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Patrick Bones
History of the Roman Republic
Professor Roncaglia
November 21, 2014
The Punic Wars and Roman Imperialism
By the time that Rome transitioned into an Empire it had already become an
imperial power and by the days of Caesar it had become nearly unrecognizable from
the early Republic. But how, when and why did Rome become imperialistic? Even
before the reign of Augustus, Roman consuls had begun to act like emperors, enforcing
Roman policy in an absolutist manner throughout the Mediterranean world. An example
of such a demonstration of imperial power can be found with Gaius Popillius Laenas’
dealings with the Seleucid King Antiochus IV during his invasion of Ptolemaic Egypt in
168 B.C.E. The Roman consul effectively dictated the foreign policy of an empire
without regard to local politics or historical precedent, ending the war with nothing more
than an impressively drawn circle in the sand. Can there be any more blatant
expression of imperialistic might than this? How did these events come to pass? How
did the Republic of Rome transition into the very political institution it was so vehemently
opposed to; am absolutist monarchy? The trouble with providing an answer lies in
distinguishing imperialistic practices from other more common political dealings
frequently seen in the ancient world. For the only real way to distinguish between the
two is by establishing the intention behind international politics. If a war is fought
defensively then it cannot be considered as an imperialist act. Likewise, an unfair treaty

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established because of enlightened self interest cannot be necessarily viewed as a form
of imperialist oppression. It is the vested interest of every state to gain as much as
possible during diplomatic dealings. To prevent additional confusion and to define what
constitutes as usage of imperial power in an authoritative and meaningful way, it is
useful to discern what imperialism means. In the focus of this essay, ‘imperial’ will be
limited to state dealings with outside forces such as non-Italian peoples, states, and
cultures. In essence, aggressively acting outside of the norm of international relations
qualifies as imperialistic. A demonstration of such a distinction can be made by
comparing the use of Roman naval power in the First and Third Centuries B.C.E. In 67
B.C.E. Pompey Magnus was charged with ridding the Mediterranean of piracy. This
usage of military force doesn’t qualify an imperialistic because it deals with an existing
problem that plagued the ancient world. Pompey’s campaign was not meant to seize
power or enforce Roman rule on another nation. Protection of maritime commercial
interests falls under the normal scope of governmental policy. Whereas the construction
of a Roman fleet in 261 B.C.E. for the purpose of pushing Carthage out of Sicily would
be considered imperialistic.
Additionally, a state’s view towards its neighbors influences the level of
imperialism. Therefore, Cato the Elder’s catchphrase ‘and Carthage must be destroyed’
is quite telling. By the end of the various conflicts with Carthage, Rome had transitioned
into an Imperial power unparalleled until the formal establishment of the Empire under
Tiberius. This paper seeks to prove that the Punic Wars, brought the Roman Republic
into greater contact with the rest of the Mediterranean and started the republic down the
road to imperialism and empire. Before the Punic Wars, Rome wasn’t the dominant

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power in the Western Mediterranean nor did its encompass territory beyond that of the
Italian peninsula. But afterwards, its territorial possessions included Spain, Italy,
Southern France, Greece, Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia. Rome’s quest for power and
wealth drew it into a series of prolonged military conflicts with the only other major
power in the Western Mediterranean and ended with its transition into imperialism.
The First Punic War began with a simple request for military aid by a group of
mercenaries located in Sicily. But the conflicts which occurred as a result caused
hundreds of thousands of deaths, the destruction of entire cities and the collapse of an
empire. Rome’s response to the Mamertine’s request for military intervention in 265
B.C.E. demonstrated a willingness on the part of the Roman political system to engage
itself in foreign and extraneous conflicts for the purpose of gaining wealth and political
power. “One thinks not only of such items as the income from Spanish mines, but also
of the large indemnity payments... approximately 27,000 talents. ” Because of the1
existing format of the Roman political system, where consuls only served for a year,
there was an emphasis on gaining quick military victories, and the accumulation of fast
wealth to further their political careers before their term ended. This bias created a
tendency for short term military confrontation. Although this, in and of itself, does not
prove Roman Imperialism; but the resulting Roman expansion and absorption of
Carthaginian territory, especially territory illegally seized, does paint the picture for a
shift from traditional foreign policy to imperialism. [Polybius] “says, ‘they aimed boldly at
Harris, William. War and Imperialism in Republican Rome. Oxford: Clarendon, 1979. Print. Page 691

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universal domination and power.’ ” Upon the conclusion of the conflict, Rome had2
gained control over the island of Sicily and complete autonomy over the Western
Mediterranean in terms of sheer naval power. Immediately after the conclusion of the
war, Rome illegally seized Corsica and Sardinia in an unprecedented land grab. This3
seizure occurred once Carthage was weakened from fighting its own mercenaries
because it couldn’t pay them as a result of the war indemnity it was required to give to
Rome. Therefore, even though Carthage had maintained the majority of its overall
military capacity during its initial conflict with Rome, the resulting financial instability
caused it to lose much of its territorial possessions. The sudden influx of wealth into
Rome from confiscated Carthaginian territory must have impressed upon “senatorial
minds that in general both war and expansion were profitable.” This positive outcome4
contributed to the ease at which Rome entered into a second conflict with Carthage
even though the war had cost the lives of so many Romans and Italians.
Now, while the results of the First Punic War do provide support for the
beginnings of a transition to imperialism it was the events leading up do, during, and
immediately after the Second Punic War which truly set Rome down the path towards
empire and imperialism. In 226 B.C.E. Rome had made an treaty with Carthage dividing
the Iberian peninsula into two separate spheres of influence based on the Ebro River,
with Rome to the north and Carthage to the south. Unfortunately the Lutatius treaty of
241 B.C.E., which ended ended the First Punic War, prohibited both Carthage and
Harris, William. War and Imperialism in Republican Rome. Oxford: Clarendon, 1979. Print. Page 1082
Roncaglia, Carolynn. “The Roman Republic.” Class. Santa Clara University, Santa Clara. 9/22/14 - 12/5/14. Lecture.3
Harris, William. War and Imperialism in Republican Rome. Oxford: Clarendon, 1979. Print. Page 684

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Rome from attacking each other’s allies. South of the River Ebro, in the Carthaginian
sphere of influence, was the city Saguntum. The city had initiated diplomatic relation
with Rome and was, technically speaking, an ally. So in when Hannibal Barca besieged
the city in 219 B.C.E., war was declared the following year. Rome used its relationship
with Saguntum to start a second war with Carthage specifically because the Roman
state had benefited so much from the prior conflict. Rome could have easily kept the
peace by abiding by the spheres of influence specified in the treaty of 226 B.C.E.
Instead, it chose to aggressively pursue a acquisition of Carthaginian territory and the
abridged narrative of the war is as follows. Hannibal led an army through southern
France and into Italy, fighting several pitched battles against Rome and her allies
without defeat. While Hannibal was somewhat successful in fragmenting the complex
network of Italian alliances with Rome, the highpoint of which was Capua’s defection to
the Carthaginian side in 216 B.C.E. Then in an effort to weaken the Carthaginian war
machine, Rome invaded Spain and was largely unsuccessful until Publius Cornelius
Scipio Africanus took command. Once Spain was pacified under Roman control any
chance of resupplying Hannibal in Italy vanished. Scipio then gathered his forces in
Sicily and launched an invasion of Africa. With Carthage in danger, Hannibal was forced
to abandon his campaign in Italy and return home where he was defeated by Scipio at
the battle of Zama in 201 B.C.E. Rome’s actions show that it was far more interested in
profiting from the conflict then stopping the damage. Rome could have focused on
Hannibal’s rampage through Italy or it could even sued for peace. Instead it launched
numerous campaigns into Spain to seize Carthage’s most valuable assets. Profit
motivated militarism is a clear sign of imperialistic intentions.

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Two points of critical importance need to be acknowledged. Firstly, while the
Carthaginian government took a backseat in the war effort. The Roman Senate was
proactive in directing the course of the war. By taking the fight to Carthaginian territory
in Spain and later to Africa itself, Rome demonstrated its ability to maintain its
perspective on territorial gains. The Second Punic War wasn’t a matter of defeating
Hannibal, it was about removing Carthage’s ability to function as an empire and adding
to the Roman state. Therefore Rome targeted its enemy’s most valuable possessions
and finally went in for the kill. This shows that Rome’s foreign policy was consistently
cohesive and outward looking. Secondly, the kingdom of Macedon, under Philip V, allied
itself with Carthage against Rome. This unification of Rome’s enemies shows that there
was a development of international thought which recognized the danger that Rome’s
expanse represented. Even if Rome itself had yet to become a full fledged imperialistic
power, its neighbors had recognized the growing trend of Rome’s imperialism. In
summation, the Second Punic War resulted in the complete collapse of Carthage as a
serious contender for Mediterranean power and the propulsion of Rome into the leading
power in the world. The war gave the Roman Republic majority control of Iberia and
launched it into a series of conflicts in Greece which in turn brought it into increased
interactions with the Ptolemaic and Seleucid dynasties. The following centuries saw the
rise of proxy wars between various Eastern Mediterranean powers at the behest of
Rome, specifically wars between the Aetolian League and Macedon. This trend of
meddling in foreign affairs continue on with the Roman victory over the Macedonian
monarch Perseus at Pydna in 168. B.C.E. and the subsequent redistricting of
Macedonian territory. This brings us back to Laenas’ interaction with the Seleucid

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Empire, marking the highpoint imperialism in the Roman Republic. For within a century
the Roman Republic would transition into an empire and fully embrace its imperialistic
nature.
In conclusion, if one compares Rome’s territorial possessions before the the First
Punic War and after the Third Punic War one can clearly see a massive spike. Likewise,
Rome’s military capacity and material wealth also dramatically increased during this
period. It is therefore assertable that the imperial period began once the Punic Wars
ended, for it was at this time that Rome was at the peak of its growth.

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Works Cited
1. Harris, William. War and Imperialism in Republican Rome. Oxford: Clarendon, 1979.
Print.
2. Badian, E. Roman Imperialism In The Late Republic. Ithica: Cornell UP, 1968. Print.
3. Thiel. A History of Roman Sea-Power Before The Second Punic War. Amsterdam:
North-Holland. Print.
4. Arnold, W. Studies of Roman Imperialism. Manchester: At The UP, 1906. Print.
5. Roncaglia, Carolynn. “The Roman Republic.” Class. Santa Clara University, Santa
Clara. 9/22/14 - 12/5/14. Lecture.
6. Plutarch. Rome in Crisis. New York: Penguin Books, 2010. Print.