Inoculating Thailand against Communism

Inoculating Thailand against Communism

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CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS

1949: Communist victory in China

1950
February: Phibun recognised Bao Dai government.
July: Korean War. Thailand sent 4,000 soldiers and 40,000 tons of rice to Korea.
July: Educational exchange agreement (Fulbright)
September: Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement.
October: First loan from World Bank to a Southeast Asian nation
October: Agreement Respecting Military Assistance. (This provided authorization for
the US to give and Thailand to receive, military assistance.)

1951
June: Manhattan Rebellion
November: Silent Coup

1952: Stringent anti-communist law passed

1953
January: Dwight Eisenhower became President of the United States
January: Formation of “Thai Autonomous People’s Government” at Yunnan province
April: Vietminh launched an invasion into Laos
May: U.N. appeal on Laos
July: PSB-D23 report
August: Arrival of Donovan as US Ambassador

1954
April: US makes plans for direct military intervention in Vietnam
May: French defeat at Dien Bien Phu
July 1954: Partition of Vietnam at the Geneva conference
Sept 1954: Formation of Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation

ABBREVIATIONS

BPP Border Patrol Police
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
MAAG U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC National Security Council
OSS Office of Strategic Services
PARU Police Aerial Reconnaissance (Resupply) Unit
PSB Psychological Strategy Board
SEATO Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
USIS United States Information Service

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 1
SETTING THE STAGE ......................................................................................................................... 2
AMERICA THE PATRON, THAILAND THE CLIENT .................................................................................... 2
CHANGES IN THE US ADMINISTRATION ................................................................................................. 6
PROCESS OF INOCULATION ............................................................................................................ 7
IN SEARCH OF A SOUTHEAST ASIAN BASE ............................................................................................. 7
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE STRATEGY .............................................................................................. 10
IMPLEMENTING PSB D-23 ................................................................................................................... 14
Donovan and guerrilla warfare ..................................................................................................... 14
Military and economic aid ............................................................................................................. 15
Anti-communist propaganda .......................................................................................................... 17
Education and training .................................................................................................................. 18
Geneva and Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) .......................................................... 19
FRUIT OF INOCULATION ................................................................................................................ 21
ANTI-COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA......................................................................................................... 21
AID ...................................................................................................................................................... 22
EDUCATION ......................................................................................................................................... 25
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................... 27
REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................................... 30

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INTRODUCTION

The 1950s was a period of great uncertainty for Thailand. With its neighbours

caught up in communist insurrections, the kingdom needed a strong ally to protect it

against a possible Red invasion. Meanwhile, the United States needed a friendly base

to launch their anti-communist plans in Southeast Asia. Their interests converged and

they hooked up.

Much has been written about the alliance between Thailand and the US (see

Darling, 1965; Surachart, 1985; Randolph, 1986; Fineman, 1997). While this paper

will still sketch out the mechanics of friendship between the two countries from the

late 1940s to the late 1950s, the objective of this paper is to study US attempts to

bolster Thailand against communism with the use of psychological warfare. During

this period, the ‘wars’ for Thailand and the US were fought more on the psychological

level. In fact, neither country was involved in large-scale physical fighting in

Southeast Asia at that time. Hence, that was why psychological warfare was all the

more important then because individual governments were making decisions and

responding based on impressions and perceptions founded on what they thought the

opposing side was doing.

The psychological warfare comprised anti-communist propaganda, military and

economic aid, educational programmes, and collective defence treaties. I would

examine these various aspects in turn and assess their effects (both intended and

unintended) on Thailand.

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SETTING THE STAGE

By April 1948, the world situation had drastically changed – the communists

pulled off a successful coup in Czechoslovakia; the US was rushing large-scale

economic and military assistance under the Marshall Plan to Western Europe to

prevent further communist aggression; much of China had fallen under the control of

Mao Zedong’s communists and communist revolts began spreading to the newly

independent nations in the Southeast Asia. At the same time, US President Harry

Truman’s momentous decision to provide assistance to the Greek and Turkish

governments in their struggle against communist guerrillas marked the beginning of a

new US foreign policy – containment of communism.

Within the increasingly turbulent region of Southeast Asia, Thailand was the only

country which did not have a communist insurrection within its borders and was the

only area which remained relatively stable and calm. The US began to be interested

in the nation. On February 10, 1949, US ambassador Edwin Stanton wrote to the

Secretary of State, proposing more attention to be paid to Thailand:

I do not need to emphasize the advisability and timeliness of establishing
and implementing an affirmative policy regarding Siam in view of
developments in China and the certainty that communist activities and
pressure will be greatly intensified throughout Southeast Asia and this
country. It is not argued that this area is equally as important as Europe,
but communism being a global problem, it appears to us here to be both
wise statesmanship and good strategy to take steps now before this area
is completely dominated by communism, to contain this threat and give
support and encouragement to such countries as Siam which are not yet
seriously infected. (Randolph 1986:11)

America the patron, Thailand the client

Concerned with the developments in its Indochinese neighbours and with its own

military security, Thailand followed the lead of the US by recognising the French-

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supported Bao Dai government in February 1950. Prior to that, Ambassador-at-large

Phillip Jessup, while in Bangkok for a conference of American ambassadors in the Far

East, had met with Phibun and urged him to recognise Bao Dai. Jessup had hinted at

the prospect of aid and of getting a chunk of the money that had been earmarked for

China. But this aroused serious dispute within the Phibun cabinet. Foreign Minister

Pote Sarasin counselled against such a move, arguing that it was a mistake for

Thailand to commit itself so openly in a struggle whose outcome was still uncertain.

Seriously split, the cabinet left the decision to Phibun, who opted in favour of

recognition. Pote resigned in protest. Thailand recognised the Bao Dai government

and was duly rewarded with US$10 million from the US. (Baker and Pasuk 2005:144)

In June 1950, when the Soviet-supplied North Korean People’s Army invaded

South Korea, Thailand supported the US-sponsored “Uniting for Peace Resolution” in

the United Nations, which encouraged collective action wherever aggression arose.

(Wiwat 1982:133) And in July, Thailand went one step further – Phibun sent 4,000

soldiers and 40,000 tons of rice to Korea – and became the first Asian nation to offer

troops and supplies for the US campaign. The Americans seized upon its PR-

potential to counter accusations that the Korean War smacks of Western/US

imperialism and hailed Thailand’s involvement as an Asian country. Phibun knew he

was playing his cards right. He even told the parliament that, “by sending just a small

number of troops as a token of our friendship, we will get various things in return”.

(Fineman 1997:117)

In September, the US agreed to provide Thailand with economic and technical

assistance, and the United States Operations Mission (USOM) was set up. A newly

created Special Technical and Economic Assistance Mission (STEM) was given

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US$8 million to set up an American-supervised language centre to teach English to

Thais, as well as to improve the nation’s agriculture and infrastructure. In October,

the World Bank gave a US$25 million loan – the first loan made by the World Bank

to a nation in Southeast Asia – for further development projects. (United Nations 1950)

In the same month, the US signed an agreement to provide equipment and training for

the Thai army under the Military Assistance Group. By January, the arms started

arriving. During the following year, the US sent 28 shipments of military equipment

to equip 10 army battalions, fighter plans and modern naval vessels. (Nongnuth

1982:140)

The Thais were impressed with the speed of the US response and Phibun became

increasingly good at espousing anti-communist rhetoric. For example in July 1949,

he confidently told parliament that “there is now no communist unrest in Thailand”.

(Fineman 1997:87) But a month later, he blatantly announced to the West that

communist pressure on Thailand had become “alarming” and internal communist

activity had “vigorously increased”. (Darling 1961:214) Phibun clearly saw how he

could kill two birds with one stone – use the communist threat as an instrument to

remove his political opponents and make the US happy at the same time.

The reunification of China in 1949 prompted another wave of nationalist feeling

among Thailand’s Chinese. Chinese names became fashionable, enrolment in Chinese

schools shot up and remittances to China increased. At the same time, conflict

between the Kuomintang and communists intermittently erupted in battles on

Bangkok streets. From late 1950, the government began to harass the press, deport

Chinese involved in political activity, smash labour organisations and use the military

and Sangha for anti-communist propaganda.

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The “communist” label became the latest tool to smear the reputations of political

opponents. During the Manhattan rebellion in June 1951 when Phibun was kidnapped

by the navy while officiating a ceremony aboard the dredger “Manhattan”, both the

navy rebels and government accused each other as “communist”. Although Phibun

finally claimed that communists were the cause of the three-day coup, linking the

navy rebels to Pridi and his Free Thai followers, observers concluded that it had

actually been caused by the increasing rivalry among the military services. The

suppression of this coup also marked and confirmed the rise to power of Phibun’s two

chief rivals in the 1947 Coup Group – police chief Phao Siyanon and army chief Sarit

Thanarat. The triumvirate quickly moved in to remove the 1949 constitution and the

power it gave to the monarchy before King Bhumibol Adulyadej returned to assume

his royal duties. While the king was at sea, en route from Singapore to Bangkok, on

November 29, the military simply announced on the state radio that:

because of the present world situation and because of communist
aggression and widespread corruption, members of the armed forces,
the police and leaders of the 1932 and 1947 coups d’état had decided to
put the 1932 Constitution in force in the kingdom. (Wyatt 2003:260)

The main justification for this Silent Coup was that communists were infiltrating the

parliament and Cabinet. This was the first time that the threat of communism was

used as the rationale for a coup. Hence the local battle over the control of the Thai

state was now being cloaked in the vestiges of a worldwide ideological struggle.

With the 1947 Coup Group taking more power, they were more determined than

ever to hush the internal political opposition. They put into place a slew of laws and

administrative changes to enhance the internal security powers of the government

even further. The most powerful tool was a stringent anti-communist law, which was

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worded widely enough to target any dissent. The police began arresting suspects

under this law within 48 hours after it was passed on November 10, 1952. More than

1,000 were arrested; mostly Chinese who were deported but also sundry enemies of

the regime including Thammasat student activists. Thirty-seven Thais, including

leftist writers like Kulap Saipradit, were jailed. Three newspapers were also closed

down. (Darling 1961:290) The police continued to seize “communist” suspects, who

were accused of plotting against the government, and occasionally newspaper editors

at regular intervals. Dissent was not tolerated at all. A junior civil servant’s comment

to an American observer summed it up well:

“Only half of our members of parliament are elected. The others are
appointed. And the elections – such strange things happen that nobody
believes in them anymore. I love Thailand. Yet if I say freely what I
say to you, they will say I am communist.” (Darling 1961:307).

Within a short time, the stress on nationalism, the fear of communism and American

arms discouraged all but a few people from opposing the policies of the government.

Hence after 1952, the Phibun government gradually eliminated all remnants of

democratic or representative government in the country.

Changes in the US administration

By 1953, there was a Republican regime in Washington that had won the

presidential election partly on the accusation that the Democrats had been “soft on

communism”. Dwight Eisenhower’s administration promised to give a new look to

the American defence posture and attempts would be made to bolster the nation’s

anti-communist allies. It indicated a desire to increase the reliance on military power

and regional collective security in deterring communist aggression. At the same time,

Eisenhower recognised the need to economise on the government’s expenditures so

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he called for an increase in the ground forces maintained by the countries in Asia and

a corresponding reduction of America troops. Local military forces could be

maintained at a smaller cost and would be supported by the mobile striking forces of

American air and naval power. The real architect of American foreign policy was not

Eisenhower but the secretary of state, John Foster Dulles. Dulles, whose father was a

Presbyterian minister, was almost rabid in his condemnation against atheistic

communism. Practising brinkmanship – the ability to get to the verge without getting

into war – with the Soviet Union, he often threatened massive retaliation if the USSR

launched a first strike.

PROCESS OF INOCULATION

In search of a Southeast Asian base

In early 1953, the situation in Southeast Asia looked increasingly bad for the

Western powers. The Vietminh had overrun vast areas of the Vietnamese countryside

and in April, it even launched an invasion into Laos which brought them to within a

few miles of the Thai border, spelling the death knell of French military and political

strategy in Indochina. The offensive convinced the US that France needed to grant

Vietnam genuine independence as well as change its military strategy to guerrilla

tactics in order to hold Indochina. The Americans also wanted a greater say in French

military planning, but the French said no on all counts.

At the same time, Red China was emerging as a regional power. Since the

Chinese intervention in the Korean War, China had in the eyes of Washington

policymakers replaced the Soviet Union as the chief adversary of the West in Asia.

This perception was shared by the Thais too. China continued its sabre-rattling with

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strident and bombastic declarations blaring from Radio Peking and Washington was

not discounting the possibility of a Chinese Korea-style invasion, most probably

knifing through Northern Thailand.

So both Thailand and the US must have been spooked when China announced in

January 1953 the formation of a Thai Autonomous People’s Government at

Sipsongpanna in southern Yunnan province. That area had been the original

homeland of the Thai people and was still inhabited by some 200,000 Thai tribesmen.

The announcement stated:

At the inaugural ceremony the Chairman [a Thai] and the council
members pledged that they would … guide the Thai people to… make
concerted efforts to smash the sabotage activities of the American
imperialists and special agents of Chiang Kai-shek’s bandit gang… under
the leadership of the Chinese communist Party, Chairman Mao Tse-tung,
and the Central People’s Government. (Stanton 1954:79)

Further concern was sparked when Pridi Phanomyong suddenly appeared in Peking in

July 1954. He was referred to as the “Public Leader of Thailand” by Radio Peking,

leading the Thai government to believe that Pridi would be used as a puppet for the

subversive purposes of China. Although Pridi had little following left in Thailand by

then, and that he was unlikely able to lead the largely backward tribesmen who had

little prestige or support among the more advanced Thai population in Thailand in a

subversive crusade, it was still regarded as a potential communist threat by both the

Eisenhower and Phibun governments.

On top of that, the Vietminh incursions into Laos in April and again in December

1953 added to Thailand’s discomfort although they did not pose a serious threat to the

kingdom. Meanwhile, the Korean War was drawing to a close. It ended with a

ceasefire agreement between the two sides due to fierce opposition from the North

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Koreans and the Chinese, as well as escalating domestic pressure in the US to end the

war. This made the Thai elite realise that the US was not as invincible as they had

earlier thought it to be. Consequently, Thailand started to pursue a two-pronged

policy of being overtly anti-communist while seeking covert rapprochement with

China. (Kullada 2003:55)

It was while the US was looking for a Southeast ally and Thailand was looking for

a protector when both became fitting bed partners. The US picked Thailand for a

variety of reasons:

Geographically, Thailand occupied a strategic area in the centre of mainland

Southeast Asia and was the best friend that the US had there – Burma was neutralist,

Malaya was under the British thumb and France was touché over its Indochinese

colonies. While the surrounding countries were embroiled in bitter military conflicts,

Thailand was an oasis of stability under Phibun’s authoritarian military regime.

Having never fallen under European domination completely, Thailand did not suffer

from xenophobia or the rabid nationalism surging through its neighbours.

Demographically, Thailand’s population of 20 million was the largest in the region

and literacy rate was estimated at between 30 and 40 per cent, a relatively high figure

for Asia. The traditional Thai antipathy towards the Chinese, who controlled much of

the private commercial sector, could be harnessed in the fight against communism.

Economically, Thailand was the world’s leading rice exporter and was rich in

resources (resources that the US would like to keep from falling into hostile hands).

The peasants were not likely to turn to communism because there was a surplus of

rice and they owned the land. Moreover, US aid and technical assistance programmes

had further increased agricultural production (especially in rice-growing), built up the

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transportation system, increased productivity in mining industries and rapidly

improved public health, especially with regards to malaria control. (Norland 1999:91)

But the most important factor was Thailand’s obedient compliance to US requests

– despite intense opposition from European powers and despite the ensuing

embarrassment when they were left holding the buck. This was first tested in

Operation Paper1 in early 1951 and then in spring 1953 when the US asked the Thai

government to make an UN appeal on behalf of the Laos over Vietminh’s invasion.

Not wanting to internationalise the issue, the French protested strongly. The British

also urged caution. But Thailand stuck firm to the American lead. Although the

appeal fell through in the end, it showed Thailand’s potential for pressuring the

French and the communists and the kingdom was beginning to function as an anti-

communist, anti-French US bastion in Southeast Asia.

Psychological Warfare Strategy

On May 6, 1953, during the discussion on the Laotian crisis at the National

Security Council (NSC) meeting, C. D. Jackson, acting as special assistant to the

president for international affairs, suggested that the NSC “look into what could be

done by way of psychological warfare with Thailand as a base”. A deputy chief of

the Psychological Warfare Division during World War II, Jackson was a firm believer

in the efficacy of psychological warfare. (Fineman 1997:171) Eisenhower, who also

had a longstanding interest in this area, approved the idea. The Psychological

Strategy Board (PSB), an inter-agency body operating since 1951, was tasked with

drafting detailed plans. It presented its report – “U.S. Psychological Strategy with

1
Under Operation Paper, the Phibun government provided diplomatic cover and logistical support to
the CIA which was attempting a large-scale invasion of southern China with the help of Nationalist
troops in Burma.

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Respect to the Thai Peoples of Southeast Asia” – on July 2. Designated as PSB D-23,

the report served as the blueprint for American Thai policy for the next year and a half.

The plan for Thailand was part of a larger psychological strategy for Southeast Asia,

whose objective was “preventing the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into

the communist orbit, and to assist them to develop the will and ability to resist

communism from within and without and to contribute to the strengthening of the free

world”. 2 (PSB D-23, 21)

The importance of a psychological strategy at this particular point in history

cannot be overstated. One has to bear in mind that this was pre-1960s – before the US

started fighting the Vietnam War and before communist insurrections flared up in

Thailand. In fact, neither Thailand nor the US was involved in any large-scale

fighting in Southeast Asia at that time. Sure, there were threats of imminent war but

the war was fought more on the psychological level than on the physical level.

Governments were making decisions based on impressions and intuition founded on

what they thought the opposing side was doing. For example, the establishment of the

Thai Autonomous State in Yunnan province and the reports that Pridi is in China and

collaborating with Free Thai leaders were in all probability part of a psychological

warfare operation launched by the Chinese communists to discourage the Phibun

government from cooperating too closely with the Western powers. (Darling

1961:255)

2
The concept of drawing a perimeter crops up again. On January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, in a speech, drew an American defence perimeter encompassing Japan, the Ryuku Islands,
and the Philippines. Asian nations falling outside the line would have to fend for themselves. Korea’s
exclusion from the perimeter was seen by some as an invitation for communist aggression that led to
the Korean War.

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The PSB believed that the secret of Vietminh success lay in Ho Chih Minh’s

ability to win the war at the psychological level. The Vietminh were seen as

defenders of Vietnamese nationhood against the French oppressors and thus won wide

support among the locals. Despite the numerical and technological superiority of

French forces, the Vietminh’s ability to maintain the military initiative created an

impression of invincibility. Ho’s constant harassment of the French troops with his

small guerrilla units also contributed to the psychological discouragement of the

French. Because “the French have demonstrated their inability to formulate and

implement a [counter-strategy]”, the US was convinced that it needed to take

leadership throughout the whole area so that it could force the French to adopt an

offensive, guerrilla-warfare strategy as well as to grant Vietnam genuine

independence. (PSB D-23, 4) This would then create “an atmosphere of victory” and

the “impression that the US is determined not to abandon Southeast Asia to the

communists”. It would also hopefully “raise the morale of non-communist

indigenous nationalist elements in Indochina – particularly in Laos and Cambodia –

because it will suggest the possibility of greater US pressure on the French to

accelerate reform.” (PSB D-23, 6) But since impressions count, the US was also

conscious that its moves might generate “British and French suspicions that US

leadership in Southeast Asia is a cloak for US ‘ambitions’ detrimental to their

interests” or stir up “similar suspicions of US ‘imperialism’ on the part of extreme

Asian nationalists”. (PSB D-23, 8)

Moreover, the PSB was quick to trump up Thailand’s ethnic make-up as an ideal

factor in psychological warfare against the Vietminh.3 Thais living in the northern

3
The PSB had wrongly presumed that there was an affinity between the Thai-related groups of Laos.

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and northeastern part of the country shared the same language as those in Laos and

Thailand actually has several times more ethnic Lao than lightly-populated Laos. The

report made certain sweeping generalizations of Thai ethnography, beginning with the

assertion that since the present Thai regime was too corrupt to “satisfy the idealistic

side of the complex Thai character, there is an urgent need for American moral

leadership to fill this psychological vacuum before the communists do”. Continuing

in the same vein, the report claimed that although the Thais are “courageous and

intelligent” they are also “gentle and frivolous”; they are “incorrigible individualists”

but also “amazingly ingenious improvisers”. On top of these, the Thais supposedly

lack foresight and dislike systematic planning. Based on these traits, the PSB advised

that the Thais are “peculiarly unsuited to military institutions of the Western type”

and “any attempt to develop rapidly a large-scale efficient modern army in Thailand is

probably foredoomed to failure”. However, the organisation of Thai manpower into

small guerrilla-type units “would minimise their military defects and give maximum

score to their virtues”. (PSB D-23, 14)

Yet one wonders if this American version of Thai ethnology is simply a case of

tailoring the description to meet the need. The US did not need an army with German

or Swiss efficiency in Thailand; it needed guerrilla-type units. So the US needed the

Thais to be courageous and “ingenious improvisers” instead of, say, efficient and

clear thinkers. With that, the US concluded that “Thailand is the logical – in fact the

only possible – focus of the integrated, offensively-defensive strategy needed to

defeat the communists in Southeast Asia”. (PSB D-23, 5)

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Implementing PSB D-23

Eisenhower once described psychological warfare as “anything from the singing

of a beautiful hymn to the most extraordinary kind of physical sabotage”.

(Presidential papers, No. 481) This just about describes the two-stage plan in PSB D-

23. Phase one involves psychological warfare operations to strengthen Thailand –

increased propaganda activities, appointment of diplomats sensitive to Thai culture,

stepped up efforts to convince the Thai people of America’s commitment to the

country sans imperialist ambitions, and aiding development. However, the key to the

programme lay in its military goals to “develop, expand and accelerate to the greatest

extent sound programmes for the creation and employment of guerrilla and

paramilitary forces” in Thailand. (PSB D-23, 22) This would then facilitate phase two,

where the US hoped to send the guerrilla units into Indochina to defeat the Vietminh.

Donovan and guerrilla warfare

The man tasked with implementing PSB D-23 was William “Wild Bill” Donovan

– former Office of Strategic Services (OSS) chief, cofounder of the CIA, Wall Street

lawyer and lobbyist for foreign governments4. As the new US ambassador to

Thailand, he was told to coordinate the efforts among the Foreign Operations

Administration (FOA), United States Information Service (USIS) and the CIA in

Thailand to go hand in hand with PSB D-23. Donovan felt that he understood the

Vietminh because the OSS had worked with Ho Chih Minh. Like the PSB, he

believed that only a guerrilla strategy shaped after Ho’s could defeat the communists.

4
Donovan continued to be a highly paid lobbyist for Phao in the US after he finished his stint as
ambassador in Thailand.

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Since Donovan considered the police to be the most flexible and effective fighting

force in the country, he centred PSC D-23’s guerrilla-warfare programme on Phao’s

department5. In late 1953, the CIA helped the Thais to establish a new intelligence

organisation which followed communist (and non-communist) dissident activities in

the kingdom and its neighbours. The Border Patrol Police (BPP), consisting of 5,000

policemen trained for military-style patrol of the border with Laos and Cambodia, was

formed under Donovan’s tenure. The unit implemented most of the guerrilla-warfare

aspects of PSB D-23. Donovan also helped Phao to set up the elite of the police

paramilitary units, the Police Aerial Reconnaissance (Resupply) Unit (PARU). The

recruits, high-school graduates proficient in the languages of neighbouring countries –

were trained in parachuting, sabotage, jungle warfare and survival. The CIA paid the

salaries of PARU and BPP troops. (Fineman 1997:182)

Tapping into the local peasants, the US gave the BPP US$4 million to distribute

light weapons to villagers and train them to fight communist guerrillas and

propaganda agents. Another civilian-based guerrilla-warfare programme focussed on

the 200,000 non-Thai hill tribesmen in Thailand’s northern mountains. The BPP,

with CIA funding and equipment, started to secretly arm and train them in guerrilla

warfare, with the eventual hope of deploying into Laos6. (Fineman 1997:183)

Military and economic aid

Armed with the objective to “prepare the country for an eventual communist

assault”, Donovan pushed Dulles to give more military aid to Thailand to boost its

military defence. (Darling 1961:260) Washington gave the green light and in 1953,

5
This was the beginning of a close friendship between Phao and Donovan.
6
In the mid-1960s, the US fought, through an anti-communist army of Hmong hill tribesmen,
America’s so-called Secret War in Laos.

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the US$56 million of military aid actually exceeded the Thai military budget by 250

per cent. (Nongnuth 1982:145) Donovan was also largely responsible for the

enlargement of the MAAG mission from 300 to 400 men in 19547. By then, the

Eisenhower administration had reduced the technical cooperation programme to about

half its former size while the defence support programme increased by more than six

times. (Nongnuth, 141)

Although US economic aid lagged far behind the astronomical sums of military

aid, American non-military aid to Thailand did increase from less than US$10 million

per year before 1953 to about $25 million per year by the late 1950s, peaking at

US$46 million in 1955. (Muscat 1990:295) It should be noted that the peak came the

year after the fall of Dien Bien Phu and Thailand’s entering SEATO. The US poured

a sizeable portion of this money into the northeastern region. In 1954, although the

area contained only about a third of the country’s population, 40 per cent of all

American economic aid for Thailand went there. (Fineman 1997:180) Being dry and

impoverished, the Isan region was the most susceptible to communist attack and

subversion8. In fact, by the 1950s, leftist politician Thep Chotinuchit found his

political base there. Responding to the threat, the US sped up rural development

projects there and established Thai public relations offices in Udon Thani and Ubon

Ratchathani. The most important project that the US initiated in Isan after PSB D-23

was probably the construction of the Friendship Highway from Saraburi to Nakhorn

Ratchasima, which linked the central region with the northeast by paved road for the

first time. Since the World Bank was not interested in supporting it, the US forked

7
This is also related to a later discussion on SEATO in this paper.
8
Thailand’s first communist insurgency was birthed there in 1965.

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out US$13 million of the US$20 million price tag because it considered the highway

crucial to possible military operations in the area. (Randolph 1986:22)

Anti-communist propaganda

One of the first things Donovan did when he arrived in Bangkok was to intensify

the anti-communist propaganda, leveraging on the substantial USIS substantial

presence in Bangkok. In December 1953, he convinced Phibun to establish a high-

level US-Thai psychological warfare committee whose target was to “disclose [the]

aims and techniques of communism through press, church [sic], universities, youth

groups, radio, military indoctrination and cultural groups”. (Fineman 1997:180) With

USIS aid, the Thai public relations offices opened libraries, broadcast radio

programmes, exhibited photographs and showed movies, all with an anti-communist

message. Local writers who wrote anything against communism were given wide

support. For example, USIS saw to it that Kukrit Pramoj’s anti-communist book

“Red Bamboo” was translated into 18 languages although it was at best, a mediocre

novel, and at worst, an outright plagiarised version of Giovanni Guareschi’s Don

Camillo stories. Mobile units were also sent to villages to preach the anti-communist

message. There were singers and dancers, comedians, soldiers who fought in the

Korean War and Chinese who lived under the communist regime in those caravans.

With parades, lectures, bawdy songs, movies and drama, they instructed the people in

the evils of communism. (New York Times Magazine, July 1956)

Some people saw communism as a new form of religion and sought ways to tap

on traditional religions to combat it. Wichit Wathanakan, Phibun’s ideologue, wrote:

“If we can build nationalism in people’s hearts in the same way that communists

17

make people believe in communism like a religion, we don’t need to worry that the

country will fall to communism.” (Baker and Pasuk 2005:147) Buddhist scholars

urged young intellectuals to form study groups to seriously study Buddhism,

reminding them that “communist practices are against Buddhist ethics” and that “a

Buddhist does not start off solving his problems by first blaming others… so remedies

for social ills are far more complicated than the readymade formulae offered by

communism”. (Bhavilai 1967:88) Christian preachers also took a strong line against

communism and this was boosted by the influx of American missionaries into

Thailand after China fell to the communists and expelled all the missionaries. About

half of the 700 missionaries in Thailand then were Americans. (Wells 1966:3)

Donovan then extended the propaganda campaign, originally targeted at the

peasants, to the Thai bureaucracy and involved the “indoctrination of the Thai

government officials at national, provincial, and local levels”. The USIS sponsored

the first of a series of anti-communist lectures to government officials in May 1954.

(Fineman 1997:180) Seni Pramoj spoke at one such lecture where he told horror

stories about communism, compared this “new faith” against Buddhism and

Christianity and found it wanting because: “Man is a spiritual animal. Communism,

seeking to satisfy only man’s material need, will fail because it fails to provide such a

spiritual answer.” (Seni 1958:25)

Education and training

“If not the educational exchanges, then what better means is there to
change the attitudes of men – what better way is there to break the
pattern of recurrent violence and destruction?” – William Fulbright.
(Indorf 1982:96)

18

One of the key ways of “indoctrination” takes place when the Thais are sent

abroad for education or training. It could be long-term, usually for graduate education,

or short-term, for special courses, on-the-job training and observation tours. The aid

programme began sending participants to the US right from the start, with an initial

14 in 1951 and 77 in 1952. The numbers rose rapidly and reached a cumulative total

of 8,000 by 1970. Typically about a quarter to a third of the participants go to the US

for graduate education. The Fulbright Educational Foundation contributed greatly to

the process. Started in 1950, it promotes two-way exchange – first by providing

scholarships for Thais to study in US universities then making it possible for

American professors and scholars to teach and study in Thailand. By the end of the

first year, 48 Thai students were attending graduate or professional schools in the US

while nine Americans were teaching and studying in Thailand. (Thai-U.S.

Educational Foundation, 1986:67) The Fulbright grants encouraged Thai-American

educational exchanges and the number of Thais leaving for studies in the US had been

on a steady climb since then. In 1951, there were 234 Thai students in US universities.

The number more than doubled to 586 in 1955. (Muscat 1990:60) Before embarking

for the US, many Thais polished their English skills at American University Alumni

(AUA), the aforementioned language centre set up by the American government in

1952.

Geneva and Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO)

By April 1954, a month before the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the French looked like

they were about to cave in to the Vietminh. A worried US started planning direct

American military intervention. Dulles tried to cobble together a coalition of Western

19

and Asian nations to justify the possibility of bombing Vietnam. But no one was

interested except for an enthusiastic Thailand, which was then rewarded with a

tentative US promise to help expand the size of its army from 60,000 to 90,000 men.

(Fineman 1997:191) The US continued to make a show of preparing for air strikes

against the Vietminh by helping Thailand build air bases at Nakorn Ratchasima and

Takli in the north, while publicising Phibun’s willingness for the bases. The gambit

worked and scored psychological points against China, which feared the US would

station troops in Thailand or Indochina. At the truce talks between the French and

Vietminh in Geneva, Zhou Enlai pressured Ho to settle for less than the Vietminh

position on the ground justified9. Ho agreed and accepted a “temporary” partition of

Vietnam into northern and southern halves.

With the domino theory10 being the dominant thinking at that time, the success of

the Vietminh had prompted fears of communist expansion in Asia. So in September

1954, representatives from the US, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan,

the Philippines and Thailand met in Manila to discuss and sign an anti-communist

pact – Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) – with the main objective of

containing communism in Southeast Asia11. Thailand had hoped for a stronger US

commitment especially after China’s recent sabre-rattling strategies. On July 30,

Pridi had criticised the “US imperialists” and “the Thai reactionary government” in

the People’s Daily and urged the Thai people to “wage a struggle against the rulers

[of Thailand] – American imperialism and its puppets, the government of Thailand”.
9
It should be noted that this conclusion came about not because there had been any physical movement
of US troops to Southeast Asia but because of the manipulation of impressions given to the Chinese.
10
The theory speculated if one key nation in a region came under the control of communists, others
would follow one after the other.
11
In August, Dulles told Eisenhower of his reluctance to form SEATO because it “involved
committing the prestige of the US in an area where we had little control and where the situation was by
no means promising”. (Dulles papers, Aug 17, 1954)

20

(Fineman 1997:196) Phibun wanted SEATO to be more NATO-like but it turned out

to be rather toothless. Nevertheless, the Thais remained keen on the pact because an

increase in US aid was expected and that the pact put on paper the US commitment to

fight for Thailand.

FRUIT OF INOCULATION

Obviously the objective of the above inoculation process was to make the Thais

immune to the lure of communism. In this section I look at how effective the

inoculation was as well as examine the side effects that have arisen from it.

Anti-communist propaganda

The USIS conducts regular research to evaluate the effectiveness of its anti-

communist programmes. The first one was completed in June 1956 and looked into

the communication behaviour of the Thai elite. In that survey, only a quarter of the

respondents perceived the movies that were screened as being outright propaganda.

The majority were very open to the films and saw them as sources of information to

life in America. (USIS 1956:15)

In 1959, another similar study was completed. The respondents were asked what

they had heard about American foreign policy and almost 40 per cent mentioned that

the US helps other countries. More than 90 per cent have heard or read that “America

is interested in the welfare of Thailand and is cooperating with Thailand in improving

Thai living standard”. Most of them could identify accurately the prominent

examples of American aid to Thailand, such as construction of roads, military help,

educational help and medical help. While 82 per cent felt that more aid was needed,

they wanted more economic and educational, instead of military aid. And when the

21

respondents were asked what they thought was America’s reason for giving aid to

Thailand, most either said it was to help Thailand fight communism or it was to help

develop Thailand. Only seven per cent voiced that such a move was in US economic

favour. The results showed that the Thai people looked upon the US as a big brother

and not as a country that was helping out of an ulterior motive. (USIS 1959:30)

In 1960, an interesting study using pictures to elicit views was completed. For

example, to get their views on Thailand’s enemy, respondents were shown a picture

of a family running away from their rural house in terror. In the background, there

were planes dropping bombs. Responding to this picture, about 80 per cent of those

interviewed saw either China or Russia as Thailand’s enemy and being the major

threat to the country. The kingdom was also seen as endangered by its strategic

position in Southeast Asia. In another picture, the opinions elicited of the communist

regime in China were uncompromisingly hostile and respondents expressed the idea

that life under the communists was intolerable. (USIS 1960:45)

Hence, it can be seen from these studies that the anti-communist propaganda had

been successful in shaping how people thought about and reacted towards the

communist bloc.

Aid

American aid has largely dominated the dynamics of the relationship between

Thailand and the US. Economic aid improved the nation’s infrastructure and sped up

rural development, with the Isan region reaping the most benefit. The Friendship

Highway opened up vast inaccessible jungle land for new and diversified crops,

22

including maize, kenaf, tapioca, castor and soya beans. This also opened up trading

opportunities for the Isan farmers.

It had been suggested that the US economic aid was an attempt to open up the

Thai economy (Surachart, 1985; Kullada, 2003) Hence, the US tried to help the Thai

economy by encouraging exports while Phibun put in place the Promotion of

Industrial Act in 1954, eager to promote US business in order to balance the economic

power of the Phao and Sarit cliques. Moreover, the US was also hoping that the Thai

economy would be integrated into the elements of a world economic system based on

US policy. Therefore, in 1950, the Thai government joined in the GATT negotiations,

in IMF meetings and in UN regional meetings of ECAFE and FAO. While I agree

that the economic aid would later pave the way to open up Thai economy, especially

during Sarit’s regime, I posit that the economic aid given in the early 1950s had more

of a political role rather than economic. The economic programmes were designed to

reinforce the alignment of the Thai government with the US. Any attempt at opening

up the Thai economy by the US was thwarted by the military cliques while foreign

investors got frustrated with the bureaucracy.

While economic aid had helped to improve the lives of Thai people, the military

aid had resulted in a much bleaker picture. It had been used as a tool to influence

both domestic and foreign policies. Because an authoritarian regime was in place, the

supplies of arms to a military regime enhanced its ability to suppress political

opposition. It also sustained domination by the military class, which benefited from

the American aid, and in turn, limited the possibility of civilian rule in the country.

American military equipment that was supposed to protect the country from

communist aggression was being used to make the internal clashes among the

23

contending military and political forces more destructive than before. In the past,

Thailand had been famous for the non-violence of the political changes. But since the

Manhattan Rebellion where there were 603 civilian casualties and 3,000 military

casualties, the coups had got progressively bloodier. “American guns killed our

people” became a rumour that was voiced around Bangkok for many days after that.

(Darling 1961:240)

By 1955, a few Americans started to question publicly the role of the US in

Thailand’s internal affairs. One senator declared that the American military

programme in Thailand was much larger than the situation warranted while another

testified that Thailand’s government was keeping itself in power with American arms

and making “windfall profits” from American aid. (Darling 1961:274) This was not

surprising given that by the 1950s, military leaders were firmly entrenched in the

boards of state enterprises and amassing private fortunes from director’s fees and

patronage contracts. They also squeezed private profit out of governmental

expenditure flows by taking a cut from contracts, concessions, and supply agreements.

Both Phao and Sarit grew very rich when their construction companies handled the

contracts for three provincial airports, several highways and buildings for state

enterprises. (Baker and Pasuk 1995:279) In fact, the US aid exacerbated the power

struggle between Phao and Sarit. Their manpower became roughly equal: 48,000

police and 45,000 in the army. They both visited the US in 1954 and returned with

aid commitments of US$25 million (Sarit) and US$37 million (Phao). (Baker and

Pasuk 2005:146) In 1955, Phao asked the US to back him in a coup against Phibun

but was turned down. Phibun survived by mediating these conflicts.

24

Education

The Thai-American educational exchanges began to bear fruit very shortly after

they were put in place. The exchange acted as a conduit to disseminate Western

values, which the US had hoped would inoculate the Thais against communism. It

even served to put a human face on US foreign policy. Eunice Brake, one of the first

teachers to come to Thailand to teach in 1951 under the Fulbright scheme said: “To

the Thai students, the US will never be that huge impersonal nation across the sea, for

it will be the home of the American teacher who was sympathetic towards their efforts

to speak English.”

The education programme heightened the political consciousness of the Thai

students returning from the US. Many of them became competent experts and

assumed responsible positions in the administration. Having imbibed the Western

values of equality, freedom, and progress, they sought to improve their own personal

status as well as the welfare of the country. None of these Western-educated

returnees, however, took an active role in politics, and many of them became

increasingly frustrated as military officers with little education or experience ran the

government in an inept and autocratic manner. A returned Fulbright scholar

commented:

“I came back from America full of ideas and enthusiasm to help my
country. But every day I see that nothing is done here except by personal
influence and favouritism. Every bit of policy is controlled by people put
into their jobs by political friends, regardless of their ability.” (Darling
1961:307)

Many Western-educated Thai joined the rising criticism of the military-dominated

government. The US seemed to have been aware of this because the PSB D-23

25

mentioned care in not “associating too closely with the ruling clique” so as not to

alienate this group of pro-democracy Thais. (PSB D-23, 13)

In the long run, many of those who returned from the US in the late 50s actually

ended up as the movers and shakers in the 1980s. The prestige from having a higher

degree from the US almost always assured future elite status. Hence Udom Bausri

(1982) wrote:

“It has become almost proverbial that those Thais found in elevated
government positions, in commerce or in banking, at universities, and
even in the military, have received at least part of their education in the
US. For a Thai to have attended an American university, or to have been
trained at an American institution for a short term, is of immense
practical value.”

At least 70 per cent of the 1,210 persons in an early 1980s Who’s Who in Thailand

had studied or trained overseas. Sixty-one per cent of the overseas study had been in

the US. About a quarter of those who studied in the US had attended six universities

– Indiana, Pennsylvania, Harvard, Radcliffe, Michigan, Illinois and Cornell. (Muscat

1990:64) This would also imply that the Thai elite would have been rubbing

shoulders among themselves and also with future US leaders during their varsity days.

This would certainly have an impact on policies when the Thai returnees become

decision makers in the government.

A 1986 study showed that nearly 40 per cent of the 411 senior government

positions12 were held by those who were educated in the US. The majority were there

for degree training. Several had gone back to the States for short-term training

opportunities. These returnees were concentrated in the core agencies of the Prime

Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Finance, as well as in the powerful Ministry of

12
Senior position have been defined as all permanent secretaries, directors-general, secretaries-general,
governor, and their deputies, plus the governors of the country’s 73 provinces.

26

Interior. (Muscat 1990:55) Other than these top-layer jobs across the ministries, many

US-educated Thais could be found in the medical and academic fields, where the

Fulbright programme had traditionally put its priority on. Those who went into

teaching would then continue to disseminate the Western values to their students. As

a result, it is little wonder why the Thais see the US-sponsored training as the most

pervasive long-run contribution the US had made to Thai development.

CONCLUSION

Traditionally Thailand was famous for its “bend with the wind” diplomacy.

However there was a shift in Thai foreign policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s

when it openly aligned itself with he United States and the “Free World” against

growing communist forces in the region. That alliance, at first informal, but later

formalised in the Manila Pact, had since then constituted the core of Thai-American

relations. And the US became increasingly reliant on Thailand as a base in Southeast

Asia against communism in the 1950s.

By embarking on a massive programme to strengthen Thailand against the

communist threat, the US unwittingly accelerated two antithetical forces in the

evolving Thai political system. On one hand American military aid which was

supposed to have been used to protect Thailand against external aggressors ended up

being used in the suppression of the regime’s political opponents. On the other hand

larger numbers of Thai people were becoming politically conscious through the

American economic and educational programmes. As higher education and economic

standards were achieved, a stronger individualism arose and more articulate pressure

27

groups were formed. As these two forces came into increasing conflict the general

tendency of most Americans was to claim that it was purely an internal affair.

While the schism between the two forces would erupt into the bloody military-

student clashes in later years, the beginnings of that tension could be seen in 1955

when Phibun, inspired by his world tour, decided to experiment with democracy. He

lifted censorship laws, allowed the formation of political parties, permitted criticism

of the government, held press conferences and even set up a “Hyde Park” debating

centre. Threatened by his increasingly powerful subordinates – Phao and Sarit – he

had hoped that the political reforms would gain him a wider base of popular support.

But he probably did not foresee that the outpouring of anti-government sentiment

would increasingly target the US. Leftists, opportunists and many long-standing

political opponents of the military regime began to criticise American military aid and

the SEATO alliance. The US was also blamed for competing in the rice trade, the low

prices for rubber and tin, and the failure to increase economic aid. (Darling 1961:270)

The new US ambassador, Max Bishop, tried to justify the high levels of military aid,

claiming that it was needed for the protection of Thailand and her neighbours. He

said: “I look at Thailand as the cork in the ink bottle, and if you were to pull this cork

the red ink would flow to Australia immediately.” (Muscat 1990:93) In October,

when many appeals were made for the release of political prisoners, the Thai

government explained that it would first have to consider “foreign views” since

Thailand was a member of SEATO (Bangkok Post, 1955) This appearance of

American interference in Thai political affairs led to opposition charges that the US

was controlling the government. The US was seen as a strong supporter of the Phibun

government – which people disliked for its widespread corruption and Phao’s cold-

28

blooded tactics. As the Thai military leaders sought to suppress the growing

opposition, public hostility toward the Americans increased. The Bangkok press

printed numerous articles critical of America. A bewildered US in turn assumed that

Thailand was rapidly being infiltrated by the Reds.

The honeymoon years of close cooperation between Thailand and the US were

beginning to wear thin. The United States, once seen as the good friend that helped

Thailand after the war, was now perceived as a meddler in local affairs. George

Kennan, known as the “father of containment”, lamented in his memoirs that US

foreign policy had been “bedevilled” by those wedded to the belief “that all another

country had to do, in order to qualify for American aid, was to demonstrate the

existence of a communist threat”. (1972:322) Thailand certainly exploited that and

the US was a willing partner. There was a communist threat to Thailand during that

time. But both Thailand and the US exaggerated the dangers to satisfy their

individual agendas – the military leaders in Thailand needed an excuse to strengthen

their grip on the country while those in the US needed a bulwark against the Vietminh

in Vietnam. In all probability, the stability and progress of the kingdom could have

been maintained with a fraction of the expenditures and effort which went into this

vast anti-communist program.

29

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