Resisting the Professional MilitaryDuring the American Revol.docx

Resisting the Professional Military
During the American Revolution
CLAUDIA MORELAND AND TOBY TERRAR
In recent times, many American National Guard troops have
resisted
foreign deployment, including ten thousand who have deserted
from
the Iraq War or committed suicide. Deserter Camilo Mejia tied
resistance to foreign war being ‘‘outside our normal duties,
which [are]
to provide disaster relief at the state level.’’ Some have filed
lawsuits
invoking the Nuremberg Principles, international law, and the
principle
that disobedience is not reprehensible, criminal wars are. There
was
similar resistance to Kosovo, the Persian Gulf War, and
Afghanistan.
Starting in January 1985, the governors of California,
Massachusetts,
Ohio, Vermont, Washington, and Maine attempted to exercise
their

authority to prevent National Guard troops from deploying to
Honduras. Earlier, it was the public outcry resulting from the
Vietnam War and the deployment there of non-professional,
high-
school-age youth that helped bring the abolition of the draft.
Even with
the voluntary military, resistance continues with many youth
refusing
recruitment despite promises of economic success, job training,
educational benefits, health care, travel, and adventure. Voters
turn
out presidents and politicians for supporting the military.
R
esistance to foreign deployment is as ancient as foreign deploy-
ment itself. The challenge in studying it during the American
Revolutionary period is to overcome the tradition of writing
from the
perspective of prominent figures such as George Washington.
His views
and those of other elites were not necessarily those of the rank
and file.
Even worse, as one scholar has noted, most studies dealing with
the

militia are nothing but ‘‘ad hominem and from authority’’
attacks issued
by those beholden to the career military.
When history is written from the basic sources, a different story
emerges. The basic source here is the militia experience of two
Fairfield
County South Carolina farmers, James Wilson (1752–1836) and
William Hogan (1760–1836). They are studied because there is
extensive
Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 22:73–81
Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN 1040-2659 print; 1469-9982 online
DOI: 10.1080/10402650903539992
73
documentation about them and because they were representative
in
being, like a majority of the population, subsistent producers
and were
neither rich nor poor. It also happens that the authors grew up
hearing
about them, as they were our ancestors.

From 1778 to 1782, Wilson and Hogan participated in eight
documented militia tours, each of which lasted from two weeks
to three
months and spanned distances of 30 to 365 miles from their
homes.
Their tours involved them in little-known operations and in
well-known
events found in published histories, among which were the
Third
Florida Expedition (June–August 1778), the Granby Campaign
(May
1781), and the Moncks Corner and Quinby Plantation
Campaigns (July
17, 1781).
The popular resistance to the regular military, as manifested by
agrarians such as Wilson and Hogan, consisted of a refusal to
enlist in
the Continental Army and a refusal by militia companies to
subordinate themselves to, or cooperate with, the regulars on
issues
such as tactics, supplies, leadership, and operations. The beliefs
underlying this resistance have been studied by historians like
Gary
Nash. He called the religious, economic, and political beliefs
that were
held by the militia troops, and which motivated their resistance,
the
‘‘small-producers creed.’’ Small-producers were characterized
by self-
sufficiency. With a majority of the population being farmers,
they
produced all they needed without the market. Many had a
negative
view of debt and usury along with the ‘‘envy, fame and wealth’’
associated with commerce.

T
he small-producers brought their beliefs and the militia tradition
with them from Europe starting in the seventeenth century. They
used the militias for neighborhood self-protection. Their
tradition
included the mid-seventeenth-century English Civil War in
which
working people under Cromwell leveled both the Royalist
gentlemen
and Parliament’s Presbyterian merchants. Charles I, whom they
beheaded, observed that ‘‘Kingly power is but a shadow without
command of the militia.’’ The king’s problem was that at
common law,
there was no standing army and militia operations were limited.
The
jurist William Blackstone noted that militiamen ‘‘are not
compellable to
march out of their counties, unless in case of invasion or actual
rebellion,
nor in any case compellable to march outside of the kingdom.’’
For a
century after the English Civil War, the militia in Britain was
left weak
because the landlords and merchants in Parliament had a ‘‘fear
of arming
the people.’’ In contrast, the newly constituted regular army
was
controllable through wages, and was neither ‘‘foes of the
constitution’’
nor friends of ‘‘fanaticism and democracy.’’
74 CLAUDIA MORELAND AND TOBY TERRAR

From the view of the colonial farmers, there was little need for
militias, so they were often dormant. Charleston attempted to
enact rules
concerning periodic militia training, but the self-subsistent
South
Carolina farmers were a rule unto themselves. In the 1750s,
they refused
to be used against Native Americans to make the province safe
for
Charleston’s land speculators.
The militias mirrored the small-producer creed. Like self-
sufficient
farming, they were independent from the market. They focused
on
neighborhood protection, not on profit. During the Revolution,
Wilson
and Hogan served without pay and provided their own supplies
and
weapons. In contrast, the Continentals were wage workers
whose job
was to kill. A French professional soldier in the Continental
Army
complained that farming people were negative toward him
because of
his illegitimate career. The Continentals were not, for the most
part,
mercenaries (in the Geneva Convention sense of being from a
foreign
country), but they were commodities in a mercenary economy.
From the perspective of the small-producer’s creed, there was
nothing to be gained by war; the farmers resisted it, and the
Continental
Army was created by the merchants to promote the war.

Historians have
noted that if anything, the South Carolina upcountry viewed
Charleston
as its main adversary, since it stood for profit and for its
partners: war and
the consumer, credit-based lifestyle of the English gentry. An
observer
commented, ‘‘The people of the backcountry had taken no part
in the
opposition to taxation by Parliament, and the slogan of no
taxation
without representation evoked little sympathy from people who
had but
slight representation in the colonial Assembly. Nor were they
concerned
with the struggles of the Assembly against the governor and
Council. The
backcountry population had as much or more reason to resent
the actions
of the Assembly as those of the British government.’’
I
llustrative of the small-producer’s antiwar feelings was the
reception
given Charleston Presbyterian cleric and Revolutionary leader,
William Tennent. He made a circuit in August 1775 to the
Camden
District where Wilson and Hogan lived. He found few who
would sign an
endorsement of the Association, which was the Revolutionary
organiza-
tion that the South Carolina Provincial Congress had just
approved.
Neither Wilson nor Hogan signed. In his diary, Tennent
recorded that

the people believed ‘‘that no man from Charleston can speak the
truth,
and that all the papers [newspapers] are full of lies.’’ To the
Council of
Safety in Charleston, he described the ‘‘unchangeable malignity
of their
minds and … bitterness against the ‘gentlemen’ as they are
called.’’
The Fairfield County small-producers were not alone in their
antiwar beliefs. One study speculates that less than a third of
the
RESISTING THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY DURING THE
AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 75
American population supported the war. The initial agrarian
indiffer-
ence to the Revolution was not unlike that experienced by
workingmen
in Boston and the other seaports. Paul Revere and the mechanics
of
Boston took up arms in 1775 only after the British soldiers
began to
menace them. Charleston’s working people split over the war,
but were
unified in opposition to the regular army, if the failure to tax
themselves
to pay for, or enlist in it, is a measure of opposition.
Several students have argued that even as late as May 1780,
when

they took Charleston, the British would have won the war, if
they had
left the farmers alone. The small producers did not care who
ruled in
Charleston and would have remained neutral. But London
wanted
more than neutrality, and its brutality lost them any chance of
loyalty.
British General Henry Clinton issued a proclamation that gave
the
South Carolinians two choices: to swear allegiance to the Crown
and
fight their countrymen, or to be considered as ‘‘rebels and
enemies to
their country,’’ subject to strong reprisals.
The neutralist influence of the small-producer creed extended to
a
Continental Congress minority that opposed the nationalist
party and
George Washington’s Continentals. In July 1780, this ‘‘militia
party’’
sought to replace Washington with General Horatio Gates.
Historian
John Dederer comments, ‘‘Gates and the Congressional faction
who
sponsored him believed that a strong militia was sufficient to
fulfill
America’s military requirements, not the regular army
advocated by
Washington, Greene, Hamilton, and the pro-nationalists.’’
For their part, the market interests symbolized by Washington
sought the weakening or destruction of the militias, since these
organizations obstructed the establishment of the regular army
and

tended to level the market in the localities where they
controlled. In the
words of historian Robert Pugh, the militias came to be viewed
by the
market forces during the war period, and after, as nothing less
that a
‘‘black beast.’’
It was because the farmer-controlled militias were neutral that
the
merchants and planters were forced to establish what was
viewed as, in
fact, if not in the words of its creators, a mercenary army in
June 1775.
In their recruiting efforts, the merchants and planters, in
addition to
wages, offered uniforms, arms, equipment, training, esprit de
corps,
organization, ‘‘patriotism,’’ adventure, and travel as
inducements. The
farmers, as one military scholar notes, ‘‘had little desire to
obtain
these.’’ They were decentralizers and localists, not attracted to
‘‘newspaper patriotism’’ and the polished preaching of the
Charleston
clergy.
When Continental General Nathaniel Greene requested South
Carolina militia leader Thomas Sumter, under whom Wilson and
Hogan sometimes served, to march his troops to Virginia to help
in the

fight there, he begged off, reflecting the sentiments of the small
producers. They would defend their neighborhoods, but not go
out of
state.
George Washington complained that brief campaigning with the
militia lured ‘‘many excellent men’’ away from more prolonged
service
with the Continentals. Wilson and Hogan were among those who
learned in their early militia campaigning the negative, if not
ignominious, nature of military life and were lured away from
the
career military. Their early education was the Third Florida
Expedition
of 1778. Many lives were lost because of the summer heat,
mosquitoes,
dysentery, and disease. Hogan later succinctly remarked, ‘‘The
troops
[were] very sickly and a great many died of the flux.’’ The
British killed
250 Americans but 1,200 died from illness. About 25,000
soldiers were
killed in the American Revolution. Of these, 6,500 died in
battle, 10,000
succumbed to hunger, disease, exposure, or wounds, and 8,000
did not
survive imprisonment by the enemy. A total of between 100,000
and
200,000 Americans took up arms during the Revolution.
I
n addition to recruitment, a second area of militia resistance
was
military tactics. The British and American regular armies
dictated a

top-down approach, such as close-ordered battle lines and
disciplined
bayonet fighting. This allowed maximum control to those on
top, but
brought slaughter to those on the bottom. Militia tactics called
for taking
cover, moving silently, shooting accurately, effecting surprises
and
ambushes, and developing the loose teamwork necessary in
irregular
fighting. Militiamen had no use for bayonets, swords, and
sabers, and the
close-order discipline necessary for their use. They fought in
fluid battle
lines, which allowed them the option to quit when necessary.
Along with close-order discipline, militia tactics rejected the
psychology that accompanied it, the notions of duty, honor,
service,
country, and glory. According to a student of South Carolina
history,
even the Continental troops did not accept such beliefs. The
regulars
suffered repeated defeats because the merchants feared to adopt
egalitarian tactics. Where the farmers and their militias ruled,
the profit
system was compromised. Charleston protested frequently
against the
militia tactic of leveling Loyalist planters. The merchants had
class,
family and economic ties to these people. They were hurt by the
leveling
and the Continental Army itself was sometimes used to defend
the
Loyalists from the militiamen.

For the farmers, the most disastrous result of fears about
leveling
was the merchant surrender of Charleston and of the southern
Continental Army in May 1780. The threat that British canons
would
AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 77
disrupt their property was all it took to make the merchants
servile.
This opened the door to the British invasion of the upcountry
and to
two years of struggle to drive them out. The militiamen had
reason to
condemn Charleston for starting the war for profit, then
surrendering
for the same reason.
Militia resistance over enlistment and tactics also extended to a
third area: leadership. Unlike the regular army, the rank-and-
file
militiamen chose their leaders. They chose men such as Thomas
Sumter, Francis Marion, and Richard Winn (who fought ‘‘Indian
style,’’) who were not averse to leveling and were not servile to
the
regular army and merchants. Sumter was so unpopular with the
Charleston gentlemen that Governor John Rutledge designated
James
Williams to replace him in October 1780. A witness later
remembered
that the troops ‘‘refused to have anything to do with him

[Williams] or
his commission and if he had not immediately left the camp he
would
have been stoned out of it.’’ In contrast, Richard Winn, who
often led
the Fairfield militia and for whom John Wilson, the father of
James
Wilson, served as a wagon master, was well-regarded because
he
minimized risk. A student of the war summarized, ‘‘he does not
seem to
have been all that active in the field.’’ Like the rank-and-file,
he did not
condone suicide for the sake of the market.
T
he egalitarian authority of militiamen in designating their
leader-
ship led to their resistance to Continental Army efforts to give
them
orders in the field or elsewhere. On one of William Hogan’s
tours, a
party of militiamen risked capture because they refused to obey
two
Continental captains seeking to command them. On another
occasion,
in July 1779, a militiaman, when chided by his captain for being
absent
from a sentry post, answered roughly. After being arrested, the
militiaman then tried to shoot the captain. But when Continental
General Benjamin Lincoln sought to intervene and convene a
court-
martial, the militia officers refused to serve on the grounds that
militiamen could be tried only under the militia laws of South
Carolina.

They forced Lincoln to concede that he had no authority.
Contrasting with small-producer views about authority, those of
the regular army generally reflected market beliefs. Soldiers
were valued
seemingly like cattle or slaves for the profit they could derive.
Those
who were deserters, thieves, and incompetents were valueless,
or as
George Washington put it, ‘‘subversives,’’ and were treated
harshly.
After the Battle of Hobkirk’s Hill, which was 30 miles from the
Wilson
and Hogan homesteads, Continental General Nathaniel Greene
‘‘was
pleased’’ to order the execution of five deserters. The Fairfield
militia
would not have permitted this.
While the market placed little value on the lives of working
people,
killing ran counter to the small-producer creed, as expressed in
their
evangelical religion. William Hogan and his family were
Methodists. A
fellow Methodist summarized, ‘‘I was determined I would have
nothing
to do with the unhappy war; it was contrary to my mind, and
grievous
to my conscience, to have any hand in shedding human blood.’’
From
ancient times, the commandment against killing brought the

church’s
rank and file into conflict with empire and market builders.
Church
historian Terry Sullivan documents that starting in the fourth
century,
the Emperors Constantine (272–337), Constans (320–350), and
their
ecclesiastical collaborators such as Augustine (354–430) began
the
persecution of the rank-and-file because they refused military
service
and participation in the perennial war-making.
Also unlike the regular army, the Fairfield militia displayed
egalitarian resistance about their military operations, as well as
about
their leadership. Only part of the district went out on tour at any
one time.
Tours were sometimes voluntary, sometimes obligatory. Taking
turns
allowed the farmers time to attend their crops. In their militia
operations,
Wilson and Hogan were not unusual in being quick to cut short
their
length of service when they encountered the regular army. In
their eight
documented tours they came late or left early in half of such
outings, so as
to miss some of the bloodiest encounters. The Continentals, who
were
enlisted for years or the duration, as one account puts it, ‘‘were
of the
opinion that their part-time comrades in arms were forever
taking leave
on the eve of battle.’’ The merchants spoke of cowardness and
lack of

manhood; the farmers, as demonstrated by their tactics,
marveled at the
gullibility of those who believed merchants.
T
o sum up, militia resistance to the war and to Continental
recruitment, tactics, leadership operations, and supplies
followed
the colonial small-producer tradition. After the war, the
militiamen
resisted the Constitution, the funding of the national debt, and
the
federal government. Such resistance helped prevent the
establishment of
a regular army in the Constitution, and none existed for several
decades
afterwards.
In return, commercial interests condemned the militias because
they were a barrier against militarism. A Frenchman living in
Philadelphia in 1782 commented about the merchant dislike for
the
emerging termination of hostilities: ‘‘It is already observable
that peace
has no outspoken partisans except in the countryside. The
inhabitants
of towns whom commerce enriches, the artisans who there earn
much
greater pay than before the war, and five or six times more than
in
Europe, do not want peace.’’
AMERICAN

REVOLUTION 79
In the War of 1812, the militias refused orders to cross the
Canadian border on the grounds that their job was to repel
invasion,
not menace their neighbors. Except for a small number, they
similarly
refused to participate in the pillaging of Mexico in the 1840s.
During
the Civil War, the southern merchants and planters were forced
to
create a professional army and draft recruits because the small
producers in the militias resisted leaving their neighborhoods.
Significant numbers of draftees deserted, especially after 1863,
when
it became clear the war was about slavery. The widespread
agrarian fear
of international complications, militarism, and monopoly
powered the
southern Congressional delegation to prevent Woodrow Wilson
from
turning the National Guard into a Continental Army during
World
War I.
A theorist of the professional military bemoaned that ‘‘to admit
that military power is equivalent to militarism is tantamount to
confessing that we are without faith in our national integrity.’’
But the
faith of the small producers such as Wilson and Hogan was
indifferent
to nationalism. They resisted the Constitution and had no faith
in the
militarism upon which it was based. Saul Cornell, in his study

of the
early militia, notes that ‘‘the language found in many state
constitutions
set the militias and the right to bear arms against the danger of
a
standing army.’’
W
ilson and Hogan’s neighbor, Thomas Cooper (1759–1839)
reflected the small producer creed of the ‘‘democratic decen-
tralizers and provincialists opposed to nationalism and
cosmopolitan
corruption.’’ He signed his articles ‘‘Back County Farmer,’’ but
in time,
taught at the University of South Carolina. He protested the new
federal government’s attempts to protect American foreign
commerce
with a standing military. He maintained that such commerce was
worth
less than the expense of supporting it. He pointed out that
American
exports consisted of articles ‘‘of the first necessity’’ and that
they would
be carried away in foreign vessels if American were not
available. He
stated, ‘‘Thus the only part of our commerce really defended by
the
American ships of war is the carrying trade.’’
In making his argument against the regular army, Cooper noted
that for the benefit, not of the farmer or mechanic but primarily
of
British agents in commercial towns, heavy taxes were levied on
the
entire community, and a standing navy was created, which led

the
nation to continuous belligerency and war. As he put it:
I know of no body of men, so ready to postpone the interests of
their Country
to their own Interests, as Merchants. They are truly a swinish
multitude: touch
but the bristle of one of them and the whole herd cryout murder.
Profess to
defend your own territory and that only, and you will have no
wars; profess to
defend your distant Commerce, and you are never safe for a
Day.
In speaking the logic of the small producers, Thomas Cooper
contended that ‘‘If wars are necessarily attendant upon
commerce, it
is far wiser to dispense with it: to imitate the Chinese and other
nations
who have flourished without foreign trade: your commodities,
the
nations who want them will fetch away:—if they will go to
China for tea
cups, they will come to America for Bread.’’
The regular army maintains it is carrying on the American
tradition. But American values were not necessarily those of the
professional military. Rather, traditional values in recent times

have
been manifested in societies that have duplicated the economic
security
of the self-sufficient farmer by modifying or eliminating the
market,
and by establishing government-guaranteed jobs, housing,
health care,
and similar blessings. These values have required an uprising of
the
lower classes at the expense of the society’s gentlemen.
Obedience to the
market is not necessarily a traditional value.
RECOMMENDED READINGS
Moreland, Claudia and Toby Terrar. 2009. ‘‘Militia Resistance
to the Professional Military: The
American Revolution from the Rank and File’s Perspective.’’
Available at <http://www.
angelfire.com/un/hoganhistory/hog/H3-CWil-8.html>.
Moreland, Claudia and Toby Terrar. 2008. ‘‘Liberation
Theology Down on the Farm: Family
Religious Values in the South.’’ Religious Studies and
Theology 27: 127–170.
Nash, Gary. 1987. ‘‘Also There at the Creation: Going Beyond
Gordon S. Wood.’’ The William
and Mary Quarterly (July) 44: 606–610.
Sullivan, Terry. 2003. The Church of the Empire Versus the
Christian Church of North Africa: 312–

430 AD. Denver, CO: Christian Radical Press.
Claudia Moreland is an independent historian and a member of
the National Federation of
Federal Employees and the Daughters of the American
Revolution. E-mail: [email protected]
bellsouth.net
Toby Terrar is an instructor at City University of Los Angeles.
E-mail: [email protected]
AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 81
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Running head: EXAMINING THE CAUSE OF HATE CRIMES
IN HOUSTON 1
5
EXAMINING THE CAUSE OF HATE CRIMES IN HOUSTON
English 1301
11/14/2016
Proposal
A common crime can be considered to result from differences

between the victims and other motives such as anger. However,
offenses involving hate threatens the society and violates the
freedom of people. Hate crime is Houston has increasingly
become an issue of concern to the defense force a central cause
for researchers regarding crimes (Levin & MacDevitt, 2013).
Hate Crimes have impacted the Houston society negatively,
through the creation of violent hatred among the members of the
community. Research proves that many instances of hate crime
happen violently and with assaults, where 60% of the offense
offenders are believed to have a thrilling control over the
victims. The Crime can, however, be avoided to improve the
safety and peace of Houston in numerous ways such as;
implementation of reporting procedures (Levin & MacDevitt,
2013). Primary education to family and friend about Hate
Crimes. The research focus is examining the cause of Hate
Crimes in Houston. The study will be conducted to understand
the motive behind Hate Crime Offenders towards committing
the offense. Also, the possible reasons for the increase in
Housotn.
Hypothetically, the main reasons behind Hate Crimes rise in
Houston, include; ethnicity race, and Sexual biases; that is
same-sex relationships such as lesbianism and gays practices
(Lai, et.al, 2010). Offenders may be considered to have some
religious differences, and the rivalry between Christianity and
Islamic religions can be the reason for their motives. On the
other hand, same-sex practice can be affecting some cultural
beliefs and offenders, may claim to protect their respect and
cultures. However, the research will examine these causes
extensively and identify the possible motive of individuals
behind such crimes. The main research objectives will be
gathering information regarding Hate Crimes, by collecting
information from the residents through interviewing and
questionnaires. Other data will be gathered from an institution
such as the police stations in the area of research, regarding
some of the current cases and past cases of Hate Crimes in the
area. The audience to be interviewed will be different people

such as couples involved in same-sex relations and victims, as
well as offenders who might express their feeling and their
motive towards the crimes they committed. Retaliation of the
victimized leads to conflicts and chaos rising the issue of
insecurity in Houston.
Hate Crimes are categorized into two processes namely; Social
psychology and structural. On one category, fundamental
category explores factors resulting to the crime, and social
activities influencing the cause of the Hate Crimes. On the other
class, the function of the emotions and state of mind leading the
offender's action towards committing the offense. The study of
people behavior is vital in understanding their motives and
feeling towards others, and reactions can be at times be
examined through the conduct of a person (Levin & MacDevitt,
2013). Psychology may help the research to understand the
motive leading people towards committing Hate Crimes.
Houston residents may influence the psychology research and
information gathering through interviews. Also, the Society of
Houston has different cultures and practices that may affect the
Hate Crimes as a strategy of protecting and preserving the
cultures (Levin & MacDevitt, 2013). The research aims at
verifying the information through providing an opportunity to
interview the victims and people with different opinions
towards the issue.
The aspects of identity may differ from, race and ethnicity,
ability, gender, sexual orientation, age, class and immigration
status. The race is a group of people with similarities and
differences in certain traits such as the skin color, hair color,
and body type features, which are biological and the society
considers them significant and these people treat each other
differently (Lai, et.al, 2010). Due to racial differences, some
people believe that other people are or superior or inferior to
others and they even approve the physical and social separation
of classes. Ethnicity is the shared cultural practices that include
language, sense of history and ancestry that distinguish a
particular group from another. The ability can be defined as the

physical, mental and financial capacity of accomplishing
something. People with disability are deemed by some societies
as liabilities since they don’t have the capability of doing any
work around. Some societies have special programs for people
living with a disability where they help and protect them from
potential risk that they may face when they mix with the able
people (Lai, et.al, 2010).
Gender is the state of being either male or female (Lai, et.al,
2010). The gender dispute has been in the society for long
where some cultures believe that the male gender is superior to
the feminine. This has led to social evils such as rape and even
marital disputes where men and women assault their partners.
Some rapist is said to rape the opposite gender just to
demoralize them and make them feel inferior (Lai, et.al, 2010).
Sexual orientation is the emotional or affectionate attraction to
another person. This can be heterosexual, which means that one
is attracted to the opposite gender, homosexual, which means
that one is attracted to the same sex or bisexual, one who is
attracted to both the male and female sex (Lai, et.al, 2010).
Homosexuality is a sign of mental disorder and moral
deficiency Immigration is the act of people moving to a foreign
country which is not their own. People moving from home
country to other countries tends to be victims Hate Crimes
especially when they are different race and religion. Immigrants
suffer discrimination, and they are seen as a liability to the host
country. There are some organizations such as the U N that
make sure that the immigrants get what they need in the place
they choose to live. This has made some immigrants live in
better living standards.
To conclude, the research will collect data and analyze the data
to make commendable findings and provide possible answers to
the purpose of the research and the research questions. As a
result, the expected result should confirm the existence of Hate
crimes and its effects. As part of the research objectives, the
study is also expected to explore the causes of Hate Crimes in
Houston critically. The research is significant to the Houston

community and the safety of visitors and immigrants. It will
also help restore the sense of security to many, providing the
residents are fighting against the Hate Crimes. For those who
are same sex, victims are threatened and feel unsafe due to such
circumstances of Hate Crimes. Consequently, others who may
desire to practice same sex relationship are either scared or hide
while practicing. Evidently, immigrants’ feels insecure due to
such crimes, and some may even relocate.
References
Lai, Y. L., & Zhao, J. S. (2010). The impact of race/ethnicity,
neighborhood context, and police/citizen interaction on
residents' attitudes toward the police. Journal of Criminal
Justice, 38(4), 685-692.
Levin, J., & MacDevitt, J. (2013). Hate crimes: The rising tide
of bigotry and bloodshed. Springer.
September–October 2012 2524 Army Sustainment
The Impact of Logistics on the British
Defeat in the Revolutionary War

by Major eric a. Mccoy
A t the onset of hostilities between Great Britain and its 13
North American colonies in 1775, the British enjoyed
significant advantages over the
future United States of America. While logistics ar-
rangements for both sides during the Revolutionary War
were somewhat spartan, the British logistics system,
compared to the logistics organization of the rebelling
colonies, was, on the surface, the epitome of effi-
ciency. Faced with a 3,000-mile line of communication
across the Atlantic Ocean, Great Britain ensured that
its military forces were reasonably well equipped and
never starved. Great powers would not repeat a strategic
logistics feat of this magnitude for more than 150 years,
until Operation Torch in World War II.
However, the British logistics architecture had sig-
nificant shortcomings, and before British strategists
and logisticians could identify and correct them, those
deficiencies contributed significantly to the British
Army’s defeat. The failure of the British to develop
an effective supply chain operation; integrate their
logistics, strategic, and tactical plans; and adapt their
supply procedures resulted in their inability to execute
a counterinsurgency campaign against the American
colonies successfully. That failure eventually resulted in
American victory.
Operating a Supply Chain
The first British logistics failure was an inability to
develop and protect an effective supply chain operation
for their campaigns. According to Injazz J. Chen and
Antony Paulraj, in their 2004

article, “Towards a Theory of Supply
Chain Management: The Constructs and Measure-
ments,” a supply chain is a system of organizations,
people, technology, activities, information, and re-
sources involved in moving a product or service from
supplier to customer. The problems of supplying the
army from Great Britain were great, and the most seri-
ous challenge was that of shipping food over such a
tremendous distance.
Cork, on the coast of Ireland, was the primary port
for shipping foodstuffs to the British in North America.
This was not only because of its large natural harbor
and its strategic location closer than English ports to the
American colonies but also because the farms of Ireland
were a major source of food. Southern Ireland also was
an important recruiting center for the British Army, thus
making it easy for British quartermasters to put troops
aboard food ships bound for America. However, a
combination of inadequate packaging, corruption, poor
quality control, and substandard inland-to-port trans-
portation limited the stocks that made it from supply
sources to the ships.
In one instance, one of the worst storms in years
struck a major logistics convoy after it had departed
Cork. Many of the ships were forced to turn back to
England, others were diverted to Antigua in the Carib-
bean, and still others spent weeks sailing up and down
the eastern seaboard of North America waiting for the
weather to break while their cargoes rotted.
American privateers authorized to intercept British
cargo also took their toll. Only 13 of the convoy’s
ships eventually made it to Boston, and very little of

their cargo survived. Only the preserved food (such as
sauerkraut, vinegar, and porter) arrived intact. Most
of the other provisions were rotten, damaged, or dead;
only 148 of the livestock survived. Out of 856 horses
shipped, only 532 survived the voyage. This convoy
marked the last time that Britain attempted to ship fresh
food and livestock to its army.
The demand for supplies was not too much for British
shipping to accommodate. However, the supply chain
broke down under the combined effects of weather,
poor supply procedures, and profiteering. Long lead-
times for resupply of goods, coupled with a less than
reliable distribution system from England, hindered
British operations on the North American continent,
requiring their forces to forage for resources and base
themselves out of key port cities in the colonies.
Moreover, logistics influenced the first significant
British strategic judgment of the war, the decision
to abandon Boston to the rebelling colonists. British
military leaders realized that, even if British forces
were successful in initiating a campaign from Boston, it
would be very hard to maintain lines of communication
with supply bases around the city. Not only were the
rebels likely to attack the precarious supply lines, but
they probably would sweep the surrounding area clean
of any usable foodstuffs and other supplies.
General Thomas Gage, the British Army commander
from 1768 to 1775, finally decided that the evacuation
of Boston was unavoidable. In correspondence to Eng-
that they need to go out there and be successful.”
Addressing the gray areas. Senior Chief Davila said

that the push for formal training was initiated because of
the need to address the “gray areas” enlisted aides face.
“When you have an enlisted aide show up at the door-
step of a general [or] flag officer and they don’t have the
proper training or they’re not qualified, then things hap-
pen,” said Senior Chief Davila. Though regulations exist
to guide enlisted aides as to what they can and cannot do
within the scope of their duties, some areas still require
careful handling because clear-cut answers are not avail-
able. In order to better equip enlisted aides to deal with
these gray areas, instructors provide them with DOD and
service instruction on what duties are permissible and
impermissible. Through role play, students are taught the
skills needed to address tough situations.
Senior Chief Davila said that it is very important
for everyone, including the general or flag officer, his
spouse, the enlisted aide, the aide de camp, the flag
aide, and all other personal staff, to be familiar with the
instruction so that gray areas do not exist.
Interpersonal role play. Because enlisted aides spend
90 to 95 percent of their work hours inside the officer’s
quarters, it is important for them to have a healthy work-
ing relationship with the spouse and any other family
members who may spend a lot of time in the home.
Students are taught to not be afraid to open up and ask
for a dialog with the spouse or officer if they feel that
something is not right. Social role play helps students
work on interpersonal relationships and the challenges
that may arise.
Continuity book. The most essential physical tool en-
listed aides need is a continuity book. This book should
include at a minimum the officer’s biography, the offi-

cer’s likes and dislikes, dietary restrictions, medications,
and any health issues the officer has that may require
intervention by the enlisted aide in an emergency. It also
includes family members’ likes and dislikes and the dates
of special occasions, such as anniversaries and birthdays.
The book also should include the DOD and service
instructions to refer to if there is a question about the
enlisted aide’s duties or responsibilities.
Uniform assembly diagrams and a photo of the officer
in his uniform also are advisable to guide the enlisted
aide in proper uniform setup.
The book also needs to include essential phone
numbers, such as the base locator, base ambulance, base
clinic, laundry facilities, commissary, medical center, fire
department, the headquarters (aide de camp, flag aide,
and secretary), legal, and base police.
Guides for hosting formal events and a schedule of
what areas of the house to clean on what days can also be
helpful for enlisted aides. Students are asked to develop
time-management schedules for their other tasks.
Field trip. To give students an idea of the operation
of single and multi-aide homes, classes take field trips,
sometimes to the Washington, D.C., area and other
times to Norfolk, Virginia, where current enlisted aides
give them tours of general or flag officers’ quarters and
answer any questions they may have about their duties.
This gives students the opportunity to observe the pace
of operations in a home and to note any tasks that they
may be required to perform that they may have over-
looked.

Uniform assembly. Enlisted aides are responsible for
setting up the uniforms of their commanding officer. As
enlisted aides serve in many interservice assignments,
sometimes on short notice, it is important for them to be
familiar with the uniforms of all the services.
EATC instructors provide hands-on training and a
practical exercise in uniform assembly to familiarize en-
listed aides with officers’ dress uniforms. In the exercise,
each student is required to set up a uniform from each
service.
Financial management. Enlisted aides learn record-
keeping and accounting procedures to help them man-
age the two types of funds that they are accountable for:
official representation funds (ORF) and personal house-
hold accounts (or petty cash funds). ORF are funds used
for official events, and petty cash funds are used in the
daily duties of maintaining the household. In the class,
students are taught to use a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet
to execute basic accounting and financial management of
the funds.
The enlisted aide will meet with the general or flag
officer monthly to discuss how much money will be
needed to cover household expenses, such as having the
officer’s uniforms cleaned and buying groceries at the
commissary. Enlisted aides must maintain receipts for all
expenses. EATC students are taught that it is a require-
ment to meet with their boss at the end of each month to
audit these records so that both parties know where the
money went.
Meal preparation and planning. Culinary skills are
also evaluated during the course. Students plan, prepare,

and present a 4-course meal, usually in the JCCoE labo-
ratory.
“It’s not a graduation requirement, but we want to see
their skill level—where are they in regards to their culi-
nary skills—and then we help them along the way,” said
Senior Chief Davila.
The Enlisted Aide Training Course is open to all
military personnel. Those in and pending assignment to
enlisted aide positions have first priority for the class,
as they are the ones who need the information provided
in EATC most immediately. Individuals interested in or
who have questions about EATC should send an email to
[email protected]
mil or call (804) 734–3112.
—Julianne E. Cochran
September–October 2012 2726 Army Sustainment
land in October 1775, he admit-
ted, “It appears to me to be most
necessary for the prosecution of
the war to be in possession of
some province where you can
be secured, and from whence
draw supplies of provisions and
forage, and that New York seems to be the most proper
to answer these purposes.” With less than 6 weeks of
provisions on hand and no knowledge of when his next
shipment might arrive, his successor, General William
Howe, had no choice but to leave Boston in March
1776.

However, despite Gage’s desire to move to New York
for strategic reasons, the army was moved to Halifax,
Nova Scotia, primarily because Howe and General
Henry Clinton were unsure if they could subsist ad-
equately in the New York area. Moreover, they were
equally unsure about when they could expect the next
supply convoy from Cork. The state of supplies at Hali-
fax was not much better than at Boston, but at least the
locals were friendly and supportive.
The move from Boston to Halifax was carried out
hastily, with significant logistics consequences. The
British left behind an estimated 30,000 pounds of sup-
plies because of inadequate shipping, and rebel forces
summarily captured those supplies. These losses,
coupled with an ineffective supply chain, hindered Brit-
ish major offensive operations.
Integrating Logistics, Strategy, and Tactics
The second British mistake was their failure to inte-
grate their logistics, strategic, and tactical plans. Major
changes in the conduct of conventional warfare, which
included changes that centralized logistics operations,
were not adopted until the Napoleonic era of the early
19th century. The British officers’ pre-Napoleonic con-
cept of war was not suitable for conducting counterin-
surgency operations in which the bulk of their logistics
support had to come from overseas.
When overseas resupply became less reliable, British
forces were required to forage off the land. However,
foraging was never entirely successful for several rea-
sons. First, foraging was no longer part of conventional
strategy. Second, it was time-consuming and tiring,

and many British soldiers considered it to be beneath
them. Third, foraging parties required a covering force,
which was a further drain on manpower and consumed
even more supplies. Finally, many foraging expeditions
produced little or nothing, which not only was demoral-
izing but also placed a further drain on supplies.
Conventional tacticians of the time did not trust
living off the land, arguing that it was bad for morale
and could lead to looting, unauthorized foraging, and
desertion. Under the British concept of limited warfare,
the military reimbursed civilians from whom supplies
were taken. In practical application, military forces
often found that it was easier to take what they needed
by force. This pillaging alienated many Americans who
were sympathetic to the British or neutral.
Worst of all, foraging exposed a great number of Brit-
ish soldiers to guerilla warfare, including ambushes and
snipers. Foraging parties grew as large as 5,000 men,
but small parties of rebels habitually harassed them.
British losses in these types of skirmishes soon equaled
those suffered in larger pitched battles.
So the British found that logistics strategies requiring
foraging or acquisition of supplies from the host nation
were counterproductive to counterinsurgency strategy.
However, in hindsight, the British did not realize the
operational and strategic impacts of these actions until
it was too late to correct them.
Furthermore, nearly every time the British Army ap-
peared ready to strike a decisive blow at the Americans,
it seemed that a shortage of reserve supplies and a lack
of confidence in resupply operations prevented action.

British generals, in particular Howe and Clinton, were
not willing to commit their forces to offensive cam-
paigns without considerable supplies in reserve. The
failure of the British Government to provide their forces
with adequate provisions was not due solely to neglect
but also to a logistics system that was inadequate and
poorly managed, combined with a lack of national will
to expand the war.
Under the precepts of Napoleonic warfare, Howe and
Clinton could not afford to lose their army because no
replacements were available in England. So they would
only commit their forces if the odds of victory were
overwhelmingly in their favor and if adequate logistics
was in place to resupply combat power. This operation-
al employment of their forces did not support a national
strategy for defeating the Americans.
In order to win the conflict and retain their colonies,
the British had to seek out the rebel forces and defeat
them. However, British generals often directed their
soldiers to sit and wait, or worse, to evacuate a posi-
tion, garrison, or city that the British had already gained
through difficult fighting. The effect that logistics
deficiencies had on these decisions to wait or pull back
is undeniable. The battles of Trenton, New Jersey, in
1776 and Saratoga, New York, in 1777 are examples of
how the long delays caused by insufficient supplies and
the resulting caution shown by British commanders al-
lowed the American forces to concentrate their forces at
critical locations and avoid potentially crushing defeats.
“There is nothing more common than to find
considerations of supply affecting the strategic
lines of a campaign and a war.”

—Carl von Clausewitz,
On War
Adapting Supply Procedures
Finally, the British failed to adapt or change their
supply procedures to respond to American tactics. Great
Britain had a system to support its widely dispersed
colonial armies, but it was plagued with many inter-
nal problems, primarily inefficiency and corruption. A
quick succession of overseas conflicts quickly exposed
faults in this support system. To their credit, the British
were able to correct many of the deficiencies before the
end of the Revolutionary War, but not in time to win.
Three bureaucracies supported the British forces: the
Treasury Department, the Navy Board, and the Ord-
nance Board. When hostilities began in North America,
the Treasury Department had overall responsibility for
supplying the army. A division of labor did exist, but it
was not rigidly maintained and featured some duplica-
tion of effort. In addition to overall coordination, the
Treasury was responsible for food supplies, including
forage for animals.
The Navy Board was responsible for moving infan-
try and cavalry soldiers, clothing, hospital supplies,
and tents and other camping equipment. The Ordnance
Board was responsible for artillery, guns, and other
ordnance stores, including ammunition, and engineers.
Failure to divide labor and ensure cross-communication
led to duplication of effort in some areas and inefficient
performance in others.
The army was not able to resupply its troops solely
from Great Britain, and the British Government never

seriously considered that possibility. The army could
not be sustained strictly with what it obtained locally,
either, but a proper balance was never achieved. The
formidable logistics hurdles, coupled with the incon-
sistent and inefficient civilian hierarchy, ensured that
whatever momentum British generals were able to
generate would be extremely difficult to maintain.
Fighting on American Terms
The lack of sufficient reserve supplies, combined with
cautious generalship, insufficient transportation, wide-
spread corruption, and the lack of a coherent strategy to
maximize the potential support of British loyalists in the
colonies, ensured British failure.
These factors forced the British Army to fight a gue-
rilla war—the only kind of war that the upstart United
States could hope to win. This allowed American forces
to delay the British while gaining a series of smaller
victories, which eventually opened the door for France
to become involved. Once France began to provide aid
to the Americans, the war became too costly for the
British to continue to prosecute.
Many of the successes with American logistics,
however limited they were, can be attributed to General
Nathaniel Greene. A Quaker, he served the Continen-
tal Army in numerous roles during the conflict: first
as a 33-year-old major general; later, as Commanding
General George Washington’s quartermaster general;
and finally, as commander of the Army of the South.
He keenly understood the relationship between logistics
and success on the battlefield.

On 16 June 1775, the Continental Congress ordered
the creation of both a quartermaster general and a
deputy quartermaster general. During this period, the
quartermaster general acted like the chief of staff for
the commander of the Continental Army, served as the
prime supplier and businessman for dealing with civil-
ians, operated and repaired supply lines (which included
the roads over which suppliers traveled), transported
troops, and furnished all of the supplies needed to estab-
lish camps when the troops reached their destinations.
As the third quartermaster general, Greene per-
formed admirably despite strong resistance from civil-
ians and businesses. By mobilizing the local economies
to support his troops and emplacing supplies forward of
the Army’s movements, Greene was able to ensure that
the Continental Army enjoyed better freedom of maneu-
ver than the British did.
The Revolutionary War can be characterized to a
large degree as a contest to control the oceans and wa-
terways sufficiently so that one side could obtain logis-
tics support by sea and deny support to their opponents.
Since the British had to depend on getting supplies from
England, support from the homeland became a criti-
cal capability for them. When that capability waned, it
became essential for the British to develop strategies
for obtaining logistics support from the North Ameri-
can continent. When the British failed to update their
logistics concept of support to complement their tactical
plans, it contributed to their eventual defeat.
The 19th century French general and military theorist
Antoine-Henri Jomini observed, “Logistics comprises
the means and arrangements which work out the plans
of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act;

logistics brings the troops to this point.” Military strate-
gists, tacticians, and logisticians must remain aware of
this tenet, which applies today as much as it did to the
British over 200 years ago.
Major eric a. Mccoy is an instructor in the
DepartMent of behaVioral sciences anD leaDership
at the uniteD states Military acaDeMy. he Was preVi-
ously the executiVe officer of the 125th briGaDe
support battalion, 3D infantry briGaDe coMbat teaM,
1st arMoreD DiVision. he has a b.s. DeGree in Mental
health froM MorGan state uniVersity, an M.s. DeGree
in aDMinistration froM central MichiGan uniVersity,
anD an M.s. DeGree in policy aDMinistration froM
GeorGetoWn uniVersity. he is a GraDuate of the orD-
nance officer basic course, the coMbineD loGistics
captains career course, the coMbineD arMs anD
serVices staff school, anD interMeDiate leVel eDuca-
tion coMMon core.
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