This document proposes several electoral reforms in India to reduce the influence of money and muscle power in politics. It suggests: 1. Requiring disclosure of assets and liabilities of candidates and explaining increases in wealth. 2. Legalizing and requiring reporting of lobbying to increase transparency around political funding. 3. Reworking the appointment process of the Chief Election Commissioner to be less influenced by the ruling party. 4. Preventing convicted criminals from becoming lawmakers and reforming rules around candidate disqualification. 5. Strengthening rules around accurate reporting of election expenses and increasing penalties for filing false reports. 6. Increasing financial accountability and internal democracy in political parties.

1. Team Details:
Abhishek K. Singh, Chandan Bugalia, Rishabh P. Shah,
Vivek Dhaka, Utsav Prashar
Students, B. A. LL.B. (Hons.), NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad
Fairness at Play: Introducing
Electoral Reforms to Reduce the
Influence of Money and Muscle
Power in Politics

2.  Disclosure of Assets of Candidates for Election
 Legalisation and Reporting of Lobbying
 Reworking the appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and
Election Commissioners
 Preventing Lawbreakers to become Lawmakers
 Combating Money’s Might in Politics
 Increasing Financial Accountability and Good Governance in Political
Parties
Overview of Suggested Reforms
The little, large Indian should not be hijacked from the course of free and fair elections by mob muscle
methods, or subtle perversion of discretion by men "dressed in little, brief authority". For "be you ever so
high, the law is above you".
Krishna Iyer, J. in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, 1977 SC

3. Problem Recommendation
The average income and assets of India’s 100
richest legislators grew by 745% between two
consecutive elections or five years
Dr B. R. Ambedkar proposed a “Four Point
Formula” with respect to declaration of assets
in the Constituent Assembly on December 31,
1948.
1. Declaration of assets and the liabilities at
the time of the nomination
2. Declaration at the end of the quitting of
the office by the legislator
3. Responsibility for explaining as to how the
assets have come to be so abnormal
4. Failure to give proper explanation
constitute an offence to be followed up
by a penalty or fine.
No mechanism of mandatory explanation of
dramatic increase in wealth of a legislator at
the end of his term in the office.
Failure to furnish proper evidence of increase
in wealth does not amount to an offence
recognised by law
Accountability in Disclosure of Assets and
Liabilities of Candidates

4. Problems Recommendation
Lobbying has not been institutionalized in
India. As a result Corruption and Money
Laundering has forayed into politics.
By Regulated Lobbying there shall be
reasoned disclosure of the source as well as
the reason behind funding by individuals and
corporations.
In order to ensure that the reasons behind
funding of political parties are revealed tax
exemptions should be made to ensure that
people register themselves as Lobbyist.
Legalisation and Reporting of Lobbying

5. Problems Recommendations
The President, in consultation with Union Cabinet
appoints the Chief Election Commissioner and the
Election Commissioners under Article 324(2) of the
Constitution of India
1. The process of the appointment must be not only
fair but also seen to be fair.
2. Amendment in the Article 324(2) of the Constitution
of India and thus, the Election Commissioners
should be appointed based on the
recommendation received by a three-member
committee consisting of the Chief Justice of India,
the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition in
the Lok Sabha or any of their representative
nominees.
3. The candidates whose name are to be considered
by the committee must be put on the website of
the Election Commission of India and objection in
written must be invited from the members of the
general public.
4. The candidates to be considered for the post of
Election Commissioners should mandatorily be
cleared by the Chief Vigilance Commissioner and
the reasons for their appointment or rejection,
minutes of the meeting should be put on the
Similarly, the Election Commissioners are appointed by
the President in consultation with the Chief Election
Commissioner. This, in effect means that the political
party in power at the Centre controls the matters of
appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and
the Election Commissioners, This problem was also
foreseen by Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena in the
Constituent Assembly.
It is only a convention but not a letter of law that the
senior most Election Commissioner assumes the office
of the Chief Election Commissioner on the incumbent’s
retirement.
Reworking the Appointment of the Chief Election
Commissioner and Election Commissioners

6. Problem Recommendation
The SC in the case of ECI v. Jan Chowkidar (People’s Watch)
held that a person in lawful custody of police is not an elector
and therefore not qualified to contest elections. This judgment
creates a huge scope of abuse of power by the ruling party
to muzzle the opposition which will threaten the very
fundamentals of a democratic system of polity.
To prevent the happening of such motivated cases, the
Election Commission of India recommended that only those
cases which were filed prior to six months before an election
alone would lead to disqualification of the candidate.
Post the judgment of the S.C. in Lily Thomas v. Union of India,
a sitting elected representative is disqualified from the date of
his conviction. The Court has further clarified that a member/
non-member will not suffer disqualification if he or she obtains
a stay of his or her conviction. However, by operation of S.
389/ 482 of the Cr.P.C., the stay will operate from the date
such conviction order is passed.
Hence by election is necessitated even if the order is patently
illegal and this protection is available only to sitting
representative.
The judgment needs to be revisited by a larger bench of the
Supreme Court.
Preventing Law Breakers to become Law
Makers

7. Problem Recommendation
According to Section 10A of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 a
person who fails to lodge an account of
election expenses without any good reason or
justification shall be disqualified. But similar
provision does not exist for a situation where a
candidate files a false account of election
expenses
The Representation of the People Act, 1951
should be amended to give powers to
Election Commission of India to disqualify a
candidate if he lodges incorrect account of
election expenses.
Combating Money’s Might in Politics

8. Problem Recommendation
As per Harold Laski, “The life of the
democratic state is built upon the party
system”.
“A political party which does not
respect democratic principles in its
internal working cannot be expected
to respect those principles in the
governance of the country”.
(170th Law Commission of India Report)
In light of the Chief Information Commissioners order
mandating that political parties make voluntary disclosures
relating to their organisation and functioning the following
reforms are proposed:
• Political parties must be required to maintain the same level
of public accountability as public institutions.
• To ensure better governance within political parties each
party must have its own executive committee. The
committee must comprise of members selected through
internal elections regulated by the Election Commission.
• A political party must maintain regular accounts of the
amounts received by the party, its income and expenditure,
have them audited and submit the same to the Election
Commission
• In the event a political party does not comply with these
measures it may either be de-registered by the Election
Commission or the power to use its own symbol may be
taken away.
Increasing Financial Accountability and
Good Governance in Political Parties