SOUTHCHINASEA ACC

China and the South China Sea
ACC/IA SPRING 2016
EUGENIA WITHEROW

Introduction
The South China Sea has become an important topic in today’s international relations.
As China continues to take aggressive steps in the region, neighboring countries are increasingly
concerned and the United States needs to maintain its strategic commitment. Among U.S. allies
that are affected are the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan. With each regional power
making competing claims, tensions solidify in the region with forecastable flashpoints in that
necessitate some level of U.S. planning and involvement.
This research paper provides a brief historical overview of recent key issues in the South
China Sea, with a more comprehensive timeline in Appendix A. Next the legal question
surrounding the applicability of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), which governs all uses of the oceans, is presented. Then, the perspectives and
motives of China in the South China Sea are reviewed, followed by the perspectives of the U.S.
allies in the region and finally the U.S. position vis-à-vis policy options.
Recent Engagements
In October of 2015, a U.S. Navy patrol sails within twelve nautical miles of Chinese-built
islands to assert “freedom of navigation” in disputed waters in the South China Sea. China’s
ambassador to the United States called the patrol a “serious provocation, politically and
militarily.”1
1 ‘China’s Maritime Disputes’.

In December of 2015, an American B-52 bomber flew over the South China Sea on a
routine mission and unintentionally flew within two nautical miles of an artificial islands built by
China. In later days, the Pentagon apologized for the event.2
In February of 2016, China deployed surface-to-air missiles on Woody Island. U.S. and
regional officials warn that the deployment may signal a “militarization” of the maritime
disputes. China argues that the installation of missiles falls within its rights for defense of its
sovereign territory.3
Perspectives and Motives of China in the South China Sea
The South China Sea holds so much importance to China for many reasons. Controlling
the many islands is partly a matter of controlling the wealth assumed to lay beneath the sea in the
form of minerals, oil, and gas. Another part of China’s claims relates to increasing their sense of
security by dominating the maritime approaches to its coast, and securing sea lanes to the
Pacific. Additionally, enforcing historical claims plays a key role in China’s behavior in the
South China Sea.4
2 ‘The Pentagon’s Groveling Apology to China for Flying near a Contested Island’, National Review, December 21,
2015, accessed April 6, 2016, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/428821/us-apologizes-b-52-south-china-sea-
signals-american-weakness.
3‘South China Sea: China Has Deployed Anti-Ship Missiles on Woody Island’, The Diplomat, March 26, 2016,
accessed March 30, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/south-china-sea-china-has-deployed-anti-ship-missiles-
on-woody-island/. China placed advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ACSM) on Woody Island. The YJ-62 ASCMs
on the island would allow China to potentially target any surface vesselwithin 248 miles of Woody Island – a
powerful power projection capability. Woody Island is a major military outpost for China in the South China Sea.
Though not quite comparable to the Spratly holdings, Woody Island notably contains a 3,000 meter airstrip and a
harbor. The YJ-62 is a modern ship-launched ASCM with a speed ranging from Mach 0.6-0.8, a range of 248 miles,
and a sea-skimming terminal attack ability with active guidance. The YJ-62 is mostly designed for launch from
coastaltransportererector launchers, but can also be affixed to China’s Type 052AC destroyers. The Department of
Defense has highlighted the YJ-62 as China’s “most capable” anti-ship cruise missile.
4 Howard W French, ‘What’s behind Beijing's Drive to Control the South China Sea?’, The Guardian (The
Guardian), September 21, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/28/whats-behind-beijings-drive-
control-south-china-sea-hainan.

Robust industrial growth and increased domestic living standards have left China with a
nearly insatiable thirst for energy. And oil has played an integral part in meeting China’s energy
demands. Until the 1990s, China enjoyed energy self-sufficiency due to the discovery of the
large Daqing field in northern china in the 1950s. In 1993, China became a net oil importer, and
in 2013, China was responsible for one-third of all oil growth. In the long term, it is projected
that China’s output of oil and petroleum will real 5.6 million barrels per day by 2040. China’s
shale oil resources tend to be waxy and buried in deposits rich in clay, making them poor
candidates for fracking techniques that are currently used to extract tight oils. Thus, there has
been a shift to the South China Sea as an oil resource for China.5
The Paracels are separate from the Spratlys, however, both the missile installations and
the island building are part of an integrated Chinese effort to establish dominance over the South
China Sea. Specifically, China is attempting to establish ownership of land areas that are
encompassed by the nine-dash line. With its increasingly assertive behavior and expansive
claims, China is able to establish its dominance and maintain sovereignty over the South China
Sea region.6
China’s maritime disputes span centuries. Claims to islands in the South China Sea
began as early as 1894 during the Sino-Japanese War. The competing claims over the region
have continued until today. Historical claims have been upheld by China, and have been the
strong basis upon which it justifies its presence in the South China Sea today.7
5 Deborah Gordon, Yevgen Sautin, and Wang Tao, China’s Oil Future, May 6, 2014, accessed March 23, 2015,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/05/06/china-s-oil-future/h93y.
6 ‘How to Oppose China’s Bid for Maritime Dominance’, The National Interest, February 26, 2016, accessed March
31, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/opposing-chinas-bid-maritime-dominance-15320.
7 ‘China’s Maritime Disputes’,Council on Foreign Relations, March 3, 2016, accessed March 30, 2016,
http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345.

China’s actions in the South China Sea have primarily been seen as an aggressive attempt
at gaining more regional power, however, this is not the perspective that China holds. China
views the South China Sea as “blue national soil.” Blue National Soil refers to the idea that
China genuinely believes the South China Sea to be its own, and due to China’s perceived
ownership of the region they are able to do with it as they please, even if it does not meet the
satisfaction of other countries in the region or around the world. Beijing envisions exercising the
absolute territorial sovereignty at sea that governments exercise within their land frontiers
regardless of the fact that the South China Sea is an open global commons that is available to all
nations.8
The Legal Issue: Maritime Boundaries
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) established a legal
framework to govern all uses of the oceans. All states bordering the South China Sea are parties
to UNCLOS. Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam are all claimant states that
have competing claims to territorial sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea. Under
UNCLOS, entitlement to maritime zones is only generated by land territory – including islands.
The Convention contains rules on coastal baselines from which maritime zones are to be
measured, breadth of the maritime zones that can be claimed, and rights and obligations of
coastal states and other states in each of those zones. Additionally, the Convention contains
provisions on settling disputes between parties over the interpretation or application of its
provisions.9
8 “The Commons: Beijing’s ‘blue national soil,’” The Diplomat, January 3, 2013, accessed May 11, 2016,
http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/a-threat-to-the-commons-blue-national-soil/.
9 Robert Beckman, ‘THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE MARITIME DISPUTES
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA’, JSTOR 107 (January 2013).

Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam view the South China Sea through the lens of
international law – especially UNCLOS. It is in their interests to bring their claims into
conformity with UNCLOS and to base their claims exclusively on the Convention. In this
context, it would be in the interests of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam to argue that all of
the islands should be treated as falling within the exception in Article 121 (3) concerning rocks
that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own.10
One of the issues raised is whether China is claiming sovereignty over geographic
features that do not meet the definition of an island under UNCLOS. To some, China’s historic
sovereignty claim is to all of the islands, rocks, reefs, and shoals in the four archipelagos,
whether or not the features meet the definition of an island under international law. Another
issue is the extent to which China’s claims are based on the nine-dash line. It is difficult to see
how China can assert that it has rights to, and jurisdiction over, the natural resources in and
under all the waters inside the nine-dash line. Additionally, the nature of Chinese maritime
claims in the South China Sea has been ambiguous.11
Perspectives of Regional Powers
Aside from China, there are several U.S. allies laying competing claims to different parts
of the South China Sea, including Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan. China, in
attempts to cement its stance in the South China Sea, has built man-made islands atop seven
10 Beckman.
11 Beckman. China’s notesverbales of May 2009 suggest that China claimed sovereignty only over the islands and
their adjacent waters, which referred to the territorial sea – a position consistent the UNCLOS. However, the
reference to “sovereign rights and jurisdiction” involved language that UNCLOS uses to refer to the coastalstate’s
rights and jurisdiction in the EEZ and on the continental shelf. Altogether, this could mean that China was claiming
sovereign rights and jurisdiction over all the maritime space within the nine-dash line. In April of 2011, the
Philippines countered China’s notes verbales,however, China held to the argument that it held all rights and
jurisdiction in the South China Sea.

reefs it controls in the Spratly archipelago. There is a growing concern among the countries in
the region that China’s ambitious island-building could trigger confrontations or conflict.12 The
U.S. military may be asked to assist its allies in the event of hostilities.
Philippines
The Spratly Islands are presently claimed by both China and the Philippines. Currently,
the Chinese are involved in dredging operations on five different reefs and have created some
2,900 acres of land in the Spratlys.13 Facing a drastic military imbalance, Manila based its
protest to Chinese behavior in the Spratlys within a legal framework. Manila is drawing on the
2002 Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea, however, Beijing is not a party to this
document.14
The Philippines is also attempting to use international law to challenge Beijing. The
Philippines has taken China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, arguing that
China’s occupation of the Spratly islands violates the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). This direct challenging of China by the Philippines has escalated tensions
12 Ivan Watson and Mark Phillips, ‘South China Sea: Taiwan Enters Power Struggle’, CNN (CNN), March 27, 2016,
http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/26/asia/taiwan-south-china-sea/index.html. The U.S. and Chinese navies have already
engaged in several rounds of shadow-boxing. Further perceived or real threats to China could result in escalation of
conflict.
13 ‘Dredging up Disaster in the South China Sea’, The National Interest, March 29, 2016, accessed March 30, 2016,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/dredging-disaster-the-south-china-sea-15612. This behavior – building man-made
islands – sits within murky and undefined legal frameworks.
14 ‘Dredging up Disaster in the South China Sea’. Manila’s case draws strongly upon section five, which states that
the parties involved agree to exercise self-restraint in activities that could escalate disputes and affect peace and
stability including, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals,cays,and
other features, and to handle differences in a constructive manner.

between the two. 15A ruling on the matter is expected in May. However, China refuses to
participate and does not recognize the court’s jurisdiction.16
Additionally, the Philippines has called on the United States to become more involved.
The U.S. military plans to increase its presence near the South China Sea by placing troops
across five bases in the Philippines – Antonio Bautista, Basa, Fort Magsaysay, Lumbia, and
Mactan-Benito Ebuen. Reportedly, the Pentagon is to make sizeable investments on construction
projects to boost capacity at the five bases.17 It is likely that the American presence there will
grow slowly because China’s activities have threatened the stability of the region, including vital
trade routes for global economy. However, Antonio Bautista Air Base is close to the Spratly
Islands where China has made its controversial territorial claims – putting the United States
closer to the scene.18
Malaysia
Malaysia has several interests in the South China Sea. First, Malaysia claims 11
maritime features in the Spratly Islands and occupies eight of them – the other three are occupied
by Vietnam and Philippines. It is in Malaysia’s interest to preserve these claims for the purpose
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/dredging-disaster-the-south-china-sea-15612.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/dredging-disaster-the-south-china-sea-15612. The UNCLOS states:rocks which
cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf. An occupied island sustains a 12 nautical mile territorial zone but China’s relationship with Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) territory is complicated. Chinas has a lot to gain economically from dredging operations, but
UNCLOS does not allow the same economic territory to be policed as territorial waters. Beijing prefers a view that
allows them to maintain a monopoly over legitimate military deployment in the area in the same way territorial
zones are defined.
17 Vishakha Sonawane and Lydia Tomkiw, ‘South China Sea Controversy: US to Deploy More Troops at 5
Philippine Bases near Disputed Spratly Islands’, International Business Times (International Business Times),
March 22, 2016, http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-controversy-us-deploy-more-troops-5-philippine-bases-
near-disputed-2340756.
18 Andrew Tilghman, ‘The U.S. Military Is Moving into These 5 Bases in the Philippines’, Military
Times (MilitaryTimes), April 1, 2016, http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2016/03/21/us -plans-use-five-
new-bases-philippines/82072138/.

of prosperity and security. Secondly, Malaysia has an interest in maintaining a strong bilateral
relationship with China beyond the South China Sea issue.19 Third, the South China Sea would
ensure broader regional peace and stability, and an open commons for Malaysia. 20 The final
interest in the South China Sea for Malaysia is the preservation of global norms and international
law.
Malaysia is attempting to avoid conflict by being diplomatic and using regional norms
and mechanisms to secure its interests. Malaysia has chosen this route because of limited
capabilities and threats in the maritime domain. However, rising nationalism among the public
may constrain government options and risk damaging a vital relationship. Malaysia has
continued to work publicly and privately with other ASEAN states to narrow differences and
forge a united front against coercion in the wake of rising tensions in the South China Sea.
Privately, Malaysia insists that ASEAN speak with one voice against any acts that violate
international law. Since 2012, there has been a growing call for a full implementation of the
Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea and a speedy conclusion of a legally binding
Code of Conduct. Militarily, Malaysia is actively augmenting its capabilities at sea.21
Vietnam
19 Maintaining this relationship would create a special relationship that would result in the development of Malaysia
as a high-income nation and developed country.
20 Prashanth Parameswaran, Playing It Safe: Malaysia’s Approach to the South China Sea and Implications for the
United States,(n.p.: CNAS, 2015), http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-
pdf/CNAS%20Maritime%206_Parameswaran_Final.pdf. The South China Sea is a highway for trade, shipping and
telecommunications through which a third of world trade passes. This provides free trade, safe and secure sea lines
of communication (SLOCs), and overall regional order of critical importance to a trading and maritime nation such
as Malaysia.
21 Prashanth Parameswaran, Playing It Safe: Malaysia’s Approach to the South China Sea and Implications for the
United States,(n.p.: CNAS, 2015), http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-
pdf/CNAS%20Maritime%206_Parameswaran_Final.pdf.

The Vietnamese government has made public declarations denouncing China’s claims to
the South China Sea. There have been anti-China demonstrations in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh
City to protest Chinese activities in the South China Sea. Adding to Vietnamese-Chinese
tensions is the formalization of closer relationship with other regional powers, such as
Indonesia.22 Additionally, Vietnam has been calling on the United States to take action in the
South China Sea dispute. Though Vietnam opposes China’s occupation of the Paracel Islands
and parts of the Spratly archipelago, its responses in disputed areas are typically measured and
come days after those of other countries involved.23
Taiwan
Taiwan claims to have continuously occupied Taiping Island in the South China Sea for
60 years. Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou asserts that Taiping Island “is entitled to an
exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles,” which gives a country special rights over the
seabed, and marine resources.24 Taiwan’s deputy foreign minister claims that they are opposed
to militarization or military expansionism in the area.
However, with competing claims from the other countries involved, the waters are largely
contested. In response to the competing claims to the region, Taiwan has rejected claims by the
Philippines, who have claimed that Taiping does not deserve to be called an island with reference
22 ‘Anti-China Sentiment Flares up in Vietnam’, Al Jazeera, 2016, accessed March 30, 2016,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/vietnam-south-china-sea-tensions-rise-160314072842269.html.
23 ‘Anti-China Sentiment Flares up in Vietnam’, Al Jazeera, 2016, accessed March 30, 2016,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/vietnam-south-china-sea-tensions-rise-160314072842269.html.
24 Watson and Phillips. Taiping Island is where $5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes through annually.

to international maritime law. Tension continues among the regional powers as China continues
to assert its dominance while the other countries struggle to maintain theirs.25
The U.S. Position on Current Actions in the South China Sea and Policy Options
The United States has not taken a hard position on the territorial disputes, but has called
for an end to land reclamation by China. The United States sails and flies its assets in the
vicinity of the reclaimed islands, citing international law and freedom of movement.26 The U.S.
Air Force will continue to fly daily missions over the South China Sea despite the buildup of
Chinese surface-to-air missiles and fighter jets. Other nations have been urged to exercise their
freedom to fly and sail in international airspace and waters claimed by China in the South China
Sea. Though the United States lays no claims to the South China Sea, it argues for ensuring
freedom of navigation and overflight, and non-use of force and coercion to assert claims.27 As
such, there are several viable policy options.
A Crisis Management System
Increased use of the contested waters by China and its neighbors heightens the risk that
miscommunication could trigger an unintended armed conflict. This is important to the United
States, as it has military commitments to allies in the region such as the Philippines. To avoid
such situations, policy experts recommend a crisis management system is needed for the region.
Open communication and cooperation in the region is ideal in the South China Sea dispute. This
25 Ivan Watson and Mark Phillips, ‘South China Sea: Taiwan Enters Power Struggle’, CNN (CNN), March 27, 2016,
http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/26/asia/taiwan-south-china-sea/index.html.
26 Katie Hunt, ‘Showdown in the South China Sea: How Did We Get Here?’, CNN (CNN), March 8, 2016,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/.
27 Rod McGuirk, ‘U.S. General: Air Force to Keep Flying over South China Sea’, Military Times (MilitaryTimes),
March 8, 2016, http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2016/03/08/us-general-air-force-keep-flying-over-
south-china-sea/81482974/.

can be achieved through military-to-military communication and the establishment of a
multilateral framework that will hold all those involved accountable.
Military-to-Military Communication
Increased dialogue between military forces of the claimants involved could help reduce
the risk of conflict escalation. Establishment of communication mechanisms such as military
hotlines could connect leaders in the event of a crisis that could arise from miscommunications
or miscalculations. Additionally, joint naval exercises, such as those proposed by Beijing in late
2015, could support greater military transparency and help develop shared rules.28 The U.S. Air
Force could play a key role in the South China Sea region by monitoring the status of the
disputed islands from above, and also working with allies in the region to provide support.
Establishment of a Multilateral Framework
The development of a multilateral, binding code of conduct between China and the other
claimants could ease territorial disputes. The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea has already been agreed upon, but none have adhered to its provisions or trust-
building proposals. Though it is uncertain that progress can be made this way, if successful,
conflict over territory could be avoided.29
Engage in Military Action
If confrontation between the Philippines and China occurs, the United States would be
obligated to consider military action under defense treaties. Under treaty obligations with the

Philippines, both the United States and the Philippines would be held accountable for mutual
support in the event of an armed attack. Military action is a last resort and is dependent on the
scale and circumstances of the escalation of conflict.
Conclusion
Based on current Chinese activity in the region, further tension and conflict is likely in
the South China Sea. China does not seem to intend on halting land reclamations or assertive
actions, and the other countries involved seem intent on maintaining their position on the issue.
Though China has made agreements with countries in the past, it does not seem to be upholding
those agreements, and they are pursuing militarization of the region. China seems to be
disregarding the agreements and discussions it has made with other countries in the region –
posing a security dilemma in the region that is only getting started. Taking this into
consideration, it is likely that the United States will need to be have a plan for action in case
conflict occurs in the region.

Appendix A: Historical Timeline
1947
China makes claims to the South China Sea under the rule of the nationalist Kuomintang
party. These territorial claims are marked with an eleven-dash line, covering the Pratas Islands,
Macclesfield Bank, and Paracel and Spratly Islands. In 1953, the CCP-led government removes
the portion including the Gulf of Tonkin, simplifying the border to nine dashes.30 To this day,
China invokes the nine-dash line as the historical basis for its territorial claims in the South
China Sea.
1982
UNCLOS is established but does not address sovereignty issues associated with the South
and East China Seas. Due to its vague wording, UNCLOS is not a credible body of law in
resolving territorial disputes.31
1992
China passes the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, laying claim to the
entire South China Sea based on its historical right to the region dating from the Xia dynasty (21-
16 B.C.E.).32
July 2012

ASEAN members fail to issue a communique. The 10 members reach an impasse over
China’s claims in the South China Sea. Members disagree over whether to include the territorial
issue in the joint statement.33
September 2012
Japan buys Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from a private landowner. This angers China and
triggers anti-Japanese protests, significant losses by Japanese companies in China, and
dramatically decreases air travel between the two countries. Two days after the purchase by
Japan, China claims territorial sea baselines.34 Two of China’s maritime agencies gain increased
power over the waters and begin to increase their patrol in areas previously dominated by the
Japan Coast Guard. In December, China submits to the UN an explanation of its claims to the
area, and argues that “geological characteristics” show a natural prolongation of China’s land
territory.
In late September, china puts its first aircraft carrier into service claiming that the vessel
will protect national sovereignty, though for the near future it would only be used for training
and testing purposes. The aircraft launch marked a continuation of Beijing’s substantial naval
modernization which has been a note of concern for the United States.
January 2013
Japanese Prime Minister Abe visits Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia in the hopes of
diplomatically engaging the region. Abe argues that there is a “dynamic change” in the strategic
environment of the Asia-Pacific, and that it is in Japan’s national interest to build closer relations

with ASEAN countries. Additionally, closer relations will contribute to the region’s peace and
stability.35
In late January, the Philippines files UN arbitration over China’s sovereignty claims
under UNCLOS. China rejects the process, forcing the court and its arbitration to continue
without its participation. This case marks the first time a country has brought a claim against
China under UNCLOS regarding the sovereignty issues.36
May 2013
Japan’s military offers military aid and $2 million for disaster relief training in East
Timor and Cambodia. To raise influence in the region, Japan considers selling military
equipment such as seaplanes and shallow-water submarines. Japan also announces that it will
provide patrol boats to the Philippine Coast Guard to enhance their capabilities in the South
China Sea and to counter China’s growing maritime presence.37
November 2013
China’s Ministry of Defense announces the creation of an Air Defense Identification
Zone that requires all non-commercial air traffic to submit flight plans before entering the region.
This covers most of the East China Sea and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.38 The territorial dispute
expands to airspace when China announces that it could take military action against aircraft
flying near the islands.

April 2014
The United States and Philippines sign a new ten-year military pact, allowing the U.S.
military to gain increased rotational troop presence in the Philippines, engage in more joint
training, and have greater access to bases across the archipelago. President Obama insists that
the deal is not aimed at containing China.39

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