Presentation examining small state security engagement in MENA. This was presented at Georgetown University, 1st October 2017.

1. Small State Security Engagement in
Post-Arab Spring MENA; Case of GCC
PhD Candidate, Durham University & Advisor, Gulf State Analytics
Matthew Hedges
m.j.hedgeshook@gmail.com
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2. Small States Foreign Relations
“Smart strategies that
combine the tools of both
hard and soft power”
JS Nye, ‘Get Smart, Combining Hard and Soft
Power’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.88, No.4, July/August
2009, p.160
for small states seeking to
best leverage their limited
political, economic and
strategic assets, it made
rational sense to increase
their importance to as
many powerful external
partners as possible’
KC Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, Hurst &
Company, London, 2014, p.41
"ensure defense assistance,
promote trade and
economic assistance,
secure cooperation at
regional levels, and benefit
from multilateral
peacekeeping,
international law, and
intervention when
necessary"
S Harden, Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro
World, Frances Pinter Publishers, 1985, pp.115-123,
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3. GCC Focused Post-Arab
Spring Focused Relations
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4. GCC Post-Arab Spring Security-Focused
Relations
• Heightened position within society
• Have increasingly deployed overseas
• Initially working with foreign states
• Have led foreign engagements
Armed Forces
Development &
Deployment
• Predominantly were commercial and
economic
• Since 2011  security focused
• Diversification of foreign ties led to
innovative relations
Utilization of
personnel ties
and connections
RealistSocial
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5. United Arab Emirates (UAE)
Unique Approach
• State-in-society interpretation
• ‘Society as a mélange of social organizations
rather than a dichotomous structure’
• JS Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform
and Constitute One Another, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2001, p.49
• Driven by TWO key factors
• UAE is a federal state
• Power concentration within a single
tribe
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6. UAE Security-Foreign Policy
UAE
Foreign
Policy
Arabian
Gulf
Arabian
Peninsula
MENA
States
Islamic
World
P Hellyer, ‘The Evolution of UAE
Foreign Policy’, I al Abed & P
Hellyer (.eds), United Arab
Emirates: A New Perspective,
Trident Press, London, 2001,
pp. 161-178
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Prioritized HARD power over soft
power
Engaged in multiple multi-national
coalitions
UAE’s security-focused societal
engagement strategy requires a
closer and in-depth analysis

7. Emirati Security Focus
Speech of Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, 72nd United Nations General Assembly
22nd September 2017
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8. Libya
• UAE joined NATO’s Operation Unified
Protector
• Contributed aerial assets to multi-national
coalition
• After Ghaddafi’s removal, the UAE united
with KSA, Egypt, and Russia to target
Islamists
• UAE sponsored the return of Haftar and has
been joined by France, Italy, and the US
• Co-opted political figures such as Bernardino
Leon and former Libyan Ambassador to UAE
Aref Ali Nayed
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9. Somalia
• Somalia portfolio initially packaged as a
commercially-driven security issue
• Orchestrated a Public-Private-
Partnership (PPP) to deliver capability
• Security focus :
• Sea based  land focused
• Development of Local entities
• Puntland Maritime Force (PMF)
• National Intelligence and Security Agency
(NISA)
• Somali National Army (SNA)
• Focus in Somaliland
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10. Yemen
• Abu Dhabi heritage linked to South
Yemen
• Joined the Saudi led coalition
• Focused efforts on combatting
extremists in South Yemen
• Abu Dhabi’s Strategy has been at odds
with Riyadh’s
• Developed local security groups
• Security Belt Forces
• Hadrami Elite Forces
• Foreign engagement mediated
through tribal and informal mediums 10

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12. Conclusion
Through re-interpretation of threats and reformed
foreign relations, the small GCC states have
significantly multiplied their arenas of foreign
engagement
Traditional allies reluctance for support has
created new security-led alliances; not replaced
but supplemented
Public-private initiatives are delivering security
through combination of hard and soft mediums,
however the UAE’s contribution to overseas
military operations evidences confidence in their
post-Arab Spring GCC vision
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