- China views dominance over the South China Sea as strategically important for gaining access to the wider Pacific and Indian Ocean, allowing it to influence global trade routes and project power. - If China gains control over the South China Sea, it could "Finlandize" countries like Vietnam and the Philippines by constraining their foreign policies to be more favorable to China's interests through economic and military pressure. - The US faces the challenge of enforcing costs on China to prevent aggression in the South China Sea, while avoiding a direct military conflict that could damage the important US-China relationship.

1. - 1 -
The Next Debate with Robert D. Kaplan
The Future of the South China Sea
Air date: June 20, 2015
Rudyard: Robert Kaplan, welcome to The Next Debate.
Robert: Well, it's a pleasure to be here.
Rudyard: I want to start off by having you explain to us why you think The South
China Sea is one of the most important pieces of geopolitical real estate
in the world today?
Robert: What The South China Sea is to China is what the Greater Caribbean
was to the United States in the 19th
and early 20th
Century. The United
States became a great power, geopolitically, by dominating the
Caribbean. Once it could do that, it could dominate the western
hemisphere, and once dominating the western hemisphere, it could
affect the balance of power in the eastern hemisphere, which was what
World War I, World War II and the Cold War were all about. The
South China Sea is no less important for China. If China can gain
dominance over The South China Sea, it then can have access to the
wider Pacific, and through the Strait of Mowaka, into the greater Indian
Ocean, which is the global energy interstate, bringing all the oil and
natural gas from the Middle East to the population zones of Asia. So
this is really big stuff. It's a sea far out of proportion to its size. It's got a
certain amount of oil, natural gas, fisheries underneath it, and also, if
China can dominate The South China Sea, then it will, effectively,
Finlandise countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, etc., which would
then affect the whole balance of power in Asia.
Rudyard: Let’s talk about this idea of Finlandise. You think this could be a big
part of the grand strategy behind China's increasingly vociferous
defence of its land and island claims in The South China Sea. What
would Finlandisation mean on the ground?
Robert: Finlandisation, during the Cold War, was a successful Soviet imperial
strategy. Essentially it allowed Finland to be democratic, free, but it
constrained Finland's foreign policy, so that Finland could not join
NATO or do other things that were not in Russia’s interests. It was a
cheap form of colonialism, in a way, unlike the expensive form, which
failed, which was the Warsaw Pact encompassing Poland south to

2. - 2 -
Bulgaria. Finlandisation, in the case of Vietnam, the Philippines,
Malaysia, etc, would mean that these countries would remain
independent, but their foreign policies would essentially be written in
Beijing. Finlandisation of The South China Sea would bring China two
or three giant steps forward, to dominating Taiwan, which is, sort of,
the northern cap in the bottle of The South China Sea.
Rudyard: Practically, how does that happen? Is it the control of shipping routes or
the extent to which China would bully its way into the natural resource
exploitation of South China Sea? I'm just trying to understand how the
projection of power gets you to the point of controlling the foreign
policy of Hanoi.
Robert: Remember that China is the demographic and geographic and economic
organising principle of East Asia, because of its sheer size. So China
can be much more dominant in East Asia than the United States,
coming from half a world away. China's more threatening to these
countries than the United States because of geographical proximity, so
the combination of economic, and military, and diplomatic pressure
would essentially cause these countries to make side deals with Beijing.
While they would never admit it, and would have nominally
independent foreign policies, there would be more and more areas
where they could not go, diplomatically.
Rudyard: How is this process not inevitable? As you say, all things being equal,
geography and demography are going to determine the balance of
power. The United States is going to lose on both those points with
China.
Robert: Well, this is the real challenge for the United States, because remember,
the United States dominated the western Pacific, as though an American
naval lake from 1945 up until recently. The Vietnam War and the
Korean War didn't really affect this reality as China and Japan had their
infrastructures devastated by World War II, and both those countries
were internally focussed, for decades, whether internally focussed in a
bad way, with a great leap forward, and cultural revolution, or
internally focussed, in a good way, with Deng Xiaoping's new
economic mechanism. Japan developed as a pacifist state and had to
recover from the aftershocks of World War II. But, what's happened in
recent decades, is that World War II has receded, China's recovered. It
has had decades of capitalist expansion, a pseudo-capitalist expansion,
and the result is it's become so rich, it can build up its military. It has
the capacity to have a first class military. So what we're seeing is a
natural evolution, from a unipolar military arrangement, dominated by
the United States, to more of a multipolar military arrangement, where
China becomes a major actor, and Japan has to become more
nationalistic and militarily oriented, in order to balance against China.
Rudyard: So if this process unfolds, as you think it will, what does this do to the
United States? What are the practical implications for the west?

3. - 3 -
Robert: What we're seeing is something new in the world. We're seeing
traditional age-old geopolitics, but played out in a globalised setting.
What the United States has to do, is enforce costs on China to keep it
from being too aggressive in The South China Sea, because The South
China Sea doesn't just effect East Asia. It affects America's reputation
for power throughout the globe.
Rudyard: Given the deep economic interdependence between America and China,
if tensions in The South China Sea rise to the extent that they really
threaten the China, US relationship, America will back down?
Robert: What America has to do, it has to steer its response between two
extremes. One extreme, as I indicated earlier, is to try to prevent the
Finlandisation of the nations of The South China Sea, but the other
extreme is to avoid a shooting war with China, because the US, China
bilateral relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the
world, and will be, going into the future. So the US has to defend a
treaty ally, like the Philippines, but it cannot allow a country like the
Philippines to lure the United States into a military conflict with China.
It's a very narrow passage to navigate, but that is the challenge,
especially for the US Defence Department and the US Navy.
Rudyard: Do you see parallels between what's happened in the Ukraine, with
Vladimir Putin's Russia and its unprecedented violation of territorial
sovereignty of neighbouring states? Has a dangerous precedent been
established that could subsequently play out in the disputes China is
having in The South China Sea?
Robert: Superficially, both Russia, Ukraine, China, South China Sea, are
examples of traditional geopolitics, played out in the global setting, but
that's where the similarities end. Russia is very brazen, sending in
people with guns and black ski masks, and just ruling territory. China is
very deft and measured. It's very elegant in its aggression. It sends in an
oil rig to explore in Vietnamese waters then after six weeks it
withdraws it. It challenges the Philippines, not with warships, but with
its coastguards and fishing vessels. So it uses small fishing boats,
coastguard vessels, the whole continuum of naval platforms, in order to
challenge its neighbours. This is not direct aggression, in the way that
Russian aggression is, and therefore it keeps The South China Sea on
page 2, rather than on page 1, like the Ukraine is now. Now, with the
latest land reclamation projects by the Chinese, things have jumped on
to page 1 because of the power of satellite photography. This is the first
time that China has elevated The South China Sea to a page 1 story.
Rudyard: Well, talk to us about that, because these disputes are century old. Why
all of a sudden has China decided to push the proverbial “go button”
with the international media, with their own domestic media?
Robert: Two things. First of all, it's true, these disputes go back decades, at the
minimum, but remember, for most decades, after World War II and
during the Cold War, these countries have been internally focussed. I

4. - 4 -
spoke about China and Japan, but Vietnam had its war, Malaysia had its
insurgencies. These countries could not project power outwards. That
has all changed. They've all been building navies and air forces, so they
can project power outward, and lo and behold, they now have active
conflicts, in terms of who owns what in the Blue Water borders. The
other thing that's driving this, from the Chinese side, is that China, as
we know, has been going through a tumultuous economic transition.
China is no longer seeing double digit economic growth rates every
year. It's down to 7%. It's probably, in reality, significantly lower. So
China's going to face a more restive population at home, and one of the
ways you deal internal dissatisfaction, is you dial up nationalism, and
that is what they're doing. So a more aggressive posture, in The South
China Sea, gives Chinese leaders more of a political cushion, in terms
of their domestic audience at home. Remember, even autocrats are
dependent on public opinion, in the 21st
Century.
Rudyard: Let's talk about Vietnam. Is there a risk that future tensions in The
South China Sea could be much more a Vietnam, China face-off, as
opposed to a the US and China conflict?
Robert: Vietnam is the most serious challenger to China in The South China
Sea. The Philippines may be a treaty ally of the US, like Japan and
South Korea, but the Philippines has very little military power, and
cannot project its military force. Vietnam is a much stronger power.
Vietnam has a long tradition, going back hundreds of years, of conflicts
with China. What Vietnam is trying to do is ensnare the United States
in its power play with China by providing American warships with
resupply capabilities along its South China Sea coast. Vietnam needs
the United States, as a de facto balancer against China.
Rudyard: What an incredible change in the relations of those two countries.
Robert: Isn't it? The Vietnamese tell me we fought one war with you, but we
fought many, many more with China, in the course of our history.
Rudyard: Is there a strategy here for the United States to marshal the nations of
the South China Sea basin into an anti-China bloc?
Robert: The United States has to show that its navy is not going to withdraw,
and may even ratchet up presence in the South and East China Sea. This
is not the time for any kind of a pullback, in terms of our military
platforms in the region, because anything like that would indicate a
weakness. We have to show that we are prepared to push back against
China, to a degree. To a degree should be in italics because, as I said,
what we need to be able to do is push back against China, without
getting into a military conflict with China. And, by the way, the
Chinese do not want a military conflict with the United States because
they would lose. Their navy is still one generation or more behind that
of the United States. So China's goal is how do we dominate the region,
while making an end run around the US Navy?

5. - 5 -
Rudyard: Talk to us a bit about where this conflict could go from here. Some
people have postulated that China's more, kind of, assertive stance of
the last year, specifically it’s rash of island building, could be the segue
to climb down, in terms of what their territorial ambitions are in the
South China Sea.
Robert: It certainly could be. They may be ratcheting up their presence, in order
to, eventually, make a diplomatic compromise from a position of
strength, on the nine dashed-line. I believe, the Chinese would love to
compromise on the so-called cow's tongue, but the problem is that that
will stir nationalist elements inside China. Remember, China has a
pattern. It stokes tension in The South China Sea, then it relaxes it, then
it shifts focus to Taiwan, to the East China Sea, then it's quiet, then it's
back again to stoking tension. As I said, the Chinese are much more
elegant at this than the Russians are.
Rudyard: In your book, Asia's Cauldron, you remind us that in the 21st
Century,
in terms of population, economic activity, this basin of The South China
Sea is going to be, not just a global hub, but possibly the pivot point of
the entire global economy.
Robert: It could. I call the South China Sea the Fulda Gap of the 21st
Century.
The Fulda Gap, of course, was the geographical point in Germany
where Soviet troops would have come through, had there been a
conventional land conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. It was
the centerpiece of strategy. The South China Sea, in a maritime sense,
can be the centrepiece of strategy, to the degree that there is one in the
whole world today. But, remember, the Fulda Gap never saw any
shooting. Nothing ever happened there, as it turned out, and the same
may be true of the South China Sea. What we may see is just tension,
and headlines, for many years to come, but with both China and the
United States each wanting to avoid a military conflict with the other,
the South China Sea may evolve into a cold war standoff type situation.
Rudyard: Do you think it could also evolve into a Petri dish to experiment with
what happens when we see the decline of one great power, and the re-
emergence of another? In this case, the decline of the United States and
the re-emergence of China….
Robert: Well I think that's where you get to the issue of Taiwan. As long as it's
seen that China lacks the capability to launch any kind of a military
action against Taiwan, we will still be, in an American century, in a
military sense, in East Asia. But once it becomes apparent, by experts,
think-tank people, that the United States can no longer defend Taiwan
credibly, then everything starts to shift. You get countries from Japan,
south to Indonesia, needing to make side deals with Beijing.
Rudyard: Surely we're pretty close to that point given China's ballistic missiles,
its shore to ship launch capacity, and their increasing dominance of
space through sophisticated satellite technology? Isn't it inevitable, that
we're going to hit your tipping point and sooner rather than later?

6. - 6 -
Robert: That's where things are headed at this point, and also remember China
does an enormous amount of trade with Taiwan. There are many
commercial flights, each week, between Taiwan and the Chinese
mainland so that China, for years, has been making an end run around
Taiwanese de facto sovereignty. So this is the real challenge for the
Pentagon, how to slow up this process? Simply because you cannot
solve something, does not mean can’t postpone it for 10 years or 15
years. In 10 or 15 years the whole world may shift. China may have an
internal rebellion due to a slow-motion economic weakening, so that the
nature of the Chinese system itself could evolve and change.
Rudyard: Final question. Many people think of naval power as some 18th
and 19th
Century concept for the projection of sovereignty and national interest.
To the contrary, you really think that in the opening decades of the 21st
Century it is key to geopolitical influence. Explain for us why?
Robert: Absolutely. In 2007, when everyone was engaged in counter-
insurgency discussions and a dirty land war in Iraq, I published a long
piece in The Atlantic monthly, talking about the importance of naval
power. Remember, we are in an age of globalisation, and an age of
globalisation is an age of container shipping, and an age of container
shipping is an age where navies are very important to protect the sea
lines of communication. Most human beings, the overwhelming
majority, live near coastlines, so we know navies will be key to the
future. Final thought, navies and air forces, combined by the United
States, can project power over large swathes of the globe whereas
ground forces, like armies and Marine Corps, deal with unpredictable
contingencies. So it's really your navy and your air force that make you
a great power. The US Navy is America's primary strategic instrument,
much more so than its nuclear weapons arsenal.
Rudyard: Well, Robert Kaplan, always insightful, always provocative. Thank you
for coming on The Next Debate.
Robert: It was my pleasure.
Note to readers: this transcript was lightly edited for readability. Not for use for direct
attribution.
© Munk Debates – June 20, 2015