Recommended
Recommended
More Related Content
Similar to Supply Chain Security for Containerised Workloads - Lee Chuk Munn
Similar to Supply Chain Security for Containerised Workloads - Lee Chuk Munn (20)
More from NUS-ISS
More from NUS-ISS (20)
Recently uploaded
Recently uploaded (20)
Supply Chain Security for Containerised Workloads - Lee Chuk Munn
- 2. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Objective Introduce a set of tools for working with containers (Integratable into your CI)
- 3. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Trend - Kubernetes Adoption https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/CNCF-AR_FINAL-edits-15.2.21.pdf
- 4. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Why are Containers Gaining Popularity? Development Distribution Deployment
- 5. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Difference Between Virtual Machines and Containers Hardware Hypervisor Applicat ion OS Applicat ion OS Applicat ion OS Hardware Linux Applicat ion Applicat ion Applicat ion Virtual machine virtualizes the hardware Network namespace virtualizes Linux
- 6. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers What is in a Container? Configurations Runtime Code Environment Dependencies
- 7. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers What is Docker (and other container tools)? A set of tools and engine for - Packaging applications into a standard format, referred to as an ‘image’ - Deploying images as containers into Linux namespaces - Manages the containers, networking, volumes, resources, etc Used the following core Linux technologies - Network namespace - CGroups - Union filesystem A write once deploy anywhere - Anywhere that Docker is installed or on anywhere with OCI compliant runtime installed
- 8. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Dockerfile FROM node:20 WORKDIR /app COPY config.json COPY main.js . COPY public . COPY package.json . RUN npm ci ENV PORT=3000 EXPOSE ${PORT} ENTRYPOINT node main Runtime Environment Dependencies Code Configurations BUILD RUN
- 9. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Docker Workflow Base image Dockerfile Your application’s image Containers Container registry Run Build Push Developer Run Pull Dependencies Application and artifacts
- 10. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Software Supply Chain Security Modern cloud native application relies and uses - Platform - Code generators - Libraries and dependencies Attackers insert malicious code into platform, compilers and code generators, libraries, etc - Use these as the attack vector rather than attacking your application directly Containerised applications supply chain - Libraries and dependencies - Pulling unverified images or from dubious image registries - Badly written Dockerfile
- 12. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Security Challenges Base image Dockerfile Containers Container registry Run Build Push Developer Run Pull Badly written Unverified base image Dependencies Application and artifacts Pulling a compromised image Malicious code in containers Your application’s image
- 13. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Container Image Integrity Scan code base, dependences, configurations for exposed secrets
- 14. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Scanning Image and Filesystem trivy - tool to scan vulnerabilities in filesystem, repository, image - Scan secrets, config, vulnerability for CVE listings - Produces report in JSON, table, SARIF - Generate SBOM (later) trivy filesystem --format=json --output=scan.json --severity=HIGH,CRITICAL <src path> trivy image --scanners=vuln --exit-code=1 -s HIGH,CRITICAL node:20 trivy filesystem -s CRITICAL --secret-config policy.yaml . Scan report format Severity Exit code, eg. using in CI pipeline Only scan for vulnerabilities Custom rules
- 15. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Infrastructure as Code Servers Networking Storage and databases Monitoring Security Iac Script Virtualized infrastructure Provision ● Process of provisioning and managing IT resources through machine readable files ● Scripts describe the required setup, configurations and dependencies between resources ● IaC tools provision the resources PaaS
- 16. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Container Image Integrity Analysis Policy Ensure that code and IaC conforms to best practices Scan code base, dependences, configurations for exposed secrets Image Build
- 17. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Docker Image Tag Tagging image - Never - no tag when building image, default to :latest - Good - give meaningful names to tags, eg v1.0.0 - Better - use the tag to associate the image to a commit eg a release branch - git rev-parse --short HEAD Using image - Never - use the :latest tag - Good - use a tag - Best - use the image digest instead of tag - The image’s hash - docker image -f ‘{{.RepoDigests}}’ <image>
- 18. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers About Image Tags docker build -t fred/myapp:v1 . docker build -t fred/myapp:v1 . Overwritten the previous image with the same tag FROM fred/myapp:v1 Might be using the incorrect image sha256:b24cde… sha256:3fbc6… Each image produce a different hash after pushing to container registry FROM fred/myapp@sha256:3fbc6… No ambiguity
- 19. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Enforce Policy conftest - evaluate Dockerfile against as set of rules - https://www.conftest.dev/ - Scan results can be output as JUnit, Github Rules are written with Rego, a Prolog like language - https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/#rego - Free course available - https://academy.styra.com/courses/opa-rego Open Policy Agent is general purpose tool to enforce policy - https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/ - Decouple policies from application conftest test Dockerfile --output github --policy policy
- 20. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Example of Policy File deny[msg] { input[i].Cmd = “from” val = input[i].Value contains(val[_], “:latest”) msg = sprintf(“Cannot use :latest tag %s”, val) } deny[msg] { input[i].Cmd = “from” val = input[i].Value count(split(val, “:”)) < 2 msg = sprintf(“Please add an image tag to %s”, val) } More examples https://www.conftest.dev/examples Policy Prevent pulling images with the ‘latest’ tag
- 21. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Container Image Integrity Sign Analysis Image Policy Build Image’s signature Verify Ensure that code and IaC conforms to best practices Validate that the image has not been tempered Scan code base, dependences, configurations for exposed secrets
- 22. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Signing Images cosign is tool for signing and verify container images and artifacts - Generate public/private key pair for signing - Signing and verify image signature - Attaching and signing container artifacts like SBOM Generate a key pair - Produces cosign.key and cosign.pub cosign generate-key-pair
- 23. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Signing and Verifying Images cosign sign --key=path/to/cosign.key myimage@sha256:12345… cosign verify --key=path/to/cosign.pub myimage@sha256:12345… Use the image digest when you sign the image. Then the signature is related to an immutable image reference Verify the image using the image digest
- 24. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Signing Image cosign rekor Record in Sign Produce
- 25. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Validating Image - 2 cosign triangulate myimage@sha256:12345… crane manifest <cosign signature> rekor-cli get --log-index <index> Extract co-located cosign signature from image Get the signature’s manifest Get the entry from Rekor
- 26. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Software Bill of Materials List of inventories and dependencies that make up an application - Identifies the software components within larger pieces of software and the licenses associated with their components - In the context of containers, these will be the contents of the image, its dependencies, licenses, etc Purpose - Track updates and known security vulnerabilities for each component in the software project’s dependencies - Auditing purposes as it ensures that only authorized dependencies are included in a software project Standards - SPDX (Software Packet Data Exchange) - https://spdx.dev/ - CycloneDX - https://cyclonedx.org/ Image from https://spdx.github.io/spdx-spec/v2.2.2/composition-of-an-SPDX-document/
- 27. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Container Image Integrity Sign Analysis Image SBOM Policy Build Produce Sign Image’s signature Attestation Verify Verify Ensure that code and IaC conforms to best practices Validate that the image has not been tempered Tracks dependencies for security, licensing, etc Confirmation of the provenance of the image Scan code base, dependences, configurations for exposed secrets
- 28. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Image SBOM and Attestation trivy image --format=spdx --output=sbom.spdx myimage@sha256:12345… cosign attach sbom --type=spdx --sbom=sbom.spdx myimage@sha256:12345… cosign attest --key=path/to/cosign.key --type=spdx --predicate=sbom.spdx myimage@sha256:12345… cosign verify-attestation --key=path/to/cosign.pub --type=spdx myimage@sha256:12345… Generate SBOM in SPDX format Attach SBOM to the image Create an attestation by signing the SBOM Verify the attestation
- 29. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Scan SBOM cosign download sbom --output-file sbom.spdx myimage@sha256:12345… trivy sbom --severity HIGH,CRITICAL sbom.spdx Download SBOM for the given image Scan the SBOM for vulnerabilities
- 30. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers Tools Sign Analysis Image SBOM Policy Build Produce Sign Image’s signature Attestation Verify Verify trivy Scan for vulnerabilities in code conftest Enforce best practices cosign Sign and verify image and BOM
- 31. https://bit.ly/supply_chain_security_for_containers My Medium Article - CI/CD Pipeline Argo Workflow — A Pipeline to Build and Deploy Containers