This document discusses the establishment of a new Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. Key points:
- The partnership aims to establish a new governance structure for development cooperation that includes both traditional and emerging donors as well as other stakeholders.
- It proposes a two-tier governance structure with a steering committee of 18 members representing different constituencies.
- Integrating emerging economy donors and differentiating their approaches from traditional donors presents a challenge given their diversity.
- Areas like agriculture may provide opportunities for substantive engagement between different donor types on issues of joint interest.
Open Dialogue MICs Conference 2013 Vienna May 8, Presentation by Koreamicconference
Thematic Dialogue on Environmental Sustainability and Green Industry, Inclusive Growth and Prosperity and Financing for Sustainable Economic Development
Our G20 Australia 2014 Summit publication in partnership with Intrinsic Communication.
Foreword to the G20 Australia 2014 Summit, Outreach Dialogue a Chance to Build a Better World by Victor Philippenko, Chairman of the Executive Board, G20 Foundation
Read about our view on G20 endeavors, next to Tony Abbott, Prime Minister of Australia, Enrique Peña Nieto, President of Mexico, Ban Ki-Moon, UN Secretary-General and many others.
Triangular Co‐operation and Aid Effectiveness Talita Yamashiro Fordelone1 Abstract Can triangular co‐operation make aid more effective? Judging by recent international declarations, governments think it can. They say that better results can be achieved when Southern partners and “traditional” donors (i.e. members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee – DAC) join forces through triangular co‐operation. Two examples: first, Brazil, Canada and Norway working together in Haiti; second, South Africa and Canada collaborating with Burundi, Rwanda and Southern Sudan. This paper addresses four questions: • What is triangular co‐operation, which countries are involved, and why? • What are the claimed benefits of triangular co‐operation vis‐à‐vis bilateral co‐operation? • What are the challenges in rendering triangular co‐operation effective? • How can the benefits of triangular co‐operation be achieved and its challenges overcome? The paper concludes that triangular co‐operation may achieve good results when: • Beneficiary countries own and participate actively in projects/programmes, helping to adapt them to local realities; • Programmes/projects are aligned with beneficiary countries’ development priorities; • Partners divide responsibilities so as to make the best use of their comparative advantages. Whether triangular co‐operation is cost‐effective remains unclear. Even if services and technologies provided by developing countries may be less expensive, triangular co‐operation may imply higher transaction costs. 1 The author is a consultant in the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate.
Open Dialogue MICs Conference 2013 Vienna May 8, Presentation by Koreamicconference
Thematic Dialogue on Environmental Sustainability and Green Industry, Inclusive Growth and Prosperity and Financing for Sustainable Economic Development
Our G20 Australia 2014 Summit publication in partnership with Intrinsic Communication.
Foreword to the G20 Australia 2014 Summit, Outreach Dialogue a Chance to Build a Better World by Victor Philippenko, Chairman of the Executive Board, G20 Foundation
Read about our view on G20 endeavors, next to Tony Abbott, Prime Minister of Australia, Enrique Peña Nieto, President of Mexico, Ban Ki-Moon, UN Secretary-General and many others.
Triangular Co‐operation and Aid Effectiveness Talita Yamashiro Fordelone1 Abstract Can triangular co‐operation make aid more effective? Judging by recent international declarations, governments think it can. They say that better results can be achieved when Southern partners and “traditional” donors (i.e. members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee – DAC) join forces through triangular co‐operation. Two examples: first, Brazil, Canada and Norway working together in Haiti; second, South Africa and Canada collaborating with Burundi, Rwanda and Southern Sudan. This paper addresses four questions: • What is triangular co‐operation, which countries are involved, and why? • What are the claimed benefits of triangular co‐operation vis‐à‐vis bilateral co‐operation? • What are the challenges in rendering triangular co‐operation effective? • How can the benefits of triangular co‐operation be achieved and its challenges overcome? The paper concludes that triangular co‐operation may achieve good results when: • Beneficiary countries own and participate actively in projects/programmes, helping to adapt them to local realities; • Programmes/projects are aligned with beneficiary countries’ development priorities; • Partners divide responsibilities so as to make the best use of their comparative advantages. Whether triangular co‐operation is cost‐effective remains unclear. Even if services and technologies provided by developing countries may be less expensive, triangular co‐operation may imply higher transaction costs. 1 The author is a consultant in the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate.
Common Goals and Differential Commitments: The Role of Emerging Economies in ...Dr Lendy Spires
Abstract The following discussion paper explores the heated debate around ‘common goals and differential commitments’ in international development cooperation. It tries to capture the views and positions of the so-called ‘emerging economies’ on their role and contribution to global development and the post-2015 agenda. It explains the divergence between North-South and South-South cooperation with regard to their historical narratives, con-ceptual paradigms, delivery approaches, functions and capacity. It highlights the im-portance of standard-setting, monitoring, accountability and peer-review but it also ex-plains the technical challenges and political tensions in bringing the ‘Southern providers’ into the regimes and systems led by the OECD-DAC and the current post-Busan Global Partnership. The paper explains the challenges of categorising the new development part-ners, and defining and measuring the quantum, quality and effectiveness of their develop-ment cooperation activities. It stresses the importance of developing a framework for mon-itoring and evaluating South-South cooperation and the identification of appropriate insti-tutional platforms for such discussions to take place. The paper is based on empirical re-search and engagement with numerous Southern stakeholders and offers concrete policy proposals for the different development partners involved in the debate.
The BRICS development bank why the world’s newest global bank must adopt a pr...Oxfam Brasil
In July 2014, a new multilateral and Southern-led development bank is expected to be launched by the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – better known as the BRICS. The BRICS Development Bank will provide a fresh source of finance for developing and emerging economies to meet their development needs. Little has been made public regarding the proposed Bank’s core mandate or activities but while governments negotiate the technicalities of the Bank, it is critical that they also provide a solid vision of the principles, priorities and objectives on which the Bank’s activities and operations will be premised. This policy brief recommends that these include commitments to: ending extreme poverty and inequality, with a special focus on gender equity and women’s rights; aligning with environmental and social safeguards and establishing mechanisms for information sharing, accountability and redress; leadership on the sustainable development agenda; the creation of mechanisms for public consultation and debate; and the adoption a truly democratic governance structure.
The Open Government Review of Brazil (2020-21) will provide an evidence-based assessment of the country’s frameworks for and governance of open government reforms and their implementation against the ten provisions of the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Open Government (2017).
Comprehensive Community Initiatives to Reduce Poverty: Canadian Lessons Learn...Wellesley Institute
This presentation provides highlights and strategic issues that impact Canadian poverty reduction initiatives.
Bob Gardner, Director of Policy
www.wellesleyinstitute.com
Follow us on twitter @wellesleyWI
Common Goals and Differential Commitments: The Role of Emerging Economies in ...Dr Lendy Spires
Abstract The following discussion paper explores the heated debate around ‘common goals and differential commitments’ in international development cooperation. It tries to capture the views and positions of the so-called ‘emerging economies’ on their role and contribution to global development and the post-2015 agenda. It explains the divergence between North-South and South-South cooperation with regard to their historical narratives, con-ceptual paradigms, delivery approaches, functions and capacity. It highlights the im-portance of standard-setting, monitoring, accountability and peer-review but it also ex-plains the technical challenges and political tensions in bringing the ‘Southern providers’ into the regimes and systems led by the OECD-DAC and the current post-Busan Global Partnership. The paper explains the challenges of categorising the new development part-ners, and defining and measuring the quantum, quality and effectiveness of their develop-ment cooperation activities. It stresses the importance of developing a framework for mon-itoring and evaluating South-South cooperation and the identification of appropriate insti-tutional platforms for such discussions to take place. The paper is based on empirical re-search and engagement with numerous Southern stakeholders and offers concrete policy proposals for the different development partners involved in the debate.
The BRICS development bank why the world’s newest global bank must adopt a pr...Oxfam Brasil
In July 2014, a new multilateral and Southern-led development bank is expected to be launched by the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – better known as the BRICS. The BRICS Development Bank will provide a fresh source of finance for developing and emerging economies to meet their development needs. Little has been made public regarding the proposed Bank’s core mandate or activities but while governments negotiate the technicalities of the Bank, it is critical that they also provide a solid vision of the principles, priorities and objectives on which the Bank’s activities and operations will be premised. This policy brief recommends that these include commitments to: ending extreme poverty and inequality, with a special focus on gender equity and women’s rights; aligning with environmental and social safeguards and establishing mechanisms for information sharing, accountability and redress; leadership on the sustainable development agenda; the creation of mechanisms for public consultation and debate; and the adoption a truly democratic governance structure.
The Open Government Review of Brazil (2020-21) will provide an evidence-based assessment of the country’s frameworks for and governance of open government reforms and their implementation against the ten provisions of the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Open Government (2017).
Comprehensive Community Initiatives to Reduce Poverty: Canadian Lessons Learn...Wellesley Institute
This presentation provides highlights and strategic issues that impact Canadian poverty reduction initiatives.
Bob Gardner, Director of Policy
www.wellesleyinstitute.com
Follow us on twitter @wellesleyWI
For decades, global development discussions predominantly revolved around the volume of aid given and received. But the 2002 Monterrey International Conference on Financing for Development broadened the focus of discussions to include the quality of the cooperation provided as a key determinant of progress. Both donors and recipients realized they needed to improve how aid was delivered to make it useful for beneficiaries. Oxfam has been actively involved in this debate, pushing for higher quality standards and aid that works for the people who need it most.1 In the years that followed, three High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness were convened by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): in Rome (2003), in Paris (2005) and Accra (2008). Each forum marked a step forward. In Rome, donor and recipient countries were asked, for the first time, to focus their discussions exclusively on aid quality, with the result that they agreed to harmonize donor practices for improved performance.2 However, this approach left the essential contribution of recipient countries to aid effectiveness out of the equation and raised concerns that even harmonized approaches might undermine country ownership. The Paris forum acknowledged the need to include recipient governments in an ongoing dialogue on how to improve aid and shift the focus of the debate from effective donorship to effective partnership. Developing countries were invited to join the negotiating table on par with their cooperation providers.3 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness4 committed signatories to respect and implement five basic principles: harmonization of donor policies and practices; alignment to national development strategies; mutual accountability; a focus on measuring and delivering results for people; and ownership of development cooperation. But, beyond making a list of good intentions, Paris also produced a clear scorecard to hold development partners accountable for what they were promising: a set of 12 indicators to measure progress in a number of crucial areas, such as the predictability of aid flows to developing country governments; the use of developing countries‟ financial and administrative systems; and the transfer of technical capacity to local staff. Each indicator included targets and a deadline to achieve them by 2010. Partners also agreed to monitor their own progress towards the governance commitments they made.
http://sdg.earthsystemgovernance.org/sdg/publications/coherent-governance-un-and-sdgs
Key messages of Policy Brief #4:
1. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) require appropriate institutional support to integrate them effectively into institutions and practices, to coordinate activities, and to mobilize resources for implementation. The High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) can be a lead “orchestrator of orchestrators” towards these ends, but will require high-level participation, innovative modalities for North-South dialogue, and links with “intermediaries” within and outside of the UN.
2. Monitoring and review processes are crucial to ensure accountability, facilitate learning among countries and stakeholders, and incentivize implementation processes. Reviews should be systemic, science-based and multi-dimensional, and focus on commitments and actions of countries, international institutions, and non-state actors and networks. The quadrennial United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meetings of the HLPF could consider revisions or modifications of the SDGs over time as new knowledge becomes available.
3. State-led mutual review of national sustainable development progress mandated under the HLPF could be organized around common challenges – for example countries coping with megacities or running out of water. Such reviews would provide systemic evaluations rather than focus only on specific goals. International institutions should be reviewed on their progress in mainstreaming SDGs and targets into their work programs or adequately focusing on areas unaddressed by other stakeholders. These reviews should be considered nodes in a wider system of review and accountability.
4. The new Global Sustainable Development Report (a collection of assessments and reviews by UN and other actors), part of the HLPF’s mandate to improve the science-policy interface, should not simply collect other reviews, but also bring together knowledge required to fill implementation gaps and identify cause-effect relationships and transition pathways, possibly overseen by a meta-science panel.
5. Governance of the SDGs should be designed to mobilize action and resources at multiple levels and through diverse mixes of government and non-state actors, partnerships, and action networks. This diversity in means of implementation must be balanced by state-led mechanisms to ensure accountability, responsibility, coherence and capacity to incentivize long-term investments for sustainable development.
New Actors and Global Development Cooperation Dr Lendy Spires
The global financial crisis has reinforced trends of shifting wealth and power in the world economy. One expression of this changing global context is the rising role of so-called ›new‹ actors as development assistance providers. The ›new actors‹ term is a convenient (though not entirely accurate) label to describe a heterogeneous group of state and non-state actors that OECD-DAC donors increasingly recognise as interesting partners for engagement. For many partner countries these new actors have provided a welcome source of additional development finance. In the context of this work programme, the global development players China, India, and Brazil, regional players such as Mexico and South Africa, private foundations and corporate philanthropies have all been included in this group. Yet the current landscape of development cooperation also extends beyond these actors to include states as diverse as Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey, and Vietnam, to name a few examples.1 One starting assumption in this work package was that an improved knowledge base about the priorities and activities of new actors in developing countries is a prerequisite for designing more effective European strategies for engagement. Drawing on the pub-lications from the work package, this paper paints a general portrait of the development cooperation efforts of new actors and highlights issues to guide thinking on how to respond to their growing presence. The Development Cooperation Engagement of the New Actors As the salience of new actors has risen on the global development agenda, efforts to estimate the scale of resources committed to development cooperation have also in-creased. The attention given to particular actors is not necessarily always related to the volume of development financing they provide.
Key Messages from "Improving the Institutional Framework for Sustainable Deve...uncsd2012
This workshop focused on discussions on promoting transparency, inclusiveness and accountability as
outcomes of Rio 2012. The discussion focused around means to enhance Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio
declaration on access to information, public participation and access to justice, as well as new means to
ensure accountability through public monitoring of commitments.
ZGB - The Role of Generative AI in Government transformation.pdfSaeed Al Dhaheri
This keynote was presented during the the 7th edition of the UAE Hackathon 2024. It highlights the role of AI and Generative AI in addressing government transformation to achieve zero government bureaucracy
Understanding the Challenges of Street ChildrenSERUDS INDIA
By raising awareness, providing support, advocating for change, and offering assistance to children in need, individuals can play a crucial role in improving the lives of street children and helping them realize their full potential
Donate Us
https://serudsindia.org/how-individuals-can-support-street-children-in-india/
#donatefororphan, #donateforhomelesschildren, #childeducation, #ngochildeducation, #donateforeducation, #donationforchildeducation, #sponsorforpoorchild, #sponsororphanage #sponsororphanchild, #donation, #education, #charity, #educationforchild, #seruds, #kurnool, #joyhome
This session provides a comprehensive overview of the latest updates to the Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards (commonly known as the Uniform Guidance) outlined in the 2 CFR 200.
With a focus on the 2024 revisions issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), participants will gain insight into the key changes affecting federal grant recipients. The session will delve into critical regulatory updates, providing attendees with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate and comply with the evolving landscape of federal grant management.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the rationale behind the 2024 updates to the Uniform Guidance outlined in 2 CFR 200, and their implications for federal grant recipients.
- Identify the key changes and revisions introduced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the 2024 edition of 2 CFR 200.
- Gain proficiency in applying the updated regulations to ensure compliance with federal grant requirements and avoid potential audit findings.
- Develop strategies for effectively implementing the new guidelines within the grant management processes of their respective organizations, fostering efficiency and accountability in federal grant administration.
What is the point of small housing associations.pptxPaul Smith
Given the small scale of housing associations and their relative high cost per home what is the point of them and how do we justify their continued existance
Up the Ratios Bylaws - a Comprehensive Process of Our Organizationuptheratios
Up the Ratios is a non-profit organization dedicated to bridging the gap in STEM education for underprivileged students by providing free, high-quality learning opportunities in robotics and other STEM fields. Our mission is to empower the next generation of innovators, thinkers, and problem-solvers by offering a range of educational programs that foster curiosity, creativity, and critical thinking.
At Up the Ratios, we believe that every student, regardless of their socio-economic background, should have access to the tools and knowledge needed to succeed in today's technology-driven world. To achieve this, we host a variety of free classes, workshops, summer camps, and live lectures tailored to students from underserved communities. Our programs are designed to be engaging and hands-on, allowing students to explore the exciting world of robotics and STEM through practical, real-world applications.
Our free classes cover fundamental concepts in robotics, coding, and engineering, providing students with a strong foundation in these critical areas. Through our interactive workshops, students can dive deeper into specific topics, working on projects that challenge them to apply what they've learned and think creatively. Our summer camps offer an immersive experience where students can collaborate on larger projects, develop their teamwork skills, and gain confidence in their abilities.
In addition to our local programs, Up the Ratios is committed to making a global impact. We take donations of new and gently used robotics parts, which we then distribute to students and educational institutions in other countries. These donations help ensure that young learners worldwide have the resources they need to explore and excel in STEM fields. By supporting education in this way, we aim to nurture a global community of future leaders and innovators.
Our live lectures feature guest speakers from various STEM disciplines, including engineers, scientists, and industry professionals who share their knowledge and experiences with our students. These lectures provide valuable insights into potential career paths and inspire students to pursue their passions in STEM.
Up the Ratios relies on the generosity of donors and volunteers to continue our work. Contributions of time, expertise, and financial support are crucial to sustaining our programs and expanding our reach. Whether you're an individual passionate about education, a professional in the STEM field, or a company looking to give back to the community, there are many ways to get involved and make a difference.
We are proud of the positive impact we've had on the lives of countless students, many of whom have gone on to pursue higher education and careers in STEM. By providing these young minds with the tools and opportunities they need to succeed, we are not only changing their futures but also contributing to the advancement of technology and innovation on a broader scale.
Presentation by Jared Jageler, David Adler, Noelia Duchovny, and Evan Herrnstadt, analysts in CBO’s Microeconomic Studies and Health Analysis Divisions, at the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Summer Conference.
Canadian Immigration Tracker March 2024 - Key SlidesAndrew Griffith
Highlights
Permanent Residents decrease along with percentage of TR2PR decline to 52 percent of all Permanent Residents.
March asylum claim data not issued as of May 27 (unusually late). Irregular arrivals remain very small.
Study permit applications experiencing sharp decrease as a result of announced caps over 50 percent compared to February.
Citizenship numbers remain stable.
Slide 3 has the overall numbers and change.
2. Introduction
These are important times for how the world manages the annual flow of around $200 billion in development
cooperation assistance to developing countries. A number of changes in global international development co-
operation are in the offing: within a one month span, development issues will be taken up by the G-20 at the
Leaders’ Summit at Los Cabos, by the United Nations at its Rio+20 Summit, and by Jim Kim upon taking over
as the first ever development professional to become president of theWorld Bank.The key issues on the table are
implementation of the Millennium Development Goals, building consensus on a new set of post-2015 Sustain-
able Development Goals, implementing a New Deal on fragile states, and closer integration of environmental,
security, trade, investment and development agendas.
There is now an opportunity to establish a new paradigm and governance structure for coordinating the many
state and non-state actors engaged in development cooperation. A new Global Partnership for Effective De-
velopment Cooperation is taking shape, backstopped by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP). Establishing this partnership was one of the key outcomes of the Busan High Level Forum on
Aid Effectiveness held in December 2011.
On June 28-29, 2012, the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, a DAC-supported international partnership
for aid effectiveness, will hold a plenary meeting in Paris which should conclude with three consequential
outcomes: (i) it will bring into being a new Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation with a
governance structure that truly reflects the multi-stakeholder nature of development today; (ii) it will dissolve
itself, marking one of the first times that a multilateral structure is actually replaced by a more suitable mecha-
nism; and (iii) it will adopt a set of indicators for monitoring global progress towards more effective develop-
ment cooperation.
Already, the outlines of the new partnership are becoming clear, thanks to a transparent process of meetings and
dialogue.There is much to be encouraged about, but as with most efforts for institutional change, the devil is in
the details.At first glance, while the Global Partnership promises to deliver substantial and significant improve-
ments in governance, its proposed new monitoring indicators are still rooted in the past and do not reflect the
new style of development cooperation that is expected in the next decade.This policy paper explores the ap-
proach to building indicators and suggests improvements to ensure better development cooperation.
CONTEXT
A total of 159 countries, 39 international organizations and seven other organizations have endorsed the Busan
Partnership document, the agreement reached at the end of the Fourth High Level Forum onAid Effectiveness,
held in Busan, South Korea on November 29 to Dec 1, 2011.1
This document, painstakingly negotiated between
18 sherpas elected to represent a wide array of stakeholders, called on theWorking Party onAid Effectiveness to
establish a new global partnership by June 2012, with a framework of indicators through which progress could
be assessed.
3. Members of theWorking Party onAid Effectiveness selected a Post-Busan Interim Group of negotiators to lead
the development and design of the mandate and governance structure, and the monitoring framework of the
new Global Partnership.That group has had to construct a partnership that would reflect the main outcomes of
the Busan High Level Forum.
Busan was, first and foremost, an expression of the diversity of stakeholders involved in development coopera-
tion.At the Paris High Level Forum in 2005, the principle of country ownership was first adopted, stressing that
development should be driven by partner countries themselves, not by aid donors.At Accra in 2008, the role
of civil society organizations was formally acknowledged.At Busan, the tent was broadened again to recognize
the importance of emerging economy donors, the private business sector and parliamentarians. At the same
time, international and local civil society organizations (CSOs) were mainstreamed into the debates and partner
countries actually led many side-events. But while Busan signaled the expansion of the range of partners in de-
velopment, it did not formalize their roles: the key international structures of accountability remain narrowly
focused on traditional donors and partner countries alone.
Busan was also about the need to move away from one-size-fits-all answers to development cooperation. Differ-
ent country contexts require differentiated solutions.This was most apparent in the discussions on fragile states,
where an increasing share of poor live and where traditional approaches to development cooperation have failed
because of the absence of long-term commitment mechanisms, lack of coordination between development and
security efforts, a poorly managed transition between the stages of relief, reconstruction and development, and
inadequate attention to peacebuilding and statebuilding.To overcome this, a New Deal on engagement in fragile
states was unveiled at Busan, endorsed by participants in the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State-
building. By encouraging a number of voluntary agreements on specific aspects of development cooperation,
Busan paved the way for more customized approaches by individual donors.This has had the benefit of moving
the agenda forward in focused areas with a limited number of engaged actors, but some observers have worried
that permitting voluntary mechanisms could undercut peer pressure for all participants to embrace common
responsibilities.
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Busan was the self-critical appraisal of the functioning of theWorking
Party onAid Effectiveness and the role of the DAC. In a highly unusual step, the DAC recognized that the legiti-
macy of its deliberations could not be broadened beyond its own membership, so that a different governance
structure would be needed in order to support a broader partnership.To this end, it has involved the United Na-
tions’ Development Program as a full partner that has endorsed and will provide secretariat support to the new
Global Partnership.With this political backing, non-DAC countries can participate more fully and on a more
equal footing in the new partnership.
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Busan was the
self-critical appraisal of the functioning of the Working
Party on Aid Effectiveness and the role of the DAC,
which recognized that a different governance structure
would be needed in order to support a broader part-
nership.
4. Busan also tracked progress made by donors against a set of commitments made in Paris in 2005. Despite the
fact that only one of 13 targets was fully met, there was a sense that the process of setting goals, targets and
indicators was useful.There was also a determination to complete the unfinished business of meeting the Paris
commitments.
Against this background, the challenges for the new partnership are:
First, to design a governance structure to reflect the broad nature of new actors in development
cooperation;
Second,to ensure a more inclusive role for emerging economy donors and to integrate the differing
nature, modalities and responsibilities of south-south cooperation into a global framework;
Third, to mainstream the private business sector into the development cooperation effort, in ser-
vice delivery, resources, supply chain management, jobs and other ways;
Fourth, to construct a set of manageable indicators to monitor global progress in development
cooperation, while differentiating between country contexts.
The remainder of this paper elaborates on each of these challenges.
GOVERNANCE OF THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
The Global Partnership presents a unique opportunity to build a new form of partnership among stakeholders.
The governance structure must wrestle with two problems.First,it must balance legitimacy and inclusiveness of
the multiple stakeholders involved in development cooperation with effectiveness and a sufficiently high politi-
cal profile to generate sustained support for and progress on development cooperation. Second, it must provide
a balanced platform to which all parties are committed and in which they participate actively.
The solution to the issue of legitimacy/inclusion versus effectiveness has been elegantly designed. It consists of
a two-tier structure, with plenary sessions at the ministerial level that permit full participation by all members
(probably with a frequency of every 18-24 months) along with a Steering Committee that is limited to 18 mem-
bers representing a constituency of stakeholders.The membership of the Steering Committee will rotate every
two years, ensuring that many groups have a chance to be part of the committee over time and giving individual
members the sense of representing a constituency as well as speaking on their own behalf.2
The Steering Committee is the working body of the new partnership and a reflection of a new style of global
governance for the 21st century that tries, from the outset, to be inclusive of state and non-state actors. It is
charged with the mandate of preparing the agenda and workstreams for the ministerial meetings as well as
overseeing the monitoring framework.The Steering Committee will have three co-chairs, one each from DAC
donors, partner countries and an emerging economy donor.The remaining 15 members will be comprised of
five partner countries (including one from the g7+ group of fragile states), three donors and one each from
emerging economies, multilateral agencies, civil society, private business, a parliamentarian group, the UNDP
and the DAC.
•
•
•
•
5. This composition of the Steering Committee already represents a significant step forward in balancing the
breadth of stakeholders and the need to keep the group small enough to have effective discussions.The fact that
partner countries have the greatest number of seats, while other groups have formalized roles is also positive.
Details of the process for selecting representatives from each group and the level of participation are still to be
worked out and will be important in ensuring that the Steering Committee functions well. It is also necessary
for countries to develop internal coordination processes so that their representative reflects the views of finance
ministries as well as foreign affairs, defense and functional ministries with specialized expertise.
One finding from the Busan High Level Forum was that development cooperation was not always given the
prominence it deserved in donor capitals. As a result, promises made by development officials and ministers
at international forums could not always be implemented if they ran afoul of domestic vested interests. One
example is the effort to untie aid. In her speech at Busan, Secretary Clinton candidly discussed the trade-offs
involved. On the one hand, she said, the U.S. clearly understood the benefits of untying aid, and had moved to
double the percentage of untied assistance between 2005 and 2009, but on the other hand it felt a need to get
political support for the budgets that are turned into development assistance.The presence of Secretary Clinton
and other dignitaries at Busan gave that forum the stature and political backing needed to move ahead to the next
stage of developing a new Global Partnership.
This example shows that a high level of representation, preferably at the minister or deputy level, is needed for
the Global Partnership and the Steering Committee to be able to project a coherent national position.Absent
this, there is a risk that the debates at the Steering Committee will not have the full endorsement of capitols
when it comes to implementation.That has already been a problem with the currentWorking Party mechanism
and remains a risk to the new partnership.
SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION
The Steering Committee has given reasonable representation to emerging economy donors to reflect the grow-
ing importance of south-south cooperation. Emerging economy donors will have a co-chair position as well as
another representative.However,unlike other groups,emerging economy donors are not organized as a distinc-
tive body with uniform views and policies, so they may not find it easy to speak from a constituency stand-point.
There is no mechanism for defining a common south-south position and southern providers of development
cooperation do not have enough in common to develop a shared view in the way that the Paris principles define
DAC donor strategies, or the Istanbul principles define civil society approaches. Given the growing number of
south-south donors (at least as many in number as DAC donors), and their differences with regard to technical
cooperation, financial assistance, geographic footprint, turn-key delivery, time-frame of engagement, and sec-
toral focus, it will be challenging for them to engage effectively on the Steering Committee.
Yet southern donors are an essential ingredient of the new partnership.They are the most dynamic source of
funds and assistance, seeing sharp growth in recent years and promises of more to come.They often are impor-
tant actors in regional cooperation structures, going well beyond aid, and therefore can leverage other instru-
ments for development in a more organized way. Indeed, aid itself is probably the least important instrument of
south-south cooperation.
6. More fundamentally, it is crucial for a global partnership to have a healthy dialogue between southern donors
and DAC donors because of the potential for adverse spill-overs from the activities of each on the other. DAC
countries hope that southern donors do not inadvertently lead countries back into debt difficulties and over-
hangs from which they have just been extracted thanks to the heavily indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative.They also look for greater transparency from southern donors and companies
on environmental and social standards being applied to development projects. Southern donors, on the other
hand,could also look to DAC countries to reduce the volatility of their aid,which can potentially lead to conflict
and reduced effectiveness for all development cooperation.3
Southern and advanced economy donors also can
benefit from working together to ensure that partner country capacity is built to ensure good operation and
maintenance of infrastructure and ultimately better results for partner countries.
As NgaireWoods has argued, the reasons why donors fail to cooperate among themselves are deep-rooted.4
She
argues that each country has its own vested interests and need for accountability to its own taxpayers, its own
philosophies about what is important for development (girls’ education or infrastructure), and its own experi-
ences with success as to what works and under what conditions.These fundamental differences have made it hard
for like-minded donors to cooperate effectively (which is why multilateral aid has not become the dominant
modality), let alone donors with wide gaps in development cooperation philosophy. Her conclusion: do not try
to force cooperation and harmonization as it will not work, but pay more attention to coordination failures that
largely stem from a lack of information.Transparency can go a long way toward instilling a “do no harm to oth-
ers” mentality among donors. So far, however, the transparency debate has been conducted among DAC donors,
through the International Aid Transparency Initiative, a voluntary grouping in which no emerging economy
has yet agreed to participate. But if recipient countries request data to be made public, that should apply to all
donors respecting country ownership and leadership in development cooperation. For example, Chinese aid to
Cambodia is available in the local aid management platform and included in the annual Cambodia Development
Effectiveness Report.5
Building more comprehensive and transparent local platforms of this type should be the
focus of the debate between DAC donors and emerging economy donors in the Steering Committee.
Emerging economy donors need the flexibility to be treated differently and on their own merits should they
choose, rather than being shoe-horned into a common global standard for aid. From this perspective, the “build-
ing blocks” initiative launched at Busan provides a further opportunity for emerging economy donors to be
treated as having shared principles, common goals and differential commitments for effective development co-
operation.The south-south cooperation building block is a start at providing an avenue for sharing experiences
among developing countries. It can serve as a mechanism through which emerging economy donors can express
their different approaches more broadly than through the narrow experiences of the two members that will sit
on the Steering Committee.It is to be hoped that the most important emerging economy donors will participate
actively in this building block.
The reasons why donors fail to cooperate among them-
selves are deep-rooted. These fundamental differences
have made it hard for like-minded donors to cooperate
effectively, let alone donors with wide gaps in develop-
ment cooperation philosophy.
7. One problem with south-south cooperation is that it is a broad term applied to many different modalities of
development cooperation. It is about the “who” not the “what” of development cooperation.TheWorking Party
building block on south-south cooperation does not, in practice, encompass the full range of activities and many
of the most important providers of south-south cooperation are not active in that building block. It is therefore
unclear whether that can become the locus for a substantive engagement with emerging economy donors.
Accordingly, it may be opportune to think of alternative topics where a substantive contribution can be made by
emerging economy donors to the Global Partnership.Agriculture and food security is one possible area where
there is growing interest from many stakeholders.Recipient countries inAfrica have embraced the prioritization
of agriculture through the Maputo Declaration and some, like Ethiopia, have new agricultural transformation
agencies. Both Brazil, via its experiences with Embrapa, and China, via its extensive rural development and rice
technology experiences, have a lot to contribute to agricultural development. Both China and Brazil have signed
memorandum of understandings with third parties on this topic (China with the Gates Foundation and Brazil
with Japan and other donors). International NGOs and the private business community are also active in this
area. Businesses have recently pledged $3 billion for investment in African agriculture under the New Alliance
for Food Security, announced at the G-8 meeting at Camp David in May 2012.
Without supplanting these other mechanisms, it may be worthwhile exploring if a new building block for the
Global Partnership can be put in place, with active participation from advanced and emerging economy donors,
recipient countries, business and international NGOs. Such a building block could connect the dots of the vari-
ous coalitions already present in the sector and develop a comprehensive approach that is oriented to feeding
the 9 billion global population envisaged for 2050.
THE PRIVATE BUSINESS SECTOR
Although the private business sector is now involved in several international forums, including the U.N.’s tem-
porary Business Action for Sustainable Development and the Business Call to Action, its role in development
cooperation has not been formalized except in specific sectors like HIV/AIDS.The Busan forum was successful
in bringing the private sector into mainstream thinking on development solutions by providing a place for the
private sector on the Steering Committee, and there is now a clear mechanism for developing further coopera-
tion between the business and development communities.
The private sector, however, is not monolithic and its impact on development is quite different according to the
sector of engagement. Mining and natural resource extraction companies contribute to development largely
through foreign exchange earnings and revenues provided to support government budgets. Large consumer
product companies, on the other hand, may contribute through supply chain networks involving millions of
small-holder producers and distributors. Telecommunication companies can contribute by making access to
financial services more universal through mobile banking.
These examples suggest that if the private sector representative on the Steering Committee is to have more than
a pro forma voice, she must be supported by workstreams with active private sector engagement in “building
8. blocks”. But the existing building blocks are thematic rather than sectoral so it is not easy for the private sec-
tor to engage.The private sector building block has focused on public-private partnerships in specific projects,
largely infrastructure, and the use of guarantees and other forms of public financial support to leverage and cata-
lyze private financial flows for development.That is useful, but leaves untouched a large array of other private
sector contributions to development.
Already there are calls for a new Global Coalition for Education.6
The private sector has also been actively in-
volved in thinking through solutions to agriculture and food security, both at a global level and at the country
level.7
Globally, businesses pledged to invest $3 billion in African agriculture during the 2012 G-8 meeting at
Camp David, during which a newAlliance for Food Security and Nutrition was announced. Locally, Ethiopia has
established a new AgriculturalTransformation Agency to bring together public and private efforts to improve
productivity and food security and other countries are emulating this kind of institutional innovation.The key
point is that there is a new enthusiasm for integrating the resources and expertise that the private sector can of-
fer with public and philanthropic funds in a partnership that can deliver economy-wide results.
These efforts are largely happening outside the current debates on the Global Partnership, but it is essential that
the partnership play a role in joining together the various international efforts that are underway. New sectoral
building blocks in agriculture and education, for example, could be ways for bringing the debates happening
in other forums into the discussions on aid and development effectiveness that should be pursued through the
Partnership.
TOWARDS A NEW MONITORING FRAMEWORK
It is in the area of designing monitoring indicators that ideas have still not evolved sufficiently.8
The principles
of focusing on indicators that are useful for a political discussion and review, and the desire to be focused rather
than comprehensive are well founded.The indicators also have to strike a delicate balance between incorporat-
ing new elements of the partnership and continuing to monitor unfinished commitments made at under the
Paris Declaration.They correctly have steered clear of outcome measures on the grounds that the Millennium
Development Goals and any successor arrangements will address these, and focused more on indicators where
there is a desire to change behavior. However, the indicators do not seem based on a sound theory of change and
hence could be usefully adjusted.
The basis for the new approach is the recognition that effective governments, engaged civil society and competi-
tive businesses are the institutional foundations of sustainable development and the relationships between these
groups are the basis for the domestic accountability that is the heart of the principle of “country ownership”
endorsed in the Paris Declaration. It is this domestic accountability that therefore should be measured in the
new monitoring framework of the Global Partnership. But the approach proposed in the current working draft
from the DAC is a mix of concepts. For effective states, the indicator is the use of country results frameworks.
For civil society, it is the enabling environment that maximizes the contribution of civil society to development.
For the private sector it is the ability to engage with development, although without any specificity, the default
indicator again appears to be a measure of the enabling environment.
9. An alternative, adapted from a triangle concept introduced by Oxfam, is to develop indicators of the relation-
ships between the three groups of actors that generate accountability for development results, rather than mea-
sures of the strength of the groups in the abstract. Figure 1 provides a diagrammatic exposition of how such a
focus on engagement and impact could work.9
It suggests that the key relationship that needs to be measured
between the government and the business sector is the degree to which public resources can leverage private
investments for development, either through joint activities or through joint programming and planning ex-
ercises. Private businesses, in turn, relate to civil society and contribute directly to development when they
start to adopt a triple bottom line approach rather than conventional profit-maximization. (Of course, private
business also contributes to development through profit maximization, but this is an indirect consequence of its
normal activities rather than an explicit part of their accountability to civil society.) Civil society can also further
development when it interacts with governments in a way to strengthen accountability for public expenditure
of development resources.
By focusing on indicators about the relationship between actors and not the actors themselves, the monitoring
framework can usefully position aid as a catalyst for development rather than a central actor.In the Paris process,
mutual accountability was defined in terms of donor-recipient responsibilities, and this may have inadvertently
crowded out more important domestic accountability relationships.The triangle of relationships depicted in
Figure 1 brings the focus more squarely on domestic accountabilities as the main driver of development.
Translating these concepts into actual monitorable indicators appears feasible, and components of such indica-
tors already exist or can be easily gathered. For example, the relationship between the government and the
business sector can be measured in part by the degree of leverage of private resources for development that is
created by public spending and aid.Already, as in the example given above of agricultural pledges, the private
sector is committing to investments in development. It is obviously important not to simply count all private
sector investment, but only that which is explicitly linked to government and aid agency plans and instruments.
Thus, the degree of leverage could include all private resources formally linked to an official development
project or program, either in the context of a public-private partnership, or in the context of a specific sectoral
strategy or plan.The commitments made in formal partnerships such as the Global Business Coalition, or the
New Alliance for Food Security or other pledges made by the business sector would be included. It would also
be useful to include an indicator on whether information is available on payments made by resource extraction
companies to governments, which signatories to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) have
agreed to do. RevenueWatch, an international think-tank, is already engaged in collecting such information and
could be tasked more formally with providing an input into this component.
One side-benefit of this approach is that it would encourage the development of better statistics on aid and
private sector resources for development.There are several distortions in aid statistics at present, one of which
is the absence of any counting for public guarantees that leverage private resources, unless these guarantees
are actually cashed-in (in which case the project is most likely to have been unsuccessful). By focusing on an
indicator that explicitly measures leverage (and asking donors to report on their leverage of private resources)
the monitoring framework would improve the database on development cooperation in a significant way. Most
donors already try to measure leverage to some degree, so agreement to include this should not pose any major
incremental burden.
10. 10
The indicators for the triple bottom line are more complicated to measure and it may be necessary to start with
a few examples.The triple bottom line approach tries to go beyond simple measures of corporate social respon-
sibility to include more direct measures of the development impact of business. Civil society organizations are
actively trying to promote improved standards of companies’ behavior to maximize their development impact.
Examples of indicators that could be developed include the number of companies signing integrity pacts, per-
ceptions of corruption, willingness to participate in the EITI, and the extent to which Equator Principles are
adopted and implemented. Rather than settling immediately on an indicator for this engagement, a pilot process
should be launched by the Steering Committee with interested elements of civil society to explore workable al-
ternatives.Without such a process, there is a risk of reverting to what is available.The proposed indicator, based
on the Civicus’ health of civil society index, is far broader and is not designed to reflect the specifics of how aid
and other resources are mobilized and used for effective development. Using this metric would be expedient
but not necessarily appropriate.
The third relationship of the triangle in Figure 1 measures the engagement between governments and civil
society. Here the proposed emphasis is on the degree to which civil society is helping ensure accountability in
the use of public resources. A critical element of this accountability is transparency. Civil society should have
the right to know about public development spending, including resources mobilized domestically and through
international cooperation agreements.That information should be available locally. PublishWhatYou Fund has
developed a useful metric on the degree to which local civil society can actually access information on aid flows.
The indicator proposed by the post-Busan implementation group, namely the use of country results frame-
works, is also a valuable indicator of accountability. It should not, however, be the sole indicator.
For donors who have already signed onto the International AidTransparency Initiative or equivalent reporting
mechanisms, transparency is not an issue in principle, although the experience with its implementation in prac-
tice still leaves much to be desired. Broader metrics of budget accountability and participation are compiled by
the International Budget Partnership and should also be used.
For each relationship in the triangle, there will probably be a number of indicators that give some insight into
the broader concept. In several instances, the raw data is being collected by think-tanks.Where that is the case,
the data should be used rather than being independently and redundantly collected by donors or countries. In
principle, there should be little difficulty in combining several indicators into a composite.That serves to add
information in a useful way and does not add to the complexity or expense if the data already exist.
There are other aspects of the indicators that could be improved.The proposal to focus on the predictability of
aid data rather than on its volatility is unfortunate. Predictability is defined as the share of aid disbursed within
the fiscal year in which it was scheduled and by the coverage of aid in indicative forward spending plans provided
to countries. But the cost to government is only partly from these elements.The bigger cost is when aid is sud-
denly cut off or disbursements are withheld as leverage by donors in their broader bilateral discussions with
partner countries. Note that neither of the proposed indicators would show any movement if such a cut-off does
in fact occur.
11. 11
There are metrics of volatility that can be directly calculated and that could be used if donors are prepared to
face the reality that when aid is unreliable (for whatever reason) its usefulness diminishes.10
Responsible finance
ministers cannot include aid receipts in the budget until they are realized, and cannot embark on long-term
programmatic investments based on promises of aid.The cut-back in funding de-worming programs in Kenya
in 2010 because of financial management problems in the ministry of education is an example of the collateral
damage to development when aid is volatile.
The proposed indicator 9 on use of country systems is also unbalanced.This indicator measures continued im-
provements in country financial management systems and better use of such systems. But the bar for donors is
set very low. For countries with excellent systems, donors only need to reduce the gap in using country systems
by two-thirds.They should be asked to eliminate it.When country systems are good, donors only need to re-
duce the gap by one-third.This is an unnecessary burden. Given that donors have plenty of ex post mechanisms
for review and redress if their funds are inappropriately used, they should be asked to use country systems as a
matter of course.
There is also a lost opportunity caused by focusing the country systems proposal so tightly on financial manage-
ment.What many countries are lacking is sound strategic plans and capabilities at the sectoral level. Indeed, a
major part of donor aid goes toward technical cooperation that is aimed at enhancing such capabilities.This kind
of aid, however, is notoriously inefficient (with exceptions in some agencies).The indicator on country systems
should be broadened to include indicators of the effectiveness of sectoral budget, planning and implementation
capacity that should be collected as part of sector-wide approaches and consultations.
Source:Author adaptation of Oxfam triangle.
accountability
leverage
triple bottom line
Competitive
businesses
Engaged
citizens
Effective
governments
Figure 1: Monitoring the Institutional Basis for Effective Development
Cooperation
12. 12
Other areas that are excluded will disappoint many observers.There is no space for an indicator on learning,
despite the enormous emphasis today on knowledge and evaluation, and despite the idea that the purpose of the
indicators is to inform a dialogue on behavior change.This is a serious omission as few developing countries have
any formal processes for evaluating their development spending. One indicator that already exists is an assess-
ment of the monitoring and evaluation framework of recipient countries, conducted by theWorld Bank.There
is also considerable scope for aid agencies themselves to improve evaluation and learning processes.An example
of what a learning indicator for donors may look like is provided by Birdsall, Kharas and Perakis.11
There is also no indicator on aid fragmentation or its converse, programmatic scaling up, although the Busan
outcome document discusses scaling up as one of the key changes in emphasis when shifting the debate from
aid effectiveness to development effectiveness. Program-based aid approaches, the top priority for developing
countries going into Busan, and one example of a potential scaling up metric, is also excluded as a monitored
indicator.
Most developing countries will have their own priorities for how aid can be most effectively used.The indica-
tors collected to monitor global progress should be complemented with qualitative assessments as to the per-
formance of governments and donors in achieving the results laid out in national strategies and goals. It would
be useful if the new Global Partnership could encourage such assessments to be systematically undertaken each
year, perhaps by a local NGO or perhaps by an Aid Management Agency or department of the government
itself.A few examples of such accountability reviews show their value. For example, the Royal Government of
Cambodia produces an annual Development Effectiveness report.Among other interesting findings, that docu-
ment also has information on development assistance by NGOs and from China. Building the data base from the
bottom-up, through such reviews, may offer a pathway to more effective coordination than top-down processes.
Local development effectiveness reviews are also more likely to be useful when governments have dedicated aid
management agencies or departments to link development cooperation to their own national processes.That
should become the norm rather than the exception and provide a solid base to link the Global Partnership with
local partnerships that coordinate development cooperation in each individual recipient country.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The arrangements for the new Global Partnership are moving steadily ahead.There is already agreement on
many of the key elements but success is not guaranteed.A few key changes could still be put in place.
The new partnership has correctly identified its key mandate as providing a global forum for a better political
discussion on development cooperation. It has gone to considerable lengths to try and improve the legitimacy of
the forum by associating with the U.N., by formalizing the roles given to emerging economy donors and non-
state actors, and by increasing the relative representation of partner countries. It must now ensure that repre-
sentatives on the Steering Committee have sufficient political clout to engage in meaningful discussions.
There is still uncertainty over the level of representation of select emerging economy donors.This is vital for
the success of the new partnership.These donors should feel reassured if the emphasis of the new partnership
13. 13
is on coordination to achieve shared principles, common goals and differential responsibilities, not cooperation
or harmonization of approaches. Bolstering emerging economy participation in voluntary “building blocks” is
another mechanism for deepening their engagement that should be explored.
The private sector should also be encouraged to participate in building blocks.This can be done most effectively
by forming new coalitions around sectoral objectives such as education or agriculture and food security where
embryo groups already exist.
It is important to get the monitoring indicators right. It may be advisable to take more time before prematurely
concluding on a set of indicators.This paper proposes focus on the institutional pillars of successful develop-
ment and an emphasis shift from an abstract and very broad concept of trying to measure the maturity of the
institutional pillars to more narrow focus on the nature of engagement between actors on key aspects of the
mobilization and use of,and accountability for,development resources.It recommends a pilot phase of consulta-
tion and experimentation with civil society participation in developing indicators that best reflect the nature of
civil society engagement with government and business in bettering development results.
The monitoring framework at the local level would also be more useful if it is accompanied by annual qualitative
assessments that dedicatedAid Management agencies should be called upon to produce.
14. 14
Endnotes
Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, 2011, “Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan,
Republic of Korea, November – December 1.Available at: http://www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/images/stories/hlf4/
OUTCOME_DOCUMENT_-_FINAL_EN.pdf
See OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2012, “Chair’s Proposal: Steering Committee of the Global Partnership for
Effective Development Co-operation,”Working Party onAid Effectiveness, 9 May, Paris,Available at: http://www.oecd.org/of-
ficialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC/EFF(2012)6docLanguage=En
Nielsen, Rich, Michael Findley, Daniel Nielsen, Zachary Davis andTara Candland, 2011, “Do Foreign Aid Shocks CauseViolent
Armed Conflict?”Brief 1,November,Aiddata.org,Available at:http://www.aiddata.org/weceem_uploads/_ROOT/File/Briefs/
Brief1-ConflictAndAidShocks.pdf
Woods, Ngaire, 2011, “Rethinking Aid Coordination” in Kharas, Homi, Koji Makino and Woojin Jung (eds.) 2011, Catalyzing
Development:A NewVision for Aid,Washington: Brookings Press.
Council for the Development of Cambodia, 2011, “The Cambodia Development Effectiveness Report,” November, Prepared
by the Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board,Available at: http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/50910762-AD98-41C0-
A540-88B05D91F345/FinalDownload/DownloadId-7120D3FCF99C6EC7FCD70684341C8AD1/50910762-AD98-41C0-
A540-88B05D91F345/cdc/aid_management/DER%202011%20FINAL%20(31%20Oct%202011).pdf
Van Fleet, JustinW., 2011,“The case for a new global business coalition for education”, September, Brookings Press.Available at:
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2011/09/global-business-coalition-vanfleet
World Economic Forum, 2012, “Putting the new vision for agriculture into Action”, A report by theWorld Economic Forum’s New
Vision for Agriculture initiative, prepared by McKinsey Company, Available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_FB_
NewVisionAgriculture_HappeningTransformation_Report_2012.pdf
Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, 2012, “Proposed Indicators, Targets and Processes for Global Monitoring of the Busan
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation”, 22 May, Available at: http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC/EFF(2012)8/ADD1docLanguage=En
For a fuller discussion of this concept see Kharas, Homi, Koji Makino andWoojin Jung (eds.), 2011, “Catalyzing Development:
A NewVision forAid,”Washington: Brookings Press.
Desai, Raj and Homi Kharas, 2010 “The Determinants ofAidVolatility”,Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/pa-
pers/2010/09/aid-volatility-desai-kharas
Birdsall, Nancy, Homi Kharas and Rita Perakis, 2012, “The Quality of official Development Assistance 2011: Is Aid Quality Im-
proving?”Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/03/26-quality-development-assistance-kharas
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.