION. A SQUADRON OF
25 CAVALRY UNDER MAJOR SHAMSHAD HAD ALREADY REACHED THE
JASSAR SECTOR WHILE THE TWO REMAINING WERE ON THE MOVE. 15
DIVISION HAD BEEN CAUGHT WITH ITS PANTS DOWN.
3. PHILORI-CHARWA-CHOBARA SECTOR. INDIAN ADVANCING COLUMNS
ENGAGED THE SCREENS OF 3FF ON THE NIGHT OF 7 SEPTEMBER. BY
FIRST LIGHT 8 SEPTEMBER THESE SCREENS AFTER SUFFERING
CASUALTIES AND OVER RUN FELL BACK TO LINE PHILORI-CHARWA-

CHOBARA AND ALONG WITH A COMPANY OF 2 PUNJAB TOOK HASTY
DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. THE SAME MORNING INDIAN ARMOUR
COLUMNS OVERRAN CHARWA-CHOBARA, BYPASSED PHILORI AND
REACHED 3-4 KMS FROM CHOWINDA. AT 8:30 AM 18 SQUADRON OF PAF
COMMANDED BY SQUADRON LEADER SALAUDDIN SHAHEED CAME
INTO ACTION WITH THREE F-86 FIGHTERS WHO ENGAGED THE INDIAN
ARMOUR AND IMPOSED A DELAY OF ONE HOUR ON INDIAN ADVANCE.
THIS ONE HOUR WAS VERY CRUCIAL AS IT PROVIDED TWO SQUADRONS
OF 25 CAVALRY THAT ARRIVED FROM NAROWAL ENOUGH TIME TO
REGROUP AND MOVE INTO BATTLE FORMATION FOR ENCOUNTER
BATTLE. IT WAS A VERY BOLD MOVE ON PART OF THE COMMANDING
OFFICER TO TAKE ON THE INDIAN ADVANCING ARMOUR HEAD ON. PAF
PROVIDED CRUCIAL SUPPORT. THE NEXT TWO SORTIES WERE LED BY
FLIGHT LIEUTENANT CECIL CHAUDARY WITH WHOM I TALKED TODAY
TO GET THE RECORDS STRAIGHT.
IN THE COURSE OF WRITING THIS, I TRACED OUT SOME OF THE
PARTICIPANTS OF THIS ACTION AND AM CONVINCED THAT ALL
ACTIONS OF 8 SEPTEMBER WERE TAKEN SOLELY BY LT. COL NISAR THE
COMMANDING OFFICER OF 25 CAVALRY AT HIS OWN INITIATIVE AND
NO ONE ELSE. THROUGHOUT THIS BATTLE BRIGADIER A A MALIK
REMAINED IN A SCHOOL AT PHILORA AND LET NISAR HANDLE THE
SITUATION. AGAIN ON 9/10 SEPTEMBER, IT WERE 25 CAVALRY AND 3FF
THAT REPULSED INDIAN ATTACKS.
4. RELIEF IN LINE. AS IF THE COMEDY OF ERRORS WAS NOT ENOUGH,
THE PAPER TIGER THINK TANK NOW LED BY SAHIBZADA YAKOOB
DECIDED TO CARRY OUT RELIEF OF TROOPS ENGAGED IN BATTLE FOR
THREE DAYS. 25 CAVALRY AND 3FF WERE REPLACED BY 11 CAVALRY
AND 9 FF (MOTORISED) ON NIGHT 10/11. IN FACT THERE WAS NO RELIEF
AND THE ENTIRE MOVEMENT WAS A FIASCO. INDIANS EXPLOITED THE
SITUATION AND LAUNCHED A FIERCE OFFENSIVE ON THE 11TH
MORNING. THE ADVANCING INDIANS WERE FIRST SPOTTED BY MAJOR
MUZZAFAR MALIK OF 11 CAVALRY WHO THEN ALERTED EVERYONE
ELSE. IT WAS A TOUGH TASK FOR THE NEW UNITS BECAUSE THEY HAD
MOVED AT NIGHT AND WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE TERRAIN.
BRIGADIER AA MALIK WAS TO REPEAT HISTORY WHEN AS GOC IN 1971,
HE LAUNCHED A JUST ARRIVE 355FF INTO ACTION AT BERA PIND AND
HAD IT MASSACRED.

THE BIGGEST LESSON OF THIS BATTLE WAS THAT BOTH ARMIES WERE
IN EFFICIENT IN HANDLING OPERATIONS AT A LARGE SCALE. INDIAN
CAUTION AND RELUCTANCE TO PURSUE AND EXPLOIT SITUATIONS
RESULTED IN FAILURE OF THEIR PLAN AND HEAVY LOSSES. IN TERMS
OF CLAUSEWITZ’ FRICTION, IT WAS MOSTLY THE MENTAL BLOCKAGE
ON PART OF COMMANDERS ON BOTH SIDES THAT RESULTED IN
MISTAKES. YET THE CONDUCT OF SMALL UNITS ON BOTH SIDES WAS
OUTSTANDING.
1965 WAS ALSO TO USHER A SPIRIT OF CAMARADERIE AMONGST THE
PAPER TIGERS THAT SURVIVES EVEN TODAY. THEY FORM A MUTUAL
PRAISE GROUP WHILE THE MOST HARDY AND TRUE ONES LIE AROUND
TO ROT IN ANONYMITY
THANKS ARE DUE TO AGHA AMIN, BRIGADIER MEHMOOD (EX-
SERVICEMEN FAME), GROUP CAPTAIN CECIL AND MAJOR SHAMSHAD.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MAJOR SHAMSHADS SUMMING UP LETTER OF AUGUST 2008
MEN OF STEEL by Major Shamshad Ali Khan Kaimkhani
(Retired),majshamshad@hotmail.com,25 Cavalry
MEN OF STEEL
By
Major Shamshad Ali Khan Kaimkhani (Retired)
majshamshad@hotmail.com
25 Cavalry
This was first sent to daily DAWN but they did not have the guts to publish it on
grounds that it involved the president and the army.

The other day I came across a book entitled ,’ MEM OF STEEL,’. President General
Mushrraf has graced the book with Foreword while the preface has been written by
General Khalid Mahmud Arif (Retired). The book is based on war diaries supposed to
had been maintained by the units and the staff or the general (late ) Abrar Hussain
who commanded 6 Armoured Division in 1965 on Chawinda sector. I cannot reason
out as to why the book has been published now when the event is forty years behind at
this point of time. As there is nothing in the book that would have jeopardized the
security of the country, it should have come out immediately after the war. That was
the time when it could provided opportunity to higher command( there is nothing for
junior leaders in the book) to learn from the experience of the one who had fought the
greatest tank battle after world war- II. That would have saved us of many debacles in
1971 and especially the ones committed in Sialkot sector on western front The book
has five parts. Part three (25% of the book) is the description of the events on the
battlefield that is of interest to students of military history. 75 % of the book
comprises of background and statistics regarding composition of units /formations,
casualties in men and material on both sides, names of commanders, list of recipients
of gallantry awards, photographs and such like details.
I feel that late general Abrar Hussain has not authored the book because he was
known to be of the type who would never indulge in such a travesty. General K.M
Arif appears to be the ghost author of the book.
I was a participant in the events on battlefield mentioned in part 3 of the book and
have a different version.
To give authenticity to my narration, which will be diametrically opposed to the one
given in the book, it is necessary to state that I was directly involved in the events as a
troop leader in C squadron of 25 cavalry and squadron commander twice on extreme
critical moments on the battle field. I was face to face with enemy every day
throughout the war. My location from day one had been at Gadgor, Phillorah,
Chawinda and Butter Dogranmdi where the battle was fought. It is regretted that I did
not have the good luck to see a red tab or even a staff officer on front line during
entire war.
From the text of part three it is clear that the general left his Headquarter, at
Bhollowal ten miles behind the front line, for the first and last time in a helicopter on
11 September in the evening, By that time our two regiments , Guides and 11 Cavalry,
had been badly mauled.. The right time for the general to leave his HQ was in the
morning when he got the news that 11 cavalry was under pressure. Had he been at

Chawinda at 1100 hours he could have directed and controlled the efforts of the three
regiments and saved the day. By the evening, while sitting in the caravan, he had
launched two more regiments, Guides and 25 cavalry. Guides was launched at a time(
about 1100 hours) when 11 cavalry had retreated and Indians had taken up defensives
position to shoot up Guides who attacked with high spirits on their first day in action.
Some fine men and officers were lost in this action due to the apathy of commanding
officer who launched the regiment in haste, without artillery and infantry support
contrary to the dictates of terrain.. Lethargy and incompetence of HQ 6 armoured
division resulted in our defeat at Phillorah which was the greatest tragedy on this
front.
As if that was not enough, 25 cavalry was launched at 1600 hours with a mission to
occupy Phillorah track crossing which was reported not occupied by the enemy.
Thanks to our stars and battle experience of preceding three days that we got away
with loss of only one tank when we hit against enemy defenses at Phillorah at 1700
hours. This is a classic example how to destroy one’s forces piecemeal.
Now a word about the title of the book.
General Musharraf in the introduction of the book has mentioned that he was proud to
be apart of the force called MEN OF STEEL by its commander. It implies that late
general Abrar had ascribed the title of MEN OF STEEL to his own formation. This
never happens, it amounts to praising oneself. Such an absurdity was not expected of
general Abrar who, I am told , was a different breed.
Titles or honors are always awarded by higher authorities .It was 25 cavalry alone
which was referred to as men of steel by General Ayub Khan during the course of his

talk on the eve of his visit to the regiment immediately after ceasefire, in
acknowledgement of our performance. This had happened on Pasrur airstrip where we
were camping .Army, Naval and Air Chiefs were also present. Since the president was
not to visit any other unit or formation head quarter, all officers in the area were called
at the airstrip.
There are tangible, discernable and universally accepted actions of 25 cavalry on the
battlefield that justify the suffix ‘ men of Steel’ with its’ title. The actions precisely
and in short are;
1-It was 25 cavalry alone which clashed headlong with an armored division , north of
Fhillorah crossing at 0800 and pushed it back to Gudgor (2.5miles) by 1200 hours.
2-we attacked, captured Gudgor at 1700 hours and pushed the enemy further back by
three miles to Chobara.,
3- we kept the enemy at bay for another two day with no additional force in our
support. Air support was of course there.
4- On night 10/11 September we were sent to Pasrur for rest and refit On this point of
time we were placed under command 6 armoured division which had taken over
Chawinda sector.
5- At about 1100 hours on 11 September C squadron 25 cavalry found itself deployed
behind Chawinda with a mission to stop the enemy at all cost that was believed to be
advancing behind our force that had retreated from Gudgor-Phillorah area in the
morning. In fact Div HQ had accepted the loss of Chawinda and therefore we were
deployed behind that town to stop the enemy advance towards Pasror.
After five hours of my insistence that Chawinda was vacant, at 1700 hours we were
ordered to advance and occupy Phillorah, which according to high command was not
held by the enemy. What happened later is along story but it should suffice to say that
we hit enemy defenses in Phillorah where tank to tank battle ensued. In the process
our one tank with crew was destroyed. The skirmish proved to be a deterrent and the
enemy did not advance any further that day.
6- On12, 13,14,and 15 September C squadron along with 3FF was defending area in
the north and up to Jassoran in the west of Chawinda. It was through this area that the
enemy attempted, for four days, to penetrate but could not succeed.

7- On 16th the enemy launched an armored Brigade to out flank Chawinda and
attacked Butter Dograndi in the rear of that town. They succeeded because the task
force commander (who later retired as Major General Wajahat Hussain), failed to
coordinate with 24 Bde and left Jassoran unoccupied providing a gap through which
the enemy infiltrated and turned our flank. We suffered heavy losses. Seven tanks
were destroyed including two of 33 TDU. In the evening we attacked Butter Dugrandi
supported by artillery. . Destroyed two enemy tanks and some infantry. Under very
critical circumstances we stopped the enemy at Butter Dograndi that was determined
to reach Pasror that day. Artillery played effective roll but never fired on enemy tanks
with open sights on that day as mentioned in the book. We never allowed enemy tanks
to reach that close to our gun areas.
8- It was a troop of 25 cavalry and company of 3 FF who again attacked (without
artillery) Butter Dograndi, midway to our main objective Jassoran, on the morning of
17th and mounted enemy trenches north of the village. Although we suffered heavy
losses and could not reach the objective, our offensive action forced the enemy to
vacate Butter Dograndi and withdraw to Jassonan in the evening and eventually across
the railway line Chawinda –Sialkot.(quoted from official history of 17 Poona Horse
that was controlling the operation on Indian side).
9-It was 25 cavalry again, along with 3 Ff who repulsed an infantry brigade attack on
night19/20 September. Although some of their troops had crossed over the railway
line and hit the track behind Chawinda at milestone 5, our tanks fired from behind
railway line and forced the enemy to withdraw, leaving behind dead and wounded.
Now where does the 6 armour division appear in this scenario? It has always been a
troop or squadron action through out war accept 11 September that was a fiasco .I can
confront any one who can prove me wrong.
Now the story as to how did 6 armored division became’Men Of Steel’.
I served in 6 armored division, of which 25 cavalry was a part , till September 1971.
No one called the Division as men of steel it was only 25 cavalry alone. I was shocked
when I visited HQ 6 armoured Div after Indian captivity in 1974. I saw on the name
boards of staff officers written ‘MEN OF STEEL’ on top. No body could explain how

it happened. Knowing general K.M.Arif I can say that he is behind this happening
supported by general Wjahat Hossain(retd) who was commanding 6 Armored
Division in 1973-74.
To face the enemy is the professional obligation of a soldier. To be killed in action,
get wounded and fall prisoner is very much a normal happening in the life of soldier
and there is nothing to be proud or ashamed about it. This ancient and universal
concept of soldiering does not hold good in Pakistan. Here a soldier sitting in trench
and killed by artillery fire can be given gallantry award and also proclaimed a national
hero. A gallantry award is justified only for an act performed beyond call of duty and
in the face of enemy.
Major K.M. Arif never left the Divisional HQ which was 10 miles away from front
line and the Div Commander left only once in the evening of 11 September, as
mentioned an the book, when fighting had subsided. Obviously both of them do not
deserve the gallantry award.
Major Khalid .Mahmod Arif ( Later general) was GSO-2 operation of 6 armored
division in 1965.
.In 1974 he was a Brigadier and held very powerful position in GHQ.
To justify undeserved gallantry awards that he and the Div commander had received
and also to cover-up the blunders committed by Div HQ, he floated the word that
general Mosa Khan had called 6 armored division as men of steel at Pasror airstrip.
Knowing his vindictive nature nobody could dare oppose him.
On his signal this word was continuously and systematically given currency for 20
years. It is possible that he provided documentary support to this misdeed while he
was in power.
It is time that we stopped fabricating and twisting history to serve the vested interests
and record true fact for our posterity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
COLONEL SARDAR YAHYA EFFENDIS SUMMING UP OF 2008 AFTER
READING BRIGADIER SIMON AND MAJOR SHAMSHADS LETTERS OF
2008

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE GENERAL WHO FAILED WHEN VICTOY WAS AT HIS FEET

ONE OF THE MOST PHENOMENAL FAILURES OF 1965 WAR--MAJOR
GENERAL RAJINDER SINGH SPARROW COMMANDER FIRST INDIAN
ARMOURED DIVISION WHO MISERABLY FAILED IN WINNING THE 1965
WAR,WHEN ON 8TH SEPTEMBER 1965 DESPITE A PHENOMENAL
SUPERIOROTY OF 5 TO 1 IN TANKS AND 15 TO 1 IN INFANTRY HE FAILED
TO OUTFLANK A LONE TANK REGIMENT 25 CAVALRY OF PAKISTAN
ARMY

THE TANK REGIMENT COMMANDER WHO EXHIBITED EXTREME COUP D
OEIL AND DEPLOYED HIS REGIMENT TO STOP A WHOLE TANK
DIVISION,NOT KNOWING WHT WAS IN FRONT OF HIM
LIEUTENANT COLONEL NISAR AHMAD COMMANDANT OF 25 CAVALRY
WHO ENTIRELY ON HIS OWN JUDGEMENT DEPLOYED 25 CAVALRY ON
BROAD FRONT AND BROUGHT THE INDIAN FIRST TANK DIVISIION TO A
HALT

Battle of Chawinda
Comedy of Higher Command Errors
Major Shamshad’s excellent and thought provoking articles published in the Defence
Journal in 1997-98 on the Battle of Chawinda, inspired this scribe to redraft parts of his book
“The Pakistan Army till 1965” and present them in form of an article devoted exclusively to the
Chawinda Battles. The article is a humble attempt to integrate the picture incorporating
viewpoints of both sides and to analyse the Battle of Chawinda in its larger perspective.
Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN examines this crucial battle objectively.
Introduction
The tank battles fought in the area between Charwa and Chawinda from 8th to 21 September
1965 were the most decisive battles of the 1965 War . Initially the Indians were very close to
victory while in the last stages the Pakistan Army was in a relatively better position to launch a
counterstroke which could have forced the Indians to abandon all gains made inside the
Shakargarh Bulge from 7th September.
The Chawinda Battles also gave birth to many myths as far as the Pakistan Army was concerned.
Many conflicting claims were made about ‘Military Effectiveness’ ‘Martial Fervour’ etc citing
the ‘Battles of Chawinda’ as an example. The Indian commanders were also criticised for
phenomenal incompetence, but somehow they rationalised their failures as a case of normal
failure in face of technically superior tanks.
Pakistani Dispositions
Pakistani dispositions in Ravi-Chenab Corridor where the battle of Chawinda was fought
were as following:-- (ONE) 8 Division consisting of four infantry brigades (24,101,104 and 115
Brigades) four armoured regiments (20 Lancers,25 Cavalry, 31 & 33 TDU 1) defending Sialkot-
Pasrur Sector and Jassar. The total frontage that this division had to defend was
approximately 180,000 yards. 2 But this was only a theoretically awesome figure, because till
1965, keeping in view the force to space ratio in terms of divisions available, the Indians were
not in a position to be effective as a threat all along this frontage. (TWO) 6 Armoured Division
in Chenab Ravi Corridor3 to defend the area from any Indian incursion. The 6 Armoured

Division was not a full strength division and consisted of a divisional headquarter, three
armoured regiments (one of which was in Chamb for Grand Slam) two artillery regiments, two
motorised infantry regiments and had no brigade headquarter. Initially it was placed at
Gujranwala but later placed at Pasrur4. This Division according to Musa was placed at Pasrur
with the express intention of dealing with enemy’s main attack which was expected on the
Jassar-Sialkot approach.5
Indian War Plan
The Main Indian Attack was aimed at decisively disrupting the Pakistani defensive layout and
resultantly forcing Pakistan to commit its main armoured reserves for defence was to be
launched by the newly formed Indian 1 Corps comprising the 1st Armoured Division and three
infantry divisions (6 Mountain Division 14 Division and 26 Division) in the Ravi-Chenab
Corridor from Samba area on the general axis Samba-Chawinda-Phillora-MRL Link and
eventually secure line Daska-Dhallewali-Mandhali6. In other words the Indian aim as stated by
another Indian military writer was to ‘cut off Sialkot from Lahore’.7 As per the wording of the
decisions taken at the planning conference of the Indian Chief of Army Staff held on 9th
August the object of the 1 Corps attack aimed at Daska was ‘with a view to relieving Jammu’.8
This meant that the Indian Army Chief viewed a Pakistani attack on Jammu with a view to
severe the Indian line of communication as most likely. This attack was rightly termed as
‘Riposte’ by some Indian authors.Riposte has been defined as ‘Striking a vulnerable point thus
forcing the enemy to abandon his attack’.9
The Battle of Chawinda
The main Indian attack against Pakistan was launched by the Ist Indian Corps opposite Chawinda
in Sialkot Sector. The Sialkot Sector was defended by the Pakistani 1 Corps comprising 15
Division and 6 Armoured Division. From 1956 onwards the 1 Corps was the only corps of the
Pakistan Army. Till 1965 its area of operational responsibility extended from river Chenab till
Sulaimanke in the north and it consisted of 1st Armoured Division, 6 Armoured Division,10,11
and 15 Divisions. The 1 Corps since soon after its creation in 1956 was commanded by
Lieutenant General Bakhtiar Rana10 whose basic qualifications were described as extreme
loyalty and limited intellect by many contemporaries! In early September the frontage of the
corps was reduced to the area between Ravi and Chenab rivers or simply the Ravi-Chenab
Corridor, and its under command formations were reduced to the 6 Armoured Division and 15
Division.
Pakistani Dispositions and Plans:- 15 Division (four infantry brigades, four tank
regiments) was designated to defend the area of responsibility while the newly formed 6
Armoured Division (previously known as 100 Armoured Brigade) was the main strategic reserve
in the area. The total frontage of 15 Division was 180,000 yards and the distribution of
forces/dispositions/tasks were as following11:--
15 Division:- This division was commanded by Brigadier Sardar Mohammad Ismail Khan from
the ASC. Its defences were organised as following:-
115 Brigade:-- The main task of this brigade was to defend the area along the river Ravi with
special emphasis on Jassar bridge over river Ravi. The brigade had two infantry battalions, one
tank regiment (33 TDU), one R & S company and two artillery batteries (one field and one
mortar).
24 Brigade:-- Defend area Chobara-Phillaura and be prepared to attack an enemy force which
seek to attack the Sialkot Sector (i.e. 15 Division area of responsibility). It was a sort of a

reserve/counterattack force. The brigade had two infantry battalions, one tank regiment (25
Cavalry), one R & S company, and one field artillery regiment less a battery in direct support.
101 Brigade:-- Defending Sialkot city against enemy attack along main Jammu-Sialkot road and
also to be prepared to go on the offensive in case of an enemy concentration in Phillaura area.
The brigade had two infantry battalions,one R & S company, one tank squadron (ex 31 TDU)
and one field regiment and a mortar battery less troop in direct support.
104 Brigade:-- This was a reserve brigade but had just one infantry battalion, one tank regiment
(31 TDU) minus one squadron and a field regiment less battery in direct support.
One infantry battalion in an independent role to defend the crucial Marala Headworks.
Covering Troops/Advance Positions:--
One tank regiment (20 Lancers) less squadron deployed in front as covering troops from Chaprar
till main Jammu-Sialkot road. 20 Lancers was the corps recce regiment.
One tank squadron (20 Lancers) with one infantry company, one R & S company deployed as
advance position on main Sialkot Jammu road in area Raspur-Kundanpur.
One R & S company as screen on border to cover the front from Bajra Garghi to Charwa.
One R & S platoon with R & S Battalion Headquarter in Shakargarh area.
Rangers (border police) to keep the border between Chaprar and Marala Headworks under
observation.
12 Mujahid Companies (Militia) and rangers all along the border subdivided into small posts for
observation/local defence.
NOTE:-- There were a total of 24 Rangers/Mujahid Companies in 15 Division area. These were
of limited military value and could not face regular Indian Army.
6 Armoured Division:- 6 Armoured Division was not an armoured division in the full sense but
did have a large number of the organisational ingredients of an armoured division. It was
commanded by Major General Ibrar Hussain. It was the 1 Corps reserve and was the main
Pakistani armoured reserve in the Ravi-Chenab Corridor with the primary role to take on an
enemy strike force attacking 1 Corps area of responsibility. According to Musa the most
expected line of Indian approach in 1 Corps defended area was the Sialkot Jassar Corridor12 and
the 6th Armoured Division was to be used in a defensive role against an enemy offensive in 1
Corps area.According to Gul Hassan it was also visualised that the 6 Armoured Division could
be used to attack the Jammu sector but later on this idea was dropped13. The 6 Armoured
Division was a curious division for it had no brigade headquarters! On 6th September 1965 it
was in dispersal in Gujranwala-Nandipur area. It had the following units14:-
Guides Cavalry (10th Cavalry)
22 Cavalry
11 Cavalry (On loan to 12 Division/7 Division for Operation Grand Slam since late August 1965
and in Chamb area on 6th September 1965.
Two infantry battalions one of which was in Kharian as defence battalion with the 1 Corps
Headquarter.
One self-propelled field artillery regiment and one medium battery. Later on from 6th September
onwards the formidable and extremely well organised 4 Corps Artillery Brigade consisting of
one field, one medium, one heavy and one locating regiment was also affiliated with it.
One engineer and one signal battalion.
Indian Dispositions and Plans:- The Indian 1 Corps was deployed opposite the Pakistani 1
Corps. The 1 Corps consisted of one armoured division (1st Armoured Division) and three
infantry divisions (6 Mountain Division,14 Infantry Division and 26 Infantry Division). The 1

Corps was the principal Indian strike force and was tasked to launch the main Indian attack
inside Pakistan.The main task of this corps in words of K.C Praval was to ‘cut off Sialkot from
Lahore’ and this was to be done by attacking from general area Samba east of Jammu
and advancing in a southwesternly direction cutting the Sialkot-Jammu road around Daska15 as
already discussed in the earlier part of this chapter. Gurcharan Singh described 1 Corps task as
‘secure a bridgehead extending to line Bhagowal-Phillora cross roads junction south of Tharoah
with a view to advancing to the eastern bank of the MRL canal’ with the possibility of
advancing further to line Dhalewali-Wahulai-Daska-Mandhali’16. The initial objectives of this
attack were capturing Phillora Chawinda and Pagowal areas.Distribution of forces/dispositions
and formation tasks were as following17:--
1st Armoured Division:-- It was the spearhead of the Indian offensive. This formation was
much weaker in numerical/organisational terms from the 1st Pakistani Armoured Division i.e.
having only four tank regiments and lorried infantry battalions and two brigade headquarters. 62
Tank regiment was therefore taken from 26 Division and assigned to it as the fifth tank
regiment.It was tasked to advance inside Pakistani territory on general axis Ramgarh-Phillora-
Pagowal-Chawinda-MRL from first light 8th September after the 6 Mountain Division had
secured the bridgehead in Maharajke-Charwa area.As per the Divisional plan this advance was to
be conducted on two axis with 43 Lorried Brigade on the right and 1st Armoured Brigade on the
left. The 1st Armoured Division was organised as following:--
1st Armoured Brigade:- It consisted of two tank regiments (17 Poona Horse, 16 Light
Cavalry) one tank squadron (from 62 Cavalry), and one and a quarter infantry battalion (lorry
borne) etc which was tasked to advance in the first phase on axis Ramgarh-Harbal-Sabzkot-
Chobara-Phillora. Tasks/Groupings for operations till MRL canal after capture of Phillora were
to be given later.
43 Lorried Brigade:- Grouped as one full tank regiment (2 Lancers), one tank regiment less
squadron (62 Cavalry) and two lorried infantry battalions tasked to advance on axis Salehriyah-
Saidanwali-Cross roads-Mastpur-Ahmad Pur-Pagowal.
Divisional Reserve:- One tank regiment (4 Hodson’s Horse) and one lorried infantry company.
6 Mountain Division:- This division was the principal infantry component of the 1 Corps
offensive battle and was tasked to secure the bridgehead inside Pakistani territory from where the
1st Armoured Division was to be launched on the thrust towards MRL canal.Its initial task was
to secure the bridgehead in area Maharajke-Charwa and exploit till line Ahmadpur-Nauni.It was
tasked to commence the attack at 2300 hours on 7th September 1965.18 It had the following
troops for the bridgehead operation:-
69 Mountain Brigade:- The right forward assaulting brigade in the 6 MountainDivision
bridgehead operation. It had three battalions and a tank squadron from 62 Cavalry and was
tasked to capture Maharajke area in the first phase of the 1 Corps operation.
99 Mountain Brigade:- The left forward assaulting brigade in the 6 Mountain Division
bridgehead operation.It consisted of three infantry battalions and was tasked to capture Charwa
in the Corps phase one.
35 Infantry Brigade:- Originally from 14 Division, this brigade consisted of three infantry
battalions and was placed under command 6 Mountain Division specifically for the bridgehead
operation. It was the reserve brigade of the 6 Mountain Division and was earmarked for
unforeseen tasks.
14 Infantry Division:- In the initial Indian attack plan this formation was supposed to take full
part in the I Indian Corps offensive in Sialkot sector. However the peculiar developments of

events in September 1965 dictated otherwise and this formation played a limited role in the 1
Corps operation. These reasons are explained in detail in note 146.19 The Division played no
role in the initial battles of 8 to 10 September 1965 as its 35 was under 6 Mountain and 1st
Armoured Division but was assigned a limited role from 11/12th September to attack Zafarwal.
Its 116 Brigade reached Samba area from Pathankot on 10th September and became the first
brigade to function under command 14 Division opposite general area Zafarwal.20
26 Infantry Division:- This formation consisted of three infantry brigades (19,162 & 168) and
one tank regiment (18th Cavalry).19 Brigade had two infantry battalions while 162 and 168
Brigades had three infantry battalions each. It was assigned the mission of containing Pakistani
forces at Sialkot so that these could not create any problem on the northern flank of the 1st
Armoured Division’s line of advance. To achieve this aim 162 and 168 Brigade with a tank
squadron each,162 Brigade on the right and 168 Brigade on the left were to carry out a limited
advance into astride Sialkot Jammu road in the direction of Unche Wains-Niwe Wains-
Bajragrahi areas from 2330 Hours night of 7th September onwards. The third brigade i.e. 19
Brigade was to be the reserve brigade.21 It appears that this brigade was brought particularly
against the Pakistani Marala Salient which was called ‘ Dagger Salient’ by the Indians. All the
Pakistanis had in this dagger salient was one simple infantry battalion! The main malady with
which the Indians suffered was having too much infantry and not knowing how to use it while
the Pakistani problem seems to have been having too many tanks and not knowing how to use
them!
Battle of Chawinda-6th to 22nd September 1965
Jassar Bridge Crisis:- At 0315 hours on the night of 6th/7th September Indian artillery shelled
the Pakistani 115 Brigades positions on both sides of the Jassar Bridge.It was ironical that both
the 115 Pakistani Brigade (two infantry battalions,one R & S Company and one TDU tank
regiment) and the 29 Indian Brigade(three infantry battalions and one tank squadron) opposing
each other in Jassar area were commanded by two extremely timid and highly nervous
commanders. The task assigned to 29 Indian Brigade originally from 7 Division but now
operating in an independent role directly under 11 Corps Headquarter was to capture the
Pakistani enclave across river Ravi which was a potential Pakistani jump off point inside Indian
territory. The Indians launched their attack at 0400 hours 6th September and by 0415 hours
reached the southern end of the Jassar bridge which was a few hundred yards from the Indian
border. 115 Brigade launched a counter attack using tanks and dislodged the Indians from the
southern end of the bridge by 0800 hours. The Pakistani GHQ, influenced by nervousness at
Headquarter 1 corps, took the situation opposite Jassar very seriously and ordered the 6
Armoured Division in dispersal in Gujranwala-Nandipur area to move to Pasrur on night 6/7
September.22 The Indian brigade commander sent exaggerated reports about Pakistani success
to 11 Corps Headquarter and requested permission to withdraw. 11 Corps Headquarter instead
sent their Chief Engineer Officer and another staff officer to revive the morale of 29 Infantry
Brigade Commander. These two officers on arrival were able to put some spirit in the 29 Brigade
and under their supervision the 29 Indian Brigade launched another attack on night 06/07
September 23. This attack was successful and the Indians recaptured the southern end of the
bridge by 0800 hours 7th September 1965. In response to this development the 115 Brigade blew
up a span of the Jassar bridge which was already prepared for demolition since 6th September at
0800 hours 07 September 1965. In reality the situation had stabilised now with river Ravi in
between and both the brigades positioned north and south of the river. Brigadier Muzaffar was
unfortunately for Pakistan Army of a different stuff. At 1130 hours on the same day i.e. 7th

September without reconfirming he sent a report to Headquarter 15 Division that an enemy
infantry battalion had crossed the ravi river and established a foothold on the northern side of the
river 24. All this was happening at a time when Headquarter 11 Indian Corps had ordered the 29
Brigade on 8th September to leave a battalion and revert to its parent formation 7 Infantry
Division’s command in area Bhikiwind on the night of 8/9th September25, in response to the
developments in 4 Mountain Division sector as a result of the 1st Armoured division’s offensive
in Khem Karan. 115 Brigades alarming report naturally caused grave apprehensions in the
Pakistani High Command from 15 Division onwards till the GHQ. Headquarter 15 Division
despatched 24 Brigade less one battalion opposite Chobara-Phillora alongwith one tank regiment
(25 Cavalry) to 115 Brigade area (Jassar). 25 Cavalry spearheading the fire brigade sent to
extinguish the exaggerated fire at Jassar reached Jassar at 2200 hours on 7th September and
found out that the situation was not a fraction as serious as reported by 115 Brigade and at 0200
hours on night 7/8 September to return to his original location Pasrur which 25 Cavalry reached
at first light 8th September26. Meanwhile the 6 Armoured Division which had started moving
from Gujranwala to Pasrur on 6th September evening and whose leading elements had reached
Pasrur by 2345 hours was ordered to return to Gujranwala by 0500 hours 7th September!27
Contrary to the porevalent thinking in Pakistan Jassar was no Indian deception but a sheer
defensive action aimed at eliminating a dangerous enclave from which the Pakistanis could
threaten Amritsar. It was the fog of war that made the Pakistani GHQ and 1 Corps imagine the
shadow at Jassar as that of a giant ! Interestingly the Indian brigade commander at Jassar was as
much afraid of the Pakistani troops opposite him as the Pakistani 1 Corps and GHQ were afraid
of the Indian threat opposite Jassar. If Major Shamshad a direct participant who went to Narowal
(Jassar) is to be believed then only one squadron of 25 Cavalry was sent to Jassar.28
The 26 Division Fixing Manoeuvre against Sialkot from 7th to 8th September:-- The aim of
26 Division attack against Sialkot was not to capture Sialkot but to contain the Pakistani forces in
Sialkot so that they could not pose a threat to the northern flank of the main Indian attack force
consisting of the 1st Armoured and 6 Mountain Division.Keeping in view the Indian superiority
in this sector this was an easy to achieve objective.The Pakistani 15 Division had relatively better
mobile forces in the shape of one tank regiment, one TDU tank regiment and one R & S
Company but just three infantry battalions (two from 101 Brigade and one being from the
divisional reserve i.e. 104 brigade) against one Indian tank regiment and eight infantry
battalions. The Indian attack commenced two brigade up against the border villages of Niwe
Wains, Bajragarhi etc from 2330 hours night 7/8 September. Both the brigades captured their
insignificant objectives.In any case the troops opposite Sialkot were too weak to interfere with
the advance of the main Indian attack. The Indians however remained obsessed with defence of
Jammu and later brought a fourth brigade i.e. the 52 Mountain Brigade(three battalions) on 11th
September 1965.29
The Main Indian Attack and 25 Cavalry (24 Brigade) Counter actions 0n 8th September
1965:--We have already discussed that 25 Cavalry and 24 Brigade minus one unit in defence
opposite Charwa was despatched to Jassar on 7th September and that 25 Cavalry returned to
Pasrur at approximately 0500 hours on 8th September. While 25 Cavalry and 24 Brigade were
moving to Jassar and moving back to Pasrur the third battalion of 24 Brigade i.e. 3 FF which was
holding defences opposite Maharajke-Chrawa extended as a screen for over 10,000
yards30 was overrun by the concerted attack of the 69 and 99 Mountain Brigades on the night
of 7th/8th September. This news about the overrunning of 3 FF was received at 0600 hours at
Pasrur by the 24 Brigade headquarter which had just reached Pasrur from Jassar at 0500 hours

on 8th September. The news was shocking! Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik the 24 Brigade
Commander knew little about tank warfare and had no idea of the quantum of troops opposite
him. However the Commanding Officer of 25 Cavalry Lieutenant Colonel Nisar, was a capable
armour officer. In adition 25 Cavalry was,to Pakistan Army’s good luck, a newly raised but
extremely fine tank regiment, having on its strength some very outstanding officers, not merely
on paper but in terms of bravery in face of enemy and in extraordinary situations. Malik who like
Nisar had no clue about the situation in his front and asked Nisar to do something.31 Thus
Malik abdicated the conduct of battle to the commanding officer of a tank regiment which was
under his command! The regiment was refuelling at this time having poofed up all the fuel
going to Jassar (Major Shamshad, a direct participant and later referred to, states that only
Charlie Squadron went to Pasrur) and coming back. Nisar immediately ordered tank squadron (B
Squadron) commanded by Major Ahmad (originally from Guides Cavalry and an extremely
brave leader of men) to advance in an extended order towards Charwa the reported point of
enemy breakthrough!After tasking one of the squadrons to advance towards Charwa Nisar
alerted the remaining part of the regiment to move towards Chawinda. At 0730 hours Nisar sent
another squadron (A Squadron) towards Tharoah on receiving reports that Indian armour was
seen opposite Tharoh area. At 1130 hours Nisar sent ‘A’ Squadron to area west of Gadgor.In
short by 1200 hours the whole of 25 Cavalry was deployed three squadrons in line abreast
opposite the Indian 1st Armoured Brigade leading the advance of the Indian 1st Armoured
Division. ‘B’ squadron of 25 Cavalry came in contact with the advancing tanks of the Indian 1st
Armoured Division near Gadgor.The Indian 1st Armoured Division which had commenced its
advance from the bridgehead secured by the 6 Mountain Division in Charwa-Maharajke area
after crossing the international border at 0600 hours on the morning of 8th September.It was
advancing two regiments up;with an inter regiment gap of approximately 3500 to 4000 metres in
between,each regiment one squadron up, 16 Light Cavalry supported by a Gurkha infantry
battalion on the right,advancing towards Phillora 17 Poona Horse on the left advancing towards
Tharoah cross roads.Both the tank regiments had a clean run during the first 15 kilometres of
their advance inside Pakistan.According to the Indian armoured corps historian the Pakistan
Airforce aircrafts attacked the leading Indian armour elements at about 8.40 Am. at Chobara but
were unable to hit any tank. The Indian 16 Light Cavalry advancing two troops up came in
contact with 25 Cavalry’s tanks advancing in extended order towards Chobara without a clue that
the Indian 1st Armoured Division was just a few miles away. 25 Cavalry ‘s ‘Bravo Squadron’
commanded by Major Ahmad ,suddenly at approximately 50 to 200 metres ranges at about
0900 or 0945 hours came into contact with two leading tank troops of 16 Light Cavalry. Some of
Ahmad’s tanks had taken firepositions while some were in the open .The Indians were on the
move. A confused firefight followed in which both sides lost tanks, Pattons burning on being hit
while Centurions getting shot through both sides! Both the Indian leading tank troop leaders
were killed, thus leaving the leading squadron commander of 16 Light Cavalry clueless.32
Major Ahmad of 25 Cavalry carried the day by fighting from the front, thus inspiring his men to
fight till death, rather than withdraw an inch. It was during this firefight that Major Ahmad, who
had already changed his tank once was also severely burnt after having personally destroyed four
tanks.33 There is no doubt that it was Major Ahmad who saved the Pakistani position at Gadgor
by fighting from the front and injecting in his men real steel. He was the only squadron
commander in 25 Cavalry who led from the front and was the only major who proved himself
equal to the crisis in 25 Cavalry! Major Shamshad one of the direct participant in that battle gave
the same verdict.34 16 Light Cavalry CO tried to bring up another squadron, commanded by an

Indian Muslim officer Major M.A.R Shiekh to outflank the Pakistani position in front from the
the east. The space for manoeuvre was however extremely limited Poona Horse the left forward
Indian unit being just 4000 metres away from the right forward unit. In the process of
manoeuvring this second squdron exposed its broadsides to 25 Cavalry tanks of ‘ Alpha
Squadron’ losing many tanks including that of Major Shiekh who received a head injury35 and
died on the spot. Finally this second squadron was held up having lost its squadron commander
and unable to manoeuvre due to limited visibility and lack of space to manoeuvre. As per
General Gurcharan Singh once the second squadron was held up CO 16 Light Cavalry passed
‘exaggerated’ reports to the 1 Armoured Brigade Commander who in turn ordered 16 Light
Cavalry not to advance any further36. We will not go in the details of what 25 Cavalry or 16
Light Cavalry did since this in itself would require a whole book.In brief 16 Light Cavalry’s
advance was checked at Gadgor by 1000 hours 8th September. 17 Poona Horse which was
advancing on the left towards Tharoah commenced its advance two squadrons up but soon
changed to one squadron up because of the limited fields of fire and observation that made
command and control, extremely difficult.It came in contact with 25 Cavalry at 0945 hours in
Tharoh area and was also checked like 16 Light Cavalry. According to Gurcharan Singh some
firing took place in between the tanks of 16 Light Cavalry and 17 Poona Horse37. This
happened because the inter regiment gap between both the regiments was too less. ‘C’ Squadron
62 Cavalry which was tasked to provide left flank protection to the 1st Armoured Division’s
advance was delayed as its tanks got bogged down while inside Indian territory .When half of
this squadron did finally got going and crossed the border at 1000 hours it went south towards
Zafarwal by some misunderstanding after crossing the Degh Nala instead of advancing parallel
and north of the Degh Nala as originally ordered!This squadron crossed the Degh Nala and
reached Zafarwal in Pakistani territory absolutely unopposed and later recrossed the Degh Nala
to go north once it probably realised that it was supposed to stay north of Degh Nala!Once this
squadron was recrossing the Degh Nala it was engaged by an Indian artillery battery providing
fire support to the 1st Armoured brigade,which naturally mistook it for Pakistani tanks seeing it
approach from south of Degh Nala.In turn this squadron also opened fire on the Indian battery
which they thought to be a Pakistani battery destroying several guns and vehicles!38 By 1300
hours Brigadier K.K Singh Commander 1st Armoured Brigade was a mentally defeated man.He
reached the conclusion that ‘He was held up by at least two Patton regiments and that there was
no possibility of advancing direct towards Phillora without suffering unacceptable losses’.He
was further unnerved by reports of a ‘raid by enemy tanks on guns and soft vehicles’ (which in
reality was the firing between 62 Cavalry’s tanks coming recrossing Degh Nadi!)39 Commander
1 Armoured Brigade concluded that ‘his line of communication was not secure’40 and
‘decided to adopt a defensive posture for the security of his command at 1400 hours issued
orders withdrawing the brigade into a ‘box’ around Sabzpir cross roads! The 17 Poona Horse
which had encountered opposition but was taking positive measures to deal with it was also
withdrawn and deployed to cover the eastern flank in the area,and the 4 Hodson’s Horse was also
detailed to defend the southern flank41. All this was happening at a time when there was just 25
Cavalry in front of the whole 1st Indian Armoured Division! The readers may note that the
Indians were not lacking in valour as cheap propaganda conducted in Pakistan after 1965
claimed but phenomenally incompetent at unit and brigade level. Their right forward unit 17
Poona Horse could have easily outflanked 25 Cavalry’s ‘Alpha Squadron’. Major Shamshad a
direct participant thus rightly observed in his article that ‘There is a big gap, about six miles
wide, between Hasri Nala and Degh Nala which could have provided a safe passage to 17 Poona

Horse up to Pasrur. No troops were deployed to defend this area. It appears that they did try to
advance but the higher headquarters held them back. I say so because I saw trackmarks of
Centurions in Seowal on 19th September.’ 42 It may be noted that the 43 Lorried Brigade
advance on the other axis also went diasastorously, less due to enemy opposition and more due
to poor as well as inefficient execution.The 43 Lorried Brigade which was supposed to
commence advance at 0600 hours commenced advance five hours late at 1100 hours because its
leading unit 8 Garhwal reached the start line much later than planned,and got delayed as soon as
it commenced advance due to poor traffic control ! No men with landmines tied to their chests
were needed in face of such phenomenally incmpetent staff and battle procedures!
43 Lorried Brigade led by 2 Lancers finally reached Sabzpir cross roads at 1530 hours where
tanks of the Indian 1st Armoured Brigade opened fire on Indian Armoured Corps’s 2
Lancers mistaking them for Pakistani tanks and in the process destroyed two Indian tanks
including CO 2 Lancers tank!43 Thus 43 Lorried brigade also harboured at Sabzpir cross
roads.Gurcharan Singh’s verdict on the Indian 1st Armoured Division’s performance is worth
quoting and is also a tribute to 25 Cavalry, the only unit of the Pakistan Army that did on 8th
September 1965 what no other unit of Pakistan Army ever did and most probably would ever do
again.44 Gurcharan thus wrote; ‘The first days battle could not have got off to a worse start. The
Armoured Brigade had been blocked by two squadrons of Pattons and in the first encounter the
brigade had lost more tanks than the enemy had....whole of 1 Corps had gained a few
kilometres... The worst consequence of the days battle was its paralysing effect on the minds of
the higher commanders. It took them another 48 hours to contemplate the next offensive move.
This interval gave the Pakistanis time to move up and deploy their 6 Armoured Division with
five additional armoured regiments.In fact the golden opportunity that fate had offered to the 1st
Armoured division to make worthwhile gains had been irretrievably lost’.45 Harbaksh Singh
also accurately summed up the Indian failure; ‘both 16 Cavalry and 17 Horse failed to determine
the strength of the opposing armour and displayed little skill in outmanoeuvring it... the Brigade
Commander made the unfortunate decision to withdraw 17 Horse from Tharoah for countering
an alleged serious tank threat on the Left flank. This was a grave error of judgement as 4 Horse
which by this time had been released to the Brigade by GOC 1 Armoured Division, could have
been used to meet any flank threat posed by the enemy armour. The blunder cost us dearly.We
made an advance of only four miles beyond the bridgehead when a much deeper penetration
could have been achieved. The fleeting chance that could have been exploited to gain a striking
success, was lost forever.... and while we were fumbling about ineffectively in a chaotic situation
of our own creation, the enemy had that vital breathing space so essential for a quick rally round
from the stunning impact of surprise. We courted a serious setback through faulty decision and
immature handling of armour which the enemy was not slow to exploit. From now onwards,the
thrust intended to keep the enemy off balance and reeling until the final blow by sheer speed of
advance, turned into a slow slogging match—a series of battering-ram actions’.46 I have not
come across any finer summing up of the Battle of Chawinda than the one done by Harbaksh
Singh. I have specifically quoted it to show that 8th September was the most critical day of the
otherwise long series of actions around Chawinda which dragged on till cease-fire on 22
September 1965. It was on 8th September or 0n 9th when the Indians could have easily
outflanked the Pakistanis at Chawinda,had their higher armour commanders not been paralysed
into a state of inertia indecision and inaction because of 25 Cavalry’s memorable extended line
stand in Gadgor area. Major Shamshad states that ‘Instead of wasting two days in planning, If
Poona Horse had advanced from Dugri to Shehzada and captured Pasroor on 9th we would have

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