The maritime territorial disputes in East Asia are proving increasingly difficult to manage for several reasons: 1) Growing strategic and economic interests in the seas have led to heightened tensions as countries seek to assert control and access resources. 2) Nationalist sentiments among the public and governments have been mobilized in support of claims, undermining relations between disputing countries. 3) While international law provides some framework, its application is limited given sovereignty disputes require consent of all parties and there are differences in how Asian countries view international law compared to Western countries where current laws originated.

1. Essay Question: Explain why maritime territorial disputes in East Asia are proving
increasingly difficult to manage.
The on-going East and South China Seas disputes, concerning both sovereignty
over offshore islands and jurisdiction over maritime zones, have reached an impasse as a
result of heightened tensions in recent years, such as the collision near the Diaoyu/
Senkaku Islands between China and Japan in September 2010, two cable cuNing incidents
between China and Vietnam in 2011, the Scarborough Shoal incidents between China and
the Philippines in 2012, Japan’s nationalisation of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in 2012 and
the Sino-Philippine arbitration since 2013. All these dynamics seem to be a quagmire of
issues relating to sea power, offshore resources, nationalist sentiments and international
law . This essay utilises realism and constructivism, and analyses the above four aspects,1
and believes that the disputes are unmanageable, because each claimant has growing
strategic and economic interests in the seas, and there exist no effective confidence-
building measures to handle the disputes .2
Sea Power
The escalating tensions are against a backdrop of Asia’s rise, China’s maritime
expansion and America’s return to Asia, and have realist roots. Mahan’s theory of sea
power points out that control of the sea is essential for global dominance, to be specific, for
developing trade and commercial shipping at peace and for projecting forces at wars .3
Therefore, with a large number of vital sea lanes of communication connecting Malacca
Strait, Karimata Strait, Balabac Strait, Mindoro Strait, Luzon Strait, Bashi Channel, Taiwan
Strait and Korea Strait, and with plenty of islands serving as key military bases for both
navy and air force, the East and South China Seas, the strategic and trade significance of
which exceed that of all other seas because of Asia’s rise with enormous and increasing
volumes of trade and energy flowing through it, are doomed to be increasingly contested
Fang, Yang, ‘The South China Sea Disputes: Whither a Solution?’, in Chapter 9 of Huang, Jing,1
Billo, Andrew (eds.), Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Navigating Rough Waters (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2015), p. 165.
Cohen, Jerome A., ‘International Arbitration and Adjudication as South China Sea Confidence-2
Building Measures’, in Chapter 3 of Hiebert, Murray, Nguyen, Phuong, Poling, Gregory B. (eds.),
Perspectives on the South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal, and Security Dimensions of the Dispute (Rowman
& LiNlefield, 2014), pp. 23-24.
Hughes, Christopher, ‘Reclassifying Chinese Nationalism: the geopolitik turn’, Journal of3
Contemporary China 20:71 (2011), p. 604.
1

2. among local disputants such as China and Japan as well as external great powers like the
United States . For example, China considers the South China Sea as its core interest, just4
as the United States regards it as its national interest.
Besides, within an international system of anarchy and a world of self-help, military
capabilities are the decisive forces for nation-states survival and the guarantee of their
interests, but military preparations of one state will trigger a security dilemma . China’s5
military activities in the seas today is exactly conducting Admiral Liu Huaqing’s navy
strategy in the late 1980s, which planned defensive deployment within the first island
chain, and advocated China’s maritime expansion towards the second island chain when
time is right. Nevertheless, China’s maritime activities concern other involved parties that
have uncertainty in their mind whether China’s substantial naval buildup and frequent
activities are only for defensive purposes or actually for offensive purposes, like ASEAN
and Japan. For instance, Japan has serious concerns about Chinese military activities in the
seas which could be exercises for its Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy against
Japan-United States combined forces operations . The security dilemma causes growing6
strategic rivalry between China and other interested parties.
Moreover, the United States needs tensions in East Asia to justify its return to Asia
and balance China, which is complicating the disputes. After the Iraq War and global
financial crisis, Washington relies more on security tool to advance American interests and
goal in the Asia-Pacific area, with democracy and economy pillars becoming weak . It is7
continuously strengthening its military capabilities in Asia, such as the 2014 Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines and additional
Dupont, Alan, ‘Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: ASEAN’s Dilemma’, in Chapter 6 of4
Hiebert, Murray, Nguyen, Phuong, Poling, Gregory B. (eds.), Perspectives on the South China Sea:
Diplomatic, Legal, and Security Dimensions of the Dispute (Rowman & LiNlefield, 2014), p. 45. Koda,
Yoji, ‘Japan’s Perspectives on U.S. Policy toward the South China Sea’, in Chapter 10 of Hiebert,
Murray, Nguyen, Phuong, Poling, Gregory B. (eds.), Perspectives on the South China Sea: Diplomatic,
Legal, and Security Dimensions of the Dispute (Rowman & LiNlefield, 2014), p. 91.
Yee, Andy, ‘Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: A Comparative Analysis of the South5
China Sea and the East China Sea’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 40:2 (2011), p. 171.
Koda, Yoji, ‘Japan’s Perspectives on U.S. Policy toward the South China Sea’, in Chapter 10 of6
Hiebert, Murray, Nguyen, Phuong, Poling, Gregory B. (eds.), Perspectives on the South China Sea:
Diplomatic, Legal, and Security Dimensions of the Dispute (Rowman & LiNlefield, 2014), p. 83.
Shulong, Chu, ‘China’s View on U.S. Policy in the South China Sea’, in Chapter 2 of Hiebert,7
Murray, Nguyen, Phuong, Poling, Gregory B. (eds.), Perspectives on the South China Sea: Diplomatic,
Legal, and Security Dimensions of the Dispute (Rowman & LiNlefield, 2014), pp. 13-15.
2

3. deployments to Japan, and is also enhancing defensive capabilities of its allies and
partners in Asia, which adds China’s mistrust and contributes to spiral conflicts .8
Offshore Resources
Rich fishery resources for food security and employment and substantial oil and
natural gas reserves for continued industrial growth are also stimuli to rising tensions. The
rationale behind the resources tensions is realists argument that relative gains will limit
cooperation in a zero-sum game. Claimant states value the East and South China Seas’
fisheries as a source of meat protein and job offers. With the coastal fisheries declining,
fisheries powers like Japan have to develop offshore fisheries, which have pushed
fishermen into the disputed waters. Actually, plenty of maritime incidents, such as the
2010 collision near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff,
were triggered by fishing boats in contested areas .9
Stakeholders in East Asia also have a rapidly growing economy with an increasing
appetite for sources of energy. No maNer whether they are self-sufficient in energy
production like Malaysia and Vietnam or reliant on energy imports like the Philippines,
China and Japan at present, they acquire additional sources of energy to fill the supply-
and-demand gap in the future . Energy sources from rogue regimes in the Middle East10
and Africa are costly and risky due to transportation costs and political uncertainty. In
contrast, the rich and untapped energy resources of the East and South China Seas serve as
an extremely aNractive solution to relieve energy demands.
In the context of resources discovery in the East and South China Seas, China’s
assertive state-centred approach towards energy security, especially its formula “what is
mine is mine and what is yours is negotiable”, has sparked concerns from some of its
Glaser, Bonnie S., ‘U.S. Strategy Seeks to Calm the Roiled Waters of the South China Sea’, in8
Chapter 7 of Hiebert, Murray, Nguyen, Phuong, Poling, Gregory B. (eds.), Perspectives on the South
China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal, and Security Dimensions of the Dispute (Rowman & LiNlefield, 2014), p.
57.
Huang, Jing, Jagtiani, Sharinee, ‘UnknoNing Tangled Lines in the South China Sea Dispute’, in9
Introduction of Huang, Jing, Billo, Andrew (eds.), Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea:
Navigating Rough Waters (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 5.
Daniels, Christopher L., South China Sea: Energy and Security Conflicts (The Scarecrow Press,10
2014), pp. 13-28.
3

4. neighbours . For instance, China faces the Xihu Depression friction with Japan in the East11
China Sea, and ocean resources competition within the nine doNed lines with the riparian
nations such as Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines in the South China Sea . As energy12
is a national security issue to states like China, the unresolved delimitation disputes
involve potential energy reserves might prompt states to use military force to resolve
issues of strategic and economic interest . Energy exploration has led to political distrust13
and power politics .14
Nationalist Sentiments
Nationalism is also a source of tension in the territorial disputes in the East and
South China Seas. Malaysia and Brunei have been quiet thanks to their strong economic
and diplomatic ties with China, whereas anti-China protests in Vietnam, the Philippines
and Japan undermine their bilateral relations with China and add the possibility of
territorial spats in the disputed seas. Nationalism sentiments can be of either the elite or
the masses, but realists argue that foreign policy is formulated not under the influence of
domestic media and publics, but by foreign policy elites .15
Actually, public opinion and media are mobilised and led by government in
support of the strategic and economic interests in the East and South China Seas .16
Governments approve domestic legislation to justify their national interest in the seas,
which will spur anti sentiments in other claimant states, just as China’s Law on the
Zhao, Suisheng, ‘China’s Global Search for Energy Security: cooperation and competition in11
Asia-Pacific’, Journal of Contemporary China 17:55 (2008), pp. 207-219. Kenny, Henry J., ‘China
and the competition for oil and gas in Asia’, Asia-Pacific Review 11:2 (2004), p. 42.
Kenny, Henry J., ‘China and the competition for oil and gas in Asia’, Asia-Pacific Review 11:212
(2004), pp. 39-40.
Zhao, Suisheng, ‘China’s Global Search for Energy Security: cooperation and competition in13
Asia-Pacific’, Journal of Contemporary China 17:55 (2008), p. 219.
Yee, Andy, ‘Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: A Comparative Analysis of the South14
China Sea and the East China Sea’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 40:2 (2011), p. 174.
Breuilly, John, ‘Nationalism’, in Chapter 25 of John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens (eds.),15
The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford University Press,
2014), p. 389. Robinson, Piers, ‘The role of media and public opinion’, in Chapter 9 of Steve Smith,
Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne (eds.), Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (Oxford University Press,
2012), p. 179.
Robinson, Piers, ‘The role of media and public opinion’, in Chapter 9 of Steve Smith, Amelia16
Hadfield, Tim Dunne (eds.), Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (Oxford University Press, 2012),
pp. 180-181.
4

5. Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone did in 1992 . Think tank representatives work for17
governments by providing evidence to support their claims, for example Chinese legal
scholars continue to debate the historical titles of China’s claims, so do scholars in Japan
and Vietnam. Citizens receive patriotic education from scholars so as to be loyal to the
existing state, for instance Chinese citizens are taught that the Diaoyu Islands were ceded
to Japan in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki which has no specific reference to the islands
indeed, so they view the islands as a symbol of past injustices and anti-Japanese
sentiments are prevalent among Chinese people, which can be proved by a common
invective “liNle Japan” . Also, in Chinese eyes, the Vietnamese are ungrateful brats who18
forget what Chinese have contributed to Vietnam War and its liberation from foreign
aggression. In reality, the Vietnamese leadership is in the similar situation that Chinese
Communist Party has experienced in relation to Soviet Union’s support to its
independence. For both Chinese Communist Party at that time and Vietnamese leadership
at present, aNitudes of their previous allies smack of imperial hauteur . The Chinese19
government has the tendency to portray China as the oppressed victim, consistently
exploited by other powers . It is blamed for having skilfully used nationalism to achieve20
its interests and goal.
In addition, disputant states perpetuate nationalist tendencies to maintain the
legitimacy of governments, since the maritime disputes serve as ideal distraction from
domestic challenges such as corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies . Addressing21
nationalism will contribute to resolution of disputes, which cannot be found unless
involving parties are willing to sacrifice some of their domestic political gains . However,22
Manicom, James, Bridging Troubled Waters: China, Japan, and Maritime Order in the East China Sea17
(Georgetown University Press, 2014), pp. 48-50.
Dixon, Jonathan, ‘East China Sea or South China Sea, they are all China’s Seas: comparing18
nationalism among China’s maritime irredentist claims’, Nationalities Papers: The Journal of
Nationalism and Ethnicity 42:6 (2014), pp. 1059-1060.
Hayton, Bill, The South China Sea: the Struggle for Power in Asia (Yale University Press, 2014), pp.19
155-156.
Billo, Andrew, ‘Harmony from Disunity: Core Issues and Opportunities in the South China Sea’,20
in Conclusion of Huang, Jing, Billo, Andrew (eds.), Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea:
Navigating Rough Waters (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 196.
Ibid, p. 195.21
Ibid, p. 196.22
5

6. as realists assume that self-interest ultimately drives political behaviour, and the seas are
national interests of disputants, how could sacrifice be made ?23
International Law
International law provides no solutions to the disputes, rather, it adds fuel to the
fire. It is impossible to resolve the sovereignty disputes through international arbitration
and adjudication if any party, like China, refuses to take legal action according to a
fundamental principle of customary international law that a sovereignty dispute cannot be
referred to an international court or tribunal without the consent of all parties to the
dispute .24
Additionally, whether sovereignty claims in Asia can be judged by rules and norms
developed in Europe still remains to be seen, since they have different historical and social
context. From an ideational viewpoint, great powers like the United States make efforts to
bind rising China into a rules-based system, and give strong and growing support for the
application of international law to resolve disputes, while Asia has its own unique
approaches to international law, like China aNaches great importance on historical titles
dating from a Sino-centric world order and tributary system . From a practical viewpoint,25
the three main principles of international law in regard to sovereignty disputes may be
Robinson, Piers, ‘The role of media and public opinion’, in Chapter 9 of Steve Smith, Amelia23
Hadfield, Tim Dunne (eds.), Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (Oxford University Press, 2012),
p. 36.
Beckman, Robert C., ‘The Philippines v. China Case and the South China Sea Disputes’, in24
Chapter 3 of Huang, Jing, Billo, Andrew (eds.), Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Navigating
Rough Waters (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 55.
Glaser, Bonnie S., ‘U.S. Strategy Seeks to Calm the Roiled Waters of the South China Sea’, in25
Chapter 7 of Hiebert, Murray, Nguyen, Phuong, Poling, Gregory B. (eds.), Perspectives on the South
China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal, and Security Dimensions of the Dispute (Rowman & LiNlefield, 2014), p.
53. Nasu, Hitoshi, Rothwell, Donald R., ‘Re-Evaluating the Role of International Law in Territorial
and Maritime Disputes in East Asia’, Asian Journal of International Law 4:1 (January 2014), p. 62.
6

7. inappropriate to decide the East Asian disputes between a former colonial power and its
former colony, like the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands .26
Ambiguities of critical date in the principle of effective control or in the principle of
inter-temporal law, fuel current tensions as well . In the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands case, the27
critical date could be 14 January 1895 against Japan or 15 May 1972 against China or a28 29
future day with uncertain outcome . As a result, neither China nor Japan will take legal30
suit as their first choice for fear of losing lawsuit. In addition, since the critical date could
be a future day, from China’s side, it has to continue various protests against Japan’s
effective control over the islands.
Furthermore, the extensive ratification of the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) among claimants has made the disputes more intractable,
for now the disputes involve not only sovereignty over islands, but also jurisdiction over
(1) The Pacta Sunt Servanda Principle: International treaty is the overriding criterion of solving the26
dispute. However, in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands case, there is no specific reference to the Diaoyu/
Senkaku Islands in the 1895 Shimonoseki Peace Treaty and the 1951 Peace Treaty. (2) The Uti
Possidetis Juris Principle: Newly formed sovereign states should have the same borders that their
preceding dependent area had before their independence. Nevertheless, in the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands case, whether the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were colonies at times of Japanese imperialism
is unsure, since Japan claims that it acquired the islands in 1895 by occupation where terra nullius
of the islands is disputed. (3) The Principle of Effective Control: This principle is a main branch of
inter-temporal law which is suggested by the Swiss jurist Max Huber in Island of Palmas arbitration
to deal with historical titles. Peaceful and continuous display of sovereign authority over contested
islands without effective protests from other claimants before a critical date is required to acquire
the islands. Nonetheless, in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands case, critical date is hard to be fixed,
which is explained in the next two footnotes.
Critical date is the moment at which the dispute has crystallised and after which actions taken27
by the parties in a dispute have no effect in the eyes of international law, and the choice of date is
critical to the outcome. However, when the dispute crystallises is hard to say. Nasu, Hitoshi,
Rothwell, Donald R., ‘Re-Evaluating the Role of International Law in Territorial and Maritime
Disputes in East Asia’, Asian Journal of International Law 4:1 (January 2014), pp. 60-61. Hayton, Bill,
The South China Sea: the Struggle for Power in Asia (Yale University Press, 2014), pp. 108-109.
On 14 January 1895, Japan claimed that the islands were formally incorporated into Okinawa28
Prefecture through a Cabinet decision.
On 15 May 1972, the United States returned the administrative rights of Okinawa including the29
Senkaku Islands to Japan according to the 1971 US-Japan Okinawa Reversion Treaty.
Tribunals in some cases have been reluctant to set a specific date and have instead allowed the30
parties to introduce evidence of events that occurred until the time of litigation, such as in the
Minquiers and Ecrehos case and the Eastern Greenland case. Dyke, Jon M. Van, ‘Legal Issues Related
to Sovereignty over Dokdo and Its Maritime Boundary’, Ocean Development and International Law
38:1-2 (2007), p. 163.
7

8. maritime zones . The UNCLOS provisions are designed to determine maritime zones, but31
also provide incentives for sovereignty disputes . For instance, the UNCLOS defines three32
kinds of maritime features endowed with certain rights, among which islands can
generate both a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea and a 200-nautical-mile EEZ . The33
enshrined right to claim more territorial sea and EEZ spurs disputants to fight for
sovereignty over islands.
Disputes also arise on the interpretation and application of the UNCLOS
provisions. Firstly, the UNCLOS provides different principles upon which to base
maritime delimitation claims, like natural prolongation principle and median line
principle in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands case . Principle discrepancy in the UNCLOS34
provisions is in need of further explication. Secondly, the UNCLOS has different
provisions for compulsory dispute seNlement procedures. On 22 January 2013, the
Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings against China under Annex Ⅶ of the
UNCLOS, while China rejected the legal proceedings according to its declaration under
Article 298 of the UNCLOS . The Philippines against China case largely demonstrates35
ambiguities of the UNCLOS provisions.
Conclusion
Yee, Andy, ‘Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: A Comparative Analysis of the South31
China Sea and the East China Sea’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 40:2 (2011), p. 166.
Fang, Yang, ‘The South China Sea Disputes: Whither a Solution?’, in Chapter 9 of Huang, Jing,32
Billo, Andrew (eds.), Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Navigating Rough Waters (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2015), p. 181.
The three features are islands, rocks and low-tide elevations. Islands can support human33
habitation or economic life, and are regarded as land and thus generate both a 12-nautical-mile
territorial sea and a 200-nautical-mile EEZ. Rocks include sandbanks and reefs above water at high
tide, cannot support human habitation and economic life, and generate a 12-nautical-mile
territorial sea but no EEZ. Low-tide elevations are only dry at low tide, and generate nothing.
Hayton, Bill, The South China Sea: the Struggle for Power in Asia (Yale University Press, 2014), pp.
112-113.
In China-Japan case, China claims a continental shelf for the whole of its natural prolongation as34
far as the Okinawa Trough, while Japan with liNle continental shelf claims an EEZ as far as a
median line. Manicom, James, Bridging Troubled Waters: China, Japan, and Maritime Order in the East
China Sea (Georgetown University Press, 2014), p. 7.
Beckman, Robert C., ‘The Philippines v. China Case and the South China Sea Disputes’, in35
Chapter 3 of Huang, Jing, Billo, Andrew (eds.), Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Navigating
Rough Waters (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 56.
8

9. The East and South China Seas are of strategic and economic importance to
stakeholders in East Asia, because the sea lanes of communication here are vital to trade
and power projection, and the natural resources in the seas are safe and cheap for
continued economic growth of claimant states. Such strategic and economic importance
increases along with the rise of Asia. In this context, China’s assertive actions and
reluctance to internationalise the disputes, the strong nationalist sentiments in China,
Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines, and America’s intervene make issues even worse.
There seem to be no approaches to confidence building.
Nian Yao
9

10. Bibliography
Beckman, Robert C., ‘The Philippines v. China Case and the South China Sea Disputes’, in
Chapter 3 of Huang, Jing, Billo, Andrew (eds.), Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea:
Navigating Rough Waters (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 54-65.
Billo, Andrew, ‘Harmony from Disunity: Core Issues and Opportunities in the South
China Sea’, in Conclusion of Huang, Jing, Billo, Andrew (eds.), Territorial Disputes in the
South China Sea: Navigating Rough Waters (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 189-201.
Breuilly, John, ‘Nationalism’, in Chapter 25 of John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens
(eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations
(Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 388-399.
Cohen, Jerome A., ‘International Arbitration and Adjudication as South China Sea
Confidence-Building Measures’, in Chapter 3 of Hiebert, Murray, Nguyen, Phuong,
Poling, Gregory B. (eds.), Perspectives on the South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal, and
Security Dimensions of the Dispute (Rowman & LiNlefield, 2014), pp. 20-24.
Daniels, Christopher L., South China Sea: Energy and Security Conflicts (The Scarecrow
Press, 2014).
Dixon, Jonathan, ‘East China Sea or South China Sea, they are all China’s Seas: comparing
nationalism among China’s maritime irredentist claims’, Nationalities Papers: The Journal
of Nationalism and Ethnicity 42:6 (2014), pp. 1053-1071.
Dupont, Alan, ‘Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: ASEAN’s Dilemma’, in Chapter
6 of Hiebert, Murray, Nguyen, Phuong, Poling, Gregory B. (eds.), Perspectives on the
South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal, and Security Dimensions of the Dispute (Rowman &
LiNlefield, 2014), pp. 45-52.
Dyke, Jon M. Van, ‘Legal Issues Related to Sovereignty over Dokdo and Its Maritime
Boundary’, Ocean Development and International Law 38:1-2 (2007), p. 157-224.
Fang, Yang, ‘The South China Sea Disputes: Whither a Solution?’, in Chapter 9 of Huang,
Jing, Billo, Andrew (eds.), Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Navigating Rough
Waters (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 164-181.
Glaser, Bonnie S., ‘U.S. Strategy Seeks to Calm the Roiled Waters of the South China Sea’,
in Chapter 7 of Hiebert, Murray, Nguyen, Phuong, Poling, Gregory B. (eds.), Perspectives
on the South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal, and Security Dimensions of the Dispute
(Rowman & LiNlefield, 2014), pp. 53-62.
Hayton, Bill, The South China Sea: the Struggle for Power in Asia (Yale University Press,
2014).
10

11. Huang, Jing, Jagtiani, Sharinee, ‘UnknoNing Tangled Lines in the South China Sea
Dispute’, in Introduction of Huang, Jing, Billo, Andrew (eds.), Territorial Disputes in the
South China Sea: Navigating Rough Waters (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 1-11.
Hughes, Christopher, ‘Reclassifying Chinese Nationalism: the geopolitik turn’, Journal of
Contemporary China 20:71 (2011), pp. 601-620.
Kenny, Henry J., ‘China and the competition for oil and gas in Asia’, Asia-Pacific Review
11:2 (2004), pp. 36-47.
Koda, Yoji, ‘Japan’s Perspectives on U.S. Policy toward the South China Sea’, in Chapter 10
of Hiebert, Murray, Nguyen, Phuong, Poling, Gregory B. (eds.), Perspectives on the South
China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal, and Security Dimensions of the Dispute (Rowman &
LiNlefield, 2014), pp. 82-95.
Manicom, James, Bridging Troubled Waters: China, Japan, and Maritime Order in the East
China Sea (Georgetown University Press, 2014).
Nasu, Hitoshi, Rothwell, Donald R., ‘Re-Evaluating the Role of International Law in
Territorial and Maritime Disputes in East Asia’, Asian Journal of International Law 4:1
(January 2014), pp. 55-79.
Robinson, Piers, ‘The role of media and public opinion’, in Chapter 9 of Steve Smith,
Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne (eds.), Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (Oxford
University Press, 2012), pp. 168-186.
Shulong, Chu, ‘China’s View on U.S. Policy in the South China Sea’, in Chapter 2 of
Hiebert, Murray, Nguyen, Phuong, Poling, Gregory B. (eds.), Perspectives on the South
China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal, and Security Dimensions of the Dispute (Rowman &
LiNlefield, 2014), pp. 13-19.
Yee, Andy, ‘Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: A Comparative Analysis of the
South China Sea and the East China Sea’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 40:2 (2011),
pp. 165-193.
Zhao, Suisheng, ‘China’s Global Search for Energy Security: cooperation and competition
in Asia-Pacific’, Journal of Contemporary China 17:55 (2008), pp. 207-227.
11