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Traffic Anomaly Detection and Attack
Recognition
QRATOR Labs
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs2
The threat
Network attack is becoming a major threat on nations,
governmental institutions, critical infrastructures and business
organizations. Some attacks are focused on exploiting software
vulnerabilities to implement denial of service attacks, damage or
steal important data. Other use a large number of infected
machines to implement denial-of-service attacks. In this
presentation we are focusing on detecting network attacks by
detecting the anomalies in network traffic flow data and
anomalous behavior of the network applications. The goal is to
detect the beginning of the attack in a real-time and to detect
when the system is returned back to the normal state.
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs3
The threat
The network traffic flow data can be represented by a set of network-level
metrics (amount of packets for different protocols, inbound and outbound
traffic, etc.) and application-level metrics (like the response duration
histogram for web server). These metrics are collected by the traffic analyser
at fixed rate. The goal for the state analyzer is to detect anomalous network
and application behavior basing on these metrics.
The input data for the analyzer is statistics matrix that contains a single row for
every traffic time slice. Each row contains the network-level and application-
level features that come from different scales. This matrix is the input for the
intrusion detection processes (both training and detection steps).
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs4
DARPA: simulated attacks on air base[1]
The example of IP-domen traffic’s features due one day and its relations (features)
The stochastic process X={x1,…xn} where x_i- all features at the moment of the time
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs5
The threat
Challenge: How to process an “ocean” of data in order to find abnormal
patterns in the data? How to fuse data from different sources (sensors) to find
correlations and anomalies? How to find distances in high-dimensional data?
How can we determine whether a point belongs to a cluster/segment or not?
The goal is to identify points that deviate from normal behaviour which reside
in the cluster. How we treat huge high dimensional data that is dynamically
and constantly changes? How can we model the high dimensional data to find
deviations from normal behavior?
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs6
Network Intrusion Detection Systems
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs7
Electronic intelligence and Cyber threat management:
Generic approach
Theory, efficient algorithms, software and prototypes (integrated system) which
process data in real time to detect anomalies that deviate from normal behavior
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs8
DARPA: simulated attacks on air base[1]
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs9
DARPA: simulated attacks on air base[1]
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs10
Problem setup
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs11
Standard approach: Diffusion Maps (DM)
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs12
Standard approach: Diffusion Maps (DM)
[2] R.R. Coifman, S. Lafon, Diffusion maps, Applied and Computational
Harmonic Analysis, 21, 5-30, 2006.
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs13
Standard approach: Diffusion Maps (DM)
It is easy to see that the map has the following properties:
• The map represents the data in a space of dimension m.
• The map is not linear.
• The distance between the images of points is equal to the diffuse
distance, that is, the probability to get from point x to point y via
random walk on the graph for the time t.
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs14
Standard approach: Diffusion Maps (DM)
The figure illustrates the effectiveness of the separation of mixed known
clusters via “diffusion maps”. If the generated data is represented as two
interlocking rings (marked different shades of blue), no any linear methods is
able to divide it. Nevertheless, a random walk on the graph represented by
these rings, have ability to divide the classes. The probability remain inside
the same ring by random walk is greater than the probability of jumping
from one ring to another.
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs15
Diffusion Maps (DM): The problem
Classification background and anomaly?
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs16
Diffusion Maps (DM): The problem
BAD RESULT
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs17
Diffusion Maps (DM): The problem
Anomalies are not grouped in clusters
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs18
Advanced approach: Homotopy in Temporal Diffusion Maps (DM)
2
2
2
1
2
2
mod)(

ji xxDji
ij eeG

Diffusion operator
The diffusion geometry is oriented around a smooth parametric curve. The
curve represents the day and night
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs19
Advanced approach: Homotopy in Temporal Diffusion Maps (DM)
Once X is mapped - extension of to , using
representatives from X (sampling)
f Xx
Xx
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs20
Advanced approach: Homotopy in Temporal Diffusion Maps (DM)
iELet
be approximating
curve and Xx
iE
Define homotopy G(x)



i
i
iEx
iExiE
xxG
))(,(
))(,()(
)(


)( xG
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs21
Advanced approach: Homotopy in Temporal Diffusion Maps (DM)
iELet
be approximating
curve and Xx
iE
Define homotopy G(x)



i
i
iEx
iExiE
xxG
))(,(
))(,()(
)(


)( xG
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs22
Advanced approach: Alpha-stream process for anomaly detection
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs23
Advanced approach: Alpha-stream process for anomaly detection
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs24
Advanced approach: Alpha-stream process for anomaly detection
Image Processing application of “alpha-stream”: Object segmentation
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs25
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs26
The features(left) and its representation in DM (right)
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs27
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs28
The features(left) and its representation in DM (right)
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs29
Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs30
anomalies background
anomalies 0,95 0,05
background 0,03 0,97
Table 1: distribution of the “false-
positive” and “true-negative” for the
result of presented algorithm.
anomalies background
anomalies 0,63 0,37
background 0,29 0,71
Table 2: distribution of the “false-
positive” and “true-negative” for the
result of projection on PCA.

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Traffic anomaly detection and attack

  • 1. Traffic Anomaly Detection and Attack Recognition QRATOR Labs
  • 2. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs2 The threat Network attack is becoming a major threat on nations, governmental institutions, critical infrastructures and business organizations. Some attacks are focused on exploiting software vulnerabilities to implement denial of service attacks, damage or steal important data. Other use a large number of infected machines to implement denial-of-service attacks. In this presentation we are focusing on detecting network attacks by detecting the anomalies in network traffic flow data and anomalous behavior of the network applications. The goal is to detect the beginning of the attack in a real-time and to detect when the system is returned back to the normal state.
  • 3. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs3 The threat The network traffic flow data can be represented by a set of network-level metrics (amount of packets for different protocols, inbound and outbound traffic, etc.) and application-level metrics (like the response duration histogram for web server). These metrics are collected by the traffic analyser at fixed rate. The goal for the state analyzer is to detect anomalous network and application behavior basing on these metrics. The input data for the analyzer is statistics matrix that contains a single row for every traffic time slice. Each row contains the network-level and application- level features that come from different scales. This matrix is the input for the intrusion detection processes (both training and detection steps).
  • 4. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs4 DARPA: simulated attacks on air base[1] The example of IP-domen traffic’s features due one day and its relations (features) The stochastic process X={x1,…xn} where x_i- all features at the moment of the time
  • 5. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs5 The threat Challenge: How to process an “ocean” of data in order to find abnormal patterns in the data? How to fuse data from different sources (sensors) to find correlations and anomalies? How to find distances in high-dimensional data? How can we determine whether a point belongs to a cluster/segment or not? The goal is to identify points that deviate from normal behaviour which reside in the cluster. How we treat huge high dimensional data that is dynamically and constantly changes? How can we model the high dimensional data to find deviations from normal behavior?
  • 6. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs6 Network Intrusion Detection Systems
  • 7. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs7 Electronic intelligence and Cyber threat management: Generic approach Theory, efficient algorithms, software and prototypes (integrated system) which process data in real time to detect anomalies that deviate from normal behavior
  • 8. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs8 DARPA: simulated attacks on air base[1]
  • 9. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs9 DARPA: simulated attacks on air base[1]
  • 10. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs10 Problem setup
  • 11. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs11 Standard approach: Diffusion Maps (DM)
  • 12. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs12 Standard approach: Diffusion Maps (DM) [2] R.R. Coifman, S. Lafon, Diffusion maps, Applied and Computational Harmonic Analysis, 21, 5-30, 2006.
  • 13. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs13 Standard approach: Diffusion Maps (DM) It is easy to see that the map has the following properties: • The map represents the data in a space of dimension m. • The map is not linear. • The distance between the images of points is equal to the diffuse distance, that is, the probability to get from point x to point y via random walk on the graph for the time t.
  • 14. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs14 Standard approach: Diffusion Maps (DM) The figure illustrates the effectiveness of the separation of mixed known clusters via “diffusion maps”. If the generated data is represented as two interlocking rings (marked different shades of blue), no any linear methods is able to divide it. Nevertheless, a random walk on the graph represented by these rings, have ability to divide the classes. The probability remain inside the same ring by random walk is greater than the probability of jumping from one ring to another.
  • 15. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs15 Diffusion Maps (DM): The problem Classification background and anomaly?
  • 16. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs16 Diffusion Maps (DM): The problem BAD RESULT
  • 17. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs17 Diffusion Maps (DM): The problem Anomalies are not grouped in clusters
  • 18. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs18 Advanced approach: Homotopy in Temporal Diffusion Maps (DM) 2 2 2 1 2 2 mod)(  ji xxDji ij eeG  Diffusion operator The diffusion geometry is oriented around a smooth parametric curve. The curve represents the day and night
  • 19. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs19 Advanced approach: Homotopy in Temporal Diffusion Maps (DM) Once X is mapped - extension of to , using representatives from X (sampling) f Xx Xx
  • 20. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs20 Advanced approach: Homotopy in Temporal Diffusion Maps (DM) iELet be approximating curve and Xx iE Define homotopy G(x)    i i iEx iExiE xxG ))(,( ))(,()( )(   )( xG
  • 21. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs21 Advanced approach: Homotopy in Temporal Diffusion Maps (DM) iELet be approximating curve and Xx iE Define homotopy G(x)    i i iEx iExiE xxG ))(,( ))(,()( )(   )( xG
  • 22. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs22 Advanced approach: Alpha-stream process for anomaly detection
  • 23. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs23 Advanced approach: Alpha-stream process for anomaly detection
  • 24. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs24 Advanced approach: Alpha-stream process for anomaly detection Image Processing application of “alpha-stream”: Object segmentation
  • 26. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs26 The features(left) and its representation in DM (right)
  • 28. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs28 The features(left) and its representation in DM (right)
  • 30. Anomaly Recognition Qrator Labs30 anomalies background anomalies 0,95 0,05 background 0,03 0,97 Table 1: distribution of the “false- positive” and “true-negative” for the result of presented algorithm. anomalies background anomalies 0,63 0,37 background 0,29 0,71 Table 2: distribution of the “false- positive” and “true-negative” for the result of projection on PCA.