This document provides a book review of Major General Rafiuddin Ahmad's two volume history of the Baloch Regiment from 1820 to 1956. The reviewer, A.H. Amin, summarizes the contents and scope of the books. He acknowledges both the difficulty of writing such a comprehensive regimental history spanning 180 years as well as constraints imposed by official sponsorship. While praising many aspects of the work, Amin also points out several factual errors in the first volume that could have been avoided by consulting standard historical references.

2. BOOK REVIEWS BY A.H AMIN
1999-2008

5. Major Agha Humayun Amin (Retired)
The author of Book Reviews

6. History of The Baloch Regiment 1820-
1939-The Colonial Period-Major
General Rafiuddin Ahmad (Retired) -
Published by Baloch Regiment Centre,
Abbottabad; Printed by Central Army
Press Rawalpindi (First Edition, 1998.)
Reviewed by A.H AMIN
October 2001

7. The two volumes on the history of the
Baloch Regiment are a welcome
edition to the extremely short list of
books on Pakistani Military History.
The first volume covers the period
from 1820 to 1939 while the second
volume covers the period from 1939 to
1956. Major General Rafiuddin Ahmed
took to military writing at an early

8. stage in his military career and came
to be regarded as an accomplished
military writer by the time he reached
colonel rank in the mid early 1970s.
This scribe read a bunch of one of his
excellent writeups on German
Airborne Warfare in 1975-76 at Quetta.
These were presented to my father by
then Lieutenant Colonel Rafi and as
far as I recollect the general was then

9. an instructor at the command and
staff college Quetta. The writers
father in laws family were active
members of Aligarh Old Boys
Association Rawalpindi .The readers
may note that the most active
members of this association included
a prominent Baluchi Brigadier Gulzar
Ahmad, and most meetings of the
association were held at this scribes

10. grandfathers residence in Rawalpindi ,
which now houses the Darya Abad
Girls School. A major qualification of
General Rafi is that in essence he is
not a member of the “Typical
Prototype Generals Trade Union”
having been promoted to general rank
a little late ! Before we proceed
further it is important to caution the
layman reader about the immense

11. odds that a military writer confronts
once he writes a regimental history !
Writing a regimental history of an
infantry regiment consisting of many
battalions which participated in many
wars including two world wars spread
over an 180 years period is a gigantic
undertaking ! It is but natural that any
such enterprise cannot be perfect or
free of factual as well as analytical

12. errors ! In addition it must be
remembered that Indo Pak and this
includes India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Nepal, and Sri Lanka is not a “History
Friendly” Region and “Intellectual
Honesty” is the rarest commodity in
all official quarters whether civil or
military in this entire region of
intellectual darkness. Organisations
as well as political parties are run on

13. the basis of personal interest rather
than national interest and at least two
Indo Pak Wars were triggered by
individuals who were motivated by
egoistic and personal rather than
nationalistic motivations disguised in
high sounding slogans! The readers
must also note that General Rafi’s
history is one which although not an
official history was “officially

14. sponsored” in terms of financial
support and thus the general, as
happens with all official or officially
supported intellectual ventures, even
in far more advanced western
countries, was allowed to proceed in a
certain officially prescribed course
which did not allow him to be too
critical in conduct of operations of the
post 1947 period involving “Sacred

15. Cows” of the Pakistani military
establishment. In the first volume
however the general has been more
critical since those who called the
shots then are now patronless
skeletons, little more than footnotes
of history and their conduct can be
criticised. The general has however
made an effort to do some critical
analysis “in between the lines” which

16. is reasonable! At places he has been
uncritical but the first volume is
certainly better since history is easier
to be written when the actors have
long been dead and are in no position
to cause any mental or physical
discomfiture to the historian in
question!The military history of
various battalions of the regiment has
been covered in an excellent manner

17. linking the unit’s role with the overall
military situation. The narrative is
most interesting since the author has
included various incidents from unit
histories involving details of battle
actions in which gallantry awards
were won or accounts dealing with
military personalities. The author does
not hesitate from giving his opinion on
various historical aspects and this

18. makes the narrative more interesting.
The battle accounts are supported by
excellent maps although credits for
most have not been mentioned in the
acknowledgement section. The
photographs and paintings are of
excellent quality and make the book
very interesting to read. The author
has taken pains to highlight the role of
the Baluchis in various remote

19. campaigns in East Africa in the late
1890s. Many in Pakistan were not
aware of these campaigns. The
acounts dealing with the Sepoy
Rebellion of 1857 and the First World
War are extremely well done . The
analysis integrates the pure military
history aspect with the Indo Pak and
particularly Indo Muslim point of view.
It is a difficult exercise since the

20. Indian Army was a mercenary army
and employed to fight against the
freedom fighters! The writer has
managed to highlight the performance
of the Baluch Regiment and has also
been symapthetic to the Freedom
Fighters. For some reason he did not
have any sympathy with the Sindhi
Hurs, but this shall be discussed in
the next review of volume two.The

21. strangest part of the work is absence
of an introduction or a foreword by
any retired or serving Baluchi officer!
This perhaps is an indication of the
lack of importance that we attach to
anything connected with intellectual
activity! The emphasis remains on self
projection, personal advancement and
personal fortune building ! We have a
large number of so called illustrious

22. retired officers! One visit to ’Pindi,
Islamabad or Lahore is enough to
prove their existence in terms of
material progress! But what is their
intellectual contribution to posterity in
terms of transferring conceptual and
intellectual experiences! Nil! All did
exceedingly well on paper but have
nothing to pen down! Ayub the longest
serving chief wrote a book but that

23. book had little to do with military
history! Yahya was held in detention
till he died and wrote little or we know
little about what he wrote! The breed
of Attique, A.I Akram etc is extinct!
The lack of three or four pages written
by any senior officer, serving or
retired, and the Baluch Regiment did
produce many generals(!) as opening
remarks in General Rafi’s history is

24. without doubt an irrefutable proof of
our intellectual bankruptcy!The first
volume contains factual errors which
were entirely avoidable had the writer
relied simply on three or four standard
books on Indian Military history. The
Safavids were overthrown not by
Nadir Shah (Page-8) but by the Ghilzai
Pathans from Afghanistan, who were
previously Persian subjects and who

25. in turn were overthrown by Nadir Shah
in 1726. The Marhattas reached the
outskirts of Delhi not in 1738 (Page-9)
but in 1737 (Refers-Page-436-Oxford
History of India-Percival Spear-1937
and Page-294-Later Mughals-Volume
Two-William Irvine-Calcutta-1921-22).
The assertion that “An Afghan power
arose in Kabul” (Page-Nine and Ten) is
also incorrect. Ahmad Shah Abdali

26. was crowned as the first king of
Afghanistan at Kandahar in 1748 at
the age of 23 and captured Kabul later
but kept his capital at Kandahar till
his death and is buried in Kandahar.
Ahmad Shah did not begin his career
as a Mughal adversary (Page-Nine) but
as a soldier in Nadir Shah’s army and
later made his entry into real power
politics once he plundered Nadir

27. Shah’s treasure in the chaotic
situation after Nadir’s assasination by
his Qizilbash generals. Ahmad Shah
Abdali annexed Punjab not in 1754
(Page-10) but in 1751-52 (Refers-Page-
434-The Cambridge History of India-
Volume Four-The Mughal Period-Edited
by Wolsely Haig and Richard Burn).
The assertion that Ahmad Shah Abdali
won the gratitude of Muslims and

28. Hindus alike for defeating Marathas is
also debatable. The target of both the
Afghans and the Marathas were the
rich and in this regard they did not
give anyone a waiver simply because
he was a Muslim or a Hindu! As a
matter of fact Abdali proclaimed by
Iqbal as a great hero mercilessly
subjected Muslim Delhi and Muslim
Punjab to merciless slaughter, rapine

29. and plunder and his deeds are a
frequent subject of even poetical
works of Muslim poets like Waris Shah
and Mir Taqi Mir! The layman reader
may note that the loot that this so
called soldier of Islam gathered in
1757 alone from Muslim Delhi was
carried from Delhi to Afghanistan by
28,000 transport animals ! (Refers-The
Pursuit of Urdu Literature-Ralph

30. Russell-Zed Books-London -1997-
Distributed by Vanguard Books-
Lahore). Delhi was captured by Lake
not in 1805 (Page-11) but September
1803. The writer has supported 1st
Punjab’s claim (Page-30) of being the
3rd Battalion of Coastal Sepoys which
in reality was the result of Lord
Roberts decision to replace Madrasis
with Punjabi manpower in the period

31. 1885-1893. It is an indisputable fact
that the post 1885 Punjabi manpower
had nothing to do with the pre 1885
battlehonours of the 2nd, 6th,16th,
22nd and 24th Madras Native Infantry
which to date they claim as their own.
The men of 3rd Battalion of Coastal
Sepoys were not the ancestors of the
post 1885 manpower of 1st Punjab.
Technically the First Punjabi claim is

32. right but historically and ethnically no
one can deny the fact that some two
third of the manpower of the Madras
Infantry of pre 1885 was South Indian
Hindu. The 1st Punjabis should thank
Lord Roberts for getting the pre 1885
Battle Honours won by a regiment
which consisted of some two third
Madrasi Hindus and one third Muslims
of mixed ancestry. Lord Hastings

33. tenure lasted not from 1814-23 (Page-
38) but from 1813-1823 having begun
from 13th October 1813 (Refers-Page-
238-A Popular History of British India-
W. Cooke Taylor-1854-Reprinted Mittal
Publications-Delhi-1987). The
assertion that the “British Government
in India tried to salvage its position
through swift retaliation “(Page-41) i.e
teaching Afghans a lesson is

34. incorrect. The actual happenings were
as following. The British Governor
General Ellenborough was irresolute
and simply wanted to withdraw the
Bengal and Bombay Armies from
Kandahar and Jalalabad. His generals
i.e Nott and Pollock were more
resolute and knew well by their
experience of having Jallalabad and
Kandahar successfully that the

35. predominantly Hindu sepoys of the
Bengal and Madras Armies and a
smaller nucleus of British regiments
could still teach the Afghans some
parting lesson by once again
capturing Kabul. It was resolution on
part of both these indomitable
generals that the British recaptured
Kabul once again in Seprember 1842
and then withdrew the Bengal and

36. Bombay Armies via the longer route
i.e Kandahar-Ghazni-Kabul-Jalalabad-
Khaibar. (Refers-Pages-269 and 270- A
History of the British Army-Volume XII-
1839-1852-Hon J.W Fortescue-
Macmillan and Co Limited-London-
1927 and Refers-Page-407-Cooke
Taylor-Op Cit). The Governor General
had initially given simple orders to
withdraw from Afghanistan in May

37. 1842. It was under military pressure
that he agreed to a withdrawal after
recapturing Kabul ! The statement
that “In January 1843 Amir Dost
Mohammad returned to Kabul” (Page-
41) is misleading and implies that this
“Amir” was fighting some kind of war
of liberation. As a matter of fact this
Amir had surrendered to the East India
Company’s troops on 3rd November

38. 1840 and living a comfortable life as a
state prisoner with a large number of
wives at Ludhiana . He was released
not because of the myth in
Afghanistan that he was exchanged
for British prisoners (who had a matter
of fact been released in 1842 by a
British punitive column) but simply
because Ellenborough had decided to
follow a policy of good will as the

39. Afghans had not harmed the British
non combatant hostages. The British
losses at Battle of Miani are described
as heavy (Page-50) although they were
not relatively heavy (about 62 Killed
and 194 wounded) once compared to
British Indian Battles of that time like
Assaye, Chillianwalla etc. The writer
states that there were very few all
Muslim battalions in Indian Army

40. except the three Baluch Battalions
(Page-61). The Bengal Army had six All
Muslim infantry Battalions in 1893 i.e
the 5th, 12th, 17th, 18th, 33rd and
40th.I was unable to find footnote one
in the main text of chapter six. This
probably was a printing error. The
spellings of Fortescue are not
“Fortesque”. Delhi was garrisoned not
by six infantry regiments on 11th May

41. 1857 (Page-80) but by three i.e the
38th, 54th, and 74th Bengal Native
Infantry. There were no British
detachments in Delhi (Page 80) but
few British ordnance personnel
serving as technical staff in the
magazine. Detachment in strict
military terminology means a subunit
in between an infantry section or
platoon. The writer states that there

42. were Bengal Army units in Sindh
(Page-81). This is incorrect since
there were no Bengal Army units in
Sindh in 1857. The two native units i.e
14 and 21 Native Infantry were
Bombay Army units. The two Bengal
Army units bearing numbers 14 and 21
Bengal Native Infantry were at
Peshawar and Jhelum respectively. 14
NI rebelled and was destroyed while

43. 21 NI remained loyal, survived the
rebellion and still survives as a unit of
the Indian Army.Both the Bombay
Army units in Sindh in 1857 however
had a large number of Hindustanis and
one of them i.e the 21 Native Infantry
did rebel .Bengal Army was withdrawn
from Sindh after 1850 and the area
was a part of Bombay Presidency.
Nicholson was not a captain from the

44. British Army (Page-86) but from the
private Bengal Army of the English
East India Company. The term
“Maratha Army” ( Page-95,104 etc) is
misleading.The Gwalior Contingent led
by Tantia Topi consisted of Hindustani
(Refers -The Revolt in Central India-
1857-59-Intelligence Branch-Army
Headquarters- Simla-1908.) troops
serving in Gwalior state and hardly

45. had any Marathas. The only other
troops that Tantia led consisted of
Hindustani regiments of Bengal Army
stationed in Central India or the Doab.
The Sepoy Rebellion had some
Maratha leaders but very few Maratha
soldiers since the largely Maratha
Bombay Army never rebelled.It is
incorrect that the caste basis was
abolished and enrolment of Brahmins

46. was discouraged (Page-112) in the
post 1857 reorganisation . As a matter
of fact there were no class basis in
the companies of the pre 1857 Bengal
Army and all classes were mixed in
each company . On the other hand
companies were recruited strictly on
“One Class” or “One Caste” basis in
the reorganised post 1857 Bengal
Army. After 1857 more loyal than the

47. king loyalists like Sayyid Ahmad Khan
became self styled consultants on the
policy of divide and rule and
suggested to their British masters
that the rebellion of 1857 had started
because “ Government certainly did
put the two antagonistic races into
the same regiment, but constant
intercourse had done its work and the
two races in a regiment had almost

48. become one. It is but natural and to be
expected, that a feeling of friendship
and brotherhood must spring up
between the men of a regiment,
constantly brought together as they
are. They consider themselves as one
body and thus it was that the
difference which exists between
Hindoos and Mahomeddans had, in
these regiments, been almost entirely

49. smoothed away. “( Refers- Page-66-
Causes of the Indian Revolt-1858-
Sayyid Ahmad Khan- Written after
1857 rebellion and presented to Lord
Canning the Governor General) As late
as 1885 there were “caste companies”
as well as companies based on
“ethnic classes” or “ethnic class cum
religion”.Thus there were at least 25
“Hindustani Hindu Brahman Infantry

50. Companies” in the Bengal Army out of
total 352 regular infantry companies
(Refers-Pages-406 & 407-A
Sketch of the Services of the Bengal
Army up to year 1895-Lieut F.G
Cardew-Office of the Superintendent
Government Printing Press-Calcutta-
1903).The assertion that the first
contingent consisting of Indian troops
west of Suez consisting of 126

51. Baluchistan Infantry in 1878 (Page-
129) is also incorrect.The first Indian
troops were employed west of Suez
Canal was in 1801 (when the Suez
Canal had not been excavated)
(Refers-Pages 74 & 75-Lieut F.G
Cardew-Op Cit). These consisted of
troops of Bengal and Bombay Armies.
There is no doubt that the first Indian
VC was won by the Baluch Regiment.

52. However the writer should have
mentioned that Indians became
eligible for this award only from 1911.
Lettow Vorbeck complimented 11
Baluch but the odds that Lettow
Vorbeck faced were a hundred time
greater than any Indian British or
South African troops.The readers may
note that Lettow Vorbeck with just
maximum 3,500 white troops and

53. maximum 12,000 native troops kept at
bay some 300,000 British South
African Colonial and Indian troops
inflicting 15,000 battle casualties on
the allies , some 700,000 disaeses
casualties , one camp followers are
included and a financial loss of 350
Million US Dollars finally withdrawing
into Portueguese East Africa .(Refers-
Pages-183 & 184-Concise History

54. of WW ONE-Brig Vincent.J.Esposito-
Pall Mall Press-London-1965) .Lettow
did not surrender till the end and did
so only once he heard that Germany
had concluded an armistice with the
allies!The assertion that Afghanistan
took advantage of the British
involvement in the Great War(Page-
217) and attacked British India is also
incorrect.The Afghans missed the

55. golden period in WW One once India
was defended by a total of just 15,000
British troops (Refers -Page-479-
Cambridge History of India-Volume Six
) .Once they attacked the British the
war was already over and the British
had reinforced India. The most serious
drawback of the book is the fact that
exact class composition of each
battalion in WW One and in the period

56. 1919-39 has not been given.The
readers must note that errors are a
natural part of any historical work.The
resource starved and intellectually
barren Pakistani society is not
“Research friendly”.Pakistani scholars
cannot hire research associates like
Churchill could.It is a one man show
and once one man does it , it is but
natural that more errors will be

57. committed. Nevertheless the writer
did a commendable job.His
achievements have to be viewed in
the relative dimension. What is the
contribution of our senior retired
officers to military writing? Nominal !
In this regard General Rafi’s history is
a positive contribution ! At least he
has made a significant attempt to add
something to the limited amount of

58. analytical and factual data of
Pakistani military history. I remember
a letter I received from General
Tirmizi in reply to a tactical paper that
I had sent him.Tirmizi wrote “ I have
not studied the concept but I do
commend your effort for taking so
much pain and coming up with
something thought providing”. General
Rafi’s work is thought provoking

59. provided it is read. What he states
may not be totally convincing but it
will hopefully cause some ripples and
perhaps will spur some lazier minds to
make another intellectual endeavour !
A vain hope , but one which we must
entertain ! The printing is excellent
and the quality of paper excellent.
General Rafi has made a landmark
effort in military history writing. His

60. work has filled a serious void in
Pakistani military history. We wish
him best of luck with the third volume
and hope he will be more forthright in
dealing with Pakistani military history
which has been promiscuously mixed
with myths and fantasies.

61. History of The Baloch Regiment 1939-
1956

62. Major General Rafiuddin Ahmad
(Retired)
Published by Baloch Regiment Centre,
Abbottabad; Printed by
Central Army Press Rawalpindi(First
Edition, 2000)
A.H Amin

63. October 2000
Book ReviewThe second volume of
Baloch Regiment history is a
welcome addition to the extremely
limited number of books on

64. Indo-Pak military history. Maximum
part of the volume deals with
the Second World War. The author has
laid greater stress on the
general military history of the Second
World War than on Baloch

65. Regiments’ role in it. This appears to
have been done since limited
material was available on the
regimental histories of the Baloch
units which participated in the war
and the fact that the Baloch

66. Regiment was relatively a much
smaller regiment than the Punjab
or the FF Groups. The first chapter
contains a good description
about the organisation of the Baloch
Regiment. The details

67. pertaining to units raised during World
War Two are sketchy. A
casual remark states that “new
classes and areas were included”
but no specific figures have been
given. The portions dealing with

68. events of Second World War are
excellent for the layman readers.
The author has also dealt with the
political aspects of Indian
perceptions about the Second World
War, with special stress on

69. the difference between Muslim
League and Congress Party
positions.The descriptions about
circumstances in which various
gallantry awards were won in WW Two
are very well written. Yahya

70. Khan’s escape is described in a very
interesting manner, however,
the author has not discussed the Axis
Camp Commandant’s warning
to Yahya about having him shot once
he was caught escaping before

71. his final successful escape. This
incident has been mentioned in
one of Shaukat Riza’s books (The 1965
War). The author made a
passing reference to General
Messervy’s getting captured by the

72. Germans in North Africa while giving
his designation but not name.
Had he mentioned his name the
narrative may have been more
interesting since Pakistan Army’s first
C in C was a German

73. prisoner for some time as a general
officer before he escaped (the
Germans not knowing that they had
captured the British general
officer commanding a British
armoured division). The author’s

74. treatment of 1947-48 War could have
been more extensive. He
has once again quoted Fazal
Muqeem’s criticism of Liaquat about
calling off Operation Venus but has
not given detailed reasons as

75. to how it may have succeeded when
the Indian Army in December
was well poised to meet it. Even the
Pakistani official account of
1970 written many years later refutes
Fazal Muqeem’s criticisms.

76. Rafi should have been more critical
and should have given a
dispassionate and concrete analysis
rather than repeating
Muqeem’s criticism. It should not have
been difficult for the

77. author to analyse the detailed pros
and cons of the projected
operation Venus. This discussion
would certainly have added meat
to the bones i.e. reproduced
judgement of Fazal Muqeem Khan. It

78. is fifty two years now from 1948. One
wonders whether the 1948
war would ever be properly analysed
or not! The volume contains
some minor factual errors. The
German Blitzkrieg struck across

79. Western Europe not in June 1940
(Page-16) but in May 1940.
Rajauri was not captured by a brigade
group (Page-206) but by a
tank squadron of Central India Horse
by a surprise attack through

80. a nala. The infantry brigade later
joined the tank squadron after
Rajauri had been captured.The book
contains extremely elaborate
and detailed appendices dealing with
various aspects of Baloch

81. regiment history. The research
scholars, very rare in Pakistan, will
find these particularly useful. The
second volume on the whole is a
fine contribution to Pakistani military
history. We hope that the

82. book will cover many blanks in
Pakistani military history. We hope
that General Rafi will be more
forthright, critical and blunt in his
third volume which covers the 1965,
and 1971 wars.