BG langford Presentation at Williams Foundation seminar October 24 2019ICSA, LLC
BRIG Ian Langford, the head of Army’s Land Capability programs highlighted at the Williams Foundation Seminar held in Canberra, Australia, October 24, 2019, how he saw the Army adapting to the new environment and contributing to fifth generation manoeuvre.
BRIG Ian Langford argued that the evolving networks of forces enabled by a fifth-generation approach could provide new ways to mix and match forces to allow for more combat flexibility.
In this prevention at the Williams Foundation Seminar held in Canberra, Australia on October 24, 2019,
The scene setting presentation for the seminar was provided by WGCDR Joe Brick of the Australian War College. She provided a look back to inform the way ahead for Australia and its allies to position themselves for decisive advantage in 21st century conflict. .
This presentation was given as part of the Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar hosted by the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in November 2014.
This presentation was given as part of the Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar hosted by the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in November 2014.
BG langford Presentation at Williams Foundation seminar October 24 2019ICSA, LLC
BRIG Ian Langford, the head of Army’s Land Capability programs highlighted at the Williams Foundation Seminar held in Canberra, Australia, October 24, 2019, how he saw the Army adapting to the new environment and contributing to fifth generation manoeuvre.
BRIG Ian Langford argued that the evolving networks of forces enabled by a fifth-generation approach could provide new ways to mix and match forces to allow for more combat flexibility.
In this prevention at the Williams Foundation Seminar held in Canberra, Australia on October 24, 2019,
The scene setting presentation for the seminar was provided by WGCDR Joe Brick of the Australian War College. She provided a look back to inform the way ahead for Australia and its allies to position themselves for decisive advantage in 21st century conflict. .
This presentation was given as part of the Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar hosted by the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in November 2014.
This presentation was given as part of the Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar hosted by the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in November 2014.
Doctrine is an army’s game plan. Doctrine not only tells an army how to fight but it communicates intent from the institutional Army to the fighting forces. The progression that leads to doctrine stretches across a temporal “reverse highway” that begins well into the future with a vision of how future wars will be fought. At some point along the highway visioning solidifies into warfighting concepts. All too often, the concept phase of this journey is where dead ends and misleading road signs appear. Visioning is cheap and ephemeral. Concepts, on the other hand, tend to ossify ideas that eventually turn into opinions. Opinions, even false ones, are defended by those whose influences are at stake. Opinions lead to investments that launch programs. Eventually the highway ends at the doctrinal present as organizations and weapons emerge to provide the tools and formations to fight wars
This presentation was given as part of the Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar hosted by the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in November 2014.
4 YEARS AGO WHEN WE FIRST ATTENDED THIS EVENT, THE SPEAKERS WERE SHARING TOPICS AND CASE STUDIES ON FLYER DISTRIBUTION AND REACH. WE WERE TALKING ABOUT PRINTING AND REACH. AND THE MENTION OF DIGITAL WASN’T SOMETHING THAT TOUCHED THE LIVES OF THE PEOPLE IN THIS PARTICULAR ROOM. THIS MONTH’S CONFERENCE COULDN’T HAVE BEEN MORE DIFFERENT, WITH LARGE PRINTERS LIKE
TRANSCONTINTENTAL GIVING TALKS ON
SOCIAL MEDIA STRATEGY AND OTHERS
SPEAKING ABOUT SHOPPERS AND MOBILE.
n preparing content for a youth audience there are a few considerations to keep in mind. The youth target audience for eXtension is K-12 of which 4-H is a part. Integrating 4-H content with the eXtension public site is relatively straightforward. However, 4-H is not our only audience so content must be presented as a land-grant resource to a broader audience. As a land-grant resource, the knowledge base and learning environment for youth can be delivered under the eXtension banner as well as the traditional 4-H clover. Other considerations include presenting content in appropriate reading levels, accommodations for adult facilitators, safe learning environments, collaborative learning, interfacing with social media, virtual learning environments, and more. Interfacing with third party resources is critical as well in order to provide paths of learning for the individual. As the Youth SET for Life CoP transitions to the For Youth, For Life CoP, an expanded knowledge base provides a rich learning resource for all learners. The land-grant knowledge base as a starting point for youth audiences can be an excellent service to our audience. Learning forums initiated with eXtension content can expand to include other resources including new knowledge generated by the forum itself.
This treatise on the recent shortcomings of the Army organizational culture challenges leaders at all levels to evaluate their personal leadership practices and their application of Army policies.
This was a presentation given at the 2007 Boyd Conference in Quantico, Virginia by Dr. Frans Osinga, author of Science, Strategy, and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd. The slides provide a great primer on Boyd Theory.
Why we have military science and theory of war?
Just because the humanity spent much more time in war then in peace. So the war is quite loyal phenomena escorting the humanity.
What we are waiting from the military science?
Whom future wars will be fought, what they will be about, how they will be fought, what wars will be fought for and why people will participate in it.
Doctrine is an army’s game plan. Doctrine not only tells an army how to fight but it communicates intent from the institutional Army to the fighting forces. The progression that leads to doctrine stretches across a temporal “reverse highway” that begins well into the future with a vision of how future wars will be fought. At some point along the highway visioning solidifies into warfighting concepts. All too often, the concept phase of this journey is where dead ends and misleading road signs appear. Visioning is cheap and ephemeral. Concepts, on the other hand, tend to ossify ideas that eventually turn into opinions. Opinions, even false ones, are defended by those whose influences are at stake. Opinions lead to investments that launch programs. Eventually the highway ends at the doctrinal present as organizations and weapons emerge to provide the tools and formations to fight wars
This presentation was given as part of the Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar hosted by the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in November 2014.
4 YEARS AGO WHEN WE FIRST ATTENDED THIS EVENT, THE SPEAKERS WERE SHARING TOPICS AND CASE STUDIES ON FLYER DISTRIBUTION AND REACH. WE WERE TALKING ABOUT PRINTING AND REACH. AND THE MENTION OF DIGITAL WASN’T SOMETHING THAT TOUCHED THE LIVES OF THE PEOPLE IN THIS PARTICULAR ROOM. THIS MONTH’S CONFERENCE COULDN’T HAVE BEEN MORE DIFFERENT, WITH LARGE PRINTERS LIKE
TRANSCONTINTENTAL GIVING TALKS ON
SOCIAL MEDIA STRATEGY AND OTHERS
SPEAKING ABOUT SHOPPERS AND MOBILE.
n preparing content for a youth audience there are a few considerations to keep in mind. The youth target audience for eXtension is K-12 of which 4-H is a part. Integrating 4-H content with the eXtension public site is relatively straightforward. However, 4-H is not our only audience so content must be presented as a land-grant resource to a broader audience. As a land-grant resource, the knowledge base and learning environment for youth can be delivered under the eXtension banner as well as the traditional 4-H clover. Other considerations include presenting content in appropriate reading levels, accommodations for adult facilitators, safe learning environments, collaborative learning, interfacing with social media, virtual learning environments, and more. Interfacing with third party resources is critical as well in order to provide paths of learning for the individual. As the Youth SET for Life CoP transitions to the For Youth, For Life CoP, an expanded knowledge base provides a rich learning resource for all learners. The land-grant knowledge base as a starting point for youth audiences can be an excellent service to our audience. Learning forums initiated with eXtension content can expand to include other resources including new knowledge generated by the forum itself.
This treatise on the recent shortcomings of the Army organizational culture challenges leaders at all levels to evaluate their personal leadership practices and their application of Army policies.
This was a presentation given at the 2007 Boyd Conference in Quantico, Virginia by Dr. Frans Osinga, author of Science, Strategy, and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd. The slides provide a great primer on Boyd Theory.
Why we have military science and theory of war?
Just because the humanity spent much more time in war then in peace. So the war is quite loyal phenomena escorting the humanity.
What we are waiting from the military science?
Whom future wars will be fought, what they will be about, how they will be fought, what wars will be fought for and why people will participate in it.
The US Government has refused since WWII to be serious about intelligence as decision support, instead treating intelligence (and now DHS) and mini versions of the DoD prok process. There is nothing intelligent about how the USG does intelligence, and that is our national sucking chest wound.
As the 21st Century dawns, warfare is in the midst of revolutionary change. Information Age warfare characterized by knowledge, speed, and precision is slowly supplanting Industrial Age war and its reliance on mass. The advent of precision firepower is but the first tremor of this tectonic shift. As it reverberates around the globe, the Precision Firepower Military Technical Revolution will dramatically increase the lethality and reach of defensive fires. Unless the means
for offensive maneuver adapt to overcome the greatly enhanced power of the defense, future soldiers will face stalemate and indecision much like their forefathers confronted in 1914.
The Kennedy Doctrine of Flexible Response Flexible Response.docxoreo10
The Kennedy Doctrine of Flexible Response
Flexible Response
Flexible response was a defensestrategy implemented by John F. Kennedy in 1961 to address his administration's skepticism of Dwight Eisenhower's New Look policy of massive retaliation. Flexible response called for mutual deterrence at strategic, tactical and conventional levels, giving the United States the capability to respond to aggression across the spectrum of warfare, not limited only to nuclear arms.
History
The New Look policy, though initially useful, quickly became obsolete with the introduction of inter-continental delivery systems that undermined the credibility of a deterrence threat. The cornerstone of U.S. and European defense strategy was then threatened as the U.S. could no longer rely on nuclear threats to provide security for it and its allies.
John F. Kennedy won the presidency by claiming that the Republican party had allowed the U.S. to fall behind the Soviets into a missile gap. Upon entering office Kennedy cited General Maxwell Taylor's book The Uncertain Trumpet to Congress for its conclusion that massive retaliation left the U.S. with only two choices: defeat on the ground or the resort to the use of nuclear weapons. Technology had improved since massive retaliation was adopted. Improvements in communication and transportation meant U.S. forces could be deployed more effectively, quickly, and flexibly than before. Advisers persuaded Kennedy that having multiple options would allow the president to apply the appropriate amount of force at the right place without risking escalation or losing alternatives. This would improve credibility for deterrence as the U.S. would now have low-intensity options and therefore would be more likely to use them, rather than massive retaliation's all-or-nothing options.
Flexible response was implemented to develop several options across the spectrum of warfare, other than the nuclear option, for quickly dealing with enemy aggression. In addition, the survivability of the retaliatory capability was stressed, leading to the diversification of the strategic force, development of the strategic triad and half the Strategic Air Command force being put on permanent alert status.
The Kennedy Doctrine did not include the ability to fight nuclear wars because of the idea that it would undermine deterrence, was technologically unworkable, would fuel the arms race, and was not politically feasible. Importance was also placed on counterinsurgency and the development of unconventional military forces, unconventional tactics and “civic action” programs.
Types of Flexible Response
There are four different avenues of response: informational, diplomatic, economic, and military. Informational responses are designed to both increase the awareness of the problem and to gain support for potential conflict from both the public and Congress. Diplomatic responses are centered on strengthening international support for the issue and p ...
Students will discuss the selection of George Washington as commander of the Continental Army, evaluate his qualifications, and decide if he was, indeed, the right choice.
Adversarial Problem Solving Modeling An Opponent Using Explanatory Coherence
Distributed Operations
1. Distributed Operations, Command, and Intelligence: A Brief Historical Perspective Intelligence Support to Distributed Operations Workshop Col Eric M. Walters, USMC Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Marine Forces Command Commercial: (757) 836-1600 [email_address]
Is Distributed Operations a new idea? Actually, the concept has historical roots well before the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab began experimenting with infestation/investation tactics in the late 1990s. What can we learn from those historical roots? What are the lessons learned? Good________, I am Colonel Eric Walters, the G2 of Marine Forces Command, and I’ll provide you with a brief overview of the historical perspective on Distributed Operations, or DO.