International opinion on the South China Sea Issue part III

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INTERNATIONAL OPINION
ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUE
PART III

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TITLE PUBLISHER COUNTRY PAGE
I. China needs to negotiate Bangkok Post Thailand 5
II. EU ready to play vital role in West
Philippine Sea dispute
New Europe Belgium 7
III. Is China Changing Its approach to
Maritime Disputes
The Diplomat South Korea 8
IV. China, Trying to Bolster Its Claims,
Plants Islands in Disputed Waters
The New York Times United
States
10
V. China’s Information Warfare
Campaign and the South China
Sea: Bring It On!
The Diplomat United
States
13
VI. South China Sea disputes: what is
in it for Europe?
European
Geostrategy
Belgium 16
VII. Philippines protests over China’s
‘reclamation’ of McKeenan Reef
Australia Network
News
Australia 20
VIII. Truth about South China Sea
dispute: expert
Ministry of National
Defense
The People’s
Republic of China
China 22
IX. Xi of Two Minds: Be a Good
Neighbor, or Assert China’s
Power?
The New York Times United
States
25
X. China ‘Internationalizes’ South
China Sea Dispute
The Diplomat United
States
27
XI. The Battle of the South China Sea
Editorials
Opinio Juris United
States
29
XII. Beijing Applying ‘3 Warfares’ to
South China Sea Disputes
Fortuna’s Corner United
States
30
XIII. ASEAN South China Sea
conundrum
The Brics Post United
Kingdom
31
XIV. Editorial: Review South China Sea
policy
Taipei Times Taiwan 34
XV. Hagel: China destabilises Asia-
Pacific region
Aljazeera Qatar 36
XVI. Template for the South China Sea The New York
Times
United
States
38
XVII. South China Sea oil dispute
unlikely to have a winner
malaymailonline Malaysia 39
XVIII. China and Vietnam Point Fingers
After Clash in South China Sea
The New York
Times
United
States
42
XIX. Conduct in the South China Sea The Japan Times Japan 44
XX. ASEAN unity and the threat of
Chinese expansion
Aljazeera Qatar 46
XXI. South China Sea dispute: The Strait Times Singapore 48

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Asaen’sneutrality is its strength
XXII. Japan, Vietnam blame China for
maritime tensions
The Japan Times Japan 49
XXIII. Beijing ‘prepared to defend rights’
in South China Sea
DW Germany 51
XXIV. Beijing’s dangerous arrogance in
the South China Sea
South China Morning
Post
Hong Kong 54
XXV. Anti-Chinese Violence Convulses
Vietnam, Pitting Laborers Against
Laborers
The New York
Times
United
States
56
XXVI. Vietnam anger rises over South
China sea
Aljazeera Qatar 59
XXVII. South China Sea Tensions Council on Foreign
Relations
United
States
63
XXVIII.Philippines Challenges China Over
Disputed Atoll
The New York
Times
United
States
68
XXIX. Philippines: China may be
building airstrip at disputed reef
The Times of India India 70
XXX. Asean’s firm stand on peaceful
ways
New Strait Times Malaysia 72
XXXI. U.S., China spar again on South
China Seas disputes
Reuters United
States
74
XXXII. Trouble in the South China Sea The New York
Times
United
States
76
XXXIII.In High Seas, China Moves
Unilaterally
The New York
Times
United
States
78
XXXIV. Philippines offers oil, gas
exploration area in waters
disputed with China
CNBC United
States
79
XXXV. Christian Le Miere: Tempers flare
in South China Sea
IISS Voices United
Kingdom
81
XXXVI. China, Vietnam, Philippines
collide amid escalating South
China tensions
CNN United
States
83
XXXVII. China Flexes Its Muscles in
Disputed with Vietnam
The New York
Times
United
States
85
XXXVIII. US slams China over
Vietnamese vessels dispute in
South China Sea
Financial Times United
States
88
XXXIX. Why U.S.-Philippines Military
Accord Worries China
WorldCrunch United
States
90
XL. Where Did All China’s Asian
Friends Go?
Epoch Times China 93
XLI. Not playing China Martin Jacques United
Kingdom
96

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XLII. Insight: Will US-Philippines pact
sideline ASEAN’s normative
order?
The Jakarta Post Indonesia 98
XLIII. China Reactions to Obama’s Asia
Tour: Overwhelmingly Negative
Foreign Policy
Association
United
States
100
XLIV. A Guide to Understanding China's
Regional Diplomacy
The National
Interest
United
States
102
XLV. Dismounting China from the
South China Sea
Rappler (foreign
authors)
United
States
105
XLVI. Defending Japan and the
Philippines is not Entrapment
The National
Interest
United
States
108
XLVII. Russia and Vietnam Team Up to
Balance China
The National
Interest
United
States
111
XLVIII.Historical Fiction: China’s South
China Sea Claims
World Affairs
Journal
United
States
114

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China needs to negotiate
EDITORIAL
Published: 30/06/2014 at 12:23 AM
Newspaper section: News
The disagreements between China and several members of Asean continue to fester.
For most of the past month, Beijing has deliberately stoked disputes, particularly with
Vietnam. Its chief instrument in pushing the envelope is an oil rig. A drilling platform
seems a strange instrument of high-stakes diplomacy on the high seas. But China is
using this unique weapon to further its own goals and confront those who dispute it.
The latest chapter in the South China Sea quarrel started in May. China moved a billion-
dollar deepwater drilling rig into waters claimed by Hanoi, about 240km off the
Vietnamese coast. The rig dropped anchor and apparently started searching for oil.
Vietnam complained China was breaking international law by drilling well inside its 200-
nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and actually on Vietnam‘s continental
shelf.
China, as usual, had its own unique maps ready, showing the CNOOC Group rig was
working well within Chinese waters. For Beijing, this is standard fare. China claims it
owns — clear and above board — about 90% of the territory of the South China Sea,
and everything under the sea bed. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Brunei (and Taiwan) all dispute this.
China‘s standard method of dealing with the disagreements is to simply dismiss them,
refuse to discuss them and, if necessary, use force to back them up.
In the past 10 days, China has moved four more oil rigs into this unnecessary and
ultimately dangerous situation. CNOOC, a true oil behemoth, announced that starting
immediately, it is opening four new exploration sites in the western and eastern sectors
of the South China Sea. Translation: At the orders of the Chinese government the state
oil firm intends to further the regime‘s territorial claims by a combination of the economic
search for oil and the military presence of Chinese navy and coast guard ships to
guarantee the security of the rigs.
The obvious targets of this 21st century form of gunboat diplomacy are Vietnam and the
Philippines. They are by far the most active governments in confronting China‘s
aggressive territorial claims, and therefore the countries that will see the oil rigs
searching — some say ―pretending to search‖ — for oil under the seabed.
The danger is obvious. Early this month, anti-Chinese demonstrations got out of hand in
a major industrial zone near Ho Chi Minh City. Anti-Chinese protests turned into full-
scale riots, with factories burnt, and several Chinese workers killed. Beijing made a big

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show of withdrawing workers from the Vietnamese economic zone, clearly appealing to
its own jingoists.
Vietnam last week tried to put the dampers on increasing anti-China feeling when it
barred a Catholic Church ―exhibition‖ on the South China Sea. The church said it had
documents and other proof that the Paracel Islands, captured and occupied by Chinese
military forces in 1974, definitely are Vietnamese territory. In the Philippines, which has
freedom of speech, there is no shortage of backing for the government‘s attempt to
confront China over parts of the Spratly Island group.
In the recent past, there have been numerous cases of violence over this dispute. The
Chinese navy has attacked and assaulted Vietnamese naval vessels recently, although
so far no actual battle has broken out. A new US base in the Philippines directly faces
the Spratlys, adding even more tension and potential for deadly showdowns between
the Chinese and other military forces.
China needs to turn its hard-nosed oil rig diplomacy into real negotiations. By engaging
in talks with Asean and its members, it could establish a more satisfactory way of
settling the disputes.

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EU ready to play vital role in West Philippine Sea dispute
June 17, 2014
The European Union (EU) has indicated its readiness to be a useful element of
―balance‖ in the strategic situation in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea) and
may play a mediation role in the territorial dispute.
Speaking on EU-Southeast Asia relations, the European External Action Service
Southeast Asia Division Deputy Head Philippe van Amersfoort said: ―EU would
welcome any request from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to help
resolve the dispute. As this strategic situation develops EU may be a useful element of
balance. EU is ready to play a role of mediation. That is a challenge on the side of EU.
We are happy to do consider that. We really hope (there is) no further escalation.‖
The EU has the belief that territorial disputes should be resolved in accordance with
international law through peaceful and cooperative solutions.
EU-Asia Centre Director Fraser Cameron said during a forum in Manila that ―the EU
supports a rules-based international system and liberty of navigation‖.
According to the EU, the West Philippine Sea is a fragile environment, being the largest
maritime route after the Mediterranean and a vital corridor for EU trade to and from East
Asia where 25 percent of world maritime cargo transit. It is also an important source of
protein for 300 million people in the region but fishing is not regulated and fishermen
from all coastal states seem to exploit marine resources without any restriction.
In addition, the sea is a sensitive military area because of US naval presence, and
China is also expanding military capabilities in the region that is bordered by 10
countries with long-standing and competing historical claims covering islands, high seas
and coastal areas, believed to be rich in oil and gas.
The EU noted the geopolitical factors growing with the involvement of two nuclear
powers, China and the US. ―The EU is not directly involved but keen to promote
peaceful resolution,‖ Cameron said.
Although far from Europe, the EU has important interests at stake in the region which
can explain the active role it wants to take to resolve the issues on the table. Cameron
stated: ―EU has ample expertise in sharing sovereignty, resolving difficult issues
(common fishing policy, environment) that could be useful for interested countries as
well as ASEAN as a whole.‖
Nevertheless, Cameron made clear that the EU model was still evolving and not really
appropriate for Asia although principles are universally applicable. He said: ―EU is also
not in a position to lecture Asians. But Asia could cherry-pick some aspect of EU
integration (regional aid, monetary cooperation, internal market).‖
The bottom line is that the EU is willing to be a useful third party for technical assistance
but pointed out that ―it is ultimately up to involved parties to resolve the disputes‖.
Cameron concluded: ―The only viable solution in the long run is setting aside disputes
and joint development.‖

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Is China Changing Its Approach to Maritime Disputes?
JIN KAI June 17, 2014
China may be shifting its strategy from ―reactive assertiveness‖ to proactive
engagement.
Since Japan nationalized the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in 2012, China has
adopted a policy of ―reactive assertiveness‖ on territorial disputes toward its neighbors –
seeing their actions as unilateral changes to the status quo and making confident but
more or less limited reactions. As Stephen A. Orlins, president of the National
Committee on U.S.-China Relations, recently said in an interview with People‘s Daily, if
we fully analyze the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue and South China Sea disputes, we will find
that China indeed is innocent. In each case, the other parties unilaterally changed the
status quo first, compelling China to react. Unfortunately the U.S. and some other
countries have rejected China‘s responses.
As the current tension drags on, it has also become more confrontational. As Japan
takes firm action to lift the ban on collective self-defense, Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe has reopened old wounds by criticizing the issuing of the 1993 Kono
Statement, which apologized for the abuse of ―comfort women‖ during World War II.
Meanwhile Vietnam‘s actions in the South China Sea have been more direct – a
number of ships and frogman teams with military background have been dispatched to
sabotage China‘s oil rig. Plus, waves of anti-Chinese violence have caused injuries and
economic losses to a large number of businesses from China, leaving four Chinese
citizens beaten to death and hundreds wounded.
For the moment, China faces intensified dual challenges in both the East and South
China Seas. There has been a growing coordination between Japan and Vietnam (and
the Philippines as well), both of which intend to gain the advantage by joining hands.
Given the circumstances, China seems to believe that the strategy and tactics of
passive reaction must be swapped out for more comprehensive and more proactive
engagement. In particular, China may reconsider its previous aversion to publicizing its
territorial disputes with its neighbors in multilateral institutions, which had previously
been ruled out due to China‘s concern over multilateral intervention.
There are recent signs that China is shifting its position. China‘s UN delegation
presented the document ―The Operation of the HYSY 981 Drilling Rig – Vietnam‘s
Provocation and China‘s Position‖ to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and asked for
this document to be circulated among all UN members. Meanwhile, Japan and China
are entangled in verbal accusations over some close calls involving aircraft over the
East China Sea. In response, China released a video clip which shows that the

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Japanese F-15 jets flew abnormally close to a Chinese Tu-154, although this may not
stop this on-going technical brawl over the exact distances involved.
The point is that as long as the tension endures, China‘s ―reactive assertiveness‖
sooner or later must evolve into a more proactive approach. It is still not clear yet
whether China has decided to take a more comprehensive or even more risky approach
to counter challenges in both the East and South China Seas. However, China does not
seem to have much strategic room to maneuver while staying strictly within its preferred
bilateral approach to solving territorial disputes. This can also be observed through the
PLA‘s increasing involvement, especially in the South China Sea disputes. At this
moment, China may particularly need a boost from international public opinion.
Although more proactively and more comprehensively publicizing the disputes to the
international community may win China a certain degree of understanding or even
support, there is also a risk. Such a move may indirectly help to further extend and
internationalize the disputes, which is exactly what China has previously expressed
concern about. Besides, China also needs to account for a certain preconception in
world politics: that a rising state (quite often a great power) will see disputes with its
smaller neighbors as opportunities to extend its growing power.

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China, Trying to Bolster Its Claims, Plants Islands in
Disputed Waters
EDWARD WONG and JONATHAN ANSFIELD June 16, 2014
BEIJING — The islands have all that one could ask of a tropical resort destination: white
sand, turquoise waters and sea winds.
But they took shape only in the last several months, and they are already emerging as a
major point of conflict in the increasingly bitter territorial disputes between China and
other Asian nations.
China has been moving sand onto reefs and shoals to add several new islands to the
Spratly archipelago, in what foreign officials say is a new effort to expand the Chinese
footprint in the South China Sea. The officials say the islands will be able to support
large buildings, human habitation and surveillance equipment, including radar.
Chinese actions have also worried senior United States officials. Defense Secretary
Chuck Hagel scolded China for ―land reclamation activities at multiple locations‖ in the
South China Sea at a contentious security conference in Singapore in late May.
Critics say the islands will allow China to install better surveillance technology and
resupply stations for government vessels. Some analysts say the Chinese military is
eyeing a perch in the Spratlys as part of a long-term strategy of power projection across
the Western Pacific.
Perhaps just as important, the new islands could allow China to claim it has an
exclusive economic zone within 200 nautical miles of each island, which is defined in
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Philippines has argued at an
international tribunal that China occupies only rocks and reefs and not true islands that
qualify for economic zones.
―By creating the appearance of an island, China may be seeking to strengthen the
merits of its claims,‖ said M. Taylor Fravel, a political scientist at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
China says it has the right to build in the Spratlys because they are Chinese territory.
―China has indisputable sovereignty over Nansha Islands,‖ a Foreign Ministry
spokeswoman, Hua Chunying, said last month, using the Chinese name for the
Spratlys. Chinese officials also contend that Vietnam and the Philippines have built
more structures in the disputed region than China, so China is free to pursue its
projects.
But analysts note that other countries did not build islands, and that they generally
erected their structures before 2002, when China and nine Southeast Asian nations

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signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. One clause
says the parties must ―exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities‖ that would
escalate tensions and must refrain from inhabiting any currently uninhabited land
features.
Although the agreement is nonbinding and does not explicitly ban building on the
islands or the creation of new ones, some analysts say those activities are covered.
―It‘s changing the status quo,‖ said Carlyle A. Thayer, an emeritus professor of politics
at the University of New South Wales in Australia. ―It can only raise tensions.‖
Since January, China has been building three or four islands, projected to be 20 to 40
acres each, one Western official said. He added that there appeared to be at least one
installation intended for military use, and that the new islands could be used for
resupplying ships, including Chinese maritime patrol vessels.
Last month, China set off alarms in the region and in Washington when a state-owned
oil company placed an exploratory oil rig farther north in the South China Sea, by the
contested Paracel Islands near Vietnam. The rig ignited diplomatic strife and violent
anti-China protests in Vietnam.
But the island-building ―is bigger than the oil rig,‖ said the Western official, who spoke
on the condition of anonymity to avoid upsetting diplomatic discussions. ―These islands
are here to stay.‖
Officials say Johnson South Reef, which China seized in 1988 after killing about 70
Vietnamese soldiers or sailors in a skirmish, is the most developed of the islands so far.
―It‘s Johnson Island now; it‘s not Johnson Reef anymore,‖ the Western official said.
Filipino officials released aerial photographs last month showing structures and a large
ship.
Le Hai Binh, a spokesman for the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, said in an email
statement that Vietnam had sovereignty over the entire Spratly archipelago and that
―China has been illegally implementing activities of expansion and construction‖ around
Johnson Reef and other sites claimed by Vietnam.
He said Vietnam demanded that China ―immediately stop illegal activities of expansion
and construction‖ on the reef and ―withdraw its vessels and facilities from the area.‖
The Spratlys comprise hundreds of reefs, rocks, sandbars and tiny atolls spread over
160,000 square miles. Six governments have overlapping claims in the area. China and
Vietnam also have competing claims for the Paracel Islands, in the area where the
Chinese oil rig still sits. Both areas have abundant fish and some oil and gas reserves.
Jin Canrong, a professor of international studies at Renmin University of China, said he
believed that the construction on Johnson South Reef was ―a technical test, to see if
such things can be done.‖ Should China want to try island-building on a larger scale, he
said, a logical choice would be Fiery Cross Reef, about 90 miles west of Johnson
South.

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Last month, digital sketches of structures intended for the Spratlys circulated on
Chinese news websites, including that of Global Times, a newspaper owned by
People‘s Daily, the Communist Party mouthpiece. The sketches, labeled a research
study, showed a new island with shipping docks, parking lots and an airfield with a
runway, airplanes and hangars. Reports said the images were from the China
Shipbuilding NDRI Engineering Company, in Shanghai. When asked about the sketches
over the phone, a woman at the company said they were ―too sensitive‖ and had been
taken off the firm‘s website. She declined to comment further.
Wu Shicun, president of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, a
government-linked research group on Hainan Island, said Chinese construction was
intended mainly to augment the country‘s fisheries administration and humanitarian
relief capabilities, not for military purposes.
―Our facilities are worse than those of both the Philippines and Vietnam,‖ he said. ―You
see that Vietnam even has a soccer field.‖
Vietnamese and Filipino naval personnel played soccer during a June 8 conclave on
Southwest Cay Island, which is controlled by Vietnam. ―Clearly this was meant to
enrage the Chinese people,‖ Mr. Wu said. The island has been occupied by the
Vietnamese military since the 1970s but is also claimed by China and the Philippines.
Christopher K. Johnson, the chief China analyst at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, in Washington, said China‘s recent moves were partly to make up
for the fact that the Chinese military focused mainly on Taiwan for more than a decade
while Vietnam and the Philippines developed facilities on shoals and reefs they
controlled.
He said Chinese military officials were probably keeping in mind future long-range naval
power projections. ―There‘s no doubt that they would love to have some kind of a naval
facility on one of these things,‖ he said.
Chinese military leaders have talked in recent years of building up a navy that can
operate beyond what is commonly called the ―first island chain‖ — islands closer to
mainland Asia that include the Spratlys and Paracels — to penetrate the ―second island
chain,‖ which includes Guam and other territories farther east.
Mr. Thayer, the Australian analyst, said he had seen no signs yet that China was
building large military facilities or a runway on the new islands. But he said there was a
clear conclusion to be drawn from China‘s actions in both the South China Sea and the
East China Sea, where China contends with Japan over islands.
―None of this is an isolated incident,‖ he said. ―It seems to be a new plan to assert
Chinese sovereignty. This isn‘t something that will go away. This is a constant thing that
will raise tensions, and at the same time no one has a good response to it.‖

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China’s Information Warfare Campaign and the South China
Sea: Bring It On!
CARL THAYER June 16, 2014
The maritime confrontation between China and Vietnam over the placement of oil rig
HYSY 981 in disputed waters in the South China Sea that began in early May is now
entering its seventh week.
On June 9 China unexpectedly opened a new front when Wang Min, Deputy
Ambassador to the United Nations, presented Secretary General Ban Ki-moon a formal
position paper on the dispute with a request that he circulate it to all 193 UN members.
China‘s action in internationalizing its dispute with Vietnam does not represent a change
in its long-standing policy that maritime disputes can only be settled bilaterally through
direct consultations and negotiation of the parties directly concerned. A day after China
submitted its position paper, Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, stated that China rejected United Nations arbitration of its dispute with Vietnam.
Why then did China take its dispute with Vietnam to the United Nations?
In 2003 the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and Central Military
Commission formally adopted the doctrine of ―three warfares‖ (san zhongzhanfa). The
three warfares doctrine is an essential element of information warfare.
According to ―China‘s Three Warfares,‖ a 2012 study written by Timothy A. Walton for
Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis, China‘s ―three warfares‖ comprises three
components: psychological warfare, media warfare, and legal warfare. It is the latter two
components that shaped China‘s position paper.
Media warfare, according to Walton, is a strategy designed to influence international
public opinion to build support for China and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing
actions contrary to China‘s interests.
China‘s position paper was sent to the United Nations in order to outflank Vietnam‘s
own propaganda effort and to isolate Vietnam. The vast majority of UN members have
no direct interest in territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Many Southeast Asian
states that hold concerns about China‘s actions would shirk at being forced to take a
public stand on the issue.
Legal warfare, according to Walton, is a strategy to use China‘s domestic and
international law to claim the legal high ground to assert Chinese interests. China‘s
position paper is replete with selected references to international law to support China‘s
stance.

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Initially, China defended its placement of the oil rig by arguing that it was within China‘s
territorial waters. China noted that the HYSY 981 was located 17 nautical miles from
Triton islet, the western most feature of the Paracel Islands. Under the UN Convention
of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), territorial waters only extend 12 nautical miles from a
state‘s coastal baselines.
China‘s June 6 statement amended this error by claiming that the HYSY 981 was within
China‘s contiguous zone. This new claim, however, lacks legal foundation.
According to UNCLOS the sole purpose of the contiguous zone is to enable a coastal
state to ―exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory
or territorial sea.‖
China has also attempted to obfuscate its dispute with Vietnam by advancing the
argument that the location of HYSY 981 is closer to the Paracel Islands than to the
Vietnamese coastline. China‘s position paper argues, for example, that HYSY 981 was
operating 17 nautical miles from both Triton islet and the baselines drawn around the
Paracels and 133 to 156 nautical miles from Vietnam‘s coastline.
At the same time, China claims sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal, which is located
closer to the Philippines than to the nearest Chinese land feature. Under international
law, mere proximity is not sufficient to demonstrate sovereignty.
China‘s position paper to the UN actually undermines its use of legal warfare to
advance its case. For example, China‘s position paper states:
The waters between China’s Xisha (Paracel) Islands and the coast of Vietnamese
mainland are yet to be delimited. The two sides have not yet conducted delimitation of
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf in these waters. Both sides
are entitled to claim EEZ and continental shelf in accordance with the UNCLOS
If this is the case, China should have followed the provisions of UNCLOS to deal with
overlapping claims. Both China and Vietnam should have entered into provisional
arrangements over the disputed area until agreement was reached on delimitation.
During this period each side was enjoined from altering the status quo and from the
threat or use of force. Clearly China‘s placement of the oil rig in disputed waters violated
international legal principles.
But China‘s position paper undermines its legal case by arguing that international law is
irrelevant. The position paper states:
However, these waters will never become Vietnam’s EEZ and continental shelf no
matter which principle (on international law) is applied in the delimitation.
China‘s Ambassador to Australia, Ma Zhaozu, contributed to Beijing‘s information
warfare campaign by repeating the same argument in an op-ed article in The Australian
on June 13. Ma argued that the disputed area has never been delimited and ―no matter

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which principle [of international law] is applied these waters concerned will never
become Vietnam‘s part of EEZ and continental shelf.‖
China‘s formal tabling of a position paper with the UN Secretary General should be
taken up by members of the international community that are concerned about
escalating tensions between China and Vietnam and their possible impact on regional
security. These states should argue that the matter be taken up by the Security
Council.
China should not be permitted to pursue information warfare in order to have it both
ways – circulating a position paper to the UN in order to demonstrate the serious nature
of its dispute with Vietnam and rejecting UN arbitration. The United States and Australia
should press for a UN Security Council debate. Japan and other maritime powers with a
stake in stability in the South China Sea should join in.
China should be forced into the uncomfortable position of opposing any Security
Council debate and thus scuttling its attempt to use UN for propaganda purposes, or to
veto any resolution arising from a debate in the Security Council critical of China‘s
action in the South China Sea.

16
European
Geostrategy
South China Sea disputes: what is in it for Europe?
BRUNO HELLENDORFF June 15, 2014
In May 2014, Vietnam celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Battle of Dien
Bien Phu. National celebration and valorisation of the elders‘ heroic struggle against
oppression were the order of the day. This year, however, past and present mingled in a
rather disturbing way, with the appearance of a giant oil rig dispatched by Chinese
state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) in contested waters of
the South China Sea. Two years earlier, CNOOC Chairman Wang Yilin had called such
oil rigs China‘s ‗mobile national territory and a strategic weapon‘. The rig was sent to the
vicinity of Triton Island, one of the many islets, sandbanks and reefs that are collectively
known as the Paracels (or Xisha in China, and Hoàng Sa in Vietnam), an archipelago
over which both Hanoi and Beijing claim sovereignty. It was escorted by seven armed
vessels of the China People‘s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and more than sixty other
ships of Chinese law enforcement agencies, recently merged in a unified coastguard.
Many of these ships engaged in water cannon duelling and intentional ramming with the
Vietnamese vessels sent into the area to defend Hanoi‘s claims of sovereignty.
Furthermore, in reaction to what was perceived as an act of aggression, Vietnamese
mobs took to the streets and sacked factories thought to be Chinese. At least one
Chinese national died and many others were injured, causing China to evacuate
thousands of its citizens, and bilateral relations to hit a new low.
While already worrying on its own, the Sino-Vietnamese spat was not the only event
contributing to rising tensions in the South China Sea. In the same month, another row
occurred between China and the Philippines after Manila arrested Chinese fishermen in
the Spratleys, an archipelago of over 750 reefs, islets, atolls, cays and islands over
which China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei all lay claim (in full
or in part). These tensions have fuelled renewed attention over maritime security in the
South China Sea, an area of considerable marine biodiversity, believed to be rich in
hydrocarbons, and where a major share of global trade transits. China claims 80% of
the South China Sea, including the Paracels, wrestled from Vietnam in 1974, and the
Spratleys, considering its sovereignty and related rights and jurisdiction in the South
China Sea ‗supported by abundant historical and legal evidence‘.
Vietnam and the Philippines, for their part, vocally contest the position of China, and
defend their own, overlapping claims based on the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a convention to which all regional countries are parties.
Both have tried on numerous occasions to internationalise the conflict, soliciting – with
little success – Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) solidarity and
appealing to external powers such as the United States (US). Malaysia and Brunei also
lay claim to parts of the Spratleys, under their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), but
have adopted a more discreet stance vis-à-vis China, quietly exploiting resources in the

17
area while reinforcing their own military capabilities. Taiwan has a similar position to that
of China; it is indeed the Chinese Nationalist government that was at the origin of the
so-called ‗nine-dash line‘, and Beijing‘s position is based on the premise that Taiwan is
part of China. It has however adopted a rather conciliatory tone throughout the last
decades.
In addition to its hold on all of the Paracels, China controls eight islands of the
Spratleys. Vietnam holds twenty-nine of them, the Philippines eight, Malaysia five,
Brunei two and Taiwan just one – but the largest (Itu Aba).
Recent events do, as a matter of fact, point at a changing security architecture in the
South China Sea. And this evolution is not without impact on the prospects of the
European Union‘s (EU) security and prosperity. Due to major trade, financial, political
and societal interconnections with countries of the region, there is little doubt that any
conflict there would affect EU interests. European trade to and from East Asia mainly
goes through the South China Sea, and thus depends on its stability. Furthermore, East
Asia is home to several strategic partnerships of the EU, not to mention areas towards
which the US has pivoted its strategic and military focus in the last few years.
The first element of change in the parameters of maritime security in the South China
Sea is China‘s creeping assertiveness in the region. While a long debated argument,
the rising assertiveness of China is certainly a tangible perception in the eyes of its
Southeast Asian neighbours. Long bent on so-called ‗hedging‘ strategies, these
countries seem to gradually be more inclined to consider balancing behaviorsvis-à-vis
China, in a somewhat harder form. All have embarked, and this is the second element
of change, on ambitious programmes of naval build-up. The military balance in the
region is rapidly changing, making the South China Sea an increasingly competitive
environment. Thirdly, great power rivalry is intensifying in the region, as would appear
from the timing of the Sino-Vietnamese spat. It indeed came on the heels of Obama‘s
visit to the region, during which he took a position on the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue, to the
displeasure of Beijing which claims the Japanese-administered islands in the East
China Sea. To several observers, the oil rig row was a comparatively low-risk Chinese
gamble, seeking to challenge both ASEAN unity as well as US resolve.
While vectors of tensions seem to be on the rise, barriers and checks to escalation are,
for their part, severely put to the test. Less and less incentives appear to exist for
unilateral self-restraint. Confidence-building measures (CBMs), in the form of Track 1,
1.5 and 2 workshops on the issue, seem not to yield the expected stability-enhancing
benefits but rather act as forums for parties to express their contending positions and
seek outside support. The ASEAN track to resolve the disputes is fraught with
uncertainties, due to the lack of unity of its members, and China‘s preference for
bilateral channels. What is more, Indonesia, long considered the main broker in the
disputes – for its sponsorship of a legally-binding Code of Conduct in the South China
Sea among other things – has seen its position challenged in recent months by
increasingly clear assertions that China‘s claims indeed overlap with its EEZ (derived
from its Natuna islands). International Law is of limited assistance in view of the
contending interpretations the various countries have of their obligations and rights. A
remaining option is joint resource exploitation as yet another form of a confidence-

18
building measure. Still, it has so far been more often promoted as a way for one party to
consolidate its own claims than as a vehicle for dispute management. The EU has long
been a vocal supporter of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, and has reacted
to the last events by encouraging self-restraint and respect of international law –
customary or else. In so doing, Brussels only engaged with the narrow field of
escalation countermeasures, whose efficacy is increasingly under strain, it appears. In
light of its interests in the stability of the South China Sea, will this be enough?
Certainly, Europe is not able to compete militarily with the Asian giants on their own
shores. In fact, even sustaining a significant military presence in East Asia seems out of
its reach. However, the various hotspots the EU has to confront in its own
neighbourhood require its attention and resources far more imperatively anyway. But
the EU could weigh, even though not decisively, on the drivers of instability in the South
China Sea. It could be more proactive than reactive. So far, the EU‘s grasp and
engagement of great power dynamics in the region have been limited. The joint
communiqué between Catherine Ashton and Hilary Clinton on the Asia-Pacific Region
has failed to have any tangible follow up so far. Some additional thinking on
transatlantic interests in East Asia and on the EU‘s relation to the US ‗pivot‘ would be
welcome.
Secondly, European countries and companies are much involved in the military build-up
processes of most Southeast Asian nations. Arms exports are being regulated by EU
rules (the EU Common Position on Arms Exports), so these linkages could provide the
EU with a possible lever of influence, if a consensus can be reached among and within
its member states. The debates over the Mistral contract between France and Russia
after the Crimea demonstrated that arms deals are not just about economics. Greater
harmonisation in the implementation of the EU Common Position on Arms Exports
would helpfully bring its part to the definition of EU interests in Asia. The ―tank deal‖
between Germany and Indonesia demonstrated this need; while both referred to the EU
Common Position, The Netherlands declined to sell Jakarta Leopard II tanks, whereas
Berlin agreed. Furthermore, arms deals often come with long-term commitments to
technology transfers and offsets. A better integrated European defence sector, as
evoked during the December 2013 summit (but far from sight, as demonstrated by the
failed EADS-BAE merger), would help in capitalising on these long-lasting linkages, and
potentially – although this is difficult in a buyer‘s market – draw red lines vis-à-vis
customers.
Thirdly, the EU has long promoted institution-building, rule of law, and experience
sharing in Southeast Asia. Its engagement with ASEAN is full of promises. Yet, neither
ASEAN nor Indonesia – nor any other ASEAN member state – are strategic partners of
Brussels. Partnering with Indonesia would probably open major opportunities in the
region, should Jakarta be convinced of Brussels‘ interest and commitment. Something
like dedicated summits, or intensified high-level contacts could help foster cooperation.
Indonesia is not only the largest and most populated country of its region, it is also the
main driver of ASEAN, and a proactive proponent of stabilisation in South China Sea
disputes. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) the EU and Indonesia
signed is a step in the right direction, and opens room of stepped up collaboration in key

19
areas. It remains to be seen whether cooperation in maritime safety and security,
institutional capacity-building, and in confronting ‗non-traditional‘ security threats will be
given adequate means and support.
The EU has considerable stakes in the stability of the South China Sea, but little
resources to devote to their protection. However, it has under-employed tools at its
disposal that can help buttress its visibility and diplomacy. Maybe now is the time to
make better use of them, and actually be serious about defining the role it wants to have
in this ‗Asian century‘.
Bruno Hellendorff is a Researcher at the Group for Research and Information on Peace
and Security (GRIP). His research focuses on defence and security issues in the Asia-
Pacific and on the security dimension of natural resources management. He writes here
in a personal capacity.

20
Philippines protests over China's 'reclamation' of McKeenan
Reef
June 14, 2014
The Philippines said on Saturday it had filed a protest with Beijing for reclaiming land on
a disputed South China Sea reef, the fourth such complaint in three months.
The new protest over reclamation at the McKeenan Reef in the Spratly Islands chain
further heats up an increasingly tense dispute over the waters where China has been
accused of using bullying tactics against other claimants.
Foreign department spokesman Charles Jose said the protest was filed last week.
"They are doing reclamation work," he said in a brief statement.
He did not say if China had responded.
The Philippines previously filed an objection against China in April after monitoring
large-scale reclamation and earth-moving activity on Johnson South Reef, which it said
might be intended to turn the tiny outcrop into an island with an airstrip.
It later announced a similar challenge over Chinese reclamation at Gaven and Cuateron
Reef. China has previously brushed aside such protests, saying the outcrops are part of
its territory.
All four reefs were already occupied by Chinese forces but are also claimed by the
Philippines.
China claims the Spratly Islands along with nearly all of the South China Sea, which
contains vital sea routes and is also believed to hold large mineral resources.
The Philippines, along with Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and Taiwan have conflicting
claims to parts or all of the same territory, which has led to tense confrontations in
recent years.
China denies warships claims
In recent weeks, China and Vietnam have traded accusations of their ships ramming
each other after China set up an oil rig in a South China Sea area also claimed by
Vietnam.
A Chinese official said on Friday that China will never send military forces to the scene
of the increasingly ugly spat and accused Hanoi of trying to force an international
lawsuit.

21
A senior U.S. official in Washington dismissed the Chinese statement as "patently
ridiculous" and said Beijing had been using air force and navy as well as coastguard
assets "to intimidate others."
Scores of Vietnamese and Chinese ships, including coastguard vessels, have squared
off around the rig despite a series of collisions after the Chinese platform was towed into
disputed waters in early May.
Vietnam has accused China of sending six warships, but Yi Xianliang, deputy director-
general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs,
said that Beijing had never sent military forces.
The Haiyang Shiyou 981 rig is drilling between the Paracel Islands and the Vietnamese
coast. Vietnam has said the rig is in its 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone and
on its continental shelf, while China says it is operating within its waters.
The United States has not taken sides in the territorial disputes but has been strongly
critical of China's behaviour in pressing its claims and called for negotiated solutions.
The U.S. official called Yi Xianliang's statement "a weak attempt to obscure what China
is really doing."
"China has maintained a robust and consistent military presence near the oil rig since its
placement on May 2, including flying helicopters and planes over and around the rig.
There are currently multiple military vessels in the vicinity of the rig," he said.
The official said that on any given day, there were also Chinese navy warships in waters
disputed with the Philippines.

22
Truth about South China Sea dispute: expert
ZHANG TAO June 14, 2014
BEIJING, June 14 (Xinhua) -- Vietnam says it has evidence to prove its claim in the
South China Sea but is ignoring its own historical documents that vindicate China's
position, Ling Dequan, a researcher with Center for World Affairs Studies affiliated to
Xinhua, said on Saturday.
The following is the full text of Ling's article titled "The truth about the sea dispute" and
published on China Daily on Saturday:
Vietnam says it has evidence to prove its claim in South China Sea but is ignoring
own historical documents that vindicate China's position. Vietnam has been using
China-Vietnam clashes in the South China Sea, and distorting facts, fanning passions
and playing up the "China threat" theory, to vilify China. Ignoring the overall
development of Beijing-Hanoi relationship, Vietnam is pretending to be a "victim" in the
South China Sea dispute, saying it is prepared to seek international arbitration on the
issue.
Vietnamese leaders have said that they have enough historical evidence to justify
Vietnam's sovereignty over "Huangsha" and "Changsha" islands, claiming that Vietnam
has been the "master" of the two islands since the 17th century. It seems like they have
lifted their remarks straight out of a white paper "Truth of China-Vietnam Relationship
over 30 Years", issued by the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry in 1979 when bilateral ties
were not normal. Worse, almost all the arguments in that 1979 document were copied
from a "white paper" issued by the Saigon-based puppet South Vietnam regime (or the
Republic of Vietnam) in February 1974.
Now the Vietnamese leaders, using the so-called historical documents, are trying to
claim that Vietnam's "Huangsha" and "Changsha" islands are actually China's Xisha
Islands and Nansha Islands. The fact is that, the islands recorded in Vietnamese
documents refer to some other islands surrounding Vietnam instead of the Xisha and
Nansha islands.
To encroach on China's territory in the 1970s, the South Vietnam regime distorted
historical facts, which were adopted by later Vietnamese leaders for political purposes.
This has complicated the issue and caused serious damage to Sino-Vietnamese ties.
A look at the evidence presented in China's diplomatic documents in the late 1970s and
early 1980s will reveal the truth. In fact, even some Vietnamese scholars have said that
the documents cited by Vietnam to claim sovereignty over the Xisha and Nanshaislands

23
are not genuine historical records but edited versions of originals, confirming China's
sovereignty over the islands.
Vietnamese leaders said China forcibly occupied the entire "Huangsha Islands" in 1974,
which were then controlled by the Saigon regime. The Saigon regime had kicked up a
row over the naval battle that broke out in 1974 in the waters around China's Xisha
Islands and sought military support from its ally, the United States, and requested the
UN Security Council's intervention. But neither the US nor the UN Security Council
acceded to the Saigon regime's request. This means the international community,
including the US, has never believed in Vietnam's complaints or claims.
On Sept 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh announced the establishment of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam in Hanoi. In January 1950, the People's Republic of China became the first
country to establish diplomatic relations with Ho Chi Minh-led Vietnam. For China and a
vast majority of the other countries, the government of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (later the Socialist Republic of Vietnam), was (and has been) the only
legitimate government of Vietnam, and the government of South Vietnam, a puppet
regime installed by French colonialists and American imperialists.
So now, about 39 years after defeating the Americans, why does the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam want to use the Saigon regime's claim to create trouble in the South China
Sea? Aren't the current Vietnamese leaders betraying Ho Chi Minh and other freedom
fighters, profaning the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of their compatriots who laid
down their lives to resist foreign aggressors, and negating the valued support of their
allies in the battle against colonialism by citing the comprador Saigon regime's claim?
The Vietnamese government must not violate the principle of estoppel in the Xisha and
Nansha islands' sovereignty issue. Vietnamese leaders claim that no country
recognizes that the Xisha and Nansha islands belong to China. This is a brazen lie,
because the Democratic Republic of Vietnam topped the list of countries that accepted
China's sovereignty over the islands.
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam's position was unequivocal in the 1950s and
1960s. The position remained unchanged even after the death of Ho Chi Minh and the
end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Documents with the Chinese Foreign Ministry from the
1970s and 1980s show the position of the Ho Chi Minh-led Vietnamese Communist
Party on the Xisha and Nansha islands. The most important of these documents is a
note given by former Vietnamese premier Pham Van Dong to Zhou Enlai and the
declaration of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1965.
On Sept 4, 1958, the Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China
said that the breadth of the territorial sea of the country shall be 12 nautical miles and
that this provision should apply to all territories of the PRC, including all the islands in
the South China Sea. On Sept 14, 1958, Pham Van Dong solemnly stated in his note to
Zhou Enlai that Vietnam recognizes and supports the Declaration of the Government of
the PRC on the country's territorial sea. On Sept 22, 1958, the diplomatic note was
publicly published in Nhan Dan, the official newspaper of the Vietnamese Communist
Party.

24
On May 9, 1965, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam issued a statement on the US'
definition on the "theater of war" in Vietnam. The statement said that by defining the
whole of Vietnam and the waters up to 100 nautical miles off its coast as well as part of
the territorial sea of China's Xisha Islands as the operational area of the US armed
forces, Lyndon Johnson, then US president, has directly threatened the security of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and its neighbors.
In recent years, however, some Vietnamese government officials and "scholars" have
tried to "reinterpret" the two government documents, only to end up making fools of
themselves. And after their attempts failed, the Vietnamese government started
pretending as if the two documents never existed.
Vietnam has said that it is fully prepared with historical and legal evidence to prove its
claim in the South China Sea, and it is waiting for the appropriate time to take China to
the international court of justice. If that is so, then Vietnam should not forget to attach
Pham Van Dong's note and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's statement, as well as
the maps and textbooks published by Vietnam before 1975, with its complaint.

25
Xi of Two Minds: Be a Good Neighbor, or Assert China’s
Power?
CHRIS BUCKLEY June 12, 2014
If you‘re sometimes discombobulated by China‘s foreign policy gyrations, there may be
some consolation in knowing that so, apparently, is President Xi Jinping. A new report
argues that China‘s external strategy under him remains an unstable compound of
impulses: swelling ambitions that China will use its growing economic and military
power to subdue rivals versus a longstanding desire for a stable, benign regional setting
so that the ruling Communist Party can tend to domestic priorities.
Since taking over as the party leader in November 2012, Mr. Xi has brought urgency to
building China into a ―great power,‖ respected and heeded by other countries, above all
by the United States, says the report by Christopher K. Johnson, the main author, and
other experts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. But
―aside from some general principles,‖ it says, ―Xi himself may not have a fully fleshed
out worldview.‖
―The challenge is compounded by the many seemingly contradictory policy inclinations
that appear to be guiding Xi and his colleagues at this point,‖ it says. ―Externally,
leaders in China‘s neighboring countries are befuddled by the leadership‘s ostensible
inability, at least so far, to sustainably reconcile the contending impulses to seek
improvements in relations on China‘s periphery while simultaneously pushing hard to
reinforce Beijing‘s sweeping territorial claims and to expand its military footprint.‖
Mr. Johnson parts company from experts who believe that China‘s external policy is at
the mercy of factional divisions between, say, diplomatic moderates and military hard-
liners. Mr. Xi has accumulated positions and authority with striking speed, suggesting
that internal opposition is not a serious threat, the report says. China‘s foreign policy
uncertainties instead center on how Mr. Xi intends to hone his broad ideas for
ascendancy while maintaining China‘s self-assigned image as a paternal provider of
economic good will, trade agreements, concessional loans and Confucius Institutes for
language instruction.
Mr. Xi himself caught the paradox well when he described his country as a resurgent yet
somehow cuddly beast of the wild.
―Napoleon said that China was a sleeping lion and when this lion awoke, it would shake
the world,‖ Mr. Xi said in March while visiting Paris. ―The lion that is China has awoken,
but it is a peaceful, amiable and civilized lion.‖
No country‘s foreign policy is free of contradictions and uncertainties, but now China‘s
matters particularly for the world. Especially since Mr. Xi came to power, Beijing has set

26
out hardened positions in territorial disputes with Southeast Asian countries in the South
China Sea and with Japan in the East China Sea. Chinese leaders appear to hope that
their diplomatic showmanship, featuring vows of friendship and economic agreements,
can ultimately settle such disputes in their favor.
Increasingly, though, economic salves are unable to win over neighbors caught in
conflict with Beijing, the report says.
―Xi‘s unflinching assertion of China‘s sovereignty claims over disputed territories in both
the East and South China Seas, however, is generating a pervasive level of insecurity
among China‘s bordering nations that risks invalidating Beijing‘s good neighbor mantra,‖
it says.
The report sees little chance that Mr. Xi will revert to a more modest, compromising
position on territorial disputes. China‘s policy changes reflect expectations, widely held
by political elites and the public, that expanding economic and military power entitle the
country to a bigger say. Still, the report suggests, the Communist Party‘s focus on
domestic development is likely to discourage radical moves that entirely upend the
region.
―As long as the concept remains in force,‖ it says, ―there will be hard limits on Beijing‘s
willingness and ability to set out a truly revisionist course aimed at fundamentally
reshaping the balance of power in East Asia.‖

27
China ‘Internationalizes’ South China Sea Dispute
ZACHARY KECK June 10, 2014
China effectively internationalized its dispute with Vietnam over an oil rig in the South
China Sea on Monday by submitting its claim against Hanoi to the UN Secretary
General.
As Shannon reported yesterday, on Sunday China‘s Foreign Ministry released a
statement entitled, The Operation of the HYSY 981 Drilling Rig: Vietnam’s Provocation
and China’s Position, which criticized Vietnam‘s alleged provocations over the oil rig
and provided the ―most comprehensive outline to date of China‘s claims to the Paracel
Islands.‖
Late Monday, that statement was posted on the website of China‘s permanent mission
to the United Nations. According to the Associated Press, on Monday China‘s Deputy
Ambassador to the UN, Wang Min, sent the paper to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon
and asked him to circulate it among all members of the UN General Assembly.
On the surface, China‘s decision to raise the dispute at the United Nations is rather
puzzling. After all, China has repeatedly and consistently criticized other claimants in its
various maritime disputes, as well as third parties like the United States, for what China
claims are attempts to ―internationalize‖ the issue. Actions that won criticism from China
included merely raising the issue at regional forums like the Shangri-La Dialogue or
summits of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In addition, Beijing
has refused to respond to the case the Philippines has filed with the UN‘s Permanent
Court of Arbitration over Manila‘s own territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China
Sea.
Instead, China has advocated that the claimants to the South China Sea disputes settle
outstanding sovereignty issues through direct, bilateral negotiations where Beijing‘s
influence over its smaller neighbors will be greatest.
China‘s rationale for internationalizing the oil rig dispute with Vietnam near the Paracel
Islands is likely that no territorial dispute exists in that case. China currently administers
the Paracel Islands and has therefore refused to acknowledge that a territorial dispute
exists at all. Instead, Vietnam‘s attempts to prevent China from setting up an oil rig are
portrayed by Beijing as unbridled aggression, which makes the UN is the right venue to
resolve the issue.
In reality, China‘s decision to raise the issue at the UN likely reflects Beijing‘s growing
concern over its neighbors‘ use of international law to negate China‘s military
superiority. Besides the Philippines‘ case mentioned above, Vietnam has threatened to
appeal to international arbitration to resolve the Paracel Islands dispute ever since the

28
oil rig row began last month. In doing so, it would likely have the full support of Japan,
Australia, and the United States, among many others.
By proactively raising the issue at an international body and outlining its claims of
sovereignty, China is likely trying to dissuade Vietnam from acting on its threats to
appeal to international law. This strategy seems evident from the statement‘s extensive
outline of the basis for China‘s sovereignty claims, as well as its effort to link these
claims to various international treaties like UNCLOS.
On the one hand, this strategy makes sense for the Paracel Islands, where China‘s
sovereignty claims are fairly strong. Thus, Beijing is almost certainly hoping that the
prospect of losing will force Vietnam to back off from its international arbitration threat,
and that the futility of Hanoi‘s attempts to use international law will deter other claimant
states from doing likewise.
This is a dangerous gamble, however, as China is internationalizing the dispute and
lending credence to international law as a basis for sovereignty claims and resolving
disputes. While this might work in China‘s favor in its dispute with Vietnam over the
Paracel Islands, Beijing‘s nine-dash line claim more generally is fundamentally at odds
with international law. China therefore risks establishing a precedent that it will not want
to uphold in many similar cases.
Interestingly, Deputy Ambassador Wang also delivered a speech on Monday at a
meeting commemorating the 20th Anniversary of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) entering into force. According to an English-language
transcript published on China‘s UN website, Wang‘s speech did not directly mention
Vietnam or the South China Sea. Instead, Wang praised UNCLOS and said that China
fully abides by the treaty, before adding that it was the ―lawful rights of countries to
independently choose a way to peaceful[ly]‖ resolve any disputes.
Right on cue, Wang clarified:
―The Chinese government believes that the most effective way to peacefully settle
maritime disputes is negotiation and consultation between the parties directly involved
in the dispute on the basis of respect for historical facts and international law. This is
also what the majority of countries did in successfully settling their maritime disputes
[emphasis added].‖
Wang‘s remarks clearly underscore that China has not changed its general position on
maritime disputes, and the speech was likely an attempt to signal this fact to other
states.

29
The Battle of the South China Sea Editorials
JULIAN KU June 9, 2014

30
Beijing Applying ’3 Warfares’ To South China Sea Disputes
Staff Reporter June 9, 2014
China is expanding its ―three warfares‖ policy in dealing with Taiwan to its territorial
disputes in the South China Sea, reports our Chinese-language sister paper Want Daily.
Richard Hu, deputy executive director of the Center for Security Studies at Taipei‘s
National Chengchi University, told the paper that the People‘s Liberation Army first
officially coined the political warfare concept of the ―three warfares‖ back in 2003, being
public opinion warfare, psychological warfare and legal warfare.
The three warfares strategy has long been adopted by Beijing for cross-strait affairs, but
now the battlefield has shifted from the Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea, Hu said.
According to Hu, China has already begun adopting the strategy against the Philippines,
which filed a 4,000-page arbitration case at The Hague under the United Nations Law of
the Sea against Beijing‘s territorial claims to the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the
South China Sea.
On June 3, Manila requested that Beijing submit a response to the complaint by Dec.
15, but China has already stated that it will not participate in the arbitration, which Hu
believes is a sign of the three warfares at work.
Even though China has refused to accept the case or participate in the arbitration, Hu
said, it will acknowledge and grasp international discourse by utilizing academic
research or documents to provide solid evidence to support its case through unofficial
channels while also making strong statements in the international arena to influence
public opinion.
In order to succeed, however, China still needs to seek assistance from Taiwan, Hu
said. China had tens of thousands of historical files documenting its territorial claims in
the South China Sea, but they were split with Taiwan during the civil war, Hu said. The
Taiwanese government still has in its possession thousands of documents on the claims
in its Ministry of the Interior, Foreign Ministry, Ministry of National Defense and research
departments, all of which are invaluable to Beijing, he added.
The territory and natural resources linked to these claims affect sovereignty and
national interests on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, but how they cooperate to use the
documentary evidence to their collective advantage will be a test of intelligence for both
governments, Hu said.
Six countries — Taiwan, China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei — claim
in whole or part to the South China Sea and its island chains and shoals

31
ASEAN’s South China Sea conundrum
June 2, 2014
A number of countries have recently been causing trouble in the South China Sea. On
May 6, the Philippines illegally seized 11 Chinese fishermen and a boat in waters off
China‘s Half Moon Shoal in the Nansha Islands. Meanwhile, Vietnam continues to
forcefully disrupt a Chinese company‘s normal drilling operations in the waters off
China‘s Xisha Islands. In addition, enterprises in Vietnam invested by China and other
countries have suffered from looting and arson.
While continuing their maritime confrontations with China, the Philippines and Vietnam
have tried repeatedly to get the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to pass a
resolution on the South China Sea issue, attempting to force ASEAN to take their side
over the South China Sea issue with calls for the ―consensus‖ that ASEAN values.
However, this attempt to hijack ASEAN has disrupted the regional group‘s integration
process, becoming the most prominent negative factor hindering regional peace,
stability and development.
Since its founding in 1967, ASEAN has been committed to regional peace and stability
and focusing on economic integration and development. Since the construction of the
ASEAN free trade area began in 1992, ASEAN‘s economic development has attracted
increasing attention from powers outside the region. With the establishment of free
trade areas with countries such as China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New
Zealand, ASEAN has become the center of East Asian regional economic cooperation.
According to ASEAN‘s development plan, the ASEAN economic community will be
established in 2015, and strengthening regional connectivity, promoting foreign trade
and attracting foreign investment have become the priority of ASEAN‘s current
development. Most ASEAN countries are making efforts to accelerate community
building and regional integration and to move forward to the realization of a master plan
for the ASEAN Community.
However, at such a critical moment, the Philippines and Vietnam have gone against the
trend of regional development and arbitrarily stirred up the South China Sea issue. By
provoking maritime disputes under the pretext of so-called national interests, the
Philippines and Vietnam attempt to hijack ASEAN in order to jointly confront China,
resulting in escalating tensions in the South China Sea and greater risks to regional
security.
These two unreasonably troublesome countries have distracted ASEAN from its focus
on community building, spoiled the peaceful and stable environment that ASEAN needs
for its development and hindered its integration process.

32
What the Philippines and Vietnam have done not only goes against ASEAN‘s
development process, but also undermines ASEAN‘s basic principles.
ASEAN is a relatively loose regional organization with a unique mode of operation. The
principle of reaching consensus through consultation without mandatory constraints is
the main feature of the ―ASEAN way‖.
The so-called non-mandatory consensus through consultation means that in the
process of reaching consensus, ASEAN leaders should fully consult other decision-
makers, take into account other decision-makers‘ opinions and feelings and, on this
basis, leaders discuss and pass modest proposals and put forth comprehensive
conclusions.
If unanimity cannot be achieved, ASEAN puts the ―Y-X‖ principle into practice – part of
the members agree with the relevant proposal and are willing to take part in collective
action, and a few members agree with the proposal, but don‘t participate in collective
action, then ASEAN can also pass a relevant resolution.
Whether pursuing unanimity or the ―Y-X‖ principle, the core principle of ASEAN‘s
decision-making mechanism is to seek common ground among member states, namely
all member states must support the proposal, rather than ―the minority obeying the
majority‖.
In other words, by forcefully and repeatedly promoting a resolution concerning the
South China Sea at ASEAN ministerial meetings and summits, the Philippines and
Vietnam have trampled the rights of countries that have no claim in the South China
Sea and posed a challenge to ASEAN, which values mutual respect and equal
consultation. The two countries‘ rude actions make ASEAN come under question in the
international arena.
In 2012, Vietnam and the Philippines attempted to turn the disputes between them and
China into a problem between China and ASEAN as a whole, which was unacceptable
for the other members of the bloc, resulting in the 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministers‘
Meeting ending without the release of a customary communique showcasing common
ground. The two countries should be blamed for the failure to issue a communique,
which is rare in the past 45 years. As a result, ASEAN‘s international image was badly
damaged.
The Philippines and Vietnam always claim that the South China Sea issue endangers
ASEAN‘s interests, but China has never had nor will it have any sovereignty disputes
with ASEAN as a regional bloc. It is ridiculous for the Philippines and Vietnam to draw
Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Singapore and Indonesia into the South China
Sea sovereignty dispute. These countries can only express concerns about the security
situation in the region, rather than respond positively to Philippines and Vietnam‘s
―claims‖.
On May 10, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers‘ Meeting in Myanmar issued a statement on
the South China Sea issue, appealing to all parties in the South China Sea to comply

33
with the universally recognized principles of international law, maintain self-restraint,
and avoid activities that might damage regional peace and stability.
It also asked all parties to settle disputes peacefully and not resort to force or menace
with force, to safeguard peace, stability and safety in the South China Sea, and to
ensure free navigation and overflight.
It calls for full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
in the South China Sea and the conclusion of a code of conduct in the South China Sea
as soon as possible.
China has reiterated that the ASEAN countries concerned should earnestly respect and
implement the DOC and make positive contributions to peace, stability and maritime
security in the South China Sea. In the final analysis, maintaining regional peace and
stability is the common responsibility of China and ASEAN countries.
Contrary to this precept, the Philippines and Vietnam have taken the lead in violating
the DOC, spoiled cooperation between China and ASEAN by transferring the South
China Sea issue to ASEAN, stirred up tensions in the region and created obstacles to
regional peace and development.
China respects the state sovereignty of ASEAN countries, but is opposed to any country
that attempts to force ASEAN to take their side in the issue of the South China Sea. It is
not in line with international practice to turn territorial disputes between China and
specific ASEAN countries over certain islets and claims to particular areas of the South
China Sea into a problem between China and ASEAN as a whole.
ASEAN and China are each other‘s important strategic partners, and maintaining
regional stability and promoting common development are their consensus and the
direction of joint efforts.
When China is making joint efforts with ASEAN to safeguard regional peace and
stability, Vietnam and the Philippines‘ scheme to hijack ASEAN and spoil cooperation
between China and ASEAN can never win support from other ASEAN countries.

34
EDITORIAL: Review South China Sea policy
June 1, 2014
The 13th Shangri-La Dialogue that began on Friday in Singapore comes at a time of
increasing tension over disputed territorial claims in the South China Sea. This
escalation has highlighted the importance of a review of the nation‘s policy on the area,
which appears to be indistinguishable from China‘s, and this weakens Taiwan‘s
position.
More than 400 top-ranking defensedecisionmakers from 27 countries attended the
three-day Asia Security Summit to address an audience of defense officials and security
specialists on major security developments in the region and to arrange private
meetings with their counterparts on the sidelines.
Taiwan is not a full participant at this leading security forum. As in previous years, two
academics from Taiwan were invited — this year, it was former minister of national
defense Andrew Yang (楊念祖) and National Chengchi University College of
International Affairs professor Arthur Ding (丁樹範).
The presence of academics in the regional Track One security dialogue mechanisms
that deal with South China Sea issues, like the Shangri-La Dialogue, is the best Taiwan
can hope for in such mechanisms. Participation of Taiwanese government officials at
the Shangri-La Dialogue was possible only once, in 2003, when China boycotted the
gathering.
Last year, the invitations extended to two other Taiwanese academics to participate in
the third Jakarta International Defense Dialogue, which is of paramount importance for
security dialogue, were withdrawn at the last minute due to opposition from Beijing.
Taiwan did not make it to the fourth annual Jakarta dialogue in March either.
China‘s policy of limiting Taiwan‘s diplomatic efforts by blocking its participation in
international affairs was not the only factor that has led to Taiwan‘s marginalization in
the events that have shaped regional geopolitics. In the case of the South China Sea,
over which Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, China, Malaysia and Brunei all have
overlapping territorial claims, it can in part be attributed to the government‘s maritime
security policy being based on the principle of not offending China, to avoid any risk to
progress in cross-strait relations.
President Ma Ying-jeou‘s (馬英九) administration has been shying away from playing an
active, participative role in maritime disputes involving China. It has opted to keep quiet
about Beijing‘s aggressive tactics in the area, in a manner distinctly different from how it
has reacted to moves by other claimants. This policy has left claimants in the region in
doubt about Taiwan‘s stance regarding cooperation with China over the disputed

35
islands. Despite the Ma administration‘s repeated denial that it will aid China, the
approach has made the parties concerned insecure.
The Philippines launched legal action against China before a UN tribunal in March,
while Vietnam, which was conspicuously quiet about the move, has threatened to follow
suit after China‘s recent deployment of a giant oil rig near the Paracel Islands (Xisha
Islands, 西沙群島). Due to its awkward position internationally, Taiwan is no match for
other countries when it comes to international arbitration on the matter, but that does
not mean that it has no room for making its case.
While the Philippines continues to press ahead with the legal initiative at the UN, China
and ASEAN countries have begun negotiations over a code of conduct in the South
China Sea. Other players, including Japan, vowed at the Singapore summit to play a
more active defensive role in the region.
Maritime disputes in the South China Sea will continue to take center stage, making it
imperative that Taiwan reviews its South China Sea policy. If Taiwan clarifies its claims
on the ―nine dash line,‖ it would be a starting point. It needs to differentiate its stance
from that of China, which is considered to be inconsistent with international law. Doing
so would also raise Taiwan‘s profile in regional security affairs.

36
Hagel: China destabilises Asia-Pacific region
May 31, 2014
The US defence secretary, Chuck Hagel, has said China actions in the South China
Sea are "destabilising" and "unilateral", rubbishing Beijing's description of the waters as
a "sea of peace, friendship and cooperation".
Hagel made the remarks on Saturday at an Asian security summit in Singapore, during
a time of increasing maritime tension between China and its neighbours including
Japan, the Phillipines and Vietnam.
He said: "China has called the South China a 'sea of peace, friendship and cooperation'.
And that's what it should be.
"But in recent months, China has undertaken destabilising, unilateral actions asserting
its claim in the South China Sea.
"It has restricted access to Scarborough Reef, put pressure on the long-standing
Phillipine presence at the Second Thomas Shoal, begun land reclamation at multiple
locations, and moved an oil rig into disputed waters near the Paracel Islands."
The statement came a day after the US delivered the first of a fleet of Global Hawk
drones to Japan.
While the US took no position on competing territorial claims, he told the audience: "We
oppose any nation's use of intimidation, coercion or the threat of force to assert those
claims".
"The United States will not look the other way when fundamental principles of the
international order are being challenged."
Territorial tensions
China was quick to react to Hagel's speech. The deputy chief of the general staff of the
People's Liberation Army called the remarks baseless, the AFP news agency reported.
"This speech is full of hegemony, full of incitement, threats, intimidation," said Wang
Guanzhong, who is due to make his own speech at the summit on Sunday.
"Moreover [it] is public, several times criticising China by name, and these kinds of
accusations are completely without basis, without reason."

37
Wang's tone was markedly different from that of China's president Xi Jinping who, on
Friday, promised not to "stir up trouble" in the South China Sea and would only "react as
necessary" to the provocations of other countries involved.
Beijing's decision to deploy an oil platform in waters claimed by Vietnam provoked anti-
Chinese riots, with thousands of Chinese citizens being evacuated from Vietnam as a
result.
At the same Singapore-based security summit Japan's prime minister, Shinzo Abe, said
on Friday that his country wanted to play a greater role in promoting peace and
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.
Abe said efforts "to consolidate changes to the status quo by aggregating one fait
accompli after another can only be strongly condemned".
He did not identify China by name, but praised the Philippines and Vietnam for their
efforts to resolve the disputes through dialogue.

38
Template for the South China Sea
THE EDITORIAL BOARD May 29, 2014
On May 22, after 20 years of negotiations, Indonesia and the Philippines signed a
maritime border agreement delineating the boundaries of their overlapping exclusive
economic zones in the Mindanao, Celebes and Philippine Seas. President Benigno
Aquino III of the Philippines and the Indonesian president, SusiloBambangYudhoyono,
hailed the accord as a model for peacefully settling the increasingly tense maritime
boundary disputes in the South China Sea.
The spirit of compromise and cooperation in this agreement, however laboriously
achieved, is very much needed to help settle the tangled web of conflicting territorial
claims involving a seemingly endless list of Asian nations: the Philippines, Malaysia,
Brunei, Taiwan, Vietnam and China. At issue is who controls what in the South China
Sea, where large reserves of oil and gas are thought to be.
Tensions keep rising, and no quick resolution seems to be in sight. In the latest
escalation, on May 1, China positioned an oil rig in waters claimed by both China and
Vietnam. Chinese and Vietnamese fishing boats and warships have been jostling
around the rig, leading to a Chinese vessel ramming and sinking a Vietnamese fishing
boat this week.
These territorial disputes in the South China Sea have strong economic motives, but
they also reflect a deep-seated nationalism. As the Chinese vice foreign minister, Liu
Zhenmin, put it, the sea is central to China‘s very existence as a global economic
power.
What is needed is an understanding that compromise and cooperation do not threaten
national sovereignty. The quarreling states should return to the spirit of their 2002
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, a lofty but nonbinding
agreement that included a commitment to international law, a pledge to resolve disputes
peacefully and a promise not to occupy uninhabited islands. As long as states continue
to make maximalist sovereignty claims, there will be no agreed upon maritime borders
and only missed opportunities to manage the resources of the sea for the benefit of all.

39
South China Sea oil dispute unlikely to have a winner
CLYDE RUSSELL May 29, 2014
MAY 29 — One of the lessons from recent history is that intractable disputes are rarely
solved as long as one or more of the parties believe they can win.
This appears to be the case with the increasingly confrontational situation between
China and its neighbours over the South China Sea, with all sides still pressing claims
unacceptable to each other.
The latest flashpoint is the Chinese decision to position an oil drilling rig in the South
China Sea in waters claimed by both China and Vietnam.
Vietnam claimed one it its fishing boats, operating near the rig, was sunk by Chinese
craft on May 26, prompting Beijing to say it capsized after ―harassing‖ and colliding with
a Chinese vessel.
And it‘s not just China and Vietnam, with the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan
all claiming parts of the South China Sea, while rejecting China‘s assertion that 90 per
cent of the waters belong to it.
China is also engaged in a dispute with Japan over small islands that lie between them
in the East China Sea, with Chinese fighter jets flying in close proximity to a Japanese
surveillance aircraft in the latest ratcheting up of tensions.
In trying to understand the dispute, it‘s always best to ask what‘s at stake.
On an economic level it‘s believed the South China Sea is rich in oil and gas deposits,
with the US Energy Information Agency estimating 11 billion barrels of oil and 190
trillion cubic feet of gas in proved and probable reserves.
For China, developing major oil and gas fields under its sovereign control has obvious
appeal, but both Vietnam and the Philippines are also hungry for energy resources.
On the political side it appears that China is becoming more assertive, taking the view
that its status as Asia‘s largest economy means it should take more of a leading role in
the region.
Beijing is also investing heavily in boosting its military capabilities to give muscle to a
more robust approach, and also to counter the influence of the United States, which
counts Japan, the Philippines and Australia as firm allies in the region.

40
For the smaller countries of Southeast Asia there appears to be a determination to
stand up to what they see as Chinese bullying, using the tactic learned by children in
playgrounds across the world that unless you stand up to the bully, he will continue his
bad behaviour.
But this isn‘t a schoolyard and the legitimate fear is that the situation can move quickly
from sinking fishing boats to armed skirmishes and ultimately all out conflict.
The main problem is that the countries involved haven‘t yet worked out that none of
them can win.
While China would almost certainly win a military conflict, assuming no US involvement,
it would lose politically and economically by becoming a pariah among its East Asian
neighbours, and probably with major trading partners such as the European Union.
Likewise, Vietnam, the Philippines and the others have to recognise the reality of a
powerful China and how it‘s better to build a working relationship with Beijing that allows
for economic development without domination.The South China Sea has been a highly
disputed area with many nations staking claims to various islands and atolls. — Reuters
The South China Sea has been a highly disputed area with many nations staking claims
to various islands and atolls. — Reuters
Leadership lacking
The South China Sea dispute doesn‘t need to deteriorate into conflict, but it will take
leadership and compromise by all parties, something that seems unlikely currently.
The Philippines is trying its luck by seeking arbitration at the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), seeking recognition of its right to exploit resources
within a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone.
The convention allows countries a 12-mile zone of control with a claim to 200 miles to
exploit resources.
The problem in the South China Sea is that several countries seek these rights from
disputed small islands and reefs, creating a multitude of overlapping claims.
Even if Manila is successful at the UNCLOS, the value of any ruling is doubtful given the
lack of any enforcement mechanism.
It seems to me that the best solution would be for the all the involved parties to sit down
and work out a structure for everybody‘s benefit.
This could take the form of a transnational corporation with weighted shareholding that
would be granted exclusive rights to exploit the resources, with the output and profits
being shared.
Or a multinational agency could be set up to coordinate developments and provide a
mutually-agreed dispute resolution process.

41
But these sorts of steps first require a recognition that nobody is going to win outright.
If you look at some other long-running disputes since the end of World War Two, a clear
pattern emerges.
As long as one side believes in total victory, the conflict drags on. The Israeli-
Palestinian situation and Colombia‘s low-intensity but 50-year-old civil war are examples
of this.
However, the resolution of decades of conflict in Northern Ireland and South Africa are
examples of leaders from all sides coming to the conclusion that victory is unachievable
and compromise is ultimately better.
But the cautionary lesson from those conflicts is that things often have to deteriorate to
near the point of no return before true leadership emerges.
This is the real risk for the South China Sea and its vast reserves of oil and gas.
In trying to gain the prize for themselves, the countries involved will end up with nothing
more than a costly and long-running dispute.
Perhaps they should refer to the Art of War, the renowned text by Chinese general Sun
Tzu, in which he said: ―There is no instance of a country having benefited from
prolonged warfare‖. — Reuters

42
China and Vietnam Point Fingers After Clash in South China
Sea
JANE PERLEZ May 27, 2014
BEIJING — Tensions in the South China Sea escalated sharply on Tuesday as China
and Vietnam traded accusations over the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel in the
vicinity of a Chinese oil rig parked in disputed waters off Vietnam‘s coast.
The sinking further aggravated the worsening diplomatic and economic frictions
between China and Vietnam, whose relations have plummeted to the worst point in
decades after anti-Chinese riots two weeks ago that killed at least four people and
injured more than 100 in Vietnam. China evacuated several thousand workers from
Vietnam last week.
In the latest incident, a Chinese vessel rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat
about 17 nautical miles southwest of the oil rig on Monday afternoon, the state-run
Vietnamese television network, VTV1, reported. All 10 crew members were rescued, the
network said.
A Vietnamese resident of Hong Kong pasted Vietnamese flags on his face during a
protest on Sunday against Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea.
But China labeled Vietnam as the aggressor, with the Chinese state-run news agency,
Xinhua, saying the Vietnamese fishing boat ―capsized when it was interfering with and
ramming‖ a Chinese fishing vessel from Hainan, a province of China. Then China
accused Vietnam of sabotage and interfering with the operations of the oil rig, which has
become a flash point ever since Vietnam learned that the Chinese had anchored the rig
in waters contested by both nations.
At sea, armadas from both countries are jousting as the Chinese try to protect the $1
billion oil rig operated by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, known as Cnooc.
Chinese and Vietnamese boats have rammed each other in the area around the oil rig,
and the Chinese have acknowledged that they used water cannons to keep the
Vietnamese away from the rig, which stands as tall as a 40-story building.
The rig arrived in the waters off the Paracel Islands, which are claimed by both China
and Vietnam, on May 1, a move that showed China was trying to establish its control of
the waters without consulting other claimants.
Chinese social media sites lit up Tuesday with nationalistic postings about the oil rig and
Monday‘s clash at sea. Users of ifeng.com, the website of Phoenix Television, a Hong

43
Kong-based satellite network, sent congratulations to the Chinese ship for its action in
sinking the Vietnamese vessel.
―Now this is showing some backbone,‖ said one anonymous user. ―Good going, finally
seeing some news of concrete action,‖ said another.
And the depth of anti-Chinese sentiment in Vietnam was on stark display last Friday
when a 67-year-old Vietnamese woman set herself on fire and died in Ho Chi Minh City,
an echo of the self-immolations by Buddhist monks in South Vietnam in the early 1960s
during the Vietnam War.
The woman burned herself at dawn in the center of the city and left behind papers
imploring the Vietnamese government to act more aggressively against the Chinese oil
rig, city officials said.
A report by Xinhua on Tuesday cited Cnooc as saying that the rig had finished its first
phase of operation and would stay in the area until mid-August. The Vietnamese
Fisheries Resources Surveillance Department said the rig was moved a few hundred
feet north on Sunday, but the significance of the move was not immediately clear.
In a signal of how China, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, now views the
South China Sea as a top foreign policy priority, the country‘s vice foreign minister said
Tuesday that the sea was central to China‘s very existence as a global economic
power.
―Being the lifeline for China, the South China Sea is far more important to China than to
other countries,‖ the minister, Liu Zhenmin, told reporters in Beijing.

44
Conduct in the South China Sea
May 26, 2014
Tension continues to grip China-Vietnam ties after China brought a deep-water oil
drilling rig early this month into an area near the Paracel Islands, which are under
China‘s effective control but also claimed by Vietnam. The move triggered violent anti-
China demonstrations across Vietnam, while ships from both countries rammed each
other around the disputed islands.
Vietnamese demonstrators attacked factories owned by foreign capital. Beijing said two
Chinese were killed in the attacks on Chinese businesses in Vietnam, and announced
partial suspension of bilateral exchanges, including tourism.
The Vietnamese government should be praised for acting in a coolheaded manner to
contain the situation. Fearing a negative effect on its economy, Hanoi clamped down on
anti-China demonstrations. Vietnam apparently had no other choice, given its close
trade ties with China — the destination of more than 10 percent of Vietnam‘s exports
and the source of nearly 30 percent of its imports — and the huge gap in the two
countries‘ military capabilities.
China for its part must exercise self-restraint and make serious efforts to peacefully
resolve the dispute in cooperation with the international community. Beijing needs to
realize that its drilling activities near the Paracel Islands constitute a unilateral move to
change the status quo in the disputed area.
To keep fueling its economic growth, China has pushed to secure its interests in the
South China Sea, which abounds in such resources as oil and natural gas, under the
slogan of becoming a ―great maritime power.‖ It had adopted a U-shaped ―nine-dash
line‖ that encircles a large area of the South China Sea and declared the sea inside the
line as its territorial waters. The area inside the nine-dash line includes both the Paracel
Islands and the Spratly Islands, the latter being claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. China has not shown any legal grounds to back up its
claims to the whole area — which are not recognized internationally. Still, it continues to
push for effective control of the area in an attempt to create a fait accompli.
China‘s drilling attempt near the Paracel Islands began after U.S. President Barack
Obama wrapped up his visit to Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines in late
April. The Obama administration tried to emphasize U.S. rebalancing military resources
to Asia in support of allies in the region.
There has been speculation that China is trying to keep U.S. policy in check, and
attempting to gauge its reactions by taking what Washington has called a ―provocative‖
move near the Paracel Islands.

45
During his Asia tour, Obama reassured Japan that the Senkaku Islands, the source of a
bitter territorial dispute between Tokyo and Beijing, is covered by U.S. defense
obligations under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. He also concluded a new security
pact with the Philippines — which has its own maritime dispute with China — that brings
back the U.S. military to the country for the first time in more than two decades.
But the China-Vietnam spat may have highlighted the waning U.S. security influence in
Asia. The Obama administration has called for self-restraint on the part of China, but
does not appear to have any effective means to control the situation.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, meanwhile, has tried to play an active role
in defusing the situation despite differences in its 10 members‘ attitudes toward China.
At a summit held in the Myanmar capital of Naypyitaw on May 10-11, the ASEAN
members issued a statement urging ―all parties concerned, in accordance with the
universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to exercise self-restraint and avoid
actions that could undermine peace and stability in the area; and to resolve disputes by
peaceful means without resorting to threat or use of force‖ — without singling out China.
China should positively respond to the ASEAN call and actively push negotiations with
the group to conclude the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. China needs to
recognize that as a major power, it has the duty to peacefully resolve disputes in the
area.

46
ASEAN unity and the threat of Chinese expansion
RICHARD JAVADHEYDARIAN May 26, 2014
Are China's expanding territorial claims in the South China Sea going to bring Southeast
Asian countries together?
Shortly after US President Barack Obama's recent visit to Asia, where he underscored
Washington's commitment to remain as an anchor of stability in the region, a new crisis
erupted in the South China Sea. Pressing its territorial claims in adjacent waters, China
dispatched HYSY981, a state-of-the-art deep-sea rig, which belongs to the state-owned
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), well into Vietnam's Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ).
Chinese officials tried to justify the move by describing it as a natural progression of
CNOOC's surveillance operations in the contested waters, but most analysts believe
that political considerations, as opposed to commercial calculations, were behind
China's latest territorial manoeuvre. The HYSY981 was reportedly accompanied by an
armada of Chinese para-military vessels.
Vietnam responded in kind by dispatching around 30 naval vessels to fend off what it
saw as a de facto Chinese occupation of hydrocarbon-rich waters claimed by Hanoi. It
didn't take long before Hanoi shared a video alleging Chinese harassment of
Vietnamese naval vessels. Soon, large-scale anti-Chinese protests engulfed Vietnam,
leading to massive destruction of factories owned by Chinese and Taiwanese investors,
and precipitating an exodus of thousands of Chinese citizens.
Meanwhile, the Philippine marine forces apprehended 11 Chinese fishermen on
charges of illegal capture of endangered species, and released photos alleging Chinese
construction activities on the disputed Johnson South Reef in the Spratly chain of
islands.
With Beijing openly challenging Washington's commitment to ensure freedom of
navigation in international waters, the US State Department directly blamed China for
sparking renewed tensions in the South China Sea. Concomitantly, up to 5,500 US and
Filipino troops participated in the annual "Balikatan" joint-military exercise in the South
China Sea - underscoring deepening Philippine-US military cooperation amid rising
Chinese territorial assertiveness.

47
The dangerous uptick in regional geopolitical tensions coincided with the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Myanmar, the current chair of the regional
body. Worried about the implications of ongoing territorial spats, the ASEAN expressed
its "serious concern" and called for the resolution of maritime disputes in accordance to
international law.
Long dismissed as a feeble regional body, the ASEAN has nevertheless emerged as a
critical component of any prospective resolution of the South China Sea disputes in a
peaceful, diplomatic fashion. But China's immense - and growing - economic influence
over its Southeast Asian neighbours will continue to complicate efforts at establishing a
unified ASEAN position on the issue.
A dynamic backyard
The establishment of the ASEAN was driven by the exigencies of the Cold War, with the
West and its regional allies aggressively resisting communist expansion. Beyond
serving as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism, there were also endogenous
motivations in play: Leading Southeast Asian countries sought to put aside their
territorial disputes and political differences in order to focus on nation-building and
regional integration.
Richard JavadHeydarian is a specialist on Asian geopolitical/economic affairs and
author of "How Capitalism Failed the Arab World: The Economic Roots and Precarious
Future of the Middle East Uprisings"

International opinion on the South China Sea Issue part III

International opinion on the South China Sea Issue part III

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