Abstract ********* SecDevOps has complex challenges: remote code execution vulnerabilities could lead to a takeover of the backend. Web hosters and Cloud providers have to deal with the extreme: remote code execution as a service by running user code (PHP, NodeJS, Go, dotnet, …). What does the Linux Kernel provide to contain successful attacks other than a firewall, user separation and permissions? Do Docker containers really contain? About the Speaker: ********************* Reinhard Kugler is Principal Security Consultant at SBA Research. He focuses on secure software engineering, infrastructure security and malware analysis. Currently his main activities concentrate on penetration testing.

1. Classification: Confidential 2
Willkommen
zur SBA Live Academy
#bleibdaheim #remotelearning
After the Exploit – Linux Self-defense
by Reinhard Kugler
This talk will be recorded as soon as the presentation starts!
Please be sure to turn off your video in your control panel.

2. Classification: Confidential 4SBA Research gGmbH, 2020 https://www.martialtribes.com/defend-against-multiple-attackers/
CVE-2018-1260
CVE-2014-6271
CVE-2018-11776CVE-2019-11043
CVE-2020-?

3. Classification: Confidential 5
Remote Code Exection Attacks
SBA Research gGmbH, 2020
apache
/bin/sh
php

4. Classification: Confidential 7SBA Research gGmbH, 2020
SelfdefenseTip0:
Don‘t breakyourownstuff.

5. Classification: ConfidentialSBA Research gGmbH, 2020
SelfdefenseTip1:
Reducetheattacksurface

6. Classification: Confidential 9
Example: Apache HTTP Server
SBA Research gGmbH, 2020
apache (root)
Underlying operating system
apache (www-data)
tcp/80
tcp/443
Things we do not like
✓ Don‘t run as root
✓ Don‘t permit access to
files of the operating
system
✓ Don‘t run arbitrary
programs

7. Classification: Confidential 10
Capabilities
• CAP_CHOWN
• CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
• CAP_NET_ADMIN
• CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
• CAP_NET_RAW
• CAP_SYS_ADMIN
• CAP_SYS_BOOT
• CAP_SYS_CHROOT
• …
expressed as bitmask in
/proc/$$/status
SBA Research gGmbH, 2018
https://www.andreasch.com/2018/01/13/capabilities/
[Service]
...
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
...
http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/systemd.exec.5.html
# setcap cap_net_bind_service+ep
/usr/sbin/apache
Systemd configuration
Extended attribute

8. Classification: Confidential 11
Example: Apache HTTP Server
SBA Research gGmbH, 2020
Underlying operating system
tcp/80
tcp/443
Rogue process
apache (www-data)
apache (www-data)
Things we do not like
✓ Don‘t run as root
✓ Don‘t permit access to
files of the operating
system
✓ Don‘t run arbitrary
programs

9. Classification: ConfidentialSBA Research gGmbH, 2020
SelfdefenseTip2:
ContaintheAttack
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Strikeforce_cage_2011-01-07.jpg

10. Classification: Confidential 13
Example: Apache HTTP Server
SBA Research gGmbH, 2020
Underlying operating system
Rogue process
container
(limited) container filesystem
tcp/80
tcp/443
apache (www-data)
apache (www-data)

11. Classification: Confidential 15SBA Research gGmbH, 2020

12. Classification: ConfidentialSBA Research gGmbH, 2020
SelfdefenseTip3:
EnsureMandatoryAccess
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Goshin_jujitsu_head_arm_lock_med.JPG

13. Classification: Confidential 18
Mandatory Access Control
SBA Research gGmbH, 2020
AppArmor SELinux
process /etc/passwd
/bin/sh
1.1.1.1:80

14. Classification: Confidential 19
Quick Fix with AppArmor
• /etc/apparmor.d/usr.sbin.apache2
SBA Research gGmbH, 2018
/usr/sbin/apache2 {
...
deny /bin/dash x,
...
}
read (r), write (w),
append (a)
link (l)
lock (k)
mmap (m)
execute (ix)
child profile (Cx)
profile (Px)
unconfined (Ux)
/** recursive
# apparmor_parser -r -W /etc/apparmor.d/usr.sbin.apache2
# aa-complain apache2
# docker run --rm -it --security-opt "apparmor=apache2" -p 8000:80 apache2
# aa-enforce apache2

15. Classification: Confidential 22
Remote Code Exection Attacks
SBA Research gGmbH, 2020
tcp/80
tcp/443
apache (www-data)

16. Classification: Confidential 23
Syscall Interface
SBA Research gGmbH, 2020
Kernel
syscall
apache2
files
memory
process
fstat(1, {st_mode=S_IFCHR|0620, st_rdev=makedev(0x88, 0), ...}) = 0
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY) = 3
fstat(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2431, ...}) = 0
fadvise64(3, 0, 0, POSIX_FADV_SEQUENTIAL) = 0
mmap(NULL, 139264, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0x7f60e0a40000
read(3, "root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bashn"..., 131072) = 2431
write(1, "root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bashn"..., 2431) = 2431
read(3, "", 131072) = 0
close(3) = 0
# /bin/cat /etc/passwd

17. Classification: ConfidentialSBA Research gGmbH, 2020
SelfdefenseTip4:
ReducetheKernelSurface

18. Classification: Confidential 25SBA Research gGmbH, 2020
http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/syscalls.2.html

19. Classification: Confidential 26
Seccomp BPF (filter syscalls)
• Create a BPF script via macros
• Load it via a syscall into the Kernel
SBA Research gGmbH, 2020
/* Allow system calls other than open() and openat() */
struct sock_filter filter[] = {
...
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, __NR_open, 2, 0),
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, __NR_openat, 1, 0),
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS)
}
struct sock_fprog prog = { .filter=filter, .len=... };
syscall(__NR_seccomp, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog);

20. Classification: Confidential 29
Example: BPF to kill proceses using syscalls
SBA Research gGmbH, 2020
[Service]
...
SystemCallFilter =~ bind
SystemCallFilter =~ chroot
...
# docker run -it --security-opt
seccomp=profile.json ...
{
"defaultAction":"SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
"syscalls":[
{
"names":[
"bind",
"connect",
"mkdir"
],
"action":"SCMP_ACT_KILL",
Systemd configurationDocker

21. Classification: ConfidentialSBA Research gGmbH, 2020
“Ifyoutakeabus,youshouldknow whentogetoff!“
― MasterIainArmstrong

22. Classification: Confidential 32
Final Remarks
SBA Research gGmbH, 2020
0)Don‘tbreakyourownstuff
1)Reduce theattacksurface
2)Contain theAttack
3)Ensure Mandatory Access
4) Reducethe Kernel Surface
https://github.com/netblue30/firejail
https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak
https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap
https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox

23. Classification: Confidential 33
Professional Services
Penetration Testing
Architecture Reviews
Security Audit
Security Trainings
Incident Response Readiness
ISMS & ISO 27001 Consulting
Forschung & Beratung unter einem Dach
Applied Research
Industrial Security | IIoT Security |
Mathematics for Security Research |
Machine Learning | Blockchain | Network
Security | Sustainable Software Systems |
Usable Security
SBA Research
Knowhow Transfer
SBA Live Academy | sec4dev | Trainings |
Events | Teaching | sbaPRIME
Kontaktieren Sie uns: anfragen@sba-research.org
Reinhard Kugler
rkugler@sba-research.org

24. Classification: Confidential 34
#bleibdaheim #remotelearning
Coming up @ SBA Live Academy
13.05.2020, 13.00 Uhr, live:
„Die COVID-19 Krise und
Simulationsmodelle. Was kann
man sagen? Und was nicht? “
by „Niki Popper (CSO und
Mitgründer der dwh GmbH)“
Treten Sie unserer MeetUp Gruppe bei!
https://www.meetup.com/Security-Meetup-by-SBA-
Research/

25. Classification: Confidential 35
Reinhard Kugler
SBA Research gGmbH
Floragasse 7, 1040 Wien
rkugler@sba-research.org
SBA Research gGmbH, 2020