The document discusses a draft Justice Sector Independence and Integrity Strategy for 2020-2023 that was prepared by the Institute for European Policies and Reforms and the Legal Resources Centre from Moldova, with financial support from the EU. It provides general recommendations on improving the strategy and action plan, as well as specific recommendations on goals, objectives, and activities. The authors express openness to further contribute to strengthening the strategic documents.
Embedding Gender Budgeting - Tackmeon YI (Korea)OECD Governance
Presentation given at the OECD Gender Budgeting Experts Meeting, Vienna, Austria. 18-19 June 2018
For more information see http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/gender-budgeting-experts-meeting-2018.htm
Central - local government relationship in property taxation: Experiences from Tanzania
1) Tanzania has oscillated between centralized and decentralized property tax collection regimes, experiencing challenges with both approaches. Reforms aimed to improve cooperation between central and local governments but faced implementation problems.
2) Recentralizing collection to the Tanzania Revenue Authority improved some collection methods but their limited local knowledge hampered efforts. Cooperation and clear roles are needed between central and local authorities.
3) The future system requires integrated electronic governance, improved data sharing between agencies, and visible service improvements to gain public support for property taxes.
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 requires CBO to prepare cost estimates for legislation at certain points in the legislative process. CBO is also required to provide the Congress with annual reports on projected spending, revenues, and deficits under current law. This presentation highlights how CBO uses information from other agencies to prepare those cost estimates and baseline projections.
This document summarizes case studies of the roles of parliament in development in Zambia and Tanzania. It was prepared by experts commissioned by the Inter-Parliamentary Union. The case studies examined how involved the parliaments are in development planning and evaluation, their relationships with donors and the executive, how they engage with civil society, and obstacles to full engagement. The health sector was used as an example. Both countries have democratically elected parliaments and receive substantial donor aid, including general budget support. The case studies used interviews and document analysis to assess parliamentary organization, public financial management, donor coordination, and national development strategies.
Italy conducted its first gender budgeting analysis of the 2016 budget as a pilot project. The analysis found that certain policies and expenditures had differing impacts on men and women. For example, women benefited more from tax relief policies aimed at work-life balance. The report recommended further developing gender budgeting practices by strengthening coordination, refining classification criteria, and integrating gender analysis into all sectoral policies.
The Best Practices are designed as a reference tool for Member and non-member countries to use in order to increase the degree of budget transparency in their respective countries. The Best Practices are organised around specific reports for presentational reasons only.
It is recognised that different countries will have different reporting regimes and may have different areas of emphasis for transparency. The Best Practices are based on different Member countries’ experiences in each area. It should be stressed that the Best Practices are not meant to constitute a formal “standard” for budget transparency.
http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/
Budgeting in Kazakhstan - Vagiz KHISMATULIN, KazakhstanOECD Governance
This presentation was made by Vagiz KHISMATULIN, Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, at the 14th CESEE SBO meeting held in Zagreb, Croatia, on 24-25 May 2018.
Embedding Gender Budgeting - Tackmeon YI (Korea)OECD Governance
Presentation given at the OECD Gender Budgeting Experts Meeting, Vienna, Austria. 18-19 June 2018
For more information see http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/gender-budgeting-experts-meeting-2018.htm
Central - local government relationship in property taxation: Experiences from Tanzania
1) Tanzania has oscillated between centralized and decentralized property tax collection regimes, experiencing challenges with both approaches. Reforms aimed to improve cooperation between central and local governments but faced implementation problems.
2) Recentralizing collection to the Tanzania Revenue Authority improved some collection methods but their limited local knowledge hampered efforts. Cooperation and clear roles are needed between central and local authorities.
3) The future system requires integrated electronic governance, improved data sharing between agencies, and visible service improvements to gain public support for property taxes.
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 requires CBO to prepare cost estimates for legislation at certain points in the legislative process. CBO is also required to provide the Congress with annual reports on projected spending, revenues, and deficits under current law. This presentation highlights how CBO uses information from other agencies to prepare those cost estimates and baseline projections.
This document summarizes case studies of the roles of parliament in development in Zambia and Tanzania. It was prepared by experts commissioned by the Inter-Parliamentary Union. The case studies examined how involved the parliaments are in development planning and evaluation, their relationships with donors and the executive, how they engage with civil society, and obstacles to full engagement. The health sector was used as an example. Both countries have democratically elected parliaments and receive substantial donor aid, including general budget support. The case studies used interviews and document analysis to assess parliamentary organization, public financial management, donor coordination, and national development strategies.
Italy conducted its first gender budgeting analysis of the 2016 budget as a pilot project. The analysis found that certain policies and expenditures had differing impacts on men and women. For example, women benefited more from tax relief policies aimed at work-life balance. The report recommended further developing gender budgeting practices by strengthening coordination, refining classification criteria, and integrating gender analysis into all sectoral policies.
The Best Practices are designed as a reference tool for Member and non-member countries to use in order to increase the degree of budget transparency in their respective countries. The Best Practices are organised around specific reports for presentational reasons only.
It is recognised that different countries will have different reporting regimes and may have different areas of emphasis for transparency. The Best Practices are based on different Member countries’ experiences in each area. It should be stressed that the Best Practices are not meant to constitute a formal “standard” for budget transparency.
http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/
Budgeting in Kazakhstan - Vagiz KHISMATULIN, KazakhstanOECD Governance
This presentation was made by Vagiz KHISMATULIN, Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, at the 14th CESEE SBO meeting held in Zagreb, Croatia, on 24-25 May 2018.
Gender Budgeting in Austria - Friederike SCHWARZENDORFER (Austria)OECD Governance
Presentation given at the OECD Gender Budgeting Experts Meeting, Vienna, Austria. 18-19 June 2018
For more information see http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/gender-budgeting-experts-meeting-2018.htm
The monthly newsletter of the Centre of Policy and Legal Reform is devoted to the analysis of the state reform, in particular in the areas of parliamentarism and elections, constitutional and judicial reform, civil service, anti-corruption, etc.
The purpose of the publication is to raise the awareness among citizens and to strengthen their ability to influence the state authorities in order to accelerate democratic reforms and establish proper governance in Ukraine.
If you want to receive the monthly newsletter by mail, please send an e-mail to busol@pravo.org.ua (Yaryna Busol, communications manager of the CPLR).
The document outlines the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) mission to assist the President in implementing policy across the executive branch. It describes OMB's roles in budget formulation and execution, management, regulatory review, legislative clearance, and issuing executive orders. The document states that OMB will develop an Open Government Plan to increase transparency, participation, and collaboration in these areas according to the President's Open Government Directive. It provides an overview of OMB's structure and key offices that carry out its central mission.
The federal budget is a measure of the overall scope and magnitude of federal activities that involve the spending or collection of money. The net costs of those activities are shown in the budget mostly on a cash basis, but some transactions are recorded by means of accrual accounting. This presentation discusses the advantages and disadvantages of cash and accrual measures when accounting for various federal insurance programs and federal retirement programs.
The conflicting behavior of the government institutions in the arrangement of...QUESTJOURNAL
ABSTRACT : This study aims to explain the behavior of the conflict between the executive and legislative institution at the stage of preparation of Public Policy Budget (KUA), the stage of preparation of Priorities and Budget Ceiling While (PPAS) and the stage of discussion of the Draft Budget and Expenditure (budgets) Government as well as to analyze models of conflict resolution between the executive and the legislature in the arrangement of local income and budget expenditures (RAPBD) Government. Informants namely the executive, in this case the Local Government and legislature are members of the Assembly of Regency or Municipality (DPRD). The general inductive approach was used to analyze the qualitative data through data reduction, presentation and verification. The study found that there was disagreement and debate between the executive and the legislature that cause conflict behavior in determining the theme of development, development priorities, plans macroeconomic targets and strategies to achieve revenue, financing and expenditures at the stage of preparation of KUA Government. There is disagreement in the determination of the Own-Source Revenue plan (PAD), determination of financing, income and expenditure, the determination of regional government affairs, prioritization of programs and activities and the determination of employee expenses, interest, grants, social assistance and expenditure unexpected cause behavioral conflict between the executive and legislative determination PPAS Government. There is a debate that raises conflict behavior between the executive and legislature in the Plenary Session, Joint Meeting, RAPBD Evaluation Meeting, the Plenary Session of Approval and Evaluation Meeting of Governors discussed the draft budget of the Government.
Independent oversight bodies lessons from fiscal productivity and regulatory ...OECDtax
This document summarizes an academic paper that discusses the rise of independent oversight bodies in fiscal policy, productivity, and regulation. It begins by noting the growing trend for governments to establish independent, non-partisan institutions to provide oversight and analysis to inform policymaking. However, some argue this replaces democracy with technocracy. The document then examines three types of independent bodies - independent fiscal institutions, independent productivity commissions, and regulatory oversight bodies. It provides examples from different countries and discusses key features like independence. In conclusion, it considers lessons learned and debates around technocratic approaches.
The Fiscal Management Act was enacted by
Parliament as a private bill. The Act is awaiting
Presidential assent pending revisions proposed
by the President. This paper discusses the
contents of the Bill, why the President has
declined to assent to the Bill, the proposed
changes to the Bill and the effect of
implementing these changes.
OECD Recommendation on Principles for Independent Fiscal InstitutionsOECD Governance
On 13 February 2014, the OECD Council adopted the Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions. Geared towards Member countries that have established or are considering establishing an independent fiscal institution (IFI), the Principles codify lessons learned and good practices that are firmly grounded in the experience of IFIs to date. The Principles seek to reinforce the core values that IFIs both promote and operate under – independence, non-partisanship, transparency, and accountability – while demonstrating technical competence and producing relevant work of the highest quality that stands up to public scrutiny and informs the public debate. As such, they aim to assist countries to design an enabling environment
conducive to the good performance of an IFI and to ensuring its long-run viability.
The monthly information bulletin of the Centre of Policy and Legal Reform (CPLR) is dedicated to the analysis of state reforms,
in particular in the areas of parliamentarianism and elections, constitutional and judicial reforms, civil service, anticorruption,
etc. The goal of the publication is to increase the level of expert awareness among the citizens and to strengthen their
capacity to influence the government authorities in order to expedite democratic reforms and to establish good governance
in Ukraine.
Federal Acquistion Regulation Preliminary Regulatory Reform PlanObama White House
The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council has drafted a preliminary plan for retrospectively analyzing existing acquisition rules as required by Executive Order 13563. The plan outlines the scope, which includes government-wide acquisition rules in the Federal Acquisition Regulation. It discusses opportunities for public input and lists eight initial initiatives for review over the next two years, including examining rules around communications with vendors, reducing sole-source contracts, past performance reviews, and conflicts of interest. The goal is to identify rules that could be simplified, strengthened, or repealed to more efficiently meet objectives of taxpayer value, public trust, and policy goals.
Gender Budgeting in Austria - Ronnie DOWNES (OECD)OECD Governance
Presentation given at the OECD Gender Budgeting Experts Meeting, Vienna, Austria. 18-19 June 2018
For more information see http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/gender-budgeting-experts-meeting-2018.htm
Presentation given at the OECD Gender Budgeting Experts Meeting, Vienna, Austria. 18-19 June 2018
For more information see http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/gender-budgeting-experts-meeting-2018.htm
Gender Budgeting in Austria - Ursula ROSENBICHLER (Austria)OECD Governance
The document discusses gender equality and performance management in Austria. It provides an overview of Austria's legal framework for gender budgeting and outcome orientation. It describes the Federal Performance Management Office's role in establishing performance management, quality assurance, monitoring, and reporting. It also discusses the challenges of coordinating gender equality objectives across ministries and how interministerial coordination processes have been developed.
This document provides an overview of fiscal administration and the Philippine national budgeting process. It discusses how the budget is prepared by government agencies submitting estimates to the Department of Budget and Management, who then consolidates them into the national budget. The budget is submitted to Congress for approval and authorization through the passage of a General Appropriations Act. It is then implemented through funds allocation and releases to agencies for priority programs.
The document discusses the history and processes of fiscal administration in the Philippines. It begins with definitions of fiscal administration and describes how it has evolved from the Revolutionary Government in the late 1800s to present day. It outlines the principal agencies involved in fiscal functions like the Department of Finance, Department of Budget and Management, and Commission on Audit. The document also discusses budgeting concepts, income sources, fiscal control mechanisms, and new policy guidelines for budgeting that focus on priority development areas and performance-based spending.
For the complete budget process, you can watch the video entitled “The Philippine Budget Process” or click the link below
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OUbUC94oa6s
The document discusses Philippine budgetary procedures and the budget process. It provides an overview of key concepts like the national budget, budgeting, and classifications of the budget by sector, cost structure, expense class, region, and type of appropriation. It also outlines the constitutional provisions and major laws governing the budget process, including sections of the Philippine Constitution regarding the roles of Congress and the President. Major sources of government funds and the distinction between a budget and cash budget are also briefly covered.
The objective of these Principles is to draw together the lessons of a decade and more of work by the OECD Working Party of Senior Budget Officials (SBO) and its associated Networks, along with the contributions and insights from other areas of the OECD and of the international budgeting community more generally. The Principles provide a concise overview of good practices across the full spectrum of budget activity, taking account in particular of the lessons of the recent economic crisis, and aim to give practical guidance for designing, implementing and improving budget systems to meet the challenges of the future. The principles are being considered as a draft Recommendation of the OECD Council, underpinning their importance to good public governance and inclusive growth.
For further information, please visit: www.oecd.org/governance/principles-budgetary-governance.htm
This document outlines the Philippine government's budget preparation process which includes:
1) A budget call issued by the Department of Budget and Management to government agencies to submit their budget proposals.
2) Stakeholder engagement sessions held for agencies to discuss their proposals with civil society groups.
3) Technical budget hearings held for agencies to defend their proposals to DBM panels.
4) An executive review process where budget proposals are prioritized and approved by the President and Cabinet.
5) The approved budget is then presented to Congress for legislation into the annual budget law.
The document outlines the budget process in the Philippines. It describes how the House of Representatives and Senate each deliberate on the President's budget, conducting committee hearings and floor debates. It then explains how a bicameral conference committee harmonizes differences in the versions passed by each chamber. The finalized budget is ratified by both houses and sent to the President for approval or veto. If not enacted by the start of the fiscal year, the previous year's budget is automatically reenacted.
Final draft operational plan ukraine guillotineDan Pasko
This document provides an operational plan for conducting a regulatory guillotine reform in Ukraine to reduce outdated regulations. The plan outlines a comprehensive approach to review over 7,000-10,000 legal norms across all sectors. Key points include coordinating the reform with other economic initiatives, estimating potential annual cost savings of $1-1.3 billion, and completing the reform progressively over 36 months. A special committee and Guillotine Unit would manage the reform process with support from the Prime Minister. The full budget is estimated at $9.96 million over 3 years, with an initial $1.52 million needed to launch the reform while procuring full resources. The plan establishes targets and performance indicators to measure cost reductions and ensure accountability.
Monitoring report on the implementation of the Cross-Cutting Justice Strategy...Ersida Sefa
This document provides a monitoring report on the implementation of Albania's Cross-Cutting Justice Strategy from July 2011 to November 2012. It summarizes the strategy's objectives, methodology, and overall evaluation.
The strategy aimed to reform Albania's justice system to strengthen the rule of law and align with EU standards. However, the report finds issues with how challenges are analyzed in the strategy and a lack of clear links between the analysis and action plan. It provides recommendations like improving objective definitions, increasing qualitative measures, and better defining the monitoring mechanism. Overall, the report evaluates implementation progress but sees room for strengthening the strategy's framework and commitment to reforms.
Gender Budgeting in Austria - Friederike SCHWARZENDORFER (Austria)OECD Governance
Presentation given at the OECD Gender Budgeting Experts Meeting, Vienna, Austria. 18-19 June 2018
For more information see http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/gender-budgeting-experts-meeting-2018.htm
The monthly newsletter of the Centre of Policy and Legal Reform is devoted to the analysis of the state reform, in particular in the areas of parliamentarism and elections, constitutional and judicial reform, civil service, anti-corruption, etc.
The purpose of the publication is to raise the awareness among citizens and to strengthen their ability to influence the state authorities in order to accelerate democratic reforms and establish proper governance in Ukraine.
If you want to receive the monthly newsletter by mail, please send an e-mail to busol@pravo.org.ua (Yaryna Busol, communications manager of the CPLR).
The document outlines the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) mission to assist the President in implementing policy across the executive branch. It describes OMB's roles in budget formulation and execution, management, regulatory review, legislative clearance, and issuing executive orders. The document states that OMB will develop an Open Government Plan to increase transparency, participation, and collaboration in these areas according to the President's Open Government Directive. It provides an overview of OMB's structure and key offices that carry out its central mission.
The federal budget is a measure of the overall scope and magnitude of federal activities that involve the spending or collection of money. The net costs of those activities are shown in the budget mostly on a cash basis, but some transactions are recorded by means of accrual accounting. This presentation discusses the advantages and disadvantages of cash and accrual measures when accounting for various federal insurance programs and federal retirement programs.
The conflicting behavior of the government institutions in the arrangement of...QUESTJOURNAL
ABSTRACT : This study aims to explain the behavior of the conflict between the executive and legislative institution at the stage of preparation of Public Policy Budget (KUA), the stage of preparation of Priorities and Budget Ceiling While (PPAS) and the stage of discussion of the Draft Budget and Expenditure (budgets) Government as well as to analyze models of conflict resolution between the executive and the legislature in the arrangement of local income and budget expenditures (RAPBD) Government. Informants namely the executive, in this case the Local Government and legislature are members of the Assembly of Regency or Municipality (DPRD). The general inductive approach was used to analyze the qualitative data through data reduction, presentation and verification. The study found that there was disagreement and debate between the executive and the legislature that cause conflict behavior in determining the theme of development, development priorities, plans macroeconomic targets and strategies to achieve revenue, financing and expenditures at the stage of preparation of KUA Government. There is disagreement in the determination of the Own-Source Revenue plan (PAD), determination of financing, income and expenditure, the determination of regional government affairs, prioritization of programs and activities and the determination of employee expenses, interest, grants, social assistance and expenditure unexpected cause behavioral conflict between the executive and legislative determination PPAS Government. There is a debate that raises conflict behavior between the executive and legislature in the Plenary Session, Joint Meeting, RAPBD Evaluation Meeting, the Plenary Session of Approval and Evaluation Meeting of Governors discussed the draft budget of the Government.
Independent oversight bodies lessons from fiscal productivity and regulatory ...OECDtax
This document summarizes an academic paper that discusses the rise of independent oversight bodies in fiscal policy, productivity, and regulation. It begins by noting the growing trend for governments to establish independent, non-partisan institutions to provide oversight and analysis to inform policymaking. However, some argue this replaces democracy with technocracy. The document then examines three types of independent bodies - independent fiscal institutions, independent productivity commissions, and regulatory oversight bodies. It provides examples from different countries and discusses key features like independence. In conclusion, it considers lessons learned and debates around technocratic approaches.
The Fiscal Management Act was enacted by
Parliament as a private bill. The Act is awaiting
Presidential assent pending revisions proposed
by the President. This paper discusses the
contents of the Bill, why the President has
declined to assent to the Bill, the proposed
changes to the Bill and the effect of
implementing these changes.
OECD Recommendation on Principles for Independent Fiscal InstitutionsOECD Governance
On 13 February 2014, the OECD Council adopted the Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions. Geared towards Member countries that have established or are considering establishing an independent fiscal institution (IFI), the Principles codify lessons learned and good practices that are firmly grounded in the experience of IFIs to date. The Principles seek to reinforce the core values that IFIs both promote and operate under – independence, non-partisanship, transparency, and accountability – while demonstrating technical competence and producing relevant work of the highest quality that stands up to public scrutiny and informs the public debate. As such, they aim to assist countries to design an enabling environment
conducive to the good performance of an IFI and to ensuring its long-run viability.
The monthly information bulletin of the Centre of Policy and Legal Reform (CPLR) is dedicated to the analysis of state reforms,
in particular in the areas of parliamentarianism and elections, constitutional and judicial reforms, civil service, anticorruption,
etc. The goal of the publication is to increase the level of expert awareness among the citizens and to strengthen their
capacity to influence the government authorities in order to expedite democratic reforms and to establish good governance
in Ukraine.
Federal Acquistion Regulation Preliminary Regulatory Reform PlanObama White House
The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council has drafted a preliminary plan for retrospectively analyzing existing acquisition rules as required by Executive Order 13563. The plan outlines the scope, which includes government-wide acquisition rules in the Federal Acquisition Regulation. It discusses opportunities for public input and lists eight initial initiatives for review over the next two years, including examining rules around communications with vendors, reducing sole-source contracts, past performance reviews, and conflicts of interest. The goal is to identify rules that could be simplified, strengthened, or repealed to more efficiently meet objectives of taxpayer value, public trust, and policy goals.
Gender Budgeting in Austria - Ronnie DOWNES (OECD)OECD Governance
Presentation given at the OECD Gender Budgeting Experts Meeting, Vienna, Austria. 18-19 June 2018
For more information see http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/gender-budgeting-experts-meeting-2018.htm
Presentation given at the OECD Gender Budgeting Experts Meeting, Vienna, Austria. 18-19 June 2018
For more information see http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/gender-budgeting-experts-meeting-2018.htm
Gender Budgeting in Austria - Ursula ROSENBICHLER (Austria)OECD Governance
The document discusses gender equality and performance management in Austria. It provides an overview of Austria's legal framework for gender budgeting and outcome orientation. It describes the Federal Performance Management Office's role in establishing performance management, quality assurance, monitoring, and reporting. It also discusses the challenges of coordinating gender equality objectives across ministries and how interministerial coordination processes have been developed.
This document provides an overview of fiscal administration and the Philippine national budgeting process. It discusses how the budget is prepared by government agencies submitting estimates to the Department of Budget and Management, who then consolidates them into the national budget. The budget is submitted to Congress for approval and authorization through the passage of a General Appropriations Act. It is then implemented through funds allocation and releases to agencies for priority programs.
The document discusses the history and processes of fiscal administration in the Philippines. It begins with definitions of fiscal administration and describes how it has evolved from the Revolutionary Government in the late 1800s to present day. It outlines the principal agencies involved in fiscal functions like the Department of Finance, Department of Budget and Management, and Commission on Audit. The document also discusses budgeting concepts, income sources, fiscal control mechanisms, and new policy guidelines for budgeting that focus on priority development areas and performance-based spending.
For the complete budget process, you can watch the video entitled “The Philippine Budget Process” or click the link below
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OUbUC94oa6s
The document discusses Philippine budgetary procedures and the budget process. It provides an overview of key concepts like the national budget, budgeting, and classifications of the budget by sector, cost structure, expense class, region, and type of appropriation. It also outlines the constitutional provisions and major laws governing the budget process, including sections of the Philippine Constitution regarding the roles of Congress and the President. Major sources of government funds and the distinction between a budget and cash budget are also briefly covered.
The objective of these Principles is to draw together the lessons of a decade and more of work by the OECD Working Party of Senior Budget Officials (SBO) and its associated Networks, along with the contributions and insights from other areas of the OECD and of the international budgeting community more generally. The Principles provide a concise overview of good practices across the full spectrum of budget activity, taking account in particular of the lessons of the recent economic crisis, and aim to give practical guidance for designing, implementing and improving budget systems to meet the challenges of the future. The principles are being considered as a draft Recommendation of the OECD Council, underpinning their importance to good public governance and inclusive growth.
For further information, please visit: www.oecd.org/governance/principles-budgetary-governance.htm
This document outlines the Philippine government's budget preparation process which includes:
1) A budget call issued by the Department of Budget and Management to government agencies to submit their budget proposals.
2) Stakeholder engagement sessions held for agencies to discuss their proposals with civil society groups.
3) Technical budget hearings held for agencies to defend their proposals to DBM panels.
4) An executive review process where budget proposals are prioritized and approved by the President and Cabinet.
5) The approved budget is then presented to Congress for legislation into the annual budget law.
The document outlines the budget process in the Philippines. It describes how the House of Representatives and Senate each deliberate on the President's budget, conducting committee hearings and floor debates. It then explains how a bicameral conference committee harmonizes differences in the versions passed by each chamber. The finalized budget is ratified by both houses and sent to the President for approval or veto. If not enacted by the start of the fiscal year, the previous year's budget is automatically reenacted.
Final draft operational plan ukraine guillotineDan Pasko
This document provides an operational plan for conducting a regulatory guillotine reform in Ukraine to reduce outdated regulations. The plan outlines a comprehensive approach to review over 7,000-10,000 legal norms across all sectors. Key points include coordinating the reform with other economic initiatives, estimating potential annual cost savings of $1-1.3 billion, and completing the reform progressively over 36 months. A special committee and Guillotine Unit would manage the reform process with support from the Prime Minister. The full budget is estimated at $9.96 million over 3 years, with an initial $1.52 million needed to launch the reform while procuring full resources. The plan establishes targets and performance indicators to measure cost reductions and ensure accountability.
Monitoring report on the implementation of the Cross-Cutting Justice Strategy...Ersida Sefa
This document provides a monitoring report on the implementation of Albania's Cross-Cutting Justice Strategy from July 2011 to November 2012. It summarizes the strategy's objectives, methodology, and overall evaluation.
The strategy aimed to reform Albania's justice system to strengthen the rule of law and align with EU standards. However, the report finds issues with how challenges are analyzed in the strategy and a lack of clear links between the analysis and action plan. It provides recommendations like improving objective definitions, increasing qualitative measures, and better defining the monitoring mechanism. Overall, the report evaluates implementation progress but sees room for strengthening the strategy's framework and commitment to reforms.
This draft paper outlines key issues and provides insights on implementing cross agency initiatives.
Delegates are invited to comment on the draft paper and reflect on the concluding questions for
discussion.
Regulations Governing Regulatory Impact Assessment, printed in 2013 by the Ministry of information society and administration and supported by the British Embassy in Skopje.
This document describes an innovative approach to strengthening governance in fragile states by providing methodological support to governments' policy planning systems, specifically their Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) development and monitoring/evaluation processes. The support is provided by an international consultant who facilitates the process and trains national staff, without involvement in substantive policy issues. This builds national capacity and ownership over time. In contrast to traditional technical assistance, this hands-on approach respects country autonomy while effectively building long-lasting planning skills among government planners.
Institutional Requirements for Gender-Sensitive BudgetingDr Lendy Spires
Background German development cooperation supports gender equality and the specific promotion of women in developing countries. Commitments to this can be found in both the Concept on Gender Equality (2001) and the Gender Action Plan 2009-2012 of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).1 However, successfully implementing a focused gender pol- icy depends not only on political recognition and the resul- tant commitments at government level. Increased public debate about gender policy also depends on successful lobby- ing by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and a clearly articulated interest on the part of the media and academia. Beyond that, successful implementation of a policy promoting gender equality and women requires funding. A country’s annual budget demonstrates whether the state is willing to allocate the available funds in line with these goals. Given the relevance of gender in a wide range of issues, responsibility is divided among a number of actors. Even so, the ministry charged with promoting gender and women’s issues2 – or a comparable institution – can play an important role at the start of the budget process. Depending on the institutional and procedural design of the budget process, the ministry can encourage a distribu- tion of public funds that will promote gender equality and women even in the very early stages of budget planning. The assumptions presented below show basic approaches to assigning this role to the gender ministry, both by strengthening the ministry vis-à-vis the finance ministry and by positioning it with regard to other sectoral ministries. Finally, possibilities are shown for supporting the reform processes through appropriate capacity development measures. The significance of various actors and their interaction in the budget process Various actors play a role in shaping the budget.3 Overall responsibility for planning, drawing up and implement- ing the national budget lies with the finance ministry. It coordinates the budget process and is ultimately responsible for the appropriate disbursement of public funds. In doing so the integration of sectoral strategies into the budget is a relatively minor concern for the finance ministry, as long as budgetary and legal provisions are satisfied. Conversely, implementation of political strategies in a sectoral budget is the task of the sectoral ministries.
RUNNING HEAD FINANCE FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS1FINANCE FOR P.docxcowinhelen
RUNNING HEAD: FINANCE FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS 1
FINANCE FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS 10
Public Financial Management Industry’s Consultant
Author’s (Name)
Institution (Affiliate)
Question 2: Public Financial Management Industry Consultant
Financial management in the public and private sector have very evident differences. Those who have experiences in one of the fields may not be able to handle financial administration in the other field. This fact is due to the differences that present themselves in the two areas. There have been a lot of theories that have been brought forward that say that the differences between these two are so obvious that the private sector management should not be applied to the public sector.
To ensure that the 100 million dollar project is completed successfully without any problems, there needs to be the proper financial management of the funds. This is because to achieve the desired progress within the set period there needs to be an appropriate financial management strategy (Guthrie, 1998).
Accounting
The financial management methods used in the accounting industry in the private and public sectors are entirely different. An example is the fact that in the private sector, the financial managers and accountants are governed by the accepted accounting principles (GAAP). This is the set of practices like the double entry used in the accounting profession which is employed in the balancing of balance sheets. This method is mainly used for the public sector funding where steps like budgeting are done. In our case, the accounting will be a crucial step since to finish the project with the set amount of money without experiencing an over expenditure in the finance we need to budget for the money allocated correctly.
Profit
Most of the parastatal bodies are not inclined on the profit factor. However, the private sector businesses are driven by the profits which they anticipate or hope to make once they began their journey in the enterprise they partake. On the public sector however like in our case the gain is substituted by the task orientation or some other motivating factor. In our case, the motivating factor is the accomplishment of the project with budgeted funds that have been allocated to the project (Schick, 1998).
Context
Context is an important difference between the public and private sector financial managers. The context influences how each of the financial managers approaches the work they are involved in doing. The private sector financial managers are driven by the realization of profit. Therefore, the decisions he will make will be by ensuring that in whatever he does he gets to benefit. The public sector financial manager, on the other hand, will not make decisions hastily. The public sector financial managers must practice constraint in their decision making so as not to make decision ...
This document discusses good governance and Sweden's development cooperation efforts related to governance. It defines good governance as encompassing responsibility, accountability, transparency, predictability, legal rights, efficiency and participation. It discusses key institutions of good governance like democratic constitutions, governments, parliaments, and independent judiciaries. It also discusses trends in public sector reform, focusing on making governments more results-oriented, simplifying regulations, and developing a strong public ethic. The document examines Sweden's experiences with governance reforms and challenges in areas like budgets, human resources, auditing, taxation, statistics, decentralization, and anti-corruption work.
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Preliminary opinion on the draft justice sector independence and integrity strategy 2020 2023
1. This project is funded
by the EU
This opinion was prepared in the framework of the project „Support to the development and implementation
of justice policies in the Republic of Moldova”, implemented by IPRE in partnership with CRJM, with the
financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
1
PRELIMINARY OPINION
on the draft Justice Sector Independence and Integrity Strategy 2020-2023
SENT VIA E-MAIL AND PUBLISHED ON THE WEBSITES WWW.IPRE.MD AND
WWW.CRJM.ORG
Addressed to: Radu FOLTEA, State Secretary, Ministry of Justice
(radu.foltea@justice.gov.md)
Lilia RUSU, chief of policy analysis, monitoring and evaluation Department,
Ministry of Justice (lilia.rusu@justice.gov.md)
Prepared by: Legal Resources Centre from Moldova (CRJM, www.crjm.org), contact
persons: Vladislav GRIBINCEA (vladislav.gribincea@crjm.org) and Ion
GUZUN (ion.guzun@crjm.org)
Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE, www.ipre.md),
contact persons: Iulian RUSU (iulian.rusu@ipre.md) and Iulian GROZA
(iulian.groza@ipre.md)
Date: 19 May 2020
This opinion is presented in the context of the public consultations launched by the
Ministry of Justice on 3 January 2020 on the draft Justice Sector Independence and
Integrity Strategy for 2020-2023 (hereinafter the Strategy) and the Action Plan for its
implementation (hereinafter "the Plan").
In the first part, the authors present certain general aspects related to the process of development
and approval of the Strategy. The second part includes recommendations on specific issues
concerning (a) the goals, (b) the strategic objectives, (c) specific objectives and activities
mentioned in the draft Strategy and Action Plan.
Our preliminary conclusion is that the draft Strategy and Action Plan is a good start, but need
additional adjustments and review. We express our openness to contribute to their improvement.
More detailed recommendations will be presented within the working groups formed for the
drafting of the Strategy, as well as throughout the process of fine-tuning and approval of these
strategic documents.
2. 2
General aspects
We consider absolutely necessary to have a strategic document that sets out the priorities for the
coming years for the development and strengthening of the justice sector. Such a document
facilitates the further implementation of reforms and provides predictability to the justice sector in
terms of the reform measures to be taken. This document also facilitates the support from the
development partners to reform the judiciary.
Such a strategic document, as a rule, is adopted for 4 years, i.e. it exceeds the period of a
Government or a Parliamentary legislature. On the other hand, the introduction of measures that
do not have consistent political support, coupled with the reluctance of the justice system to
reform, risks creating major difficulties at the stage of implementation of the strategy. Therefore,
the new justice reform strategy must be adopted with a broad political consensus. This can be
best achieved through a transparent drafting of the document and its consultation with all relevant
actors, in particular the judiciary, the parliamentary opposition and civil society. The draft Strategy
and Action Plan was published on 3 January 2020. The Ministry of Justice began its drafting in
2017. We hope that the draft Strategy and Action Plan will follow the necessary steps in the
context of transparency in decision-making process and public consultations, avoiding changes
without prior consultation at the stage of approval by the Government and Parliament. The
implementation of the Strategy is even more relevant after the end of the public consultation and
adoption procedure.
Based on the above, it is important that:
a. The strategic document includes a risk assessment of potential crises (epidemiological,
economic or financial) that could affect the possible implementation of the Strategy.
b. The strategic document responds to the real problems identified. We noticed that some
activities do not answer to the identified problems, but were rather introduced at the proposal of
the actors of the justice sector. Other proposed measures are aimed at redressing problems that
do not actually exist (e.g. increasing the number of staff assisting judges. CEPEJ data confirm
that there is no shortage in this regard, the real problem is staff turnover, number of vacancies
and inefficient management of available positions. We did not find measures to address these
shortcomings in the Strategy);
c. The proposed measures for the identified problems are sufficient. We have noticed that
sometimes the reviewed documents do not contain sufficiently firm measures. For example,
although the Strategy mentions the lack of integrity in the judiciary as a serious problem, the
measures proposed to remedy this problem are modest;
d. The proposed measures are clear. The formulation of the actions / measures in the action plan
does not offer a clear direction of the efforts as well as the end result is directed (for example,
activity 1.2.5.c)). Thus, it is not clear in what sense the fees of bailiffs will be modified, in the sense
of reduction or their increase;
e. The proposed measures are result-oriented. Activities such as “drafting a law”, entrusted
exclusively to the Ministry of Justice, should be avoided (see Action Plan, activity 1.1.2 d)). The
drafting of a law cannot be an end in itself, unlike the adoption of a law;
f. The strategic document is concise. The strategy must contain only the absolutely necessary
aspects. We recommend avoiding mentioning in the Strategy the activities carried out by the
authorities on a regular basis. We noticed that the action plan contains sufficient such activities
(see, for example, the activities related to the National Institute of Justice mentioned at point
1.3.2);
3. 3
g. The strategy should contain measurable implementation indicators. The published Strategy
mentions in general terms that certain phenomena will be improved or eradicated, but does not
offer measurable indicators (e.g. increasing confidence in justice by 20%). This shortcoming will
inevitably lead to discussions on whether the implementation was good and whether the expected
results were achieved;
h. The strategy should have a sufficiently influential coordination and monitoring mechanism to
ensure a genuine implementation. One of the lessons learned from the implementation of the
previous Strategy is that monitoring of the implementation must be carried out by a sufficiently
influential body from a political point of view. The monitoring by the commissions set up at the
level of the Ministry of Justice did not ensure the desired impact for the previous Strategy.
Moreover, the Ministry of Justice does not have sufficient leverage to ensure the implementation
of the Strategy by the Judiciary, Government or Parliament. The coordinating and monitoring body
could be set up under the Government, Parliament or the Presidency. It is true that the Strategy
provides for annual Parliamentary monitoring, but this is insufficient, as Parliamentary monitoring,
in the proposed form, will take place once a year in the standing committee, which risks turning
the monitoring exercise into a pronounced process with political implications. Discussions in the
relevant Parliamentary committee must exist, but they cannot be the only means of monitoring
the implementation of the Strategy;
i. The composition of the coordination and monitoring body for the implementation of the Strategy
to ensure its independence and representativeness. The draft provides for the establishment of a
forum for justice decision-makers, but this forum is composed exclusively of the heads of the
institutions to be reformed. Usually, the leaders of the institutions are reluctant to admit the serious
problems in their own institutions and have a busy schedule. Moreover, such a format does not
allow the discussion of issues in detail. We recommend that this body is composed of
representatives of institutions of a lower level, but with sufficient influence, such as secretaries of
state, deputy directors of institutions, etc. We also believe that the presence of members of civil
society and of the media in this body will increase the efficiency of the discussions. At the same
time, the share of the latter and of the representatives of the liberal professions should be
sufficient to have a decisive influence on the decisions of this body.
j. Coordination and monitoring should not turn into a technical, routinised process. The monthly
meetings in the context of the previous Strategy proved to be ineffective. Half-yearly sessions
seem to be a better solution because they ensure sufficient time for the preparation for the
meetings and allows a more objective assessment of progress. Certainly extraordinary
circumstances may arise, and extraordinary meetings may take place to resolve them;
k. Sufficient financial resources are provided to ensure a successful implementation. Neither the
draft Strategy nor the Action Plan provide realistic estimates in this regard. It is clear that some
activities will not require additional budget expenditures. However, many activities require
expenditures, especially on infrastructure, equipment, surveys and independent studies. We
recommend that a preliminary assessment is made on the expenditures and that this expenditure
is explicitly mentioned in the Action Plan. The assessment must be realistic. In case of uncertainty
on the exact costs, we recommend budgeting costs slightly higher than the estimated minimum
costs. This will ensure that no future budgetary adjustments are needed, which are difficult to
manage. Last but not least, the content of the planned budgets need to be coordinated with the
Medium Term Budget Framework (MTBF), updated every year by the Government. In this
context, it is necessary to quantify the financial costs, including for the implementation of Law no.
76/2016 on the reorganization of the courts of 21 April 2016 and the digitalisation of the courts (in
particular by sending online procedural documents, wider application of electronic signatures,
4. 4
extension of the electronic file to all courts, prosecutors and attorneys, regulation and application
of teleconferences for detainees, minors and authorised persons).
l. The Strategy and the Action Plan is coordinated at content level with the provisions of National
Integrity and Anticorruption Strategy for 2017-2020 (NIAS) and National Human Rights Action
Plan for 2018-2022 (NHRAP III). Both NIAS and NHRAP III contain provisions relevant to the
integrity and protection and promotion of fundamental rights. Pillar III is especially relevant in the
case of NIAS and domain no. 2 - The national justice system - in the case of NHRAP III.
m. The Strategy and the Action Plan provide a separate component for the development of the
quality of teaching at law schools and the steering of the education process towards the needs of
the justice system, as the former are the main sources of new staff in the justice system.
Specific aspects
Although the strategy is inevitably a general document that provides a strategic planning
framework for the justice sector reform, it must be clear enough to avoid unnecessary discussions
at the implementation stage. General formulations should be avoided. It is also necessary to
exclude the apparent contradictions between the text of the Strategy and of the Action Plan,
which, at first glance, are rather numerous.
The list of actions to be completed in the strategic document is not exhaustive. In this context, we
reiterate our readiness to return with additional comments and suggestions on the draft Strategy
and Action Plan in the process of their development and fine-tuning.
Below is a set of specific recommendations.
a. Strategic priorities
The draft Strategy envisages three strategic directions:
1) Independence, administration, responsibility and integrity of actors in the justice sector;
2) Access to justice, quality and transparency of justice;
3) Efficient and modern justice.
The strategic goals generally address the three main issues affecting the judiciary in the Republic
of Moldova: (i) insufficient independence, (ii) corruption and (iii) the low quality of justice. As an
additional effect, the system is affected by the reluctance of legal actors to apply the law uniformly
and equally, as well as to ensure respect for and observance of human rights.
However, we note the need to redefine the three proposed goals. Thus, the administration of
justice is part of the efficiency of justice, and the efficiency of justice cannot take place without
quality. At the same time, ensuring modern justice can be too general a strategic goal for a policy
document. It is rather a means of ensuring the efficiency or accessibility of justice. On the other
hand, the related aspects of respect for human rights, given the seriousness of the issue, would
deserve to become a strategic direction. This will create the preconditions for deeper human rights
reforms. However, it is important to ensure the complementarity of actions relevant to human
rights with the actions provided for by NHRAP III.
To ensure better clarity and subsequent coordination, we propose that the strategic goals in the
Draft Strategy are reformulated as follows:
5. 5
1) Independence, accountability and integrity of justice actors: This must also include the
transparency of justice, as an element of accountability. The self-government of the liberal
professions could also be found in this goal;
2) Accessibility, efficiency and quality of justice: All activities related to access to justice, the
efficiency of justice actors and the quality of documents issued by them should be included here.
The draft Strategy now contains such objectives in all three announced strategic goals (e.g.
Objectives 1.3, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1 and 3.2);
3) Respect for human rights in the justice sector: Solutions for systemic deficiencies such as
the lack of a fair trial or the abusive use of insurance measures in the criminal process may find
their place here.
b. Proposed strategic objectives
The reformulation of the strategic goals implies the relocation of the 10 strategic objectives. On
the other hand, we are not sure that some strategic objectives are in fact objectives. In our opinion,
at least two objectives are rather indicators or activities, namely:
1) 2.4 Increasing the level of trust in the justice system;
2) 3.3 Modernisation of the justice sector by provision of equipment and its interconnection.
It is also recommended to define distinct strategic objectives for the above proposed third goal -
Respect for human rights in the justice sector. These may include:
1) Increasing the respect for human rights at the stage of criminal prosecution;
2) Improving the level of respect for the right to freedom;
3) Improving the level of respect for privacy in the civil, criminal and misdemeanour procedures;
4) Improving the enforcement of court decisions;
5) Reducing the phenomenon of ill-treatment and detention in inhuman / degrading conditions.
c. Specific objectives and activities
In our opinion, (i) some specific objectives and proposed activities are not necessary, (ii) others
need to be repositioned. We also consider that (iii) additional measures (activities) are needed.
(i) Among those which we consider not necessary are the following:
1) Activity 1.1.4.a) which refers to the judicial reserve. The institution of judicial reserve is
extremely difficult to manage. It has not been implemented for over 20 years, although it is
provided in general terms by law. Filling the vacancies in the judiciary is an easier and more
sustainable solution;
2) Activity 1.1.4.b) which refers to the gradual increase in the number of legal assistants in courts
and courts of appeal. CEPEJ data confirms that the number of actual staff assisting judges and
prosecutors is close to or even above the European average. Efforts should be directed towards
filling existing vacancies;
3) Activity 1.1.5.a), which refers to the standardisation of the access in the positions of judge and
prosecutor based on employment seniority. This method was adjusted only a few years ago and
has not yet been implemented. Changing these provisions now does not seem appropriate;
6. 6
4) Activity 1.1.6.c), which refers to the delimitation of competencies between the CSP and the
General Prosecutor. The law on the prosecutors’ offices is clear in this regard. Unfortunately, the
CSP does not make full of these legal provisions. Eventually some clarifications may be
introduced in the law, but these are not so important as to be provided for in the new Strategy;
5) Specific objective 1.3.2 has no place in the Action Plan, as it reproduces the activities that are
in any case implemented by the NIJ and are not decisive for the proposed reform measures;
6) Activity 2.1.1.a) is required but is voluntary and cannot be imposed on attorneys. The pro-bono
activity of attorneys depends on their goodwill and availability. The mandatory nature of this
system, in the absence of traditions to ensure the quality of attorneys’ work, will not produce any
beneficial effects for the population, but on the contrary may affect the quality of provided services.
In fact, the pro-bono activity of attorneys is rather determined by their sufficient income;
7) Activity 2.3.1, which proposes the introduction in law of the criteria of quality and clarity of court
decisions. This cannot be achieved in practice. The Civil Procedure Code (CPC) and the Criminal
Procedure Code (CrPC) already contain requirements for judgments (civil) and, respectively,
sentences (criminal) - they must be legal, justified and motivated (art. 239 CPC and art. 384 para.
(3) CrPC). The quality criteria cannot be listed exhaustively and they change from time to time.
They are the emanation of practitioners, not the legislator. Such criteria must be developed by
the SCJ, which has such powers within the meaning of Articles 2 letter. c) and 16 let. c) of Law
no. 789/1996. Moreover, such criteria are not necessary in the case of standardising judicial
practice and streamlining the activity of the SCJ. The quashing of poorly prepared decisions is
the best remedy which will increase the quality of court decisions;
8) Activity 2.3.2.d), which refers to the preparation of a written report on the appeal by the reporting
judge. This measure is ineffective and will only increase the workload of judges. A simpler solution
would be to drop the ruling part of the judgments and to issue instead fully reasoned judgments;
9) Activity 3.2.2.b) could be obsolete in case of the decision within activity 3.2.2.a) to waive the
mandatory judicial mediation delivered by judges. We recommend its exclusion.
(ii) Among the measures which require a difference placement are the following:
1) For activity 2.1.2.g) a better place is within the specific objective 2.1.6.;
2) Specific objectives 2.1.6. and 2.1.7 are better placed under the strategic goal dedicated to the
observance of human rights.
(iii) Among the measures, which are absolutely necessary and which are not in the
Strategy or Action Plan are the following:
1) At specific objective 1.4 insert activities that will ensure in practice the application of the rules
of ex-parte communication of judges and prosecutors, as well as the thorough verification of the
assets of all judges and prosecutors. Also, to this end, measures should be introduced to ensure
the observance in practice of the electronic random distribution of cases in courts;
2) At specific objective 1.4 it is necessary to include related actions to review the competences
of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, which must investigate cases of major corruption,
ensure the transparency of the Superior Council of Prosecutors and strengthen the National
Integrity Authority;
3) At the specific objective 1.3. (Strengthening legal training, education and specialisation)
should also include an analysis of the work of the NIJ and its procedures to increase the quality
of training at the NIJ. The NIJ was a key institution included in the previous Strategy and was
7. 7
the recipient of assistance from various partners. However, it is not clear how the NIJ has
reformed itself to be able to respond adequately to current requirements;
4) At the specific objective 2.1.5 an activity on the possibility of outsourcing translation services
should be inserted. This will solve many of the existing problems in this area;
5) Insert in the specific objective 2.2.3 of an activity to provide for the implementation of the
random distribution of cases in the prosecutors’ offices;
6) Insert at objective 2.3.2 an activity that refers to the revision of the role of the SCJ, so that it
becomes a genuine cassation court and whose main task is to harmonise judicial practice,
reduce the competences and the number of judges;
7) Insert at objective 2.3.2 an activity that would require the SCJ to develop guidelines on the
individualization of criminal sanctions in different categories of cases, a widespread practice in
advanced democracies and which considerably reduces the risk of arbitrariness;
8) Insert at objective 2.4.1 an activity related to the implementation of the E-File system and the
introduction of an efficient mechanism for the public to receive and submit documents to courts
in electronic format;
9) Insert at objective 2.4.1 an activity related to the observance of the rules of publication of
anonymised court decisions on the courts’ portal. There are significant shortcomings in this
regard. Some decisions are excessively anonymised and other decisions that need to be
anonymised are published without the exclusion of sensitive data;
10) Insert at objective 3.3.1 letter f) an activity that provides for the exclusion starting with
January 1, 2021 of keeping of judicial statistics in handwritten registers, a practice that
undermines the accuracy of the data from the Integrated File Management Program (IFMP);
11) The strategy does not provide for actions on criminal measures to combat corruption in the
judiciary. These should be found in the Strategy or Action plan, including in terms of assessing
existing practices, strengthening mechanisms for investigating corruption in the judiciary and
enforcing sufficient sanctions, coordinated with the content of the NIAS for 2017-2020 and with
the Action Plans for the implementation of the NIAS, in particular the one relevant for Pillar III -
Justice and Anticorruption Authorities;
12) Neither the Strategy nor the Action plan provide for measures aimed at ensuring the
functional autonomy of the Judicial Inspection within the SCM. This measure must be introduced
to ensure a functioning Judicial Inspection;
13) Neither the Strategy nor the Action plan provides for measures to improve the functioning of
the Constitutional Court, although such measures were proposed in the previous Strategy and
have not been implemented;
14) The endorsed documents do not address the issue of excessive workload at the courts of
appeal and large discrepancies among their workload. This could be solved by including
activities that involve: 1. Reviewing the constituencies of courts of appeal and some district
courts and, 2. Ensuring minimum annual budget expenditures for the planning and construction
of new courthouses in accordance with Parliament Decision no. 21 of March 3, 2017. The
workload at the courts of appeal could also be reduced by adjusting the appeal system in civil
and criminal cases (waiving the submission of unmotivated appeals and separate reinstatement
within the appeal period).
15) There are no measures for the efficient management of human resources in the justice
system, including of resources that have left the system. To reduce the negative impact on the
8. 8
justice system due to frequent vacancies in the system and staff turnover, we recommend
creating a register of employees of the justice system, to ensure subsequent contact with former
employees in the event of vacancies;
16) Although the Action Plan refers to the involvement of judges in the election of chairmen and
vice-chairmen of courts (p.1.1.2), there are no measures to exclude the conflict of jurisdiction
between the president of the court and the mechanisms established by law to exclude influence
on how the random distribution of files takes place;
17) Include a separate component according to point 1.3. dedicated to the development of the
quality of teaching at law schools and the steering of educational process towards the needs of
the justice system. These may include evaluating curricula and encouraging courses to improve
the quality of critical thinking, legal writing and motivation, as well as learning about the
administration of the justice system.
Finally, we reiterate on the opportunity to reflect in the new strategic document the outstanding
policy measures in the field of justice and integrity in the justice sector previously formulated in
the White Book on Good Governance1
presented by IPRE, CRJM and Expert-Grup on July 19,
2019.
1
IPRE, CRJM, Expert-Grup, White Book on Good Governance, 19.07.2019 available in English at: http://ipre.md/2019/07/19/cartea-alba-a-
bunei-guvernari-propuneri-privind-prioritatile-de-politici-pentru-urmatoarele-12-luni-pentru-guvernul-republicii-moldova/?lang=en