Thomas Stack Research Writing Sample- The 1970s- A Watershed Period in Sino-U.S. Relations

The 1970s: A Watershed Period in Sino-U.S. Relations
Thomas Stack
Prof. Ekbladh
US Foreign Relations Since 1900
27 April, 2015 (Edited January 2017)
Note: This research paper was written over the course of my final semester at Tufts University
and draws on background knowledge acquired in the pursuit of both my International Relations
and Chinese majors.

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Introduction
On December 16, 1978, a simple document of some 250 words articulated a policy shift
which would change the nature of Sino-United States relations, and indeed the face of
international relations, for decades to come. Through this document, known as the “Joint
Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic of
China and the United States of America,” the U.S. officially recognized the People’s Republic of
China and its Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-led government as the official representatives of
Chinese people, reestablishing relations which had been frozen since the CCP came to power in
1949 and ending official relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan).1
This Communique was not an abrupt, isolated policy shift in its own right, but rather was
the product of nearly a decade of negotiations deeply rooted in the political and economic milieu
of the time. Through this paper, I will argue that the greatest factor motivating the
reestablishment of Sino-American negotiations and the eventual release of the Joint
Communique was the shifting Cold War landscape of the 1970s, which altered the calculus of
power politics for U.S. and Chinese leaders. Of secondary importance, though also a significant
factor in motivating leaders on both sides of the Communique, were domestic political concerns.
Finally, I will argue that economic interests, though they may, in retrospect, appear paramount,
actually played a relatively small role in the decision to reopen China-U.S. relations as
articulated by the Communique.
Sino-US Relations 1949-1968: Cold War Enemies
Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic1
Relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America (December 16,
1978)”

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The period from 1949 to 1968 marked a low point in China-US relations. During the
Chinese Civil War (1946-1949), the U.S. government had supported Chinese nationalist forces of
the Kuomingtang under Chiang Kai-shek against the Communist forces of Mao Zedong, who
were seeking closer ties with the Soviet Union. When Mao’s forces overran the KMT in 1949
and forced them to flee to the island of Taiwan, the U.S. ambassador fled with Chiang. U.S.2
opposition to Mao’s P.R.C. regime in mainland China was solidified by the Korean War, in which
the U.S. military, backing capitalist South Korea, squared off against the P.R.C. military, who
were supporting Communist North Korea. Consequently, the P.R.C. froze U.S. assets in
mainland China. This set the stage for a bitter freeze in relations between the U.S. and P.R.C.
which would remain the status quo until the end of the 1960s. During this time, the U.S. again
fought the P.R.C. through a proxy war in Vietnam, which served to further increase distrust
between the two governments.3
The Taiwan Question
As a consequence of the above described split with the PRC, which controlled mainland
China beginning in 1949, the US began to cultivate a close relationship with the capitalist
Republic of China (R.O.C) in Taiwan. This relationship, which came to define U.S. dealings in
the region until the 1970s, was codified on December 2, 1954, by the “Mutual Defense Treaty
Between the United States and the Republic of China,” which broadly declares cooperation
between Taiwan and the US. Article V of the treaty boldly states,
Radha Sinha, “Sino-American Relations: Mutual Paranoia,” (New Work: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003),2
46-49.
Sinha, “Sino-American Relations,” 50-673

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“Each party recognizes that an attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the
territory of either of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional processes.”4
That is to say, in the event that the P.R.C. should ever threaten the R.O.C. militarily, the United
States would step in to defend Taiwan.
Thus, as articulated by the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, the United States had clearly
thrown its support behind the R.O.C. in Taiwan in opposition to the P.R.C. in mainland China.
This support of the R.O.C. over the P.R.C. was made all the more decisive by the fact that both
parties have, since their founding, maintained a “One China Policy.” This policy dictates that
only one government can be the true representative of the Chinese people and that, therefore, the
recognition of one such government must come at the exclusion of the recognition of all others.5
Therefore, by accepting the legitimacy of the R.O.C., the U.S. was, in the minds of mainland
China and Taiwan leaders, rejecting the legitimacy of the P.R.C.
Sino-U.S. Relations 1968-1978: Detente
Moving Toward a New China Policy
In the dark days of the 1950s and early 1960s, it must have seemed almost unimaginable
that relations between the P.R.C. and the United States would soon thaw. However, precisely
such a thaw began on September 17th, 1968, when the U.S. State Department sent a proposal to
“Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of China” in American Foreign4
Policy, 1950-55
David Ekbladh, "Chinese Opera: Nixon Goes to China—Détente and its Meaning," Lecture, Tufts5
University, Medford, MA, April 8, 2015.

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the PRC’s embassy in Prague that ambassadorial-level negotiations be resumed. This was a
significant step as such high level talks had not been proposed by either side since 1955. Though
the proposed meetings never materialized, they marked the beginning of a new trend toward6
detente in relations between the P.R.C. and U.S.
This move toward detente took a further step forward in January 1969 with the
inauguration of U.S. President Richard Nixon, who, despite his posture of being ‘tough’ on
communism, had long advocated improving ties with the P.R.C. Under the Nixon7
administration, the back channel dialogue which had begun in 1968 continued, and was given a
major boost in April 1971 by the friendly meeting of the national ping pong teams of the U.S.
and the P.R.C. at an international tournament in Japan . Perhaps encouraged by this8
development, Nixon’s then national security advisor Henry Kissinger withdrew from the public
eye during a visit to Pakistan in July 1971 and secretly flew to Beijing. In Beijing, Kissinger met
with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai to discuss issues including Taiwan and the “One China Policy.”9
This first meeting of the P.R.C. and U.S. administrations proved productive, and was followed up
by a second secret meeting between Kissinger and Zhou in October 1971.10
The stage was then set for the momentous events of February 1972, in which President
Nixon personally traveled to Beijing to meet with the P.R.C.’s Chairman Mao Zedong. During
John H. Holdridge, “Crossing the Divide: An Insider’s Account of the Normalization of U.S.-China6
Relations,” (Oxford: Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 1997), 25-27.
Holdridge, “Crossing the Divide,” 30.7
“Getting to Beijing: Henry Kissinger’s Secret 1971 Trip,” USC US-China Institute, accessed March 8,9
2015.
“Getting to Beijing: Henry Kissinger’s Secret 1971 Trip,” USC US-China Institute.10

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this groundbreaking visit, Nixon and Mao discussed a variety of issues regarding Sino-US
relations, including their respective views on the benefits of cooperation and what was to be done
regarding Taiwan. These discussions culminated in the “Joint Communiqué of the United11
States of America and the People's Republic of China” of February 28, 1972, also known as the
“Shanghai Communique”. The document stated that “progress toward the normalization of
relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries” and that no
nation should “seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region,” thus officially articulating the efforts
to move toward normalization in relations which had already been underway through back
channels for years. In this vein, though official recognition had not been established, it was
agreed that the U.S. and the P.R.C would establish Liaison Offices in each other’s countries.12
One point of contention between the P.R.C. and U.S. which the communique failed to
resolve was the status of Taiwan. The U.S. did, however, recognize the desire for “One China,”
while remaining fairly ambiguous about what that meant. Rather than articulating a strong
position on the status of the R.O.C., the document held that the U.S. “... reaffirms its interest in a
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” Along these lines, the
U.S. affirmed its “ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military
installations from Taiwan.” Therefore, though it had not officially abandoned Taiwan, the13
Shanghai Communique sent a clear message that the U.S. was willing to break ties with the
R.O.C., at least militarily, in order to improve relations with the P.R.C.
“Mao Meets Richard Nixon,” USC US-China Institute, accessed March 8, 2015.11
“Joint Communique of the Peoples Republic of China and the United States (February 28, 1972),”12
Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China, accessed April 26, 2015.
Joint Communique of the Peoples Republic of China and the United States (February 28, 1972),”13
Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China, accessed April 26, 2015.

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With diplomatic communications reestablished through liaison offices beginning in 1972,
contact between the U.S. and the P.R.C continued throughout the 1970s. However, progress
toward full normalization of relations was put on hold by the Watergate scandal, which forced
Nixon to resign in August 1974 and abandon his promise to normalize relations with China in his
second term. Following Nixon, Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter reaffirmed the U.S.14
commitment to normalize relations with the P.R.C. and carried out further negotiations.
The Joint Communique & Diplomatic Recognition
These negotiations culminated in the “Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of
Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America,”
released in December 1978. Through this Communique, both parties agreed to extend official
recognition to the other, and to establish diplomatic missions in each other’s countries as of
March 1979. After thirty years, the United States and the Peoples Republic of China would15
finally be linked by official diplomatic channels. In reestablishing such channels, the
communique states that each party should commit to the idea that,
“Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the
world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to
establish such hegemony.”16
Robert G. Sutter, “U.S.-China Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present,” (Plymouth: Rowman and14
Littleﬁeld, 2013), 75.
“Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic of15
China and the United States of America (December 16, 1978),” Embassy of the People’s Republic of
China, Accessed April 26, 2015.
China, Accessed April 26, 2015.

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This statement can be seen as a recognition that neither the U.S. nor P.R.C. would seek excessive
power in East Asia, and, importantly, that they would stand together against efforts by the Soviet
Union (to which the ‘other group of countries’ mentioned can be assumed to refer) to exert
power in the region.
Perhaps as significantly, in line with the One China Policy already discussed, the
Communique declared,
“The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of
China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the
United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the
people of Taiwan.”17
Though ‘unofficial’ ties would be maintained, the fact that U.S. leadership was willing to sever
all official ties with it’s R.O.C. ally in Taiwan speaks volumes about the perceived importance of
P.R.C.-U.S. relations. Indeed, the new U.S. position on Taiwan was formalized by President
Carter’s termination of the explicit support for Taiwan articulated in the 1954 Mutual Defense
Treaty and its replacement with the more vague Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979. Under the
TRA, the U.S. notes its support for a peaceful resolution to the dispute between Taiwan and
Mainland China, and suggests that it will keep selling arms to Taiwan. The TRA does not,
however, guarantee that the U.S. will come to Taiwan’s defense should it be faced with Chinese
aggression.18
Motivations for Detente
China, Accessed April 26, 2015.”
“Taiwan Relations Act of 1979,” USC US-China Institute, accessed April 26, 2015.18

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Having analyzed the diplomatic process by which Sino-American detente of the 1970s,
culminating in the 1979 Joint Communique, came about, I will now seek to analyze the
underlying factors which motivated this shift in relations. From my perspective, the shifting
political landscape of the Cold War played the largest role, followed by the somewhat less
significant but still relevant factor of Chinese and American domestic politics. Finally,
economics, though it may seem relevant from a contemporary perspective, appears to have
played a very small role in motivating U.S.-P.R.C. detente.
Shifting Cold War Landscape Alters Sino-U.S. Strategic Thinking
Based on my research, the greatest motivating factor behind the U.S.-P.R.C. detente of
the 1970s were shifts in Cold War politics. The first of these shifts was the Sino-Soviet split,
which isolated the P.R.C. from its former ally, the U.S.S.R. The beginning of this split can be
traced back to 1960, when Kruschev withdrew Soviet aid and advisors from the P.R.C over
ideological differences. This split deepened further, and became more internationally apparent,
with the 1962 closing of all Soviet consulates in the P.R.C. Relations grew more strained still19
in 1968, when forces of the Soviet Union violently suppressed a democratic uprising in
Czechoslovakia known as the “Prague Spring.” This exemplified a new hardline Soviet policy
against Communist states seen as deviant, which came to be known as the “Brezhnev Doctrine,”
after the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. According to Amb. John H. Holdrige, who worked on20
Nixon’s China policy,
Evelyn Goh, “Constructing U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From ‘Red Menace’ to ‘Tacit19
Ally’,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 4.
Sutter, “US China Relations,” 69.20

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“The implications of this ideology for the ‘fraternal socialist states’ was obvious. If any
of them deviated from the communist ideological ‘norm’ and went down the slippery path
of ‘antisocialist degeneration,’ it then became the responsibility of the remaining
members of the socialist camp to set the errant member back on the right course, even to
the extent of using force, and quite in disregard of the concept of national sovereignty.”21
Understandably, the Soviets’ apparent disregard for national sovereignty was deeply troubling to
the P.R.C., which shares a massive land border with the Soviet Union and was seen by many
Soviet officials as deviant from Marxist orthodoxy. What the Soviets did to Czechoslovakia,22
they could attempt to do to China. Armed border clashes between the U.S.S.R and P.R.C. soon
broke out, including a bloody 1969 battle over the island of Zhenbao. These clashes were23
followed by backchannel communications in which Soviet leaders suggested, in no uncertain
terms, that they were entertaining the possibility of an all-out invasion of China. In the face of
such escalating rhetoric, P.R.C. leadership became more inclined to accept diplomatic overtures
from the U.S., which could serve as a counterbalance to Soviet influence.24
Meanwhile, the idea of Sino-American talks was made more palatable to leaders on both
sides by U.S. commitments to withdraw troops from Southeast Asia in accordance with the
Nixon Doctrine. This doctrine was first articulated by President Nixon at a press conference in
Guam in July 1969, at which he stated,
“Asians will say in every country that we visit that they do not want to be dictated to
from the outside, Asia for the Asians. And that is what we want, and that is the role we
should play. We should assist, but we should not dictate.... as far as our role is concerned,
Sutter, “U.S.-Chinese Relations,” 69.22
Goh, “Constructing U.S. Rapprochement,” 4.24

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we must avoid that kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us
that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam...”25
In other words, through the Nixon Doctrine, U.S. leadership expressed a desire to decrease their
commitment of ground troops to American allies around the world. Instead, the U.S. would act
as a nuclear deterrent to attacks on its allies . Indeed, under the Doctrine, the U.S. withdrew26
over 600,000 troops from Vietnam and elsewhere on China’s periphery. Naturally, from the27
perspective of C.C.P. leadership, such a withdrawal could be seen as a U.S. retreat from attempts
to contain China in Southeast Asia. This, in turn, could be interpreted as a gesture of goodwill28
which helped to pave the way for more amicable U.S.-P.R.C relations. From the perspective of
U.S. leadership, with less American troops present in the region, China could no longer be seen
as a direct threat to U.S. military assets and interests.
Further, the role of Cold War politics in prompting Sino-American detente can also be
understood in terms of growing U.S. concerns regarding the Soviet Union. In 1974, as
negotiations between the U.S.A. and P.R.C. were ongoing, Prof. Albert Wohlstetter of the
University of Chicago published an article titled “Is There a Strategic Arms Race?”, in which he
revived old fears that there was a growing ‘missile gap’ between the United States and the Soviet
Union, and that the Soviets were winning. Such ideas, coupled with the general sentiment that29
Richard Nixon, “Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen,” in USCB: The American Presidency25
Project, accessed April 26, 2015.
David Ekbladh, "Chinese Opera: Nixon Goes to China—Détente and its Meaning," Lecture, Tufts26
University, Medford, MA, April 8, 2015.
Albert Wohlstetter, “Is There a Strategic Arms Race?” Article, Foreign Policy, 1974. JSTOR (http://29
www.jstor.org/stable/1147927?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents).

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U.S. power had been sapped by the Vietnam War, lead to an increase in fears of the Soviet Union
among the American public in the early 1970s. By tacitly allying with the P.R.C. against the
Soviets, therefore, U.S. leaders could help allay the concerns of their people by balancing against
Soviet power. Moreover, by the early 1970s, Nixon had begun efforts at detente with the
Soviets. One school of thought holds that, by perusing detente with the P.R.C. as well, Nixon
could force the Soviets to negotiate more quickly.30
However, the idea that the shifting political landscape of the Cold War was the most
central and immediate cause of Sino-U.S. detente is not without its critics. One of the more
eloquent of these critics is Evelyn Goh, who attacks the traditional balance of power framework
of understanding warming Sino-U.S. relations as being overly realist. Goh argues that such an
interpretation falls short by assuming that “structural changes automatically induce appropriate,
rational responses from states.” Instead, she adopts the constructivist perspective that absolute31
‘rationality’ is not the norm among states and their leaders, but rather that perceptions in global
geopolitics are often made up of “constructed realities.” In this vein, Goh points out two32
major shortcomings of orthodox realist ‘balance of power’ explanations of Sino-American
detente.
On one level, Goh suggests that such accounts “lack historical context.” Noting that a
Sino-Soviet split became evident to the international community as early as 1962, she poses the
question, “Why did the balance-of-power response from Washington and Beijing take so
Sutter, “U.S.-Chinese Relations,” 66-67.30

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long?” If shifting Cold War relations were truly the driving force behind rapprochement, she33
argues, major negotiations and reconciliation should have begun long prior to 1972. This is, on
its surface, a legitimate observation. However, it understates the importance of events of the late
1960s which fundamentally shifted the calculus of the Cold War balance of power. First, though
China and the Soviet Union had certainly not been on good terms since the early 1960s, it was
the conceptual threat of the Prague Spring in 1968 and the very tangible threat of a Soviet
invasion of the Chinese homeland in 1969 which seems to have pushed Chinese leaders to seek a
tacit U.S. alliance with which to counterbalance Soviet power. Second, as already discussed, it34
was not until 1969 that Nixon first articulated his “Nixon Doctrine.” In doing so, he positioned
the U.S. as less of threat to Chinese regional dominance in Southeast Asia, which, in turn, led
Chinese leadership to see the Americans as a more agreeable partner with which to
counterbalance the Soviet threat. Considering the fact that the Chinese seemed somewhat35
receptive to U.S. requests for negotiation in 1978, and that Kissinger himself was allowed to visit
Beijing by 1971, the historical record would appear to indicate that these events, very much
linked to the international balance of power, pushed China over the proverbial edge in their
willingness to negotiate with the United States.36
Goh’s second major criticism of the idea that shifting Cold War politics was the driving
force behind China-U.S. rapprochement is that such an account is “...silent on how Nixon and
Holdridge, “Crossing the Divide," 24-27.36

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Kissinger managed to convince others of the rationality of their new policy.” She points out37
that China had historically been seen as a major U.S. enemy, and that the Nixon administration’s
ability to open the doors to U.S.-China reconciliation without massive political backlash cannot
be explained without extensive analysis beyond the realist ‘balance of power’ interpretation. In
this regard, Goh’s critique of realist explanations of Sino-American reconciliation is somewhat
legitimate. Cold war Power politics cannot entirely explain Nixon’s success. However, Nixon’s
ability to change opinions on China can be understood without venturing too far from the realist,
balance-of-power framework. First, Nixon was a president with sterling anti-communist
credentials. Indeed, he first emerged on the national political scene as a member of the House
Un-American Activities Committee in 1948. Such credentials certainly helped shield him from38
some criticism in reaching out to China. Second, it should not be forgotten that Kissinger
arranged Nixon’s 1972 trip to China and the release of the Shanghai Communique in secret.39
By the time political opponents and other critics would have had a chance to effectively attack
Nixon for his talks with China, he had already returned to the U.S. with a conciliatory agreement
in hand. Thus, though it was nonetheless impressive, Nixon’s ability to successfully open
negotiations with China is relatively understandable, and by no means conflicts with balance of
power explanations of the improving relationship.
In short, though Goh and constructivist critics like her raise some intriguing and valid
questions about whether the shifting Cold War political landscape was the central motivating
Conrad Black, “Richard M. Nixon: A Life in Full,” (PublicAffairs, 2007),129-135.38
“Getting to Beijing: Henry Kissinger’s Secret 1971 Trip,” USC US-China Institute, accessed March 8,39
2015.

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factor behind China-U.S. rapprochement, their arguments ultimately fall short of disproving such
orthodox realist understandings. However, their interpretation is still valuable in that it allows us
to problematize more traditional power balance explanations, and to enrich our understanding of
the broad array of factors which did contribute to the detente in China-U.S. relations.
Domestic Political Motivations
Though the shifting political landscape of the Cold War was the dominant factor behind
the Sino-U.S. detente of the 1970s, the domestic political environment of each nation also played
a significant role. In China, U.S. overtures in the early 1970s regarding negotiations came at an
opportune time for Mao. As argued by Roderick Macfarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, due to
the political purges of the Cultural Revolution, members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),
who generally stood in contrast to Mao’s more radical faction, had gained significant power in
the CCP’s Central Committee by the late 1960s. Mao believed that this PLA faction, lead by Lin
Biao, would continue to gain power and influence, perhaps posing a threat to his leadership, if
the specter of war with the Soviet Union continued to loom large in the Chinese consciousness.
Consequently, “If the Soviet threat could be neutralized by an opening to the United States, then
the role of the PLA could be diminished...”, and preeminence of Mao’s radical faction could be
assured. Put another way, political infighting among the Chinese Communist Party may have40
contributed to Mao’s decision to seek negotiations with the United States as a means to quiet
perceived political opposition from individuals such as Lin Biao.
Roderick Mafarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, “Mao’s Last Revolution,” (Cambridge: The Belknap40
Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 320-321.

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Yet another domestic political factor which may have contributed to the Chinese
willingness to establish full diplomatic relations with the United States was the death of Mao
Zedong in 1976. Though he would be briefly replaced by the similarly radical “Gang of Four”
from 1976 to 1978, Mao’s death nonetheless marked the beginning of a transition to more
moderate Chinese leadership in the person of Chairman Deng Xiaoping and his successors.41
This is significant as, though he had shown a willingness to open up to negotiations with the
United States, how far Mao would have been willing to go to improve Sino-American ties
remains to be seen. Indeed, Mao’s willingness to open relations with the international
community was thrown into question as late as July 1976, when his regime refused to allow
foreign aid in the recovery efforts following a major earthquake in Tangshan, due to Maoist
ideological dedication to ‘self reliance’. Moreover, whether U.S. leadership could have42
managed to politically sell full diplomatic recognition of a P.R.C. government lead by Mao, one
of the ideological forefathers of global Communism, remains to be seen. With the ascendence of
the more moderate leader, Deng Xiaoping, in 1978, the idea of official recognition of China may
have become more palatable to the American public.
Domestic U.S. politics seem to have played a role in detente in other ways as well. One
factor, no doubt, was the anti-war movement which was swelling on college campuses and
throughout the nation from the late 1960s. Indeed, by 1971, nearly 70% of Americans supported
the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam, based on one poll. This increasingly negative43
William L. Lunch and Peter W. Sperlich, “American Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam,” p. 26,43
Article, The Western Political Quarterly, 1979. JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/stable/447561).

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public opinion on the Vietnam War, coupled with the U.S. military’s inability to make significant
strategic progress on the ground, likely influenced Nixon to articulate and later to carry out his
intention to withdraw American troops from Southeast Asia through the Nixon Doctrine.
Therefore, the decreased concern among P.R.C. leadership regarding U.S. efforts to contain
China brought about by the Nixon Doctrine, as perviously discussed, was indirectly related to44
the unpopularity of the Vietnam War in domestic U.S. politics. Moreover, Chinese involvement
in the Vietnam conflict had long been articulated as one of the reasons for U.S. involvement. As
far back as President Johnson’s administration, U.S. officials had been highlighting the dangers
of Beijing’s meddling in Vietnam based on the ‘domino theory’ and concepts of containment.45
Perhaps, in Nixon’s view, by opening friendly negotiations with China, he could allay American
concerns about China’s Southeast Asian interests. In doing so, he could more easily extricate
himself from the Vietnam debacle.
Regardless of his reasoning, it is apparent that Nixon viewed reopening relations with
China as a political prize. According to Robert G. Sutter, he was particularly concerned about
letting such a political opportunity fall into the hands of his Democratic rivals . Statistically46
speaking, Nixon’s assumption that opening China would be politically valuable proved correct.
According to Gallop polls, between the beginning of February and the beginning of March,
1972, during which period Nixon made his historic trip to China, his approval ratings jumped 4%
Robert Garson, “Lyndon B. Johnson and the China Enigma,” Article, Journal of Contemporary History,45
1997. JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/stable/261076).

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from 52% to 56% and disapproval ratings dropped 5% from 37% to 32%. Moreover, his 197247
campaign played up the theme of Nixon as a great peacemaker. In his August 1972 acceptance
of the Republican Presidential nomination, he asserted, “The dialogue that we have begun with
the People's Republic of China has reduced the danger of war and has increased the chance for
peaceful cooperation between two great peoples.” In this same vein, one 1972 Nixon campaign48
ad proudly declared, in song, “Reaching out across the sea, making friends where foes used to
be. Giving hope to Humanity...” while displaying a dramatic photo of Nixon being greeted by
Mao . Clearly, Nixon understood the domestic political value of opening talks with China, and49
was not afraid to use his success in this area to gain votes.
Though they were certainly significant, domestic political concerns played a less vital
role in China-U.S. rapprochement than did shifting Cold War politics. After all, many of the
domestic political factors above discussed, including Mao’s desire to stem the ascendency of a
PLA faction within the CCP and the introduction of the Nixon Doctrine, were closely tied to the
politics of the shifting Cold War balance of power. That is to say, many domestic political
motivations for restoring China-U.S. relations would not have come to prominence had it not
been for concerns about the shifting Cold War political landscape.
Moreover, any suggestion of the preeminence of domestic politics in shaping China-U.S.
relations must ignore the tangible domestic political opposition to detente which existed in both
“Job Performance Ratings for Richard Nixon,” Roper Center Public Opinion Archives, Accessed April47
26, 2015.
Richard Nixon, “Remarks on Accepting the Presidential Nomination,” The American Presidency Project,48
accessed April 26, 2015.
“Nixon 1972 Presidential Campaign Ad,” The Living Room Candidate, Accessed April 24, 2015.49

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nations. In the P.R.C., many CCP officials, particularly those of Lin Biao’s PLA faction, appear
to have been opposed to detente with the United States on principle. Indeed, during one
declassified 1972 discussion with Nixon, Mao spoke of a “reactionary group which is opposed to
our contact with you,” almost certainly in reference to Lin Biao. Had Lin not been killed in a50
plane crash in September 1971, which some say was orchestrated by Mao, such political51
opposition could have proved to be a stumbling block to Mao’s efforts at improving Sino-U.S.
relations. Domestic opposition to detente was palpable in the United States as well. Luckily for
Nixon, his strong anti-Communist reputation largely protected him from some such criticism.
However, when President Carter attempted to decrease U.S. support for Taiwan in the wake of
the 1979 Joint Communique by terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 and replacing it
with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, he faced staunch opposition from the Senate.
Some Congressmen even attempted to bring a constitutional challenge against the TRA, claiming
that Carter had overstepped his authority by reversing previous security agreements with Taiwan.
Though this challenge to improved Sino-U.S. relations failed, it demonstrates the real opposition
faced by such measures in the United States. Given such opposition, the decision to reopen52
relations with China could not have been a foregone conclusion for any American President.
Therefore, domestic politics were ultimately less of a factor in bringing about detente than were
shifts in the Cold War political landscape.
Economic Motivations
“Mao Meets Richard Nixon,” USC US-China Institute, accessed March 8, 2015.50
Mafarquhar and Schoenhals, “Mao’s Last Revolution,” 322.51
Sutter, “U.S. Chinese Relations,” 78.52

Stack 19
Finally, upon beginning my research for this paper, I was convinced that economic
interests would have played a major role in promoting the China-U.S. detente of the 1970s,
which culminated in the 1979 Joint Communique. However, after extensive research, I must
conclude that economic factors, though they were considered by leaders on both sides of the
Pacific in deciding to improve Sino-U.S. relations, played a secondary role far less significant
than the Shifting Cold War landscape or domestic political concerns.
The logic behind my initial assumption was straightforward. After all, 1978 marked the
beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform and Opening” in China, which sought to liberalize the
P.R.C.‘s historically centrally planned economy. As part of these reforms, China began to seek
limited foreign investment in so-called “Special Economic Zones.” By reestablishing relations
with the United States, China could tap investment capital from the world’s largest economy. By
getting in on the proverbial ‘ground floor’ of investment in mainland China, U.S. investors stood
to make a major profit.
Some U.S. interest in opening up China’s massive economy did exist. Indeed, as far back
as 1967, Nixon had indicated in an article in Foreign Policy that “there is no place on this small
planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.” Evidently,53
Nixon took the economic potential of China’s massive population seriously. Moreover, in the
early 1970s, Senator William Fulbright organized hearings which touched on the issue of China’s
Richard Nixon, “Asia After Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs, October, 1967, accessed April 25, 2015,http://53
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23927/richard-m-nixon/asia-after-viet-nam.

Stack 20
massive economic potential. In these hearings, organizations such as the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce emerged as proponents of Sino-U.S. detente.54
However, despite their presence, it appears that such voices promoting economic reasons
for opening relations with China remained in the background of major debates on the subject.
Upon examining economic statistics, it becomes evident why. Even by 1988, a decade after
Deng’s “Reform and Opening” had begun, the total value of trade between the U.S. and the
P.R.C remained below $20 billion. In retrospect, this is an understandable outcome. After all,55
China’s economic liberalization has happened through gradual stages. Even with the beginning
of Reform and Opening in 1978, the Chinese economy was still a primarily centrally planned
one, and would remain that way for years to come. Moreover, to foreign observers, including
Americans, it may have been difficult to gauge just how dedicated Deng’s regime was to
economic reform. After all, the CCP had historically been prone to seemingly unpredictable
policy shifts. In light of such gradual reform and well founded doubts about the future of
China’s economic liberalization, it is unsurprising that economic opportunities remained
secondary to Cold War and domestic politics as a motivating factor behind the China-U.S.
detente of the 1970s.
In light of this realization, I recognize that my initial presumption of the centrality of
economic concerns was likely biased by my experience with contemporary Sino-American
relations, in which trade is paramount. I failed to sufficiently account for the fact that this trade
Goh, “Constructing The U.S. Rapprochement,” 57-58.54
“Talking Points: June 3-17, 2009,” USC US-China Institute, accessed April 24, 2015. http://55
china.usc.edu/talking-points-june-3-17-2009.

Stack 21
is a relatively recent phenomenon. In the future, I will be more cautious about letting my biases
influence my analysis of historical events.
Conclusion
The 1970s marked a watershed period in China-U.S. relations. The “Joint Communiqué
on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic of China and the
United States of America,” released in December 1978, was the culmination of a decade of work
by American and Chinese politicians to replace decades of mistrust between the U.S. and P.R.C.
with a working, productive diplomatic relationship. Though many factors motivated this shift in
relations, the most significant cause was the shifting international political landscape of the Cold
War, followed by somewhat less vital but still significant trends in the domestic politics of the
U.S.A. and P.R.C.. Finally, despite contemporary appearances, economic factors actually played
a relatively small role in the warming of Sino-U.S. relations.

Stack 22
Annotated Bibliography
American Foreign Policy, 1950-55; Basic Documents. [Mutual Defense Treaty Between the
United States and the Republic of China]. Washington, D.C.: Washington, U. S. Govt. Print.
Office, 1957.
This primary source document details the pre-communique relationship of the United
States with the Republic of China (Taiwan) at the expense of the People’s Republic of
China (mainland China). Provides perspective on changes due to communique.
Black, Conrad. “Richard M. Nixon: A Life in Full,” PublicAffairs 2007.
This secondary source covers the background of Nixon’s rise to power and his anti-
communist credentials.
“China,” Foreign Relations of the United States., edited by Nickles, David P. Vol. XIII,
1977-1980. Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 2013.
This collection of primary source documents from the US government exposes
discussions around detente with China and the communique specifically, providing a
view of what motivated US government officials at the time.
Ekbladh, David. "Chinese Opera: Nixon Goes to China—Détente and its Meaning," Lecture,
Tufts University, Medford, MA, April 8, 2015.
This secondary source provides background on the history of U.S. relations and
rapprochement with the P.R.C.
Garrison, Jean A. Making China Policy: From Nixon to G.W. Bush. Boulder: Lynne Riener
Publishers, 2005.
Secondary source providing background on difficulties faces by Pres. Carter in signing
1979 Join Communique.
"Getting to Beijing: Henry Kissinger's Secret 1971 Trip." USC US-China Institute, accessed 8
March, 2015, http://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip.
Secondary source which provides background on Nixon administration’s first attempts at
outreach and direct communication with the PRC, explaining origins of communique.
Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974 :From "Red
Menace" to "Tacit Ally". Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Secondary source providing detailed information on how early detente between US and
China proceeded in years prior to communique.

Stack 23
Holdridge, John H. Crossing the Divide: An Insider's Account of the Normalization of US-China
Relations. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997.
Firsthand account of the evolution of the US-China relationship before and after the
communique. Provides context.
“Job Performance Ratings for Richard Nixon,” Roper Center Public Opinion Archives, Accessed
April 26, 2015. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cfide/roper/presidential/webroot/
presidential_rating_detail.cfm?allRate=True&presidentName=Nixon.
Primary source showing rise in Nixon’s popularity after 1972 China trip.
Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic
of China and the United States of America, Website of the Embassy of the People's Republic
of China in the United States (December 16, 1978).
The communique itself (primary source). This is what my paper is built around.
Lunch, William L. and Sperlich, Peter W., “American Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam,”
p. 26, Article, The Western Political Quarterly, 1979. JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/stable/
447561).
Primary source regarding declining popularity of Vietnam war and its contribution to
Nixon doctrine.
Mafarquhar, Roderick, and Schoenhals, Michael, “Mao’s Last Revolution,” Cambridge: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006.
This secondary source details the argument that CCP infighting led Mao to negotiate
with the U.S.
“Mao Meets Richard Nixon,” USC US-China Institute, accessed March 8, 2015.
This primary source details Mao’s discussion of those opposed to reconciliation with
the U.S within his own party
“Nixon 1972 Presidential Campaign Ad,” The Living Room Candidate, Accessed April 24, 2015.
http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1972/nixon-now.
Primary source which loud’s Nixon’s achievements in opening China.
Nixon, Richard. “Asia After Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs, October, 1967, accessed April 25, 2015,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23927/richard-m-nixon/asia-after-viet-nam.
Primary source in which Nixon alludes to economic significance of China.

Stack 24
Nixon, Richard, “Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen,” in USCB: The American
Presidency Project, accessed April 26, 2015. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?
pid=2140
In this primary source, Nixon lays out the basis of the Nixon doctrine.
Nixon, Richard. “Remarks on Accepting the Presidential Nomination,” The American
Presidency Project, accessed April 26, 2015. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?
pid=3537.
Primary source in which Nixon talks about his record on China to gain support.
Sweetman, Arthur, and Zhang, Jun. Economic Transitions with Chinese Characteristics: 30
Years of Reform and Opening Up. Montreal: McGill- Queens University Press, 2009.
This secondary source provides some background regarding reform and opening in China
the economic motivations for an improved relationship with the U.S.
Sinha, Radha, “Sino-American Relations: Mutual Paranoia,” New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2003.
This secondary source provides background on the history of U.S. vs P.R.C.
hostilities.
"Taiwan Relations Act of 1979." USC China- US Institute, accessed 8 March, 2015.
Primary source detailing change in status (official non-recognition) adopted by US
toward Taiwan with release of communique.
"Talking Points: June 3 - 17, 2009." USC US-China Institute, accessed March 8, 2015, http://
china.usc.edu/talking-points-june-3-17-2009.
Provides some charts and hard data backing up claims that trade between PRC and US
has grown massively from 1978 into 21st century.
Wohlstetter, Albert, “Is There a Strategic Arms Race?” Article, Foreign Policy, 1974. JSTOR,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147927?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
This primary source from the period details concerns about the Russian missile gap
which may have contributed to rapprochement with China.

Thomas Stack Research Writing Sample- The 1970s- A Watershed Period in Sino-U.S. Relations

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