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ISP Border Definition
Alexander Azimov
<aa@qrator.net>
ISP goal (one ASN)
BGP Decision Process
Step Attribute Transit
1 Highest Local Preference value Non-transit
2 Lowest AS Path length Transit
3 Lowest Origin type Transit
4 Lowest MED Non-transit
5 eBGP learned over iBGP learned Automatic
6 Lowest IGP cost to border router Local configuration
7 Lowest router Id Local configuration
Send traffic with maximum benefit.
BGP Decision Process
Step Attribute Transit
1 Highest Local Preference value Non-transit
2 Lowest AS Path length Transit
3 Lowest Origin type Transit
4 Lowest MED Non-transit
5 eBGP learned over iBGP learned Automatic
6 Lowest IGP cost to border router Local configuration
7 Lowest router Id Local configuration
Get rid of traffic as soon as possible!
ISP goal (multiple ASNs)
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝐴𝑆𝑁1 + 𝐴𝑆𝑁2 > 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝐴𝑆𝑁1 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝐴𝑆𝑁2
Multiple ASNs – One ISP
ASN 1 ASN 2
UpstreamsUpstreams
ClientsClients
PeersPeers
ISP
1
Not so fast…
ASN 1 ASN 2
Pref Transmission
ASN 3
ISP
ASN1 ASN2
a. Assign pref
ASN 1 ASN 2
Pref Transmission
ASN 3
ISP
ASN1 ASN2
a. Assign pref
b. Community -> pref
ASN 1 ASN 2
Pref Transmission
ASN 3
ISP
ASN1 ASN2
a. Assign pref
b. Community -> pref
c. Community -> Pref
ASN 1 ASN 2
‘Hot potato’ routing
ASN 3
ISP
Prepend 1
ASN 1 ASN 2
AS Path 3 3 3
External
External
ASN 1 ASN 2
‘Hot potato’ routing
ASN 3
ISP
Prepend 1
ASN 1 ASN 2
AS Path 3 3 3
External
External
ASN 1 ASN 2
‘Hot potato’ routing
ASN 3
ISP
Prepend 1
ASN 1 ASN 2
AS Path 2 3 3
External
External
ASN 1 ASN 2
Securing ‘Hot potato’ routing
ASN 3
ISP
Prepend 1
ASN 1 ASN 2
AS Path 3 3 3
3->1 3->2 2->1 1->2
Origin IGP IGP EGP EGP
External
External
ASN 1 ASN 2
Securing ‘Hot potato’ routing
ASN 3
ISP
Prepend 1
ASN 1 ASN 2
AS Path 3 3 3
Isolation
External
External
Path Length: Increased
ASN 1
ASN 2
Peer ASN 3
ISP
Customer ASN 4
ASN 1 ASN 2 ASN 4
AS Path 3 1 3 2 1 3
Path Length: Route Loops
ASN 1
ASN 2
Peer ASN 3
ISP
Customer ASN 4
ASN 1 ASN 2 ASN 4
AS Path 4 2 3 3 2 3
no-prepend
Multiple ASNs – One Network
Target Plain BGP
Preference transmission
1. Synchronize Local Preference Values
2. Local-pref->Community->Local_pref
‘Hot potato’ routing Origin modification / router isolation
Path length Increased / Loop Risk
Route Leak prevention Community synchronization
There is no simple way!
rfc7705: Autonomous System
Migration Mechanisms
rfc7705: Local ASN capability
ASN 1 Global ASN 1
Local ASN 2
OPENOPEN
BGP session will be established if:
ASN in OPEN message = Local ASN OR
ASN in OPEN message = Global ASN
1. Add Local AS capability to RR
2. Unite ALL RR in one cluster
3. Slow migration to ASN 1
rfc7705: Migration ASN2 to ASN1
ASN 1
Global ASN 1
Local ASN 2
ISP
RR Cluster
rfc7705: Multiple ASNs – One Network
Target rfc 7705
Preference transmission
1. Synchronize Local Preference Values
2. Unite all RR in cluster
‘Hot potato’ routing Built in
Path length Partial increased / Loop Risk
Route Leak prevention Community synchronization
What if you have single RR in legacy AS?
What if you have more than two networks to migrate?
rfc5065: ASN Confederations
Sub-ASN 65000 Sub-ASN 65001
ASN 1
A collection of autonomous systems represented and advertised as a
single AS number to BGP speakers that are not members of the local
BGP confederation.
rfc5065: Internal Routing
Sub-ASN 65000
Sub-ASN 65001
ASN 1
ASN 2
ASN 3
AS_CONFED
ASN 1 ASN 65000 ASN 65001 ASN 3
AS Path 1 1 (65000) 1 2 1
rfc5065: Multiple sub-ASNs – One ASN
Target rfc5065
Preference transmission
1. Synchronize Local Preference Values
2. Synchronize confederation list
‘Hot potato’ routing Built in
Path length Not increased
Route Leak prevention Community synchronization
How to extend to multi-ASN level?
ISP Border Definition
BGP Session is Internal if:
Neighbor ASN = Local ASN
Plain
BGP
Neighbor ASN = Global or Local ASN rfc5065
Neighbor ASN in Confederations list rfc7705
Next technical problem – next ad-hoc?
The Neighbor Roles
OPEN with
internal role
OPEN with
peer role
NotificationNotification
4 pairs of non-conflict roles:
1. Peer <---> Peer
2. Customer <---> Provider
3. Complex <---> Complex
4. Internal <---> Internal
Preventing Route Leaks
If route was learned from a provider or peer it should not be
announced to another provider or peer
Set iOTC if neighbor is
customer or peer
Internal Session
No iOTC change
Filter routes if iOTC is set and
neighbor is customer or peer
iOTC – internal Only To Customer attribute (zero size)
ISP Border Definition
OPEN with
Internal role
OPEN with
Internal role
Enable transmission of local attributes through
If both sides are Internal
OPENOPEN
ASN 1 ASN 2
Securing ‘Hot potato’ routing
ASN 3
ISP
Prepend 1
ASN 1 ASN 2
AS Path 3 3 3
External
Internal
Multiple ASNs – One Network
Target BGP + roles
Preference transmission
1. Synchronize Local Preference Values
2. Synchronize roles
‘Hot potato’ routing Built in
Path length Increased / Loop Risk
Route Leak prevention Built in
ISP Confederations
ASN 1 ASN 2
ISP
A collection of autonomous systems represented and advertised as a
single AS number BGP speakers that are not members of the local
BGP confederation.
Loop Prevention
Internal Routing – likewise ASN confederation;
External Routing – filter routes with AS Path
segments from confederation list;
These two rules guarantees loop free scenario!
Path Length
ASN 1
ASN 2
Peer ASN 3
ISP
Customer ASN 4
ASN 1 ASN 2 ASN 4
AS Path 3 3 (1) 2 3
AS_CONFED
filtered
A Simple Config
protocol bgp IAMOPERATOR_1 {
local as MY_AS1;
neighbor X.X.X.X as MY_AS2;
role internal;
confederation MY_AS1, MY_AS2;
}
Multiple ASNs – One Network
Target BGP + Roles + ISP Confederations
Preference transmission
1. Synchronize Local Preference Values
2. Synchronize roles
3. Synchronize Confederation List
‘Hot potato’ routing Built in
Path length Not increased
Route Leak prevention Built in
There was no simple way!
Migration Process
Roles deployment
at connection links
Roles deployment
at ISP level
ISP Confederation
At ISP level
Pref transmition
‘hot potato’ routing
Route Leak prevention
No increase of AS Path
Summary
• ASN union vs ASN migration;
• Utilization with BGP confederations;
• Simplified configuration with no AS Path
increase;
• Route Leak prevention;
• No affect on networks with single ASN.
Useful Links
• Draft, description and implementation of roles
and route leak mitigation;
• Description and implementation of ASN union.

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ISP Border Definition

  • 1. ISP Border Definition Alexander Azimov <aa@qrator.net>
  • 3. BGP Decision Process Step Attribute Transit 1 Highest Local Preference value Non-transit 2 Lowest AS Path length Transit 3 Lowest Origin type Transit 4 Lowest MED Non-transit 5 eBGP learned over iBGP learned Automatic 6 Lowest IGP cost to border router Local configuration 7 Lowest router Id Local configuration Send traffic with maximum benefit.
  • 4. BGP Decision Process Step Attribute Transit 1 Highest Local Preference value Non-transit 2 Lowest AS Path length Transit 3 Lowest Origin type Transit 4 Lowest MED Non-transit 5 eBGP learned over iBGP learned Automatic 6 Lowest IGP cost to border router Local configuration 7 Lowest router Id Local configuration Get rid of traffic as soon as possible!
  • 5. ISP goal (multiple ASNs) 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝐴𝑆𝑁1 + 𝐴𝑆𝑁2 > 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝐴𝑆𝑁1 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝐴𝑆𝑁2
  • 6. Multiple ASNs – One ISP ASN 1 ASN 2 UpstreamsUpstreams ClientsClients PeersPeers ISP 1 Not so fast…
  • 7. ASN 1 ASN 2 Pref Transmission ASN 3 ISP ASN1 ASN2 a. Assign pref
  • 8. ASN 1 ASN 2 Pref Transmission ASN 3 ISP ASN1 ASN2 a. Assign pref b. Community -> pref
  • 9. ASN 1 ASN 2 Pref Transmission ASN 3 ISP ASN1 ASN2 a. Assign pref b. Community -> pref c. Community -> Pref
  • 10. ASN 1 ASN 2 ‘Hot potato’ routing ASN 3 ISP Prepend 1 ASN 1 ASN 2 AS Path 3 3 3 External External
  • 11. ASN 1 ASN 2 ‘Hot potato’ routing ASN 3 ISP Prepend 1 ASN 1 ASN 2 AS Path 3 3 3 External External
  • 12. ASN 1 ASN 2 ‘Hot potato’ routing ASN 3 ISP Prepend 1 ASN 1 ASN 2 AS Path 2 3 3 External External
  • 13. ASN 1 ASN 2 Securing ‘Hot potato’ routing ASN 3 ISP Prepend 1 ASN 1 ASN 2 AS Path 3 3 3 3->1 3->2 2->1 1->2 Origin IGP IGP EGP EGP External External
  • 14. ASN 1 ASN 2 Securing ‘Hot potato’ routing ASN 3 ISP Prepend 1 ASN 1 ASN 2 AS Path 3 3 3 Isolation External External
  • 15. Path Length: Increased ASN 1 ASN 2 Peer ASN 3 ISP Customer ASN 4 ASN 1 ASN 2 ASN 4 AS Path 3 1 3 2 1 3
  • 16. Path Length: Route Loops ASN 1 ASN 2 Peer ASN 3 ISP Customer ASN 4 ASN 1 ASN 2 ASN 4 AS Path 4 2 3 3 2 3 no-prepend
  • 17. Multiple ASNs – One Network Target Plain BGP Preference transmission 1. Synchronize Local Preference Values 2. Local-pref->Community->Local_pref ‘Hot potato’ routing Origin modification / router isolation Path length Increased / Loop Risk Route Leak prevention Community synchronization There is no simple way!
  • 19. rfc7705: Local ASN capability ASN 1 Global ASN 1 Local ASN 2 OPENOPEN BGP session will be established if: ASN in OPEN message = Local ASN OR ASN in OPEN message = Global ASN
  • 20. 1. Add Local AS capability to RR 2. Unite ALL RR in one cluster 3. Slow migration to ASN 1 rfc7705: Migration ASN2 to ASN1 ASN 1 Global ASN 1 Local ASN 2 ISP RR Cluster
  • 21. rfc7705: Multiple ASNs – One Network Target rfc 7705 Preference transmission 1. Synchronize Local Preference Values 2. Unite all RR in cluster ‘Hot potato’ routing Built in Path length Partial increased / Loop Risk Route Leak prevention Community synchronization What if you have single RR in legacy AS? What if you have more than two networks to migrate?
  • 22. rfc5065: ASN Confederations Sub-ASN 65000 Sub-ASN 65001 ASN 1 A collection of autonomous systems represented and advertised as a single AS number to BGP speakers that are not members of the local BGP confederation.
  • 23. rfc5065: Internal Routing Sub-ASN 65000 Sub-ASN 65001 ASN 1 ASN 2 ASN 3 AS_CONFED ASN 1 ASN 65000 ASN 65001 ASN 3 AS Path 1 1 (65000) 1 2 1
  • 24. rfc5065: Multiple sub-ASNs – One ASN Target rfc5065 Preference transmission 1. Synchronize Local Preference Values 2. Synchronize confederation list ‘Hot potato’ routing Built in Path length Not increased Route Leak prevention Community synchronization How to extend to multi-ASN level?
  • 25. ISP Border Definition BGP Session is Internal if: Neighbor ASN = Local ASN Plain BGP Neighbor ASN = Global or Local ASN rfc5065 Neighbor ASN in Confederations list rfc7705 Next technical problem – next ad-hoc?
  • 26. The Neighbor Roles OPEN with internal role OPEN with peer role NotificationNotification 4 pairs of non-conflict roles: 1. Peer <---> Peer 2. Customer <---> Provider 3. Complex <---> Complex 4. Internal <---> Internal
  • 27. Preventing Route Leaks If route was learned from a provider or peer it should not be announced to another provider or peer Set iOTC if neighbor is customer or peer Internal Session No iOTC change Filter routes if iOTC is set and neighbor is customer or peer iOTC – internal Only To Customer attribute (zero size)
  • 28. ISP Border Definition OPEN with Internal role OPEN with Internal role Enable transmission of local attributes through If both sides are Internal OPENOPEN
  • 29. ASN 1 ASN 2 Securing ‘Hot potato’ routing ASN 3 ISP Prepend 1 ASN 1 ASN 2 AS Path 3 3 3 External Internal
  • 30. Multiple ASNs – One Network Target BGP + roles Preference transmission 1. Synchronize Local Preference Values 2. Synchronize roles ‘Hot potato’ routing Built in Path length Increased / Loop Risk Route Leak prevention Built in
  • 31. ISP Confederations ASN 1 ASN 2 ISP A collection of autonomous systems represented and advertised as a single AS number BGP speakers that are not members of the local BGP confederation.
  • 32. Loop Prevention Internal Routing – likewise ASN confederation; External Routing – filter routes with AS Path segments from confederation list; These two rules guarantees loop free scenario!
  • 33. Path Length ASN 1 ASN 2 Peer ASN 3 ISP Customer ASN 4 ASN 1 ASN 2 ASN 4 AS Path 3 3 (1) 2 3 AS_CONFED filtered
  • 34. A Simple Config protocol bgp IAMOPERATOR_1 { local as MY_AS1; neighbor X.X.X.X as MY_AS2; role internal; confederation MY_AS1, MY_AS2; }
  • 35. Multiple ASNs – One Network Target BGP + Roles + ISP Confederations Preference transmission 1. Synchronize Local Preference Values 2. Synchronize roles 3. Synchronize Confederation List ‘Hot potato’ routing Built in Path length Not increased Route Leak prevention Built in There was no simple way!
  • 36. Migration Process Roles deployment at connection links Roles deployment at ISP level ISP Confederation At ISP level Pref transmition ‘hot potato’ routing Route Leak prevention No increase of AS Path
  • 37. Summary • ASN union vs ASN migration; • Utilization with BGP confederations; • Simplified configuration with no AS Path increase; • Route Leak prevention; • No affect on networks with single ASN.
  • 38. Useful Links • Draft, description and implementation of roles and route leak mitigation; • Description and implementation of ASN union.