10. Restored. Journal of Money, Credit and
Bankind, 476-495.
6. Maslowska, A. (2008). Quest for the
best: How to measure central bank
indepence and show its relation with
inflation? Turku: Aboa Centre for
Economics.
7. Pasha, A. (2011). Eurozone indices: A
New model for measuring central bank
indepence. Special Conference Paper
(pages 56). Greece: Bank of Greece.
8. S. Maliszewski, W. (2000). Central bank
Indepence in Transition Economics.
London: Centre for Social and Economic
Research, London School of Economics
and Political Science.
9. Thomas F.Cargil, G. P. (2012).
Measuring Central Bank Independence,
Policy Implications, and Federal
Reserve Independence. San Diego:
American Economic Association.
10. Law on the central bank of Albania
11. Law on the central bank of Belarus
12. Law on the central bank of the Ukraine
13. Law on the central bank of republic of
Armenia
14. Law on the central bank of Latvia
15. Law on the central bank of the Russian
federation
16. Law on the central bank of Moldova
17. Law on the central bank of Lithuania
III. Электрон эх үүсвэр
1. www.nso.mn
2. http://www-
management.wharton.upenn.edu/he
nisz/
3. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polit
y/polity4.htm
4. http://en.wikipedia.org
Зохиогчын тухай: Б.Пүрэвдаваа,
Д.Тунгалагтуяа бид нар нь Мандах бүртгэл
дээд сургуулийн Банкны эдийн засаг НББ-н
чиглэлээр суралцдаг 3-р курсын оюутнууд юм.
Бид судалгааны ажилаа докторант багш
С.Цолмон багшаараа удирдуулан хийлээ.
Утас:99140670,99956032
11. Хавсралт
CBIG индекс
Legal
(CBIGLeg) Terms of office of Governor 1
Legal power to Appoint Governor 0,5
Legal power to Dismiss Governor 0,5
Regulatory responsibility separation 1
0,75
Political
(CBIGPol)
Turnover of Governor 0
Members of the management board of Bank 1
Governor holding otheroffice in the Goverment 1
0,666667
PriceStability
objectives
(CBIGPStab)
Price stability 1
Inflation 1
Interest rate 1
1
Exchange
RatePolicy
(CBIGForx)
Intervention 1
Foreign exchange market regulations 1
Foreign exchange borrowings 1
1
MonetaryPolicy
andDeficit
Financing
(CBIGMonPol)
Responsibility for monetary policy formulation 1
Final word in resolation of conflict 1
Lending to the government 0,67
Terms of lending 0,67
Maturity loans 0,67
Interest rates on loan must be 0,67
0,78
Accountability
and
Transparency
(CBIGAccTrans
)
Objectives of the bank 1
Communication strategy 1
Reporting of banking activities publicly 1
Accountability of the Governor 1
Central bank activities audit 1
1
Нийт 0.866111
ХАВСРАЛТ 2
LVAU индекс
Variables Weight Numerical
coding
Монголд
1. CEO
A 0.05
Over 8 years 1
6 to 8 years 0.75 0.75
5 years 0.5
12. 4 years 0.25
Under 4 years or at the discretion of appointer 0
B 0.05
Board of central bank 1
A council of the central bank board, executive branch,
and legalislative branch
0.75
Legislature 0.5 0.5
Executive collectively 0.25
One or two member of the executive branch 0
C 0.05
No provision for dismissal 1
Only for reasons not related to policy 0.83
At the discretion of central bank board 0.67
At legislature’s discretion 0.5
Unconditional dismissal possibly by legislature 0.33
At executive’s dipcretion 0.17
Unconditional dismissal possible by executive 0
D 0.05
No 1 1
Only with permission if the executive branch 0.5
No rule against CEO holding anotheroffice 0
2. Policy formulation
A 0.05
Bank alone 1 1
Bank participates, but has little influence 0.67
Bank only advises government 0.33
Bank has no say 0
0.05
The bank, on issues clearly defined in the law as its
objectives
1 1
Government, on policy issues not clearly defined as the
bank’s goals or in case of conflict within the bank
0.8
A council of the bank, executive branch, and legislative
branch
0.6
The legislative, on policy issues 0.4
The executive branch on policy issues, subject to due
process and possible protest by the bank
0.2
The executive branch has unconditional priority 0
C 0.05
Central bank active 1
Central bank has no influence 0 0
3. Objectives 0.15
A Price stability is the major or only objectives in the charter,
and the central bank has the final word in case of conflict
with other government objectives
1 1
Price stability is the only objective 0.8
Price stability is one goal, with order compatible
objectives, such as a stable banking system
0.6
Price stability is one goal, with potentially conflicting
objectives, such as full employment
0.4
No objectives stated in the bank charter 0.2
13. Stated objectives do not include price stability 0
4. Limitation on lending to the government
a 0.15
No advanced permitted 1
Advanced permitted, but with strict limits 0.67 0.67
Advanced permitted, and the limits are loose 0.33
No legal limits on lending 0
b 0.1
Not permitted 1
Permitted, but with strict limits 0.67 0.67
Permitted, and the limits are loose 0.33
No legal limits on lending 0
c 0.1
Controlled by the bank 1 1
Specified by the bank charter 0.67
Agreed between the central bank and executive 0.33
Decided by the executive branch alone 0
D 0.05
Only the central government 1 1
All levels of government 0.67
Those mentioned above and public enterprises 0.33
Public and private sector 0
e 0.025
Currency amounts 1
Shares of central bank demand liabilities or capital 0.67
Shares of government revenue 0.33 0.33
Shares of government expenditures 0
F 0.025
Within 6 moths 1
Within 1 year 0.67 0.67
More than 1 year 0.33
No mention of maturity in the law 0
g 0.025
Above minimum rates 1
At market rates 0.75
Below maximum rates 0.5
Interest rate is not mentioned 0.25 0.25
No interest on government borrowing from the central bank 0
H Central bank prolibited from buying or selling government
securities in the primary market
0.025
Yes 1
No 0 0
Хавсралт 3
Загвар 1
Dependent Variable: INF
Method: Least Squares
14. Date: 03/10/15 Time: 16:47
Sample: 2010:01 2015:01
Included observations: 61
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CBI -0.69134 0.781001 -3.282019 0.0021
LAGINF 0.055630 0.107421 0.517866 0.6073
LAGM2 0.004824 0.001166 4.138474 0.0002
GDP -0.43750 9.128552 -3.991597 0.0003
OPENESS -0.000142 0.000268 -0.529181 0.5995
POLITY12 -0.046079 0.076241 -0.604383 0.5489
C 3.5918 0.79681 8.156662 0.0002
R-squared 0.978757 Mean dependent var 2.066178
Adjusted R-squared 0.968478 S.D. dependent var 0.678656
S.E. of regression 0.524598 Akaike info criterion 1.681669
Sum squared resid 1.28333 Schwarz criterion 1.954553
Log likelihood 33.36007 F-statistic 384.2763
Durbin-Watson stat 1.781268 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000097
Загвар 2
Dependent Variable: INF
Method: Least Squares
Date: 043/10/15 Time: 17:18
Sample: 2010:01 2015:01
Included observations: 61
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CBI -0.08283 0.738568 -3.182992 0.0028
LAGINF 0.041464 0.108768 0.381218 0.7050
LAGM2 0.004895 0.001163 4.210503 0.0001
GDP -0.07619 0.090899 -2.078385 0.0002
OPENESS -0.000195 0.000261 -0.746197 0.4598
EXECCON -0.009044 0.036517 -0.247674 0.8056
C 6.9490 0.65126 9.224966 0.0001
R-squared 0.984829 Mean dependent var 2.066178
Adjusted R-squared 0.978059 S.D. dependent var 0.678656
S.E. of regression 0.116536 Akaike info criterion 1.689044
Sum squared resid 0.366835 Schwarz criterion 1.961928
Log likelihood 39.53706 F-statistic 354.1800
Durbin-Watson stat 1.827590 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000111
Загвар 3
Dependent Variable: INF
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/10/15 Time: 17:48
Sample: 2010:01 2015:01
Included observations: 61
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CBI -1.97744 0.659588 -2.999715 0.0046
LAGINF 0.112452 0.112269 1.001628 0.3224
LAGM2 0.004215 0.001216 3.467185 0.0012
GDP -0.73383 0.507886 -3.337633 0.0018
OPENESS -0.000190 0.000252 -0.754514 0.4549
POLCON -2.074006 1.342097 -1.545348 0.1299
C 3.8096 0.07620 10.467702 0.0012
15. R-squared 0.983058 Mean dependent var 2.066178
Adjusted R-squared 0.970335 S.D. dependent var 0.678656
S.E. of regression 0.512223 Akaike info criterion 1.633926
Sum squared resid 0.754729 Schwarz criterion 1.906810
Log likelihood 42.21422 F-statistic 416.9174
Durbin-Watson stat 1.584119 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000040
Загвар 4
Dependent Variable: INF
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/10/15 Time: 18:30
Sample: 2010:01 2015:01
Included observations: 61
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CBI -0.626896 0.619432 -10.16697 0.0029
FREEPRESS 0.592522 0.399729 27.48230 0.0059
LAGINF 0.056977 0.104333 0.546106 0.5880
LAGM2 0.004841 0.001133 4.272546 0.0001
GDP 0.028124 8.863795 -4.142835 0.0002
OPENESS -0.000243 0.000255 -0.953238 0.3461
C 2.395681 0.437768 24.48994 0.0001
R-squared 0.99482 Mean dependent var 2.066178
Adjusted R-squared 0.997612 S.D. dependent var 0.678656
S.E. of regression 0.513354 Akaike info criterion -2.638335
Sum squared resid 0.805482 Schwarz criterion -2.911218
Log likelihood 102.3203 F-statistic 2526.856
Durbin-Watson stat 1.961026 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000043
Загвар 5
Dependent Variable: INF
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/10/15 Time: 19:17
Sample: 2010:01 2015:01
Included observations: 61
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CBI -0.047802 0.509326 -0.210683 0.0026
LAGINF 0.062251 0.101941 0.610658 0.5448
LAGM2 1.002960 0.001452 2.038617 0.0480
GDP 0.049973 11.48352 -1.872225 0.0683
OPENESS 0.000871 0.000412 -2.112386 0.0408
FIXED 0.398974 0.047769 -2.071919 0.0446
C 0.467118 1.153432 0.423516 0.0496
R-squared 0.952957 Mean dependent var 2.066178
Adjusted R-squared 0.945292 S.D. dependent var 0.678656
S.E. of regression 0.501337 Akaike info criterion -0.590962
Sum squared resid 1.304490 Schwarz criterion -0.863846
Log likelihood 21.18309 F-statistic 167.5211
Durbin-Watson stat 3.162236 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000018