This document provides an overview and analysis of partisan politics in the late Roman Republic, focusing on the dictatorships of Sulla and Caesar and the Augustan settlement. It examines how Sulla and Caesar both aimed to restore order but were only temporarily successful, as they failed to address the popular desire for more egalitarian governance. Their reforms excluded segments of the population and undermined the possibility of the Republic's survival. The document argues Octavian was most successful in avoiding the perception of tyranny through his careful reforms that incorporated aspects of Sulla and Caesar's successes while cloaking himself in the traditions of the Republic.

1. Partisan Politics in the Last Decades of the Roman Republic:
The Dictatorships of Sulla and Caesar and the Augustan Settlement
Gregory D. Mansi
CaliforniaState University, Northridge
2015

2. i
Introduction
The history of the last decades of the Roman Republic leading to the establishment of Rome as an
imperial state remains a subject of intense scholarly debate. Speculation and opinion embrace nearly
every aspect of Roman society during this most tumultuous period. For centuries there had been a
struggle between two political ideologies in Rome. In the turbulent decades following of deaths of the
Gracchi brothers traditional republican institutions were irreversibly fractured. Those decades
witnessed the rise of Cornelius Sulla and Gaius Caesar, two individuals vying for personal control of
the state. Sulla's aim, it is clear, was a restoration of the traditional republican institutions and the
means to which he attempted that restoration were to be temporary. Caesar's intention, arguably, was
the permanent and hereditary centralization of the powers of the state into the hands of a single person.
In the pages that follow I will examine the dictatorships of both Sulla (138-78 BC) and Caesar (100-
44 BC) in light of the changing political atmosphere of Rome in the last two centuries BC. Both these
men aimed at restoring order and stability but were only temporarily successful. Temporary, this
analysis will show, because they made destructive errors in both perception and judgment
undermining their personal goals. Their only lasting success lay in their responsibility for eliminating
any possibility that the Republic might survive. In order to accomplish this goal each of these men
altered the definition of an almost forgotten dictatorship using that extraordinary magistracy to enact
partisan reform measures, the nature of which served only to exclude significant segments of the
Roman population. These two leaders were the end products of the Republic's self-destructive
expansionist policies begun in the middle of the third century BC. The process of restoring order and
repairing the damage of the civil wars would fall to Caesar's heir, Octavian. His reforms carefully
avoided any appearance of kingly or dictatorial power incorporating the successes of both Sulla and

3. ii
Caesar. In 27 he was awarded the additional name Augustus symbolizing both the admiration of the
population and the cementing of his auctoritas.1 He was now sole ruler of an empire carefully cloaked
in the trappings of a republic.
Sulla still held out hope that the Republic could be saved. His reforms were as reactionary as those
of the Gracchi. While he did bring about a transitory stability in the republic, so craved after decades of
turmoil, he either ignorantly or willfully ignored centuries of popular political gains. While he had no
desire for permanent personal authority he mistakenly believed that his reform measures, re-
establishing the traditional senatorial prerogatives, would be permanent. He grossly underestimated
the popular desire for more egalitarian governance and it wasn’t long after his retirement before his
own adherents abandoned his reforms and removed, once again, the authority of the senate. Sulla
catastrophically underestimated the power of the popular movement in Rome setting the stage for
Caesar.
In 49 BC, after years of preparing himself for leadership in Rome, Caesar entered that city with an
army at his back. Rome's second civil war had begun. Following the political disturbances of the
twenty years after Sulla's retirement, Caesar, embracing the new demagogic politics of his era,
embarked on an equally partisan and exclusive populist program. Unlike Sulla he saw the impending
end of the Republic. Once firmly in control and riding the wave of popular resentment, his aim was
clearly to reverse Sulla's reestablishment of aristocratic authority. His further alteration of the office of
dictator established his personal authority in Rome. He meant to make that authority not only
permanent but, arguably, hereditary. It was to his great misfortune that he mistakenly disregarded the
power of the weakened senate and the influence it wielded behind the scenes. Further, he
1 P. A. Brunt and J. M. Moore,Res Gestae Divi Augusti: The Achievements ofthe Divine Augustus. (London: OxfordUniversity Press,
1967), 10

4. iii
miscalculated the rejection of the Sullan reform measures as having effectively and permanently
diminished the Senate as an influential legislative body, and grossly underestimated the desire of the
Romans for a sense of stability not seen since before Rome embarked on a course of empire.
It would be Caesar's adopted son Octavian who would utilized the successful methods of both
Sulla and Caesar while cleverly avoiding the perception of tyranny which plagued his predecessors. He
too, like Caesar, saw the inevitability of the collapse of the Republic. His control of all legislative and
military decision making was accepted with little criticism largely because of his diligence with regard
to establishing friendly relations with the oligarchy in the Roman Senate as well as the commoners
throughout his empire. In the end he attained the security for the state which Sulla aimed for and the
permanence of authority which Caesar desired.
A note about the ancient sources.
For the earliest accounts of the Roman Republic down to 293 BC, I relied primarily on Livy (59 BC -
AD 17), in particular Books 2 through 10 in his monumental History of Rome. Of the original 142 Books
only 35 have survived. For the missing books, 11-20 covering the years down to 220 BC, I turned to the
Periochae (summaries), written sometime in the 4th century AD and the Greek writer Dionysus of
Halicarnassus (c. 60 BC - c. 7 BC), whose Roman Antiquities, fills in some of the gaps of that period. In
addition, Book 1 of Polybius' Histories is used for an account of the period from about 246 BC down to
216 BC, including an account of the First Punic War and the beginnings of the period of Roman
expansion outside Italy. Only Books 1-5 of his account survive. Both Cassius Dio (AD 155 - 235) and
Appian of Alexandria (AD 95-165)fill in many of the gaps lost in Polybius' account. After 146 BC there
are no accounts written that have survived.

5. iv
Appian's Civil Warsprovide the only real account of the events which led to the end of the republic
in which he offers an account of the wars against Mithridates ending the career of Marius and
propelling` Sulla to the highest office in Rome. In addition to the more annalistic traditions I have
relied on Plutarch (AD 46-120),who's writing, less history than biography, offer valuable insight with
regard to the personalities examined here. His Parallel Lives, although criticized heavily, particularly by
modern readers, as moralistic, offers a wealth of information of the period concerned here. I have
utilized, to a limited extent, some excerpts from Sallust (86 BC – c. 35 BC), particularly in relation to the
period of the Jugurthine War (112 BC-105 BC),although as a populist and partisan of Caesar his work
is somewhat lacking in objectivity. Cicero (104 BC - 43 BC)is useful in relation to the politics of the last
decades of the republic but I have chosen to avoid personal perspectives and autobiographical sketches
unless they can be corroborated by other sources. All dates in both the body and notes of the pages that
follow are B.C. unless otherwise stated.

6. 1
The Middle Republic
Following the first Punic War, and the Carthaginian treaty of 241, ceding Sicily, Rome began its
long march toward a provincial empire establishing self-administering provincial governments,
headed by governors and proconsuls (with imperium). By divesting administrative control of its new
acquisitions into the hands of regional governors it was left without the necessary constitutional
oversight it had when its borders were limited to the shores of Italy. In a very short space of time,
Rome became addicted to the great wealth derived from their newly acquired territories however few
Romans benefited. The road to empire soon began to reveal a marked difference with the policies that
united Italy into a federated republic. Prior to the acquisition of Sardinia and Corsica in 227, Rome had
a policy of incorporating conquered people as either citizens or closely associated confederates.
By the middle of the third century this policy had drastically changed. E. Badian went so far as to
suggest that "No administration in history has ever devoted itself so whole-heartedly to fleecing its
subjects for the private benefit of its ruling class as Rome in the last age of the Republic".2
As Rome progressed from the capital of a group of Italian cities into a Mediterranean empire, and
dramatically increased its sphere of authority outside Italy, it became the depository of enormous
amounts of tribute from those new territories under its direct control. This, coupled with the fact that
in 367 the consulship became open to men of plebeian status, transformed the political atmosphere of
the Republic considerably.
2 E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic. 2ndEd. (United States: Cornell University Press,1971), 87. cf. WilliamA. McDevitte.,ed.
2015. ‘Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, XLIII, vii. 10 -viii. Perseus Digital Library. AccessedMarch18.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0149%3Abook%3D43%3Achapter%3D7.9. "Caius Lucretius had
carriedoff inships, to Antium, the plunder amassedby suchsacrilege,andhad draggedpersons offree conditioninto slavery; the property of
the allies ofthe Roman people was subjectedto rapine and plunder every day. For Hortensius, pursuing the practice ofCaius Lucretius, kept
the crews ofhis ships in lodgings bothinsummer and winter alike; so that their houses were filled with a crowdofseamen, andthose men
who showedno regardto propriety, either intheir words or actions, livedamong the inhabitants, their wives, andchildren.”

7. 2
A new group of leaders began to emerge, many from the ranks of the cavalry or equiteswho came
primarily from the provinces and municipalities of Italy. They became the backbone of the business
interests in Rome and dealt, for the most part, with banking, trading and tax farming, the publicani. 3
The capitol was becoming wealthy beyond all expectations and with it a level of luxury to those in
power.4 The aristocratic senatorial element combined with the financial componentcreated a political
grouping which was unprecedented in Roman politics prior to the reforms of Tiberius and Gaius
Gracchus.5 The astonishing influx of wealth, in the hands of what was now the "new rich", particularly
from exploited provincial holdings resulted in an increased level of corruption as yet unseen in Rome.
L.R. Taylor, expounding on Sallust's seemingly constant theme of Roman decay following the fall of
Carthage, notes that "[T]he prizes of empire enriched and corrupted the senators and the knights, who
together exploited the provinces, and at the same time resulted in the impoverishment of the common
people of Rome and Italy". 6
The level of prosperity of the Republic was not derived from any outstanding domestic economic
policies. On the contrary, Rome was becoming increasingly and solely dependent on its newly acquired
provincial territories. The provinces provided all that was necessary to maintain the "imperial"
lifestyle. Rome had established control over the entire Mediterranean area but it was showing itself
more and more incapable of governing this vast territory. Administrators were corrupt; Italy itself was
3 Lily Ross Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar. (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1949), 3ff
4 Livy. History of Rome. xxxix, vi 3-9. In Naphtali Lewis and Meyer Reinhold. 1990. Roman Civilization:Selected Readings: The Republic and the
Augustan Age. 3rded. Vol. 1.(UnitedStates: ColumbiaUniversity Press.1990),490. "At the endofthe year 187, after the new magistrates had
beenelected, Gnaeus Manlius Vulso celebratedhis triumph over the Galatians onthe fifth ofMarch. The reasonwhy he deferredhis triumph
to so late a date was his anxiety to avoidprosecutionunder the PetillianLaw while Quintus Terentius Culleo was praetor, and the possibility
ofbeing burnedby the flames ofthe verdictby whichLucius Scipio was condemned." The PetillianLaw relatedto the handling ofbooty
obtainedfrom the various campaigns inAsiaMinor. Onthe status ofbakers. cf. Pliny, Natural History xviii, xi.107. "There were no bakers at
Rome until the war with King Perseus, more than580 years after the founding the city. The ancientRomans usedto make their ownbread, it
being anespecial occupationofthe women, as evennow among many peoples."
5 G. Gracchus elevatedthe power andstatus ofthe equites when, as part ofhis sweeping reforms, he gave themthe rightofjury duty inthe
criminal courts, stripping this power fromthe ranks ofthe aristocracy.
6 Taylor, Party Politics, 4. " Senators,as governorsofprovincesor as members ofthe governors' staffs, and knights as bankers…broughtback
to Rome the fabulous wealth ofthe provinces, the goldandsilver ofSpainand Mac edonia, the richesgainedfromthe bounteous agricultural
products ofSicily, Sardinia, and Africa." cf. LewisandReinhold. Ed., Roman Civilization, 242. Appian, Civil Wars, I. i. 7.

8. 3
becoming divided by an ever-deepening gulf between rich and poor, and by a too grudging
enfranchisement policy. The machinery of governmentat Rome, designed for a small Republic, had
proved woefully inadequate for the guidance of a huge empire. Additionally, as the traditional small
family farms in Italy were steadily replaced by great land owners, the peasantry was left in ruin. The
populations of allied regions in Italy and provinces abroad became by this time increasingly aware of
their status, not as citizens of Rome but as subjects.7 After Rome had finally defeated Hannibal in the
battle of Zama (202), it levied reprisals against the disloyal allied communities, furthering their
animosities and leading to the great social and political crises of the last century. 8
By the middle of the second century factional struggles within the Republic had become so severe
that the authority of the Senate was severely weakened. No longer were the educated, worldly men of
noble descent alone looked to for political and social guidance and stability. The center of Roman
government, at least in appearance, now shifted from the marble floor of the Senate to the grassy fields
of the assembly and its popularly favored leaders, although in reality the authority of the Senate
remained for the entire republican period the real decision making body in Rome and her provinces, a
fact which Caesar would largely ignore and regret. What is ultimately so interesting and ironic in
relation to this period of social and political shifting is the political vacuum created by the weaker
Senate and senatorial class. It was not, as would be expected, filled by the recently empowered
populares, but from some of the oldest aristocratic families in Rome. 9
7 Badian, Roman Imperialism, 17f. Badian's opinion,contrary to the prevailing Marxisthistoriography ofhis time, is that the Roman
governmentwas notnecessarily the beneficiary ofwealthderivedfromalliedcommunities. There were few complaints fromthe allies and
provincials inrelationto equality and citizenshipuntil the demagogues ofthe 120's stirredthe potofdiscontent.
8 Foster, BenjaminOliver. 2015.‘Titus Livius (Livy), The History ofRome, XXVI. xvi. 5-13,xxxiv. AccessedMarch12.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0155%3Abook%3D9%3Achapter%3D38.
9 Taylor, Party Politics, 14f

9. 4
The Late Republic
In 133, a year which marked the beginning of what would be a general shift in the internal power
structure in Rome, Tiberius Gracchus, an aristocrat by birth, was elected tribune. Along with his
brother Gaius, the Gracchi had produced a political whirlwind with their insistence that the Assembly
of Tribes take a more active role in the administration of the Republic. Politicians with new ideas now
appeared opposing the senatorial politicians of the old school.10 Although the people of Rome had for
a long time the ability to legislate in the Assembly, there were few who had the political will to act on
behalf of the general population and those who did often found themselves in a political wasteland.11
Something drastically changed in Roman politics after 122. Throughout Italy and the provinces
most aristocratic and popular leaders feigned at representing the people of the empire and their desire
for the maintenance of a republican form of government. Conscious of the weariness of the public
certain individuals, using and misusing either their inherited nobility or their newly gained political
status, worked to promote their own agendas and at capturing notoriety and wealth, sometimes by
force and oratorical persuasion, sometimes by utilizing state issued largess. The idea of birth-right in
relation to political achievement was becoming less important.
The Senate weakened its own integrity further by opening up traditionally aristocratic offices to
certain wealthy popular leaders and military men. Post Gracchan Rome witnessed the rise of
demagogues, astute and capable, building political careers as military leaders and developing their
10 Matthias Gelzer, Caesar: Politician andStatesman.Translatedby Peter Needham. (UnitedStates: HarvardUniversity Press,1985), 13, cf., S. A.
Handford, trans., Sallust: The Jugurthine War/The Cataline Conspiracy. (London: PenguinBooks. 1963),78."SowhenTiberius andGaius
Gracchus…soughtto establishthe liberty ofthe commonpeople andexpose the crimes ofthe oligarchs, the guilty noblestook frightand
opposedtheir proceedings by every means attheir disposal, using now the Italian allies and 'Latin' communities, now the EquestrianOrder,
who they had seducedfromthe people'scause by holding outto themthe hope ofbeing allowedto share their ownprivileges. 41.5
11 Taylor, Party Politics , 13

10. 5
own clientela by promising tangible rewards for political support.12 Land grants were offered to
soldiers in return for honorable and faithful service and political support, not to Rome itself, but to the
individual commander. Powerful plebeians were now entering the tight orbit surrounding the center of
power in Rome with great success. They secured for themselves the necessary following and courted a
client base from the weaker members of the patrician class. Gelzer points arguably, "the very fact that
they had clients of their own did more than anything else to make them the social equals of the
patricians". 13 These extraordinary commands were given to certain military men by the ruling
oligarchy as a result of the continuous warfare facing the republic. This situation resulted in a shifting
of the power base from the traditional oligarchic rule of the Republic to "the figure of the victorious
general" who obtained his political support based more on ability than heredity. 14 Political support
was now based on which constituency best suited the personal aims of those vying for power. The
path to political success rested on capturing the support of the various populations within the city of
Rome and its immediate surroundings. The peasantries of the areas outside Rome, unable to
participate were treated indifferently by politicians in Rome.
The violent struggle for control, initiated by the Senate during the Gracchan revolts of 133 and 123
set the stage for the political difficulties which lasted until the peaceful settlement of Augustus.
Appian, in his Civil Wars, describing the inauguration of political violence in Rome, focused the blame
in no small part on the aristocracy who feared for the dismemberment of their power structure and
status. The political strife in Rome after 133 quickly degenerated into chaos and changed little
12 Taylor, Party Politics, 21. "They…the Gracchi, Marius, Cinna, Pompey for mostofhis career, andCaesar…were all, exceptperhaps the
Gracchi, seeking personal power rather than establishmentofthe rights ofthe sovereignpeople".
13 Gelzer, Caesar, 3
14Ibid., 10

11. 6
throughout the century.15 Rome was in the midst of a centuries old constitutional crisis. Most of the
organs of state were now functioning in a way which would have been completely unrecognizable to
the sixth century B.C. Roman.16 Under these conditions, Rome was in no position to deal effectively
with serious internal difficulties particularly on the eve of the re-emergence of great turmoil inside the
borders of Italy herself.
Magister Populi: The Dictator
Before examining Sulla and Caesar and their respective roles in the last decades of the Republic, a
brief but careful examination of the origin and nature of the office of dictator should be undertaken to
offer a contrast with the political atmosphere of the late Republic.
The constitutional Republic of Rome had managed the great transition from purely oligarchic rule
to a more inclusive and more representative government. In 509 the Romans took to the task of
reorganizing their new government. The comitia centuriata, a body which plebeians had a vote, elected
two consuls, each serving as colleagues for one year terms.17 A consul, while he served in office, could
not be removed and was free of any possible prosecution in relation to that office.18 The initial powers
assigned to them were absolute but soon after certain limitations were enacted designed to avoid both
the appearance and the reality of the tyranny suffered under the kings. 19
15 Appian, Civil Wars, I, Introduction 2 inLewis andReinhold. Ed., Roman Civilization, 270f. " Repeatedly the parties came into openconflict,
oftencarrying daggers,andfrom time to time in temples, the assemblies, or the Forum, some tribune, praetor, consul, or candidate for these
offices, or some personotherwise undistinguished, wouldbe slain. Unseemly violence prevailedalmostconstantly, together withshameful
contemptfor law and justice. "
16 Arthur Keaveney,Sulla:The LastRepublican, 2nd. Ed., (London: Routledge,2005),140
17 EarnestCarey, trans., The Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. IV, 84 (Heinemann: London; HarvardUniversity Press: Cambridge,
Mass., 1937), 525. The Consuls were L. Iunius Brutus and L. Tarquinius Collatinus. It was the consul Brutus who advisedthe gathering;
"…notto make one man's judgmentthe supreme authority over all, butto entrust the royal power to two men, For the rulers will be less
arrogantand vexatious whenthe power is dividedbetweentwo andeachhas the same authority; moreover, mutual respect, the ability of
eachto preventthe other fromliving as suits his pleasure, and a rivalry betweenthemfor the attainment ofa reputation for virtue would be
mostlikely to resultfromsuchequality ofpower and honour.
18 Once his termhad expired, however, chargescouldbe broughtagainsthimfor any misconductwhile he served.
19 R.M. Ogilvie andBetty Radice, trans., Livy: Rome andItaly:Books VI-Xof The History of Rome From Its Foundation (Ab Urbe Condita). 6thed.
(United Kingdom: PenguinGroup, USA,1982), 113f. The ValerianLaw enactedby Publius Valerius Publicolain507,allowedaRomancitizen
the right ofappeal to the people shouldhe or she be condemnedby amagistrate. This law eliminated the authority ofthe co nsuls to

12. 7
With the Valerio-Horatian Laws (449) the plebeian magistrates and the assembly became an integral
and influential part of the Roman Republic. It was then decided that in order to remedy the aristocratic
imbalance of the office of consul the people would be allowed to elect, from either class, military tribuni
militum consulari potestate, military tribunes with consular power. That practice ended with the
passage of the Lex Licinia in 367. Livy writes; "This year will be noteworthy as the one in which a 'new
man' held the consulship, as well as for the creation of two new magistrates, those of praetor and of
curule aedile. These offices the patricians sought for themselves in return for one of the two consulships
which they had conceded to the plebeians".20
The realization was soon made that occasionally certain special interests would side with this or
that consul who did, in some cases, lead to the inability to come up with workable solutions to the
problems facing the Republic.21 Further, written in to the laws establishing the office of consul was the
right of either consul to veto decisions and commands of the other.22 This had the effect of further
weakening the executive.
Judging from the original law authorizing the appointment of a dictator, lex de dictatorecreando, the
office itself was conceived as a short term solution to intractable problems which the ordinary offices of
the state could or would not solve.23 In order to avoid delaying solutions, the dictatorship was an
appointed rather than an elective office, and the potential candidate had to be nominated by the consul.
This had the added benefit of allowing restrictions and even removal without the usual factional
pronounce any sentence inwhichdeathwas the penalty without consulting withthe comitia centuriata thereby removing thatone detestable
vestige ofthe Tarquinkings.
20 Ogilvie andRadice, trans., Livy: Rome andItaly, 97. cf.,Finley Hooper. Roman Realities. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press,1979), 55ff.
21 Hooper. Roman Realities, 41
22 RightofIntercession. A further provisionofthe ValerianLaw of507.
23 EarnestCary and HerbertB. Foster, trans., Dio's Roman History,Vol. I. (Cambridge, Mass: Loeb Classical Library HarvardUniversity Press,
1914), 108f. cf. Dionysius ofHalicarnassus, LacusCurtius. Roman Antiquities. V .59‑77. 2015. AccessedMarch15.
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/DionysiusV,70., Ogilvie, andRadice, trans., Livy: Rome andItaly, 1982,124f.

13. 8
politics which often accompanied elections. 24 An analysis by Ronald Ridley suggests that it was either
of two men, T. Larcius or M. Valerius appointed as Rome's first dictator.25 All other sources prefer
Larcius and modern historians for the most part follow that conclusion, albeit Mommsen was an
exception.26
The consuls for the year 509 began a series of successful military operations aimed at the Sabines.27
Within six years they had broken the Sabine threat but immediately new difficulties began to arise with
other Latin territories. In addition to the mounting external problems plaguing the young Republic, a
growing resentment was being felt between the ruling aristocracy and the lower classes. With these
new threats the population offered an ultimatum; the consuls must cancel their growing debts or face
the possibility of a general refusal to take up arms.28 It is at this point, one of tremendous internal
anxiety that the decision was made to appoint a dictator.29 Since Roman military commanders were by
law restricted from acting within the boundaries of the city, the consuls, always subject to partisan
24 A. W. Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic. (Oxford, England: ClarendonPress, 1999),110. cf. IanScott-Kilvert, trans., Polybius. The
Rise of the Roman Empire (London: PenguinBooks, 1979),254. Ogilvie andRadice, Livy: Rome andItaly, 1982, 190,298. The nominationwas so
important that in one instance the senate joinedforceswiththe tribunes ofthe people inorder to compel the consul to appo inta dictator.
25 RonaldT. Ridley. "The Originofthe RomanDictatorship: AnOverlookedOpinion." Rheinisches Museum für Philologie. Neue Folge,122. Bd.,
H. 3/4 (1979), 303-309. The latter only mentionedas apossibility inLivy, writing inthe late 1stcentury BC, andSextus Festus who wrote his
history sometime inthe late 4thcentury AD. Ridley is suspicious ofthese sources largely due to the temporal distance fromthe period.
Ridley is suspicious ofthese sources largely due to the temporal distance fromthe period. As to the exactdate or personwho firstheldthis
office the sourcesare mixed. Some claimthat it was Manius Valerius Maximus. According to Livy, "The precise date ofthis is not
known…The oldestauthorities, Ifind, state that the first Dictator was Titus Lartius and that Spurius Cassius was his Master ofthe Horse."
What is interesting to note is that the office itselfmust have beenamatter oflaw prior to its use for the first time sinc e Livy,relying onhis
sources, claims that "Menofconsular rank were appointedto these offices, for thatwas what the law demanded…" cf. William Purdie
Dickson. trans., "The ProjectGutenberg EBook, The History of Rome, Book II, by Theodor Mommsen." www.gutenberg.org.June 1, 2006.
AccessedMarch11, 2015. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/10702/10702.txt.
"Inthe lightofthese regulations the dictatorshipis doubtless to be conceivedas aninstitution whicharose atthe same time with the
consulship, andwhichwas designed, especially inthe eventofwar, to obviate for atime the disadvantages ofdividedpower and to revive
temporarily the regal authority…"
26 Ibid., 303. cf. WilliamSmith, LLD, WilliamWayte, G. E. Marindin, Ed., A Dictionaryof Greek and Roman Antiquities (London: J. Murray,
1890), 631. Mommsen's viewis that M. Valerius was infactthe first electedto thatoffice buthis name was removedbecause ofthe fallacy that
a personwho didnot holdthe consulshipcouldbe appointeddictator.
27 Ogilvie andRadice, trans., Livy: Rome and Italy,122f. The Sabines were anancientItalic tribe locatedinthe mountainous country eastofthe
Tiber River. The consuls were Marcus Valerius andPublius Postumius.
28 Ibid., 107.
29 "The RomanAntiquities ofDionysius ofHalicarnassus." V.73 Http://penelope.uchicago.edu/. AccessedMarch11, 2015.
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Dionysius_of_Halicarnassus/5D*.html#73. The justificationfor this appointment as a
curative for serious internal problems wouldbecome the prec edent. cf. Aubrey De Sélincourt, trans., Livy: The Early History of Rome: Books I-V
ofThe History of Rome from Its Foundation (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 1971), 124-125.

14. 9
political alliances, were in many cases ineffective. By placing all authority, administrative, political
and military, in the hands of a single person it would have the effect of quieting opposing alliances and
of providing the necessary singular authority to deal with difficult problems at home.30 There is no
indication in any of the ancient records that would suggest that the population of Rome had any input
into the development of this new office. In fact, Livy suggests that the purpose of this appointment
was two-fold: aristocratic intimidation of the general population in Rome in an effort to quell their
increasingly violent protestations, and to send a strong message to the Sabines. 31 The aristocracy used
the threat of imminent danger from outside to control the growing antagonism felt by the population at
large over internal issues.
Several classifications of the office of Dictator evolved as justifications for its use. The most
common was rei gerundae cause, "for getting things done" or "carrying on the business of state". Along
with the title, the appointees were empowered with the imperium as it was defined by the Lex Curiata.32
The broad nature of this classification and the number of times it was used would suggest this
appointment could and was made for virtually any reason.33 There were other classifications used as
justification for appointing a dictator, most of which were non-emergencies. In the absence of the
consuls, certain governing acts of which only the consul had constitutional authority, had to be
30 De Selincourt, trans., Livy: The Early History of Rome, 1971, 125. cf. Cary and Foster, trans., Roman History, 107. Dio insinuation that this
appointment met with the approval of the people of Rome is unlikely given the aristocratic makeup of the government at this time.
31 De Selincourt, trans., Livy: The Early History of Rome, 1971, 124. cf. Hooper, Roman Realities, 42
32 BenjaminOliver Foster, trans.," Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome", IX. 38,39. AccessedMarch11,2015.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0155%3Abook%3D9%3Achapte r%3D38.
33 Ofthe 102 appointments to the office ofdictator, 59 were rei gerundae causa, notincluding sixinwhichwe are unsure ofthe designationbut
in all likelihoodwere the same. The dictators inthose cases were Marcus Aemilius Barbula, appointed in 292 andagainin 285 and Appius
Claudius Caecus andPublius Cornelius Rufinus, 291 BC andfor a secondtime in285 BC. These appointments occurredwhile Ro me was
embroilednotonly insignificantpolitical turmoil at home butthe third oftheir S amnite Wars (298-290) and
The Pyrrhic War (280-275).

15. 10
performed. In those cases a dictator was occasionally appointed with very specific duties and the
expectation of voluntary resignation upon completion. 34
There are differing historical opinions as to the constitutional nature and prerogatives of the Roman
dictator. For this purpose of this study, however, I will limit the discussion to the prevailing theory;
originally the office was designated a temporary revival of the kingship in order to focus the power of
the state into the hands of a sole decision maker, thereby eliminating the disagreement and delay of the
separated powers of the republic.
Upon appointment, the dictator's authority over the consuls and the praetor was unquestioned and
absolute.35 It is clear from the earliest sources that the dictator held the imperium, broadly defined as
"power of command". From the beginning of the Republic until about 218 the authority of the consuls
was in fact dismissed as long as the dictator was in power.36 Mommsen,relying primarily on Livy as
his source, held the position that the dictatorship was designed from its inception to work in unison
with the consulship as a collega maior. This view is correct but only after the Second Punic War when
the nature of the power of the dictator was altered as a result of the expansion of the Republic. By the
late third century, the consuls did not automatically abdicate authority. There was a shared, yet
34 Smith, Wayte, andMarindin , A Dictionary of Greek andRoman Antiquities, 633. They includedholding elections, comitiorum habendorum
causa, religious rituals, clavi figendicausa, andquieting seditious acts, seditionis sedandae etrei gerundae causa. Inaddition to these classifications
there was ferigrum constituendarum causa, appointing holidays,ludorumfaciendorum causa, for officiating atthe public games, quaestionibus, for
the purpose ofcriminal jurisdiction, and legendo senatui, for filling a vacancy inthe senate.
It is striking to note that as power generally slippedfromthe hands ofthe senate between494 and202 the appointment of a dictator
specifically comitiorumhabendorum causa, "for holding elections", was usedonmore thantwenty occasions. Adding to that the number of
times political electionsplayedarole inthe appointment rei gerundae causa during this same periodand a pattern begins to appear which
suggests thatthe office hadevolvedinto apolitical weaponinwhose hands major legal and legislative changescouldandwere made. This
law did not, however, do anything to solve the constantdissensionamong the consuls inrelationto bothcivil andmilitary decisions. Upto
202 BC this political chaos was readily appliedas a concrete excuse for atbesttemporarily focusing power typically to the benefitofthe
patrician class.For specific instances ofthis see for the periodbetween494to 404 see De Selincourt, trans., Livy: The Early History of Rome, 1.9,
2.17, 2.30,3.26,4.14,4.26,4.31, 4.47,4.57.
35 Theodor Mommsen. 2015. ‘The History of Rome. Book II’. Editedby Michael S. Hart. www.gutenberg.net. AccessedMarch14.
http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10702/pg10702.html. Mommsenheldthat the authority ofdictator was sharedwith the consulship
whichmade their respective offices a collega maior witheachofthe offices,including the praetor, acting independently. He admits, however,
that the power ofthe dictator was in this arrangementabove thatofboth those offices.
36 Keyes, ClintonWalter. 1971. ‘The Constitutional Positionofthe RomanDictatorshiponJSTOR’. Studies inPhilology 14 (October): 298–305.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4171715. 298. cf. Dionysius ofHalicarnassus, Roman Antiquities. V . 59‑77. 2015. AccessedMarch15.
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Dionysius V. 70. Cf. Polybius, LacusCurtius. Histories. 2015.AccessedMarch15.
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/polybius. III, 86.6-87.

16. 11
hierarchical imperium with the consul's authority dominant over the praetor and the dictators over the
consul all subject to the approval of the senate.37
The office of dictator did retain some extraordinary prerogatives. He had more independence from
the senate, freedom from prosecution for any actions as dictator, and the ability to sentence
wrongdoers without their decision being subject to appeal by the people.38 As to the limits of the
dictator's authority it was restricted to six months and its powers were limited by the term of the
consul. Moreover, the dictator had no authority over the treasury, and he was not allowed to leave
the boundaries of Italy as fearing he would amass a large military contingent under his direct
command. 39 That fear was enough to justify altering the nature of that office by limiting its absolute
authority.40 These changes were made quietly and without legislation. It is not an accident of history
that from 201 until 82 there are no dictators appointed as this period corresponds with that
new trend. 41 So why then, in the last century BC did that extraordinary magistracy returned to Rome?
The Social War
The history of the republic from 133 to the principate of Augustus is one of reactionary politics and
programs. The Gracchan movementwas a reaction to aristocratic dominance. Its aim was a
diminution of the senatorial prerogative in the governance of Rome. It achieved the goal of placing
most authority into the hands of the tribunate in the hope of correcting the wrongs facing those least
37 Ibid., 301
38 Wayte, andMarindin , A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities , 632. cf. ‘LacusCurtius, Polybius’ Histories’ 2015, iii.86.8 Polybius states
that the dictator, in relationto his positionvis-à-vis the senate, couldactcompletely onhis own. " …andthat while the consuls require in
many matters the co-operationofthe Senate, the Dictator is ageneral withabsolute powers,all the magistrates in Rome, exceptthe Tribunes,
ceasing to holdoffice onhis appointment". This descriptionofthe independence ofthe dictator, inthis case Quintus Fabius Maximus (c. 280 -
208 BC) pre-dates the alterationofthat office as theorizedin(Keyes 1971).
39 De Selincourt, trans., Livy: The Early Historyof Rome, 1971,216, 321. cf. Ioannis Zonarae, Epitome Historiarum,7,13. InCary and Foster,
trans., Roman History, Vol. IV,107. "The office ofdictator extendedfor a periodofnotmore than sixmonths, in order that no suchofficial by
lingering oninthe midst of so greatpower andunhampered authority shouldbecome haughty andbe carriedaway by apassionfor sole
leadership".
40 This period, from200 to 103 saw no less than16 major wars, more thanthe combinedwars ofthe fifth thru the end ofthe third centuries BC
producing several powerful soldier/politicians. As to the cause, there is adirectcorrelationto the number offoreignwars and the
establishmentRoman provincial system, begunaround241 BC.
41 The lastdictator, until Sulla in 82 BC was Gaius Servilius Geminus, dictator comitiorum habendorumcausa, in202.

17. 12
represented. 42 Its success was fleeting. Soon after the deaths of the Gracchi brothers Rome again fell
into chaos. The rich land-owners reasserted their dominance over the provinces where fresh hostilities
soon erupted into full scale military conflicts.
Of all the crises Rome faced from none were as politically and socially consequential to the
Republic as the Social War (91-88). Conditions on the Italian peninsula were tumultuous at best. Ever
since Rome embarked on empire building the people inhabiting Italy proper had been steadily ignored.
Part of Rome's provincial policy was to categorize Italians into three groups; Roman citizens, Latins
and Italian Allies.43 It is with the Italian allies that the struggle centered, conquered people to whom
citizenship was not offered and who suffered most from the indifference of the both the aristocracy and
the popular leaders in Rome despite the fact that they contributed greatly to Rome's many military
adventures. 44
All previous attempts at securing for the Latin allies any formal recognition as citizens or even any
clear path towards inclusion in the greater Roman family met with failure at the hands of the most
conservative elements within the Senate, the ranks of the equites and even among the commoners in
Rome.45 Drusus' failed attempt in 91 to propose legislation offering relief to the Latin allies met with
his assassination and the outbreak of the Social War.46 This conflict was widespread, although certain
allies remained loyal to Rome. According to Diodorus the largest of these Italian allied cities,
42 Plutarch, Lives, trans. and edited by Bernadotte Perrin. Vol.4 (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press.Loeb Classical Library. 1914), 167.
"The wildbeasts that roamover Italy," he wouldsay, "have every one ofthemacave or lair to lurk in; but the menwho fight and die for Italy
enjoy the commonair and light, indeed, but nothing else; houseless andhomeless they wander aboutwith their wives andchildren".
43 Christopher J. Dart. The Social War,91to 88 BCE: A History of the Italian Insurgency Againstthe Roman Republic. (UnitedKingdom:
Ashgate Publishing, 2014), 44f
44 Handford, trans., Sallust, 152. "Itis true that, in the absence ofarepresentative system, few wouldhave beenable to use votes ifthey had
them. There were, however, social andlegal advantages to be gainedfromcitizenrights-for example, protectionagainstacts ofoppressionon
the part ofmagistrates and army officers. Apartfromthis, it was a matter ofprestige andequity: they bitterly resentedtheir exclusionbecause
it was a gross injustice".cf. Thomas Africa, The Immense Majesty: A History of Rome andthe Roman Republic, (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co.,
1974), 154
45 Ibid., 153. Unlike the earlier revoltofthe Italian allies in 340, precipitatedby Rome'srefusal to admit the populations o fLatium to the rights
ofcitizenshipbasedonreligious grounds, in91 the justificationwas simply baseduponprotectionofmonopoly rights andimmunities.
46 JohnCarter, trans., Appian, The Civil Wars. I.38 (London: PenguinGroup, 1996) , 22. Marcus Livius Drusus (d. 108)

18. 13
Corfinium, formed the independent state of Italia. Having established this new state within the
boundaries of Italy itself, what followed was essentially a civil war.47 It wasn't long after the first year
of hostilities (90) that the Romans, fearing that even the loyal allies were becoming increasingly
discontent with their inferior status, conceded to their demands of citizenship but for only those who
had remained loyal during the crisis.48
The discontent of the Roman allies was not however entirely solved and those concessions would
have a lasting and negative impact on the political and economic future of the Republic. In addition to
the limitations of their voting rights, the allies now found themselves among the much larger Roman
citizenship. 49 The new citizenry, scattered all over Italy, held no real participation in the governing of
the Republic. Neither through legislation or participation in the various magistracies did the new
citizens of Rome have a real voice. All those benefits conferred on Roman citizens , grain distribution
as well as participation in the games, were made largely unavailable to the newly enfranchised Latin
communities. The reason for Roman concession here was both obvious and prudent. Fresh hostilities
with Mithridates of Pontus were emerging during this time and the Romans could not deal with
internal problems of that scale, particularly when at any moment the allies could refuse to send
military troops to deal with more pressing problems outside Italy.
47 ‘Diodorus Siculus, LacusCurtius. Diodorus Siculus, (fragments covering the period91 -88 ) Book 37 -Translation’. 2015. University of
Chicago.AccessedApril 6. http://attalus.org/translate/diodorus37.html.
48 The lex Iulia. (90) Althoughthe loyal Italian allies receivedcitizenship, the senate attemptedto limit the number ofvoting rights ofthe new
territories by carefully limiting the tribal units in number. Appian, Civil Wars, I. vi. 49, in Lewis andReinhold., Ed., Roman Civilization, 285. "
The Romans did not enroll these new citizensinthe thirty-five existing tribes, lestthey shouldoutvote the oldcitizens inthe elections, but
incorporatedthemin tennew tribes, whichvotedlast. So itoftenhappenedthat their vote was useless,since amajority was obtainedfrom
the thirty-five tribes that votedfirst." Further legislationwouldfollow. The Lex Plautia Papiria, in89 granting full rights to every Italian who
petitionedthe praetor within sixty days ofits passage.
49 Tenney Frank, 'RomanCensus Statistics from225to 28B. C.', Classical Philology, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Oct., 1924),pp. 329-341
Publishedby: The University ofChicago Press,Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/262658, 333.Census figuresshow anincrease in
Roman citizenshipfromroughly 394,000before the war, 86/85, to approximately 900,000by the calculationof70. According to Frank,
however, "relying ontwo incidental referencesinCicero, the citizens were apparently compelledto make the journey to Rome ifthey wished
to be enrolled. Hence, the 900,000 givenby Livy's epitome is againfar frombeing acomplete list. Those who livedator near Rome doubtless
gave intheir names. Ofcitizens who livedfar away, we may assume that those who desiredto register property thatmight qualify them as
equites or as citizens ofthe upper "classes" inthe assembly wouldtake the journey.

19. 14
By 88 the Social War was over. Sulla, having been successful, was overwhelmingly elected
consul. 50 While this was a tremendous achievement, Sulla had much greater ambitions. Recognizing
his success in ending the war against the Latin allies and conscious of his enormous popularity the
senate approved his appointment to that command against Mithridates of Pontus. 51 While away,
Sulla's great opponent Marius schemed with the leading anti-Sullan senators in Rome to have the
command transferred to himself. Moreover, along with the popular demagogue L. Cinna, consul in 87,
he proceeded to embark on an agenda aimed directly at the supporters of Sulla.
Sulla's justification for saving the republic was grudgingly accepted by a population exhausted by
turmoil and wanting nothing less than stability. At the head of an army, and for the first time in its
republican history, Sulla entered Rome, to many, as a liberator. 52 While the people of Rome were
undoubtedly pleased that the hostilities between the various political factions may be coming to an
end, they could not have envisioned the level of turmoil created under the leadership of their one-time
hero. He routed the Marian "populist" party with a program of proscription which outraged and
terrified the population of Rome. 53
Crisis of the last century:
Lucius Cornelius Sulla
In 82 Sulla was appointed dictator legibusfaciendiset rei publicaeconstituendae causa.54 His intention,
it is clear from the sources, was the restoration of stability in Rome. While in agreement with Keaveney
50 Diodorus, fragment. 37.25. " Lucius Sullabravely andgallantly performedmostnotable actions, andhis fame and renownwas celebratedall
over the city.The people ofRome judgedhimworthy ofthe consulship, looking uponhimas a man eminent for bothhis valour and his skill
as a general; insummary, it was clear that he was likely to reachthe highestpitchofglory." cf. Gruen, The LastGeneration of the Roman
Republic, 7.
51 Arthur Keaveney,Sulla:The LastRepublican. 2ndEd. (London: Routledge, 2005), 45f. cf. RexWarner, trans., Plutarch: The Fall of the Roman
Republic: Six Lives: Sulla. 6.9 (UnitedKingdom: PenguinGroup, 2005), 64f.
52 Taylor, Party Politics, 18f.
53 Warner., trans., The Fall of the Roman Republic, 99.
54 Dictator for the making oflaws and for the settling ofthe constitution. There is agreatdeal ofspeculation, bothinthe original sourcesand
modernhistoriography vis-à-vis Sulla's appointment. Some suggestthatSullaquietly demanded the title. Appian tells us that "…Sullawent
somewhere outside the city andtoldthe senate to choose the so-calledinterrex. They chose Valerius Flaccus andexpectedhimto setintrain a

20. 15
that Sulla was at heart a reformer, his suggestion that his dictatorship in no way changed the
fundamental nature of that ancient office but merely reshaped it to function within the circumstances
facing him in the first century is misleading. 55 For Keaveney, Sulla's voluntary abdication from that
office as evidence of his loyalty to its traditional function ignores Sulla's own suggestion that the
appointment was made without constraint of any time limit.56 While there is almost unanimous
agreement that Sulla never intended on making hisdictatorship permanent, the deliberate exclusion of
the traditional six month time limit served as a model for Caesar a generation later.
Moreover, the distinction, legibusfaciendiset rei publicae constituendae causa, attached to his new
office was unprecedented. It was the first time that any dictator was able and allowed to alter the
Roman Constitution.57 Keaveney theorized that this was "a natural outcome of what may, not unfairly,
be described as Sulla's political philosophy". 58 While this may be a correct analysis, it belies the fact
that Sulla did fundamentally alter the ancient tradition of that office. I find myself in agreement more
with Baker's appraisal that the office which Sulla assumed was not that of dictator in any traditional
sense but an absolute monarchy, holding all the powers once held by the kings. 59
Sulla's initial instincts were correct.60 Aware of the popular revulsion due to his actions against the
Marians, he made every effort to legitimize his appointment through the Comitia. 61 Moreover, he
continued this appearance of legitimacy throughout his time as dictator by appointing, or putting up
for election, a consul to serve as his colleague. While Sulla went to great lengths to foster the
consular election;butSullawrote instructing him to make knownto the people that he, Sulla, thoughtit advantageous atthis presentmoment
that the city shouldhave the magistracy they call the dictatorship…" InJohnCarter, trans., Appian, The Civil Wars. I.98,54f.
55 Keaveney, Sulla, 139
56 Ibid., 139
57 Gelzer, Caesar, 27. A distinctionSullaassignedto himself.
58 Ibid., 138
59 G.P. Baker, Sulla the Fortunate: RomanGeneral and Dictator (New York: Cooper Square Press,2001), 259
60 Warner, trans., The Fall of the Roman Republic, 96.
61 JohnCarter, trans., Appian, The Civil Wars. I, 99, 55. "The Romans unwillingly acceptedthis shamofan electionas atokenpretence of
freedomand chose Sullaas despotwithabsolute power for as long as he wished".

21. 16
appearance of republican governance he was in fact in complete control over all legislative activity.62
With the memory of proscriptions there was no one in Rome who would challenge his authority.
The historiography on Sulla focus primarily on his bad acts and while those actions deserve
criticism and contributed to the ultimate failure of most of his program, his greatest mistake lay in the
fact that his stated desire to return stability to the government ran counter to his legislative acts. Erich
Gruen offers cautionary advice not to dismiss Sulla's program as reactionary. In his view his program
reflected efforts to avoid future difficulties between rivalries for political office, both in the senate and
tribunate, which had plagued the republic for generations. 63 Looked at in total, however, it does not
strain the bounds of credulity to suggest that Sulla's reforms, particularly those aimed at the tribunate
and equites, was a reaction to his perceived mistreatment at the hands of Marius and the
popular party. 64
His partisan program favoring the aristocracy could not succeed. Sulla must have believed that he
could be successful in erasing three centuries of shared government. Judging from his reform
measures Sulla saw traditional aristocratic absence from power as the cause of the turmoil which
plagued the republic, particularly that period of its history when the new plebeian nobility gained the
most traction, during the tribunates of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus.65 Instead of fostering a
continuation of egalitarian policies achieved through centuries of struggle Sulla's aim was a revival of
62Frederik Juliaan Vervaet. 2004. ‘The Lex Valeria andSulla’s Empowermentas Dictator (82-79)’. Cahiers Du Centre Gustave Glotz 15 (1):37–84.
doi:10.3406/ccgg.2004.858., 75. cf. G.P.Baker, Sulla The Fortunate: Roman General andDictator. (New York, Cooper Square Press, 2001), 278f .,
JohnCarter, trans., Appian, The Civil Wars, I, 100. 55f. "Inashow ofobserving the traditional constitutionSullapermitted the people to vote for
consuls…He himselfwas like aking over them; the axes were carriedinfrontof him, twenty -four for a dictator, the same number that
precededthe oldkings…"
63 ErichS. Gruen,. The LastGeneration of the Roman Republic (UnitedStates: University ofCaliforniaPress.1995), 8. Gruenoffers cautionary
advice notto dismiss Sulla's programas reactionary. Inhis view Sulla's programreflectedhis efforts to avoidfuture difficulties between
rivalries for political office thathad plagued the republic for generations. For evidence ofthis see Sulla's treatmentof the Italians after the
Social War.
64 Keaveney, Sulla, 29
65 Ibid., 140f

22. 17
the traditional prerogatives of the aristocracy. The only way to achieve this was through the
elimination of those popular organs of government which were at odds with his program.
Of his many acts, limiting the power of the tribunate was paramount. He mistakenly believed, and
Keaveney agrees, it was the tribunate which was the cause of Rome's turmoil and that by returning the
republic to the rule of the aristocracy he could set the clock back to a time when Rome was
unquestionably more stable and unified. 66 Gruen's assessment of the tribunate is probably more
accurate. He correctly states that very few tribunes had ever engaged in the kind of agitation which
could be damaging to the republic as a whole. In fact, it would only take the veto of one tribune to halt
any legislation damaging to the aristocracy who, by the time of Sulla, had held a majority of its seats.67
Restrictions and fines were adopted to curtail the rise of ambitious popular politicians. In addition,
he ordered that no one should be allowed to hold the consulship for two successive years. 68 The
number of senate seats was nearly doubled and the number of criminal courts, removed from the
equites and handed over to the senate, was increased dramatically. 69
Adding to the error of his decision to pursue his damaging partisan policies was his trusting those
reforms to an inexperienced senate he was responsible for creating. 70 Further, he under-estimated the
ambition of men vying for leadership roles who, following in the footsteps of other popular leaders,
would at the first opportunity undermine his efforts. Contrary to his own desire for stability, he opened
the door to renewed partisanship and eventually civil war. It was his own adherents and in particular
Pompey and Crassus, who were the first to begin the dismantling of his program not long after his
retirement and death.
66 Ibid., 140. The office ofthe tribunate had assumedmuch wider powers since its creationandinsome cases, throughthe actionsof
individuals like the Gracchi, Sulpicius Rufus and Drusus, had threatenedthe structure ofthe republic.
67 Gruen, The LastGeneration of the Roman Republic, 22f
68 Ibid., 8. This piece oflegislationwas directedatthe protractedconsulships ofMarius.
69 Carter, Appian: The Civil Wars, I. 100, 55
70 Gelzer, Caesar, 28

23. 18
Gaius Julius Caesar
A descendant from one of the oldest patrician families in Rome, Caesar, was a very young and
ambitious man when Sulla became dictator of Rome. Anxious of the relationship between the young
Caesar and Marius, a cousin by marriage and enemy of the aristocratic party in Rome, Sulla, very early
on, blocked Caesar's attempts at entering into the political arena. 71 Identifying himself with the
Marian party, and ever determined for popular favor, which by now was the established path to
leadership in Rome, Caesar spent a literal fortune on spectacular games.72 Vestiges of the Marian party,
although subdued by Sulla, were still alive in Rome at this time. In a spectacular feat of political
propaganda, Caesar successfully revived the spirit of that faction with himself at its head.73 His aim
was the consulship but without the backing of more prominent political figures there would be no way
of achieving that goal. In another political stroke of genius, Caesar reconciled the wealthy Crassus and
popular military hero Pompey, two of the most powerful men in Rome. These two men had a falling
out following the Third Servile War of 71 in which Pompey took credit for its success.74 He then
secured a marriage contract between his daughter Julia and Pompey.75 Crassus, an aristocrat of
enormous wealth helped to finance the propaganda machine of this new "triumvirate". Pompey,
always it seems on the outskirts of the alliance, utilized his wide influence and clientela he had so
assiduously worked to obtain throughout his long military career. Caesar, although the junior
71 RobertGraves, trans., Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus,The Twelve Caesars ( Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1957, revised by James B. Rives, 2007), 1
" Everyone knows thatwhenSullahad long heldoutagainstthe mostdevoted and eminent men of his party who interceded for Caesar, and
they obstinately persisted, he atlastgave way andcried, either by divine inspirationor ashrewdforecast. 'Have your way andtake him; only
bear in mind that the man youare so eager to save will one day deal the death blow to the cause of the aristocracy, which you have joined
with me in upholding; for in this Caesar there is more than one Marius.'"
72 Warner, trans., Fall of the Roman Republic, 259
73 Ibid., 259f.
74 Ibid., 125
75 Ibid., 267

24. 19
member, was the main component of the political trio and through the aid of his partners and he
secured for himself the consulate in 59.76
At the end of his year in office he secured for himself the proconsulship of Gaul where from 58 to
51. While Caesar was in Gaul Crassus was killed in battle against the Parthian Empire (54). The death
of a triumvir exasperated tensions which had always existed between Caesar and Pompey.77
Eventually Pompey, realizing that the differences between the two were irreconcilable and fearing the
extraordinary popularity of Caesar, broke with him and re-joined the aristocrats. The resulting contest
between the two culminated in the battle of Pharsalus in 48. 78 Witnessing the destruction of his forces
Pompey fled to Egypt where shortly thereafter he was assassinated while trying to go ashore. 79
Caesar was now alone at the top. He had accomplished, with few exceptions, the defeat and
complete capitulation of his enemies. Even with these achievements, he was not one to sit on his
hands. On the contrary, as Plutarch asserts, these accomplishments "were incentives and
encouragements to go on, and raised in him ideas of still greater actions, and a desire of new glory, as if
the present were all spent".80 Smarter, more subtle and certainly more tactful than Sulla, Caesar was
well aware of the level of fatigue felt by the Roman people concerning the civil wars and he used that
to his great advantage.
76 Christian Meier, Caesar:A Biography. (Harper Collins. New York. 1982), 71 His colleague for the year was Bibulus. Relations betweenthe
two were hostile. cf. C. Meier. 'Caesar divi filius and the Formationofthe Alternative inRome'. InK. A. Raaflaub and M. Toher. Ed. Between
Republic and Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate ( Berkeley University ofCaliforniaPress, 1990), p.60. "Caesar…broke withthe
Senate andthe constitutioninthe year 59. He hadto do so ifhe wanted to succeedinpassing his laws. However, whether or nothe gotalong
well with the Senate doesnotappear to have made muchdifference to him; by thenhe had already distancedhimself from the ruling
oligarchy inRome. Inhis isolationhe took the Romanaristocracy's ideal ofachievements (or dignitas) very seriously,evenabsolutely; thus he
no longer respectedthe limits setfor personal ambitionby the aristocratic society. FirstinGaul and henin high-ranking and often
incompetentprincepes what one mancouldachieve. Since there was no cause andno alternative to whichhe couldfind himself, his
legitimationcouldonly be his ownperson -whichforcedhimto prove his greatness everywhere."
77 Carter, trans., Appian: The Civil Wars, I,1-4, 2f.
78 For details onthe Battle ofPharsalus in 48 see ibid., II, 29-90,84ff.
79 Warner, trans., Plutarch, Pompey , 246f
80 Ibid., Caesar, 259

25. 20
Of Sulla's ultimate goal there can be little doubt as is plainly evidenced by his resignation and
departure from the political scene shortly after his reform movement had somewhat hardened. It
would later crumble as a more populist political wing of the senatorial ranks began again to gain favor.
Caesar, judging from his extensive reforms, was in for the long haul. His plans indicate a fundamental
re-structuring of many social and political institutions throughout the empire.
A growing negative sentiment to his "edicts" soon developed among the closed political establishment
in Rome sparking concerns of oppressive dictatorial power.81 In both Plutarch and Suetonius we read
that the primary cause of anxiety among the people of Rome in general, and those of the senate and
political establishment in particular, was his perceived arrogance. Most of the source evidence would
suggest that while Caesar feigned republican virtues it was evident to many that he was slowly
shedding any pretense towards maintaining what was left of republican government. His apparent
and mounting contempt for the senate was unconcealed. Adding to the tension were a good number of
key men who desired to crown Caesar. He of course denied royal ambitions and on several occasions
seemed annoyed at those senators who made charges of kingly aspirations.82 His enemies never
ceased in their attempt to plot his eventual downfall. They succeeded in convincing some of Caesar's
closest intimates to murder the dictator. 83
Gelzer's appraisal of Caesar is probably correct. He shows us a man of enormous personal
ambition who was willing to play every side of every issue, even, in some instances at the expense of
his most ardent supporters. As a politician with great ambition in Rome towards the last decades of
81 Ibid., Caesar, 305. Plutarchremarks that Cicero, onone occasion, "whensomeone inhis company chancedto say the nextmorning Lyra
wouldrise, replied, 'Yes, inaccordance withthe edict'".
82 Graves, trans., Suetonius, 38fcf. Plutarch Lives, p.267f. Notthe leastofwhichwas Antony himselfwho onseveral occasions made the
attempt at public gatherings.
83 Ibid., 40. More thansixty joinedthe conspiracy againsthim, ledby Gaius Cassius and Decimus andMarcus Junius Brutus. Atfirst they
hesitated whether to formtwo divisions atthe elections inthe FieldofMars, so thatwhile some hurledhim from the bridge as he summoned
the tribes to vote, the restmightwait below andslay him; or to setuponhim in the SacredWay oratthe entrance to the theater. When,
however, ameeting ofthe Senate was calledfor the ides ofMarchinthe Hall ofPompey, they readily gave thattime and place the preference.

26. 21
the first century, it was quite common for ambitious politicians to adopt measures best suited to their
class, status and party. What is different about Caesar, as Gelzer shows, was his indifference to what
commonly motivated politicians. He would adopt any position which worked towards his personal
ambition and had a personality which could not allow him to accept good counsel or outside checks on
his ambitions.
There has been much controversy in relation to Caesar's actions as to whether or not he had a plan
from early on in his career to set himself up as sole ruler of Rome. Gelzer warning not to read so much
into every small action of Caesar with regard to his personal, political, and military actions is prudent
but one cannot ignore the one convicting piece of evidence to the contrary. With absolute control in
Rome he had himself appointed dictator for ten years in 47, for life a month before his assassination 44
BC and at the hands of those powerful senators he treated with such indifference.
It has become somewhat fashionable in certain modern academic circles to portray Caesar as a great
defender of Roman Republican virtue and a political and social reformer dedicated to the interests of
the down-trodden. Any reforms that Caesar either initiated in the past or planned for in the future
were designed to help Caesar. He was a demagogue of the highest order.
The Augustan Settlement
The years between the death of Caesar in 44 to the establishment of the Principate of Augustus in 30
witnessed political alliances, intrigues, assassinations and proscriptions. During this tumultuous
period rose the Second Triumvirate of M. Antonius, J. Caesar Octavianus, and M. Lepidus, who for two
years battled the murderers of Caesar until finally overtaking the last of them at Philippi in 42. Rome
was now divided between them but it was not long before serious dissention among them led to

27. 22
violence. Finally, in 31, Octavian and Antony met at Actium. The outcome was disastrous for Antony.
On October 30, 30, he took his own life leaving Rome to the rule of one man.
Tacitus describes the transition from the Republic to the Principate of Augustus. After the death of
Brutus and Cassius, there was no longer any army loyal to the Republic; Sextius Pompey 84 had been
crushed at Sicily; and, with Lepidus deposed and Antony dead, "even the Caesarian party had no
leader left except the 'Caesar' himself, Octavian". Laying aside the triumvir and parading as a consul,
and professing himself satisfied with the tribunican power for the protection of the plebs, Augustus
enticed the soldiers with gifts, the people with grain, and all men with the allurement of peace, and
gradually grew in power, concentrating in his own hands the functions of the Senate, the magistrates,
and the laws. 85 Like Sulla he accomplished all this on the pretext of a new republic but he was in fact
Rome's new monarch. He did not take the title of king nor did he assume the title of dictator which,
since the days of Sulla had evoked equal levels of anxiety throughout the Roman world.86
Instead he assumed the title Imperator, a designation which meant absolute authority but did not
have the emotional effect of the former titles. The Roman people have always had a gift for euphemism
and Augustus knew how to utilize it. 87 He based his power on a combination of proconsular imperium,
which gave him complete and unmatched command of the armies and tribunician authority, providing
him with the traditional 'sacrosanctity' of that office and more importantly the appearance of being the
representative of the people. During the more than forty years of his reign, Augustus restored the
Roman world. 88 He revived the Republican institutions in Rome, although in such a weakened state
84 The sonofPompey the Great
85 Tacitus, The Annals of ImperialRome. I. 1. Translatedby Michael Grant. UnitedKingdom: PenguinGroup(USA, 1973), 32
86 Augustus. Res Gestae Divi Augusti,I,5. (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,1967), 21
87 Augustus preferredthe designation princeps, the more informal term, with its overtone ofrepublicanism, after the traditional princeps
senatus. This title offeredthe distinctionof'firstcitizen', primus inter pares, rather than ruler "over" subjects.
88 Christian Meier. 'C.Caesar divi filius andthe Formationofthe Alternative in Rome'. InK.A. Raaflaub and M. Toher. Ed. Between Republic and
Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate. (University ofCaliforniaPress. Berkeley. 1990), 56. "There canbe no doubtthat he

28. 23
that his authority was never threatened. All the Roman magistracies were filled as usual but the
highest offices, consul and tribunate, were peopled through nominations made directly by him. With
both consular and tribunical powers, Augustus had the authority to legislate and as censor he controlled
the Senate by regularly updating the membership at will.89
His recognition of the Senate involved the construction of a semi-hereditary aristocracy from which
he chose his most able administrators and military leaders. 90 Since the number of Senators was
"swelled by a low-born and ill-assorted rabble " he restored it to its former limits and distinction by two
purges, one according to the choice of the members themselves, each man naming one other,and a
second made by Agrippa and himself. 91
Augustus's financial reorganization of the empire began in the provinces, ravaged by one hundred
years of constant warfare. On many occasions he supplied the treasury with his own personal funds.92
He reformed the tax collection services severely restricting the publicani and replaced them with
equestrian procurators charged with tax collections. His building program was immense and must have
served well the interests of the Roman people who had witnessed only destruction throughout the last
century of the Republic. As Christian Meier points out; "[R]easonably enough, Augustus at first took
over only external duties, the defense of the border provinces. This offered two advantages; it further
increased his credit, and it helped the Romans realize, whenever unrest arouse in the capital, that the
createdanew order that took rootbroadly acrossall ofRomanSociety. Thus after the crisis ofaboutone hundredyears basedonsocial and
political power amanifest alternative to the traditional order was shaped in the formofthe principate ofAugustus.
89 Cassius Dio. Roman History,LIII-xvii, I-xviii,3, xii. 3-7
90 Lewis andRhinehold. Roman Civilization, 577. The dates ofthe purges are 29-28, 18, and13.
91 Suetonius. The Lives of the Caesars. xxxv. Translatedby Molly Dauster andJ.C. Rolfe. (UnitedStates: Barnes & Noble Inc. 2004), 67
Cf. Cassius Dio. RomanHistory LII, xlii,1-7. InLewis andRhinehold, Roman Civilization, 557f. Agrippawas chosenby Augustus as colleague
in the consul.
92 Augustus. Res Gestae I. 15., 25. "Four times Icame to the assistance ofthe treasury withmy ownmoney, transferring to those incharge of
the treasury 150,000,000 sesterces. Andinthe consulshipofMarcus Lepidus Itransferred outofmy ownpatrimony 170,000,000sesterces to the
soldiers' bonus fund, whichwas establishedonmy advice for the purpose ofproviding bonusesfor soldierswho hadcompleted twenty or
more years ofservice."

29. 24
saving hand of the princepswas indispensable in the domestic sphere as well". 93 Augustus died in 14
AD leaving behind him a restored world diligently obtained through force of political will and extreme
intelligence.
The dictatorship was returned to Rome after a 120 year absence as a direct result of the disease of
Rome's provincial system begun in the middle of the second century which brought to Rome centuries
of turmoil and unrest solved only by the genius of Augustus. The office itself was altered by both
Sulla and Caesar because they understood that the traditional understanding of the nature and limits of
the dictatorship would be insufficient to deal with the difficulties facing the republic in the last century
BC. They reasoned that that extraordinary magistracy was the only means by which they could push
through their personal political agendas given the fractured nature of Rome's political institutions at
that time. The choice of Sulla and Caesar to pursue partisan solutions ultimately led to their personal
and political failures.
The aftermath of each of their partisan programs led to renewed civil strife. These errors in
judgment and perception were the final elements in a process of republican disintegration. The
Augustan settlement was an amalgamation of the more practical qualities of both Sulla and Caesar.
His great success lay in the fact that he was able to solidify a fractured state by centralizing virtually all
decision making while at the same time managing to maintain the impression that the republic was
functioning as it should. This pretense would be slowly eroded over the next few centuries until again
the empire was threatened from abroad when there would be no Augustus to save it.
93 Christian Meier, 'C. Caesar divi filius',56

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