Why is there maritime tension between China and its southeast Asian neighbours, and where is it heading? Lord Michael Williams and Christian Le Mière of International Institute for Strategic Studies discuss at Chatham House on 23 October 2012.
- China views dominance over the South China Sea as strategically important for gaining access to the wider Pacific and Indian Ocean, allowing it to influence global trade routes and project power.
- If China gains control over the South China Sea, it could "Finlandize" countries like Vietnam and the Philippines by constraining their foreign policies to be more favorable to China's interests through economic and military pressure.
- The US faces the challenge of enforcing costs on China to prevent aggression in the South China Sea, while avoiding a direct military conflict that could damage the important US-China relationship.
This document provides context on past, present, and future military cooperation between Vietnam and the United States from the Vietnamese perspective. It discusses Vietnam's reasons for closer cooperation with the US, including concerns about China's rise and actions in the South China Sea. The document then outlines the development of the military relationship since 1995, starting with cooperation on recovering MIA soldiers and moving to increased exchanges, training programs, and high-level visits between the two countries. It concludes by noting Vietnam's calculations in strengthening ties with the US while avoiding provoking China.
Philippines-China Security Relations and the South China Sea Disputes: Curren...Rommel Banlaoi
This document discusses the history and current state of relations between the Philippines and China. It notes that ancient relations were characterized by good neighborliness, while modern relations have been more complex, with periods of amity and hostility. Key topics covered include tributary missions dating back to the 10th century, periods of relations defined by the Cold War and normalization, and recent tensions over territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The document also outlines visits by Philippine presidents to China and identifies current issues challenging relations such as the situations at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal.
The document discusses China's increasingly assertive "frown diplomacy" in Southeast Asia regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea, in contrast to its previous "smile diplomacy." It describes how China strongly pressured ASEAN countries at a July 2010 meeting to not discuss the South China Sea issue. However, many countries brought it up anyway, angering China. The US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's comments at the meeting implicitly challenged China's position on the disputes. Moving forward, China, ASEAN countries, and the US all need to find a cooperative approach to resolve the issues and uphold international law regarding the South China Sea.
The China factor in US alliances in East Asia and the Asia Pacific 1Shree Silwal
What are China’s perception and concerns regarding the US alliance system as a whole and regarding specific bilateral military alliances of the US?
What is the China’s place in the US worldview after cold war ?
What are the view of US allies regarding China?
What are the changes in the perception of China regarding the future alliance development in after math of post 9/11 incident ?
International opinion on the South China Sea issueraissarobles
This PDF file was just now provided by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs. It is the first such compilation of reports on the South China Sea conflict from Manila's perspective
The document summarizes the territorial disputes over islands and waters in the South China Sea between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. It discusses China's "nine-dash line" claim over much of the region that was rejected by an international tribunal in 2016 in a case brought by the Philippines. The ruling found that China had violated the Philippines' sovereign rights, and that none of the features China occupied qualified as islands under international law. However, China and its ally Pakistan have rejected the tribunal's ruling.
The Rise of China's Maritime Power in the South China Sea: Maritime Security ...Rommel Banlaoi
This document discusses the rising maritime power of China in the South China Sea and the security dilemma it creates in Philippines-China relations. It argues that China's implementation of its naval strategy has grown its maritime power, creating security anxieties for the Philippines. This security dilemma has trapped both countries in a "guessing game" where they try to determine each other's strategic intentions as either benign or malign. The document states that overcoming this maritime security dilemma is essential for improving bilateral ties between the Philippines and China.
- China views dominance over the South China Sea as strategically important for gaining access to the wider Pacific and Indian Ocean, allowing it to influence global trade routes and project power.
- If China gains control over the South China Sea, it could "Finlandize" countries like Vietnam and the Philippines by constraining their foreign policies to be more favorable to China's interests through economic and military pressure.
- The US faces the challenge of enforcing costs on China to prevent aggression in the South China Sea, while avoiding a direct military conflict that could damage the important US-China relationship.
This document provides context on past, present, and future military cooperation between Vietnam and the United States from the Vietnamese perspective. It discusses Vietnam's reasons for closer cooperation with the US, including concerns about China's rise and actions in the South China Sea. The document then outlines the development of the military relationship since 1995, starting with cooperation on recovering MIA soldiers and moving to increased exchanges, training programs, and high-level visits between the two countries. It concludes by noting Vietnam's calculations in strengthening ties with the US while avoiding provoking China.
Philippines-China Security Relations and the South China Sea Disputes: Curren...Rommel Banlaoi
This document discusses the history and current state of relations between the Philippines and China. It notes that ancient relations were characterized by good neighborliness, while modern relations have been more complex, with periods of amity and hostility. Key topics covered include tributary missions dating back to the 10th century, periods of relations defined by the Cold War and normalization, and recent tensions over territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The document also outlines visits by Philippine presidents to China and identifies current issues challenging relations such as the situations at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal.
The document discusses China's increasingly assertive "frown diplomacy" in Southeast Asia regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea, in contrast to its previous "smile diplomacy." It describes how China strongly pressured ASEAN countries at a July 2010 meeting to not discuss the South China Sea issue. However, many countries brought it up anyway, angering China. The US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's comments at the meeting implicitly challenged China's position on the disputes. Moving forward, China, ASEAN countries, and the US all need to find a cooperative approach to resolve the issues and uphold international law regarding the South China Sea.
The China factor in US alliances in East Asia and the Asia Pacific 1Shree Silwal
What are China’s perception and concerns regarding the US alliance system as a whole and regarding specific bilateral military alliances of the US?
What is the China’s place in the US worldview after cold war ?
What are the view of US allies regarding China?
What are the changes in the perception of China regarding the future alliance development in after math of post 9/11 incident ?
International opinion on the South China Sea issueraissarobles
This PDF file was just now provided by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs. It is the first such compilation of reports on the South China Sea conflict from Manila's perspective
The document summarizes the territorial disputes over islands and waters in the South China Sea between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. It discusses China's "nine-dash line" claim over much of the region that was rejected by an international tribunal in 2016 in a case brought by the Philippines. The ruling found that China had violated the Philippines' sovereign rights, and that none of the features China occupied qualified as islands under international law. However, China and its ally Pakistan have rejected the tribunal's ruling.
The Rise of China's Maritime Power in the South China Sea: Maritime Security ...Rommel Banlaoi
This document discusses the rising maritime power of China in the South China Sea and the security dilemma it creates in Philippines-China relations. It argues that China's implementation of its naval strategy has grown its maritime power, creating security anxieties for the Philippines. This security dilemma has trapped both countries in a "guessing game" where they try to determine each other's strategic intentions as either benign or malign. The document states that overcoming this maritime security dilemma is essential for improving bilateral ties between the Philippines and China.
1. The document analyzes the South China Sea dispute between China and neighboring ASEAN countries over island territories, and the recent involvement of the US.
2. It argues that the US portrayal of renewed engagement is overstated, as the US has long maintained a naval presence and military exercises in the region. Meanwhile, China has strengthened economic ties with ASEAN through their free trade agreement.
3. The document concludes that media portrayals of rising tensions are overblown, as claimants are continuing informal negotiations over the disputes through ASEAN-China cooperation, while military conflict is unlikely given China's preference for non-military resolution and expanding economic influence in the region.
This document discusses international opinion on disputes between China and its neighbors in the South China Sea. It argues that defending US allies Japan and the Philippines from Chinese aggression would not constitute entrapment for two reasons. First, the disputes involve China trying to alter the status quo through intimidation and coercion in critical trade routes and strategic waters. Second, the US' policy of strategic ambiguity has not been effective in preserving stability, as China continues rejecting international law and multilateral negotiations. Clear security commitments from the US are needed to uphold international law and freedom of navigation, and to reassure allies like Japan that are critical to US interests in the region.
Dean Cheng is The Heritage Foundation‘s research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs. He specializes in China’s military and foreign policy, in particular its relationship with the rest of Asia and with the United States. He is fluent in Chinese, and uses Chinese language materials regularly in his work. Prior to joining Heritage, he was a senior analyst with the China Studies Division at Center for Naval Analyses from 2001-2009, where he specialized on Chinese military issues, and authored studies on Chinese military doctrine, Chinese mobilization concepts, and Chinese space capabilities.
complex.
South China Sea & Crimea -- similarities !!!Jeff Schubert
Events is Crimea should serve as a warning about what could easily happen in the South China Sea. Russia & China will always focus on "national security"
This document provides an overview of an international conference on the South China Sea that will take place from September 28-30, 2016 in Canberra, Australia. The conference is organized by UNSW Canberra at the Australian Defence Force Academy, the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, and the Japan Institute of International Affairs. The conference will include panels on the strategic and economic implications of the South China Sea disputes, challenges for Southeast Asian countries, the role of international law, and paths forward for conflict mitigation. It outlines the objectives, participants, speaker details, and session topics for the conference and associated workshops.
Chapter TwoAmerican Foreign PolicyGlenn P. HastedtDaJinElias52
Chapter Two
American Foreign Policy
Glenn P. Hastedt
Dateline: The South China Sea
By definition, foreign policy is outward-looking and seeks to promote the national interest. Disagreement exists over how best to anticipate threats and recognize opportunities found beyond state borders. Do we look at the structure of the international system, changing relations between countries, or specific events? Each of these focal points presents itself as the United States formulates a foreign policy to respond to Chinese actions in the South China Sea.1
Some 648,000 square nautical miles, the South China Sea is one of the world’s largest semi-enclosed seas. Five countries (six if Taiwan is counted) with a combined population of about 270 million are found along its borders: China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia. All claim 28sovereignty over some or all of it. China argues that these islands have been Chinese territory “since antiquity.” At issue is control not only over the waters and the airspace above it, but also over some four hundred to six hundred rocks, reefs, atolls, and islands. The two largest groupings of land in the South China Sea are the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Both have been the focal point of military-political conflicts involving competing claims made by China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The United States has taken no official position on these conflicting territorial claims, other than rejecting China’s claim to sovereignty over virtually all of it.
Three geostrategic factors come together to frame the South China Sea foreign policy problem facing the United States. First, the South China Sea is a critical passageway for global commercial shipping and naval operations linking the Middle East and Africa to Asia. The amount of oil passing through its waters is six times larger than that going through the Suez Canal. Second, evidence points to the presence of potentially significant natural energy reserves beneath the South China Sea that the Chinese media refer to as “the second Persian Gulf.” Third, the South China Sea is of great strategic importance to China. It is often spoken of in terms comparable to the United States’ traditional view of the Caribbean Sea. To a considerable degree it was in recognition of China’s growing economic and military power, along with the key role that the South China Sea played in China’s foreign policy thinking, that President Obama called for a “pivot” to Asia when he became president.
Tensions between the United States and China have grown noticeably over the past decade. As China’s military and economic power have increased, the U.S. has placed greater emphasis on Asia in its foreign policy. In November 2013, after China unilaterally claimed the right to police a contested portion of the airspace over the South China Sea, the United States sent two B-52 bombers into that zone without asking permission. In May 2014, without notice, China unilaterally placed a $1 billion deep ...
The document discusses China's increasingly assertive "frown diplomacy" in Southeast Asia regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea, in contrast to its previous "smile diplomacy." It describes how China strongly urged ASEAN countries not to discuss the South China Sea at a July 2010 meeting, but several countries did anyway, angering China. It also summarizes comments by Hillary Clinton on the US position regarding maritime disputes and international law. Going forward, China, ASEAN countries, and the US all need to find a cooperative approach to resolve disputes peacefully according to international law.
- China has been building artificial islands in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and claiming territory far beyond what international law allows. This has angered other countries that border the sea like Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines.
- The South China Sea is a critical global trade route and may contain significant oil and gas resources, giving China strategic and economic incentives to control the area. However, its aggressive actions are exacerbating tensions.
- By ignoring international laws and treaties, China seeks to dominate the South China Sea, but its actions undermine stability in the region and its relations with neighbors. Investors would be wise to avoid the area due to these legal and political risks.
Strategy on east asia the strategic choices for beijing, tokyo and moscowAlexander Decker
1. The document discusses Washington's "Returning to Asia" strategy and its potential impacts on East Asia. The strategy has two pillars: promoting the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement and redeploying US military forces in the Asia-Pacific region.
2. It analyzes the strategic choices available to China, Japan, and Russia in response to the US strategy. For China, it suggests continuing to advance trade agreements with ASEAN while remaining open to TPP, using trade leverage in territorial disputes, and being prepared to counter Japanese militarism with force if needed.
3. For all regional powers, managing tensions and conflicts will be important to prevent deterioration of the security situation in East Asia
Southeast asian perspectives on the rise of chinaRommel Banlaoi
1) Southeast Asian countries view China's rise as an economic opportunity but also a security challenge rather than a serious threat. They see China as a partner in economic cooperation and growth.
2) However, China's territorial disputes in the South China Sea and past military actions continue to cause worries in the region. Its assertive behavior in incidents like the EP3 plane collision raised concerns.
3) Still, Southeast Asian countries are engaging with China through economic cooperation and security forums to help shape China's behavior and assure its intentions remain peaceful. The release of China's recent defense white paper created optimism that it will be more transparent.
The EU has indicated its readiness to play a mediating role in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. As a neutral party, the EU supports resolving disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law. The EU would welcome an ASEAN request for assistance and hopes to prevent any further escalation of tensions. The South China Sea is an important trade route and fishing ground, but lacks regulation, and competing claims over its islands and waters have increased military tensions.
Maritime Territorial Disputes in East AsiaNian Yao
The maritime territorial disputes in East Asia are proving increasingly difficult to manage for several reasons:
1) Growing strategic and economic interests in the seas have led to heightened tensions as countries seek to assert control and access resources.
2) Nationalist sentiments among the public and governments have been mobilized in support of claims, undermining relations between disputing countries.
3) While international law provides some framework, its application is limited given sovereignty disputes require consent of all parties and there are differences in how Asian countries view international law compared to Western countries where current laws originated.
Taiwan The Tail That Wags DogsMichael McDevittAsia Po.docxdeanmtaylor1545
Taiwan: The Tail That Wags Dogs
Michael McDevitt
Asia Policy, Number 1, January 2006, pp. 69-93 (Article)
Published by National Bureau of Asian Research
DOI: 10.1353/asp.2006.0011
For additional information about this article
Access provided by Florida International University (9 Sep 2013 16:14 GMT)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/asp/summary/v001/1.mcdevitt.html
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/asp/summary/v001/1.mcdevitt.html
asia p olicy, number 1 (january 2006 ), 69–93
Michael McDevitt (Rear Admiral, retired) is Vice President and Director
of the Center for Naval Analyses at the CNA Corporation. These views are his
own and do not represent the views of the CNA Corporation. He can be reached
at <[email protected]>.
keywords: taiwan; china; united states; japan; foreign relations
Taiwan: The Tail That Wags Dogs
Michael McDevitt
[ 70 ]
execu tive summary
asia p olicy
This essay explores how Taiwan has been able to seize the political initiative
from China, Japan, and the United States.
main argument
Taiwan has attained this leverage due to the interrelationship of four factors:
• Strategic considerations stemming from Taiwan’s geographic position lead
Tokyo and Washington to prefer the status quo, while leading China to
strive for reunification. China’s increasing military power, however, may
suggest a Chinese intention to change the status quo.
• Shared democratic values and the fact that the “democracy issue” has great-
ly prolonged the timetable for reunification give Taipei political influence
in both Washington and Tokyo.
• China’s constant threats of force actually empower Taipei in its relationship
with Washington, and cause the United States to plan for the worst.
• Taiwan is a litmus test of U.S. credibility as an ally, a condition that in turn
creates a perception on the island that U.S. military backing is uncondi-
tional.
policy implications
• Taipei’s high-risk diplomatic approach carries with it the very real possibil-
ity of miscalculation, which could easily lead to great power conflict.
• The United States would benefit from exploring with Beijing ways in which
to demilitarize the issue of Taiwan independence so that the threat of great
power conflict over Taiwan is greatly moderated.
• Tensions may eventually lessen substantially if Beijing can be encouraged to
substitute political deterrence for military deterrence.
• In order to ensure that the U.S. position in the region would survive a
Taipei-provoked conflict should the United States choose not to become
directly involved, Washington can undertake extensive talks with Japan de-
signed to ensure that Japan does not lose confidence in Washington.
organization of the essay
The first four sections of the essay respectively explore the four factors of the
complex U.S.-Taiwan-Japan-China relationship outlined above:
Geostrategic Issues and Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Taiwan The Tail That Wags DogsMichael McDevittAsia Po.docxperryk1
This document summarizes and analyzes a journal article about Taiwan's strategic importance and influence in its relationships with China, Japan, and the United States. The summary identifies four key factors that have allowed Taiwan to seize diplomatic initiative: 1) Taiwan's geographic position which leads China to seek reunification but Japan and US to prefer status quo, 2) Shared democratic values with Japan and US, 3) China's threats of force which empower Taiwan, and 4) Taiwan being a test of US credibility which Taiwan relies on. The document then analyzes each factor in turn and discusses policy implications, including the need to reduce tensions to prevent miscalculation leading to conflict.
This thesis examines rising tensions between China and the United States that could escalate into a new Cold War. It explores the modernization of China's military, increasing cyber conflicts, and tensions over economic and maritime disputes. The author analyzes how the U.S. can counter China's growing naval power, address cyber vulnerabilities, and diversify its economy to reduce tensions. The thesis aims to determine if the relationship has deteriorated enough to be considered a Cold War and what policies the U.S. could adopt in response to China's rising threat.
The document discusses rising tensions between China, Japan, and the US that mirror tensions prior to World War I. There are concerns that a small incident, such as a conflict over the Diaoyu Islands, could escalate due to military nationalism in China and Japan, miscommunications, and alliance commitments dragging the US into a wider war. The Shinzo Abe government in Japan includes nationalist figures more likely to confront China, while China uses nationalism to bolster its government. A regional war could have negative economic and political consequences for all countries involved.
How Americans are loved in Vietnam despite a brutal war? How China has to secure global leadership amid so many internal and external challenges? How China is eager to claim a global leadership - while living with Few Friends but with more Rivals? What are the prospective Political Reforms that follows the full commitment to UNIVERSAL HUMAN VALUES, CAN GIVE CHINA A WIDER GLOBAL RECOGNITION AND ACCEPTABILITY FOR ITS GLOBAL LEADERSHIP.
The management of U.S.-China relations poses significant challenges for any U.S. administration. While China's rise is legitimate and beneficial in many ways, its growing military capabilities and claims in the South China Sea call into question the long-standing U.S.-led security architecture in Asia. Additionally, the U.S. and China have competing visions for the regional and global order that will shape their relationship. The author outlines several policy frameworks that will be essential for any U.S. administration to balance in managing relations, including strengthening alliances, upholding international norms, addressing ideological differences, improving perceptions of each other's intentions, and expanding practical cooperation. Finding solutions that address China's security concerns without threatening U.
Intelligence Analysis & Cognitive Biases: an Illustrative Case StudyPierre Memheld
This case study is foremost an educational tool. It involves two European and Asian multinational tires manufacturer for OTR, Off the Road, or “off road” and a problem of price competition. It shows how an initial intelligence effort is led astray. Instead the solution is a combination of approaches, better known as Competitive Intelligence. It is built on the external vision of the company craft, the use of all information sources characteristics of an intelligence field dedicated to the business world. It is not a new discipline but a trans-disciplinary approach for information exploitation which is using elements from financial analysis, SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) matrixes, and value chain analysis. In the above case, the company Eurotires used mostly the following sources: internet, scientific and patent databases; public administrative sources; customers interviews, industrial experts (manufacturing and distribution), and marketing analysis.
PME / PMI : prévenir les risques juridiques à l'internationalPierre Memheld
Les PME et PMI peuvent être exposées aux différents risques criminels dans leurs activités à l'international: extorsion de fonds, sollicitation de corruption, blanchiment d'argent, prise de contrôle hostile.
Operational Decision Elaboration Method as a Foresight Method: a Corporate Ap...Pierre Memheld
The corporate intelligence field does not have the same characteristics, or the same stakes, than the political or the military intelligence one. But rightly, its characteristics allow to us tactical analysis to forecast what would happen. Competitors, companies, have known technologies, capacities, finances, resources and pre-defined markets. In these conditions, they have a limited number of “options”. “Operational decision elaboration method” uses tactical intelligence to determine what an “adversary” is able to do when confronted to another “party”: what are its equipments, troops, intentions, organizational and operational behaviors. Thus, a military strategist has constraints, imperatives, objectives, limited means and variables that will create an uncertainty for the fulfillment of the mission. This is where intelligence plays a role. The article would stress how this method allow to forecast companies decisions, as their variables and options are less diversified than in the military field. This method would not allow to forecast precisely every decision but limit the number of factors to monitor: the consequence is a better ability to orientate corporate intelligence means, themselves more limited than in the military field. In this case, analysis takes an even more important place.
Intelligence économique et anticipation des risques: application à la lutte a...Pierre Memheld
Les sociétés souhaitant se développer globalement sont confrontées à différents types de risques : instabilités internes, concurrence abusive, espionnage économiques mais aussi parfois la corruption qui apparait dans les appels d’offres publics ou la réalisation de projets industriels. Or ces risques peuvent parfois s’agencer dans un cas ultime où la société « visée » n’aura pas toujours les mêmes moyens d’action ou d’influence que ses concurrents. Actuellement l’accroissement du risque « corruption » représente un décalage de compétitivité tant les lois varient d’un pays à l’autre. Le développement de ces nouvelles formes de concurrence exacerbée, liées à l’émergence d’acteurs n’ayant pas les mêmes lois à appliquer, crée un nouveau défi. La bonne gouvernance interne, ainsi que l’audit des activités, et les « due diligence », méthodes associées au concept de conformité (compliance en anglais) sont de nouvelles façons de se prémunir contre ces menaces. L’intelligence économique, comme outil de management de l’information et de coordination des actions, peut elle servir dans ce cadre ?
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Similar to The South China Sea: Disputes, Risks and Diplomacy
1. The document analyzes the South China Sea dispute between China and neighboring ASEAN countries over island territories, and the recent involvement of the US.
2. It argues that the US portrayal of renewed engagement is overstated, as the US has long maintained a naval presence and military exercises in the region. Meanwhile, China has strengthened economic ties with ASEAN through their free trade agreement.
3. The document concludes that media portrayals of rising tensions are overblown, as claimants are continuing informal negotiations over the disputes through ASEAN-China cooperation, while military conflict is unlikely given China's preference for non-military resolution and expanding economic influence in the region.
This document discusses international opinion on disputes between China and its neighbors in the South China Sea. It argues that defending US allies Japan and the Philippines from Chinese aggression would not constitute entrapment for two reasons. First, the disputes involve China trying to alter the status quo through intimidation and coercion in critical trade routes and strategic waters. Second, the US' policy of strategic ambiguity has not been effective in preserving stability, as China continues rejecting international law and multilateral negotiations. Clear security commitments from the US are needed to uphold international law and freedom of navigation, and to reassure allies like Japan that are critical to US interests in the region.
Dean Cheng is The Heritage Foundation‘s research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs. He specializes in China’s military and foreign policy, in particular its relationship with the rest of Asia and with the United States. He is fluent in Chinese, and uses Chinese language materials regularly in his work. Prior to joining Heritage, he was a senior analyst with the China Studies Division at Center for Naval Analyses from 2001-2009, where he specialized on Chinese military issues, and authored studies on Chinese military doctrine, Chinese mobilization concepts, and Chinese space capabilities.
complex.
South China Sea & Crimea -- similarities !!!Jeff Schubert
Events is Crimea should serve as a warning about what could easily happen in the South China Sea. Russia & China will always focus on "national security"
This document provides an overview of an international conference on the South China Sea that will take place from September 28-30, 2016 in Canberra, Australia. The conference is organized by UNSW Canberra at the Australian Defence Force Academy, the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, and the Japan Institute of International Affairs. The conference will include panels on the strategic and economic implications of the South China Sea disputes, challenges for Southeast Asian countries, the role of international law, and paths forward for conflict mitigation. It outlines the objectives, participants, speaker details, and session topics for the conference and associated workshops.
Chapter TwoAmerican Foreign PolicyGlenn P. HastedtDaJinElias52
Chapter Two
American Foreign Policy
Glenn P. Hastedt
Dateline: The South China Sea
By definition, foreign policy is outward-looking and seeks to promote the national interest. Disagreement exists over how best to anticipate threats and recognize opportunities found beyond state borders. Do we look at the structure of the international system, changing relations between countries, or specific events? Each of these focal points presents itself as the United States formulates a foreign policy to respond to Chinese actions in the South China Sea.1
Some 648,000 square nautical miles, the South China Sea is one of the world’s largest semi-enclosed seas. Five countries (six if Taiwan is counted) with a combined population of about 270 million are found along its borders: China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia. All claim 28sovereignty over some or all of it. China argues that these islands have been Chinese territory “since antiquity.” At issue is control not only over the waters and the airspace above it, but also over some four hundred to six hundred rocks, reefs, atolls, and islands. The two largest groupings of land in the South China Sea are the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Both have been the focal point of military-political conflicts involving competing claims made by China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The United States has taken no official position on these conflicting territorial claims, other than rejecting China’s claim to sovereignty over virtually all of it.
Three geostrategic factors come together to frame the South China Sea foreign policy problem facing the United States. First, the South China Sea is a critical passageway for global commercial shipping and naval operations linking the Middle East and Africa to Asia. The amount of oil passing through its waters is six times larger than that going through the Suez Canal. Second, evidence points to the presence of potentially significant natural energy reserves beneath the South China Sea that the Chinese media refer to as “the second Persian Gulf.” Third, the South China Sea is of great strategic importance to China. It is often spoken of in terms comparable to the United States’ traditional view of the Caribbean Sea. To a considerable degree it was in recognition of China’s growing economic and military power, along with the key role that the South China Sea played in China’s foreign policy thinking, that President Obama called for a “pivot” to Asia when he became president.
Tensions between the United States and China have grown noticeably over the past decade. As China’s military and economic power have increased, the U.S. has placed greater emphasis on Asia in its foreign policy. In November 2013, after China unilaterally claimed the right to police a contested portion of the airspace over the South China Sea, the United States sent two B-52 bombers into that zone without asking permission. In May 2014, without notice, China unilaterally placed a $1 billion deep ...
The document discusses China's increasingly assertive "frown diplomacy" in Southeast Asia regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea, in contrast to its previous "smile diplomacy." It describes how China strongly urged ASEAN countries not to discuss the South China Sea at a July 2010 meeting, but several countries did anyway, angering China. It also summarizes comments by Hillary Clinton on the US position regarding maritime disputes and international law. Going forward, China, ASEAN countries, and the US all need to find a cooperative approach to resolve disputes peacefully according to international law.
- China has been building artificial islands in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and claiming territory far beyond what international law allows. This has angered other countries that border the sea like Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines.
- The South China Sea is a critical global trade route and may contain significant oil and gas resources, giving China strategic and economic incentives to control the area. However, its aggressive actions are exacerbating tensions.
- By ignoring international laws and treaties, China seeks to dominate the South China Sea, but its actions undermine stability in the region and its relations with neighbors. Investors would be wise to avoid the area due to these legal and political risks.
Strategy on east asia the strategic choices for beijing, tokyo and moscowAlexander Decker
1. The document discusses Washington's "Returning to Asia" strategy and its potential impacts on East Asia. The strategy has two pillars: promoting the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement and redeploying US military forces in the Asia-Pacific region.
2. It analyzes the strategic choices available to China, Japan, and Russia in response to the US strategy. For China, it suggests continuing to advance trade agreements with ASEAN while remaining open to TPP, using trade leverage in territorial disputes, and being prepared to counter Japanese militarism with force if needed.
3. For all regional powers, managing tensions and conflicts will be important to prevent deterioration of the security situation in East Asia
Southeast asian perspectives on the rise of chinaRommel Banlaoi
1) Southeast Asian countries view China's rise as an economic opportunity but also a security challenge rather than a serious threat. They see China as a partner in economic cooperation and growth.
2) However, China's territorial disputes in the South China Sea and past military actions continue to cause worries in the region. Its assertive behavior in incidents like the EP3 plane collision raised concerns.
3) Still, Southeast Asian countries are engaging with China through economic cooperation and security forums to help shape China's behavior and assure its intentions remain peaceful. The release of China's recent defense white paper created optimism that it will be more transparent.
The EU has indicated its readiness to play a mediating role in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. As a neutral party, the EU supports resolving disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law. The EU would welcome an ASEAN request for assistance and hopes to prevent any further escalation of tensions. The South China Sea is an important trade route and fishing ground, but lacks regulation, and competing claims over its islands and waters have increased military tensions.
Maritime Territorial Disputes in East AsiaNian Yao
The maritime territorial disputes in East Asia are proving increasingly difficult to manage for several reasons:
1) Growing strategic and economic interests in the seas have led to heightened tensions as countries seek to assert control and access resources.
2) Nationalist sentiments among the public and governments have been mobilized in support of claims, undermining relations between disputing countries.
3) While international law provides some framework, its application is limited given sovereignty disputes require consent of all parties and there are differences in how Asian countries view international law compared to Western countries where current laws originated.
Taiwan The Tail That Wags DogsMichael McDevittAsia Po.docxdeanmtaylor1545
Taiwan: The Tail That Wags Dogs
Michael McDevitt
Asia Policy, Number 1, January 2006, pp. 69-93 (Article)
Published by National Bureau of Asian Research
DOI: 10.1353/asp.2006.0011
For additional information about this article
Access provided by Florida International University (9 Sep 2013 16:14 GMT)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/asp/summary/v001/1.mcdevitt.html
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/asp/summary/v001/1.mcdevitt.html
asia p olicy, number 1 (january 2006 ), 69–93
Michael McDevitt (Rear Admiral, retired) is Vice President and Director
of the Center for Naval Analyses at the CNA Corporation. These views are his
own and do not represent the views of the CNA Corporation. He can be reached
at <[email protected]>.
keywords: taiwan; china; united states; japan; foreign relations
Taiwan: The Tail That Wags Dogs
Michael McDevitt
[ 70 ]
execu tive summary
asia p olicy
This essay explores how Taiwan has been able to seize the political initiative
from China, Japan, and the United States.
main argument
Taiwan has attained this leverage due to the interrelationship of four factors:
• Strategic considerations stemming from Taiwan’s geographic position lead
Tokyo and Washington to prefer the status quo, while leading China to
strive for reunification. China’s increasing military power, however, may
suggest a Chinese intention to change the status quo.
• Shared democratic values and the fact that the “democracy issue” has great-
ly prolonged the timetable for reunification give Taipei political influence
in both Washington and Tokyo.
• China’s constant threats of force actually empower Taipei in its relationship
with Washington, and cause the United States to plan for the worst.
• Taiwan is a litmus test of U.S. credibility as an ally, a condition that in turn
creates a perception on the island that U.S. military backing is uncondi-
tional.
policy implications
• Taipei’s high-risk diplomatic approach carries with it the very real possibil-
ity of miscalculation, which could easily lead to great power conflict.
• The United States would benefit from exploring with Beijing ways in which
to demilitarize the issue of Taiwan independence so that the threat of great
power conflict over Taiwan is greatly moderated.
• Tensions may eventually lessen substantially if Beijing can be encouraged to
substitute political deterrence for military deterrence.
• In order to ensure that the U.S. position in the region would survive a
Taipei-provoked conflict should the United States choose not to become
directly involved, Washington can undertake extensive talks with Japan de-
signed to ensure that Japan does not lose confidence in Washington.
organization of the essay
The first four sections of the essay respectively explore the four factors of the
complex U.S.-Taiwan-Japan-China relationship outlined above:
Geostrategic Issues and Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Taiwan The Tail That Wags DogsMichael McDevittAsia Po.docxperryk1
This document summarizes and analyzes a journal article about Taiwan's strategic importance and influence in its relationships with China, Japan, and the United States. The summary identifies four key factors that have allowed Taiwan to seize diplomatic initiative: 1) Taiwan's geographic position which leads China to seek reunification but Japan and US to prefer status quo, 2) Shared democratic values with Japan and US, 3) China's threats of force which empower Taiwan, and 4) Taiwan being a test of US credibility which Taiwan relies on. The document then analyzes each factor in turn and discusses policy implications, including the need to reduce tensions to prevent miscalculation leading to conflict.
This thesis examines rising tensions between China and the United States that could escalate into a new Cold War. It explores the modernization of China's military, increasing cyber conflicts, and tensions over economic and maritime disputes. The author analyzes how the U.S. can counter China's growing naval power, address cyber vulnerabilities, and diversify its economy to reduce tensions. The thesis aims to determine if the relationship has deteriorated enough to be considered a Cold War and what policies the U.S. could adopt in response to China's rising threat.
The document discusses rising tensions between China, Japan, and the US that mirror tensions prior to World War I. There are concerns that a small incident, such as a conflict over the Diaoyu Islands, could escalate due to military nationalism in China and Japan, miscommunications, and alliance commitments dragging the US into a wider war. The Shinzo Abe government in Japan includes nationalist figures more likely to confront China, while China uses nationalism to bolster its government. A regional war could have negative economic and political consequences for all countries involved.
How Americans are loved in Vietnam despite a brutal war? How China has to secure global leadership amid so many internal and external challenges? How China is eager to claim a global leadership - while living with Few Friends but with more Rivals? What are the prospective Political Reforms that follows the full commitment to UNIVERSAL HUMAN VALUES, CAN GIVE CHINA A WIDER GLOBAL RECOGNITION AND ACCEPTABILITY FOR ITS GLOBAL LEADERSHIP.
The management of U.S.-China relations poses significant challenges for any U.S. administration. While China's rise is legitimate and beneficial in many ways, its growing military capabilities and claims in the South China Sea call into question the long-standing U.S.-led security architecture in Asia. Additionally, the U.S. and China have competing visions for the regional and global order that will shape their relationship. The author outlines several policy frameworks that will be essential for any U.S. administration to balance in managing relations, including strengthening alliances, upholding international norms, addressing ideological differences, improving perceptions of each other's intentions, and expanding practical cooperation. Finding solutions that address China's security concerns without threatening U.
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The South China Sea: Disputes, Risks and Diplomacy
1. Transcript
The South China Sea:
Disputes, Risks and
Diplomacy
Lord Michael Williams of Baglan
Distinguished Visiting Fellow and Acting Head, Asia Programme, Chatham House
Christian Le Mière
Research Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security, International Institute for Strategic
Studies
Chair: Jonathan Marcus
Diplomatic Correspondent, BBC
23 October 2012
The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House
is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not
take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if
any extract is used, the author(s)/ speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited,
preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to
or reports statements made by speakers at an event every effort has been made to provide a fair
representation of their views and opinions, but the ultimate responsibility for accuracy lies with
this document’s author(s). The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from
delivery.
2. Transcript: South China Sea
Jonathan Marcus:
Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much for coming. We
are going to be discussing the various dramas in the South China Sea.
To look at some of the regional and international questions raised by all of
this, we have two speakers this evening. Lord Michael Williams of Baglan is a
Distinguished Visiting Fellow here and Acting Head of the Asia Programme at
Chatham House – an old colleague of mine from many years ago, a man who
has pursued a number of distinguished positions both in the British
government, advising foreign ministers, and with the United Nations. On my
left, Christian Le Mière is Research Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime
Security at the other great foreign policy institute in London, the International
Institute for Strategic Studies. So Michael, if you’d like to start…
Lord Williams:
It’s a pleasure to speak to you tonight on this subject, particularly with
Jonathan chairing. As he said, we were colleagues in Bush House in the old
days, in the 1980s – halcyon days in the World Service. Curiously, this is a
subject that I would write upon quite often then, but I believe that today – 20
or 30 years on – it’s actually become a far more serious issue.
The title of this talk is ‘The South China Sea: Disputes, Risks and Diplomacy’.
I suspect, like most talks, there is a short and a long version. The short
version would run something like this: the disputes are many and principally
between the claimants to the Spratly Islands and to a lesser extent the
Paracel Islands, which involves China and Taiwan but also four of the ASEAN
countries: Vietnam, Brunei, the Philippines and Malaysia. The risks are very
considerable, I believe, and increasing. This is an arena where there have
been clashes in the past, principally between China and Vietnam, although
more recently a standoff between the Philippines and China. It’s also an area
where, if you like, the two great powers – the United States and China – are
increasingly active: China for the obvious reasons; the US, although it had
never turned its back on Asia and the Pacific – far from it – has become or is
trying to be more assertive through the pivot towards Asia. Finally, there is the
diplomacy. That’s the rub of the matter, because it seems to me there is not
very much diplomacy.
If we go back to the disputes, these are very longstanding. They’ve been
causes of friction between China and the four ASEAN countries that are
claimants to the Spratly Islands, but particularly between China and Vietnam.
In the dog days of the Vietnam War, the Chinese opportunistically took
www.chathamhouse.org 2
3. Transcript: South China Sea
advantage of that war to seize the Paracel Islands from the old South
Vietnamese regime in 1974. China and Vietnam had a major war in 1979,
triggered by Vietnam’s toppling of the Khmer Rouge regime, but curiously
there were no naval engagements in that war. But almost a decade later there
was another sharp clash, in 1988, between the Chinese and the Vietnamese,
resulting in as many as 70 deaths on the Vietnamese side.
But why are these issues becoming more vexed and bitter in recent times? I
think there are several reasons. One is the economic factors. All the
claimants believe that this area of the South China Sea, particularly around
the Spratlys, is rich in oil and gas deposits. All are anxious to pursue oil and
gas exploration. Another economic reason is the fact that the coastal waters
of so many of these countries are becoming exhausted from fishing and
fishing fleets are having to go out further to sea. This is particularly the case
with regard to China, which has such a huge population to feed.
The disputes are also getting more bitter because of the tensions between
China and the US that Jonathan mentioned at the beginning, and in particular
because of what the US has termed a ‘pivot’ towards Asia and the Pacific.
Amazingly – Jonathan referred to Subic Bay – there has even been some
debate in the Philippines; the pendulum is moving back toward granting a
new… some sort of base facility to the US. Whether or not the Americans
would again have permanent facilities in the Philippines, it is the case that the
Philippines together with another ASEAN member – Thailand – is a treaty ally
of the United States. That has particular significance. Another ASEAN
country, Singapore, also has very close defence ties with the United States.
Even before the US pivot towards Asia and the Pacific, US-China relations
have been tense in recent years over many issues – economic; the bombing
of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade back in 1998; and more recently the
incident in Hainan with the US reconnaissance plane, in 2001 – the subject,
by the way, of the first long telephone conversation between Tony Blair and
George Bush, over how to handle that issue and bring about the repatriation
of the US airmen detained for a while by the Chinese, and also the airplane.
Chinese-US relations are difficult and will become more difficult in the coming
period.
One very striking development was the failure of the ASEAN regional summit
– the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting – in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian
capital, in July this year. That meeting, unusually in the 45-year history of
ASEAN, did not come out with a communiqué or any consensus at the end.
Now, one thing that ASEAN is famous for more than any other regional
www.chathamhouse.org 3
4. Transcript: South China Sea
organization is an endless stream of communiqués. But there wasn’t a
communiqué, because they could not find agreement with reference to the
disputes in the South China Sea, despite the fact that most members,
including those who don’t have claims – big countries like Indonesia – are
sympathetic to the respective claimants. The absence of consensus was the
result of a direct intrusion by China through the ASEAN country closest to
China for the time being – namely, Cambodia. That wrecked a consensus and
has made a common position now very difficult. The assertiveness of China,
through Cambodia, at the Phnom Penh conference is quite a striking
development and one that has been widely remarked upon in the region.
All of the ASEAN countries have substantial Chinese minorities and there is
an element in these disputes of the anti-Chinese feelings that are often felt
and demonstrated on the streets of various Southeast Asian capitals.
Indonesia, for example, the largest country within ASEAN, does not have any
territorial disputes with China but it is apprehensive about what it sees as
Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and the fact that the
southernmost point of the Chinese claim comes very close to Indonesian
waters. Indonesia is a country that historically has had a very troubled
relationship with China. They didn’t have diplomatic relations, for example, for
a quarter of a century, between 1965 and 1990, and as recently as 1998, with
the downfall of President Suharto, there were very widespread anti-Chinese
demonstrations in Indonesia.
I think this growing feeling and apprehension of China as a power, and locally
and domestically anti-Chinese feelings against Chinese minorities in the
region, are coming together in a somewhat unhealthy way. Even to some
extent in a place like Singapore, for example, where there was widespread
unease caused by a traffic accident – someone from China driving a top-
range Ferrari who killed two or three Singaporean citizens. That led to an
explosion of anti-Chinese sentiment on the internet and on blogs.
I’m sure Christian is going to refer to this, but one of the worrying things is the
rearmament of many of the ASEAN countries, particularly with regard to
submarines – by definition, an offensive vessel. There is a scramble among
ASEAN countries to buy submarines from South Korea, France, Germany
and Sweden.
Let me turn finally to the diplomacy, of which there is not very much. This has
been hindered further by the crisis within ASEAN in developing a common
position, following the Phnom Penh summit. It’s not easy to see a diplomatic
path going forward. Indonesia is thought of playing that role but Indonesia’s
www.chathamhouse.org 4
5. Transcript: South China Sea
position is far more akin to and sympathetic to its fellow members of ASEAN.
The International Crisis Group, in a recent paper on the region, suggested a
troika of ASEAN ministers, but that also doesn’t seem to me to be a formula
that will work. It certainly would not be one that would be attractive to Beijing.
Michael Wesley [formerly] of the Lowy Institute in Sydney has suggested that
Australia could play a role in trying to broker a solution to what is becoming a
more bitter dispute. But again, given Australia’s close alliance relationship
with the US, it is unlikely to be seen by Beijing as a neutral broker.
That doesn’t leave many other possibilities. One that I would put forward is
what is called in the Charter of the UN the ‘good offices’ of the secretary-
general. This might be something that could be used; it has been in the past.
The UN played a role, for example, during the time of [Javier] Pérez de
Cuéllar’s secretary-generalship, in assisting with the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan, way back in 1989. I think that ASEAN countries would be
sympathetic to such a UN role but it would remain a tough sell with China. But
as time goes on, I believe China will find it uncomfortable having difficult
relationships with ASEAN countries, the Asian countries on its doorstep, and
hopefully may look more benignly at diplomatic solutions.
Christian Le Mière:
I’ll start by saying – and I’m sure Lord Williams feels this even more acutely
than I do, given the longevity with which he’s been looking at these issues –
but over the last ten or more years that I’ve been writing about these very
remote islands and maritime disputes, there’s never been as much interest as
there is now. Obviously this reflects the strategic issues, and it’s very
gratifying that suddenly people care about these issues that I’ve been looking
at. It’s also very harrowing, because I suddenly have a lot more work to do
than I did before. So I’ve been thinking about this quite a lot recently.
Whereas Lord Williams concentrated on the diplomacy and the strategic
importance of the islands, I’ll look more at the military procurements,
paramilitary developments and what that means for diplomacy as well in the
South China Sea.
The first thing to say is that there is an unprecedented armament process
going on in East Asia generally, and to some extent in Southeast Asia. There
was a huge procurement of arms in Southeast Asia in the late 1980s/early
1990s which was curtailed by the Asian financial crisis in 1997. There was
much talk then of a regional arms race in Southeast Asia and preparedness
for and against this concept. Again, there is now talk of an arms race in East
www.chathamhouse.org 5
6. Transcript: South China Sea
Asia generally. I think that’s largely because of the action/reaction dynamic
we see in some procurements in the region. Lord Williams mentioned the
submarines. Submarines are very useful vessels to have: they are
necessarily clandestine; they add an element of surprise; they are huge sea
denial capabilities and force multipliers that allow you to deny large areas of
the sea just by having one submarine and the element of doubt. These are
certainly being purchased because Vietnam can no longer compete with
China’s much more superior surface fleet in the South Sea fleet. So there is
evidence of action/reaction dynamics and therefore this theory of an armed
race.
But other procurements don’t necessarily follow the same line or aren’t
necessarily related to China’s rise. Malaysian submarines, for instance –
they’ve bought two in recent years and had some problems with them given
that they couldn’t actually go underwater for a while. They have not
necessarily been bought with China in mind – more likely Singapore, given
their decades-old subregional rivalry. This will never be admitted to in public
but it’s probably the major motivation for Malaysian submarines.
Other countries, such as the Philippines, have also started to arm themselves
from, frankly, a risible state that the navy was in; it has started to look at US-
donated cutters. But this is a very complex, overlapping issue, so it is difficult
to categorize it as a regional arms race per se.
There have, however, been a series of incidents that have often involved
maritime paramilitary vessels that suggest a greater assertiveness from China
and greater tension over this area generally. The term ‘assertiveness’ is one
of great academic debate when related to China’s activities recently. China
would suggest it’s not being assertive, it’s merely being reactive to other
provocations. I would have some sympathy with this statement. The maritime
paramilitary incidents that involved the cutting of exploration wires, or survey
vessels, towed array sonars, in Vietnam in 2011 is partially related to the fact
that Vietnam and the Philippines have become a lot more forthcoming in their
oil and gas exploration, and started to change the status quo to some extent.
Having said that, whether you believe that China is assertive or not, it is
certainly a lot more confident in the use of its paramilitaries and its diplomacy
generally.
The use of these maritime paramilitaries is something I will call in a book I will
publish next year ‘coercive maritime diplomacy’, or perhaps more
sensationally, ‘para-gunboat diplomacy’. The reason behind that is that it
shares many of the characteristics of European imperial-era gunboat
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diplomacy – that is, the use of coercive force to compel or deter your rivals –
but it’s doing it with unarmed vessels. So it’s a very much latent form of force
that is being utilized here.
The use of paramilitaries rather than gunboats themselves is useful,
particularly for China, for three main reasons. One is that, given that they are
unarmed, they necessarily demilitarize the situation and do not allow any
possibility of escalation up the military ladder. If you have two warships out in
a sea, on their own, out of contact with their political leaders back home,
things can go very awry very quickly. But with maritime paramilitaries, that is
less likely to happen.
Secondly, they’re a very useful way for China to reinforce her claim of
sovereignty. They act as a kind of de facto sovereignty claim in and of
themselves, even though they have no reference to de jure sovereignty over
these areas. The sending of a maritime paramilitary vessel is like sending a
police car to a village in a disputed border area: by having the police car
there, it demonstrates that you must have sovereignty over this area – why
else would you police it? It doesn’t have any legal basis but it’s a very useful
physical presence to retain.
Finally, particularly from China’s point of view, using unarmed maritime
paramilitaries avoids accusations of hypocrisy in its particular stance. If you
remember in 2009, the USNS Impeccable, which is a US military surveillance
vessel, was harassed and jostled by Chinese paramilitary, military and civilian
vessels for undergoing research in China’s EEZ (exclusive economic zone).
For China to then send military vessels on questionably peaceful terms to
other countries’ EEZs would come easily under some kind of criticism from
those countries. Unarmed maritime paramilitaries have no legal impediment
to their deployment and it’s very easy to cast them as being there for peaceful
reasons rather than for any kind of aggressive reasons.
Having said that, there is a concern over the use of maritime paramilitaries,
and that is that they may lower the barrier to violence or the use of violence.
They are very easy to procure and maintain. They are quite cheap ships, in
comparison to the very expensive vessels that are currently being built. They
have a greater possibility of aggressive manoeuvring. Consider the Chinese
trawler captain incident in 2010, when a Japanese coast guard vessel was
rammed by the trawler itself and in reaction also engaged in fairly aggressive
manoeuvres. For that to happen to a warship is unthinkable. No civilian
vessel would attack the warship; no warship would attack the civilian vessel
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through manoeuvres themselves. So it creates the greater probability of some
kind of aggressive manoeuvres and therefore some kind of low-level violence.
Because of this, I think there is an ongoing likelihood of unarmed maritime
paramilitary confrontations. These various reasons make it very appealing for
the countries in the region to pursue these particular forms of coercive
diplomacy.
But there is also the fact that the use of maritime paramilitaries suggests that
no countries are actually looking for a conflict-based solution. It is true that
often these activities are supported by the latent threat of military force. If we
look at the East China Sea, on a slight tangent, the recent deployment of
Chinese paramilitary vessels was supported by a military exercise, a live fire
exercise, where they fired off 40 missiles in the East China Sea as a
demonstration and a reminder that China’s military force exists and could be
utilized and called upon if necessary.
Nonetheless, conflict does seem very improbable in the region at the moment
for a variety of reasons. One is the potential cost of the conflict, both in terms
of blood and treasure. The other is I’m not sure what a military operation
would look like in the South China Sea currently. Lord Williams mentioned
1974 and the taking of the Paracel Islands; 1988 was China’s first entry into
the Spratly Islands and its creation of fortifications there. But now for China to
launch any kind of operation against the various claimants to the Spratly
Islands would be increasingly complex. I’m not sure what they would gain out
of it – they would have to take 30 to 40 installations in a very short period of
time. They would then have to occupy those installations and reinforce them.
And they would be dealing with four different entities at the same time. So I
don’t really know what an operation would look like from China’s point of view.
Finally, there is also the presence of the US and the pivot to Asia, which
although very modest in the number of forces is very clearly directed towards
China.
So I would argue – and this is in slight contrast to what Lord Williams has said
– that the use of maritime paramilitaries is a tacit signal by China and other
states that avenues of diplomacy are still open and we’re not inevitably
heading towards some kind of conflict between these various states, even
while they arm themselves for the insurance policy of having the armaments.
In another book I’m currently co-writing for the Institute – I said I was very
busy – we look at the various possibilities of diplomacy around this. I won’t
spoil the ending by telling you all the issues now, because then you’ll have to
buy the book.
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But there are various areas where there could be diplomatic progress through
collaborative clarification of the claims in the South China Sea – these are still
very unclear, particularly China’s nine-dashed line, but no state is innocent
here. Vietnam has not defined which islands are actually the Spratly Islands.
The Philippines has its Kalayaan island group but again, it’s unclear whether
that’s an EEZ claim or not. Clarifying whether these features are islands or
rocks under maritime law would be very useful. Talking about collaborative
maritime sovereignty or joint resource development would be a great way to
develop this and there is some precedent there. There are avenues of
diplomacy open. There has been a lot of backroom discussion over a possible
code of conduct this year, which would be a legally binding instrument and
build on the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea, which is merely a political statement but one which did for some time
certainly ease tensions. So the progress towards a code of conduct, no
matter how weak or vague it might be, would further suggest that countries
are looking for a peaceful way to, if not resolve, at least shelve these disputes
for the time being.
That is a point of view that does not necessarily accord with the media
representation of the South China Sea, and to some extent the East China
Sea at the moment, but I think it’s one that is likely to frame the diplomatic
framework for the next few years at least.
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