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Sanjay pradhan
- 1. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Improving Governance in Developing Countries Presented by: Sanjay Pradhan Director Public Sector Governance Board The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course Presented to:
- 2. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Focus for Today: Outline Importance of Good Governance & Anticorruption Governance: Framework & Measurement Priority Areas for Improving Governance Operational Strategy on Anticorruption
- 3. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Governance – Good and Bad Lessons from the last 50 years Some governments have helped deliver substantial improvements in income, health and education outcomes (East Asia) In other countries, governmental action has resulted in wasted resources, weak investment and growth, and entrenched corruption
- 4. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Good Governance matters for investment and growth 10% 15% 20% High Medium Low % Investment share in GDP High Medium Low -1.5% 0% 1% 2% 1.5% -0.5% -1.0% 0.5% Income per capita Growth Rate Governance Quality Governance Quality measured by perception of 4000 firms in 67 countries on: (i) protection of property rights; (ii) judicial reliability; (iii) predictability of rules; (iv) control of corruption. World Development Report Survey 1997
- 5. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› The direction of causality … Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) found that while higher per capita incomes foster democracy, democracy in turn does not foster higher incomes B. Friedman (2005) argues that higher living standards encourage more open, tolerant and democratic societies Growth causes governance to improve ... … and better governance causes growth Using measures of rule of law, bureaucratic quality and corruption, Chong and Calderon (2000) found significant causality from good governance to growth and vice versa – i.e. “good governance” both contributes to and results from strong economic performance Other studies have dealt with the potential for reverse causation by using exogenous instruments for the governance indicators and concluded that good governance has a significant and strong causal impact on economic performance … … but the debate on causality continues …
- 6. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Bangladesh Governance – Growth Conundrum Moderate growth rates and high corruption coexist Need to unbundle governance – not all bad news State allowed civil society to step in and deliver key services Is Bangladesh’s governance ‘good enough’? Bangladesh needs to move to a higher growth path of 6-7% a year to achieve the PRSP’s poverty reduction objectives and related MDGs Growth rates may not be sustainable – growth is driven largely by garment exports and phase out of the MFA quota system puts this growth at risk Fiduciary and reputational risk to Bank significant Improving governance is key to unlocking other sources of growth According to the 2005 ICA, corruption is now the greatest obstacle to doing business, overtaking power Bangladesh remains fairly isolated from the world economy and is unable to capitalize on the growth dividend that globalization might bring. Trade openness is very low (Bangladesh ranks 175 out of 182 countries), as is FDI (Bangladesh ranks 137 out of 141 countries). Attracting FDI would require significant improvements in the investment climate Improving critical infrastructure, especially power and ports, requires solving fundamental governance problems in each sector
- 7. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Focus for Today: Outline Importance of Good Governance & Anticorruption Governance: Framework Priority Areas for Improving Governance Operational Strategy on Anticorruption
- 8. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Governance & Corruption – Not the same thing! The manner in which the State acquires and exercises its authority to provide public goods and services Using public office for private gain Governance Corruption Corruption is an outcome – a consequence of the failure of accountability relationships in the governance system
- 9. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Governance Systems: Supply and Demand Supply-side: Capacities and organizational arrangements – leadership, skills, human resource and financial management systems – embodied in state institutions to deliver public goods and services Demand-side: Institutions and accountability arrangements – elections, political parties, parliaments, judicial systems, free press, civil society organizations, accountable local governments – that enable citizens and firms to hold state institutions to account
- 10. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Governance Systems: Actors, Capacities and Accountability Outcomes: Services, Regulations, Corruption Political Actors & Institutions • Political Parties • Competition, transparency Executive-Central Govt Service Delivery & Regulatory Agencies Subnational Govt & Communities Check & Balance Institutions • Parliament • Judiciary • Oversight institutions Civil Society & Private Sector •Civil Society Watchdogs •Media •Business Associations Cross-cutting Control Agencies (Finance, HR) Citizens/Firms Citizens/Firms Citizens/Firms Citizens/Firms
- 11. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Governance Systems: When Accountability Breaks Down Outcomes: Services, Regulations, Corruption Political Actors & Institutions • Political Parties • Competition, transparency Executive-Central Govt Service Delivery & Regulatory Agencies Subnational Govt & Communities Check & Balance Institutions • Parliament • Judiciary • Oversight institutions Civil Society & Private Sector •Civil Society Watchdogs •Media •Business Associations Cross-cutting Control Agencies (Finance, HR) Citizens/Firms Citizens/Firms Citizens/Firms Citizens/Firms State Capture Patronag e & nepotis m administrati ve corruption
- 12. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Governance Problems: Some Examples Grand Corruption: State Capture Leaders plundering state assets (Mobutu, Abacha) Powerful “oligarchs” buying state officials (CIS) Corrupt leaders colluding with corrupt investors: non- competitive, non-transparent award of contracts (oil & gas) Nepotism and Patronage in Public Service Political pressure for award of contracts, appointments Politicized transfers (South Asia) Administrative (Petty) Corruption & Inefficiency: Bribes for licenses, permits, government services Diversion of funds for public programs Inefficient and ineffective service delivery
- 13. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Two Governance Patterns Good (enough) governance: Developmental orientation of political leadership, functional check & balances, system not highest performing but mutually reinforcing and self-correcting Clientelist: Political leaders use authority to maintain their power base or are captured by powerful private interests. Leaders bypass check and balance institutions and use bureaucracy for patronage.
- 14. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Political Accountability • Political competition, broad-based political parties • Transparency & regulation of party financing • Disclosure of parliamentary votes Checks & Balances • Independent, effective judiciary • Legislative oversight (PACs, PECs) • Independent oversight institutions (SAI) • Global initiatives: UN, OECD Convention, anti- money laundering Citizens/Firms Citizens/Firms Citizens/Firms Citizens/Firms Decentralization and Local Participation • Decentralization with accountability • Community Driven Development (CDD) • Oversight by parent-teacher associations & user groups • Beneficiary participation in projects Civil Society & Media • Freedom of press, FOI • Civil society watchdogs • Report cards, client surveys Private Sector Interface • Streamlined regulation • Public-private dialogue • Extractive Industry Transparency • Corporate governance • Collective business associations Effective Public Sector Management • Ethical leadership: asset declaration, conflict of interest rules • Cross-cutting public management systems: meritocracy, public finance, procurement • Service delivery and regulatory agencies in sectors Good Governance has many dimensions
- 15. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Political Accountability • Political competition, broad-based political parties • Transparency & regulation of party financing • Disclosure of parliamentary votes Checks & Balances • Independent, effective judiciary • Legislative oversight (PACs, PECs) • Independent oversight institutions (SAI) • Global initiatives: UN, OECD Convention, anti- money laundering Citizens/Firms Citizens/Firms Citizens/Firms Citizens/Firms Local Participation & Community Empowerment • Decentralization with accountability • Community Driven Development (CDD) • Oversight by parent-teacher associations & user groups • Beneficiary participation in projects Civil Society & Media • Freedom of press • Freedom of information • Civil society watchdogs • Public hearings of draft laws • Report cards, client surveys • Participatory country diagnostic surveys Private Sector Interface • Streamlined regulation • Public-private dialogue • Break-up of monopolies • Extractive Industry Transparency • Corporate governance • Collective business associations Effective Public Sector Management • Ethical leadership: asset declaration, conflict of interest rules • Cross-cutting public management systems: meritocracy, public finance, procurement • Service delivery and regulatory agencies in sectors The Bank operations focus only on some Primary focus of WB operations in governance
- 16. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Operational Implication: Unpack Governance What are the specific governance problems of concern? Corruption? If so, where is it concentrated? Health? Education? Financial sector? Procurement? Poor delivery of public services? If so, which one? Weak credibility for private investment? What are the specific drivers of poor outcomes? Powerful interests purchasing state policy for private interest Kick-backs in public procurement Lack of citizen voice to influence service delivery Weak checks and balances to constrain arbitrary action What are the priorities for governance reform? Public regulation and financing of political parties Transparent, competitive procurement Strengthened legislative oversight, independent judiciary Meritocracy in public administration
- 17. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Focus for Today: Outline Importance of Good Governance & Anticorruption Governance: Measurement Priority Areas for Improving Governance Operational Strategy on Anticorruption
- 18. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Two Approaches to Measuring Governance Broad and Aggregated: Broad measures to measure governance at more aggregated levels. Help reveal systematic patterns – and basis for monitoring trends over time. Specific and Disaggregated: Specific measures of quality of key governance subsystems, including using “actionable indicators” to benchmark and track reforms.
- 19. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Control of Corruption: one Aggregate Indicator (selected countries from 204 worldwide, for illustration, based on 2004 research data) -2.5 0 2.5 EQUATORIALGUINEA KOREA,NORTH TURKMENISTAN UZBEKISTAN TAJIKISTAN BANGLADESH VENEZUELA ZAMBIA RUSSIA KOREA,SOUTH MAURITIUS SOUTHAFRICA GREECE ITALY BOTSWANA SLOVENIA CHILE FRANCE SPAIN UNITEDKINGDOM NETHERLANDS NORWAY NEWZEALAND FINLAND Poor Gov- ernance Governance Level Margins of ErrorGood Governance Source for data: : 'Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004’, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10th percentile rank; Light Red between 10th and 25th ; Orange, between 25th and 50th ; Yellow, between 50th and 75th ; Light Green between 75th and 90th ; Dark Green above 90th.
- 20. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Comprehensive Fiscal oversight: Are the aggregate fiscal position and risks are monitored and managed? Information: Is adequate fiscal, revenue and expenditure information produced and disseminated to meet decision-making and management purposes? Comprehensive, Policy-based, budget: Does the budget capture all relevant fiscal transactions, and is the process, giving regard to government policy? Budget Realism: Is the budget realistic, and implemented as intended in a predictable manner? Control: Is effective control and stewardship exercised in the use of public funds? Accountability and Transparency: Are effective external financial accountability and transparency arrangements in place? PEFA’s Performance Measurement Framework Six PFM System Aspects
- 21. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› The “Bribe Fee” List Unofficial payments by firms in Ukraine Enterprises Type of License/Service/”Favor” Average fee required admitting need to pay (1996) “unofficially” Enterprise registration $176 66% Each visit by fire/health inspector $42 81% Tax inspector (each regular visit) $87 51% Telephone line installation $894 78% Lease in state space (square ft. per month) $7 66% Export license/registration $123 61% Import license/registration $278 71% Border crossing (lump sum) $211 100% Border crossing (percent of value) 3% 57% Domestic currency loan from bank on 4% 81% preferential terms (percent of value) Hard currency loan on preferential 4% 85% terms (percent of value)
- 22. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Citizen Report Card of Government Services: Latvia 0 10 20 30 40 Percent giving favorable rating Post Office State Educational Institutions Office of Social Benefits Polyclinic/Health Services Agency of Immigration & Citizenship Prosecutor Customs Service Courts Local Housing Authority Police
- 23. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› 5 10 15 20 25 30 Proportion of firms affected by capture of … Hungary Estonia Russia Ukraine Parliamentary Votes Presidential Admin. Decrees Civil Court Decrees The Challenge of State Capture
- 24. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Focus for Today: Outline Importance of Good Governance & Anticorruption Governance: Framework & Measurement Priority Areas for Improving Governance Operational Strategy on Anticorruption
- 25. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Priority Areas for Improving Governance Strengthening Public Management Systems Strengthening public finance management & accountability E-procurement for greater transparency and competition Improving front-line service provision Instituting citizen report cards and monitoring Strengthen community monitoring and oversight Strengthening Leadership & Ethics for good governance Strengthening global checks and balances: Instituting transparency in extractive industries Strengthening global initiatives to curb transnational corruption
- 26. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› The new international aid architecture emphasizes the principle of mutual accountability Scaling up of donor assistance requires sound PFM systems and reduced corruption in partner countries Strengthening PFM Systems a key priority Increasing recognition that "ringfencing" projects will not work Important benefits from using country's own systems -- but need to strengthen capacity and accountability of PFM
- 27. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Budget realism Tanzania MTEF Budget Comprehensiveness Oversight by CSOs & Professional groups Information AAA support merging planning and budgeting in Lesotho Control IFMIS in Sierra Leone, accounting training in Africa Civil society monitoring of Chad Oil Fund, Professional Accountancy Institutions in DRC, Mali, Guinea and Kenya Internal control and audit support in HIPCs Bank interventions to build capacity: multiple targets and tools (AFR) Parliamentary Oversight Support for Parliamentary oversight in Ghana, Kenya and Zambia; Supreme Audit Institutions in Cape Verde, Sierra Leone and Senegal
- 28. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› ‘Demand-side’ interventions to strengthen accountability in PFM Participatory Budgeting, Puerto Alegra (Brazil) Civil Society Oversight; transparent, competitive procurement (Slovakia) Strengthening Supreme Audit Institutions (Hungary) Public Expenditure Tracking & Information Campaigns (Cambodia, Cameroon, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia and on-going in Azerbaijan and Yemen) Procurement oversight by CSOs (Philippines) Strengthening Public Accounts Committees of Parliament (India) Transparent, competitive e- procurement (LAC) Strengthening Public Accounts Committees of Parliament (Kenya, Ghana, Zambia -- AFR)
- 29. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› All supplier companies register, indicating areas of business (e.g., IT, construction, furniture) Public agencies submit tenders through internet Automatic e-mail to all companies in selected area Online information on name, position of official in-charge Online information on results: who participated, proposals made, scores received, who won bid, historical record of agency’s purchases and contracts Chile’s Internet-based Public Procurement: Transparency and Competition
- 30. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Civil Society Monitoring for Improved Service Provision: Bangalore 5 6 4 9 25 1 14 41 47 42 67 34 34 16 32 32 73 94 73 92 73 78 85 96 77 n/a n/a 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 C ity council ElectricityW atersupply Telephones Public hospitals PoliceLand authorityPublic buses Transportauthority Agencies %satisfied 1994 1999 2003 Source : Public Affairs Center, India
- 31. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Transparency & Community Monitoring: Primary Education in Uganda 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 US$ per Student Intended Grant Amount Received by School (mean) 1999 Public info campaign
- 32. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› “BIR Officials Amass Unexplained Wealth” By Tess Bacalla , Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism CAR MODEL BENEFICIAL OWNER REGISTERED OWNER Nissan Patrol Edwin Abella BIR Reg'l Director, Quezon City Sulpicio S. Bulanon Jr. 1817 Jordan Plains Subd., Quezon City (listed address of Abella in his SALs) Suzuki Grand Vitara Ditto Merrick Abella (son of Abella) 24 Xavierville, Loyola Heights, Q uezon City Nissan Cefiro Ditto Elizabeth S. Buendia 152 Road 8, Pag-asa, Quezon City BMW Lucien E. Sayuno BIR Reg'l Director, Makati City Limtra Dev. Corp. Zone 4, Dasmariñas, Cavite BMW Ditto Marie Rachel D. Meneses c/o Metrocor and Holdings, G&F, Makati City Honda Accord Danilo A. Duncano BIR Reg'l Director, Quezon City Daniel Anthony P. Duncano 2618 JP Rizal, New Capital Estate, Quezon City Mitsubishi L200 Corazon P. Pangcog Asst.Reg'l Director, Valenzuela City Alberto P. Pangcog (husband) B2 L23 Lagro Subd., Quezon City Honda CR-V Ditto Alberto P. Pangcog 9 Ricardo St., Carmel 1 Subd., Quezon City Honda CR-V Ditto Ditto BMW Flordeliza P.Villegas Revenue District Of’cer Cabanatuan City Charito P. Sico 8 Ma.Elena St., Carmel 1 Subd., Quezon City Owner: Regional Director in the Bureau of Internal Revenue; forced to resign; currently facing corruption charges; other officials suspended, also facing charges Media,Transparency, and Combating Corruption
- 33. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Leadership & Ethics Beyond accountability systems, leadership and ethics in public service shape standards of governance and anticorruption Leaders set standards for integrity, catalyze politically difficult change Way forward is to empower and develop critical mass of reform-minded leaders committed to integrity Innovative pilots in transformational leadership to engender paradigm shift: Madagascar, Burundi, Kenya Global Integrity Alliance: Peer support network of public officials committed to ethics in public service
- 34. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Strengthening Public Service Ethics 5 Cs to Counter Corruption Strengthen Values & Ethics: Counter Corruption Commitment to Contribute Connectedness Courage Cosmology Care & Compassion Overcoming insecurity & incessant quest for material acquisitions Creating a sense of belonging to society Creating a sense of Compassion to care for the more needy in society Creating a commitment to public service – to give v/s take Broaden vision by seeing life in the context of the huge universe Source: H.H. Sri Sri Ravishankar (Founder, IAHV) @ The International Anticorruption Conference, Korea
- 35. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Recent global initiatives to curb transnational corruption OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (1997) UN Convention Against Corruption Treaty (2003) – 94 countries join Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) (1989) -- 40 Recommendations (2003) Recovery of proceeds from corruption (Nigeria 2005) Publish What You Pay, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative World Bank blacklists corrupt firms Transparency International Principles for countering bribery Governance Network of OECD DAC (GOVNET) Norway’s ‘Doers’ Network on Anticorruption (2004)
- 36. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: Key Principles Independent review of payments made to the government by oil, gas and mining companies and of revenues received by government from those companies by a reputable third party (i.e. audit firm). Publication in a readily accessible form of payments made by the companies and of revenues received by government. Extension of all of the above to companies including state owned enterprises. Active engagement of all stakeholders in the design, monitoring, and implementation process. Commitment to a work plan and timelines for implementation.
- 37. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Focus for Today: Outline Importance of Good Governance & Anticorruption Governance: Framework & Measurement Priority Areas for Improving Governance Operational Strategy on Anticorruption
- 38. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Fiduciary Risk That donor resources will not be used for the purposes intended Reputational Risk That large amounts of aid in countries with corrupt leaders will tarnish donors’ reputation Development Effectiveness Risk That poor governance- corruption will undermine the impact of development efforts in general and in donor- supported projects Corruption pose three significant risks
- 39. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› 1 Afghanistan 2 Angola 3 Azerbaijan 4 Bangladesh 5 Belarus 6 Cambodia 7 Central African. Rep. 8 Chad 9 Comoros 10 Congo, Dem. Rep. 11 Cote D'Ivoire 12 Djibouti 13 Equatorial Guinea 14 Gambia, The 15 Guinea 16 Guinea-Bissau 17 Haiti 18 Iraq 19 Kazakhstan 20 Korea, North 21 Kyrgyz Rep. 22 Lao, PDR 23 Lebanon 24 Liberia 25 Libya 26 Myanmar 27 Nigeria 28 Paraguay 29 Sierra Leone 30 Somalia 31 Sudan 32 Swaziland 33 Tajikistan 34 Togo 35 Turkmenistan 36 Uzbekistan 37 Venezuela 38 Yemen, Rep. 39 Zimbabwe (Countries in blue are inactive WB borrowers) Notes: Data on left: Countries listed in alphabetical order using 2004 data. These countries scored in the bottom quartile on the main corruption question in the World Bank’s 2004 CPIA which covered 135 countries AND scored in the bottom quartile on the 5 questions on broader governance issues in the 2004 CPIA OR scored in the bottom quartile on the 2004 Control of Corruption component of the WBI/DEC Kaufmann-Kraay Aggregate Governance Indicator. Countries not included in the 2004 CPIA but included in the WBI/DEC index are here if they fell in the bottom quartile of that index (Afghanistan, Iraq, North Korea, Liberia, Libya, Myanmar, and Somalia). This list includes inactive borrowers and ineligible countries. Inactive countries are defined as those with no lending/grants in SAP for FY04-06. Challenges in Identifying High-Risk Countries Country Rank Country Source: TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2005 2005 CPI Score 117 Afghanistan, Bolivia, Ecuador Guatemala, Guyana, Libya Nepal, Philippines, Uganda 2.5 126 Albania, Niger, Russia, Sierra Leone 2.4 130 Burundi, Cambodia, Congo (Republic), Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Papua New Guinea 2.3 137 Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iraq, Liberia, Uzbekistan 2.2 144 Congo (Democratic Republic), Kenya, Pakistan, Paraguay, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan 2.1 151 Angola 2.0 152 Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria 1.9 155 Haiti, Myanmar, Turkmenistan 1.8 158 Bangladesh, Chad 1.7
- 40. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Help countries that request support in their efforts to reduce corruption Prevent fraud and corruption in donor-financed projects Anticorruption as key filter in design of country assistance strategies Support international efforts to reduce corruption Anti-Corruption Strategy World Bank
- 41. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Addressing Corruption in CAS’s Systematic diagnosis of the nature & drivers of corruption Aid amount linked to level of corruption Actions to address the most significant development risks posed by corruption: Reducing corruption in key sources of growth, service delivery Actions to mitigate reputational risk from grand corruption: Transparency in major procurement deals, asset declaration, Actions to mitigate fiduciary risk: Enhanced fiduciary safeguards in projects, PFM assessment for using budget support Political economy assessments to identify feasible actions Coordinated donor action for complementarities and collective impact
- 42. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Russia (customs/treasury) Colombia (diagnostics & civil society) Jordan (civil society) Major programs launched… Pakistan (devolution) Ghana (PE accountability) Albania (public admin.) Guatemala (diagnostic to action program) Tanzania (PSR) Ethiopia (decentralization) Cambodia (PE; forestry) Ukraine (tax admin) Gabon (water/electricity) Kyrgyz Republic (governance reform) Latvia (inspections) India – Andra Pradesh (power; e-gov); Karnataka (right to info) Indonesia (local governance) Uganda (education) Philippines (procurement) Bangladesh (NGOs in social sectors) …with some evidence of success
- 43. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Lessons learned: Deeper challenges in high-risk countries These appear to be working when the underlying environment is conducive: Committed leadership Coalition for reform Capacity State capture and corrupt leadership in clientelistic states Powerful vested interests and political obstacles Weak ‘demand’ pressures for reform – limited voice, media freedoms, civil rights, etc. Political drivers of corruption (e.g., lack of political competition, party financing) Strong on PFM diagnostics Emphasis on core public management reforms Good at technocratic solutions and design Deeper underlying challenges
- 44. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Reducing corruption in high-risk countries: Priorities for action in the next stage Better understanding and management of political economy of reforms Tackling political corruption (e.g. party finance, electoral corruption, etc. ) with partners Partnerships and new instruments to support demand-side initiatives: working with civil society, media, parliamentarians Tackle political drivers of governance challenges in sectors (e.g., power, ports, EI) Develop operational strategies to engage with corrupt leadership in clientelist, captured states
- 45. The World Bank Governance& Anticorruption Core Course, page ‹#› Q&A