This document summarizes and analyzes a journal article about Taiwan's strategic importance and influence in its relationships with China, Japan, and the United States. The summary identifies four key factors that have allowed Taiwan to seize diplomatic initiative: 1) Taiwan's geographic position which leads China to seek reunification but Japan and US to prefer status quo, 2) Shared democratic values with Japan and US, 3) China's threats of force which empower Taiwan, and 4) Taiwan being a test of US credibility which Taiwan relies on. The document then analyzes each factor in turn and discusses policy implications, including the need to reduce tensions to prevent miscalculation leading to conflict.
The China factor in US alliances in East Asia and the Asia Pacific 1Shree Silwal
What are China’s perception and concerns regarding the US alliance system as a whole and regarding specific bilateral military alliances of the US?
What is the China’s place in the US worldview after cold war ?
What are the view of US allies regarding China?
What are the changes in the perception of China regarding the future alliance development in after math of post 9/11 incident ?
The China factor in US alliances in East Asia and the Asia Pacific 1Shree Silwal
What are China’s perception and concerns regarding the US alliance system as a whole and regarding specific bilateral military alliances of the US?
What is the China’s place in the US worldview after cold war ?
What are the view of US allies regarding China?
What are the changes in the perception of China regarding the future alliance development in after math of post 9/11 incident ?
An armed conflict between the US and China will not end well for the US. US cannot, BY TREATY, defend Taiwan in case of China trying to annex her. It can only help Taiwan defend herself.
{This is the first part of a talk given to the students of the University of Tokyo, JAPAN.
Early Warning Memo for the United States Governmen.docxsagarlesley
Early Warning Memo for the United States Government
How to Deal with the Potential Conflicts in Cross-Strait Relations
between the PRC and the ROC
Table of Contents
1.0 Executive Summary
2.0 Key Facts
2.1 The Cross-Strait Relations between the PRC and the ROC
2.2 An Important External Factor – the United States
3.0 What is at Stake?
4.0 The Important Characteristic of the Conflict Situation
4.1 The Constraints of History
4.2 The Boundedness of International Mediation
4.3 The “Mess” of Various Aspects of Cross-Strait Relations between the PRC and the ROC
5.0 The Reasons Why Prevention Action is Merited
6.0 Future Scenarios
6.1 Lower Feasibility - Standing with the ROC
6.2 Medium Feasibility - Exiting the “Game” or Keeping Silent
6.3 Higher Feasibility - Standing with the PRC
7.0 Conclusion
References
1.0 Executive Summary
In my 2017, the 23rd annual meeting of North American Taiwan Studies Association (NATSA) was held at Stanford University. The experts and scholars, who focused on researching the relevant issues about Asian-Pacific region, such as Kharis Templeman, Erin Baggott Carter, Thomas Fingar, and Lanhee J. Chen, analyzed the potential conflicts in Cross-Strait relations between People’s Republic of China (PRC-China) and Republic of China (ROC-Taiwan) on this meeting.[footnoteRef:1] During the process of discussing the potential conflict between PRC and ROC, the United States was highlighted as the most important mediator that could influence the trends of the conflict between PRC and ROC, and that was able to provide it with windows of opportunity. This early warning policy memo will examine the three scenarios with different degrees of feasibilities by regarding the United States government as the most suitable mediator. The key facts of Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and the ROC will be demonstrated, and the important characteristic of the conflict situation will also be analyzed. Based on them, this memo will discuss the points that are at stake, and the reasons why prevention action is merited for Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and the ROC. After analyzing the pros and cons of three future scenarios, the last one, which the United States government stands with the PRC and supports “One-China” policy, reveals the relatively higher feasibility. [1: Williams, Jack F. China Review International 10, (2017): 382-85. ]
2.0 Key Facts
2.1 The Cross-Strait Relations between the PRC and the ROC
Since the second Chinese Civil War happened in 1937, the issues about the relations between PRC and POC, which were also called as Cross-Strait relations (Haixia Liangan Guanxi), have become seriously sensitive topics in both of the two political entities that were geographically separated by the Taiwan Strait in the west Pacific Ocean. In 1949, the second Chinese Civil War led to the political status that the mainland of China being governed by the PRC, instead, Taiwan pertains to the ROC, wh ...
a statistical software package
that helps address this flaw in strategy analysis.
The software analyzes what events may happen
in the future, gives their probability of occurrence, and provides the chance you will be surprised or blindsided by an unforeseen event.
Sino-US Relations in the 21st Century: Is a Sino-US War Possible?Bright Mhango
This paper grapples with this question and concludes that war between the two can break out even tonight if certain conditions are met. However, for now, with China’s military not advanced enough, any war would have to be started by the US. And it so happens that the US actually has enough motives to engage China before it fully modernizes but cannot just do so from the blue. The US is thus trying to force China to give it the reason to justify a war to its increasingly war skeptical allies and domestic publics.
The reasons why the two cannot fight for now range from interdependence, the fact that Taiwan has not declared independence yet and the fact that Sino-Japan relations do not boil beyond the Yasukuni rhetoric. It is also due to the fact that China is powerless and relies on the US for many things such as access to lucrative markets and technology. The characters and personalities of the leaders of the two countries are also partly the reason there is not enough bad-blood to sound the war cry yet.
As the U.S. repositions its military forces to assume a great role in the Western Pacific, the state Department has taken a position to defend the contested Senkaku islands, which most Americans have never heard of. f the U.S. does not stay out of this dispute, then there is certain to be at least one aggrieved nation, and the era of U.S. diplomatic pressure and “gunboat” diplomacy belong to another era. Those few in Washington with a historical memory might recall that in 1853 an American naval flotilla forcibly opened up Japan to western trade.
This section will be inclusive of the brief overview of the overall paper, including the key arguments throughout the paper and the aim of the same. This section will also raise certain questions that have led to the formulation of the paper and the whole issue of U.S’s interfere in the Diaoyu / Senkakus islands.
Carefully review the following essay prompt. First, draft an outli.docxannandleola
Carefully review the following essay prompt. First, draft an outline showing your intended thesis statement and supports. Put your outline on the first page of the essay. Next, write the essay. Your essay needs to be at least a page long. It must include: a title, an introduction, a clear thesis statement, and well-supported paragraphs. Make sure to include specific textual support in your answer. Direct quotations are not necessary, but if you quote, paraphrase, or summarize make sure to provide proper attribution.
Essay prompt. Define and explain epic poetry, giving a detailed explanation of common themes and form. Compare/contrast the epic traditions of all of the following texts: The Epic of Gilgamesh, The Iliad, The Ramayana, and Sunjata.
Research on China's Middle East Diplomatic Strategy Construction
I. The Importance of the Middle East Diplomatic Strategy to China
The President of China Xi Jinping's first trip to the Middle East in early 2016 opened a new chapter in China-Middle East relations. Based on the analysis of current situation changes and trends in the Middle East, combining with the development strategy of big country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, this paper puts forward the necessity and feasibility of constructing China's Middle East diplomatic strategy, and considers its connotation, goals, key points and practical paths. This paper believes that the core concept of China's Middle East diplomatic strategy should be: to inherit the friendship and consensus, strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation, achieve common development, uphold fairness and justice, and promote stable peace. The main objectives are: to enhance all-round cooperation with the Middle East countries and expand China's presence and national interests in the Middle East, enhance China’s strategic presence in the Middle East, make China’s politically more influential, economically more competitive. The basic idea is: motivate, move forward, and steadily advance, make full use of its own advantages, actively shape the regional environment conducive to the development of all countries and the new relationship between China and the Middle East countries, seek development opportunities in constructive participation, and strengthen economic cooperation, accumulate political consensus and promote the right to speak and influence in the process of actively maintaining regional stability and promoting regional peace.
From a regional perspective, the Middle East countries are gradually entering a period of comprehensive transformation. Although the various forces to start the game and even the conflict is still the main feature of some Middle Eastern countries at this stage, stability and development will eventually become the main theme of political and social transformation in the Middle East. After the turmoil in the first few years of the upheaval in the Middle East, the current Middle East countries are determined by the people's minds and need.
South China Sea & Crimea -- similarities !!!Jeff Schubert
Events is Crimea should serve as a warning about what could easily happen in the South China Sea. Russia & China will always focus on "national security"
Review the Institute of Medicines 2010 report The Future of Nurs.docxhealdkathaleen
Review the Institute of Medicine's 2010 report "The Future of Nursing: Leading Change, Advancing Health." Write a 750-1,000 word paper discussing the influence of the IOM report on nursing practice. Include the following:
1. Summarize the four messages outlined in the IOM report and explain why these are significant to nursing practice.
2. Discuss the direct influence the IOM report has on nursing education and nursing leadership. Describe the benefits and opportunities for BSN-prepared nurses.
3. Explain why it is important that a nurse's role and education evolve to meet the needs of an aging and increasingly diverse population.
4. Discuss the significance of professional development, or lifelong learning, and its relevance in caring for diverse populations across the life span and within the health-illness continuum.
5. Discuss how nurses can assist in effectively managing patient care within an evolving health care system.
Prepare this assignment according to the guidelines found in the APA Style Guide, located in the Student Success Center. An abstract is not required.
This assignment uses a rubric. Please review the rubric prior to beginning the assignment to become familiar with the expectations for successful completion.
Berger 1st.pdfBergerBerger 1.pdfBerger 2
A Playbook for Taming Donald Trump
Four strategies that other countries can use to deal with a suddenly unpredictable superpower.
By Stephen M. Walt
| August 13, 2018, 4:03 PM
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/13/a-playbook-for-taming-donald-trump/
Politicians, pundits, and plenty of regular citizens love to argue about U.S. foreign policy. These discussions usually revolve around the question of what the United States should do with its extraordinary power and the influence it still enjoys around the world. Should the goal be “America First?” To be the “Indispensable Nation?” or a “Reluctant Sheriff?” How about being an “offshore balancer?” Something else entirely?
Asking what the United States should do with its power is important, but so is the flip side: What should other states do about U.S. power? If you were running Germany, Brazil, Mexico, Japan, Poland, Afghanistan, Russia, India, Iran, Australia, etc., how would you deal with the 800-pound gorilla that still looms large on the world stage?
I wrote a whole book on this topic back when George W. Bush was president. It identified the various strategies that states could employ to tame American power, and I argued that the Bush administration was encouraging more countries to oppose U.S. primacy and making it easier for their efforts to succeed. But I never anticipated that the ship of state would one day be skippered by a man with the emotional stability of Capt. Queeg. (For the record: I’m not the first person to make the latter comparison).
This makes the question of dealing with U.S. power all the more pertinent. Handling a powerful actor is always difficult, even when its lea ...
Take a few moments to research the contextual elements surrounding P.docxperryk1
Take a few moments to research the contextual elements surrounding President Kennedy’s inauguration in 1961 and then critically examine this speech:
“Inaugural Address,” by John F. KennedyLinks to an external site.<
https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://nam01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https*3A*2F*2Furldefense.com*2Fv3*2F__https*3A*2F*2Fwww.jfklibrary.org*2FAsset-Viewer*2FBqXIEM9F4024ntFl7SVAjA.aspx__*3B!!ACPuPu0!nRyVaN_vHAO7VokwK2jIluLRE3Rbgg_zTzlKs2LU0jy7JJDLOQzoLng5O9kq8Ar2xqOxu6ASoTCCAw*24&data=02*7C01*7Cs3521396*40students.fscj.edu*7C3dbff0e6302e40df260508d83ebef2dd*7C4258f8b94f8d44abb87f21ab35a63470*7C0*7C0*7C637328337145689500&sdata=rjSnrpQbmBtBYheBjJTh*2B57JapV8a8uLTbS*2BwaXQFps*3D&reserved=0__;JSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSU!!ACPuPu0!lzlmNESbzfxzfV0D2RFZGvC0P4JM5SVIIXnoztdLO3J83rBb44XpTJOZcRrT89Wp_du_$
> is made available by the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. It is in the public domain.
In a short rhetorical analysis (minimum of four paragraphs in length), please answer all of the questions below. Your work should include an introduction, a body of supporting evidence, and a conclusion. Please take some time to edit your writing for punctuation, usage, and clarity prior to submission.
Questions for Analysis
1. Which important historical and social realities had an impact on this speech in 1961, and how do these contextual elements figure in President Kennedy’s organization of this speech?
2. What is President Kennedy saying about the nature of human progress (science and technology) and the challenges that we must navigate as a global community? Are these challenges unique to 1961, or relative throughout human history?
3. What are the goals of this speech? Isolate at least three aims of President Kennedy’s address, identify his strategy for supporting these goals, and critique their efficacy. Is this an effective speech? Where applicable, please include a quotation or two from the speech.
In a rhetorical analysis (minimum of eight paragraphs in length), please answer all of the questions below. Your work should include an introduction, a body of supporting evidence, and a conclusion. Please take some time to edit your writing for punctuation, usage, and clarity prior to submission.
Questions for Analysis
1. How does Jefferson organize this important document? How many subdivisions does it have, how do they operate, and how does his approach to organization impact the document’s efficacy?
2. Using at least one citation from the text, analyze Jefferson’s approach to style, voice, and tone. How does he create a sense of urgency in moving toward the conclusion of the work?
3. The complexities of this document’s reach are immense. How many different audiences was Jefferson writing to, and what were the needs of those different groups?
4. In terms of the approaches to formal rhetoric that we studied in the first learning module, which does The Declaration of Independence most closely resemble? .
Table of Contents Section 2 Improving Healthcare Quality from.docxperryk1
Table of Contents Section 2: Improving Healthcare Quality from Within Week 4
Week 4 - Assignment: Interpret Performance Measures
Week 4 - Assignment: Interpret
Performance Measures
Instructions
Course Home Content Dropbox Grades Bookshelf ePortfolio Library The Commons Calendar
You have just been appointed as the administrator of a large managed healthcare organization
with multiple facilities in your state, including facilities in city X and Y (table below). A task your
office is charged with is to reimburse facilities based on how they perform on a set of healthcare
quality measures.
Based on the information provided below, what considerations will you make in your decision-
making process? To complete this assignment, prepare a PowerPoint presentation that
highlights whether or not these two facilities (A and B) should be treated equally when
conducting your assessment. If any, what are the implications of treating these facilities as
equals for the purpose of comparison? Also, address the techniques you will use to ensure these
facilities are assessed fairly.
Measures Facility A Facility B
1
Population
characteristics
City X: Mostly people
with high economic
status and those with
more than high school
education
City Y: Mostly people
with low economic
status, minorities,
high school or less
education
2 Population served All ages
Mostly older adults
and people with
disabilities and
chronic conditions
3
Staff to patient
ratio
1:4 1:8
4
Physician and
nurses continuing
education
Required Required
5 Average number of
hours staff work
per week
50 hours 60 hours
Reflect in ePortfolio
Submissions
No submissions yet. Drag and drop to upload your assignment below.
Drop files here, or click below!
Upload Choose Existing
You can upload files up to a maximum of 1 GB.
Length: 8-10 slides (excluding title slide and references slide)
References: Include a minimum of 3-5 peer-reviewed, scholarly resources referenced on a
separate slide at the end of your presentation.
Your assignment should reflect scholarly academic writing, current APA standards,
Record
Week 4
Course Home Content Dropbox Grades Bookshelf More
Interpreting Performance Improvement Measures
and Benchmarking
As a healthcare administrator/manager, it is in your best
interest to help the facility you serve to move in the
direction charted in the National Quality Strategy (Joshi et
al., 2014). Organizations that fail to meet set standards are
known to face sanctions and sometimes required to close
shop. In consideration of this, you will want to ensure that
the facility you manage is adopting a culture of quality that
puts its patients at the center of healthcare delivery. You will
want to do this by making sure that your facility provides
quality patient care, while also keeping the facility’s
bottom-line healthy.
To ensure you are moving in the right direction, you must
measure and monitor key qual.
More Related Content
Similar to Taiwan The Tail That Wags DogsMichael McDevittAsia Po.docx
An armed conflict between the US and China will not end well for the US. US cannot, BY TREATY, defend Taiwan in case of China trying to annex her. It can only help Taiwan defend herself.
{This is the first part of a talk given to the students of the University of Tokyo, JAPAN.
Early Warning Memo for the United States Governmen.docxsagarlesley
Early Warning Memo for the United States Government
How to Deal with the Potential Conflicts in Cross-Strait Relations
between the PRC and the ROC
Table of Contents
1.0 Executive Summary
2.0 Key Facts
2.1 The Cross-Strait Relations between the PRC and the ROC
2.2 An Important External Factor – the United States
3.0 What is at Stake?
4.0 The Important Characteristic of the Conflict Situation
4.1 The Constraints of History
4.2 The Boundedness of International Mediation
4.3 The “Mess” of Various Aspects of Cross-Strait Relations between the PRC and the ROC
5.0 The Reasons Why Prevention Action is Merited
6.0 Future Scenarios
6.1 Lower Feasibility - Standing with the ROC
6.2 Medium Feasibility - Exiting the “Game” or Keeping Silent
6.3 Higher Feasibility - Standing with the PRC
7.0 Conclusion
References
1.0 Executive Summary
In my 2017, the 23rd annual meeting of North American Taiwan Studies Association (NATSA) was held at Stanford University. The experts and scholars, who focused on researching the relevant issues about Asian-Pacific region, such as Kharis Templeman, Erin Baggott Carter, Thomas Fingar, and Lanhee J. Chen, analyzed the potential conflicts in Cross-Strait relations between People’s Republic of China (PRC-China) and Republic of China (ROC-Taiwan) on this meeting.[footnoteRef:1] During the process of discussing the potential conflict between PRC and ROC, the United States was highlighted as the most important mediator that could influence the trends of the conflict between PRC and ROC, and that was able to provide it with windows of opportunity. This early warning policy memo will examine the three scenarios with different degrees of feasibilities by regarding the United States government as the most suitable mediator. The key facts of Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and the ROC will be demonstrated, and the important characteristic of the conflict situation will also be analyzed. Based on them, this memo will discuss the points that are at stake, and the reasons why prevention action is merited for Cross-Strait relations between the PRC and the ROC. After analyzing the pros and cons of three future scenarios, the last one, which the United States government stands with the PRC and supports “One-China” policy, reveals the relatively higher feasibility. [1: Williams, Jack F. China Review International 10, (2017): 382-85. ]
2.0 Key Facts
2.1 The Cross-Strait Relations between the PRC and the ROC
Since the second Chinese Civil War happened in 1937, the issues about the relations between PRC and POC, which were also called as Cross-Strait relations (Haixia Liangan Guanxi), have become seriously sensitive topics in both of the two political entities that were geographically separated by the Taiwan Strait in the west Pacific Ocean. In 1949, the second Chinese Civil War led to the political status that the mainland of China being governed by the PRC, instead, Taiwan pertains to the ROC, wh ...
a statistical software package
that helps address this flaw in strategy analysis.
The software analyzes what events may happen
in the future, gives their probability of occurrence, and provides the chance you will be surprised or blindsided by an unforeseen event.
Sino-US Relations in the 21st Century: Is a Sino-US War Possible?Bright Mhango
This paper grapples with this question and concludes that war between the two can break out even tonight if certain conditions are met. However, for now, with China’s military not advanced enough, any war would have to be started by the US. And it so happens that the US actually has enough motives to engage China before it fully modernizes but cannot just do so from the blue. The US is thus trying to force China to give it the reason to justify a war to its increasingly war skeptical allies and domestic publics.
The reasons why the two cannot fight for now range from interdependence, the fact that Taiwan has not declared independence yet and the fact that Sino-Japan relations do not boil beyond the Yasukuni rhetoric. It is also due to the fact that China is powerless and relies on the US for many things such as access to lucrative markets and technology. The characters and personalities of the leaders of the two countries are also partly the reason there is not enough bad-blood to sound the war cry yet.
As the U.S. repositions its military forces to assume a great role in the Western Pacific, the state Department has taken a position to defend the contested Senkaku islands, which most Americans have never heard of. f the U.S. does not stay out of this dispute, then there is certain to be at least one aggrieved nation, and the era of U.S. diplomatic pressure and “gunboat” diplomacy belong to another era. Those few in Washington with a historical memory might recall that in 1853 an American naval flotilla forcibly opened up Japan to western trade.
This section will be inclusive of the brief overview of the overall paper, including the key arguments throughout the paper and the aim of the same. This section will also raise certain questions that have led to the formulation of the paper and the whole issue of U.S’s interfere in the Diaoyu / Senkakus islands.
Carefully review the following essay prompt. First, draft an outli.docxannandleola
Carefully review the following essay prompt. First, draft an outline showing your intended thesis statement and supports. Put your outline on the first page of the essay. Next, write the essay. Your essay needs to be at least a page long. It must include: a title, an introduction, a clear thesis statement, and well-supported paragraphs. Make sure to include specific textual support in your answer. Direct quotations are not necessary, but if you quote, paraphrase, or summarize make sure to provide proper attribution.
Essay prompt. Define and explain epic poetry, giving a detailed explanation of common themes and form. Compare/contrast the epic traditions of all of the following texts: The Epic of Gilgamesh, The Iliad, The Ramayana, and Sunjata.
Research on China's Middle East Diplomatic Strategy Construction
I. The Importance of the Middle East Diplomatic Strategy to China
The President of China Xi Jinping's first trip to the Middle East in early 2016 opened a new chapter in China-Middle East relations. Based on the analysis of current situation changes and trends in the Middle East, combining with the development strategy of big country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, this paper puts forward the necessity and feasibility of constructing China's Middle East diplomatic strategy, and considers its connotation, goals, key points and practical paths. This paper believes that the core concept of China's Middle East diplomatic strategy should be: to inherit the friendship and consensus, strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation, achieve common development, uphold fairness and justice, and promote stable peace. The main objectives are: to enhance all-round cooperation with the Middle East countries and expand China's presence and national interests in the Middle East, enhance China’s strategic presence in the Middle East, make China’s politically more influential, economically more competitive. The basic idea is: motivate, move forward, and steadily advance, make full use of its own advantages, actively shape the regional environment conducive to the development of all countries and the new relationship between China and the Middle East countries, seek development opportunities in constructive participation, and strengthen economic cooperation, accumulate political consensus and promote the right to speak and influence in the process of actively maintaining regional stability and promoting regional peace.
From a regional perspective, the Middle East countries are gradually entering a period of comprehensive transformation. Although the various forces to start the game and even the conflict is still the main feature of some Middle Eastern countries at this stage, stability and development will eventually become the main theme of political and social transformation in the Middle East. After the turmoil in the first few years of the upheaval in the Middle East, the current Middle East countries are determined by the people's minds and need.
South China Sea & Crimea -- similarities !!!Jeff Schubert
Events is Crimea should serve as a warning about what could easily happen in the South China Sea. Russia & China will always focus on "national security"
Review the Institute of Medicines 2010 report The Future of Nurs.docxhealdkathaleen
Review the Institute of Medicine's 2010 report "The Future of Nursing: Leading Change, Advancing Health." Write a 750-1,000 word paper discussing the influence of the IOM report on nursing practice. Include the following:
1. Summarize the four messages outlined in the IOM report and explain why these are significant to nursing practice.
2. Discuss the direct influence the IOM report has on nursing education and nursing leadership. Describe the benefits and opportunities for BSN-prepared nurses.
3. Explain why it is important that a nurse's role and education evolve to meet the needs of an aging and increasingly diverse population.
4. Discuss the significance of professional development, or lifelong learning, and its relevance in caring for diverse populations across the life span and within the health-illness continuum.
5. Discuss how nurses can assist in effectively managing patient care within an evolving health care system.
Prepare this assignment according to the guidelines found in the APA Style Guide, located in the Student Success Center. An abstract is not required.
This assignment uses a rubric. Please review the rubric prior to beginning the assignment to become familiar with the expectations for successful completion.
Berger 1st.pdfBergerBerger 1.pdfBerger 2
A Playbook for Taming Donald Trump
Four strategies that other countries can use to deal with a suddenly unpredictable superpower.
By Stephen M. Walt
| August 13, 2018, 4:03 PM
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/13/a-playbook-for-taming-donald-trump/
Politicians, pundits, and plenty of regular citizens love to argue about U.S. foreign policy. These discussions usually revolve around the question of what the United States should do with its extraordinary power and the influence it still enjoys around the world. Should the goal be “America First?” To be the “Indispensable Nation?” or a “Reluctant Sheriff?” How about being an “offshore balancer?” Something else entirely?
Asking what the United States should do with its power is important, but so is the flip side: What should other states do about U.S. power? If you were running Germany, Brazil, Mexico, Japan, Poland, Afghanistan, Russia, India, Iran, Australia, etc., how would you deal with the 800-pound gorilla that still looms large on the world stage?
I wrote a whole book on this topic back when George W. Bush was president. It identified the various strategies that states could employ to tame American power, and I argued that the Bush administration was encouraging more countries to oppose U.S. primacy and making it easier for their efforts to succeed. But I never anticipated that the ship of state would one day be skippered by a man with the emotional stability of Capt. Queeg. (For the record: I’m not the first person to make the latter comparison).
This makes the question of dealing with U.S. power all the more pertinent. Handling a powerful actor is always difficult, even when its lea ...
Take a few moments to research the contextual elements surrounding P.docxperryk1
Take a few moments to research the contextual elements surrounding President Kennedy’s inauguration in 1961 and then critically examine this speech:
“Inaugural Address,” by John F. KennedyLinks to an external site.<
https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://nam01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https*3A*2F*2Furldefense.com*2Fv3*2F__https*3A*2F*2Fwww.jfklibrary.org*2FAsset-Viewer*2FBqXIEM9F4024ntFl7SVAjA.aspx__*3B!!ACPuPu0!nRyVaN_vHAO7VokwK2jIluLRE3Rbgg_zTzlKs2LU0jy7JJDLOQzoLng5O9kq8Ar2xqOxu6ASoTCCAw*24&data=02*7C01*7Cs3521396*40students.fscj.edu*7C3dbff0e6302e40df260508d83ebef2dd*7C4258f8b94f8d44abb87f21ab35a63470*7C0*7C0*7C637328337145689500&sdata=rjSnrpQbmBtBYheBjJTh*2B57JapV8a8uLTbS*2BwaXQFps*3D&reserved=0__;JSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSU!!ACPuPu0!lzlmNESbzfxzfV0D2RFZGvC0P4JM5SVIIXnoztdLO3J83rBb44XpTJOZcRrT89Wp_du_$
> is made available by the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. It is in the public domain.
In a short rhetorical analysis (minimum of four paragraphs in length), please answer all of the questions below. Your work should include an introduction, a body of supporting evidence, and a conclusion. Please take some time to edit your writing for punctuation, usage, and clarity prior to submission.
Questions for Analysis
1. Which important historical and social realities had an impact on this speech in 1961, and how do these contextual elements figure in President Kennedy’s organization of this speech?
2. What is President Kennedy saying about the nature of human progress (science and technology) and the challenges that we must navigate as a global community? Are these challenges unique to 1961, or relative throughout human history?
3. What are the goals of this speech? Isolate at least three aims of President Kennedy’s address, identify his strategy for supporting these goals, and critique their efficacy. Is this an effective speech? Where applicable, please include a quotation or two from the speech.
In a rhetorical analysis (minimum of eight paragraphs in length), please answer all of the questions below. Your work should include an introduction, a body of supporting evidence, and a conclusion. Please take some time to edit your writing for punctuation, usage, and clarity prior to submission.
Questions for Analysis
1. How does Jefferson organize this important document? How many subdivisions does it have, how do they operate, and how does his approach to organization impact the document’s efficacy?
2. Using at least one citation from the text, analyze Jefferson’s approach to style, voice, and tone. How does he create a sense of urgency in moving toward the conclusion of the work?
3. The complexities of this document’s reach are immense. How many different audiences was Jefferson writing to, and what were the needs of those different groups?
4. In terms of the approaches to formal rhetoric that we studied in the first learning module, which does The Declaration of Independence most closely resemble? .
Table of Contents Section 2 Improving Healthcare Quality from.docxperryk1
Table of Contents Section 2: Improving Healthcare Quality from Within Week 4
Week 4 - Assignment: Interpret Performance Measures
Week 4 - Assignment: Interpret
Performance Measures
Instructions
Course Home Content Dropbox Grades Bookshelf ePortfolio Library The Commons Calendar
You have just been appointed as the administrator of a large managed healthcare organization
with multiple facilities in your state, including facilities in city X and Y (table below). A task your
office is charged with is to reimburse facilities based on how they perform on a set of healthcare
quality measures.
Based on the information provided below, what considerations will you make in your decision-
making process? To complete this assignment, prepare a PowerPoint presentation that
highlights whether or not these two facilities (A and B) should be treated equally when
conducting your assessment. If any, what are the implications of treating these facilities as
equals for the purpose of comparison? Also, address the techniques you will use to ensure these
facilities are assessed fairly.
Measures Facility A Facility B
1
Population
characteristics
City X: Mostly people
with high economic
status and those with
more than high school
education
City Y: Mostly people
with low economic
status, minorities,
high school or less
education
2 Population served All ages
Mostly older adults
and people with
disabilities and
chronic conditions
3
Staff to patient
ratio
1:4 1:8
4
Physician and
nurses continuing
education
Required Required
5 Average number of
hours staff work
per week
50 hours 60 hours
Reflect in ePortfolio
Submissions
No submissions yet. Drag and drop to upload your assignment below.
Drop files here, or click below!
Upload Choose Existing
You can upload files up to a maximum of 1 GB.
Length: 8-10 slides (excluding title slide and references slide)
References: Include a minimum of 3-5 peer-reviewed, scholarly resources referenced on a
separate slide at the end of your presentation.
Your assignment should reflect scholarly academic writing, current APA standards,
Record
Week 4
Course Home Content Dropbox Grades Bookshelf More
Interpreting Performance Improvement Measures
and Benchmarking
As a healthcare administrator/manager, it is in your best
interest to help the facility you serve to move in the
direction charted in the National Quality Strategy (Joshi et
al., 2014). Organizations that fail to meet set standards are
known to face sanctions and sometimes required to close
shop. In consideration of this, you will want to ensure that
the facility you manage is adopting a culture of quality that
puts its patients at the center of healthcare delivery. You will
want to do this by making sure that your facility provides
quality patient care, while also keeping the facility’s
bottom-line healthy.
To ensure you are moving in the right direction, you must
measure and monitor key qual.
Take a company and build a unique solution not currently offered. Bu.docxperryk1
Take a company and build a unique solution not currently offered. Build a
Lean Business Model Canvas.jpg
and present your idea using all 5 frameworks below:
1.Start with Why (by Simon Sinek)
2.Blue Ocean Strategy(by Chan Kim & Renee Mauborgne)
3.Being re"Markable"
4.The Tipping Point (by Malcolm Gladwell)
5.Story Brand (by Donald Miller)
.
Tackling a Crisis Head-onThis week, we will be starting our .docxperryk1
Tackling a Crisis Head-on
This week, we will be starting our work on Assignment 2. Go to
The Wall Street Journal
menu item and find an article about a crisis that occurred at a specific organization in the last year.
Considering the course materials for this week, answer the following:
Describe the crisis faced by the organization.
What communication tactics did the organization use to address its crisis? Refer to Jack and Warren's guidance for dealing with crises.
To what extent, if any, was the organization's crisis communication plan effective?
If you were a senior leader in the organization, would you have responded differently? Why or why not?
This week and next, continue to research this specific crisis so that you can better prepare for Assignment 2.
Post your initial response by Wednesday, midnight of your time zone, and reply to at least 2 of your classmates' initial posts by Sunday, midnight of your time zone.
1st response
The Bank of America Earnings Crisis
In 2020, many businesses experienced notable challenges due to the outbreak of the coronavirus. The Bank of America was no exception based on its reports of firm earnings in 2020. According to Eisen (2021), many large financial organizations in the United States withstood the recession due to COVID-19. However, the author explains that the banks have not been fully protected against the minimal rates brought about by the pandemic. For Bank of America, the outcomes of the COVID-19 outbreak have been felt in many ways, particularly the reduction of earnings by 22%. Additionally, lenders have also experienced significant challenges based on low-interest rates, and Bank of America is among them. Since the financial institution gains earnings on the difference between their lending payments and what they pay to depositors, the bank's interest rates downfall. The earnings crisis also affected the firm's operations in the last quarter of 2020 even though it made considerable profits.
Communication Tactics and Addressing the Crisis
Handling a crisis in organizations presents notable problems for managers and leaders that do not understand the proper ways of solving a crisis. Warren Buffet explains that there are four significant steps a leader can take to address a crisis. First, getting the crisis right and understanding why it happens and what can stop it will help address the crisis. The Bank of America leaders understood that the company needs to introduce measures that will increase the earnings. Secondly, according to Buffet, responding to the crisis fast is also a core step in managing a crisis. The Bank of America did not wait until the last quarter of 2020 to react to the earnings crisis. Rather, they resorted to ensuring the loan demands are stabilized by business consumers and focused more on investment activities (Eisen, 2021). The third and fourth steps based on Warren's advice involve getting the crisis out by dealing with it and getting over with. Th.
take a look at the latest Presidential Order that relates to str.docxperryk1
take a look at the latest Presidential Order that relates to strengthening cybersecurity that relates to critical infrastructure:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-strengthening-cybersecurity-federal-networks-critical-infrastructure/
Let’s look at a real-world scenario and how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plays into it. In the scenario, the United States will be hit by a large-scale, coordinated cyber attack organized by China. These attacks debilitate the functioning of government agencies, parts of the critical infrastructure, and commercial ventures. The IT infrastructure of several agencies are paralyzed, the electric grid in most of the country is shut down, telephone traffic is seriously limited and satellite communications are down (limiting the Department of Defense’s [DOD’s] ability to communicate with commands overseas). International commerce and financial institutions are also severely hit. Please explain how DHS should handle this situation.
please explain how DHS should handle the situation described in the preceding paragraph.
.
Take a look at the sculptures by Giacometti and Moore in your te.docxperryk1
Take a look at the sculptures by Giacometti and Moore in your text. Both pieces are good examples of the relationship between form, content, and subject matter. How do you feel the form of each sculpture expresses the content? What specific characteristics give us clues and communicate meaning?
Select a third work of art from the text and discuss how the form and content relate. Identify at least five visual elements and/or principles of design in your analysis of the third piece.
.
Table of ContentsLOCAL PEOPLE PERCEPTION TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE TOU.docxperryk1
Table of Contents
LOCAL PEOPLE PERCEPTION TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE TOURISM IN DENMARK1
Declaration:2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT2
CHAPTER:15
Introduction5
1.1 Background of the study6
1.2 Problem Statement:7
1.3 Research Questions:8
1.4 Research Objectives:8
1.5 Thesis Structure8
CHAPTER:29
Literature review9
2.1 Attitudes of local people towards Sustainable tourism9
2.2 Practices of Sustainable tourism10
2.3 Sustainable tourism development.12
2.4 Involvement of people in Sustainability.14
2.5 Theoretical Framework.15
3.1 Introduction17
3.2 Research Design17
3.3 Sampling method18
3.4 Data collection18
3.5 Measurements and Variables18
3.6 Data analysis19
CHAPTER:1Introduction
Sustainable tourism is a form of tourism, which requires a tourist to respect the local culture, environment, preserving cultural heritage, and supporting local economies by purchasing local products which also benefits the people of that country. Sustainable tourism is a form of development, which is Social development, Economic development and Nature protection. According to the World Tourism Organization, Sustainable tourism is “Tourism that takes full account of its current and future economic, social and environmental impacts, addressing the needs of visitors, the industry, the environment, and host communities” UNWTO (2013). Denmark is more concerned about sustainable environment, for instance the Government is aiming at Copenhagen becoming the world’s first carbon-neutral capital by 2025. Government have put high taxation on vehicles, cars so Danes have to think twice before buying or using them. This could be the strategy of the nation. As they are on the way to gain something remarkable, they also have some challenges. The tourism industry has a million of turnover in Danish economy and Danish government puts a high effort in order to make it more sustainable. The big topic could be how the tourist react on it? All the government efforts could be result less if the customer and the business does not act smart. To the Danes, sustainability is a holistic approach that includes renewable energy, water management, waste recycling and green transportation including bicycle culture. Most of the local restaurants use re-usable things during their service also, practices waste deposable for take away.
Tourism is the best way to experience the culture however, damage and waste can occur due to inappropriate behavior of tourists. According to the Denmark statics (2019), every year tourist spends around 128 billion DKK in Denmark. Denmark is very responsible towards environment and most of the hotels are practicing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). For example, Scandic Kødbyen is one of the hotels practicing sustainability, first to implement CSR. It plays a significant support in sustainable tourism business, which includes hotel, restaurant and the service provided sectors. Visit Copenhagen states that 70% of hotels hold an official eco-certification and also known as the hap.
Table of Contents Title PageWELCOMETHE VAJRA.docxperryk1
Table of Contents
Title Page
WELCOME
THE VAJRACCHEDIKA PRAJÑAPARAMITA SUTRA
COMMENTARIES
PART ONE - THE DIALECTICS OF
PRAJÑAPARAMITA
Chapter 1 - THE SETTING
Chapter 2 - SUBHUTI’S QUESTION
Chapter 3 - THE FIRST FLASH OF LIGHTNING
Chapter 4 - THE GREATEST GIFT
Chapter 5 - SIGNLESSNESS
PART TWO - THE LANGUAGE OF
NONATTACHMENT
Chapter 6 - A ROSE IS NOT A ROSE
Chapter 7 - ENTERING THE OCEAN OF REALITY
Chapter 8 - NONATTACHMENT
PART THREE - THE ANSWER IS IN
THE QUESTION
Chapter 9 - DWELLING IN PEACE
Chapter 10 - CREATING A FORMLESS PURE
LAND
Chapter 11 - THE SAND IN THE GANGES
Chapter 12 - EVERY LAND IS A HOLY LAND
Chapter 13 - THE DIAMOND THAT CUTS
THROUGH ILLUSION
Chapter 14 - ABIDING IN NON-ABIDING
Chapter 15 - GREAT DETERMINATION
Chapter 16 - THE LAST EPOCH
Chapter 17 - THE ANSWER IS IN THE QUESTION
PART FOUR - MOUNTAINS AND
RIVERS ARE OUR OWN BODY
Chapter 18 - REALITY IS A STEADILY FLOWING
STREAM
Chapter 19 - GREAT HAPPINESS
Chapter 20 - THIRTY-TWO MARKS
Chapter 21 - INSIGHT-LIFE
Chapter 22 - THE SUNFLOWER
Chapter 23 - THE MOON IS JUST THE MOON
Chapter 24 - THE MOST VIRTUOUS ACT
Chapter 25 - ORGANIC LOVE
Chapter 26 - A BASKET FILLED WITH WORDS
Chapter 27 - NOT CUT OFF FROM LIFE
Chapter 28 - VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS
Chapter 29 - NEITHER COMING NOR GOING
Chapter 30 - THE INDESCRIBABLE NATURE OF
ALL THINGS
Chapter 31 - TORTOISE HAIR AND RABBIT
HORNS
Chapter 32 - TEACHING THE DHARMA
CONCLUSION
Copyright Page
WELCOME
WELCOME
BROTHERS AND SISTERS, please read The Diamond
That Cuts through Illusion with a serene mind, a mind
free from views. It’s the basic sutra for the practice of
meditation. Late at night, it’s a pleasure to recite the
Diamond Sutra alone, in complete silence. The sutra is
so deep and wonderful. It has its own language. The
first Western scholars who obtained the text thought it
was talking nonsense. Its language seems mysterious,
but when you look deeply, you can understand.
Don’t rush into the commentaries or you may be
unduly influenced by them. Please read the sutra first.
You may see things that no commentator has seen. You
can read as if you were chanting, using your clear body
and mind to be in touch with the words. Try to
understand the sutra from your own experiences and
your own suffering. It is helpful to ask, “Do these
teachings of the Buddha have anything to do with my
daily life?” Abstract ideas can be beautiful, but if they
have nothing to do with our life, of what use are they?
So please ask, “Do the words have anything to do with
eating a meal, drinking tea, cutting wood, or carrying
water?”
The sutra’s full name is The Diamond That Cuts
through Illusion, Vajracchedika Prajñaparamita in
Sanskrit. Vajracchedika means “the diamond that cuts
through afflictions, ignorance, delusion, or illusion.” In
China and Vietnam, people generally call it the Diamond
Sutra, emphasizing the word “diamond,” but, in fact,
the phrase “cutting through” is the most important.
Prajñaparamita means “per.
Take a few minutes to reflect on this course. How has your think.docxperryk1
Take a few minutes to reflect on this course. How has your thinking (e.g., worldview, knowledge, etc.) been challenged from what you thought prior to taking this course? What are your thoughts now on the significance of correctly diagnosing mental health disorders? What are your thoughts on the treatment of psychopathology? In general, what thoughts do you have about psychopathology and its impact on an individual and the family?
.
TABLE 1-1 Milestones of Medicine and Medical Education 1700–2015 ■.docxperryk1
TABLE 1-1 Milestones of Medicine and Medical Education 1700–2015 ■ 1700s: Training and apprenticeship under one physician was common until hospitals were founded in the mid-1700s. In 1765, the first medical school was established at the University of Pennsylvania. ■ 1800s: Medical training was provided through internships with existing physicians who often were poorly trained themselves. In the United States, there were only four medical schools, which graduated only a handful of students. There was no formal tuition with no mandatory testing. ■ 1847: The AMA was established as a membership organization for physicians to protect the interests of its members. It did not become powerful until the 1900s when it organized its physician members by county and state medical societies. The AMA wanted to ensure these local societies were protecting physicians’ financial well-being. It also began to focus on standardizing medical education. ■ 1900s–1930s: The medical profession was represented by general or family practitioners who operated in solo practices. A small percentage of physicians were women. Total expenditures for medical care were less than 4% of the gross domestic product. ■ 1904: The AMA created the Council on Medical Education to establish standards for medical education. ■ 1910: Formal medical education was attributed to Abraham Flexner, who wrote an evaluation of medical schools in the United States and Canada indicating many schools were substandard. The Flexner Report led to standardized admissions testing for students called the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT), which is still used as part of the admissions process today. ■ 1930s: The healthcare industry was dominated by male physicians and hospitals. Relationships between patients and physicians were sacred. Payments for physician care were personal. ■ 1940s–1960s: When group health insurance was offered, the relationship between patient and physician changed because of third-party payers (insurance). In the 1950s, federal grants supported medical school operations and teaching hospitals. In the 1960s, the Regional Medical Programs provided research grants and emphasized service innovation and provider networking. As a result of the Medicare and Medicaid enactment in 1965, the responsibilities of teaching faculty also included clinical responsibilities. ■ 1970s–1990s: Patient care dollars surpassed research dollars as the largest source of medical school funding. During the 1980s, third-party payers reimbursed academic medical centers with no restrictions. In the 1990s with the advent of managed care, reimbursement was restricted. ■ 2014: According to the 2014 Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMAC) annual survey, over 70% of medical schools have or will be implementing policies and programs to encourage primary care specialties for medical school students. TABLE 1-2 Milestones of the Hospital and Healthcare Systems 1820–2015 ■ 1820s: Almshouses or poorhouses, the pr.
Tackling wicked problems A public policy perspective Ple.docxperryk1
Tackling wicked problems : A
public policy perspective
Please note - this is an archived publication.
Commissioner’s foreword
The Australian Public Service (APS) is increasingly being tasked with solving very
complex policy problems. Some of these policy issues are so complex they have
been called ‘wicked’ problems. The term ‘wicked’ in this context is used, not in the
sense of evil, but rather as an issue highly resistant to resolution.
Successfully solving or at least managing these wicked policy problems requires
a reassessment of some of the traditional ways of working and solving problems
in the APS. They challenge our governance structures, our skills base and our
organisational capacity.
It is important, as a first step, that wicked problems be recognised as such.
Successfully tackling wicked problems requires a broad recognition and
understanding, including from governments and Ministers, that there are no quick
fixes and simple solutions.
Tackling wicked problems is an evolving art. They require thinking that is capable
of grasping the big picture, including the interrelationships among the full range of
causal factors underlying them. They often require broader, more collaborative
and innovative approaches. This may result in the occasional failure or need for
policy change or adjustment.
Wicked problems highlight the fundamental importance of the APS building on the
progress that has been made with working across organisational boundaries both
within and outside the APS. The APS needs to continue to focus on effectively
engaging stakeholders and citizens in understanding the relevant issues and in
involving them in identifying possible solutions.
The purpose of this publication is more to stimulate debate around what is
needed for the successful tackling of wicked problems than to provide all the
answers. Such a debate is a necessary precursor to reassessing our current
systems, frameworks and ways of working to ensure they are capable of
responding to the complex issues facing the APS.
I hope that this publication will encourage public service managers to reflect on
these issues, and to look for ways to improve the capacity of the APS to deal
effectively with the complex policy problems confronting us.
Lynelle Briggs
Australian Public Service Commissioner
1. Introduction
Many of the most pressing policy challenges for the APS involve dealing with very
complex problems. These problems share a range of characteristics—they go
beyond the capacity of any one organisation to understand and respond to, and
there is often disagreement about the causes of the problems and the best way to
tackle them. These complex policy problems are sometimes called ‘wicked’
problems.
Usually, part of the solution to wicked problems involves changing the behaviour
of groups of citizens or all citizens. Other key ingredients in solving or at least
managing complex policy problems include successfu.
Tahira Longus Week 2 Discussion PostThe Public Administration.docxperryk1
Tahira Longus Week 2 Discussion Post:
The Public Administrations may entrust the development of collective bargaining activities to bodies created by them, of a strictly technical nature, which will hold their representation in collective bargaining before the corresponding political instructions and without prejudice to the ratification of the agreements reached by the bodies. Government or administrative with competence for it. In addition, public bargaining involves the process of resolving labor-management conflicts. It alsoensuresboth the employee and the employer fair treatment during the negotiation process. The Tables will be validly constituted when, in addition to the representation of the corresponding Administration, and without prejudice to the right of all legitimate trade union organizations to participate in them in proportion to their representatives, such union organizations represent, at least, the absolute majority of the members of the unitary representative bodies in the area in question.
www.ilo.org ›
The Public Administrations may entrust the development of collective bargaining activities to bodies created by them, of a strictly technical nature, which will hold their representation in collective bargaining before the corresponding political instructions and without prejudice to the ratification of the agreements reached by the bodies. Government or administrative with competence for it. In addition, public bargaining involves the process of resolving labor-management conflicts. It also assures both the employee and the employer fair treatment during the negotiation process. The Tables will be validly constituted when, in addition to the representation of the corresponding Administration, and without prejudice to the right of all legitimate trade union organizations to participate in them in proportion to their representatives, such union organizations represent, at least, the absolute majority of the members of the unitary representative bodies in the area in question.
Tara St Laurent Post
.
Tabular and Graphical PresentationsStatistics (exercises).docxperryk1
Tabular and Graphical Presentations
Statistics (exercises)
Aleksandra Pawłowska
April 7, 2020
Glossary (part 1)
Categorical data Labels or names used to identify categories of like items.
Quantitative data Numerical values that indicate how much or how many.
Frequency distribution A tabular summary of data showing the number (fre-
quency) of data values in each of several nonoverlapping classes.
Relative frequency distribution A tabular summary of data showing the fraction
or proportion of data values in each of several nonoverlapping classes.
Percent frequency distribution A tabular summary of data showing the percent-
age of data values in each of several nonoverlapping classes.
Bar chart A graphical device for depicting qualitative data that have been sum-
marized in a frequency, relative frequency, or percent frequency distribution.
Pie chart A graphical device for presenting data summaries based on subdivision
of a circle into sectors that correspond to the relative frequency for each class.
Dot plot A graphical device that summarizes data by the number of dots above
each data value on the horizontal axis.
Aleksandra Pawłowska Tabular and Graphical Presentations
Glossary (part 2)
Histogram A graphical presentation of a frequency distribution, relative frequency
distribution, or percent frequency distribution of quantitative data constructed
by placing the class intervals on the horizontal axis and the frequencies, relative
frequencies, or percent frequencies on the vertical axis.
Cumulative frequency distribution A tabular summary of quantitative data show-
ing the number of data values that are less than or equal to the upper class limit
of each class.
Cumulative relative frequency distribution A tabular summary of quantitative
data showing the fraction or proportion of data values that are less than or equal
to the upper class limit of each class.
Cumulative percent frequency distribution A tabular summary of quantitative
data showing the percentage of data values that are less than or equal to the
upper class limit of each class.
Ogive A graph of a cumulative distribution.
Scatter diagram A graphical presentation of the relationship between two quan-
titative variables. One variable is shown on the horizontal axis and the other
variable is shown on the vertical axis.
Trendline A line that provides an approximation of the relationship between two
variables.
Aleksandra Pawłowska Tabular and Graphical Presentations
Useful tips (part 1)
1 Often the number of classes in a frequency distribution is the same as the
number of categories found in the data. Most statisticians recommend
that classes with smaller frequencies be grouped into an aggregate class
called „other”. Classes with frequencies of 5% or less would most often be
treated in this fashion.
2 The sum of the frequencies in any frequency distribution always equals
the number of observations. The sum of the relative frequencies in any
relative frequency distribution.
Table 4-5 CSFs for ERP ImplementationCritical Success Fact.docxperryk1
Table 4-5 CSFs for ERP Implementation
Critical Success Factors
Description
Management Support
Top management advocacy, provision of adequate resources, and commitment to project
Release of Full-Time Subject Matter Experts (SME)
Release full time on to the project of relevant business experts who provide assistance to the project
Empowered Decision Makers
The members of the project team(s) must be empowered to make quick decisions
Deliverable Dates
At planning stage, set realistic milestones and end date
Champion
Advocate for system who is unswerving in promoting the benefits of the new system
Vanilla ERP
Minimal customization and uncomplicated option selection
Smaller Scope
Fewer modules and less functionality implemented, smaller user group, and fewer site(s)
Definition of Scope and Goals
The steering committee determines the scope and objectives of the project in advance and then adheres to it
Balanced Team
Right mix of business analysts, technical experts, and users from within the implementation company and consultants from external companies
Commitment to Change
Perseverance and determination in the face of inevitable problems with implementation
Question 11 pts
The melody of a piece of music is
the harmony
the rhythm
the tune
the chords
Flag this Question
Question 21 pts
Chords are an element of
melody
rhythm
all of the above
harmony
Flag this Question
Question 31 pts
The distance between pitches is called
a space
an interval
a beat
all of the above
Flag this Question
Question 41 pts
Rhythmic organization in pre-Conquest Native American music was
divisive
in duple meter
in triple meter
additive
Flag this Question
Question 51 pts
Pan-Indian music often uses:
all of the above
the Navajo language
vocables
English
Flag this Question
Question 61 pts
Pre-conquest Native American musicians were primarily valued for their expertise in spiritual matters.
True
False
Flag this Question
Question 71 pts
Traditional Native American melodies have a wide melodic range
True
False
Flag this Question
Question 81 pts
Early Native American music features intervals that are:
rhythmically longer
rhythmically shorter
farther apart than what we have in the western system
closer together than what we have in the western system
Flag this Question
Question 91 pts
In the early New England colonies folk songs were:
derived from Irish melodies
derived from English melodies
all of the above
usually sung without accompaniment
Flag this Question
Question 101 pts
Early Anglo - American folks songs were:
often in polymeters
often in triple meter
often in duple meter
often in free meter
Flag this Question
Question 111 pts
Of the following, which is not a form of early Anglo-American folk songs?
ballads
lyric songs
work songs
jubilees
Flag this Question
Question 121 pts
Of the following which instrument was not brought to the Americas by European colonists?
clavichord
recorder
viol
banjo
Flag this Question
Quest.
TableOfContentsTable of contents with hyperlinks for this document.docxperryk1
TableOfContentsTable of contents with hyperlinks for this documentExcluding standard worksheets that come with the original dataSheet namePurposeNotesOnDataPrep!A1Tips and tricks for students in doing data analysis in ExcelSalaryPivotTable!A1Using a histogram of salary to compare other variables in terms of chunks of salaryDescriptiveStatsForFrequency!A1Example of producing descriptive stats for chunks of a numeric variable (grouping, frequency table as 'categories')VariableDescriptiveStatsPHStat!A1Example of descriptive stats produced by PHStat and then edited, items removed that are not neededCorrelations!A1Instructor reference for how all variables are inter-relatedRegressionAge!A1Example of regression output highighting output to pay attention toSPSSRegressionAllEnter!A1Instructor reference - regressing salary on all independent variables to discern stongest, independent predictorsPivotTableCreatePercentPolygon!A1Example of comparing distributions between two categories with different number of cases or different scales, i.e., version of percent polygonAnalysis resultsGender univariate descriptive statisticsGenderAnalysis!A1Gender/Salary; Gender/Job Grade Classification analysis; Gender/other independent variables Salary histogram, distributionCompare gender/salary descriptive statisticsGenderCompareDescriptives!A1Comparison Table gender descriptive statistics in terms of all variables. This might be something worth doing.EthnicitySalaryAnalysis!A1Ethnicity/Salary analysisOptionalEthnicitySalaryAnalysis!A1Optional ethnicity/salary analysis - distribution of ethnicity over chunks of salary, percent polygonEthnicityJGClassAnalysis!A1Ethnicity/Job Grade Classification analysisAgeSalaryAnalysis!A1Age/Salary analysisAgeJobGradeClassAnalysis!A1Age/Job grade classification analysisYearsWorkedSalaryAnalysis!A1Years worked/Salary analysisYears worked/Job grade classification analysisRelationship between endogenous variablesJob grade classification/Salary analysisRelationship between independent variablesPercentPolygonGenderYearsWorked!A1Compare years worked distribution by gender; Example of comparing distributions between two categories with different number of cases or different scales, i.e., version of percent polygon Standard sheets that come with the dataVariable INFO'!A1Information on variablesHuman Resources DATA'!A1DataCross-Class-Table'!A1Summary Table'!A1Histogram!A1% Polygons 2 Groups'!A1Freq. & % Distribution'!A1
Variable INFOTableOfContents!A1The data are a random sample of 120 responses to a survey conducted by the VP of Human Resources at a large company.Source:INFO 501 class at Montclair State UniversityVariablesSalaryin thousands of dollars (K)Age in years YrsWorkin years JGClassjob-grade classification of 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11 (lowest skill job to highest skill job)Ethnicity1=Minority0=Not MinorityGender(Male, Female)Named ranges created in this worksheet - use these names to address the data more quickly then manually selecting dat.
Tajfel and Turner (in chapter two of our reader) give us the followi.docxperryk1
Tajfel and Turner (in chapter two of our reader) give us the following definition of Social Identity Theory: "SIT proposes that individuals make sense of their social environment by categorizing themselves and others into groups that can be contrasted with others" (Oksanen et al., 2014). SIT brings order to chaos, you might say, in that individuals define themselves as being different from everyone else.
Considering what we have read about the perpetrators of group violence, how do you suppose that it is that people make the leap from their own social identity to group violence? What social and psychological mechanisms are at work that would go from simple categorization to overt violence?
.
Tableau Homework 3 – Exploring Chart Types with QVC Data .docxperryk1
Tableau Homework 3 – Exploring Chart Types with QVC Data
Getting familiar with the data
You will focus on five dimensions as you start to explore the QVC data:
• order date (Order Dt)
• merchandise department (Merchandise Dept)
• region of the country (Region)
• customer state (Ship To State)
• location of the originating warehouse (Warehouse Zip).
You will use five measures:
• price (Total Line Amt)
• number of orders (Number of Records)
• average order value (AOV to be calculated)
• delivery time ([Days Shipped] to be calculated)
Create two calculated fields:
AOV = SUM([Total Line Amt])/SUM([Number of Records]). On the Data Pane, change the number
format to Currency with 2 decimal places.
Days Shipped = CEILING( [Delivery Confirmation Dt]-[Shipped Dt])
In the next homework, we will explore additional measures to address the QVC analytics challenge more
explicitly. In this homework, the primary goal is to continue to build basic Tableau skills for creating
tables, maps, and charts.
Change the label in the Region dimension for Alaska and Hawaii:
Alaska and Hawaii were not assigned a region in the input data, but we are going to change the Null
label to AK/HI. Depending on the context, we may filter out these states.
To change the label, go to the blue pill for Region and right-click (or click on the down arrow) to get the
menu of actions. Select Aliases…. In the pop-up box, change the alias for Null to AK/HI.
For the rest of the course, you are expected to have complete titles on every worksheet you complete. I
will guide you through this process for the first few worksheets.
Chapter 19 – Highlight Tables
1. Create a text table with merchandise departments for rows and the sum of sales (Total Line Amt) in
the table. Sort in descending order by sales.
Add Region to the Columns Shelf. You should have a crosstab table with 5 columns and 11 rows of data.
Drag the Total Line Amt to the Color marks card. Change the mark type to Square. Note that the East
region has highest sales overall and the ordering within region is similar. Name the sheet Highlight
Table.
Edit the title (double-click on the Highlight Table text and type over <Sheet Name>) to be something like
‘Total sales by region and merchandise department’.
Chapter 22 – Scatter Plot
2. Open a new worksheet. Create a scatter plot of average Days Shipped (Columns Shelf) and average
order value AOV (Row Shelf). Make sure you change the default SUM aggregate function to AVG for
Days Shipped. Drag Merchandise Dept to the Detail marks card. Drag Total Line Amt to the Size marks
card.
At this point, you will want to change the axis settings so they do not include 0. Right-click on each axis,
select Edit Axis, and uncheck the Include zero box.
Add an average line for each measure. This plot highlights that the jewelry department has high average
ship times, though is a small revenue department. .
Operation “Blue Star” is the only event in the history of Independent India where the state went into war with its own people. Even after about 40 years it is not clear if it was culmination of states anger over people of the region, a political game of power or start of dictatorial chapter in the democratic setup.
The people of Punjab felt alienated from main stream due to denial of their just demands during a long democratic struggle since independence. As it happen all over the word, it led to militant struggle with great loss of lives of military, police and civilian personnel. Killing of Indira Gandhi and massacre of innocent Sikhs in Delhi and other India cities was also associated with this movement.
The Roman Empire A Historical Colossus.pdfkaushalkr1407
The Roman Empire, a vast and enduring power, stands as one of history's most remarkable civilizations, leaving an indelible imprint on the world. It emerged from the Roman Republic, transitioning into an imperial powerhouse under the leadership of Augustus Caesar in 27 BCE. This transformation marked the beginning of an era defined by unprecedented territorial expansion, architectural marvels, and profound cultural influence.
The empire's roots lie in the city of Rome, founded, according to legend, by Romulus in 753 BCE. Over centuries, Rome evolved from a small settlement to a formidable republic, characterized by a complex political system with elected officials and checks on power. However, internal strife, class conflicts, and military ambitions paved the way for the end of the Republic. Julius Caesar’s dictatorship and subsequent assassination in 44 BCE created a power vacuum, leading to a civil war. Octavian, later Augustus, emerged victorious, heralding the Roman Empire’s birth.
Under Augustus, the empire experienced the Pax Romana, a 200-year period of relative peace and stability. Augustus reformed the military, established efficient administrative systems, and initiated grand construction projects. The empire's borders expanded, encompassing territories from Britain to Egypt and from Spain to the Euphrates. Roman legions, renowned for their discipline and engineering prowess, secured and maintained these vast territories, building roads, fortifications, and cities that facilitated control and integration.
The Roman Empire’s society was hierarchical, with a rigid class system. At the top were the patricians, wealthy elites who held significant political power. Below them were the plebeians, free citizens with limited political influence, and the vast numbers of slaves who formed the backbone of the economy. The family unit was central, governed by the paterfamilias, the male head who held absolute authority.
Culturally, the Romans were eclectic, absorbing and adapting elements from the civilizations they encountered, particularly the Greeks. Roman art, literature, and philosophy reflected this synthesis, creating a rich cultural tapestry. Latin, the Roman language, became the lingua franca of the Western world, influencing numerous modern languages.
Roman architecture and engineering achievements were monumental. They perfected the arch, vault, and dome, constructing enduring structures like the Colosseum, Pantheon, and aqueducts. These engineering marvels not only showcased Roman ingenuity but also served practical purposes, from public entertainment to water supply.
2024.06.01 Introducing a competency framework for languag learning materials ...Sandy Millin
http://sandymillin.wordpress.com/iateflwebinar2024
Published classroom materials form the basis of syllabuses, drive teacher professional development, and have a potentially huge influence on learners, teachers and education systems. All teachers also create their own materials, whether a few sentences on a blackboard, a highly-structured fully-realised online course, or anything in between. Despite this, the knowledge and skills needed to create effective language learning materials are rarely part of teacher training, and are mostly learnt by trial and error.
Knowledge and skills frameworks, generally called competency frameworks, for ELT teachers, trainers and managers have existed for a few years now. However, until I created one for my MA dissertation, there wasn’t one drawing together what we need to know and do to be able to effectively produce language learning materials.
This webinar will introduce you to my framework, highlighting the key competencies I identified from my research. It will also show how anybody involved in language teaching (any language, not just English!), teacher training, managing schools or developing language learning materials can benefit from using the framework.
We all have good and bad thoughts from time to time and situation to situation. We are bombarded daily with spiraling thoughts(both negative and positive) creating all-consuming feel , making us difficult to manage with associated suffering. Good thoughts are like our Mob Signal (Positive thought) amidst noise(negative thought) in the atmosphere. Negative thoughts like noise outweigh positive thoughts. These thoughts often create unwanted confusion, trouble, stress and frustration in our mind as well as chaos in our physical world. Negative thoughts are also known as “distorted thinking”.
The French Revolution, which began in 1789, was a period of radical social and political upheaval in France. It marked the decline of absolute monarchies, the rise of secular and democratic republics, and the eventual rise of Napoleon Bonaparte. This revolutionary period is crucial in understanding the transition from feudalism to modernity in Europe.
For more information, visit-www.vavaclasses.com
This is a presentation by Dada Robert in a Your Skill Boost masterclass organised by the Excellence Foundation for South Sudan (EFSS) on Saturday, the 25th and Sunday, the 26th of May 2024.
He discussed the concept of quality improvement, emphasizing its applicability to various aspects of life, including personal, project, and program improvements. He defined quality as doing the right thing at the right time in the right way to achieve the best possible results and discussed the concept of the "gap" between what we know and what we do, and how this gap represents the areas we need to improve. He explained the scientific approach to quality improvement, which involves systematic performance analysis, testing and learning, and implementing change ideas. He also highlighted the importance of client focus and a team approach to quality improvement.
The Art Pastor's Guide to Sabbath | Steve ThomasonSteve Thomason
What is the purpose of the Sabbath Law in the Torah. It is interesting to compare how the context of the law shifts from Exodus to Deuteronomy. Who gets to rest, and why?
The Indian economy is classified into different sectors to simplify the analysis and understanding of economic activities. For Class 10, it's essential to grasp the sectors of the Indian economy, understand their characteristics, and recognize their importance. This guide will provide detailed notes on the Sectors of the Indian Economy Class 10, using specific long-tail keywords to enhance comprehension.
For more information, visit-www.vavaclasses.com
How to Create Map Views in the Odoo 17 ERPCeline George
The map views are useful for providing a geographical representation of data. They allow users to visualize and analyze the data in a more intuitive manner.
Taiwan The Tail That Wags DogsMichael McDevittAsia Po.docx
1. Taiwan: The Tail That Wags Dogs
Michael McDevitt
Asia Policy, Number 1, January 2006, pp. 69-93 (Article)
Published by National Bureau of Asian Research
DOI: 10.1353/asp.2006.0011
For additional information about this article
Access provided by Florida
International University (9 Sep 2013 16:14 GMT)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/asp/summary/v001/1.mcdevitt.html
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/asp/summary/v001/1.mcdevitt.html
asia p olicy, number 1 (january 2006 ), 69–93
Michael McDevitt (Rear Admiral, retired) is Vice President and
Director
of the Center for Naval Analyses at the CNA Corporation.
These views are his
own and do not represent the views of the CNA Corporation. He
can be reached
at <[email protected]>.
keywords: taiwan; china; united states; japan; foreign relations
Taiwan: The Tail That Wags Dogs
2. Michael McDevitt
[ 70 ]
execu tive summary
asia p olicy
This essay explores how Taiwan has been able to seize the
political initiative
from China, Japan, and the United States.
main argument
Taiwan has attained this leverage due to the interrelationship of
four factors:
• Strategic considerations stemming from Taiwan’s geographic
position lead
Tokyo and Washington to prefer the status quo, while leading
China to
strive for reunification. China’s increasing military power,
however, may
suggest a Chinese intention to change the status quo.
• Shared democratic values and the fact that the “democracy
issue” has great-
ly prolonged the timetable for reunification give Taipei political
influence
in both Washington and Tokyo.
• China’s constant threats of force actually empower Taipei in
its relationship
with Washington, and cause the United States to plan for the
3. worst.
• Taiwan is a litmus test of U.S. credibility as an ally, a
condition that in turn
creates a perception on the island that U.S. military backing is
uncondi-
tional.
policy implications
• Taipei’s high-risk diplomatic approach carries with it the very
real possibil-
ity of miscalculation, which could easily lead to great power
conflict.
• The United States would benefit from exploring with Beijing
ways in which
to demilitarize the issue of Taiwan independence so that the
threat of great
power conflict over Taiwan is greatly moderated.
• Tensions may eventually lessen substantially if Beijing can be
encouraged to
substitute political deterrence for military deterrence.
• In order to ensure that the U.S. position in the region would
survive a
Taipei-provoked conflict should the United States choose not to
become
directly involved, Washington can undertake extensive talks
with Japan de-
signed to ensure that Japan does not lose confidence in
Washington.
organization of the essay
The first four sections of the essay respectively explore the four
4. factors of the
complex U.S.-Taiwan-Japan-China relationship outlined above:
Geostrategic Issues and Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 73
Democracy in Taiwan: The Influence of Democratic Values . . .
. . . . . . . . 77
China’s Policy of Threatening the Use of Force . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 83
The Symbolic Importance of Taiwan to U.S. Credibility . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . 87
A conclusion (p. 91) summarizes the report and offers policy
implications.
[ 7 1 ]
mcdevit t • taiwan: the tail that wags d o gs
T he year 2005 has turned out to be a more difficult period for
Sino-U.S. relations than many observers anticipated. A series of
trade issues, in
particular the growing trade deficit and concerns over the lack
of Chinese
enforcement of WTO intellectual property obligations, have
combined with
both concerns regarding China’s currency being overvalued and
growing geo-
strategic anxiety over China’s rise and its military
modernization to shift the
policy spotlight away from Taiwan as a potential
“troublemaker” and place it
squarely on Beijing.
5. This is quite a change from the winter of 2004–05 when
Beijing’s policy
focus changed from considerations related to when reunification
with Taiwan
ought to take place, to a policy of halting moves toward
independence by the
government in Taipei. Much to the gratification of the White
House, Beijing
has gone along with the U.S. policy of no unilateral changes to
the cross-Strait
status quo. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s president Chen Shui-bian has
become more
restrained in his ambitions to redefine Taiwan’s constitutional
structure in a
way that presages de jure independence for Taiwan. As a result,
an equilib-
rium exists (albeit an uneasy one), and the atmosphere of near
crisis prevalent
not quite a year ago has abated.
Looking back, one of the fascinating aspects of the existing
relationship
between Taiwan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan,
and the United
States is the degree to which the Chen Shui-bian administration
in Taipei
has managed to seize the political initiative and put the three
great powers of
Northeast Asia in a reactive mode. Unfortunately, the way by
which a small
nation of only 23 million people has been able to accomplish
this feat of dip-
lomatic jujitsu is by stoking the coals of Taiwanese nationalism
on the island
to a point just short of crisis with the PRC. Washington and
Tokyo have not
6. been amused by the willingness of Taipei to play diplomatic
“chicken” with
Beijing because the stakes of a miscalculation by either side are
so high for all
concerned. The purpose of this paper is to explore this situation
and consider
alternatives that could reduce the possibility of Taiwanese
“provocations” elic-
iting great power responses.
The main argument is that Taiwan’s leverage is derived from
four inter-
related factors, which are examined respectively in the first four
sections of
the paper:
Strategic considerations stemming from Taiwan’s geographic
position
in Northeast Asia lead Tokyo and Washington to prefer the
status quo,
while leading China to strive for reunification. The increasing
power
of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), however, is making
both Japan
•
[ 72 ]
asia p olicy
and the United States nervous regarding China’s ability to
coerce a
change in the status quo in the near future.
7. Shared democratic values and the fact that the “democracy
issue” has
greatly prolonged the timetable for reunification give Taipei
political
influence in both Washington and Tokyo.
China’s constant threats of force actually empower Taipei in its
rela-
tionship with Washington, and cause the United States to plan
for the
worst.
Taiwan is a litmus test of U.S. credibility as an ally, a condition
that
in turn creates a perception on the island that U.S. military
backing
can be relied upon unconditionally. The United States should
work
to ensure that the U.S. position in the region, and the value of
the
United States to Asian nations as the balancer against China,
would
survive a Taipei-provoked conflict should the United States
choose
not to become directly involved. Washington can strive to
achieve this
by undertaking extensive consultations with Japan designed to
ensure
that Tokyo does not lose confidence in Washington and that the
U.S.-
Japan alliance remains strong.
While Taipei has been effective in drawing the United States
into a de
facto military alliance, and has caused Beijing to shift its
8. Taiwan policy from
reunification to halting independence (which is another way of
supporting
the status quo), Taipei’s high-risk strategy carries with it the
very real possibil-
ity of miscalculation.
Because miscalculation could lead to great power conflict, it is
important
to try to demilitarize the Taiwan issue. A conclusion thus offers
a summary of
recommendations necessary to achieve such a demilitarization.
As one sce-
nario, tensions may eventually lessen substantially if Beijing
begins to substi-
tute political deterrence for military deterrence. In addition, the
United States
and Japan should seek ways to mitigate the possible impact on
U.S. credibility
if Washington decided not to intervene militarily should Taiwan
recklessly
and foolishly precipitate a crisis with China.
•
•
•
[ 73 ]
mcdevit t • taiwan: the tail that wags d o gs
geostrategic issues and considerations
9. Of the four factors, geography is the only element of strategy
that does
not change. Geography, to a very large degree, determines
strategic interests
and dictates the strategic choices in most national policies.
Taiwan’s Strategic Impor tance to the PRC
When East Asia is considered in its totality—i.e., both
continental and
maritime domains, it is clear that China dominates the
continent. This has
been the case ever since Mao Zedong drove the U.S.-backed
Nationalist Chi-
nese allies off the continent in 1949 and U.S. forces were fought
to a standstill
on the Korean peninsula from 1950 to 1953. During the United
States’ last
land war in Asia, the Vietnam War, the Johnson administration
refused to
countenance a number of seemingly sensible military actions
against North
Vietnam lest such moves draw the PRC directly into the war.
Moreover, Viet-
namese and Russian military capabilities have declined
precipitously in the
past two decades, and while the Indian army has made great
strides since
the 1962 Sino-Indian border skirmish, extreme Himalayan
terrain ensures a
secure buffer against a major invasion in either direction. On
the continent,
China is militarily supreme.
A very different situation exists, however, on the PRC’s
10. maritime frontier.
Here, the United States and its island and archipelagic allies—
including Japan
and Taiwan—predominate. This has been an area of strategic
vulnerability
ever since China first encountered the West (including
Westernized Japan)
in the nineteenth century, and remains so today. Since defeating
its only rival
for primacy, Japan, in World War II, the United States has been
the dominant
military power in littoral Asia.
From Beijing’s vantage point, the combination of the Ryukyu
chain and
Taiwan effectively act as a picket fence around the East China
Sea, potentially
constraining either access to the eastern seaboard of central and
northern
China (including Shanghai) or egress for PRC maritime traffic
to the Pacific
Ocean. James Lilley, former U.S. ambassador to China,
accurately noted that
Taiwan “is the cork in China’s bottle.” Taiwan falling into the
PRC’s hands
would “end what China feels to be a blockade on its ability to
control its sur-
rounding seas.”�
� Ambassador James Lilley, quoted in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker,
“If Taiwan Chooses Unification,
Should the United States Care?” Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3
(Summer 2002), 22.
11. [ 74 ]
asia p olicy
Taiwan is Strategically Impor tant to Tokyo
Tokyo has long been aware that the location of Taiwan has
made the is-
land strategically important to Japan. It was the Imperial
Japanese Navy that
persuaded the Japanese government to insist on the annexation
of Taiwan in
1895; Japanese naval strategists believed that in order to
become a “Western”
industrialized society, Meiji Japan would require maritime trade
to bring raw
materials to Japan and to transport Japanese goods to countries
around the
world. As early as 1879, when Tokyo asserted sovereignty over
the Ryukyu
kingdom by unilaterally annexing this island chain,� Japanese
strategists rec-
ognized the importance of having control over the islands
spread along the
major sea lanes between Japan and Southeast Asia.�
One hundred and ten years has not changed this geostrategic
reality. As
a major trading and energy-importing nation, Tokyo still
realizes that Japan’s
economic viability is dependent on the maritime trade routes
from the Mid-
dle East and Southeast Asia that pass through waters proximate
to Taiwan.
Because a hostile power in possession of Taiwan could easily
disrupt maritime
12. traffic bound for Japan, Taiwan is strategically significant to
Japan.
Japan’s vulnerability to economic isolation is not simply a
conceptual
problem for Tokyo. The U.S. submarine campaign in World War
II, which
succeeded in economically isolating Japan, is a historical
reminder of the im-
portance of preventing a disruption to maritime commerce.
Hisahiko Oka-
zaki has been explicit in spelling out the strategic implications
of the PRC
annexation of Taiwan: such a development would not only
compromise the
sea lanes upon which Japan’s Middle Eastern oil imports travel
(e.g., the Bashi
Channel east of Taiwan), but also give China improved leverage
in its rela-
tionship with Southeast Asia, which could have an indirect
impact on Japan’s
significant economic interests in that region.�
� The island chain includes Okinawa and stretches southward
all the way to Taiwan.
� The Ryukyu kingdom had been a Chinese tributary since
1372 and concurrently a district of the
Southern Japanese Satsuma domain since 1609. When
negotiations between Tokyo and Peking to
resolve the status proved fruitless, Japan unilaterally annexed
them. See S.C.M. Paine, The Sino-
Japanese War of �89�–�895: Perceptions, Power and Primacy
(New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2003), 90–91.
13. � Hisahiko Okazaki, “The Strategic Value of Taiwan” (paper
prepared for U.S.-Japan-Taiwan Trilat-
eral Strategic Dialogue, Tokyo, March 2, 2003) •
http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst. While
Okazaki’s interpretation may be a bit overdrawn, many Japanese
do share his view.
[ 75 ]
mcdevit t • taiwan: the tail that wags d o gs
Taiwan’s Value for U.S. Hedging Strateg y
Official U.S. policy has no explicit geostrategic caveats
regarding reuni-
fication so long as any such unification is peacefully achieved
with the con-
sent of the people of Taiwan. There is no question, however,
that as long as
the long-term impact on regional stability occasioned by
China’s rise remains
unclear, perpetuation of the status quo makes geostrategic
sense. The history
of World War II is a reminder to the United States that
Taiwan’s geographic
position in East Asia is important. Japanese air power launched
from bases
in Taiwan destroyed General Douglas MacArthur’s air force at
Luzon in De-
cember 1941, and greatly facilitated the Japanese conquest of
the Philippines.5
Thus, PLA naval and air bases on the east coast of Taiwan
would permit China
to project power more easily throughout littoral East Asia, and
14. provide the
PRC with the ability to interrupt seaborne commerce destined
for Northeast
Asia. With Taiwan and its Pratas island group in PRC hands—
along with the
Paracels seized from Vietnam in 1974 and many of the Spratly
islands, China
would have territorial sea and economic exclusion zone claims
to large chunks
of the South China Sea.
Impact of China’s Rise on Cross-Strait Stability
The difficult reality for Taiwan is that it is always going to be
only one
hundred miles from China, is always going to be one-fiftieth the
size of China
in terms of population, and is always going to be hugely
disadvantaged in
terms of the size of military establishments, long-term military
potential, and
the resources available for defense. Finally, as an island nation
with few natu-
ral resources, Taiwan is always going to be dependent on
maritime imports.
Taiwan has not been swallowed up over the past half-century
largely be-
cause the Taiwan Strait presents a natural barrier to the power
of the PLA, and
because other great naval powers have helped to keep Chinese
air and naval
power on the west side of the strait. The Japanese were so much
more militar-
ily advanced than China in the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War that
they could
15. promise to march on Beijing if their demands—including the
annexation of
Taiwan—were not met. Fifty-five years later it was the United
States that was
strong enough to underwrite Taiwan’s security and permit the
Republic of
China (ROC) to survive.
5 H.P. Willmott, Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied
Pacific Strategies to April �9�� (Annapo-
lis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1982), 146–48. Willmott
provides an excellent assessment of the
impact of Japanese airpower flying from Formosa at the start of
World War II.
[ 76 ]
asia p olicy
During much of the Cold War, when China’s military potential
was ei-
ther focused on the threat from the Soviet Union or was
consumed by do-
mestic unrest (such as the “Cultural Revolution”) the defense
establishment
remained wedded to a doctrine of “People’s War.” The United
States was thus
able to fulfill its defense obligation with the U.S. forces then
stationed in East
Asia, which were principally responsible for the defense of
Japan or Korea.
Taiwan did not require a large separate increment of
“dedicated” U.S. military
power. In this sense the defense of Taiwan was an “economy of
16. force” com-
mitment—a situation that soon will no longer be true due to
steady improve-
ments in the PLA. Soon, the cross-Strait balance will no longer
grossly favor
the combined capabilities of the United States and Taiwan.
The PLA’s single-minded focus on Taiwan in recent years has,
however,
given the PLA the military capabilities necessary to reach
Taiwan in a way
that was not possible in earlier decades. The Chinese military is
beginning
to match Taiwan’s qualitatively superior capabilities with
equally, or nearly as
advanced, Russian systems. As the December 2004 PRC defense
white paper
makes clear, the PLA is investing more in naval and air forces
for the express
purpose of establishing air and sea control over the seaward
approaches to the
PRC.� If not balanced by increased U.S and Taiwanese
capabilities, the PLA’s
modernization will inevitably change the defense equation for
both Taiwan
and the United States.
Summar y
In sum, Taiwan’s geographic position creates geostrategic
interests on the
part of the United States and Japan that are different from those
of the main-
land. Washington and Tokyo’s interests favor perpetuation of
the status quo so
long as the nature of a “risen China” remains an open question
17. and the PRC’s
military modernization has the potential to destabilize the
region. Neither the
United States nor Japan is likely to press Taiwan on the issue of
reunification.
Tokyo and Washington will be content so long as Taipei does
not go beyond
the status quo and seek permanent separation of Taiwan and the
mainland.
� State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense
in �00�, Beijing, December 2006, 6.
[ 7 7 ]
mcdevit t • taiwan: the tail that wags d o gs
demo cracy in taiwan:
the influence of demo cratic values
In 1986 President Chiang Ching-kuo decided to gradually
rollback
Kuomintang (KMT) authoritarian rule in Taiwan. Once in place,
these po-
litical reforms resulted in a fairly rapid dismantlement of the
institutions of
repression. By 1996 Taiwan could boast of having a very lively
democratic
system. The 2000 elections actually resulted in a change in
ruling party, and
Chen Shui-bian—who had been jailed for democratic activism
decades ear-
lier—became president.
18. Democratic Values and the United States
This democratization process has had a major impact on the
relationship
with the United States by broadening Taiwan’s political support
to both major
U.S. political parties. As Richard Bush writes: “Previously,
American liberals
had criticized the KMT for its repressive rule. Now the island
was a poster
child for American values, made all the more prominent by the
fact that po-
litical repression was still the order of the day across the
Taiwan Strait.”�
Democracy and reunification • The advent of democracy in
Taiwan has
also made it much more politically difficult for Washington to
push Taipei
into a unification dialogue in order to bring an end to
Washington’s 50-year
security obligation. One of the most significant consequences of
democracy
took place in 1991, when Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui
approved a set of
Guidelines for National Reunification. In retrospect, this change
put the is-
land on a very different political trajectory in that Taipei
dropped the pretense
that the ROC represented the only legitimate government of
China. As long
as the PRC and the ROC each claimed to represent the true
Chinese state and
each aimed to reunify the country under its own political model,
there was no
dispute regarding concepts of “one China.” Each side asserted it
19. would end the
Chinese civil war by “recovering” the territory occupied by the
other.
Instead, Taipei’s new guidelines accepted the PRC as the
legitimate gov-
ernment of the part of China that Beijing controlled. This move
effectively
nullified the underlying premise of the 1972 Shanghai
Communiqué that
“Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is
but one China
and that it is a part of China.” As Harry Harding has stated,
“Taiwan basically
abandoned the vision of one country, one legitimate government
that had
� Richard C. Bush, “The United States and Taiwan” (paper
presented at the International Conference
on the United Nations and Taiwan, New Century Institute,
September 2003), 6.
[ 78 ]
asia p olicy
been pursued by Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, and for
that matter
Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.”8 The 1991 Guidelines for
National Reuni-
fication softened the political blow of backing away from the
old formulation
of “one China” by stating that the ROC still envisioned a “one
country, one
20. system” future but only when the PRC had become “democratic,
free, and
equitably prosperous”—just like Taiwan.
The notion of reunification only when the mainland becomes
democratic
is implicit—but not explicit—U.S. policy as well. The U.S.
policy of support-
ing no unilateral changes to the status quo was articulated in the
oval office
by President Bush in the presence of PRC Premier Wen Jiabao.
This policy
in effect means that the people of Taiwan have a veto over any
reunification
scheme with which they do not agree. Polls in Taiwan have
repeatedly indi-
cated that the citizens of Taiwan are not interested in reuniting
with a main-
land that is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Ironically,
while applauding this presidential statement as a warning to
Chen Shui-bian,
Beijing was also endorsing a policy that does not promise any
near-term reso-
lution of this issue. That Beijing would be pleased over
preservation of the
status quo is testimony to how much Chen Shui-bian has
managed to change
the terms of the cross-Strait debate.
While the status quo may satisfy Washington over the long term
and Bei-
jing in the near term, the leadership in Taiwan remains
distinctly unsatisfied.
The status quo does not meet the growing desire of Taiwan’s
polity for greater
21. international recognition of its democratic success. President
Chen Shui-bian
captured this desire in a 2004 speech on Taiwan’s National Day:
“There is no
reason that the 23 million people of Taiwan should continue to
be ‘politically
isolated’ and remain as international nomads without due
acknowledgement.
Taiwan must stand tall on the international stage, with parity
and dignity.”9
The Bush administration • In the early years of the first term
of George
W. Bush, the administration made conscious efforts to show
U.S. sympathy
regarding Taiwan’s anomalous situation—the island is a full-
blown democ-
racy recognized by only a handful of insignificant countries,
and excluded
from virtually all international institutions that require
“statehood” as a cri-
terion for membership. By the middle of 2003 the Bush
administration was
characterized as “… pursuing a policy toward Taiwan that was
more heavily
8 Harry Harding, “‘One China’ or ‘One Option’: The
Contending Formulas for Relations across
the Taiwan Strait,” (lecture, Asian Affairs Committee of the
Association of the Bar of New York,
November 1, 2000), reprinted in the National Committee for
U.S.-China Relations Newsletter, March
2001.
9 For a printed version of Chen’s speech, see “President Chen’s
National Day Address,” Taiwan Up-
22. date 5, no. 11 (October 29, 2004), 5 •
http://www.tecro.org/taipei_update/pdf-issues/102904.pdf.
[ 79 ]
mcdevit t • taiwan: the tail that wags d o gs
weighted toward Taiwan than at any time since U.S.
normalization of relations
with the PRC.”�0
What this meant in practice was a decision to allow Chen Shui-
bian to
make an extended transit stop in the United States, including
visits with two
dozen members of Congress and attending public functions and
meetings
with local elected officials. Taiwan’s Vice President Annette
Lu, an outspoken
independence advocate, was also permitted the same transit
privileges. In a
remarkable departure from previous practice, Taiwan’s defense
minister was
authorized to visit the United States to attend a conference in
Florida orga-
nized explicitly so he and his sizable entourage would be able to
meet with an
array of various defense contractors as well as with the Deputy
Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz and other officials from the
Department of Defense
(DoD). The administration also approved a Taiwan arms sales
package that
included submarines, something no previous administration was
23. willing to
authorize.��
Although having made an unprecedented good faith effort to
both posi-
tively acknowledge Taiwan’s democracy and give the island
more “interna-
tional space,” the Bush administration’s enthusiasm for the
Chen administra-
tion began to wane in late summer of 2003. President Chen
announced that
he was planning to resolve some of the island’s most difficult
policy debates
through the process of national referenda. This immediately
provoked con-
cern in Beijing because the CCP leadership is convinced that
the referenda
process is a slippery slope that will inevitably lead to a national
referendum on
independence—something Beijing absolutely opposes, seeing it
as a concrete
step toward de jure independence. A referendum could
legitimize a declara-
tion of independence as an act that reflects the will of the
people of Taiwan.��
Because Beijing was concerned, Washington—deeply embroiled
as it
was in Afghanistan and Iraq—was also concerned. The Bush
administration
feared that Chen Shui-bian had embarked on a course that would
eventu-
ally undermine stability across the Taiwan Strait. The last thing
Washington
wanted was another crisis on its hands. Washington was
especially concerned
24. because Chen was persisting in this course despite signals sent
from the high-
�0 “Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices,”
CRS Issue Brief for Congress (updated July
16, 2003), CRS–12.
�� Worth remembering is that, due to successful PRC
economic and diplomatic pressure, no country
except the United States is willing to sell arms to Taiwan.
�� The author most recently discussed the slippery slope
metaphor with a delegation from a variety
of Chinese think tanks in May 2004 during an extended meeting
focused on the Taiwan issue. This
has long been a Chinese concern and has been reinforced of late
by the series of incremental steps
taken by Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian toward de jure
independence.
[ 80 ]
asia p olicy
est levels in the U.S. government that Taiwan should not go
forward with a
plan that could lead to a crisis. Chen’s attitude regarding
Washington’s warn-
ings was that he would not bow to pressure from Washington:
“Taiwan is
not a province of one country nor is it a state of another … I
don’t think a
democratic country can oppose our democratic ideals.”�� From
Washington’s
25. perspective, Chen was ignoring U.S. interests, a development
which was espe-
cially irksome given how far the Bush administration had gone
to expand the
range of U.S.-Taiwan relations.
Chen’s statement captures perfectly how the issue of shared
democratic
values empowers Taiwan when it deals with Washington. By
seizing the moral
high ground, Chen made it difficult for Washington to be too
publicly criti-
cal of the direction in which Chen appeared to be heading,
namely making
changes to Taiwan’s constitution. Private and diplomatic
interventions fell
on deaf ears. By brushing aside Washington’s worries over
provoking a cri-
sis with Beijing, Chen Shui-bian was apparently willing to
ignore President
Bush’s concerns over Taiwan’s actions provoking a conflict
with …
Sanctioning North Korea: The Political Economy of
Denuclearization and Proliferation
Author(s): Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland
Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 50, No. 3 (May/June 2010), pp. 539-
568
Published by: University of California Press
Stable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2010.50.3.539 .
Accessed: 09/09/2013 16:11
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the
27. University of California Press’s Rights
and Permissions website,
http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI:
AS.2010.50.3.539.
539
STEPHAN HAGGARD AND MARCUS NOLAND
Sanctioning North Korea
The Political Economy of Denuclearization and Proliferation
ABSTRACT
Following North Korea’s second nuclear test, the U.N. Security
Council tightened
sanctions. However, North Korea has tilted its relations toward
partners uninterested
in such measures. Since 2005, it has retreated from economic
reform, most obviously
in the 2009 confiscatory currency reform. These developments
raise doubts about
North Korea’s interest in engagement.
KEYWORDS: North Korea, economic sanctions, nuclear
weapons, missiles, United
Nations Security Council
Passage of the United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1874 on June 12, 2009, marks a new phase in the
development of the
North Korean nuclear crisis. Until that time, the dominant view
was that North
Korea was probably still engaged in a protracted negotiation.
The missile and
28. nuclear provocations of 2006 were followed relatively quickly
by the signing of
important roadmap agreements in February and October 2007.
Similarly, the
haggling in 2008 over the parties’ respective commitments
under these two agree-
ments and the conflict over a verification protocol could be
interpreted as tactical
moves. Although the last round of the Six Party Talks in
December of 2008 ended
in a stalemate, the Obama administration was publicly
committed to a resump-
tion of the negotiations and a broader strategy of engagement.
Since the missile and nuclear tests of early 2009, however, the
mood with
respect to North Korea’s intentions has turned dourer. North
Korea’s actions
and statements appear to support the hawks’ view that
Pyongyang is now
Stephan Haggard is Lawrence and Sally Krause Professor,
Graduate School of International
Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San
Diego. Marcus Noland is Deputy
Director and Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for
International Economics and Senior Fellow
at the East-West Center. The authors would like to thank the
Smith Richardson, MacArthur, and
Korea Foundations for financial support. Jennifer Lee provided
considerable research assistance.
AS5003_05_Haggard & Noland.indd 539 6/16/10 4:03 PM
This content downloaded from 131.94.16.10 on Mon, 9 Sep
2013 16:11:11 PM
29. All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
540 • ASiAN SURvEY 50:3
committed to developing and keeping a credible nuclear
deterrent. In an
early test of the Obama administration, North Korea stated that
it would
only relinquish nuclear weapons after relations with the U.S.
had been nor-
malized. Following the April 5 test of a multistage rocket, the
U.N. Security
Council (UNSC) issued a presidential statement that moved to
implement
sanctions under the earlier Security Council Resolution 1718,
passed in Oc-
tober 2006 following the country’s first nuclear test. North
Korea responded
by withdrawing from the Six Party Talks, resuming the
reprocessing of spent
fuel rods, and undertaking a second nuclear test on May 25,
2009.
Following the passage of UNSCR 1874 in June, North Korea
once again
escalated by claiming that it would weaponize all recently
reprocessed pluto-
nium, commence a uranium enrichment program, and provide a
“decisive
military response” to any “blockade” against the country.
Former President
Bill Clinton’s visit to Pyongyang in August to secure the release
of two de-
30. tained journalists provided an opening for the resumption of
dialogue. But
even optimists foresee protracted negotiations in which the
regime will con-
tinue to wield its nuclear and missile arsenals as bargaining
chips.
There are ample reasons to believe that North Korea’s behavior
is driven
not by the external environment but by complex domestic
developments
that include Kim Jong-il’s health, factional struggles over the
succession, and
longer-run economic changes that have weakened the
government’s hold
over a fraying socialist system. We should not believe that fine-
tuning incentives—
in the form of either carrots or sticks—will necessarily succeed;
much will
depend on developments in Pyongyang as well.
However, whether the five parties (the U.S., China, Japan,
South Korea, and
Russia) settle on a strategy of increased pressure on Pyongyang,
or new induce-
ments, or both, it is important to understand how recent changes
in North
Korea’s economy may affect these strategies. We make two
major points here,
one having to do with North Korea’s domestic political
economy and the second
with its foreign sector. First, there is strong evidence from as
early as 2005 that
the leadership has become increasingly wary of economic
reform.1 The onset of
the nuclear crisis and a more “hostile” international
31. environment clearly do not
favor reform, but it is likely that concerns about the
government’s weakening
control over the economy have also influenced the turn to a
more Stalinist eco-
nomic policy, culminating in the disastrous currency reform of
late 2009.
1. See also Andrei Lankov, “Pyongyang Strikes Back: North
Korean Policies of 2002–08 and
Attempts to Reverse De-Stalinization from Below,” Asia Policy
8 (July 2009), pp. 47–71.
AS5003_05_Haggard & Noland.indd 540 6/16/10 4:03 PM
This content downloaded from 131.94.16.10 on Mon, 9 Sep
2013 16:11:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
HAGGARD AND NOLAND / NORTH KOREA SANCTiONS •
541
This caution with respect to economic reform has important
implications
for our understanding of North Korean intentions.2 General
economic in-
ducements, such as the lifting of sanctions, entry into
international financial
institutions (IFIs), or more formalized regional cooperation,
have never been
as appealing to the North Korean leadership as proponents of
engagement
have believed. The regime has always favored targeted transfers
32. that can be
directly controlled by the leadership, including food aid, heavy
fuel oil ship-
ments, or cash payments such as those secured from the 2000
North-South
summit and the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and Mt.
Kumgang proj-
ects.3 In the current environment, the appeal of general
economic induce-
ments is even less than it has been historically.
The second, and apparently contradictory, observation is that
the North
Korean economy has become more open. However, the
geographic composi-
tion of North Korea’s trade has shifted quite fundamentally.
Trade with
Japan has virtually collapsed. Trade and investment from
Europe stagnated
after the onset of the nuclear crisis. Following the inauguration
of President
Lee Myung-bak, South Korean aid fell sharply as well. At the
same time,
North Korea’s dependence on China has grown dramatically in
both abso-
lute and relative terms. In addition, North Korea has sought out
other part-
ners that do not pose sanctions risks, or with whom its nuclear
and missile
interests are aligned, most notably Iran, Syria, and potentially
Egypt.
These shifts in trade patterns make it much more difficult,
although not
impossible, to pursue an effective sanctions strategy. In the
absence of robust
33. cooperation from China, policy would have to target North
Korea’s interna-
tional financial ties or directly interdict trade moving by sea or
air. UNSCR
1874 takes some steps in this direction but remains focused
overwhelmingly on
trade in weapons, and is thus unlikely to be decisive even if
implemented fully.
Our discussion proceeds in four stages. In the first section, we
provide a
brief overview of the development of the North Korean
economy from the
collapse of the Soviet Union to the onset of the second nuclear
crisis.
2. Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia
and the Middle East (Princeton,
N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2007).
3. KIC and the Mt. Kumgang project are two enclave
cooperation projects that have their ori-
gins in a 1998 negotiation between North Korea and the South
Korean firm Hyundai. For the ori-
gins of the projects, see Marcus Noland, Avoiding the
Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics,
2000). For details on their economic
significance, see Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “North
Korea’s Foreign Economic Rela-
tions,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 8:2 (May
2008), pp. 219–46.
AS5003_05_Haggard & Noland.indd 541 6/16/10 4:03 PM
This content downloaded from 131.94.16.10 on Mon, 9 Sep
34. 2013 16:11:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
542 • ASiAN SURvEY 50:3
Drawing on evidence from a survey of refugees, we emphasize
the impact of
the great famine of the mid-1990s on what we call
“marketization from
below,” the tentative policy changes that culminated in the
economic re-
forms of July 2002, and the evidence of retrenchment since
2005.
In the second section, we trace the evolution of the external
sector, noting
the ongoing ability of the country to finance a substantial
current-account
deficit and the steady diversification of its foreign economic
relations. Of
particular interest is the growth in North Korea’s trade and
investment with
other developing countries, most notably in the Middle East,
and the related
concerns about proliferation activities.
We then examine in greater detail the changing economic
relationship with
China and South Korea following important political
breakthroughs with both
countries in 2000–01. We show the growing weight of China in
North Korea’s
external economic relations, the increasingly commercial nature
35. of these ties,
and the minimal impact of the 2006 sanctions on the growth of
China-North
Korea trade and investment. These patterns contrast with North
Korea-South
Korea economic relations, which under Lee Myung-bak have
seen a profound
reversal from previous engagement strategies.
In the final section, we provide an overview of the sanctions
imposed
under UNSCR 1874. The resolution sent an important political
signal and
included several ground-breaking precedents, such as a right to
monitor, and
perhaps interdict, suspected arms sales and to use financial
sanctions against
violating entities. Nonetheless, the political compromises
required to pass
the sanctions through the Security Council limited their
substantive, as op-
posed to signaling, effect. In the absence of complementary
inducements
and constraints by the five parties, they will have minimal
impact.
THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY: 1990–2009
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the North Korean
economy went
into a steep decline, culminating in one of the most destructive
famines of the
20th century.4 The causes of this collapse were multiple,
including long-run
4. Daniel Goodkind and Lorraine West, “The North Korean
36. Famine and Its Demographic Im-
pact,” Population and Development Review 27 (2001), pp. 219–
38; Suk Lee, “Food Shortages and Eco-
nomic Institutions in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea,” unpublished doctoral dissertation,
Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry,
U.K., 2003; Stephan Haggard and
Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and
Reform (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2007).
AS5003_05_Haggard & Noland.indd 542 6/16/10 4:03 PM
This content downloaded from 131.94.16.10 on Mon, 9 Sep
2013 16:11:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
HAGGARD AND NOLAND / NORTH KOREA SANCTiONS •
543
distortions associated with the socialist growth model and the
lost opportuni-
ties for reform that resulted from the first nuclear crisis of
1993–94. The failure
to adjust to the rapid decline of Soviet support is the principal
reason both the
industrial and agricultural sectors of North Korea went into a
secular decline
in the first half of the 1990s. The floods of 1995 were only a
final shock.
In response to the crisis, the North Korean economy began to
undergo a
37. profound “marketization from below.” Households, work units,
local party
organs, government offices, and even military units all
scrambled for food,
venturing into new, monetized economic activities. Markets
began to play a
more important role, both in generating household income and
as a source
for retail purchases including food (abetted by the diversion of
aid from
external donors, primarily the World Food Program [WFP], that
began ar-
riving in 1995), and eventually a wider range of consumer
goods.
A 2008 survey we conducted of 300 North Korean refugees
living in South
Korea provides insight into the extent of this process of
informal marketiza-
tion.5 We asked respondents whether, in addition to their
regular work, they
engaged in other economic activities. A total of 71% said they
had engaged in
trading, 9% in private services, 19% in “other” business
activities, and 15% in
August 3 units, entrepreneurial businesses run out of the
traditional state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). A surprising 69% of all respondents
said that they
secured over half their income from private business activities,
and 46% said
they secured all of their income from private activities. These
results were mir-
rored on the expenditure side. Less than 10% of the respondents
in our survey
said that their primary source of food at the time they left North
38. Korea was the
state-run public distribution system (PDS) or their work places.
Moreover,
there is little difference in this response across different dates
of departure; if
anything, reliance on the market appears to have gone up over
time.
During the famine and its immediate aftermath, the regime had
little
choice but to acquiesce in these developments. In 1998 the
leadership intro-
duced constitutional revisions that tentatively broadened the
space for eco-
nomic activity outside direct state control.6 External political
developments
provided some additional hints of an economic opening; these
included the
5. For details on the survey, see Stephan Haggard and Marcus
Noland, “Reform from Below:
Behavioral and Institutional Change in North Korea,” Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organiza-
tion 73 (2010), pp. 133–52.
6. Ruediger Frank, “Economic Reforms in North Korea (1998–
2004): Systemic Restrictions,
Quantitative Analysis, Ideological Background,” Journal of the
Asia Pacific Economy 10:3 (2005), pp.
278–311.
AS5003_05_Haggard & Noland.indd 543 6/16/10 4:03 PM
This content downloaded from 131.94.16.10 on Mon, 9 Sep
2013 16:11:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
39. http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
544 • ASiAN SURvEY 50:3
2000 North-South summit, the resumption of high-level visits
with China
in 2000 and 2001, and the Koizumi summit with Japan in 2002.
These im-
portant diplomatic developments appeared to confirm that
political engage-
ment and economic reform were complementary. A relaxation of
tensions
provided space for the domestic reform effort, and a greater
focus on the
necessity of reform also motivated the leadership to broaden its
foreign po-
litical and economic relations.
The regime effectively ratified these developments with a set of
policy
changes announced in July 2002. There are ample grounds for
criticizing this
reform as a limited and flawed effort.7 Nonetheless, it allowed
the continued
growth of controlled markets and began or continued
incremental reforms
of the cooperatives (for example, by reducing the size of work
teams) and of
SOEs (for example, by granting greater managerial autonomy).
Yet, the timing of the reform proved highly inauspicious.
Within months of
the launching of the 2002 reforms, the second nuclear crisis had
broken. An
40. internal debate over the merits of reform continued through
2005, primarily
in the form of controversy over the weight that should be given
to the military
and heavy industrial sectors, as opposed to light industry and
agriculture.8
However, by 2005 signs had begun to emerge that hardliners
were winning the
policy battles. We consider briefly five examples of “reform in
reverse”:
• Developments in the food economy, including efforts to revive
the PDS;
• The restrictive response of the government to the development
of markets;
• The management of border trade;
• Government statements with respect to overall development
strategy,
most notably in the joint New Year’s editorial of 2009;
• The 2009 currency reform.
The Breakdown and Reconstitution of the Public Distribution
System
Prior to the famine of the mid-1990s, the government set
production quotas
for the cooperatives, provided farmers with rations at the time
of the harvest,
and distributed food to urban residents at nominal prices
through the PDS.
7. Haggard and Noland, “Reform from Below,” pp. 176–91.
8. Robert L. Carlin and Joel S. Wit, “North Korean Reform:
Politics, Economics, and Security,”
41. Adelphi Paper, no. 382 (London: International Institute for
Security Studies, 2006); Georgy Tolo-
raya, North Korea Now: Will the Clock Be Turned Back?
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
2008); <http://www.nautilus.org>, accessed July 13, 2009.
AS5003_05_Haggard & Noland.indd 544 6/16/10 4:03 PM
This content downloaded from 131.94.16.10 on Mon, 9 Sep
2013 16:11:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
HAGGARD AND NOLAND / NORTH KOREA SANCTiONS •
545
Markets played virtually no role in the allocation of grain.
During the fam-
ine, the PDS broke down, and households relied on the market,
barter, pri-
vate farming, and other private activities such as foraging. The
influx of
foreign aid in the late 1990s provided the basis for a partial
revival of the
PDS because donors had no independent channels for
distributing food. But
the process of marketization continued apace, driven by partial
reforms in
the food sector, such as allowing some private plots and
expanding the role
of farmers’ markets, as well as the diversion of food aid and
cooperative
output into the market and growing commercial trade in food
across the
42. Chinese border.
In August 2005, the government decided to counter this trend
toward
marketization by reinstating the PDS (as of October 1) and
banning private
trading in grain. As in the past, the ability of the government to
implement
this policy varied across the country, and eventually it was
forced to quietly
shelve the policy.9 But such moves intensified again in the
wake of floods in
2006 and particularly 2007. First, the government increased
production
quotas for the next crop cycle, including through exactions
earmarked for
the military. Second, officials began to crack down on
“embezzlement” and
“corruption” on the part of cooperative managers. Third, new
restrictions
were placed on private plots and cooperative leasing of land, in
an effort to
redirect effort back into cooperative work.
Through a reconstruction of aggregate food balances, an
analysis of prices,
and direct observation by nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and
U.N. WFP observers, we now know that the food situation in
North Korea
was more precarious in 2008 than at any time since the
famine.10 These
shortages help explain the willingness of the North Korean
government to
engage in negotiations over a large food aid package with the
U.S., con-
43. cluded in May 2008. The shortages may have influenced
Pyongyang’s will-
ingness to negotiate over the broader nuclear issues as well. But
in other re-
spects, the 2007–08 crop cycle showed a continuing preference
for controls
and limits to engagement, most clearly visible in the decision in
May 2009
to terminate the 500,000 metric ton food aid program with the
U.S.
9. For an analysis of the state capacity to extract grain across
provinces, see Hazel Smith, “North
Korea: Market Opportunity, Poverty, and the Provinces,” New
Political Economy 14:2 (June 2009),
pp. 231–56.
10. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “Famine in North
Korea Redux?” Journal of Asian
Economics 20:4 (September 2009), pp. 384–95.
AS5003_05_Haggard & Noland.indd 545 6/16/10 4:03 PM
This content downloaded from 131.94.16.10 on Mon, 9 Sep
2013 16:11:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
546 • ASiAN SURvEY 50:3
Responding to Markets and Traders
The breakdown of the PDS and the emergence of markets pose
important
44. challenges for the North Korean government, not only vis-à-vis
the country-
side but in the urban and industrial sectors as well. These
included a fall in
real wages and the migration of labor out of the state sector and
into market
activities, and the corresponding weakening of the SOE sector.
North
Korea’s food problems have increasingly come to resemble
those in market
economies, in which incomes, rather than political position, are
the deter-
minants of hunger and malnutrition.
Recent initiatives have not been limited to food but have
included a
wider assault on market activity, culminating in the 2009
confiscatory cur-
rency reform. This campaign began with the imposition of
escalating age
restrictions on market traders in the fall of 2007, ultimately
banning men
and women under 50 from trading in general markets in an
attempt to
force the “able-bodied” back into employment in state-
controlled entities
such as SOEs. From mid-January 2008, the government stepped
up in-
spections of the general markets (jangmadang), in an effort to
control the
range of goods offered. The apparent intention behind this
effort was re-
version to the more-limited farmers’ markets that were
permitted to trade
only in supplementary foodstuffs. In October 2008, North
Korean authori-
45. ties issued a decree through local commerce management
offices around the
country ordering all permanent markets to open only once every
10 days.
There have also been periodic reports of efforts to control
prices. Even prior
to the currency reform, control efforts intensified, with bans on
a variety of
foreign products that have been increasingly important to the
burgeoning
retail trade.
There is also evidence that the efforts to exercise control over
markets ex-
tended to cross-border trade as well. The 2004 and 2007
revisions of the
criminal code appear to place substantial weight not only on
economic
crimes in general but on violations of foreign exchange and
trade controls in
particular. Larger trading entities in the land ports along the
border, particu-
larly in Sinuiju, have fallen under government scrutiny.11 In a
noteworthy
development in April 2008, the central government dispatched a
team of
11. The city of Sinuiju is a locus of China-North Korea trade
and investment, and in 2002 was
slated for autonomous zone status in a bizarre scheme involving
Chinese fraudster Yang Bin. See
Marcus Noland, Korea after Kim Jong-il (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for International Economics,
2004), for details.
AS5003_05_Haggard & Noland.indd 546 6/16/10 4:03 PM
46. This content downloaded from 131.94.16.10 on Mon, 9 Sep
2013 16:11:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
HAGGARD AND NOLAND / NORTH KOREA SANCTiONS •
547
200 investigators to Sinuiju in the name of an Antisocialist
Conscience In-
vestigation to inspect the books of foreign trade organizations.
Prior to the currency reform, there was scant evidence of overt
social or
political backlash; the barriers to collective action in North
Korea are well
known. But a March 2008 episode in Chongjin suggested that
the markets
themselves could become the locus of protest and everyday
forms of resis-
tance. City officials had sought to enforce the age restriction on
female trad-
ers. In what appeared to be a coordinated action across several
markets in the
city, large groups of women staged protests against the ban on
trading on
March 4. Municipal authorities took the unusual step of
reopening the mar-
kets under the authority of the local ministry of labor on March
5 but were
subsequently compelled to enforce the ban at the insistence of
the central
government. The episode reveals the complex pressures on local
47. officials
squeezed between the dictates of Pyongyang, the absence of
resources,
mounting political and social pressures, and the risks of further
repression.
The Border Problem
The dramatic increase in trade with China has resulted in the
creation of dense
business networks that include major Chinese and North Korean
enterprises,
smaller Chinese and North Korean businesses, and North
Koreans with rela-
tives in China who are permitted to travel. As a result, the
border poses
profound challenges to the North Korean leadership. When
economic circum-
stances deteriorate, the incentives rise for North Koreans to
move into China,
either permanently or in search of business opportunities and
food. With this
movement comes the gradual breakdown of the government’s
monopoly on
information about the outside world. Moeover, cross-border
trade has come to
include an array of communications and cultural products that
directly under-
mine the government’s monopoly on information: from small
televisions ca-
pable of receiving Chinese broadcasts in border areas to South
Korean videos
and DVDs and even mobile phones.12 The border also poses a
variety of more-
direct economic problems. Illicit border trade in drugs,
particularly metham-
48. phetamines, has been widely reported as has the smuggling of
scrap metal and
other products that reflect the looting of SOEs and public
infrastructure.
12. North Korea has made several attempts to introduce cellular
services on a limited basis. The
most recent involves a joint venture with the Egyptian firm
Orascom Telecommunications, which
is now providing services in Pyongyang. See Marcus Noland,
“Telecommunications in North Korea:
Has Orascom Made the Connection?” North Korean Review 5:1
(Spring 2009), pp. 62–74.
AS5003_05_Haggard & Noland.indd 547 6/16/10 4:03 PM
This content downloaded from 131.94.16.10 on Mon, 9 Sep
2013 16:11:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
548 • ASiAN SURvEY 50:3
Prior to changes in the North Korean penal code in 2004, a
person who il-
legally crossed a “frontier of the Republic” faced a sentence of
up to three years
in a political penal labor colony. Those who did not appear
politically danger-
ous were sent to village- or unit-level labor camps, where they
would spend
between three months and three years in forced labor. Those
classified as “po-
litical offenders” faced more severe penalties, including
49. indefinite terms of im-
prisonment and forced labor, confiscation of property, or death.
Regulations
under the 2004 penal code appear to have codified the
differential treatment
between economic refugees and those cases deemed political,
stipulating
lighter sentences for those crossing for economic reasons,
although legal revi-
sions did not necessarily reflect the discretion exercised by
officials.
The recurrence of severe food shortages following the floods of
2007, …
The MIT Press
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539347 .
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of
JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp.
JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that
unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an
entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal,
non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this
work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitp
ress. .
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the
50. same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,
researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information
technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new
forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please
contact [email protected]
The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to International Security.
http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitp
ress
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539347?origin=JSTOR-pdf
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitp
ress
Realism, Robert Jervis
Neoliberalism, and
Cooperation
Understanding the Debate
The study of conflict
and cooperation has been an enduring task of scholars, with the
most recent
arguments being between realists and neoliberal
institutionalists.1 Most stu-
dents of the subject believe that realists argue that international
51. politics is
characterized by great conflict and that institutions play only a
small role. They
also believe that neoliberals claim that cooperation is more
extensive, in large
part because institutions are potent.
I do not think that this formulation of the debate is correct. In
the first section
of this article, I argue that the realist-neoliberal disagreement
over conflict is
not about its extent but about whether it is unnecessary, given
states' goals. In
this context we cannot treat realism as monolithic, but must
distinguish be-
tween the offensive and defensive variants.2 In the second
section, I explain
Robert Jervis is Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International
Politics at Columbia University and author
most recently of System Effects: Complexity in Political and
Social Life (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1997).
I am grateful for comments by David Baldwin, Page Fortna,
Robert Keohane, Jeffrey Legro, Helen
Milner, Andrew Moravcsik, and Kenneth Waltz.
1. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International
Institutions," International Security, Vol.
19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49; Robert 0. Keohane and
Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of
Institutional Theory," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1
(Summer 1995), pp. 39-51; Mearsheimer
"A Realist Reply," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1
(Summer 1995), pp. 82-93. See also Martin
52. and Beth Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of
International Institutions," International
Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 729-758; and
Keohane and Martin "Institutional
Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," paper prepared for
meeting on "Progress in International
Relations Theory," January 15-16, 1999, Scottsdale, Arizona,
which says that "institutional theory"
is a more descriptive title than "neoliberal institutionalism."
2. My definition of the distinction between offensive and
defensive realism can be found below,
pp. 48-50. For other discussions, see Jack L. Snyder, Myths of
Empire: Domestic Politics and Interna-
tional Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991);
Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domes-
tic Politics," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer
1992), pp. 177-198; Charles L. Glas'er,
"Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International
Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter
1994/95), pp. 50-90; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's
Status-Quo Bias: What Security Di-
lemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-
121; Stephen Brooks, "Dueling
Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer
1997), pp. 445-478; Eric J. Labs,
"Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War
Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No.
International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 42-63
? 1999 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
42
53. Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation | 43
the disagreement in terms of what each school of thought3
believes would have
to change to produce greater cooperation. This raises the
question of institu-
tions. In the third section, I argue that realists claim not that
institutions lack
utility, but that they are not autonomous in the sense of being
more than a tool
of statecraft. Even if it is true that cooperation and the presence
of institutions
are correlated, it does not follow that cooperation can be
increased by estab-
lishing institutions where they do not exist, which I think is
why most people
find the realist-neoliberal debate over cooperation of more than
academic
interest.
I do not want to exaggerate the gap separating realism and
neoliberalism.
Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin have noted that "for better of
worse, institu-
tional theory is a half-sibling of neorealism."4 Both realism and
neoliberalism
start from the assumption that the absence of a sovereign
authority that can
make and enforce binding agreements creates opportunities for
states to ad-
vance their interests unilaterally and makes it important and
difficult for states
to cooperate with one another.5 States must worry that others
will seek to take
4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49; and Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in
54. Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers
Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1
(Autumn 1997), pp. 114-155. Glaser uses
the term "contingent realism," which I think is more descriptive
than "defensive realism," but I
use the latter term because it has gained greater currency.
3. I use this term because I do not think realism and neoliberal
institutionalism can be sharply
defined. Indeed, they are better labeled schools of thought or
approaches than theories. Although
this vagueness contributes to confusion as scholars talk past one
another, a precise definition would
be necessary only if either of these approaches really were a
tight theory. In that case, falsification
of propositions derived from the theory would cast doubt on the
entire enterprise. But, for better
and for worse, neither of these approaches has the sort of
integrity that would permit the use of
that logic. For an attempt to formulate a rigorous, but I think
excessively narrow, definition of
realism, see Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is
Anybody Still a Realist?" International
Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999). See also Kenneth N.
Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist
Theory," in Robert L. Rothstein, ed., The Evolution of Theory
in International Relations (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 21-38; and the
exchange between Colin Elman and
Waltz in Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 7-
61.
4. Keohane and Martin, "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and
Delegation," p. 3; Robert 0.
Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the
World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 9, 29, 67; Robert 0.
Keohane, International Institutions and
55. State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), pp. 7-9. See also
Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," p. 85;
Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, "A Tale of Two
Realisms: Expanding the Institutions
Debate," Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41,
Supplement 1 (May 1997), pp. 1-32; and
Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of
International Institutions," pp. 739-740.
In the statement quoted, Keohane and Martin refer to
neorealism, not realism. For the purposes
of this article, I do not need to distinguish between the two, as
Waltz does very well in "Realist
Thought and Neorealist Theory."
5. The realization that commitment is difficult within states as
well has led to enormous progress
in understanding domestic politics and arrangements among
private actors, thus making recent
analyses in American and comparative politics appear quite
familiar to students of international
politics. See Helen V. Milner, "Rationalizing Politics: The
Emerging Synthesis among International
International Security 24:1 | 44
advantage of them; agreements must be crafted to minimize the
danger of
double crosses; the incentives that operate when agreements are
signed may
be quite different when the time comes for them to be carried
out; and both
promises and threats need to be made credible. Thus it will take
some disen-
tangling to isolate the areas in which there are important
disputes between
56. realism and neoliberalism.6
Possibilities for Cooperation
Is it true that realism denies the possibility of international
cooperation or, less
extremely, that realists see less cooperation in world politics
than do neoliberal
institutionalists? I think the former statement is flatly wrong.
The latter is also
incorrect, but when properly reformulated, it points in a
productive direction.
FALSE OR EXAGGERATED ISSUES
The affinity between realism and neoliberal institutionalism is
not the only
reason to doubt the claim that realism has no place for
cooperation. This view
would imply that conflict of interest is total and that whatever
one state gains,
others must lose.7 This vision of a zero-sum world is
implausible. The sense
of international politics as characterized by constant bargaining,
which is
central to realism (but not to realism alone, of course), implies
a mixture of
common and conflicting interests. One can have fighting in a
zero-sum world,
but not politics.
More worthy of exploration is the less extreme view that
realism sees world
politics as much more conflictful than does neoliberal
institutionalism.8 For
57. Politics and American and Comparative Politics," International
Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn
1998), pp. 759-786. It is often assumed that anarchy and the
possibility of the use of force are the
same, but this is not correct, as shown by Milner, "The
Assumption of Anarchy in International
Relations Theory: A Critique," Review of International Studies,
Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 71-
74; and Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations
Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal
Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring
1994), pp. 330-334.
6. The differences may be sharper in some central issues I am
putting aside here: the efficacy and
fungibility of various forms of power, especially military
power; the differences in state behavior
when force, coercion, or unilateral solutions are available; and
the frequency of such situations.
7. This view is hard even to conceptualize in a multipolar
world. Any gain of territory or power
by state A would have to come at the expense of some other
state, but if it diminishes state B or
state C, this might aid state D, at least in the short run, if D is
the rival of B or C. Here the situation
is zero-sum (or, more technically, constant sum) overall, but not
all actors are hurt, and some may
be advantaged, by another's gain.
8. How to measure and even conceptualize conflict and conflict
of interest is not easy. See Robert
Axelrod, Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with
Applications to Politics (Chicago:
Markham, 1970).
Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation | 45
58. realists, world politics is a continuing if not an unrelenting
struggle for sur-
vival, advantage, and often dominance. Neoliberals do not deny
the existence
of cases of extreme conflict, but they do not see them as the
entire or even a
representative picture of world politics. In many cases and in
many areas,
states are able to work together to mitigate the effects of
anarchy, produce
mutual gains, and avoid shared harm.
Although not entirely misguided, this characterization of the
difference
between realism and neoliberalism is still wrong. To start with,
some of this
difference reflects the issues that the schools of thought
analyze. Neoliberal
institutionalists concentrate on issues of international political
economy (IPE)
and the environment; realists are more prone to study
international security
and the causes, conduct, and consequences of wars. Thus,
although it would
be correct to say that one sees more conflict in the world
analyzed by realist
scholars than in the world analyzed by neoliberals, this is at
least in part
because they study different worlds.9
Similarly, while neoliberal institutionalism is more concerned
with efficiency
and realism focuses more on issues of distribution, which are
closely linked to
power as both an instrument and a stake,10 it is not clear that
59. this represents
different views about the world or a difference in the choice of
subject matter.
Neoliberalism's argument (usually implicit) that distributional
conflicts are
usually less important than the potential common gains stems at
least in part
from its substantive concern with issues in which large mutual
benefits are
9. The differences between the issue areas are not inherent, but
it is generally believed that the
factors that are conducive to cooperation, such as vulnerability,
offensive advantage, and lack of
transparency, are more prevalent in IPE than in the security
arena. See Robert Jervis, "Security
Regimes," International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring
1982), pp. 358-360; and Charles H.
Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security
Affairs," World Politics, Vol. 37, No.
1 (October 1984), pp. 1-23.
10. Nonetheless, I think neoliberals were enlightened by Jack
Knight's argument that institutions
can affect not only the level of cooperation, but who gains
more. See Knight, Institutions and Social
Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
Similarly, while neoliberals have drawn
heavily on the literature on organizations, they pay little
attention to power-laden analyses such
as Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3d
ed. (New York: Random House, 1986).
Robert 0. Keohane acknowledges that he initially
underestimated the significance of distributive
issues. See Keohane "Institutional Theory and the Realist
Challenge after the Cold War," in David
A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The
60. Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1993), pp. 446-447. See also Keohane and
Martin, "The Promise of Institutional
Theory," pp. 45-46. For a good discussion of distribution and
institutions, see Powell, "Anarchy
in International Relations Theory," pp. 338-343. For an
argument that the shape of domestic
institutions affects both the chance of international agreement
and the distribution of the benefits,
see Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information:
Domestic Politics and International Relations
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
International Security 24:1 | 46
believed to be possible, such as protecting the environment,
rather than with
disputes over values such as territory, status, and influence (if
not dominance).
The related difference between realists and neoliberals on the
issue of rela-
tive and absolute gains also should not be exaggerated, as recent
formulations
have explained.11 To start with, it is not clear whether
neoliberals are arguing
that realists are incorrect to assert that states often are
concerned with relative
gains or that it is the states that err when they are thus
concerned, perhaps
because they have been socialized by realist prescriptions.
Substantively, real-
ists never claimed that relative gains were all that mattered-to
assert this
61. would be to declare international politics a zero-sum game-and
many realists
have been sensitive to possibilities of mutual security. Thus
within a few
months of the explosion of the first atomic bomb, realist
scholars noted that
once both sides had a sufficient number of these weapons, little
could be
gained by further increases and there was little to fear from the
other side's
increases. The title of the first major book on the subject, The
Absolute Weapon,
indicated quite clearly the radical change from a world in which
the greatest
form of military power was relative.12 Indeed, this effect also
undercuts much
of the concern over relative gains in the economic area because
they have much
less impact on security.13 Neoliberals also have adopted a less
extreme position
on the absolute-relative gains debate. They initially cast their
arguments in
11. Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in
International Relations Theory," American
Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp.
701-726; Powell, "Anarchy in Interna-
tional Relations Theory," pp. 334-338; Glaser, "Realists as
Optimists," pp. 74-75; and Arthur A.
Stein, Why Nations Cooperate (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1990), chap. 5. Issues of relative
versus absolute gains are not the same as distribution versus
efficiency because an actor can care
about distribution even in the absence of concerns about relative
gains. It should also be noted
that although the main reason for seeking relative gains today is
62. to improve one's absolute situation
tomorrow, some goods are inherently positional. See the classic
and yet underappreciated analysis
of Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1976).
12. Bernard Brodie et al., The Absolute Weapon (New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1946).
13. When states are allied-and expect to remain so in the future
-ach may gain "security
externalities" from the others' economic gains. See Joanne
Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and Interna-
tional Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994),
chap. 3. But relative economic gains
can redistribute power within an alliance (as shown by Arthur
A. Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma:
Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic
Order," International Organization,
Vol. 38, No. 2 [Spring 1984], pp. 355-386), and will be of
concern if actors believe that they will
influence future wealth. See Robert Jervis, "International
Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?"
International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 54-59;
and John C. Matthews III, "Current
Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains
Matter," International Security, Vol.
21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 112-146. Furthermore, despite the
existence of nuclear weapons, an
extreme gap in the economic health of the United States and
Western Europe on the one hand,
and the Soviet Union on the other, undermined the latter's
security, largely by sapping its
self-confidence.
Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation | 47
63. terms of absolute gains, but soon acknowledged that it is
dangerous for one
state to seek absolute gains that would put it at a relative
disadvantage
vis-a-vis an adversary.14
AREA OF DISAGREEMENT: NOT CONFLICT, BUT
UNNECESSARY CONFLICT
The disagreements between realism and neoliberalism have not
only been
exaggerated, but they have also been misunderstood.
Neoliberalism does not
see more cooperation than does realism; rather, neoliberalism
believes that
there is much more unrealized or potential cooperation than
does realism, and
the schools of thought disagree about how much conflict in
world politics is
unnecessary or avoidable in the sense of actors failing to agree
even though their
preferences overlap.15 To put it in a context that frames the
next section of this
article, they differ over the changes that they believe are
feasible and required
to reduce conflict.
When a realist such as Stephen Krasner argues that much of
international
politics is "life on the Pareto frontier," he implies that states
already have been
able to cooperate to such an extent that no further moves can
make all of them
better off.16 For neoliberals, in the absence of institutions we
are often far from
64. this frontier, and much of international politics resembles a
prisoner's dilemma
or a market failure in producing suboptimal outcomes for all
concerned.
Although neoliberals are strongly influenced by neoclassical
economics, they
reject the idea that the free play of political forces will capture
all possible joint
14. The greatest deficiency in the relative/absolute gains
literature is that it has remained largely
at the level of theory and prescription, with much less attention
to when decisionmakers do in fact
exhibit relative-gains concerns. Thus as noteworthy as the fact
that leading academics employed
impeccable logic to demonstrate the irrelevance of relative
advantage in a world of mutual
second-strike capabilities was the fact that each side's
decisionmakers remained unpersuaded,
continued to fear that the other sought nuclear superiority, and
sought advantage, if not supe-
riority, for itself. For a related argument, see Glaser, "Realists
as Optimists," pp. 86-88. For a good
empirical study in the trade area, see Michael Mastanduno, "Do
Relative Gains Matter? America's
Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security,
Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991),
pp. 73-113.
15. For a parallel discussion of "real" and "illusory"
incompatibility, see Kenneth E. Boulding,
"National Images and International Systems," Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 3, No. 2 (June 1959),
p. 130. This distinction and the one I am making are not without
their difficulties, as I discuss
below. The move from conflicting preferences to conflictful
behavior is not entirely direct because
65. if information is complete and outcomes are infinitely divisible,
the actors should be able to find
a way of reaching the outcome that is cheaper than engaging in
costly conflict. This is known as
the Hicks paradox in economics and was introduced into the
international relations literature by
James D. Fearon in "Rationalist Explanations for War,"
International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3
(Summer 1995), pp. 379-414. The subject is important but not
central to the issues of concern here.
16. Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communication and National
Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,"
World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 336-366.
International Security 24:1 | 48
gains."7 Thus the old joke about two neoclassical economists
walking down the
street: one sees a $20 bill, but before he can bend down to pick
it up, his
colleague says, "Don't bother; if it were really there someone
would have
gotten it before us." For neoliberal institutionalists, the world is
littered with
$20 bills. Because they believe that there are many mutually
beneficial arrange-
ments that states forgo because of the fear that others will cheat
or take
advantage of them, they see important gains to be made through
the more
artful arrangement of policies. Like neoclassical economists,
some realists
doubt this, believing that all available $20 bills have already
been picked up.
66. For them, it is unfortunately true that we live in the best of all
possible worlds.
And if this is the case, distributional issues loom large, making
it hard to see
how neoliberalist analysis can be brought to bear.18
To proceed further, we need to divide realism into offensive and
defensive
categories. Offensive realists think that few important situations
in interna-
tional politics resemble a prisoner's dilemma. This model does
not elucidate
the most crucial area of the pursuit of security by major powers
because mutual
security either is not sought or cannot be gained: one or more of
the states is
willing to risk war to expand or has security requirements that
are incompat-
ible with those of others. Thus for John Mearsheimer, states
maximize power
(which must be seen in relative terms) either because it is the
means by which
they can be secure or because they want other values that power
is (correctly)
believed to bring.19 For Colin Gray, arms races are a reflection
of conflicts of
interest, and wars result not because of the mutual pursuit of
security but
because one if not both sides is aggressive.20 For Randall
Schweller, it is
especially important to "bring the revisionist state back in"
because security-
seeking states do not get into unnecessary conflicts: they are
able to discern
17. This is not to say that all arguments that actors are below
67. the Pareto frontier share neoliber-
alism's stress on the importance of institutions. Thus Deborah
W. Larson's analysis of missed
opportunities during the Cold War seeks to demonstrate that, at
a number of points, lack of trust
and related psychological impediments prevented the United
States and the Soviet Union from
relaxing tensions and reaching agreements that would have
made both of them both better off.
See Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations during
the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1997).
18. For discussion, see Martin and Simmons, "Theories and
Empirical Studies of International
Institutions," pp. 744-747; and James K. Sebenius, "Challenging
Conventional Explanations of
International Cooperation," International Organization, Vol. 46,
No. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 334-339.
19. John J. Mearsheimer, Great Power Politics (New York:
W.W. Norton, forthcoming).
20. Of Gray's voluminous writings, see, for example, Colin
Gray, Weapons Don't Make War: Policy,
Strategy, and Military Technology (Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 1993); and Gray, House of
Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1992).
Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation | 49
one another's intentions and can move sufficiently quickly to
protect them-
selves if others should become menacing.21
Defensive realists disagree, and take a position on the role of
68. unnecessary
conflict that has more in common with neoliberals. Scholars
such as Charles
Glaser, John Herz, Stephen Van Evera, and myself see the
prisoner's dilemma
as capturing important dynamics of international politics,
especially through
the operation of the security dilemma-the ways in which the
attempt by one
state to increase its security has the effect (often unintended and
sometimes
unforeseen) of decreasing the security of others. Often states
would be willing
to settle for the status quo and are driven more by fear than by
the desire to
make gains. According to this "spiral model" of international
politics, both
structural and perceptual reasons conspire to render self-
defeating the actions
states take to protect themselves. In many cases, it is the
interactive process
among states that generates conflict rather than merely reveals
or enacts the
preexisting differences in goals. Both sides would be satisfied
with mutual
security; international politics represents tragedy rather than
evil as the actions
of states make it even harder for them to be secure. This is not
true in all cases,
however. Aggressor states are common; security and other
interests often
create differences that are irreconcilable. In these and only
these instances,
defensive realists see conflict as unavoidable.
Despite important similarities, three differences make defensive
69. realists less
optimistic than neoliberals. First, as noted above, defensive
realists believe that
only in a subset (size unspecified) of situations is conflict
unnecessary. Second,
and related to this, they believe that it is often hard for states to
tell which
situation they are in. The difficulty status quo powers have in
recognizing one
another, in part because of deeply rooted political and
perceptual biases, is
compounded by the high price to be paid for mistaking an
expansionist state
for a partner that seeks mainly security. Third, defensive
realists have less faith
in the ability of actors to reach common interests than do
neoliberals: in some
cases, mistrust and fear of cheating may be too severe to be
overcome. The
extent of the differences between the schools of thought are
difficult to esti-
mate, however, because realism and neoliberalism have rarely
analyzed com-
21. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing
the Revisionist State Back In,"
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-
107; and Schweller, "Neorealism's
Status-Quo Bias." See also Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing."
This is why Charles Glaser sees
"realists as optimists": in most circumstances, states that seek
security can develop a military
posture that signals their benign intentions, thereby minimizing
unnecessary conflict. Glaser, …
70. The Pacific Review, Vol. 22 No. 2 May 2009: 205–232
The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute
and Sino-Japanese political-economic
relations: cold politics and hot
economics?
Min Gyo Koo
Abstract Can economic interdependence reduce conflicts among
states in East
Asia? The so-called ‘cold politics and hot economics’ has
become a defining feature
of Sino-Japanese political-economic relations. This puzzling
pattern of interaction
is clearly illustrated in the sovereignty dispute over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
The island dispute has unfolded in five rounds of distinct
clashes thus far. From one
perspective, the competitive elements in the island dispute make
it difficult for both
Japan and China to give way to the other side on the territorial
and maritime issues.
At the same time, the two countries have successfully managed
to contain their
respective territorial and maritime claims thus far. Drawing on
the liberal peace
theory, this article systematically demonstrates that economic
interdependence has
repeatedly fostered the de-escalation of Sino-Japanese conflict
over territorial and
maritime rights.
Keywords Sino-Japanese relations; Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands;
East China Sea; East
72. There is a huge disconnect between the economic and political
re-
lations of China and Japan . . . Japanese business enthusiasm for
the
China economic miracle continues. But at the political level,
there is
no talk of integration. Rather, there is a stiffening back of
nationalism
in both countries.
(Gerald Curtis quoted in Marquand 2005)
The so-called ‘cold politics and hot economics’ (seirei keinetsu
in Japanese
or zhengleng jingre in Chinese) has thus become a defining
feature of their
bilateral relations.
Nowhere is this puzzling interaction more clearly illustrated
than in the
unsettled sovereignty dispute over a small group of rocks in the
East China
Sea. These offshore islands – known as Senkaku Retto (Rocky
Hill Islands)
in Japan and as Diaoyutai (Fishing Platform Islands) in China –
are effec-
tively controlled by Japan, but the Chinese challenge its
sovereignty claim.
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands may lack the same degree of
strategic and eco-
nomic value as the Paracel and Spratly Islands for China and the
Northern
Territories/Kurile Islands for Japan.2 Yet the competitive
elements in the
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, which has symbolic, political,
economic, and his-
73. torical significance, make it difficult for both China and Japan
to give way to
the other side on the territorial and maritime issues.
Furthermore, a conces-
sion of sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and nearby
maritime
zone could possibly jeopardize their respective claims to the
other disputed
islands.
Empirically, we see the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute persisting,
neither
reaching a peaceful settlement nor escalating into a full-scale
militarized
conflict. Conventional explanations for this phenomenon have
largely fo-
cused on one or more of the following factors: the validity of
contending
historical evidence, domestic legitimization processes,
competition for en-
ergy and marine resources, historical animosities, and the role
of the United
States as an architect of the postwar Asian system. Despite their
partial ex-
planatory utility, these approaches cannot fully capture the
continuing pat-
tern of the rise and fall of conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands.
This article argues that a liberal peace perspective offers a
better account.
The liberal peace argument hinges upon an assumption that
economic in-
terdependence fosters peaceful relations by giving states an
economic in-
centive to avoid costly military disputes. I show that both Japan
74. and China
have found it in their interest to de-escalate conflicts because of
concerns
over damaging their economic relationship, thus supporting a
liberal peace
interpretation.
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. The second
sec-
tion characterizes the key feature of the Senkaku/Diaoyu
dispute in the
broad context of East Asian island disputes. After reviewing
conventional
M. G. Koo: Cold politics and hot economics? 207
explanations, the third section develops an alternative thesis
that links dif-
ferent channels of economic interdependence to the prevention
of inter-
national conflict. From this liberal peace perspective, the fourth
section
examines the transition between, and conclusion of, five
different rounds
of clashes. To summarize the main findings, the initial
impetuses of the is-
land dispute tend to come from ultra-nationalist activities either
in Japan or
China, or both. At first, both Beijing and Tokyo used them to
mobilize polit-
ical support for their regime or particular policy goals.
Eventually, however,
both governments sought to minimize diplomatic damage,
fearing that con-
75. tending Sino-Japanese nationalisms could snowball into a
larger, possibly
destabilizing movement that would undermine bilateral
economic ties. The
fifth section draws conclusions and policy implications.
Characteristics of East Asian island disputes
East Asia is home to many of the world’s most vexing territorial
disputes.
There are at least thirty-five territorial dyads in the region
contiguous
on land or within 400 nautical miles (nm) – the sum of two
hypothetical
countries’ 200 nm exclusive economic zones (EEZs) – of water
between
their undisputed land territories. Most of these dyads have
outstanding
territorial disagreements with each other: China–Taiwan,
China–Japan,
China–Vietnam, China–Philippines, North Korea–South Korea,
South
Korea–Japan, Japan–Russia, Philippines–Taiwan, Thailand–
Myanmar,
Thailand–Cambodia, and Cambodia–Vietnam, among others.
The territories in dispute need not cover the entire soil of a
particular
country, as in the cases of the two Chinas and the two Koreas,
in order to se-
riously strain interstate relationships. Even small, barely
habitable offshore
islands can serve as the most persistent and explosive bone of
contention.
Aside from the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, examples of
unresolved island
76. disputes include competing sovereignty claims to the
Dokdo/Takeshima
Islands in the East Sea/Sea of Japan, the Northern
Territories/Kurile Is-
lands in the Northwest Pacific Ocean, the Islands of Sipadan,
Sebatik, and
Ligitan in the Celebes Sea, and the Paracel and Spratly Islands
in the South
China Sea.
In the East Asian Seas, few target countries, whose sovereignty
claim is
challenged by revisionist countries, recognize the existence of
disputes at
all, preventing claimant countries from engaging in
negotiations. Further-
more, a periodic pattern exists in the iteration of disputes with
little indi-
cation of early settlement. One can find examples of the
aggressive use of
military force and intransigent bargaining strategies. For
instance, China
has the most assertive and controversial claims to the Paracel
and Spratly
archipelagos. Although Vietnam is not the only party to the
many territo-
rial disputes with China, it has had the sharpest differences with
its longtime
archrival, particularly since China took the Western Paracel
Islands by force
from what was then South Vietnam in 1974 (Lo 1989).
208 The Pacific Review
77. Despite regular outbreak of tension, military inaction and
accommoda-
tive diplomacy have equally been evident. For instance, the
postwar dispute
over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands has shown a periodic pattern
of continu-
ity and mutual restraint. Although either natural resources or
ultra-rightist
activities have provided the initial impetuses for regular flare-
ups since the
early 1950s, both South Korea and Japan have followed
restrained policies
to prevent the island dispute from undermining bilateral
economic relations
(Koo 2005: 84–140).
A similar pattern is evident in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. The
first
flare-up of the dispute started in late 1968 when the findings of
a high
probability of oil and gas deposits near the disputed islands
made every-
one scramble for energy. Yet the island issue gradually took a
back seat by
the end of 1971. The second round surfaced in a more serious
manner in
spring 1978, but both China and Japan successfully shelved the
island issue
towards the end of the same year. Catalyzed by lighthouses built
on the is-
lands by an ultra-nationalist Japanese group, the third and
fourth rounds
of dispute took place in September 1990 and in July 1996,
respectively.
However, by the ends of the respective years both governments
once again
78. sought to defuse the tension. Finally, the latest round in 2004
was catalyzed
by a group of Chinese activists and further exacerbated by
intense resource
competition in the East China Sea throughout 2005. Although
the latest
flare-up effectively brought Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations
to the low-
est ebb, both countries again chose to exercise restrained
policies for fear of
escalating the sovereignty and resource issues out of control.
How might we
account for the pattern of a repeated rise of tensions and then
subsequent
de-escalation in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute? It is to this
question that we
now turn.
Conventional explanations and the liberal peace perspective
We can characterize existing explanations of the
Senkaku/Diaoyu into three
categories: (1) the first accounts for the dispute’s ongoing
nature and mo-
tivations for dispute escalation; (2) the second examines the
factors that
account for the mutual restraint that has repeatedly been shown
in past dis-
putes; and (3) the third attempts to account for periodic patterns
of dispute
escalation and de-escalation. Despite their partial explanatory
utility, none
of these traditional accounts fully explain the patterns we see.
After review-
ing the strengths and weaknesses of these different approaches,
I develop a
79. liberal peace hypothesis to account for the lacunae in these
explanations.
Explanations for continuity and escalation
In this category of work, some arguments are based directly or
indirectly on
historical and cultural approaches to international relations.
Symbolic at-
tachment of territory to national identity and pride often makes
territorial
M. G. Koo: Cold politics and hot economics? 209
conflicts all the more intractable and difficult to resolve. This
can be the
case even when pragmatic solutions – for example setting aside
sovereignty
claims in favor of shared ownership – may appear applicable in
theory.
From this perspective, China’s growing irredentist tendency,
combined with
Japan’s habit of glossing over its war past, increases the
likelihood of
territorial conflicts by fueling nationalist sentiments in its
neighbors
(Suganuma 2000: 3–10; Suzuki 2007: 23–47).
Other accounts within this category treat the Senkaku/Diaoyu
dispute as
a result of competition for locations of strategic and economic
value. At
a time of rising oil prices, this view contends that the island
dispute has