The document discusses safety-critical systems and their dependability. It defines safety-critical systems as those whose failure could result in catastrophic consequences such as loss of life. Examples include failures that caused loss of spacecraft, power outages, and airplane crashes. Dependability is the ability of a system to deliver services and avoid failures. It consists of threats like faults, errors, and failures; attributes like availability and reliability; and means to achieve attributes like fault prevention and fault tolerance. The document outlines techniques used to develop dependable safety-critical systems, including verification, validation, and engineering practices applied at early stages.
The document summarizes a tutorial on requirements engineering for dependable systems. It discusses the nature of dependability and requirements, how to develop requirements, important quality factors for requirements, and common pitfalls. Dependability refers to the trustworthiness of a system to deliver its services and must be defined in the system specification. There are different types of requirements, including behavioral, quality, programmatic, and implementation requirements. Behavioral requirements specify the externally visible functions of a system. Quality requirements relate to attributes like maintainability. Programmatic requirements address contractual aspects of development. Implementation requirements constrain the design space.
The document discusses specifications for dependability and security. It covers topics like risk-driven specification, safety specification, and security specification. It emphasizes that critical systems specification should be risk-driven as risks pose a threat to the system. The risk-driven approach aims to understand risks faced by the system and define requirements to reduce these risks through phased risk analysis including preliminary, life cycle, and operational risk analysis. Safety specification identifies protection requirements to ensure system failures do not cause harm, with risk identification, analysis, and reduction mirroring hazard identification, assessment, and analysis. An example of a safety-critical insulin pump system is provided to illustrate dependability requirements and risk analysis.
CS 5032 L6 reliability and security specification 2013Ian Sommerville
This document discusses reliability and security specification. It defines reliability metrics like probability of failure on demand, rate of occurrence of failures, mean time to failure, and availability. It describes the reliability specification process of risk identification, analysis, and decomposition to generate quantitative requirements. The document also discusses security specification, threat assessment, and defining security requirements to protect system assets. Formal methods for specification are introduced.
Reliability and security specification (CS 5032 2012)Ian Sommerville
This document discusses reliability specification and metrics. It describes how to identify types of system failure, estimate costs and consequences, and identify root causes to generate reliability specifications. Types of failures include loss of service, incorrect service, and system/data corruption. Reliability metrics are discussed such as probability of failure on demand, rate of occurrence of failures/mean time to failure, and availability. These metrics provide measurements of system reliability.
This document discusses key aspects of dependability engineering including: achieving dependability through fault avoidance, detection, and tolerance; using redundancy and diversity; the importance of well-defined, repeatable processes; and guidelines for dependable programming such as checking inputs, handling exceptions, avoiding error-prone constructs, and including timeouts. Critical systems often have high dependability requirements and their development must convince regulators that the system is dependable, safe, and secure.
This document discusses dependability and security specification. It covers topics like risk-driven specification, safety specification, and security specification. For risk-driven specification, it emphasizes identifying risks through preliminary, life cycle, and operational risk analysis to define requirements that reduce risks. For safety specification, it describes identifying hazards, assessing hazards, and defining safety requirements to ensure system failures do not cause harm. Examples of applying these techniques to an insulin pump are provided.
This document provides an overview of key topics from Chapter 11 on security and dependability, including:
- The principal dependability properties of availability, reliability, safety, and security.
- Dependability covers attributes like maintainability, repairability, survivability, and error tolerance.
- Dependability is important because system failures can have widespread effects and undependable systems may be rejected.
- Dependability is achieved through techniques like fault avoidance, detection and removal, and building in fault tolerance.
This document discusses dependable systems architectures, including protection systems, self-monitoring architectures, and N-version programming. It notes that dependable architectures use redundancy and diversity to ensure fault tolerance. Key challenges include achieving true software and design diversity, as teams may interpret specifications similarly and diverse versions could still contain common errors.
The document summarizes a tutorial on requirements engineering for dependable systems. It discusses the nature of dependability and requirements, how to develop requirements, important quality factors for requirements, and common pitfalls. Dependability refers to the trustworthiness of a system to deliver its services and must be defined in the system specification. There are different types of requirements, including behavioral, quality, programmatic, and implementation requirements. Behavioral requirements specify the externally visible functions of a system. Quality requirements relate to attributes like maintainability. Programmatic requirements address contractual aspects of development. Implementation requirements constrain the design space.
The document discusses specifications for dependability and security. It covers topics like risk-driven specification, safety specification, and security specification. It emphasizes that critical systems specification should be risk-driven as risks pose a threat to the system. The risk-driven approach aims to understand risks faced by the system and define requirements to reduce these risks through phased risk analysis including preliminary, life cycle, and operational risk analysis. Safety specification identifies protection requirements to ensure system failures do not cause harm, with risk identification, analysis, and reduction mirroring hazard identification, assessment, and analysis. An example of a safety-critical insulin pump system is provided to illustrate dependability requirements and risk analysis.
CS 5032 L6 reliability and security specification 2013Ian Sommerville
This document discusses reliability and security specification. It defines reliability metrics like probability of failure on demand, rate of occurrence of failures, mean time to failure, and availability. It describes the reliability specification process of risk identification, analysis, and decomposition to generate quantitative requirements. The document also discusses security specification, threat assessment, and defining security requirements to protect system assets. Formal methods for specification are introduced.
Reliability and security specification (CS 5032 2012)Ian Sommerville
This document discusses reliability specification and metrics. It describes how to identify types of system failure, estimate costs and consequences, and identify root causes to generate reliability specifications. Types of failures include loss of service, incorrect service, and system/data corruption. Reliability metrics are discussed such as probability of failure on demand, rate of occurrence of failures/mean time to failure, and availability. These metrics provide measurements of system reliability.
This document discusses key aspects of dependability engineering including: achieving dependability through fault avoidance, detection, and tolerance; using redundancy and diversity; the importance of well-defined, repeatable processes; and guidelines for dependable programming such as checking inputs, handling exceptions, avoiding error-prone constructs, and including timeouts. Critical systems often have high dependability requirements and their development must convince regulators that the system is dependable, safe, and secure.
This document discusses dependability and security specification. It covers topics like risk-driven specification, safety specification, and security specification. For risk-driven specification, it emphasizes identifying risks through preliminary, life cycle, and operational risk analysis to define requirements that reduce risks. For safety specification, it describes identifying hazards, assessing hazards, and defining safety requirements to ensure system failures do not cause harm. Examples of applying these techniques to an insulin pump are provided.
This document provides an overview of key topics from Chapter 11 on security and dependability, including:
- The principal dependability properties of availability, reliability, safety, and security.
- Dependability covers attributes like maintainability, repairability, survivability, and error tolerance.
- Dependability is important because system failures can have widespread effects and undependable systems may be rejected.
- Dependability is achieved through techniques like fault avoidance, detection and removal, and building in fault tolerance.
This document discusses dependable systems architectures, including protection systems, self-monitoring architectures, and N-version programming. It notes that dependable architectures use redundancy and diversity to ensure fault tolerance. Key challenges include achieving true software and design diversity, as teams may interpret specifications similarly and diverse versions could still contain common errors.
This document discusses dependability and security in computer systems. It defines dependability as the extent to which a system operates as expected without failure. Dependability is determined by attributes like availability, reliability, safety, and security. A system is considered dependable if it does not fail and continues delivering its expected services. The document outlines the importance of dependability and explains how attributes like availability, reliability, safety, and security are related and impact one another. It provides terminology and concepts regarding faults, failures, hazards, and risks as they relate to system dependability and security.
IJERA (International journal of Engineering Research and Applications) is International online, ... peer reviewed journal. For more detail or submit your article, please visit www.ijera.com
The document discusses critical systems and their dependability requirements. It defines critical systems as those where failure could result in loss of life, environmental damage, or large economic losses. Dependability encompasses availability, reliability, safety, and security. The document uses the example of an insulin pump, a safety-critical system, to illustrate dependability dimensions and how failures could threaten human life. Formal development methods may be required for critical systems due to the high costs of failure.
This document discusses safety engineering for systems that contain software. It covers topics like safety-critical systems, safety requirements, and safety engineering processes. Safety is defined as a system's ability to operate normally and abnormally without harm. For safety-critical systems like aircraft or medical devices, software is often used for control and monitoring, so software safety is important. Hazard identification, risk assessment, and specifying safety requirements to mitigate risks are key parts of the safety engineering process. The goal is to design systems where failures cannot cause injury, death or environmental damage.
CS5032 L11 validation and reliability testing 2013Ian Sommerville
Critical systems require additional validation processes beyond non-critical systems due to the high costs of failure. Validation costs for critical systems are significantly higher, usually taking over 50% of development costs. Various static analysis techniques can be used for validation, including formal verification, model checking, and automated program analysis. Statistical testing with an accurate operational profile is also used to measure a critical system's reliability.
ARRL: A Criterion for Composable Safety and Systems EngineeringVincenzo De Florio
While safety engineering standards define rigorous and controllable
processes for system development, safety standards’ differences in distinct
domains are non-negligible. This paper focuses in particular on the aviation,
automotive, and railway standards, all related to the transportation market.
Many are the reasons for the said differences, ranging from historical reasons,
heuristic and established practices, and legal frameworks, but also from the
psychological perception of the safety risks. In particular we argue that the
Safety Integrity Levels are not sufficient to be used as a top level requirement
for developing a safety-critical system. We argue that Quality of Service is a
more generic criterion that takes the trustworthiness as perceived by users better
into account. In addition, safety engineering standards provide very little
guidance on how to compose safe systems from components, while this is the
established engineering practice. In this paper we develop a novel concept
called Assured Reliability and Resilience Level as a criterion that takes the
industrial practice into account and show how it complements the Safety
Integrity Level concept.
The document discusses security engineering design guidelines and system survivability. It covers:
1) Design guidelines that help make secure design decisions and raise security awareness.
2) Guidelines for avoiding single points of failure, failing securely, balancing security and usability, and more.
3) Designing for deployment to minimize vulnerabilities introduced during configuration and installation.
4) Ensuring systems can continue essential services when under attack through resilience and recoverability.
This document summarizes key topics from a lecture on security engineering, including design guidelines for security, design for deployment, and system survivability. The design guidelines encourage basing decisions on an explicit security policy, avoiding single points of failure, and failing securely. Deployment issues like vulnerable defaults and access permissions are addressed. Finally, resilience strategies like resistance, recognition and recovery are discussed to help systems continue operating during attacks.
CS 5032 L1 critical socio-technical systems 2013Ian Sommerville
This document outlines the aims and topics of a course on critical systems engineering. The course aims to help students understand critical systems, which are technical systems that are profoundly affected by organizational and human factors. Key topics covered include system dependability, security engineering, and human/organizational factors. The course will examine critical infrastructure systems through topics like resilience engineering and cybersecurity. Assessment includes an exam and a coursework assignment involving requirements specification.
This document summarizes key concepts from Chapter 15 on resilience engineering. It discusses resilience as the ability of systems to maintain critical services during disruptions like failures or cyberattacks. Resilience involves recognizing issues, resisting failures when possible, and recovering quickly through activities like redundancy. The document also covers sociotechnical resilience, where human and organizational factors are considered, and characteristics of resilient organizations like responsiveness, monitoring, anticipation, and learning.
The document discusses threat profiles in OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation), which is a security risk evaluation method. It describes how to document threats to an organization's critical assets by creating threat profiles. Specifically, it discusses building asset-based threat profiles in Phase 1 to identify threats, actors, outcomes, etc. for each critical asset. Generic threat categories and properties are defined, and the process of tailoring the generic threat profile and creating a specific threat profile for a critical asset is explained through an example.
The document provides an overview of key security engineering activities that should be integrated into the software development lifecycle (SDLC). It discusses securing each phase of development through threat modeling, secure coding practices like code reviews, and security testing. The goal is to build security into applications from the start to help prevent vulnerabilities and deliver more robust products.
This document summarizes Chapter 12 of a textbook on dependability and security specification. It discusses risk-driven specification, including identifying risks, analyzing risks, and defining requirements to reduce risks. It also covers specifying safety requirements by identifying hazards, assessing hazards, and analyzing hazards to discover root causes. The goal is to specify requirements that ensure systems function dependably and securely without failures causing harm.
This document summarizes the topics covered in the first lecture of a security engineering course. It discusses security engineering and management, security risk assessment, and designing systems for security. The lecture covers tools and techniques for developing secure systems, assessing security risks, and designing system architectures to protect assets and distribute them for redundancy.
The document discusses dependability in systems. It covers topics like dependability properties, sociotechnical systems, redundancy and diversity, and dependable processes. Dependability reflects how trustworthy a system is and includes attributes like reliability, availability, and security. Dependability is important because system failures can have widespread impacts. Both hardware and software failures and human errors can cause systems to fail. Techniques like redundancy, diversity, and formal methods can help improve dependability. Regulation is also discussed as many critical systems require approval from regulators.
The document discusses reusable software components in safety-critical real-time systems. It notes that safety-critical systems must be certified to demonstrate acceptable safety. The use of off-the-shelf components poses challenges for certification. Contracts and pre/post-conditions can be used to specify requirements for components and ensure consistency across contexts. Reliability must also be considered when components are reused in new environments.
This document provides an overview of topics in chapter 13 on security engineering. It discusses security and dependability, security dimensions of confidentiality, integrity and availability. It also outlines different security levels including infrastructure, application and operational security. Key aspects of security engineering are discussed such as secure system design, security testing and assurance. Security terminology and examples are provided. The relationship between security and dependability factors like reliability, availability, safety and resilience is examined. The document also covers security in organizations and the role of security policies.
CS 5032 L12 security testing and dependability cases 2013Ian Sommerville
The document discusses security validation techniques like experience-based validation using known attacks, tiger teams that simulate attacks, and tool-based validation. It also discusses the importance of having a well-defined development process for safety-critical systems that includes identifying and tracking hazards. Safety and dependability cases collect evidence like hazard analyses, test results, and review reports to argue that a system meets its safety requirements. Structured safety arguments demonstrate that hazardous conditions cannot occur by considering all program paths and showing unsafe conditions cannot be true.
Semantic Modeling & Monitoring for Real Time Decision Making: Results and Nex...Drogkaris Prokopios
The document discusses semantic modeling and monitoring for real-time decision making within Greece's Cyber Crime Center of Excellence (GCC). It presents research on developing dynamic models of critical infrastructures to monitor systems, manage risks, and enable adaptive response to disruptions. A case study of applying this approach to the air traffic sector is described, involving modeling data exchange in airport collaborative decision making systems to analyze security and evaluate key performance indicators. Next steps involve further implementation within the GCC to enhance cyber defense of critical national infrastructure.
IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS AND SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW ON RISK BASED ACCESS CONTR...ijcseit
This document provides a systematic literature review of risk-based access control models in cloud computing. It begins with an introduction to access control systems, traditional static models, and dynamic risk-based models. A methodology for the literature review is then described involving search criteria, quality evaluation, and data extraction. Key findings include the identification of security risks for cloud consumers and providers, common risk factors used in access control models, and risk estimation techniques. The review contributes an in-depth analysis of recent research on applying risk-based access control in cloud environments.
PLANT LEAF DISEASES IDENTIFICATION IN DEEP LEARNINGCSEIJJournal
Crop diseases constitute a big threat to plant existence, but their rapid identification remains difficult in many parts of the planet because of the shortage of the required infrastructure. In computer vision, plant leaf detection made possible by deep learning has paved the way for smartphone-assisted disease diagnosis. employing a public dataset of 4,306 images of diseased and healthy plant leaves collected under controlled conditions, we train a deep convolutional neural network to spot one crop species and 4 diseases (or absence thereof). The trained model achieves an accuracy of 97.35% on a held-out test set, demonstrating the feasibility of this approach. Overall, the approach of coaching deep learning models on increasingly large and publicly available image datasets presents a transparent path toward smartphoneassisted crop disease diagnosis on a large global scale. After the disease is successfully predicted with a decent confidence level, the corresponding remedy for the disease present is displayed that may be taken as a cure.
Operational Security for Transportation: Connectivity to Rails Ashley Finden
The rail industry has a complex and novel threat model and Frank Marcus will provide an industry overview of the unique process. With a rise in connectivity between devices, it is necessary to understand what you can learn from other industries to protect your whole system.
This document discusses dependability and security in computer systems. It defines dependability as the extent to which a system operates as expected without failure. Dependability is determined by attributes like availability, reliability, safety, and security. A system is considered dependable if it does not fail and continues delivering its expected services. The document outlines the importance of dependability and explains how attributes like availability, reliability, safety, and security are related and impact one another. It provides terminology and concepts regarding faults, failures, hazards, and risks as they relate to system dependability and security.
IJERA (International journal of Engineering Research and Applications) is International online, ... peer reviewed journal. For more detail or submit your article, please visit www.ijera.com
The document discusses critical systems and their dependability requirements. It defines critical systems as those where failure could result in loss of life, environmental damage, or large economic losses. Dependability encompasses availability, reliability, safety, and security. The document uses the example of an insulin pump, a safety-critical system, to illustrate dependability dimensions and how failures could threaten human life. Formal development methods may be required for critical systems due to the high costs of failure.
This document discusses safety engineering for systems that contain software. It covers topics like safety-critical systems, safety requirements, and safety engineering processes. Safety is defined as a system's ability to operate normally and abnormally without harm. For safety-critical systems like aircraft or medical devices, software is often used for control and monitoring, so software safety is important. Hazard identification, risk assessment, and specifying safety requirements to mitigate risks are key parts of the safety engineering process. The goal is to design systems where failures cannot cause injury, death or environmental damage.
CS5032 L11 validation and reliability testing 2013Ian Sommerville
Critical systems require additional validation processes beyond non-critical systems due to the high costs of failure. Validation costs for critical systems are significantly higher, usually taking over 50% of development costs. Various static analysis techniques can be used for validation, including formal verification, model checking, and automated program analysis. Statistical testing with an accurate operational profile is also used to measure a critical system's reliability.
ARRL: A Criterion for Composable Safety and Systems EngineeringVincenzo De Florio
While safety engineering standards define rigorous and controllable
processes for system development, safety standards’ differences in distinct
domains are non-negligible. This paper focuses in particular on the aviation,
automotive, and railway standards, all related to the transportation market.
Many are the reasons for the said differences, ranging from historical reasons,
heuristic and established practices, and legal frameworks, but also from the
psychological perception of the safety risks. In particular we argue that the
Safety Integrity Levels are not sufficient to be used as a top level requirement
for developing a safety-critical system. We argue that Quality of Service is a
more generic criterion that takes the trustworthiness as perceived by users better
into account. In addition, safety engineering standards provide very little
guidance on how to compose safe systems from components, while this is the
established engineering practice. In this paper we develop a novel concept
called Assured Reliability and Resilience Level as a criterion that takes the
industrial practice into account and show how it complements the Safety
Integrity Level concept.
The document discusses security engineering design guidelines and system survivability. It covers:
1) Design guidelines that help make secure design decisions and raise security awareness.
2) Guidelines for avoiding single points of failure, failing securely, balancing security and usability, and more.
3) Designing for deployment to minimize vulnerabilities introduced during configuration and installation.
4) Ensuring systems can continue essential services when under attack through resilience and recoverability.
This document summarizes key topics from a lecture on security engineering, including design guidelines for security, design for deployment, and system survivability. The design guidelines encourage basing decisions on an explicit security policy, avoiding single points of failure, and failing securely. Deployment issues like vulnerable defaults and access permissions are addressed. Finally, resilience strategies like resistance, recognition and recovery are discussed to help systems continue operating during attacks.
CS 5032 L1 critical socio-technical systems 2013Ian Sommerville
This document outlines the aims and topics of a course on critical systems engineering. The course aims to help students understand critical systems, which are technical systems that are profoundly affected by organizational and human factors. Key topics covered include system dependability, security engineering, and human/organizational factors. The course will examine critical infrastructure systems through topics like resilience engineering and cybersecurity. Assessment includes an exam and a coursework assignment involving requirements specification.
This document summarizes key concepts from Chapter 15 on resilience engineering. It discusses resilience as the ability of systems to maintain critical services during disruptions like failures or cyberattacks. Resilience involves recognizing issues, resisting failures when possible, and recovering quickly through activities like redundancy. The document also covers sociotechnical resilience, where human and organizational factors are considered, and characteristics of resilient organizations like responsiveness, monitoring, anticipation, and learning.
The document discusses threat profiles in OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation), which is a security risk evaluation method. It describes how to document threats to an organization's critical assets by creating threat profiles. Specifically, it discusses building asset-based threat profiles in Phase 1 to identify threats, actors, outcomes, etc. for each critical asset. Generic threat categories and properties are defined, and the process of tailoring the generic threat profile and creating a specific threat profile for a critical asset is explained through an example.
The document provides an overview of key security engineering activities that should be integrated into the software development lifecycle (SDLC). It discusses securing each phase of development through threat modeling, secure coding practices like code reviews, and security testing. The goal is to build security into applications from the start to help prevent vulnerabilities and deliver more robust products.
This document summarizes Chapter 12 of a textbook on dependability and security specification. It discusses risk-driven specification, including identifying risks, analyzing risks, and defining requirements to reduce risks. It also covers specifying safety requirements by identifying hazards, assessing hazards, and analyzing hazards to discover root causes. The goal is to specify requirements that ensure systems function dependably and securely without failures causing harm.
This document summarizes the topics covered in the first lecture of a security engineering course. It discusses security engineering and management, security risk assessment, and designing systems for security. The lecture covers tools and techniques for developing secure systems, assessing security risks, and designing system architectures to protect assets and distribute them for redundancy.
The document discusses dependability in systems. It covers topics like dependability properties, sociotechnical systems, redundancy and diversity, and dependable processes. Dependability reflects how trustworthy a system is and includes attributes like reliability, availability, and security. Dependability is important because system failures can have widespread impacts. Both hardware and software failures and human errors can cause systems to fail. Techniques like redundancy, diversity, and formal methods can help improve dependability. Regulation is also discussed as many critical systems require approval from regulators.
The document discusses reusable software components in safety-critical real-time systems. It notes that safety-critical systems must be certified to demonstrate acceptable safety. The use of off-the-shelf components poses challenges for certification. Contracts and pre/post-conditions can be used to specify requirements for components and ensure consistency across contexts. Reliability must also be considered when components are reused in new environments.
This document provides an overview of topics in chapter 13 on security engineering. It discusses security and dependability, security dimensions of confidentiality, integrity and availability. It also outlines different security levels including infrastructure, application and operational security. Key aspects of security engineering are discussed such as secure system design, security testing and assurance. Security terminology and examples are provided. The relationship between security and dependability factors like reliability, availability, safety and resilience is examined. The document also covers security in organizations and the role of security policies.
CS 5032 L12 security testing and dependability cases 2013Ian Sommerville
The document discusses security validation techniques like experience-based validation using known attacks, tiger teams that simulate attacks, and tool-based validation. It also discusses the importance of having a well-defined development process for safety-critical systems that includes identifying and tracking hazards. Safety and dependability cases collect evidence like hazard analyses, test results, and review reports to argue that a system meets its safety requirements. Structured safety arguments demonstrate that hazardous conditions cannot occur by considering all program paths and showing unsafe conditions cannot be true.
Semantic Modeling & Monitoring for Real Time Decision Making: Results and Nex...Drogkaris Prokopios
The document discusses semantic modeling and monitoring for real-time decision making within Greece's Cyber Crime Center of Excellence (GCC). It presents research on developing dynamic models of critical infrastructures to monitor systems, manage risks, and enable adaptive response to disruptions. A case study of applying this approach to the air traffic sector is described, involving modeling data exchange in airport collaborative decision making systems to analyze security and evaluate key performance indicators. Next steps involve further implementation within the GCC to enhance cyber defense of critical national infrastructure.
IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS AND SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW ON RISK BASED ACCESS CONTR...ijcseit
This document provides a systematic literature review of risk-based access control models in cloud computing. It begins with an introduction to access control systems, traditional static models, and dynamic risk-based models. A methodology for the literature review is then described involving search criteria, quality evaluation, and data extraction. Key findings include the identification of security risks for cloud consumers and providers, common risk factors used in access control models, and risk estimation techniques. The review contributes an in-depth analysis of recent research on applying risk-based access control in cloud environments.
PLANT LEAF DISEASES IDENTIFICATION IN DEEP LEARNINGCSEIJJournal
Crop diseases constitute a big threat to plant existence, but their rapid identification remains difficult in many parts of the planet because of the shortage of the required infrastructure. In computer vision, plant leaf detection made possible by deep learning has paved the way for smartphone-assisted disease diagnosis. employing a public dataset of 4,306 images of diseased and healthy plant leaves collected under controlled conditions, we train a deep convolutional neural network to spot one crop species and 4 diseases (or absence thereof). The trained model achieves an accuracy of 97.35% on a held-out test set, demonstrating the feasibility of this approach. Overall, the approach of coaching deep learning models on increasingly large and publicly available image datasets presents a transparent path toward smartphoneassisted crop disease diagnosis on a large global scale. After the disease is successfully predicted with a decent confidence level, the corresponding remedy for the disease present is displayed that may be taken as a cure.
Operational Security for Transportation: Connectivity to Rails Ashley Finden
The rail industry has a complex and novel threat model and Frank Marcus will provide an industry overview of the unique process. With a rise in connectivity between devices, it is necessary to understand what you can learn from other industries to protect your whole system.
Program Robustness is now more important than before, because of the role software programs play in our
life. Many papers defined it, measured it, and put it into context. In this paper, we explore the different
definitions of program robustness and different types of techniques used to achieve or measure it. There
are many papers about robustness. We chose the papers that clearly discuss program or software
robustness. These papers stated that program (or software) robustness indicates the absence of ungraceful
failures. There are different types of techniques used to create or measure a robust program. However,
there is still a wide space for research in this area.
Security Training: #3 Threat Modelling - Practices and ToolsYulian Slobodyan
This document provides an overview of threat modeling practices and tools. It begins with an introduction that defines threat modeling and outlines its benefits. It then covers threat modeling basics like principles, approaches and reasons it is avoided. The main threat modeling process is described, including creating diagrams, identifying threats and planning mitigations. Popular threat modeling tools and a demo are discussed. Standard mitigation techniques and a sample threat model appendix are also included.
This document discusses using dynamic adaptive systems in safety-critical domains. It begins by introducing safety-critical cyber-physical systems and how dynamic adaptivity could provide benefits like increased fault tolerance and deployability. However, adaptivity also introduces challenges for testing and certification. The document then discusses using the Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) to model and analyze dynamic adaptive safety-critical systems. It considers issues like what constitutes sufficient pre-deployment testing of such systems and how failures from untested configurations can be mitigated. Overall, the document explores how to incorporate safety-critical concerns into the design of dynamic adaptive systems.
This document discusses the key aspects of system dependability, including availability, reliability, safety, and security. It notes that dependability reflects the degree to which users trust a system and defines it as covering attributes like availability, reliability, and security. It also discusses factors that influence perceptions of reliability and availability, such as usage patterns, outage length and number of users affected.
This document discusses the topics of security and dependability in computer systems. It defines dependability as comprising reliability, availability, safety, and security. These properties are interdependent and important for systems where failures could significantly impact users. The document outlines various dependability properties and how they are measured. It discusses how dependability is achieved through techniques like fault avoidance and tolerance. It also distinguishes between safety and reliability, defining safety as preventing harm even if a system fails. Key aspects of safety-critical systems and achieving safety are also covered.
This document summarizes research on integrating safety critical systems in information technology. It discusses how modern information systems are increasingly safety critical as their failure can result in financial loss or loss of life. The document reviews literature on safety critical systems, including analyzing reliability and safety of parallel-series models. It also discusses modeling approaches for designing safety critical systems before hardware or software implementation. The goal is to reduce costs from design errors found later. Overall, the document examines how information technology is used in safety critical systems and approaches for analyzing and designing such systems.
This document discusses security challenges and mitigation strategies in cloud computing. It explores common attack types like denial of service attacks, malware injection, and man-in-the-middle attacks. It also covers security challenges, controls, and best practices for cloud environments. These include encryption, access control, logging and monitoring. The document concludes that while adoption of cloud computing is increasing, continued research is still needed to address security threats and develop more robust solutions.
Software security risk mitigation using object oriented design patternseSAT Journals
Abstract It is now well known that requirement and the design phase of software development lifecycle are the phases where security incorporation yields maximum benefits.In this paper, we have tried to tie security requirements, security features and security design patterns together in a single string. It is complete process that will help a designer to choose the most appropriate security design pattern depending on the security requirements. The process includes risk analysis methodology at the design phase of the software that is based on the common criteria requirement as it is a wellknown security standard that is generally used in the development of security requirements. Risk mitigation mechanisms are proposed in the form of security design patterns. Exhaustive list of most reliable and well proven security design patterns is prepared and their categorization is done on the basis of attributes like data sensitivity, sector, number of users etc. Identified patterns are divided into three levels of security. After the selection of security requirement, the software designer can calculate the percentage of security features contribution and on the basis of this percentage; design pattern level can be selected and applied.
IJRET : International Journal of Research in Engineering and Technology is an international peer reviewed, online journal published by eSAT Publishing House for the enhancement of research in various disciplines of Engineering and Technology. The aim and scope of the journal is to provide an academic medium and an important reference for the advancement and dissemination of research results that support high-level learning, teaching and research in the fields of Engineering and Technology. We bring together Scientists, Academician, Field Engineers, Scholars and Students of related fields of Engineering and Technology.
Internal & External Attacks in cloud computing Environment from confidentiali...iosrjce
IOSR Journal of Computer Engineering (IOSR-JCE) is a double blind peer reviewed International Journal that provides rapid publication (within a month) of articles in all areas of computer engineering and its applications. The journal welcomes publications of high quality papers on theoretical developments and practical applications in computer technology. Original research papers, state-of-the-art reviews, and high quality technical notes are invited for publications.
This document discusses security threats in cloud computing environments from the perspectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. It identifies internal and external attacks that can threaten cloud systems. Internally, malicious insiders like users, providers, or third parties can access data. Externally, remote software or hardware attacks are possible from external attackers. Specific threats are organized by their impact on confidentiality like data leakage; integrity like incorrect resource segregation; and availability like denial of service attacks. The document concludes that security efforts should focus on both prevention of threats and detection of security issues.
The document discusses integrating software security into the software development lifecycle. It recommends addressing security as early as possible, including during the requirements phase by performing threat assessments and defining security requirements. During design, it suggests involving security experts, using threat modeling to understand risks, and implementing defenses like isolation, least privilege, and defense in depth. Throughout development and testing, it advises performing security reviews, testing, and activities to find and fix vulnerabilities before deployment.
High dependability of the automated systemsAlan Tatourian
This is the second research talk I gave at the Semiconductor Research Corporation (SRC) in September. Here I bring to attention the need to solve problems of SW maintainability and of the self-adaptable but still reliable architectures. State of the art in the industry now is ‘fail-operational’ which is based on redundancy. We can build a better technology which will optimize itself based on some global minimum function and will be able to adapt both to external changes in the environment and internal operating conditions.
Building a Distributed Secure System on Multi-Agent Platform Depending on the...CSCJournals
Today, applications in mobile multi-agent systems require a high degree of confidence that running code inside the system will not be malicious. Also any malicious agents must be identified and contained. Since the inception of mobile agents, the intruder has been addressed using a multitude of techniques, but many of these implementations have only addressed concerns from the position of either the platform or the agents. Very few approaches have undertaken the problem of mobile agent security from both perspectives simultaneously. Furthermore, no middleware exists to facilitate provisioning of the required security qualities of mobile agent software while extensively focusing on easing the software development burden. The aim is to build a distributed secure system using multi-agents by applying the principles of software engineering. The objectives of this paper is to introduce multi agent systems that enhance security rules through the access right to building a distributed secure system integrating with principles of software engineering system life cycle, as well as satisfy the security access right for both platform and agents to improve the three characteristics of agents adaptively, mobility and flexibility. This project based on the platform of PHP and MYSQL (Database) which can be presented in a website. The implementation and test are applied in both Linux and Windows platforms, including Linux Red Hat 8, Linux Ubuntu 6.06 LTS and Microsoft Windows XP Professional. Since PHP and MySQL are available in almost all operating systems, the result could be tested the platform as long as PHP and MySQL configuration is available. PHP5 and the MySQL (database) software are used to build a secure website. Multiple techniques of security and authentications have been used by multi-agents system. Secure database is encrypted by using md5. Also satisfy the characteristics for security requirements: confidentiality (protection from disclosure to unauthorized persons), integrity (maintaining data consistency) and authentication (assurance of identity of person or originator of data).
This document discusses the importance of secure application development and having a security development lifecycle (SDLC). It argues that application security cannot be bolted on after development, and that all developers need to understand security principles. The document outlines key aspects of a secure SDLC, including requirements, design, implementation, testing, code reviews, authorization enforcement, logging, error handling, and conclusions. The core theme is that secure applications start with good, tested code and having a mature development process in place.
1. Safety-Critical Systems Dependability
Engineering and International Standards
Saleh Al-Da’ajeh
Saleh.aldaajeh@adpoly.ac.ae
http://www.adpoly.ac.ae
December 23, 2012
jjlogo
2. 1Introduction
Overview
Safety -Critical Systems
Safety -Critical Systems Applications, Characteristics, and
other Terminologies
2Dependability
Taxonomy
Threats on Safety -Critical Systems Dependability
Dependability Attributes
3Means to Achieve Dependability
Achieving Dependability Quality Attributes
4Summary
3. Software Systems Development
Development Phases
Introduction
Overview
Safety -Critical Systems
Safety -Critical Systems
Applications, Characteristics,
and other Terminologies
Dependability
Taxonomy
Threats on Safety -Critical
Systems Dependability
Dependability Attributes
Means to Achieve
Dependability
Achieving Dependability
Quality Attributes
Summary
Figure: Waterfall Model - Typical Software Development Phases
Saleh Al-Da’ajeh Safety-Critical Systems Dependability December 23, 2012 3/16
4. Problems Developing Software Systems
Software Engineers Role in Solving Problems
Introduction
Overview
Safety -Critical Systems
Safety -Critical Systems
Applications, Characteristics,
and other Terminologies
Dependability
Taxonomy
Threats on Safety -Critical
Systems Dependability
Dependability Attributes
Means to Achieve
Dependability
Achieving Dependability
Quality Attributes
Summary
Saleh Al-Da’ajeh Safety-Critical Systems Dependability December 23, 2012 4/16
5. Safety-Critical Systems
Definition and Applications
Introduction
Overview
Safety -Critical Systems According to John C. Knight, Safety Critical Systems are those
Safety -Critical Systems
Applications, Characteristics, systems whose failure could result in a catastrophic consequences
and other Terminologies
such as loss in life.
Dependability
Taxonomy Examples of Safety-Critical Systems Applications and
Threats on Safety -Critical
Systems Dependability
Catastrophic Consequences:
Dependability Attributes
Loss of the Mars Polar Lander 1999, cost 110 million $
Means to Achieve
Dependability
Emergency Shut-down of the Hatch Nuclear Power Plant,
Achieving Dependability March 7th, 2008 - Software Update.
Quality Attributes
Power Outage across Northeastern U.S. and Southeastern
Summary
Canada, August 2003, cost 14 billion $
Airplanes crashes such as the American Airlines -Flight 965,
Korean Air-Flight 801, Air France- Flight 447.
Saleh Al-Da’ajeh Safety-Critical Systems Dependability December 23, 2012 5/16
6. Safety-Critical Systems Applications
Common Characteristics, and Other Terminologies
Introduction
Overview
Safety -Critical Systems
Safety -Critical Systems Safety-critical systems are also known as:
Applications, Characteristics,
and other Terminologies
Real-Time Systems
Dependability
Taxonomy
and some times known as "‘Embedded Systems"’ according to
Threats on Safety -Critical their existing environment.
Systems Dependability
Dependability Attributes
Different type of safety-critical systems shares four common
Means to Achieve
Dependability
requirements:
Achieving Dependability
Quality Attributes Real-time constraints
Summary
Dependability
Resources consumption
and Long-Operating life.
Saleh Al-Da’ajeh Safety-Critical Systems Dependability December 23, 2012 6/16
7. Safety-Critical Systems Dependability
Fundamental Concepts of Dependability
Introduction
Overview
Safety -Critical Systems
Safety -Critical Systems
Applications, Characteristics,
and other Terminologies
Dependability is the property of a system that delivers
Dependability
Taxonomy
justifiably services at a reliance level and the ability of the
Threats on Safety -Critical
Systems Dependability
system to avoid failures that are serious and numerous.
Dependability Attributes
The concept dependability consists of three main parts
Means to Achieve
Dependability Threats
Achieving Dependability
Quality Attributes Attributes
Summary
Means
Saleh Al-Da’ajeh Safety-Critical Systems Dependability December 23, 2012 7/16
8. Dependability Taxonomy
Dependability Exposed
Introduction
Overview
Safety -Critical Systems
Safety -Critical Systems
Applications, Characteristics,
and other Terminologies
Dependability
Taxonomy
Threats on Safety -Critical
Systems Dependability
Dependability Attributes
Means to Achieve
Dependability
Achieving Dependability
Quality Attributes
Summary
Figure: Dependability Taxonomy
Saleh Al-Da’ajeh Safety-Critical Systems Dependability December 23, 2012 8/16
9. The Threats: Faults, Error, Failure
Faults are further investigated enclosing various aspects such as phase of creation
Introduction
Overview
or occurence of faults, system boundaries, domain, phenomenological cause, intent,
Safety -Critical Systems
and presistance of faults.
Safety -Critical Systems Failures are discussed covering different aspects such as the domain of the failures,
Applications, Characteristics,
and other Terminologies controllability of the failures, consistency of the failures, consequences of the
failure.
Dependability
Taxonomy
Threats on Safety -Critical
Systems Dependability
Dependability Attributes
Means to Achieve
Dependability
Achieving Dependability
Quality Attributes
Summary
Figure: Relationship between Error, Faults, and Failures
Saleh Al-Da’ajeh Safety-Critical Systems Dependability December 23, 2012 9/16
10. Faults Analysis
Introduction
Overview
Safety -Critical Systems
Safety -Critical Systems
Applications, Characteristics,
and other Terminologies
Dependability
Taxonomy
Threats on Safety -Critical
Systems Dependability
Dependability Attributes
Means to Achieve
Dependability
Achieving Dependability
Quality Attributes
Summary
Saleh Al-Da’ajeh Safety-Critical Systems Dependability December 23, 2012 10/16
11. Failure Analysis
Introduction
Overview
Safety -Critical Systems
Safety -Critical Systems
Applications, Characteristics,
and other Terminologies
Dependability
Taxonomy
Threats on Safety -Critical
Systems Dependability
Dependability Attributes
Means to Achieve
Dependability
Achieving Dependability
Quality Attributes
Summary
Saleh Al-Da’ajeh Safety-Critical Systems Dependability December 23, 2012 11/16
12. Attributes According to the Larpie and /ISO 9126
Introduction
Overview Dependability consists of a subset of quality attributes that can be classified into
Safety -Critical Systems run-time quality attributes, and non-run time quality attributes:
Safety -Critical Systems
Applications, Characteristics,
and other Terminologies
Run-time Attributes
Dependability Availability: readiness of service for authorized users
Taxonomy Reliability: continuity of service. The system is expected to
Threats on Safety -Critical
Systems Dependability
perform its task in spite of the existence of some faults.
Dependability Attributes Integrity: non-occurrence of improper alternation of
Means to Achieve
information.
Dependability Confidentiality: non-occurrence of unauthorized disclosure of
Achieving Dependability
Quality Attributes information as system data and programs are resistant to
unauthorized modifications.
Summary
Safety: non-occurrence of catastrophic consequences for the
user(s) and in the operation environment.
Non Run-time attributes:
Maintainability: aptitude to undergo repairs and evolution
Saleh Al-Da’ajeh Safety-Critical Systems Dependability December 23, 2012 12/16
13. Achieving Dependability Quality Attributes
Verification, Validation, and Engineering
Introduction
Overview
Safety -Critical Systems
Safety -Critical Systems The oldest methods, approaches, and techniques undertaken
Applications, Characteristics,
and other Terminologies
to achieve dependability quality attributes are nowadays
Dependability depicted as verification and validation activities; falling into
Taxonomy
Threats on Safety -Critical the software testing stage.
Systems Dependability
Dependability Attributes The very recent mechanisms undertaken to achieve the
Means to Achieve various dependability quality attributes are focused on
Dependability
Achieving Dependability engineering quality attributes at the early stages, such as
Quality Attributes
balancing the quality attributes relationships by utilizing the
Summary
most suitable architectural strategies and patterns for the
software systems.
Saleh Al-Da’ajeh Safety-Critical Systems Dependability December 23, 2012 13/16
14. Means to Achieve Dependability to Safety
-Critical Systems
Introduction
Overview
Safety -Critical Systems Although dependability quality attributes achievement is
Safety -Critical Systems
Applications, Characteristics,
strongly related to the software architecture stage, yet
and other Terminologies
almost all the means undertaken to achieve dependability
Dependability
Taxonomy quality attributes are usually left to be used in late stages of
Threats on Safety -Critical
Systems Dependability
the software development life-cycle.
Dependability Attributes
Attaining dependability quality attributes is never isolated
Means to Achieve
Dependability to a distinct stage nor a certain technique/approach.
Achieving Dependability
Quality Attributes Means adopted by dependability engineers are as follow:
Summary Fault Prevention
Fault Tolerance
Fault Removal
Fault Forecasting
Saleh Al-Da’ajeh Safety-Critical Systems Dependability December 23, 2012 14/16
15. Is the solution to give up on our use of software
for such purposes altogether?!
Introduction
Overview
Safety -Critical Systems
Safety -Critical Systems
Applications, Characteristics, Recent decades bear testimony to how we have gone from
and other Terminologies
merely using software , to rely on it, and to ultimately
Dependability
Taxonomy becoming dependent on it, for our day to day lives.
Threats on Safety -Critical
Systems Dependability Better engineering, testing, and practices are needed to be
Dependability Attributes
implemented, and this is especially true of software that is
Means to Achieve
Dependability related to safety-critical systems.
Achieving Dependability
Quality Attributes Software engineering, and related curriculum at educational
Summary institution should be updated to reflect the every growing
importance of software safety as a field.
Saleh Al-Da’ajeh Safety-Critical Systems Dependability December 23, 2012 15/16
16. Thank you all for attending this seminar.
Questions are most welcomed !