Tobias.Yasutake.Thesis.Text

1
Introduction
In 1972, President Richard Nixon normalized relations with the People’s Republic
of China. Since then, Sino-American relations have become the most important bilateral
relationship in the world. The country with the largest economy in the world is the USA,
followed by China. The strongest country in the world (in terms of military spending) is
the USA, followed by China.
Both countries are tied together economically, and the shadow that their
interaction casts affects the economy of the entire world. If these two giants clash with
each other then regardless of which one of them won the conflict all of East Asia will
lose. Both sides have a vested interest in cooperation, yet both are worried about each
other; the US and China conflict over intractable issues like Taiwan or territorial disputes
in the South China Sea, but these are systemic of a larger issue. The two countries do not
seem to trust each other, and while they work together on many issues, their relationship
is not stable like it needs to be.
Why? The answer is complicated, but a part of it seems to be that misperceptions
caused by cultural differences between the two countries. These differences are
something that goes beyond the scope of traditional realist models of international
relations: they are things that affect not only what the average person in each country
think of the other, but also what the leaders think and the policy that those leaders put in
place.

2
China’s Search for Prosperity and Security
Everything that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has done since the late
1970s, it could be argued, was done either for security or for economic growth. The
method of this economic growth radically changed when Deng Xiaoping took over once
Mao Zedong died; Deng pushed for many changes to the system that were very different
from the policies of Mao.
Today, China is much more serious about ‘green energy,’ but in the early stages
of China’s development it was “growth-at-all-costs.” Deng Xiaoping is often quoted
saying “it doesn’t matter if the cat is black or white. All that matters is that it catches
mice.”1
He meant that what China needed to do was not cling to old ideologically
Communist ideas, rather it needed to do whatever was necessary to grow economically
even if it meant taking up Capitalist concepts. This resulted in actions such as the Special
Economic Zones, the liberalization of production, or the allowance of private investment
all starting around 1978, two years after Mao Zedong’s death.2
Since then, China has
bounded up economically. In 2010, China overtook Japan as the world’s second largest
economy in terms of GDP (gross domestic product),3
and some expect China to overtake
1
Mark Leonard, What Does China Think? (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2008), 42.
2
"China's Special Economic Zones," Hofstra University, accessed April 25, 2016,
https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch5en/conc5en/China_SEZ.html.
3
"China GDP Surpasses Japan, Capping Three-Decade Rise," Bloomberg, April 16, 2010, accessed April 26,
2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-08-16/china-economy-passes-japan-s-in-second-
quarter-capping-three-decade-rise.

3
the United States before 2020,4
and it has already taken over the United States in terms of
PPP (purchasing power parity).5
Despite these leaps and bounds, China’s economic growth is slowing down, and
upcoming problems definitely need to be met, such as “rising labour costs, pollution, a
potential real estate bubble and rapid ageing arising from the government’s one child
policy.”6
These problems are not something simple that will easily be solved. In terms of
pollution, China is exuding more carbon emissions than any other country, even the
United States.7
Even though China changed its infamous ‘one-child policy’ to a two-child policy
in 2015, the damage is already done and is irreversible. China’s workforce is aging
rapidly, as “By 2030, China is expected to have more than 243 million people over the
age of 65 – an 85 percent increase over today.”8
The very nature of the one-child policy
locks the demographics of a country in a particular course, and with an ever increasing
age average the effects will be felt for a very long time indeed.
The very fact that China has shifted to a two-child policy, and will probably lift
all restrictions down the line, is a strong indication that things need to change.
They’ve switched tack to the point of encouraging people to have children, but
almost no modern country has been able to reverse this trend. . . . . Even if you do
galvanize the country into producing more babies, it takes 20 years on average for
4
Shamim Adam, "China to Exceed U.S. by 2020, Standard Chartered Says," Bloomberg, November 14,
2010, accessed April 28, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-11-15/china-may-
surpass-u-s-by-2020-in-super-cycle-standard-chartered-says.
5
Jeff Desjardins, "China vs. United States: A Tale of Two Economies," Visual Capitalist, October 15, 2015,
accessed April 28, 2016, http://www.visualcapitalist.com/china-vs-united-states-a-tale-of-two-
economies/.
6
Media Eghbal, "Top 5 Largest Economies in 2020," Euromonitor, February 25, 2013, accessed April 26,
2016, http://blog.euromonitor.com/2013/02/top-5-largest-economies-in-2020-china-and-russia-displace-
usa-and-germany-respectively.html.
7
Vlogbrothers, “How to Be Green Without Being a Prick,” YouTube video, 4:00, May 26, 2010,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SwhOhzo_REU; This is a big reason on why China is emphasizing
green energy today.
8
Curtis S. Chin, "Singapore Offers Clue on China's Two-child Policy," CNBC, November 02, 2015, accessed
April 28, 2016, http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/02/china-2-child-policy-problems--commentary.html.

4
these babies to grow into workers. This means there’s no altering the course for
the next 20 to 25 years.9
China is also suffering from a middle income trap, which is one of the reasons
why China has been affected by such a dramatic economic slowdown. “[T]he middle-
income trap characterizes economies that, once they achieve middle-income status, wind
up stagnating there, unable to move to high-income status. This is usually because the
very factors that fostered the country's rapid growth start to evaporate as the its income
levels increase.”10
As a country moves into the middle income, the higher wage makes
the country no longer the cheap labor investment target that it once was. The country
needs to shift somehow from a country that focuses on straight labor and into a more
advanced and higher paying industry, but this can be tough. These countries can find that
“its costs are now too high to compete with low-income nations but its productivity can't
compete with that of high-income nations.”11
Another problem that China is suffering from is a large degree of income
inequality. The rapid and tremendous growth from China’s economic reform has also
come with the “largest increase in income inequality of all countries for which
comparable data are available.”12
The income inequality is so great that it is larger than
even the United States, and in a 2012 survey was found to be China’s number one social
9
Mei Fong, "The Legacy of China's One-Child Policy," The Diplomat, April 20, 2016, accessed April 28,
2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/the-legacy-of-chinas-one-child-policy/.
10
Matthew Johnston, "Is China Suffering From the Middle-Income Trap?" Investopedia, 2015, accessed
April 28, 2016, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/092515/china-suffering-middleincome-
trap.asp.
11
Ibid.
12
Dennis Tao Yang, “Urban-Biased Policies and Rising Income Inequality in China,” The American
Economic Review 89. No. 2 (1999): 306, http://www.jstor.org/stable/117126

5
challenge.13
Much of the inequality falls among the rural verses urban divide, though it is
also a regional problem as the poorest region in China has a lower GDP per capita than
India.14
It is almost like a First World country sitting on top of a Third World country.
China is climbing closer and closer to the United States in terms of aggregate
GDP, but it still has a long way to go. A myriad of issues stands in its way. How
successfully China deals with these issues is something that only time will conclusively
prove, but the big gap between the United States and China that will not be bridged for
the far foreseeable future is GDP per capita. China has a total population of 1,385 million
people, more than four times that of the United States’ 320 million. As such, the GDP per
capita of the US is more than seven times as great as China’s,15
and the average US
citizen is five times as wealthy as the average Chinese citizen.16
China’s stunning amount
of population makes it understandable on how it is approaching the United States in terms
of GDP, but the United States is still an economic powerhouse in its own right.
In terms of security, China has as many if not more problems than with its future
economic growth. In their book China’s Search for Security, Nathan and Scobell
immediately say in their opening chapter that “[v]ulnerability to threats is the main driver
of China’s foreign policy. The world as seen from Beijing is a terrain of hazards,
stretching from the streets outside the policymaker’s window to land borders and sea
13
Lorraine Woellert and Sharon Chen, "China's Income Inequality Surpasses U.S., Posing Risk for Xi,"
Bloomberg, April 29, 2014, accessed April 29, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-
28/gap-between-rich-poor-worse-in-china-than-in-u-s-study-shows.
14
"All the Parities in China," The Economist, February 25, 2011, accessed April 29, 2016,
http://www.economist.com/content/chinese_equivalents.
15
Desjardins, "China vs. United States: A Tale of Two Economies."
16
Matt Schiavenza, "China Economy Surpasses US In Purchasing Power, But Americans Don't Need To
Worry," International Business Times, October 08, 2014, accessed April 28, 2016.
http://www.ibtimes.com/china-economy-surpasses-us-purchasing-power-americans-dont-need-worry-
1701804.

6
lanes thousands of miles to the north, east, south, and west and beyond to the mines and
oilfields of distant continents.”17
Threats include problems both internally and externally. Externally, there is the
issue of many neighboring states, of which there is unpredictable unstable states such as
Myanmar or North Korea, states with border disputes such as India and Japan, or
powerful states like Russia and the United States. The US in particular is a factor in
almost every external level of China’s security concerns. American military seems to be
everywhere, yet their old enemy the U.S.S.R. has been dismantled. Why does America
keep these troops deployed if not to threaten China?18
Internal threats are also quite worrisome. These include a large number of protests
and unrest,19
entire regions inside of China that desire to break away (such as Tibet, or
Xinjiang, or Taiwan), unemployment, corruption, and China’s own brand of terrorists.20
After the Tiananmen Square incident, Deng Xiaoping had this to say on the matter
of Security: “Of all of China’s problems, the one that trumps everything is the need for
stability.”21
The CCP since then has tried to avoid public leadership splits, prevent large-
scale unrest, and keep the military aligned with the CCP.22
Small scale protests seem to
be acceptable (if not inevitable), however, so long as they are not over a topic that
threatens the CCP and as long as they do not grow to large.23
But security was important
even before in Mao’s time. The reason why Nixon was able to play the China card and
17
Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China's Search for Security (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2012), 3.
18
Ibid., 90.
19
Many but not all of which are products of the economic problems mentioned above.
20
Katie Hunt and Matt Rivers, "Xinjiang Violence: Does China Have a Terror Problem?" CNN, December 2,
2015, accessed April 29, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/02/asia/china-xinjiang-uyghurs/.
21
Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 38.
22
Ibid., 39.
23
Murray Scot Tanner, “China Rethinks Unrest,” The Washington Quarterly 27. No. 3 (2004): 148.

7
have Mao shift towards the United States was because the relationship between China
and Russia (who before then China viewed almost as an older brother nation) soured.
China played a dangerous but successful game of playing the two world powers against
each other for China’s own advantage.
Fear from and of the Rising Power
Analysts fear a coming conflict between the “rising power” of China and the
“declining power” of the United States. Titles such as The Rise of China and the Future
of the West, Can the Liberal System Survive? published by Foreign Affairs or "China
Threat" or a "Peaceful Rise of China"? published by the New York Times abound. From
the book jacket of What Does China Think? it says that “very few things that happen in
our lifetime will be remembered after we are dead. But China’s rise is different: like the
rise and fall of Rome or the Soviet Empire, its aftereffects will reverberate for
generations to come.”24
A February 2014 poll found that people in the United States
thought that China was America’s “greatest enemy today.”25
China is rising and it is here
to stay, and it is frightening to many in the West.
In the past, whenever there has been a rising power, the rising power challenged
the then dominant power for control over the system, and conflict ensued. We saw this,
for example, in both WWI and WWII with Germany. There is at least one major
exception to this rule: when the US surpassed Great Britain, so there may be hope that
24
Leonard, What Does China Think?
25
Jeffrey M. Jones, "Far Fewer Americans Now Say Iran Is No. 1 U.S. Enemy," Gallup, February 20, 2014,
accessed May 03, 2016, http://www.gallup.com/poll/167501/far-fewer-americans-say-iran-no-
enemy.aspx; Although the article stresses that this is not because of China itself but because Iran has
become less of an enemy in American eyes. Still, while the fear of China may not be all pervasive it still
exists in the core of many Americans.

8
China’s rise will be another exception, but it is dangerous to just assume so without
taking proper precautions. “[America and Britain] were able to avoid war in large part
because they shared the same values and culture, something that cannot be said of
democratic America and communist China.”26
Nor is this an idea held only by
Americans. Zhou Qi wrote:
Among Chinese . . . there is a view suggesting that the rivalry between China and
the United States is ultimately insoluble because it is “structural” in nature.
According to this notion, the second-most-powerful country in the world will
inevitably pose—or at least be perceived to pose—a challenge to the most
powerful country in the world. Therefore, it is almost impossible to build mutual
trust between them. But history suggests that this fatalistic assumption may not be
valid. The United States once overtook the United Kingdom as the world’s
dominant power, and Japan was once the second-largest economy, yet neither of
them had as much difficulty reconciling their differences with the United States as
China has had. This suggests that values, ideology, and political systems are, in
the end, key causes of strategic suspicion.27
So one of the reasons to fear a coming conflict between these two ‘giants’ is
because they are too different, and at the very least a smooth transition of power is not
something that can be expected. In addition to the differences in values, political systems,
and cultures (or perhaps because of those differences?) the two countries are acting in
ways that are potentially exacerbating the problem with a large emphasis on military
power and military spending.
China is spending more and more on military spending each year, and it is
worrying both China’s neighbors and the United States. With the U.S.S.R. out of the
picture, it is fear of an aggressive United States and other possible enemies that drives
China’s current military spending.
26
Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, 9.
27
Zhou Qi and Andrew J. Nathan, “Political Systems, Rights, and Values,” in Debating China: The U.S.-
China Relationship in Ten Conversations, ed. Nina Hachigian, (Oxford University Press, 2014), 45.

9
Conventional wisdom may say that the declining power and the rising power’s
conflict is likely to occur, but such a conflict is not at all in the interest of either country,
or indeed, any country in the world. With an overwhelming strength on the side of the
United States, is it any wonder that the Chinese are worried about being pressured into a
situation that is disadvantageous for them? And with an alarming growth in military
spending whose only possible use is against the United States or its allies, is it any
wonder that the US is worried at the intent of China?
Rapid economic growth across the Asia Pacific and China’s surging investment in
military power—itself aimed in large part at mitigating the military superiority of
the United States and some key U.S. allies—have been central drivers of
Washington’s so-called rebalance toward the Asia Pacific. In response, Beijing
cries foul, bemoans alleged U.S. efforts to “contain its peaceful rise”—a popular
meme in Chinese commentary on U.S. strategic intentions toward Asia—further
ramps up its military spending and bolsters its warfighting capabilities. A vicious,
unavoidable, and tragic action-reaction cycle is born.28
The vicious cycle the above quote talks about is called the “security dilemma,” a
political situation similar to the prisoner’s dilemma where both sides are afraid that the
other will not cooperate or have peaceful intentions, and therefore choose to take the
“safe” option that overall benefits neither and could spell disaster. When two nations both
increase their military spending because the other is increasing its military spending, and
importantly if “[t]he states involved are not pursuing offensive or revisionist security
strategies and do not seek domination or conquest; rather, they are status quo security-
seekers[,]”29
it becomes a security dilemma. The cycle is not a necessary outgrowth of
two opposing enemies operating in a zero-sum environment, but rather is an unneeded
28
Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, "Racing toward Tragedy?: China's Rise, Military Competition in the
Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma," International Security 39, no. 2 (2014): 53.
doi:10.1162/isec_a_00176.
29
Ibid., 58.

10
and avoidable buildup of mistrust and danger that could easily have been prevented if
misperceptions did not come into play. In other words, if the situation is indeed a security
dilemma, then it may look zero-sum but it is not.
Are the actions of Beijing and Washington both defensive and reactive to the
perceived threat of the other? Or is it not a true security dilemma because one or both
sides seek to engage in conflict? Scobell finds that at least from the Chinese side, it is a
true security dilemma. He says:
China possesses an enduring underdog mentality which makes it extremely
difficult to conceive of a security dilemma. In the case of US–China relations in
the twenty-first century, the security dilemma is especially alien because the
United States is considered so much more powerful than China. How could the
United States even remotely perceive China as a real threat? The presumption in
Beijing is that the United States is hyping the threat for nefarious reasons.30
And:
From the perspective of many Chinese it is difficult to fathom that Beijing can be
perceived as threatening to Washington. After all, China is weaker economically
(albeit closing the gap rapidly). Moreover, China is far weaker in terms of
military capabilities, with a small nuclear arsenal and limited power projection.
China takes pains to articulate explicitly its intentions as largely limited to
protecting national unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. So how does this
get translated into a threat to the United States?31
The danger of all of this is that security dilemmas are more difficult to overcome
and are more consuming when one or both parties are unaware that they are in a security
dilemma, and China just does not understand why they are threatening to the United
States.32
30
Andrew Scobell, "Learning to Rise Peacefully? China and the Security Dilemma," Journal of
Contemporary China 21, no. 76 (July 2012): 715. doi:10.1080/10670564.2012.666839.
31
Ibid., 721.
32
Scobell does mention that the idea of the security dilemma exists in China, just not among the decision
makers. The security dilemma exists in the minds of some Chinese “at least [as] a topic of academic
interest,” but Scobell has reservations on how much of that idea is communicated to the leadership, and if
it is how much the idea of a security dilemma is actually taken seriously by said leadership.

11
But threatening it is. In particular, the sheer amount of military spending not only
seems extreme, but there is evidence that it is not accurate and Beijing is spending even
more on military spending. This “lack of military transparency” forces the US to consider
the worst case scenario. Beijing has said that they wish to increase trust and reduce
suspicion, but Washington feels like the onus is on Beijing to show that they are willing
to cooperate.33
But being a security dilemma, this is a two way street. China has noticed that the
strategic security alliances that the United States set up in the Asian Pacific in order to
fight against the U.S.S.R. during the cold war are still active, and who could they be
aimed at containing this time? The US does not see it this way. Liff and Ikenberry state
that “the United States and its security allies and partners seem to see their own moves as
responses to the objective reality of the changing distribution of material capabilities and
uncertainty about the future; they are aimed at maintaining regional stability and a status
quo that allows all countries—including China—to remain secure and grow
prosperous.”34
The US, then, sees itself as providing security not just for the West but for
everyone.
In addition to the concerns over military spending, there is also concern in the
United States in terms of Chinese economic growth. In fact, in Gallup polls running from
2013 to 2016, the Chinese economy has always been deemed at least as much a threat to
the United States than China’s military.35
It seems that the American public does not
33
Liff and Ikenberry, "Racing toward Tragedy?” 84-87.
34
Ibid., 66.
35
"China," Gallup, accessed May 03, 2016, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1627/china.aspx.

12
really expect China to attack or defeat the United States militaristically, but huge gains in
economic growth does cause a disproportionately large amount of worry.
American people increasingly feel that China is catching up to the US. According
to a survey conducted by the Washington-based Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press in 2011, about 47 per cent of participants say China, not the
US, is the world’s top economic power, while 31 per cent of participants continue
to name the US. The result of the survey obviously contradicts the reality, but it
reflects that American people feel anxious with China’s growing power and
influence.36
On the Chinese side of the issue, the fear is that the United States has and will
continue to try its best to contain the rising power of China. It is not enough for America
to say that it has the best of intentions, China can ‘see’ through the deceptions to the
‘truth’ that America is trying to prevent its rise. As Scobell and Nathan write, “Chinese
analysts are prone to interpret American actions almost anywhere in the world as secretly
directed against China.”37
The cries of containment appear over and over again, a few have already been
mentioned in this paper. If the US do something to the detriment of China, then it is
likely that at least some in China would conclude that the action is a deliberate attempt to
contain China’s rise. These include but are not limited to: peacekeeping in the region,38
human rights accusations,39
interest in protecting its allies,40
and the ‘pivot to Asia.’41
“China holds different viewpoints on why China’s relations with neighbouring
countries are deteriorating. According to 2011 Pacific Blue Book published by the
Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Academy of Social Sciences in January
2011, all problems with its bordering countries are not the results of China’s new
36
Jinghao Zhou, “American Perspective versus Chinese Expectation on China’s Rise,” International Journal
of China Studies 2, no. 3 (2011): 627.
37
Nathan and Scobell., China's Search for Security, 91.
38
Minxin Pei, "How China and America See Each Other," review of Debating China: The U.S.-China
Relationship in Ten Conversations, by Nina Hachigian, Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2014.
39
Zhou and Nathan, “Political Systems, Rights, and Values,” 48.
40
Wang Shou and Susan Shirk, “The Media,” in Debating China: The U.S.-China Relationship in Ten
Conversations, ed. Nina Hachigian, (Oxford University Press, 2014), 73.
41
Pei, "How China and America See Each Other."

13
foreign policy but derived from the action of the US returning to Asia. China
views that the United States seeks to contain China’s rise and attempts to block it.
The US claims that it still has a vital role in helping to manage this changing
balance of power in Southeast Asia.”42
But perhaps the most ridiculous example of the Chinese belief is when in 1999 the
US accidently bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Rather than believing that the
United States was capable of making the mistake of using old maps, the Chinese interpret
the event as a statement “that the U.S. will punish any challenger with brutal force.”43
What it amounts to is that despite the fact that America “has opened its markets to China,
trained hundreds of thousands of China's best and brightest at American universities,
invested billions in Chinese manufacturing, and supported Beijing's accession to the
World Trade Organization,”44
and “even though Washington has a decades-long track
record of encouraging China’s development and prosperity, and although tensions over
some long-standing issues (e.g., Taiwan’s status) remain salient,”45
China still cannot
believe that the United States’ actions are, at least from their perspective, open and
straightforward.
This may appear to Americans as extreme, exasperating, or even hilarious, but it
is something that is very serious. Chinese are fairly certain that America is intentionally
trying to minimize China’s rise, but in the same way Americans suspect that China
intends to upset the current global structure. Neither side believes the other in their
statements on intention, which turns the situation into a game of perceived deception
where neither side is the aggressor and both are benign.
42
Zhou, “American Perspective versus Chinese Expectation on China’s Rise,” 628.
43
Nathan and Scobell, China's Search for Security, 91.
44
45
Liff and Ikenberry, "Racing toward Tragedy?” 82.

14
China seems more apprehensive about actual and possible American political
penetration into its domestic affairs, whereas the United States is more concerned
about China’s international challenges in the long run. In this sense, Chinese
anxieties are more immediate and present, and American worries are based on
projections of China’s ascendance and its implications. Interestingly enough,
therefore, both assume that they are on the defensive rather than the offensive and
deny any hostile intentions toward the other side.46
The Western System is not for China
In 1989, Francis Fukuyama published an essay that was destined to become quite
well known, titled: The End of History? A few years later he expanded it into a book. Its
thesis was not that history was over, but rather that the struggle between ideologies that
dominated the 20th
century had ended with the Cold War. Dictatorships and the remnants
of Communism might still exist, but everyone would acknowledge that Liberal
Democracy was the best form of government humans had ever discovered, and it may be
the best that would ever be discovered.47
Whether Liberal Democracy is the final form of government is up for debate, but
with the rise of Fundamental Islam time seems to be proving that Fukuyama is wrong
about Liberal Democracy being universal in every country. In an effort to not
misinterpret Fukuyama, he argues that Liberal Democracy will eventually be everywhere,
and the events of the early 21st
century are just barriers to the evolution of history. In the
words of Fukuyama addressing 9/11 and the critical response to his thesis, “I believe that
in the end I remain right: Modernity is a very powerful freight train that will not be
derailed by recent events, however painful and unprecedented. Democracy and free
46
Kenneth Lieberthai and Wang Jisi, “An Overview of the U.S.-China Relationship,” in Debating China: The
U.S.-China Relationship in Ten Conversations, ed. Nina Hachigian, (Oxford University Press, 2014), 10-11.
47
Michael S. Roth, "Review essays," review of The end of History and the Last Man, by Francis Fukuyama,
History & Theory 32, no. 2 (1993): 188.

15
markets will continue to expand over time as the dominant organizing principles for
much of the world.”48
However, while it might be possible that democracy is the final form of
government from the Western World,49
we have yet to see any real ideological ripples
from outside the West. The last three-hundred years have been so dominated by Western
thought that other ideas and thought systems seem to have been abandoned by the
wayside simply because the West became the culture of the leading powers. In Jared
Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel, Diamond argues that the West became dominant not
because of inherently superior attribute of culture or breeding, but rather because of a
better application of guns, the invention of steel, and the unintentional spread of
biological disease.50
A better industrial capacity hardly proves an objectively better
ethical understanding or philosophical viewpoint. Other systems of thought, specifically
China’s system, might be a useful and powerful system that has not yet had the chance to
prove itself.
As the old adage goes, history is written by the winners. Escobar credits Foucault
with “unveiling the mechanisms by which a certain order of discourse produces
permissible modes of being and thinking while disqualifying and even making others
48
Francis Fukuyama, “History Is Still Going Our Way,” accessed April 07, 2016,
http://englishmatters.gmu.edu/issue6/911exhibit/emails/fukuyama_wsj.htm.
49
Final by what standard? Most morally superior or best in the interests of the people? Perhaps
Fukuyama means it in a literal sense, that democracy is merely the most catching idea: a system that
proves itself simply because it as an idea is the most tenacious and likely to survive? Even this is suspect in
my mind. It reminds me of the apocryphal quote that was said to be uttered in 1899: “everything that can
be invented has been invented.” It seems strange to me to think that no other system of thought will ever
come about. What this new system would look like is difficult to understand, but it is as difficult as
imagining a cat-flap before its invention.
50
CGP Grey, “Americapox: The Missing Plague,” YouTube video, 12:07, posted November 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JEYh5WACqEk.

16
impossible.”51
The dominance of the West created a barrier through which everyone
agreed—even those who were not Western—that western ideas are right and correct.52
The idea that a Chinese system is incorrect because China was defeated by Western
powers has been prevalent among intellectuals, yet it hardly seems to be decisive proof.
The Chinese tradition is 5000 years old, and for most of that time period, China
(in whatever dynasty currently ruled it) was the dominant power. In terms of GDP, China
at many points in times was by far the most powerful, but it is more than that. Especially
if taken as a single entity, China has outlasted every other empire in the world. The great
Western powers—The Romans, the Ancient Greeks, Charlemagne, the Hapsburgs, other
great traditions like the Ottoman Empire—cannot compare to the ancient age of China.
With China there is a legacy that stretches back to the ancient world; ancient China is
synonymous with Mesopotamia, Egypt, or Persia. All those have gone, yet China
remains. Couldn’t there possibly be some ideas in that system that would work even in
today’s modern world?
In contrast, the West was nearly wiped out several times before its rise. During
the middle ages, Christendom was challenged by a new rising religion and culture: Islam.
By today’s standard, Islam was clearly the more cultured and superior civilization of the
two: Islam had greater developments in government over the brutal feudal system, better
medicine and technologies, better mathematics. Islam was the civilization that kept the
old Greek philosophy alive, it was only after Venice started trading with the Islamic
world that these ideas came back to Europe. Islam tolerated Christianity and Judaism, but
51
Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 5.
52
Alison Adcock Kaufman, "The “Century of Humiliation,” Then and Now: Chinese Perceptions of the
International Order," Pacific Focus 25, no. 1 (April 2010): 7.

17
Christianity did not tolerate Islam, and it only barely tolerated Judaism. By any standard
those who lived in Europe were brutal, backward, vicious barbarians, and those who were
Muslim were the greats.
In the end Europe surpassed the Middle East in terms of advancement, but that is
the point. Different cultures become dominant; they wax or wane in power. Europe
happened to be in power when Globalization occurred.
In 1840, during the first Opium War, the West was stronger than it had ever been
before, and China was in an exceptionally weak position. The Qing Dynasty was
suffering and near its lowest point due to corruption, rebels, and inflexible leadership. It
was ripe for outside influences to take advantage of it. The Opium War was the start of
the “Century of Humiliation,” a period of exploitation and shame for China, first at the
hands of Western power after Western power, and then even an old subservient culture
(the Japanese) that lasted until Mao Zedong finally created a strong centralized
government once again. The Century of Humiliation is so important that it has its own
section in this paper, but it is briefly mentioned here to point out to show some of its
implications on the Chinese psyche. Whether its narrative is true or not, it has had a
powerful effect on Chinese belief.53
Even if Diamond’s thesis is incorrect, Fukuyama’s correct, and the West’s rise is
directly related to its superior ideas and governmental system, China is willing and able
to try forge its own path and is not going to become a purely democratic country any time
soon. The validity of the Century of Humiliation is in some ways irrelevant, it is what
53
Matt Schiavenza, “How Humiliation Drove Modern Chinese History,” The Atlantic, accessed April 8,
2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/10/how-humiliation-drove-modern-chinese-
history/280878/.

18
China believes; the Chinese do not see themselves as a power upsetting the status quo,
they see any shift of power from West to East as a return to the status quo. Many Chinese
intellectuals are searching for solutions that are not based solely on Western concepts, but
rather on something else.54
Some of the systems China has already tried have not worked out well for China
in the long run. In the short run China has given aid and invested in many countries,
offering an alternative to the United States who insists on good governance.55
This has
improved the situation of those countries, but it has also drawn criticism of China in its
seemingly immoral approach of helping dictatorial countries, and its selfish search for
resources (sometimes exploiting the people of the nations that it is dealing with). In his
article Beyond Dependency, Ricky Wai-kay Yue argues that China’s international
relationship with the developing world has had setbacks based on their current model of
simply focusing on economy and nothing else. This system is not a step in the wrong
direction, but it needs moral guidance that Yue suggest should be filled in with
Confucianism.56
The Chinese have alternative ideas on democracy. Rather than view democracy as
a goal to achieve, some Chinese are asking what democracy can do for China, which may
not be all that much.
In the 1980s and 1990s many scholars argued that democracy was the necessary
prerequisite for wider political and economic progress. In particular, it was seen
by many as a precondition for growth. But in recent years – not least because of
China’s own economic success – this link has been increasingly questioned. It is
54
Leonard, What Does China Think? 15.
55
Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, "China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs,
January/February, 2009, accessed April 27, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-06-
01/chinas-new-dictatorship-diplomacy.
56
Ricky Wai-Kay Yue, "Beyond Dependency: The Promise of Confucianism in Post-Westphalia
International Relations," Bandung: Journal of the Global South 2, no. 1 (2015): 16.

19
this instrumental view of democracy – as a route to prosperity or political stability
rather than a goal in itself – which allows Pan Wei to attack it head on. He argues
that elections will not fix any of China’s most pressing problems: the rise in
protests, the gap between rich and poor, the near bankruptcy of the rural economy,
the lack of domestic consumption, or the pervasive corruption of the political
elite. In fact, Pan Wei thinks that democracy would actually make things worse:
‘The more electorates politicians want to reach, the more money they need in
exchange for some government support. Therefore, once elected, the public
officers are to serve electors on the one hand and money providers on the other.’
The pressing issues for most people, he says, is not ‘who should run for the
government?’, but ‘how should the government be run?’ He argues that political
reform should flow from social problems rather than universal or Western
principles.57
This idea may seem strange to Westerners. It might be taken inherently
skeptically as propaganda of a Communist One-Party Dictatorship. Mark Leonard, author
of the book What Does China Think usually limits the contents of his book to writing
simply what Chinese intellectuals are thinking about, but every once in a while he slips in
a comment on how he disagrees, saying, “It is hard to make out how much of [Pan Wei’s]
discourse stems from his instinct for self-preservation and how much is a product of
absorbing the government’s relentless propaganda.”58
Or in another section where he
says:
Even if the People’s Republic had done nothing in the world, the power of the
Chinese example would have presented a major challenge to promoters of
democracy. The contrast between its performance and that of the Soviet Union
has given rise to a widespread belief that economic reform must precede political
reform. This ‘sequencing myth’ has become a major barrier for promoters of
democracy, taking the pressure off many countries to liberalize their political
systems. Even more worrying, China’s economic success has broken the
perceived link between democracy and growth.59
Taking the idea that economic reform should be a precursor to political reform
and labelling it as a ‘myth’ is premature. The ‘sequencing myth’ of economy over
57
Leonard, What Does China Think? 60-61.
58
Ibid., 64.
59
Ibid., 124-125.

20
political reform may be correct, or it may not be, but without further research done one
can only state his opinion. China breaking ‘the perceived link between democracy and
growth,’ similarly, should not be bad in of itself. If there is no real link between
democracy and growth then the Chinese model is a real and powerful alternative to the
high standards imposed by the First World.
But perhaps it is important to maintain the morally correct goal of universal
democratization? Yet the Chinese people seem to be fine with their totalitarian
government. Tianjian Shi finds through survey data that “[m]any Chinese rate their
political system more highly on the scale of democracy than citizens do in countries
whose political systems are democratic in fact.”60
There is also a fear that China cannot
survive democracy without splintering into many smaller countries; China almost
certainly will disintegrate if it becomes fully democratic, and so the CCP argue against
democracy. This is why the CCP is so worried about Taiwan and so insistent on a ‘One
China Policy,’ because the existence of a democratic Taiwan seems to go against the
narrative that democracy is not compatible with China.
What makes the Chinese so neuralgic about Taiwan’s political system is the
correct assessment that the Taiwanese would vote for independence were they not
living under the Damoclean sword of a Chinese military threat. And what is true
of Taiwan could turn out to be true of each of the other Chinese minorities. Would
Tibetans vote for independence? What about the Uighurs of Xinjian[g]? China,
like the former Soviet Union, is more of an empire than a nation state, And the
experience of the USSR is seen as proof that democracy could lead to the break-
up of the nation.61
Tibet and Xinjiang are important regions for China. They make up one third of
the country, they are rich in resources and they are incredibly important strategically.
60
Tianjian Shi, “Democratic Values Supporting an Authoritarian System,” in How East Asians View
Democracy, ed. Yun-han Zhu et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 209.
61

21
China cannot risk losing them. The reason why is greater than simply Chinese strength; if
that were merely the case, it would still be understandable that an imperial power would
not want to lose territory it controlled, but it could be viewed as the attitude of a greedy
and power hungry nation attempting to grab all it could get. There is also concern over
these territories for security reasons. Due to their strategic nature, “[a]ny one of them that
escaped Chinese control might serve as a base for an outside power to threaten China.
They are key pieces of a geographically deep, politically unstable hinterland that Beijing
must control in order to assure the security of the Han heartland.”62
Between questioning the universal validity of the Western system and being
unwilling to strive for democracy for democracy’s sake, questioning the efficacy of
democracy in solving China’s problems rather than causing its downfall, and somehow
making its citizens feel like their country has more democratic aspects than the how the
citizens in other Asian countries feel about their government (despite the fact that their
government is actually democratic), China is not going to democratize in the short to
medium term, despite support for a democratic China from inside.
. . . in China we cannot assume that widespread support for democracy portends a
likely transition in the regime. On the contrary, the China case shows that a high
level of popular support can be sustained for an authoritarian regime even as the
forces of socioeconomic modernization and cultural globalization bring increasing
public support for the abstract idea of democracy.63
In short, China strongly believes that the Western system is not for China, and
that China needs to develop its own alternative path—at least if it wants to maintain its
power without going through a dire crisis—perhaps through a combination of Western
62
63
Shi, “Democratic Values Supporting an Authoritarian System,” 235-236.

22
ideas adapted for Chinese needs, some of the underpinnings of the (failed) Communist
system, and old ideas of Confucianism.
The Century of Humiliation and American Exceptionalism
As stated earlier, the Century of Humiliation is essential to understand the psyche
of modern China. To this day, whether consciously or unconsciously, Chinese elites use
terms and vernacular that was developed by Qing Dynasty thinkers while the century of
humiliation was happening in context of today’s international relations. This means that
for many in China, the mechanics of international relations are directly based off of ideas
from derived the late 19th
century.64
In some ways, the narrative of the Century of Humiliation is intentionally used as
a tool by the CCP. During the second Opium War, the British sought to strike a blow to
China by plundering and destroying its ‘Summer Palace.’ Today, the ruined state of the
Summer Palace is maintained by the CCP as a reminder of what the British did more than
a Century and a half ago.65
However, the Century of Humiliation has a long history of
affecting the thoughts of the policymakers themselves. While they might use it as a tool,
Chinese intellectual are just as affected by it, even if they try to distance themselves from
it.
The Century of Humiliation is a driving force behind China’s attitude to not
interfere with the internal politics of other nations. The CCP has greatly taken to heart the
Western idea of Sovereignty, in part because they remember the horrible things that had
64
Kaufman, "The “Century of Humiliation,” 4.
65
Schiavenza, ”How Humiliation Drove Modern Chinese History;” although, to be fair, the Summer Palace
was not repaired by either the Qing or the Republican government before the CCP came to power.

23
happened to them.66
This has given them a bad reputation in some ways. First, by
supporting countries with human rights abuses, by for example ignoring sanctions placed
upon those countries.67
Second, by not participating in certain actions, such as not taking
part in multilateral actions or abstaining on UN issues.68
This aspect of China might be changing. There are some Chinese elites that have
pushed for China to be more accepting of the West and the current Western system. Signs
of this are “China’s participation in intrusive activities like peacekeeping”69
or touting
China’s membership in the G-20,70
or playing hardball with North Korea’s attempts to
nuclearize.71
However, Alison Kaufman says that there are three broad schools of thought
in how to deal with International relations. Acceptance of the global system is only one of
the three. Each of these schools differ, but they all come from the same root: that of the
Century of Humiliation.
Chinese elites today offer at least three views of how China should interact with
other nation-states. All three use vocabulary and world views developed during
the Century of Humiliation, and all start from the implicit premise that today’s
international system has not changed in its essence from the 19th century: the
world is composed of strong and weak nation-states that vie for dominance on the
global stage. They differ, however, on whether this state of affairs is permanent
and on what global role China should seek. Some assert that the international
system still revolves around Western interests that seek to subjugate and humiliate
weaker nations. They suggest that China’s leaders should tread cautiously in their
interactions with the “strong nations” of the world. A second viewpoint suggests
that the current system is acceptable now that China can play a prominent role in
it. This view tends to soften the potentially harmful nature of a competitive
international system, arguing that this dynamic can be sufficiently modified by
tweaking existing institutions and practices. And a third line of reasoning suggests
that China is in a unique position to fundamentally remake the international
system precisely because its experiences of shame and subjugation have given the
66
Ibid. 64, 11.
67
68
Ibid. 64, 11.
69
Ibid., 17.
70
Ibid., 19.
71
Ahlbrandt and Small, "China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy."

24
Chinese people an alternative vision of how international relations can and should
be conducted.
In each of these three broad schools, the idea of a China whose goal is to
dominate the world and recreate it in its own image without considering the other does
not appear. Rather, in each there is the idea that cooperation and harmony is possible and
ideal. Let us dig a little into Kaufman’s three strands.
First there is the most pessimistic branch that says that China is still at serious risk
from other nations and needs to defend itself. These “reference the Century of
Humiliation as a major source of their anxieties about Western intentions.”72
They
believe that international relations is a zero sum game and they need to participate or else
see a repeat of the Century of Humiliation. This path is certainly the most dangerous in
terms of international relations, as the only way out for China is to either fight the
international system or be beaten by it. But here, the idea is not to conquer but rather to
defend China from brutal imperialism.
There are those in this branch who think that the zero-sum nature of international
relations is not an inherent quality of the universe, but rather an inherent quality of the
Western system. These people think “that US discomfort with China’s rise derives from
this understanding of global dynamics” and “China’s rise only threatens the West because
the West itself believes that this is what will happen.”73
If there was some way to change
America’s attitude then a conflict between China’s rising and the United States’ decline
could be entirely avoided.
72
Kaufman, "The “Century of Humiliation,” 12.
73
Ibid., 13-14.

25
The second group thinks that the international order is fine and China should play
by the rules. These “argue that China must participate in global conversations. They
assert that with China’s rising power comes not only the ability but also the responsibility
to engage in a substantial way with other nations.”74
The third viewpoint says that China can participate in creating a greater system
then the current one without upsetting the current status quo with violence. “[W]here
those two viewpoints accepted the 19th century premise that competition is inevitable,
this one asserts that this premise is simply wrong.75
” Some say that the reason why China
is able to create a system better for the world than the Western system is because of
China’s unique culture and civilization, but others say that it is specifically because it
went through the Century of Humiliation.76
Either way, this viewpoint says that
international relations is not a zero-sum situation and treating Sino-American relations as
such is a mistake.
Such statements posit that conflictual, zero-sum relations between nations are
disadvantageous even to nations that occupy a strong position in the system. They
remark that the USA’s continued adherence to what they label a “Cold War
mentality” – that is, the view that strong nations must compete against one
another – makes it impossible to establish cooperation or lasting peace.77
In each way of thinking a conflict with the United States is in no way an ideal
outcome; even in the most pessimistic viewpoint the inevitable conflict between rising
power and declining power is a Western myth. In short, the Chinese do not believe that
they should challenge the West directly, rather, they fear that the West will challenge
them.
74
Ibid., 19.
75
Ibid., 23.
76
Ibid., 24-25.
77
Ibid., 24.

26
This argument is reinforced by more closely analyzing how the Chinese are
improving their military: the Chinese are following an ‘asymmetric approach.’ Instead of
planning on fighting the US on their own terms China is trying to develop ways in which
to counteract the United States. For example, in the case of Taiwan, China has put in
place rockets that could destroy the island despite a blockade set up by the US; to fully
protect Taiwan the US would need to take the costly strategy of invading China on the
mainland rather than holding onto its sea advantage, or rather than trying to launch
something akin to the US’s ‘Star Wars,’ China has developed weaponry “which could
destroy the satellites which provide so much of the USA’s military intelligence.”78
These
are not the strategies of a power that is confident it can topple the world hegemon, they
are aggressively defensive strategies designed to deter the most power fighting force in
the world from attacking them.
On the other side of the coin is an idea that is important to understanding the
United States’ view of international relations: the idea of American exceptionalism.
American exceptionalism, Zhou Qi argues, is the American ideology that America
doesn’t admit that it has.79
Defining American exceptionalism is difficult to say the least.
It has been defined as the idea that America is ‘different’ or an ‘exception’ when
compared to other countries, or as how Americans think they are different and
exceptional, or as ‘the American Mission,’ the drive to ‘make of world a better place,’ or
simply as a self contradictory fantasy that America uses to separate itself from the rest of
the world.80
78
79
80
Miloš Hrnjaz and Milan Krstić, “Obama’s Dual Discourse on American Exceptionalism,” Croatian
International Relations Review 21, no. 73 (2015): 29-30. doi:10.1515/cirr-2015-0010.

27
American exceptionalism is a powerful concept that has been used by American
leaders and has affected the people of America. It is the promise of the American Dream,
a land where hard work will allow those who are worthy to achieve what they deserve. It
is the idea that all men are created equal and that each has unalienable rights; the
evidence for these facts is the American belief that they are true, and little else. The idea
that America is an exception to the rule and that the American way is the best is an idea
discussed in many places and in many ways.81
This understanding of American exceptionalism as a vague notion of American
superiority or an American mission to spread its unique way of life to the world (whether
real or merely a fantasy) may be a mislabeling of a particularly virulent strain of
Nationalism. But even if you define American exceptionalism as simply American
Nationalism, because of American’s position in the world order the effect of said
Nationalism in international relations is greater than the ‘exceptionalism’ of other
nations.82
In any case, Hrnjaz and Krstić find that “in US public discourse there are
important differences (even contradictions) in the articulation of [American
exceptionalism] in terms of US foreign policy and its relationship with international
law.”83
Despite its fluidity (or possibly because of it) the United States has been strongly
affected by this narrative.
“American exceptionalism” has been the intellectual starting point of both the
idealist and the realist tendencies in American foreign policy since the
establishment of the United States. It has served as the justification for both
81
Speaking personally, the siren call of American exceptionalism is immediately familiar. The tautological
idea that America is great because it is ‘America’ is a concept that worryingly seems to make sense to me
intrinsically.
82
Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, "The Problem of American Exceptionalism," Pew Research Center RSS,
May 09, 2006, accessed April 21, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/2006/05/09/the-problem-of-
american-exceptionalism/.
83
Hrnjaz and Krstić, “Obama’s Dual Discourse on American Exceptionalism,” 47.

28
isolationism and liberal-internationalist interventionism. Because of these
contradictory consequences of exceptionalism, though, exceptionalism itself
seems contradictory. On the one hand, it might help feed the altruistic and
humanitarian motives of U.S. foreign policy, but on the other hand it legitimizes
the bloody territorial expansion of the United States on the American continent in
the mid-19th century, guided U.S. foreign policy into imperialism as the United
States grew in the late 19th century, and justified the pursuit of global dominance
in the aftermath of the Second World War. Americans have never understood why
people outside the United States are unable to perceive any essential difference
between “assuming leadership of the world” and seeking world hegemony.84
It of course would make perfect sense to those who have the power that they are
only keeping the power to make sure that no one misuses it, completely missing the fact
that everyone else is nervous about those that have the power in the first place. To the
American, the current state of affairs is not an American hegemony, nor is it a fault or
failure to meddle in other people’s affairs so long as it is done with the best of intentions.
There has been many, many criticisms by Americans for the failure, contradictory
nature, or impossibility of what America has promised and taught them. This happens
both inside the realm of literature and in academia. “The two books most cited as the
great American novel are the Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and . . . the Great Gatsby
by F. Scott Fitzgerald. The U.S. is a country founded on the principles of freedom and
equality; Huck Finn is a novel about slavery and radical inequality. We’re also a nation
that believes in the American Dream; we pride ourselves on our lack of aristocracy and
the equality of opportunity but Gatsby is about our De Facto aristocracy and the limits of
American opportunity.”85
While an article by IEEE argues that American exceptionalism
84
85
Crash Course, “Like Pale Gold - The Great Gatsby Part I: Crash Course English Literature #4,” YouTube
video, 11:42, posted Dec 13, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xw9Au9OoN88; While the
American Dream is not related to the international aspects of American exceptionalism, it still is related to
the domestic, and the larger point is that these great and ambitious statements on equality and virtue
that represents American cultural values are ultimately flawed, or at least in some way misguided.

29
is a failure, as what matters is not GDP or nuclear capacities but “life, death, and
knowledge” of which the United States does dismally at for a First World country.86
But regardless of whether American values are correct or incorrect (if that could
even be conclusively proven, it is not the purpose of this paper) American leaders use
American exceptionalism as a tool in international relations. The American public,
however, might be a different matter.
The ordinary American’s modest appetite for spreading U.S. ideals goes hand in
hand with the public’s lack of imperial aspirations. Consider the American
reaction to the collapse of the Soviet Union. . . . . Far from a mood of triumph or
hunger for world domination, the American public became even more indifferent
to international affairs than it had been, while the size of the isolationist minority
in the United States rose to a 40-year high.87
Nor do the American elites entirely disagree: they believe that American ideals
should be present in the world, but not for it to be the only voice. “While two out of three
American opinion leaders believe that the United States should play a strong leadership
role in the world (twice the proportion of the public at large), fewer than 10 percent think
the United States should be the single world leader[.]” 88
It is not that Americans wish to dominate the world with their system, for freedom
of choice is an inherent attribute of America. While American politicians and elites can
take the concept of American exceptionalism and twist it somewhat to suit their current
agenda or point of view, the general sense for Americans is live and let live. It is more
like an American to say “We think the American way is great; we assume you want to be
like us, but, if you don’t, that’s really not our concern.”89
86
“American exceptionalism,” IEEE Spectrum 52, no. 11 (2015): 24. Doi: 10.1109/MSPEC.2015.7335894
87
Kohut and Stokes, "The Problem of American Exceptionalism."
88
Ibid.
89
Ibid.

30
While the Chinese are guided by the harsh torment of the Century of Humiliation,
America is guided by their sense of right, even when it seers them wrong. The general
sense of China based on the Century of Humiliation is that theirs is a country that is
coming back to power after being exploited and defeated, but they are afraid that the
United States will stand in their way. The general sense of the United States based on the
idea of American exceptionalism is that their worldview is just and right, but they don’t
feel like they need to force it upon the rest of the world.
The Collapse of China Theory and American Insensitivity
Spoiler alert: China isn’t going to collapse. America is still insensitive, however.
In “The Coming Chinese Collapse,” written in 1995, Goldstone and Ohman
predict the demise of Communist China.
It is doubtful that the collapse of communism in China can be averted; indeed, it
is not clear that it should be averted. Rather, as with the demise of the Communist
party in the USSR, the problem is how best to anticipate that collapse and prevent
it from triggering international crises. Given that China's population problems will
force major economic adjustments, that such reforms are likely to intensify
confrontations among party factions, elites, workers, and other groups, and that
the communist leadership appears unwilling to grant the democratic reforms that
might win it renewed support, we can expect a terminal crisis within the next 10
to 15 years.90
There have been many others who have also predicted the fall of China. After the
complete failure of anyone predicting the fall of the Communist Soviet Union, it seems
that there was a trend to think that China was going to follow suit. In 2001, Gordon G.
Chang predicted the fall of Communist China in his book “The Coming Collapse of
China.” He claimed that it would fall within the next ten years. In 2011, he wrote a follow
90
Jack A. Goldstone and Jack Ohman, “The Coming Chinese Collapse,” Foreign Policy 99. (1995): 54.

31
up on why his prediction failed to come true and stated once again that it would still fall,
he just had the numbers wrong, and that it would happen in the year 2012.91
Another more recent example is Jackson Diehl’s “The Coming Collapse,” written
in late 2012, where he analyzes the current state of Russia under Putin and China.
“…both governments [Russia and China] are saddled with economies that have lost their
most dynamic means of growth. They are facing the imperative of far-reaching
restructuring in order to avoid stagnation or recession in the coming years; but it is
questionable whether either regime has the strength to push through the changes
necessary to hold off crisis.”92
I cannot help but notice that all three of these titles have
very similar names.
This is not to say that China will not collapse: the analysis either way would need
to be much more comprehensive, this is merely to illustrate that the West has had a bad
track record in predicting China.93
Personally, though, an internal collapse of China in the
near future seems doubtful: the CCP seems very skilled at maneuvering the dangers that
could make them lose power, even if that maneuvering requires them to make difficult or
dangerous decisions for China in the long term.
91
Gordon G. Chang, “The Coming Collapse of China: 2012 Edition,” Foreign Policy, December 29, 2011,
accessed April 30, 2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/29/the-coming-collapse-of-china-2012-
edition/
92
Jackson Diehl, “The Coming Collapse: Authoritarians in China and Russia Face an Endgame,” World
Affairs, September/October 2012, accessed April 29 2015,
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/coming-collapse-authoritarians-china-and-russia-face-
endgame.
93
If the rest of the information in this paper is at all accurate, then there is plenty of evidence that
America doesn’t really understand how China thinks. I believe a large part of this is the belief that
Communism itself is impractical and unstable. Yet China is only nominally Communist and the CCP’s
number one concern seems to be to remain in power and either remove or mitigate any threats to their
rule.

32
Another example of a failed Western prediction of China was the handover of
Hong Kong to China in 1997.
You may remember what the Chinese constitutional proposition was: “one
country two systems.” And I’ll lay a wager that barely anyone in the West
believed them. Ha! Window dressing! When China gets its hands on Hong Kong
that won’t be the case. Thirteen years on the political and legal system in Hong
Kong is as different now as it was in 1997. We were wrong.94
The West has a long history of falsely romanticizing and understanding the East,
arguably stretching back to ancient Greece.95
This tendency mixed with the qualities of
American exceptionalism to create a people who are tremendously callous towards the
cultures of others. This shows through for both the populous of America but also
alarmingly in the policy makers. For example, there is the argument that the Bush
administration did not understand exactly what they were getting into with the invasion
of Iraq: the democratization of Iraq could never have worked.96
Or how Nixon, in his
effort to normalize relations with China, upset his Japanese allies by practically not
telling them in advance.
The Japanese ambassador to Washington, Ushiba Nobuhiko, was informed of
Nixon’s announcement less than an hour before, and the Japanese prime minister,
Sato Eisaku, is said to have learned of it only a few minutes before. There arose a
strong feeling among Japanese policy makers that they were betrayed by the
United States.97
For the second half of the 20th century, America was not only just the most
powerful nation in the world, they shared the title of “superpower” with their rival, the
94
Martin Jacques, “Understanding the rise of China,” filmed Oct 2010, TED video, 21:30,
https://www.ted.com/talks/martin_jacques_understanding_the_rise_of_china?language=en.
95
Edward W. Said, Orientalism, New York: Random House, 1979, 56-59.
96
Amanda Sakuma, "Donald Rumsfeld: George W. Bush Was Wrong about Iraq," MSNBC, June 09, 2015,
accessed April 25, 2016, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/donald-rumsfeld-george-w-bush-was-wrong-
about-iraq/.
97
Soeya Yoshihide, "Taiwan in Japan's Security Considerations," The China Quarterly CQY 165 (2001): 138.
doi:10.1017/s0009443901000079.

33
Soviets. So what cultures other than the American culture was it important for the United
States to understand? The Russians were maligned, ‘evil,’ and opposed to the United
States, so there is a natural bias towards misrepresenting them and categorizing them as
‘the other.’ It would be useful to understand the inner workings of Russia on an intimate
level,98
but the very nature of the Cold War (with events like the Red Scare) make it
skeptical that Americans had this understanding besides a few individuals. The other
powers at the time were mostly all European, which is relatively close culturally to
America (they are mostly all of the Western tradition). The United States could afford to
not care about the cultural subtleties of the Third World. This quite often came to bite the
United States back in the long run. The United States had a tendency to support
governments and people simply because they were anti-Communist, such as when the
CIA gave weapons to Afghanistan to help them fight the Russians that were eventually
used against America itself.99
This ties back into American exceptionalism. Without really understanding the
truth of the world outside America, the United States will continue to do actions which it
believes may be for the ‘greater good’ but in the end create weaknesses inside America
and anger outside of it. “As demonstrated by the international record of the Bush
administration, the monologue of American exceptionalism has produced both internal
98
知彼知己，百戰不殆；不知彼而知己，一勝一負；不知彼，不知己，每戰必殆, or “if you know
your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your
enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor
yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle.”
99
Andrew Marshall, “Terror 'blowback' burns CIA,“ The Independent, October 31, 1998, accessed May 04,
2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/terror-blowback-burns-cia-1182087.html.

34
and external enemies because of its Manichean understanding of a world divided between
good and evil.”100
Before, whether it be because they were considered very much as the enemy or
because they were allies and relatively similar in culture, or because they cannot seriously
harm the United States (in the short term at least), the United States never had to deal
with other countries on their terms; rather the other countries had to deal with the US on
its terms. China is different. China is not so clear cut as the enemy that the US can
directly seek to oppose it, nor is the power difference so small that America can afford to
ignore China.
Difference in Cultural Outlooks
In Nina Hachigian’s book, Debating China, Hachigian prompted and collected
together ten different correspondences from twenty different experts, half from China and
half from the United States. These letters cover all kinds of topics, ranging from each
country’s economy and military to human rights and the environment, and each pairing of
Chinese and American discuss their assigned topic in detail with each other, and
comment on each other’s views.101
What is interesting about this book is how it does not really favor one side. Both
sides speak, and then both sides get to offer a rebuttal. Seeing where the experts agree,
and where there is disagreement is the perfect case study for this paper to analyze.
Granted, it is just the opinions of twenty people on ten different aspects of a complex
100
Taesuh Cha, “American Exceptionalism at the Crossroads: Three Responses,” Political Studies Review
13 (2015): 360. doi: 10.1111/1478-9302.12091
101
Nina Hachigian, “Introduction,” in Debating China: The U.S.-China Relationship in Ten Conversations,
ed. Nina Hachigian, (Oxford University Press, 2014), xii.

35
relationship, but while one Chinese specialist commenting on, for example, the economic
relationship between China and the United States may not fully encapsulate the entirety
of the Chinese perspective on that matter, it is a good measure for what the situation
currently is.
It is to be expected that the two different countries would often times have
different points of view. While the experts seem to agree on the facts, what the facts
stipulate (and in some cases even the questions that should be asked surrounding those
facts) comes into question and is open for debate. The following is a perfect illustration
of how two different worldviews centered on different ideas and cultural backgrounds
could not just conflict with each other, but totally miss each other.
In a conversation on Political Systems, Rights, and Values, Zhou Qi opens by
discussing how China and America are separated from each other in part because of their
different values, gives a few points on how and why those values are different, discusses
positive rights versus negative rights,102
discusses how the Chinese view democracy,103
and closes by saying that while a Chinese shift towards American values would help
diplomatic ties between the two countries, he did not believe it to be realistically possible.
The topic of their discussion was so relevant to what this paper was on that it is
Zhou’s description of American exceptionalism that is used above. However their
conversation is quickly derailed.
102
Positive are rights that cause a government to be proactive: economic and living standard rights which
China is focusing on and excelling at. Negative rights are restrictions placed onto government in order to
protect the people from the government, which is what America excels at. The argument that Zhou Qi
uses is that Americans are quick to judge Chinese over their failure to implement negative rights, but
forget just how many people the CCP have increased the living standard of and lifted out of poverty.
103
That Chinese like the idea of democracy, and that many want democracy or want to use democratic
ideas in China, but also warns that the ill and reckless application of democracy can be destabilizing or
dangerous.

36
In response to Zhou, Andrew Nathan opens by mentioning three human rights
cases that he thinks are extremely clear cut, and goes on to only discuss aspects of human
rights, and the failure of the Chinese government to meet an acceptable standard. In my
opinion he does a great job discussing that issue, but in focusing on only one aspect of the
question (which just happens to be the one Americans get the most riled up over) he
limits the scope of the conversation. As Zhou Qi immediately responds, “My
understanding was that the focus of our assignment was not to judge the human rights
practices in China and the United States, but rather to discuss how and why Americans
and Chinese have different perspectives on human rights in their own and other
countries.”104
Even in the second set of exchange, Nathan continues to discuss human
rights almost exclusively.
In this way, the two authors fail to meet and discuss the questioned topic except a
specific piece of it.105
The American author seemed unable to understand that the values
he espoused are exactly the ‘American exceptionalism’ that the Chinese author discussed,
and the Chinese author seemed unable to understand the American author’s view that it
was not simply just “American.” As Nathan puts it: “International human rights
instruments say nothing about specific American-style institutions like the separation of
powers, the multiparty system, federalism, or the Electoral College.”106
But system of
government is not at all what Zhou Qi is talking about. It seems like Nathan cannot
conceive that anyone would seriously disagree about the validity of universal human
rights.
104
105
A fact that Nathan admits by saying “We seem to be talking past each other.”
106
Ibid., 65.

37
Although a single instance, this is an example of different cultural backgrounds
influencing the viewpoints of scholars. It is more than just a viewpoint in favor of one’s
own country. I argue that it is also more than simply two scholars having a difference in
opinion; it is an entirely different approach to a different question.
Nathan criticized China for its failure to uphold human rights, but Zhou says that
for the East the important thing is not rights but rather rites: it is the function of duty that
maintains and protects social harmony and political order. Zhou goes on to say:
However, a rites-based political order lends itself to authoritarian rule and to
conformity, rather than to individual freedom. Thus Confucianism has not
produced liberal democracy, mass political participation, and the freedom of
thought, speech, and association that from the core of Western conceptions of
human rights. The Chinese system of values and social relations is “incompatible
with the vision of equal and autonomous individuals that underlines international
human rights norms.”107
Nathan and Zhou’s conversation is not the only heavily conflicting conversation
in Debating China. In Minxin Pei’s review of the book, he comments that “differences
emerge in the exchanges on China's military modernization, human rights, Taiwan, and
regional security.”108
Similar to me, Pei finds that “[t]he debaters see these issues from
clashing perspectives and question each other's underlying premises.” The conflict is
deeper than simply just a few scholars disagreeing with each other. It is cultural, coming
from different backgrounds and beliefs in different narratives as well as a fundamental
difference in values.
107
108

38
Censorship and Nationalism
When I was an undergraduate in my capstone class, we discussed history and
world tragedy. The professor was an elderly white woman. We read Fahrenheit 451 and
watched The Killing Fields and discussed the evils of Communist Russia. In my class
there were a slew of Chinese students who all hung together in the back of the class, who
basically went unnoticed by me the entire semester. One day, the professor asked them,
“hey, do you know about what happened in Tiananmen square in 1989?” They did not,
and so she told them, but all they did was shrug.
I don’t pretend that my anecdotal experience is absolute reality, but the concept
that regular Chinese are not all consciously suffering from the censored oppression of
their state was a new one. I understand that there are differing opinions on the matter;
some Chinese do struggle and suffer under censorship restrictions. For example I know
that liberal Chinese reporters have cleverly said “May 35” in an attempt to
circumnavigate the restriction of saying “June 4,” the anniversary of the Tiananmen
Square incident.109
But it seems that for most Chinese citizens, they don’t know and don’t
care that they don’t know.
China censors its news. This is something that is viewed in the West as regrettable
or unavoidable, and mentioning how oppressed the Chinese are by their CCP overlords is
a quick way to attract a headline, especially in the United States where freedom of the
press is an extremely important part of our culture. The following is from an article with
the provocative title Control Information, Control Souls:
109
Yang Xiao, “Moral Hazard, Are the linguistic tricks Chinese journalists use to express their opinions just
another form of self-censorship?” Nieman Reports, January 31, 2014,
http://niemanreports.org/articles/moral-hazard/.

39
In China, either the party or the state must own every media outlet. At the core of
China’s media censorship regime is the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) of
the Chinese Communist Party. The CPD has two functions: to control information
and to control souls. By controlling information, the party can drive individuals
away from independent thinking and turn them into tools of the party.110
There are arguments defending Chinese censorship that line up with my
experience while I was an undergraduate; the censorship of China is not as bad or as all
inclusive as it is made out to be in the West. “Much of the commentary about [internet]
censorship suggest that China is an iron-clad Stalinist state, shielded from global events
by the ‘great firewall of China’. However, analogies with Russia and Eastern Europe in
the 1980s are misleading. . . . . China . . . is already part of the capitalist world. It is
awash with information, products and all the baubles of consumer society.”111
The link
with negativity, censorship, and Communism for Americans is instinctive,112
but the
censorship that China pushes on its citizens is not the thought control of the Kim regime
in North Korea. China’s censorship is limited to issues that, once again, threaten the rule
of the CCP. The censorship is limited to issues like Taiwan, Tibet, or Tiananmen Square.
“This kind of censorship is not aimed at shutting China off from the world, but rather at
zeroing in on political controversy. Google, for example estimates that less than 2 per
cent of internet searches will be affected by censorship.”113
This is not to say that censorship is a good thing. If Americans found out that the
US government was actively participating in ‘a little bit of censorship’ from their own
people and did not have a very good reason for doing so, there would be a lot of anger.
110
Yu Gao, “Control Information, Control Souls,” Nieman Reports, March 12, 2013,
http://niemanreports.org/articles/control-information-control-souls/.
111
112
Something in which I go into greater detail in the next section.
113
Ibid., 78-79; Granted, this source was written in 2007, and in 2010 Google was no longer accepted by
the CCP, so things may have changed rapidly since then.

40
The merits of censorship or a total lack of censorship is not the point: merely that
Americans believe in a much darker and more conditioned China than is actually the
case.
But censorship has become harder and harder to keep under control in a more
modernizing China. Wang Shou makes the case that Weibo114
has changed the landscape
and put information into the hands of the Chinese people rather than from a single
controllable source. But this is not necessarily a good thing. The CCP’s primary goal is to
maintain order, and when information is given through unprofessional sources, it
becomes an uncontrollable creature that is inaccurate as often as it is factual. As Wang
Shou says:
Weibo is reshaping the way the government and the people in China interact,
putting people and the government face to face. And Weibo usually magnifies,
not moderates. So when the government’s objectives and public opinion conflict,
the conflict becomes more violent. These are not surprises to us anymore.
The opposite is also true. When the government’s objective is compatible with
public opinion, then the government tends to take a more populist stance than it
needs to. The U.S.-China relationship will feel this impact. A populist approach in
international relations becomes nationalism.115
This leads to Nationalism. Nationalism is on the rise in Asia, and an overly
nationalistic government is not a good thing for international relations. Susan Shirk in her
book China: Fragile Superpower, agrees with Wang. She says that “[t]he Communist
Party has embraced nationalism as its new ideology in an age when almost nobody
believes in communism anymore. China’s new commercial media and the Internet, as
they compete for audiences, stimulate nationalism with front-page stories hyping the
114
The Chinese substitute of Twitter after Twitter got banned in China.
115
Wang and Shirk, “The Media,” 72.

41
threats from Japan, Taiwan, and the United States.”116
With its emphasis on remaining in
power and keeping stability, the CCP is sometimes dictated in what it has to do.
“Whenever the public pays close attention to an issue, leaders feel they have to act tough
to show how strong they are.”117
A reviewer of Shirk’s book gives the example of a
misinterpretation of Chinese internet news becoming the official party line of what
happened, despite the facts being known to the party.118
Over the past several Years, Americans have noticed with apprehension a steady
drumbeat of media messages about America’s supposed “containment” of China
that have undoubtedly been officially encouraged [by the CCP]. The precedents of
Germany and Japan show how this kind of commercialized semi-controlled
media, by creating myths and mobilizing anger against perceived foreign enemies,
can drag a country into war.119
A similar thing is happening in the United States. While government censorship is
not generally a problem, sensationalism can rage just as strongly. The as of this writing
2016 republican nominee Donald Trump has used the world “China” quite a bit in his
campaign. A video clip cutting together different instances of Trump saying the word has
him say it a total of 234 times.120
In his speeches Trump talks about how America is
‘losing’ to China, and the ‘dangers’ of China to America. This directly speaks to
Americans who fear China for its ‘otherness’ quality, and has the potential to be very
dangerous.
It is a danger whenever the government need to answer to the people. It is must
easier to know the course and take it without stopping to explain it to any and every
116
Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, 11.
117
Ibid.
118
Roger Fox, review of China: Fragile Superpower, by Susan L. Shirk, Economic Affairs, December 2008,
93.
119
Wang and Shirk, “The Media,” 78.
120
Ben Craw, "Donald Trump Says ‘China,’" Huffingtonpost, August 28, 2015, accessed May 4, 2016,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-says-china_us_55e06f30e4b0aec9f352e904.

42
person who has a dissenting opinion, so since the Sino-American relationship opened up
from its initial closed contact between Mao and Nixon. This is why public opinion
matters in the relationship a great deal. As Wang Jisi puts it, “there have been many
suspicions in each country that their own government is “too soft” or even “selling out
the nation’s interests” to the other country. It is likely that leaders in Washington
sometimes feel it easier to deal with their counterparts in Beijing than to convince the
U.S. congress or certain think tanks of their wisdom and vision in dealing with China.
The same can be said of Beijing’s dealings with Washington.”121
American Distrust of Communism
The censorship issue is one facet of a larger and older American fear: the specter
of Communism. This might be preferably called a fear of autocracy, but the ring of
Communism is traditionally a deep and dreadful note to the American psyche. This ghost
that lives within the minds of Americans and some fearful of China not because it is the
number two economy but because it is autocratic, oppressive, or in other words ‘evil.’
This did not apply to Japan despite the fact that Japan was at one time the number two
economy, or even despite the fact that Japan was America’s bitter enemy during World
War II.
China's stunning economic growth has convinced the West that it is just a matter
of time until China becomes a world superpower. But its ideological orientation
makes China a revolutionary power that is threatening both to the United States'
status and global structure.122
121
Lieberthai and Wang, “An Overview of the U.S.-China Relationship,” 4.
122
Ming Xia, ""China Threat" or a "Peaceful Rise of China"?" Nytimes, accessed April 29, 2016.
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-politics-007.html.

43
General surveys on US opinions opinions of China start off more unfavorable
than favorable in the early eighties, but climb to 72 per cent favorable by the spring of
1989. But following the Tiananmen Square massacre it dropped dramatically and
remained roughly at 50 per cent unfavorable until today.123
The democratization
movements of that time were a hopeful sign that inevitably was crushed by a brutal and
authoritarian government, or so it seemed.
In the spring of 2006, Chinese students at MIT were berated and were extremely
criticized for their stance in defense of China in a Sino-Japanese War controversy. The
critics, which were other students, “framed the debate as Chinese nationalism vs. US
academic freedom.”124
These critics said that the Chinese students, in defending their
home country, were “politically motivated, blind Chinese nationalists whose umbilical
cord to the Chinese Communist Party’s indoctrination was all too intact and whose
privileged education in this free country was a disappointment.”125
Ironically, the MIT Chinese students were being lectured on the very academic
freedom that they tried to exercise. Yet the critics did not seem to recognize and
accept their freedom to speak their minds. Instead, they considered their protest to
be a threat to academic freedom. Academic freedom was indeed being challenged
by various forces in the United States. But since when and by what political
mechanisms had the MIT Chinese students become such a threat? . . . . Perhaps
this was a reflection of the “China threat” mentality that had gone overboard. But
scholars were supposed to critically scrutinize such mentality instead of
contributing to it.
Also ironic was that in the spring of 1989, in Tiananmen Square, the Chinese
students demanded much more, relative to the political and social context, from
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government, and with much more radical
measures. But the Western world, and especially Western academics, stood with
them, at least for that spring. Did the change of geography and target alter the
123
"China," Gallup.
124
Qin Shao, "American Academic Freedom and Chinese Nationalism: An H-Asia Debate," Positions: Asia
Critique 23, no. 1 (February 01, 2015): 42. doi:10.1215/10679847-2870462.
125
Ibid., 43.

44
principle that the Chinese students have the freedom to speak their minds and
challenge authority, even if it is a US academic powerhouse in this case?126
Qin’s explanation for this prejudiced and narrow treatment of Chinese students is
an “imagined Chineseness,” and an “othering of the Chinese” created by an American
nationalism. Qin suggests that “[p]erhaps some Western scholars should examine their
own particularly heightened sensitivity, or should we say aversion, toward “Chinese
nationalism,” and their indiscriminant treatment of any sign of “Chinese nationalism” as
a result of CCP indoctrination that in turn serves the CCP’s interest.”127
I am unsure if
this paper qualifies, but it is an attempt.
Another example of Western fear of the Chinese government is reactions to a
social credit system called ‘Sesame Credit.’ Similar the American credit system, it is a set
of numbers that goes up and down depending on your actions. Rather than telling how
trustworthy you are in paying off of your bills, it just tells how trustworthy you are.
According to the outline plan of Sesame Credit, its goal is “raising the entire society’s
sense of sincerity and credit levels and improving the economic and social operating
environment as targets, put people first, broadly shape a thick atmosphere in the entire
society that keeping trust is glorious and breaking trust is disgraceful, and ensure that
sincerity and trustworthiness become conscious norms of action among all the people.128
That might sound benign, but it has alarmed those in the West. The actions involved
could easily and are believed to include things that toe the party line, and that is a terrible
126
Ibid., 43-44.
127
Ibid., 45-46.
128
"Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020)," China Copyright and
Media, June 14, 2014, accessed February 09, 2016,
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/06/14/planning-outline-for-the-construction-of-a-
social-credit-system-2014-2020/.

45
thing because the CCP is Communist and autocratic, therefore it is obviously evil,129
and
because Western ideas of individualism and criticism of one’s government are
discouraged.
The system has been called “Orwellian” and has been likened to “Big Brother,” or
a return to the dang’an system, “which was highly opaque and inaccessible to the
individuals and firms being rated.” 130
A very critical summary of the Sesame Credit
system called it “one of the most terrifying tools of authoritarian oppression [he has] ever
read about.” 131
His main concern was that your “sesame score” was linked to your social
media friends, and if they had a low score then simply by association it lowers your
score.
[M]ass censorship, jail time, assassinations, those are all big messy implements
for keeping a population in line. That messiness and severity fosters resentment,
eventually rebellion. They are expensive, unwieldy, in the end those tools are
impossible to maintain. But social pressure? Ostracization? Those things are free.
They happen on their own, and as a government tool they don’t have nearly the
same potential to go embarrassingly disastrously wrong. With a system like this in
place, the government doesn’t even have to tell neighbor to spy on neighbor—to
rat each other out— because that is all built into a seemingly innocuous game
system. The government need not step in. Reeducation will be handled for them
by friends, classmates, and relatives who want to maintain a high score. And if
that doesn’t work then potentially dangerous ideas still end up quarantined by the
social isolation this game system causes. Express or help to spread too many
radical ideas and people will stop associating with you, and not because some
jack-booted thug showed up at the door with threats, but simply because
associating will someone with those ideas lose them all the privileges they’ve
worked so hard to obtain.132
129
Obviously I’m being hyperbolic here. But the concern is real. “Evil” is the clearest word I can use to try
to convey the feeling that the CCP inspires in many Americans. Remember, Americans have a strong
tendency to see things in terms of black and white.
130
Sara Hsu, “China’s New Social Credit System,” The Diplomat, May 10, 2015, accessed March 30, 2016,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/chinas-new-social-credit-system/.
131
Extra Credits, “Propaganda Games: Sesame Credit - The True Danger of Gamification - Extra Credits,”
YouTube video, 7:38, Dec 16, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lHcTKWiZ8sI.
132
Ibid.

46
The author posted in a post script that he may be wrong,133
and that it is difficult
to get accurate information out of China not only because of Chinese censorship, but also
because “there’s a lot of alarmism with regards to Western coverage of China.”134
The
purpose of this example is not to alarm anyone to the dangers of Sesame Credit, it is to
show how readily and easily Westerners can be terrified of the collectivist actions of the
Chinese Communist Party.
The general public doesn’t really know all that much about the inner workings of
China and the thoughts that are going on there. This is the said reason why Mark Leonard
wrote his book What Does China Think? and is a possible reason for why there is so
much suspicion of China: they are powerful and we know nothing of them. Americans
just assume that current day China is very similar to how it was before, but China today is
very different from how China was in the 1970s.
The reason that few Westerners have acknowledged the changes to China’s
political system is that the reforms have been geared towards preserving the one-
party state, rather than embracing liberal democracy. Western theorists tend to fall
back on well-worked-out theories to explain why China’s democratization is
inevitable . . . . the assumption that political change can only lead in one direction
has blinded many observers to the remarkable political changes that China has
already implemented. After three decades of reform, China has made steady
improvements in developing the rule of law and professionalizing its civil service
but it has developed very few of the tenets of liberal democracy. With remarkable
ease, the Chinese authorities have been able to co-opt each political reform to
entrench the power of the ruling Communist Party.135
The old fear of the other nation as a holdover from the Cold War can be also
applied, of course, to the Chinese. Whether they believed it or not (though they probably
did) the CCP has done its fair share of being paranoid and directly opposed to
133
Indeed, he mentions more than once that he hopes that he is wrong and that his analysis is incorrect.
134
Ibid., The first comment posted by the author.
135

47
capitalism.136
For example, up to and including the Tiananmen incident, Leninists in
China emphasized that unrest and revolts could not happen in a Communist country
without outside instigation, and claimed that the increasing number of incidents that did
occur proved that there was a conspiracy orchestrated by enemies of the CCP.137
At least
part of the reason that the Chinese are so afraid of containment from the West is because
they believe that Capitalist and Imperialist countries inherently do contain rivals.
[Marxism] posits that the relations of imperialist powers with the rest of the world
are economically exploitative. An imperialist power extends its military force
around the world and politically manipulates foreign governments to perpetuate
its economic advantage. Even though China runs trade surpluses with the U.S.
and accumulates foreign exchange, its analysts believe the U.S. is getting the
better of the relationship by using cheap Chinese labor and credit to live beyond
its real means. As China increasingly moves out into the world to protect its
economic security by competing with the U.S. for resources and markets, it sees
signs of American resistance.138
This fear that the Chinese have for America is not just old Marxist ideas, but also
the (perhaps correct?) assumption that the United States still clings to old anti-
Communist ideas. Fears that the United States’ goal is to enact a ‘color revolution’ to
overthrow the current party for a democratic, weak, and pro-American Chinese state are
based in “the long American record of anticommunism, in Washington’s regular calls for
greater democracy and more respect for human rights, and in its stubborn support for
what China sees as separatist movements in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang.”139
136
Although I already mentioned it, this again highlights the importance of Deng Xiaoping’s “so long as it
catches mice” mentality. The CCP was so used to thinking of capitalism as the enemy that there needed to
be a radical shift in thought before China could begin to develop as it has today.
137
Tanner, “China Rethinks Unrest,” 138.
138
139
Ibid.

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