This document provides summaries of various strategic theories and concepts related to warfare and national security. It lists over 50 concepts, briefly explaining each one and attributing it to an author or source. Some of the major concepts covered include centers of gravity, attrition, annihilation, coercion, sea control, deception, maneuver warfare, insurgency, and counterinsurgency strategies.
This document discusses the need for the US Army to develop capabilities for operating in the "human domain" as it did previously for the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains. It draws parallels between the development of AirLand Battle doctrine in the 1980s in response to the Soviet military threat and the current need to develop new strategies, organizations, training, and equipment for dealing with irregular and hybrid enemies. The document argues that success in modern "wars among the people" requires understanding and influencing populations, so the Army must develop human domain competencies alongside traditional land warfare skills. It also stresses the importance of building global partnerships and networks of allied forces to help address security challenges in a time of fiscal constraints.
The document provides an overview of the deliberate attack tactic. It defines a deliberate attack as one mounted against well-organized defenses, allowing time for detailed planning and preparation with full coordination of resources. Key aspects discussed include careful reconnaissance, weight of supporting fire, organizing the attack in phases with assaulting and reserve combat teams, maintaining momentum, and securing flanks. The principles of surprise, momentum, and security are emphasized. Planning considerations and the conduct of the deliberate attack through the assault, reorganization, and potential exploitation are also outlined.
This document provides an overview of withdrawal as a phase of war, outlining key terms, principles, control measures, planning considerations, and logistics involved. It discusses reasons a withdrawal may be necessary, threats to withdrawing troops, and explains terms like present defensive position, new main position, intermediate position, and covering troops. The document also outlines importance of flexibility, simplicity, offensive action, information acquisition, morale, and control during a withdrawal. It provides details on timing, security measures, fire plans, and engineering works to facilitate a successful withdrawal.
Lessons for rebuilding Iraq's shattered security forces drawn from modern Arab military success stories. A briefing by Washington Institute Kahn Fellow Michael Eisenstadt. January 21, 2015.
Horatio Lord Nelson's Warfighting Style and the Maneuver Warfare Paradigm, by...Professor Joel Hayward
Readers seeking to analyze Maneuver Warfare’s applicability to combat on the seas that cover most of the globe can be forgiven for noticing the absence of scholarly interest in this theme and thinking that, in short, Maneuver Warfare must have no applicability at sea. One can, however, easily find many fine examples of what is now called Maneuver Warfare in seapower’s long history. This article draws from one such example – splendidly manifest in the person of Britain’s greatest fighting seaman, Vice-Admiral Horatio, Lord Nelson (1758–1805) – to demonstrate that students of maneuver need not fear turning their attention occasionally from land battles towards those fought at sea. They may indeed be greatly enriched by doing so. While being mindful to avoid anachronism (Maneuver Warfare’s conceptual framework, after all, is very recent), this article shows that Lord Nelson’s warfighting style closely resembles the modern Maneuver Warfare paradigm. He was not fighting according to any paradigm, of course, much less one that dates from almost 200 years after his death. He understood naval tactics and battle according to the norms and behavioral patterns of his own era and continuously experimented and tested ideas, rejecting some, keeping others. The article naturally makes no claim that Nelson’s warfighting style was unique among sea warriors or that he contributed disproportionately to conceptual or doctrinal developments in tactics or operational art. Even a cursory glance at the careers of John Paul Jones, Edward Hawke and John Jervis (one of Nelson’s mentors), to mention but a few, reveals that their names fit almost as aptly as Nelson’s alongside Napoleon Bonaparte’s, Erwin Rommel’s and George S. Patton’s in studies of effective maneuverists. Yet Lord Nelson makes an ideal focus for a case study of Maneuver Warfare at sea. Extant sources pertaining to his fascinating life are unusually abundant and reveal that he raised the art of war at sea to unsurpassed heights, all the while perfecting the highly maneuverist warfighting style that gave him victory in several of naval history’s grandest battles.
This treatise on the recent shortcomings of the Army organizational culture challenges leaders at all levels to evaluate their personal leadership practices and their application of Army policies.
Real-time threat evaluation in a ground based air defence environmentAshwin Samales
By JN Roux and JH van Vuuren
In a military environment a ground based air defence operator is required to evaluate the tactical situation in real-time and protect Defended Assets (DAs) on the ground against aerial threats by assigning available Weapon Systems (WSs) to engage enemy aircraft. Since this aerial environment requires rapid operational planning and decision making in stress situations, the associated responsibilities are typically divided between a number of operators and computerized systems that aid these operators during the decision making processes. One such a Decision Support System (DSS), a threat evaluation and weapon assignment system, assigns threat values to aircraft (with respect to DAs) in real-time and uses these values to propose possible engagements of observed enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft WSs. In this paper a design of the threat evaluation part of such a DSS is put forward. The design follows the structured approach suggested in [Roux JN & van Vuuren JH, 2007, Threat evaluation and weapon assignment decision support: A review of the state of the art, ORiON, 23(2), pp.151–187], phasing in a suite of increasingly complex qualitative and quantitative model components as more (reliable) data become available.
This document discusses the need for the US Army to develop capabilities for operating in the "human domain" as it did previously for the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains. It draws parallels between the development of AirLand Battle doctrine in the 1980s in response to the Soviet military threat and the current need to develop new strategies, organizations, training, and equipment for dealing with irregular and hybrid enemies. The document argues that success in modern "wars among the people" requires understanding and influencing populations, so the Army must develop human domain competencies alongside traditional land warfare skills. It also stresses the importance of building global partnerships and networks of allied forces to help address security challenges in a time of fiscal constraints.
The document provides an overview of the deliberate attack tactic. It defines a deliberate attack as one mounted against well-organized defenses, allowing time for detailed planning and preparation with full coordination of resources. Key aspects discussed include careful reconnaissance, weight of supporting fire, organizing the attack in phases with assaulting and reserve combat teams, maintaining momentum, and securing flanks. The principles of surprise, momentum, and security are emphasized. Planning considerations and the conduct of the deliberate attack through the assault, reorganization, and potential exploitation are also outlined.
This document provides an overview of withdrawal as a phase of war, outlining key terms, principles, control measures, planning considerations, and logistics involved. It discusses reasons a withdrawal may be necessary, threats to withdrawing troops, and explains terms like present defensive position, new main position, intermediate position, and covering troops. The document also outlines importance of flexibility, simplicity, offensive action, information acquisition, morale, and control during a withdrawal. It provides details on timing, security measures, fire plans, and engineering works to facilitate a successful withdrawal.
Lessons for rebuilding Iraq's shattered security forces drawn from modern Arab military success stories. A briefing by Washington Institute Kahn Fellow Michael Eisenstadt. January 21, 2015.
Horatio Lord Nelson's Warfighting Style and the Maneuver Warfare Paradigm, by...Professor Joel Hayward
Readers seeking to analyze Maneuver Warfare’s applicability to combat on the seas that cover most of the globe can be forgiven for noticing the absence of scholarly interest in this theme and thinking that, in short, Maneuver Warfare must have no applicability at sea. One can, however, easily find many fine examples of what is now called Maneuver Warfare in seapower’s long history. This article draws from one such example – splendidly manifest in the person of Britain’s greatest fighting seaman, Vice-Admiral Horatio, Lord Nelson (1758–1805) – to demonstrate that students of maneuver need not fear turning their attention occasionally from land battles towards those fought at sea. They may indeed be greatly enriched by doing so. While being mindful to avoid anachronism (Maneuver Warfare’s conceptual framework, after all, is very recent), this article shows that Lord Nelson’s warfighting style closely resembles the modern Maneuver Warfare paradigm. He was not fighting according to any paradigm, of course, much less one that dates from almost 200 years after his death. He understood naval tactics and battle according to the norms and behavioral patterns of his own era and continuously experimented and tested ideas, rejecting some, keeping others. The article naturally makes no claim that Nelson’s warfighting style was unique among sea warriors or that he contributed disproportionately to conceptual or doctrinal developments in tactics or operational art. Even a cursory glance at the careers of John Paul Jones, Edward Hawke and John Jervis (one of Nelson’s mentors), to mention but a few, reveals that their names fit almost as aptly as Nelson’s alongside Napoleon Bonaparte’s, Erwin Rommel’s and George S. Patton’s in studies of effective maneuverists. Yet Lord Nelson makes an ideal focus for a case study of Maneuver Warfare at sea. Extant sources pertaining to his fascinating life are unusually abundant and reveal that he raised the art of war at sea to unsurpassed heights, all the while perfecting the highly maneuverist warfighting style that gave him victory in several of naval history’s grandest battles.
This treatise on the recent shortcomings of the Army organizational culture challenges leaders at all levels to evaluate their personal leadership practices and their application of Army policies.
Real-time threat evaluation in a ground based air defence environmentAshwin Samales
By JN Roux and JH van Vuuren
In a military environment a ground based air defence operator is required to evaluate the tactical situation in real-time and protect Defended Assets (DAs) on the ground against aerial threats by assigning available Weapon Systems (WSs) to engage enemy aircraft. Since this aerial environment requires rapid operational planning and decision making in stress situations, the associated responsibilities are typically divided between a number of operators and computerized systems that aid these operators during the decision making processes. One such a Decision Support System (DSS), a threat evaluation and weapon assignment system, assigns threat values to aircraft (with respect to DAs) in real-time and uses these values to propose possible engagements of observed enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft WSs. In this paper a design of the threat evaluation part of such a DSS is put forward. The design follows the structured approach suggested in [Roux JN & van Vuuren JH, 2007, Threat evaluation and weapon assignment decision support: A review of the state of the art, ORiON, 23(2), pp.151–187], phasing in a suite of increasingly complex qualitative and quantitative model components as more (reliable) data become available.
Deterrence aims to persuade opponents not to initiate action through psychological threats rather than physical involvement. It involves restricting actions, promising punishment, and threatening retaliation to deter attacks. Key thinkers on deterrence include Bernard Brodie, Henry Kissinger, and Thomas Schelling. For deterrence to succeed, it requires communication of capabilities and credibility of retaliation. Types of deterrence include active/extended deterrence involving direct threats and passive deterrence relying on enemy perceptions. Massive retaliation and flexible response were Cold War deterrence doctrines that struggled with credibility.
The document provides an overview of the evolution of air power from its origins in World War I through the modern era. It discusses early air power theorists like Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell and how their ideas influenced development. It then examines employment of air power in major conflicts like World War II, the Cold War, post-Cold War, and future potential uses. Key lessons discussed include the importance of air superiority, how technology and tactics have continually evolved air power capabilities, and the need for a balanced air strategy integrated with land and naval forces.
This document discusses deterrence theory, which gained prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War regarding nuclear weapons. Deterrence is intended to dissuade an adversary from taking action by threatening reprisal or preventing them from acting against another state's desires. It is based on psychological concepts and gaining credibility for effective deterrence. The document outlines different types of deterrence such as denial and punishment, and discusses assumptions and concepts like rationality and mutual vulnerability in deterrence strategy.
This document summarizes the evolution of air power from its origins in the late 19th century to modern times. It traces major developments such as the establishment of independent air forces during World War I, the rise of strategic bombing theories in the interwar period, the integration of air power into combined arms operations during World War II, and post-war innovations like the US AirLand Battle doctrine. Throughout history, air power concepts and employment have adapted to technological advances and lessons from conflicts. The document aims to provide context for how air power capabilities and roles have changed over time.
This document summarizes the traditional focus in airpower theory on strategic offensive interdiction, which aims to deliver quick military victories through decisive strikes that disable an adversary's military capabilities without prolonged fighting. It discusses how this strategy seeks to avoid attritional warfare by destroying logistics, infrastructure, and high-value targets behind enemy lines. The document then questions if this approach is still appropriate given today's more complex geopolitical environment involving peer competitors like China that have both conflicting and interconnected interests with the US. It explores alternative perspectives from Clausewitz on limiting the aims and intensity of warfare between great powers based on the specific political context.
This presentation was given as part of the Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar hosted by the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in November 2014.
This document discusses the concept of cross-domain deterrence and the tension between nuclear deterrence and strategic deterrence. It notes that there is agreement within the Department of Defense and Air Force that strategic deterrence is cross-domain deterrence, involving not just nuclear capabilities but also space, cyber, and conventional capabilities. However, there is currently no common framework for ensuring understanding of how these different capabilities interact and integrate to achieve deterrent effects. The document examines challenges in analyzing and planning for cross-domain deterrence in the modern strategic environment.
Lessons 14, 15, And 16 Prin Of War, War And Amer Mil, And Do D Doherty 29...runningman825
This document provides an overview and agenda for lessons 14, 15, and 16 of the AS-4100 course. It includes discussions of principles of war, the Department of Defense, and war and the American military. The lessons will cover principles of joint operations through a short movie and discussion, an overview of the DOD including its budget and global presence, and concepts of war such as realism, pacifism, and just war theory.
This document discusses the challenges of developing a theory of cross-domain deterrence (CDD) in an era of increasing complexity. It describes a research project studying how the growing number of means of political influence affects deterrence. It notes that emerging technologies have given weaker states and non-state actors new ways to threaten stronger opponents. This complexity poses difficulties for strategy and grand strategy. The document debates how to define "domains" and argues CDD is really about using one type of means to deter another. It acknowledges the conceptual limits of CDD and the risk of definitional debates becoming too academic.
BG langford Presentation at Williams Foundation seminar October 24 2019ICSA, LLC
BRIG Ian Langford, the head of Army’s Land Capability programs highlighted at the Williams Foundation Seminar held in Canberra, Australia, October 24, 2019, how he saw the Army adapting to the new environment and contributing to fifth generation manoeuvre.
BRIG Ian Langford argued that the evolving networks of forces enabled by a fifth-generation approach could provide new ways to mix and match forces to allow for more combat flexibility.
Operational Idea - From Midway to the MarianasBen Anderson
This document provides a comparison of the operational ideas behind the Battle of Midway and Operation Forager, the US invasion of the Mariana Islands. It analyzes how the US military matured in its understanding and application of operational art from Midway to the Marianas. Specifically, it examines elements like objectives, principles of war, sequencing/synchronization, operational fires, protection of friendly forces, and targeting the enemy's center of gravity. It finds that Operation Forager exhibited a much more sophisticated operational plan and execution compared to the reactive defense at Midway.
US Pol-Mil Presence in the Asia-Pacific.8Michael Kraig
This document discusses the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and challenges to maintaining access and freedom of movement. It examines classic military strategy texts and their emphasis on linking tactical operations to strategic political goals. The document also analyzes Chinese perceptions of strategic vulnerabilities due to straits and sea lanes controlled by other powers. It proposes a framework called "JAAM-GC" for applying operational art to achieve limited objectives against opponents short of full-scale war, through speed, surprise and temporary control of contested areas. Overall the document argues for approaches that can gain victory without costly attrition-style warfare.
In this prevention at the Williams Foundation Seminar held in Canberra, Australia on October 24, 2019,
The scene setting presentation for the seminar was provided by WGCDR Joe Brick of the Australian War College. She provided a look back to inform the way ahead for Australia and its allies to position themselves for decisive advantage in 21st century conflict. .
Mc paper analysis capt wahyu nugroho team echo eccc 1 18WahyuWwnugroho
mission command paper adalah bentuk penugasan wajib yang dilaksanakan oleh siswa Engineer Captain Career Course di Ft Leonard Wood, Amerika Serikat yang berisi tentang analisa kepemimpinan dalam pertempuran merujuk kepada doktrin kepemimpinan militer AS yang disebut Mission Command. Dalam tulisan ini penulis membahas tentang analisa pertempuran Mogadishu yang menyebabkan insiden Blackhawk down dan membahas secara khusus aspek kepemimpinan Mayor Jenderal William F. Garrison sebagai Komandan Satgas tersebut
The document summarizes the US Navy's positioning of warships in the eastern Mediterranean that are capable of launching Tomahawk missiles against targets in Syria. It notes that while such limited strikes could temporarily degrade Syrian regime operations and chemical weapons capabilities, they cannot achieve broader strategic aims alone and risk being ineffective without a clear US policy on Syria. It analyzes the capabilities and armaments of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, estimating that four ships currently in the area could launch around 180 Tomahawk missiles total. However, it stresses the importance of the US articulating its strategic objectives for any military involvement in Syria.
A Case Study in Early Joint Warfare: An Analysis of the Wehrmacht's Crimean C...Professor Joel Hayward
Military theorists and commentators believe that joint operations prove more effective in most circumstances of modern warfare than operations involving only one service or involving two or more services but without systematic integration or unified command. Many see Nazi Germany's armed forces, the Wehrmacht, as early pioneers of 'jointness'. This essay demonstrates that the Wehrmacht did indeed understand the value of synchronizing its land, sea and air forces and placing them under operational commanders who had at least a rudimentary understanding of the tactics, techniques, needs, capabilities and limitations of each of the services functioning in their combat zones. It also shows that the Wehrmacht's efforts in this direction produced the desired result of improved combat effectiveness. Yet it argues that the Wehrmacht lacked elements considered by today's theorists to be essential to the attainment of truly productive jointness - a single tri-service commander, a proper joint staff and an absence of inter-service rivalry - and that, as a result, it often suffered needless difficulties in combat.
This document discusses the concept of "offense is the best defense" in a military context. It provides an overview of offensive and defensive military strategies and actions. Some key points include:
- Offensive actions seek to gain initiative and occupy territory, while defensive actions aim to protect and guard against attacks.
- Types of offensive actions include theater offensives, strategic offensives, and offensive operations like raids and ambushes.
- Defensive strategies include permanent defenses of bases, temporary defenses, and positional defenses.
- A counteroffensive is a large-scale strategic offensive operation launched in response to an enemy attack.
- Both offensive and defensive actions have strategic purposes in military planning,
This document discusses the concept of "the offensive is the best form of defense" in a military context. It begins with introductions to key concepts like military strategy, offensive actions, and different types of offenses. It then covers different types of defenses and compares offense and defense. Other topics include counteroffensives, risk strategies, and dirty wars. The aim is to analyze whether the offensive is the best form of defense through studying these military strategies and concepts. It concludes that both offense and defense are important but offensive actions may be more effective and provide benefits to the population as well as security forces.
This document provides a list of military tactics organized into categories such as offensive, defensive, deception, and individual movement techniques. It includes brief descriptions of common tactics like flanking maneuvers, encirclement, infiltration, reconnaissance, and the use of cover and fortifications. The document also outlines eight classical maneuvers of warfare including penetration of the center, single and double envelopment, and attack from a defensive position.
The US Air-Land Battle concept from the 1980s emphasized initiative, agility, depth and synchronization across all branches of the military. It advocated for an extended battlefield in both space and time, with deep strikes beyond the forward line of troops. Key aspects included decentralized execution, integrated air-ground operations, reliance on new technologies, and adopting the German concept of mission-type tactics. For Pakistan, facing a conventionally superior enemy, it provides lessons on concentrating combat power decisively, exploiting weaknesses, and maximizing limited resources through excellent coordination and jointness between the army and air force.
The document discusses Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart's theory of the indirect approach in military strategy. It summarizes that during WWI, Liddell Hart observed Allied and German initiatives to break deadlocks and formulated the theory of the indirect approach. The theory advocates avoiding frontal assaults and using surprise and flanking maneuvers. It also describes exploiting weaknesses and focusing attacks on command centers to render enemy forces ineffective. The document provides examples of how to apply the indirect approach in high value business sales situations.
Deterrence aims to persuade opponents not to initiate action through psychological threats rather than physical involvement. It involves restricting actions, promising punishment, and threatening retaliation to deter attacks. Key thinkers on deterrence include Bernard Brodie, Henry Kissinger, and Thomas Schelling. For deterrence to succeed, it requires communication of capabilities and credibility of retaliation. Types of deterrence include active/extended deterrence involving direct threats and passive deterrence relying on enemy perceptions. Massive retaliation and flexible response were Cold War deterrence doctrines that struggled with credibility.
The document provides an overview of the evolution of air power from its origins in World War I through the modern era. It discusses early air power theorists like Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell and how their ideas influenced development. It then examines employment of air power in major conflicts like World War II, the Cold War, post-Cold War, and future potential uses. Key lessons discussed include the importance of air superiority, how technology and tactics have continually evolved air power capabilities, and the need for a balanced air strategy integrated with land and naval forces.
This document discusses deterrence theory, which gained prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War regarding nuclear weapons. Deterrence is intended to dissuade an adversary from taking action by threatening reprisal or preventing them from acting against another state's desires. It is based on psychological concepts and gaining credibility for effective deterrence. The document outlines different types of deterrence such as denial and punishment, and discusses assumptions and concepts like rationality and mutual vulnerability in deterrence strategy.
This document summarizes the evolution of air power from its origins in the late 19th century to modern times. It traces major developments such as the establishment of independent air forces during World War I, the rise of strategic bombing theories in the interwar period, the integration of air power into combined arms operations during World War II, and post-war innovations like the US AirLand Battle doctrine. Throughout history, air power concepts and employment have adapted to technological advances and lessons from conflicts. The document aims to provide context for how air power capabilities and roles have changed over time.
This document summarizes the traditional focus in airpower theory on strategic offensive interdiction, which aims to deliver quick military victories through decisive strikes that disable an adversary's military capabilities without prolonged fighting. It discusses how this strategy seeks to avoid attritional warfare by destroying logistics, infrastructure, and high-value targets behind enemy lines. The document then questions if this approach is still appropriate given today's more complex geopolitical environment involving peer competitors like China that have both conflicting and interconnected interests with the US. It explores alternative perspectives from Clausewitz on limiting the aims and intensity of warfare between great powers based on the specific political context.
This presentation was given as part of the Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar hosted by the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in November 2014.
This document discusses the concept of cross-domain deterrence and the tension between nuclear deterrence and strategic deterrence. It notes that there is agreement within the Department of Defense and Air Force that strategic deterrence is cross-domain deterrence, involving not just nuclear capabilities but also space, cyber, and conventional capabilities. However, there is currently no common framework for ensuring understanding of how these different capabilities interact and integrate to achieve deterrent effects. The document examines challenges in analyzing and planning for cross-domain deterrence in the modern strategic environment.
Lessons 14, 15, And 16 Prin Of War, War And Amer Mil, And Do D Doherty 29...runningman825
This document provides an overview and agenda for lessons 14, 15, and 16 of the AS-4100 course. It includes discussions of principles of war, the Department of Defense, and war and the American military. The lessons will cover principles of joint operations through a short movie and discussion, an overview of the DOD including its budget and global presence, and concepts of war such as realism, pacifism, and just war theory.
This document discusses the challenges of developing a theory of cross-domain deterrence (CDD) in an era of increasing complexity. It describes a research project studying how the growing number of means of political influence affects deterrence. It notes that emerging technologies have given weaker states and non-state actors new ways to threaten stronger opponents. This complexity poses difficulties for strategy and grand strategy. The document debates how to define "domains" and argues CDD is really about using one type of means to deter another. It acknowledges the conceptual limits of CDD and the risk of definitional debates becoming too academic.
BG langford Presentation at Williams Foundation seminar October 24 2019ICSA, LLC
BRIG Ian Langford, the head of Army’s Land Capability programs highlighted at the Williams Foundation Seminar held in Canberra, Australia, October 24, 2019, how he saw the Army adapting to the new environment and contributing to fifth generation manoeuvre.
BRIG Ian Langford argued that the evolving networks of forces enabled by a fifth-generation approach could provide new ways to mix and match forces to allow for more combat flexibility.
Operational Idea - From Midway to the MarianasBen Anderson
This document provides a comparison of the operational ideas behind the Battle of Midway and Operation Forager, the US invasion of the Mariana Islands. It analyzes how the US military matured in its understanding and application of operational art from Midway to the Marianas. Specifically, it examines elements like objectives, principles of war, sequencing/synchronization, operational fires, protection of friendly forces, and targeting the enemy's center of gravity. It finds that Operation Forager exhibited a much more sophisticated operational plan and execution compared to the reactive defense at Midway.
US Pol-Mil Presence in the Asia-Pacific.8Michael Kraig
This document discusses the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and challenges to maintaining access and freedom of movement. It examines classic military strategy texts and their emphasis on linking tactical operations to strategic political goals. The document also analyzes Chinese perceptions of strategic vulnerabilities due to straits and sea lanes controlled by other powers. It proposes a framework called "JAAM-GC" for applying operational art to achieve limited objectives against opponents short of full-scale war, through speed, surprise and temporary control of contested areas. Overall the document argues for approaches that can gain victory without costly attrition-style warfare.
In this prevention at the Williams Foundation Seminar held in Canberra, Australia on October 24, 2019,
The scene setting presentation for the seminar was provided by WGCDR Joe Brick of the Australian War College. She provided a look back to inform the way ahead for Australia and its allies to position themselves for decisive advantage in 21st century conflict. .
Mc paper analysis capt wahyu nugroho team echo eccc 1 18WahyuWwnugroho
mission command paper adalah bentuk penugasan wajib yang dilaksanakan oleh siswa Engineer Captain Career Course di Ft Leonard Wood, Amerika Serikat yang berisi tentang analisa kepemimpinan dalam pertempuran merujuk kepada doktrin kepemimpinan militer AS yang disebut Mission Command. Dalam tulisan ini penulis membahas tentang analisa pertempuran Mogadishu yang menyebabkan insiden Blackhawk down dan membahas secara khusus aspek kepemimpinan Mayor Jenderal William F. Garrison sebagai Komandan Satgas tersebut
The document summarizes the US Navy's positioning of warships in the eastern Mediterranean that are capable of launching Tomahawk missiles against targets in Syria. It notes that while such limited strikes could temporarily degrade Syrian regime operations and chemical weapons capabilities, they cannot achieve broader strategic aims alone and risk being ineffective without a clear US policy on Syria. It analyzes the capabilities and armaments of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, estimating that four ships currently in the area could launch around 180 Tomahawk missiles total. However, it stresses the importance of the US articulating its strategic objectives for any military involvement in Syria.
A Case Study in Early Joint Warfare: An Analysis of the Wehrmacht's Crimean C...Professor Joel Hayward
Military theorists and commentators believe that joint operations prove more effective in most circumstances of modern warfare than operations involving only one service or involving two or more services but without systematic integration or unified command. Many see Nazi Germany's armed forces, the Wehrmacht, as early pioneers of 'jointness'. This essay demonstrates that the Wehrmacht did indeed understand the value of synchronizing its land, sea and air forces and placing them under operational commanders who had at least a rudimentary understanding of the tactics, techniques, needs, capabilities and limitations of each of the services functioning in their combat zones. It also shows that the Wehrmacht's efforts in this direction produced the desired result of improved combat effectiveness. Yet it argues that the Wehrmacht lacked elements considered by today's theorists to be essential to the attainment of truly productive jointness - a single tri-service commander, a proper joint staff and an absence of inter-service rivalry - and that, as a result, it often suffered needless difficulties in combat.
This document discusses the concept of "offense is the best defense" in a military context. It provides an overview of offensive and defensive military strategies and actions. Some key points include:
- Offensive actions seek to gain initiative and occupy territory, while defensive actions aim to protect and guard against attacks.
- Types of offensive actions include theater offensives, strategic offensives, and offensive operations like raids and ambushes.
- Defensive strategies include permanent defenses of bases, temporary defenses, and positional defenses.
- A counteroffensive is a large-scale strategic offensive operation launched in response to an enemy attack.
- Both offensive and defensive actions have strategic purposes in military planning,
This document discusses the concept of "the offensive is the best form of defense" in a military context. It begins with introductions to key concepts like military strategy, offensive actions, and different types of offenses. It then covers different types of defenses and compares offense and defense. Other topics include counteroffensives, risk strategies, and dirty wars. The aim is to analyze whether the offensive is the best form of defense through studying these military strategies and concepts. It concludes that both offense and defense are important but offensive actions may be more effective and provide benefits to the population as well as security forces.
This document provides a list of military tactics organized into categories such as offensive, defensive, deception, and individual movement techniques. It includes brief descriptions of common tactics like flanking maneuvers, encirclement, infiltration, reconnaissance, and the use of cover and fortifications. The document also outlines eight classical maneuvers of warfare including penetration of the center, single and double envelopment, and attack from a defensive position.
The US Air-Land Battle concept from the 1980s emphasized initiative, agility, depth and synchronization across all branches of the military. It advocated for an extended battlefield in both space and time, with deep strikes beyond the forward line of troops. Key aspects included decentralized execution, integrated air-ground operations, reliance on new technologies, and adopting the German concept of mission-type tactics. For Pakistan, facing a conventionally superior enemy, it provides lessons on concentrating combat power decisively, exploiting weaknesses, and maximizing limited resources through excellent coordination and jointness between the army and air force.
The document discusses Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart's theory of the indirect approach in military strategy. It summarizes that during WWI, Liddell Hart observed Allied and German initiatives to break deadlocks and formulated the theory of the indirect approach. The theory advocates avoiding frontal assaults and using surprise and flanking maneuvers. It also describes exploiting weaknesses and focusing attacks on command centers to render enemy forces ineffective. The document provides examples of how to apply the indirect approach in high value business sales situations.
This document provides a 3-paragraph summary of the key points from Sun Tzu's classic text "The Art of War". The summary outlines some of the major strategies and tactics discussed in the book, including the importance of preparation, flexibility, deception, assessing strengths and weaknesses, and varying tactics. Specific strategies mentioned include surrounding the enemy, attacking where they are unprepared, dividing opposing forces, and knowing both yourself and your enemy. The document provides high-level insights into the essential teachings from this influential work on military strategy.
This document provides an overview of tactical fundamentals for Marine officers. It discusses achieving decisions through analytical and intuitive decision making based on understanding the situation using METT-TC. Tactical tenets like achieving a decision guide making sound tactical decisions. The principles of war and tactical tenets form the framework for decision making and evaluating tactics to achieve victory.
The Patternof Engagementin Sales CampaignsPaul McNeil
The document discusses Lt. General Sir Francis Tuker's book "The Pattern of War" and how its concepts of different types of military engagements (linear, area, siege) can be applied to sales campaigns. It outlines the three types of engagements, how to identify the current engagement type, the roles of different sales "forces," and tactics to convert a linear engagement into a more advantageous area engagement, such as turning an open flank. The key takeaway is that understanding Tuker's patterns can help salespeople strategize how to gain the upper hand against competitors and close deals.
Why we have military science and theory of war?
Just because the humanity spent much more time in war then in peace. So the war is quite loyal phenomena escorting the humanity.
What we are waiting from the military science?
Whom future wars will be fought, what they will be about, how they will be fought, what wars will be fought for and why people will participate in it.
Neil McDonnell and the GovCon Chamber of Commerce make the Army's Futures Command concept documents available to federal government contractors as they do their "homework" to support the Department of Defense.
The purpose of the Army Operating Concept Team Teach is to provide uniformed and civilian leaders across the Army and it's Joint, Interorganizational and multinational partners with an understanding of the Army's vision of future conflict as described in the U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World.
Marine Corps Small Unit Leaders Guide To CounterinsurgencyMarine Books
This document provides tactics, techniques and procedures for small unit leaders engaged in counterinsurgency operations. It begins with an overview of insurgency and counterinsurgency, describing their nature and root causes. The document then covers common insurgent approaches, preparation for counterinsurgency including intelligence gathering and training, mobilizing local populations, information and intelligence operations, and small unit operations in a counterinsurgency environment. While providing proven methods, the document stresses the need for adaptation to unique local circumstances and emphasizes that success requires a long-term, whole-of-government approach.
Army Capability Integration Center - America's Army Globally Responsive, Regi...Tom "Blad" Lindblad
The document discusses the United States Army's strategic priorities and vision for the future. It makes three main points:
1) The Army will focus on developing adaptive leaders through expanded education and training programs to prepare for complex global challenges.
2) The Army aims to be globally responsive and regionally engaged by organizing regionally-focused forces that can be rapidly deployed worldwide to support combatant commands.
3) The Army will work to remain ready and modern by adapting current capabilities, evolving new technologies, and innovating to ensure overmatch against future threats.
This document discusses the principles of war, which are proven guidelines for conducting military operations based on historical experience. It outlines 9 key principles: selection and maintenance of the aim; maintenance of morale; offensive action; security; surprise; concentration of force; economy of effort; flexibility; and cooperation. These principles provide a framework for commanders to gain advantage over the enemy with the least harm to their own forces.
This document discusses the principles of war and their evolution. It outlines several key principles that have developed from ancient warfare texts and been refined through historical military operations. These principles include selection and maintenance of a clear aim, maintaining morale, taking the offensive action when possible, ensuring security, achieving surprise, concentrating forces, being economical with resources, demonstrating flexibility, cooperation between all forces, and sustainability of operations. The principles are intended to provide guidelines for effective conduct of war and military operations.
The military problem is adversaries with capable militaries may use access denial, information operations, advanced conventional weapons, WMD, and irregular warfare in new ways to threaten stability. The central idea is for joint forces supported by other powers to conduct high-tempo, synergistic actions across domains to shatter adversary plans and render them unable to oppose objectives. The defeat mechanism is disintegration through integrated destruction and dislocation. The endstate is an adversary unable to oppose objectives, setting conditions for long-term stability. Operational objectives support this endstate through isolating, denying access to, and freedom of action for the adversary.
Army Futures Command Concept for Maneuver in Multi Domain Operations 2028Neil McDonnell
Neil McDonnell and the GovCon Chamber of Commerce make the Army's Futures Command concept documents available to federal government contractors as they do their "homework" to support the Department of Defense.
This document provides an overview of offense and defense tactics at the tactical level of war. It discusses engagements and battles, and how tactical operations fit within the context of strategic and operational levels. Tactics requires both an art and a science, with the art including flexible application of means to accomplish missions, decision-making under uncertainty, and understanding effects on soldiers. Tactical operations can be either hasty or deliberate based on time available for planning and preparation.
This document provides an introduction to maneuver warfare and operational maneuver from the sea. It discusses key concepts like the nature of war, the levels and spectrums of war, and aspects of maneuver warfare such as friction, uncertainty, fluidity, and the human dimension. The document outlines maneuver warfare tactics like penetration, envelopment, and infiltration. It also covers operational maneuver from the sea, which emphasizes achieving objectives rapidly using the sea as maneuver space and integrating all assets to overwhelm the enemy.
Este documento es el manual del Comando Jungla de la Compañía Antinarcóticos Jungla R-2 de la Policía Nacional de Colombia. Presenta información sobre la historia y formación del Comando Jungla, así como instrucciones y procedimientos operacionales clave como el liderazgo, el mando y control, la conducción de tropas, la planificación de operaciones, el patrullaje y más. El manual consta de 216 páginas y busca capacitar a los miembros del Comando Jungla en tácticas de operaciones especiales.
This document provides guidance on key terrain features, map reading, and navigation skills for scouts. It describes how to use a lensatic compass to determine direction and read azimuths during the day and night. It emphasizes the importance of recognizing natural and man-made terrain features, relating maps to actual terrain, and using a compass to circumvent obstacles and follow azimuths while navigating cross-country. Being able to properly use a compass and understand terrain is essential for scouts to effectively observe and report on enemy and terrain conditions.
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This document provides an introduction to CubeSats for first-time developers. It discusses the basics of CubeSats, including standard CubeSat sizes and dispenser systems used to deploy them from launch vehicles. It then gives an overview of the multi-step development process for a CubeSat project, from initial concept through launch and operations. Finally, it introduces some common mission models and requirements sources that CubeSat developers must consider to successfully design, build, test, launch and operate their small satellites. The goal is to lay out everything needed to take a CubeSat idea from concept to becoming an actual spacecraft in orbit.
O documento descreve os benefícios da atividade física para a saúde e qualidade de vida, incluindo benefícios físicos, psicológicos e profissionais. Também discute cuidados prévios como avaliação médica, nutrição e vestimentas, além de testes de aptidão física e programas de treinamento para bombeiros.
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O documento apresenta um sumário de capítulos sobre diferentes tipos de armas, incluindo pistolas, fuzis e metralhadoras. O primeiro capítulo descreve a pistola 9 mm M973 "FI", com detalhes sobre suas características, medidas, desmontagem e funcionamento.
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1. Strategic Theories and Concepts
SHORT TITLE CONCEPT AUTHOR
Air Superiority
Air superiority is essential to a successful
air campaign. It is achieved by 1) mastery of
the air, 2) attacking the means of
production, 3) maintain battle ourselves, 4)
prevent the enemy from battle
Trenchard
Annihilation
Annihilation seeks political victory through
the complete destruction of the enemy
armed forces
Delbruck
Attrition
Attrition seeks victory through the gradual
destruction of the enemy's armed forces
Delbruck
Centers of Gravity
The COG is the hub of all power and
movement on which everything depends,
the point at which all energies should be
directed
Clausewitz
Coercion
Compelling an enemy to involuntarily
behave in a certain way by targeting the
leadership, national communications, or
political-economic centers
Pape
Command of the
Sea
A naval force has command of the sea
when it is so strong that its rivals cannot
attack it directly. Also called sea control,
this dominance may apply to its
surrounding waters (i.e., the littoral) or may
extend far into the oceans, meaning the
country has a blue-water navy. It is the naval
equivalent of air superiority
Mahan
Decapitation
Decapitation is to achieve strategic
paralysis by targeting political leadership,
command and control, strategic weapons,
and critical economic nodes
Warden, Hart, Pape
Deception
A strategy that seeks to deceive, trick, or
fool the enemy and create a false
perception in a way that can be leveraged
for a military advantage
Sun Tzu
Decisive Point
A geographic place, specific key event,
critical system, or function that allows
commanders to gain a marked advantage
over an enemy and greatly influence the
outcome of an attack
DoD Definition
Denial
A strategy that seeks to destroy an enemy's
ability to wage war
Pape
DIME(FIL)
The elements of national power diplomacy,
information, military, and economics, often
included are financial, intelligence, and law
enforcement
Joint Doctrine
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2. Ends, Ways, Means,
Risk
Strategy is much like a three legged stool of
ends, ways, means balanced on a plane of
varying degree of risk
Lykke
Exhaustion
A strategy that seeks to erode the will or
resources of a country
Delbruck
Fabius Strategy
Fabius was well aware of the military
superiority of the Carthaginians, and so
when Hannibal invaded Italy, Fabius refused
to meet him in a pitched battle. Instead, he
kept his troops close to Hannibal, hoping to
exhaust him in a long war of attrition.
Fabius was able to harass the Carthaginian
foraging parties, limiting Hannibal's ability
to wreak destruction while conserving his
own military force. The delaying tactics
involved a pincer of not directly engaging
Hannibal while also exercising a "scorched
earth" practice to prevent Hannibal's forces
from obtaining grain and other resources
Fabius Maximus
Fog, Friction,
Chance
War is characterized by fog, friction, and
chance
Clausewitz
Golden Bridge
To leave an opponent an opportunity to
withdraw in order to not force them to act
out of desparation
Sun Tzu
Guerrilla Warfare
In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of
seeming to come from the east and
attacking from the west; avoid the solid,
attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a
lightning blow, seek a lightning decision.
When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy,
they withdraw when he advances; harass
him when he stops; strike him when he is
weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In
guerilla strategy, the enemy's rear, flanks,
and other vulnerable spots are his vital
points, and there he must be harassed,
attacked, dispersed, exhausted and
annihilated
Mao
Heavy Force (COIN)
A counterinsurgency strategy that seeks to
destroy and insurgency with overwhelming
force while it is still in a manageable state
Kitson
Incentive
A strategy that uses incentives to gain
cooperation
Army War College
Indirect Approach
Dislocation is the aim of strategy. Direct
attacks almost never work, one must first
upset the enemy's equilibrium, fix weakness
and attack strength, Seven rules of strategy:
1) adjust your ends to your means, 2) keep
your object always in mind, 3) choose the
line of the least expectation, 4) exploit the
line of least resistance, 5) take the line of
operations which offers the most
alternatives, 6) ensure both plans and
dispositions are flexible, 7) do not throw
your weight into an opponent while he is on
guard, 8) do not renew an attack along the
same lines if an attack has failed
Hart
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3. Insurgency Granted mobility, security (in the form of
denying targets to the enemy), time, and
doctrine (the idea to convert every subject
to friendliness), victory will rest with the
insurgents, for the algebraically factors are
in the end decisive, and against them
perfections of means and spirit struggle
quite in vain
Lawrence
Intelligence
Sun Tzu advocated knowing oneself, the
enemy, and the terrain. He also advocated
the use of intelligence collection.
Sun Tzu
Iron Calculus of
War
Resistance = Means x Will Clausewitz
Limited War
A war in which the survival of a nation is not
at stake
Clausewitz
MIDLIFE
The elements of national power diplomacy,
information, military, and economics, often
included are financial, intelligence, and law
enforcement
DoD Definition
Moral Ascendency
Moral force is the trump card for any
military event because as events change
the human elements of war remain
unchanged
Du Piq
National Military
Strategy
A document approved by the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff for distributing and
applying military power to attain national
security strategy and national defense
strategy objectives. Also called NMS
DoD Definition
National Security
Strategy
A document approved by the President of
the United States for developing, applying,
and coordinating the instruments of
national power to achieve objectives that
contribute to national security. Also called
NSS
DoD Definition
Naval-Economic
Dominance
Navies exist to protect their nations
commerce and interrupt that of the enemy
Mahan
Net Assessment
and Reassessment
A look at both sides of complex military
competitions, examining the long-term
trends and present factors that govern the
capabilities of a country and its potential
enemies
Marshall
OODA Loop
Decision-making occurs in a recurring cycle
of observe-orient-decide-act. An entity
(whether an individual or an organization)
that can process this cycle quickly,
observing and reacting to unfolding events
more rapidly than an opponent, can thereby
"get inside" the opponent's decision cycle
and gain the advantage
Boyd
Paradoxical Nature
The nature of strategy is a paradoxical and
does not follow a linear pattern
Luttwak
Periclean Strategy
The two basic principles of the "Periclean
Grand Strategy" were the rejection of
appeasement (in accordance with which he
urged the Athenians not to revoke the
Megarian Decree) and the avoidance of
overextension
Pericles
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4. Persisting Strategy A strategy that seeks to destroy the means
by which an enemy sustains itself
Jones
Positive Ends
The possibility of taking advantage of a new
security environment to create conditions
for long-term peace
Wass de Czege
Primacy of Policy War is an extension of policy Clausewitz
Primary Trinity
(1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity;
(2) the play of chance and probability; and
(3) war's element of subordination to
rational policy
Clausewitz
Principles of War
-Objective (Direct every military operation
towards a clearly defined, decisive, and
attainable Objective)
-Offensive (Seize, retain, and exploit the
initiative)
-Mass (Concentrate combat power at the
decisive place and time)
-Economy of Force (Allocate minimum
essential combat power to secondary
efforts)
-Maneuver (place the enemy in a
disadvantageous position through the
flexible application of combat power)
-Unity of Command (For every Objective,
ensure Unity of effort under one responsible
commander)
-Security (Never permit the enemy to
acquire an unexpected advantage)
-Surprise (Strike the enemy at a time, at a
place, or in a manner For which he is
unprepared)
-Simplicity (Prepare clear, uncomplicated
plans and clear, concise orders to ensure
thorough understanding)
US Army FM 3.0
-Offensive (Seize, retain, and exploit the
initiative)
-Mass (Concentrate combat power at the
decisive place and time)
-Economy of Force (Allocate minimum
essential combat power to secondary
efforts) -Maneuver
(place the enemy in a disadvantageous
position through the flexible application of
combat power)
-Surprise (Strike the enemy at a time, at a
place, or in a manner For which he is
unprepared)
Punishment
A strategy that seeks to push a society
beyond its economic and physiological
breaking point
Pape
Raiding Strategy A strategy that seeks to destroy the enemy Jones
Rapid Decisive
Operations
Compelling an adversary to undertake
certain actions or denying the adversary the
ability to coerce or attack others. Although
many RDO principles will apply to larger-
scale, longer-lasting operations, the RDO
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5. concept is not intended as a preliminary
phase of a protracted campaign
Revolution in
Military Affairs
The evolution of weapons technology,
information technology, military
organization, and military doctrine among
advanced powers
Owens
Revolution
In guerrilla terminology, strategy is
understood as the analysis of the objectives
to be achieved in light of the total military
situation and the overall ways of reaching
these objectives. To have a correct strategic
appreciation from the point of view of the
guerrilla band, it is necessary to analyze
fundamentally what will be the enemy's
mode of action. If the final objective is
always the complete destruction of the
opposite force, the enemy is confronted in
the case of a civil war of this kind with the
standard task: he will have to achieve the
total destruction of each one of the
components of the guerrilla band. The
guerrilla fighter, on the other hand, must
analyze the resources which the enemy has
for trying to achieve that outcome: the
means in men, in mobility, in popular
support, in armaments, in capacity of
leadership on which he can count. We must
make our own strategy adequate on the
basis of these studies, keeping in mind
always the final objective of defeating the
enemy army.
Guevara
Risk
Threaten the things that the leadership
value
Schelling
Sea Control
Navies do not have to command the
expanse of the sea, simply control the most
appropriate areas for the circumstances at
hand
Corbett
Sea-Ground
Connection
The importance of navies lay in their ability
to affect events on land
Corbett
Shape, Clear, Hold,
Build
The counterinsurgency theory that states
the process of winning and insurgency is
shape, clear, hold, build
Galula
Secondary Trinity People, Army, and Government Clausewitz
Separation of
Insurgents
A counterinsurgency strategy should first
seek to separate the enemy from the
population, then deny the enemy reentry,
and finally execute long enough to deny the
insurgent access
Trinquier
Sequential,
Simultaneous,
Cumulative
The distinction on whether the effects of a
military strategy on an enemy are in
sequence, simultaneous, or cumulative
US Army War College
Small Navy
Technology and the size of the ocean make
sea control difficult and expensive, a
country is better off having a small navy
Ecole
Strategic Culture
Countries have distinct strategic cultures
that affect their decision making
Snyder/Rand
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6. Strategic Defensive The first phase of people's war
characterized by guerilla warfare and
tactics, designed to erode the enemy to
achieve force parity
Mao
Strategic Stalemate
The second phase of people's war
characterized by guerilla warfare and
traditional methods of warfare as forces
gained parity
Mao
Strategic Offensive
The third phase of people's war
characterized by regular forces when force
advantage was gained over the enemy
Mao
Strategy
A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing
the instruments of national power in a
synchronized and integrated fashion to
achieve theater, national, and/or
multinational objectives.
DoD Definition
Swarming
Military swarming involves the use of a
decentralized force against an opponent, in
a manner that emphasizes mobility,
communication, unit autonomy and
coordination/synchronization. Historical
military forces have used the principles of
swarming, but there is now active research
in designing military doctrines that
consciously draw ideas from swarming. In
nature and nonmilitary situations, there are
several forms of swarming. Biologically
driven forms are often complex adaptive
systems, but have no central planning,
simple individual rules, and
nondeterministic behavior that evolves with
—or fails to evolve with—the situation
RAND
Systems Approach
Nation-states operate like biological
organisms composed of discrete systems.
These systems included: leadership,
organic essentials, infrastructure,
population, and the military
Warden
Theater Strategy
Concepts and courses of action directed
toward securing the objectives of national
and multinational policies and strategies
through the synchronized and integrated
employment of military forces and other
instruments of national power
DoD Definition
Tipping Point
A strategy that seeks to achieve "levels at
which the momentum for change becomes
unstoppable." Gladwell defines a tipping
point as a sociological term: "the moment
of critical mass, the threshold, the boiling
point."
Gladwell
Total War War in which a nation's survival is at stake Clausewitz
VUCA
Volatility, uncertainty, complexity and
ambiguity characterize the strategic
environment
US Army War College
War Expediency War is a matter of expedients von Moltke
Weinberger-Powell
Doctrine
A list of questions have to be answered
affirmatively before military action is taken
by the United States:
Powell
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7. Powered by
Microsoft Office Live | Create a free website
Is a vital national security interest
threatened?
Do we have a clear attainable objective?
Have the risks and costs been fully and
frankly analyzed?
Have all other non-violent policy means
been fully exhausted?
Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid
endless entanglement?
Have the consequences of our action been
fully considered?
Is the action supported by the American
people?
Do we have genuine broad international
support?
Win Without
Fighting
Sun Tzu argued that a brilliant general was
one that could win without fighting
Sun Tzu
Home | Theory By Author | Theory By Subject | Bibliography | Are we missing a topic? Suggest one here!
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