The document discusses the implications of the new START III treaty between Russia and the US on nuclear arms reduction and the changing military-strategic balance in Europe. It notes that START III, along with discussions around a joint European missile shield, have revived negotiations on reducing tactical nuclear weapons and regulating conventional arms. Specifically for Moldova, this means the viability of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, which could help demilitarize Transnistria if Russia withdraws troops and ammunition as promised. However, Russia's moratorium on the CFE in 2007 reduced prospects for resolving the Transnistrian conflict as it removed pressure on Russia to remove forces from Moldova.

1. Institute for
Development and
MOLDOVA’S FOREIGN POLICY STATEWATCH Social Initiatives
“Viitorul”
Issue 18, February 2011
THE TRANSNISTRIAN DEMILITARIZATION
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REMODELING
MILITARY-STRATEGIC BALANCE IN EUROPE
Eduard Țugui
Moldova’s Foreign Policy Statewatch represents a series of brief
NEXT TOPICS
analyses, written by local and foreign experts, dedicated to the TO BE COVERED:
most topical subjects related to the foreign policy of Moldova,
major developments in the Black Sea Region, cooperation with Opportunities
international organizations and peace building activities in the region. of the Polish EU
It aims to create a common platform for discussion and to bring
together experts, commentators, officials and diplomats who are
Presidency
concerned with the perspectives of European Integration of Moldova.
It is also pertaining to offer to Moldova’s diplomats and analysts a
valuable tribune for debating the most interesting and controversial
points of view that could help Moldova to find its path to EU.
T
he new Russian-American Treaty for nuclear disarmament START (Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty) III, entered into force on 5 February 2011, together
with the change of its ratification instruments between the heads of delega-
tions from the two countries. The Russian-American Agreement, signed on 8
April 2010 in Prague by B. Obama and D. Medvedev, modifies the parameters
of international and continental security, as it aims a 30% reduction of nuclear-
strategic arsenals and binds their nuclear offensive capabilities of American
Missile Shield, which is expected to be installed in Eastern Europe1. Signing and rati-
fying of a document that provides strategic nuclear arms reduction caused talks and
negotiations about simultaneous reduction of the tactical nuclear arms and the control
of the conventional arms in Europe. These are processes with direct impact on the se-
curity of the Republic of Moldova and therefore require an attitude, especially due to
the fact that on the provisions of a (potential) new Treaty on Conventional Armed For-
ces in Europe (CFE) depends largely the demilitarization of the Transnistrian region.
1 Договор между Российской Федерацией и Соединенными Штатами Америки о мерах по дальнейшему сокращению и
ограничению стратегических наступательных вооружений. [On-Line]. 2010. http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/512 (accessed 19.01.2011).

2. 2 Moldova’s Foreign Policy Statewatch
Premises of the new European
military-strategic balance
International and continental geopolitical changes related to the erosion and subsequently collapse
of the Soviet Union were accompanied by a series of agreements designed to ensure international and
European security. The signing of the INF treaty (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) in December
1987, treaty of the nuclear forces with intermediary range of action (500-5500 km) was followed by the
signing of the START Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) I in July 1991, which limited nuclear strategic
forces with long-range action – the intercontinental ballistic missiles. Between these two major Russian-
American commitments on nuclear disarmament, was signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe (CFE) which was designed to complete nuclear disarmament with the strategic balance regulation
in the field of conventional military capacities on the European continent.
The signing of START III, on the background of an international loaded agenda at the beginning
of the XXI century, along with the NATO summit decision from November 2010 on creating a joint missile
shield in Europe and the proposals to Russia to participate in it, are premises for a new security architecture
on the European continent and, consequently, reanimate negotiations on tactical nuclear armament and
conventional arms. Thus, during the signing of the START III, the U.S. President said that he was interested
in continuing negotiations with Russia on reducing nuclear tactical weapons, provision which Republicans
from Congress were willing to be included in the Treaty2. At the same time, this revitalized the consultations
on signing a new treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, which started immediately after the signing
of START III.
Conventional Forces in Europe:
Limitations and uncertainties
The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed on 19 November 1990 in Paris
by the sixteen NATO countries and six Warsaw Pact countries and entered into force on 2 November 1992.
According to the treaty, on the targeted territory, from the Atlantic to the Ural, both groups of countries are
allowed to have an equal number of military equipment, but the total number should not overcame five
categories: tanks - 40 000, armored cars — 60,000; 100mm caliber artillery - 40 000; fighters — 13 600;
attack helicopters — 4000. At the same time, the treaty provided for enhancing transparency and mutual
trust through exchanges of informations and developing mechanisms for inspections, and creating the
special regime of flanks with reduced holdings of military equipment, where the forces of NATO and the
Warsaw Pact were in close contact3.
After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the signatory
states have started the process of adaptation of the CFE Treaty to the new (geo)political and security realities
on the European continent by adoption of the Adapted Treaty on 19 November 1999 OSCE Summit from
Istanbul. The document amended the limitations of the previous system of military blocs and includes
national and territorial limits for all 30 signatory states4. Important for the Republic of Moldova is that the
Adapted Treaty contains provisions on the need of host State agreement for the stationing of foreign troops,
as important is its connection with the Final Act and Declaration of the OSCE Istanbul Summit5, documents
2 The White House Office of The Press Secretary, April 8, 2010; The New START, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report
to the Senate, October 1, 2010.
3 McCausland J. The CFE Treaty: A Cold War Anachronism? [On-Line]. 1995. p. 2-6. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/
pdffiles/pub361.pdf . (accessed 10.01.2011).
4 Witkowsky A., Garnett Sh., McCausland J. Salvaging the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty Regime: Options for Wash-
ington. // BROOKINGS Arms Control series, Paper 2, March 2010, p. 6-8.
5 Fruntaşu Iu. Retragerea trupelor ruse din Moldova în contextul Tratatului FACE adaptat: percepţii, interese şi natura schimbătoare a
securităţii europene. [On-Line]. 2005. http://fruntasu.com/blog/retragerea-trupelor-ruse-din-moldova. (accessed 10.01.2011).
Str. Iacob Hîncu 10/1, Chişinău MD-2005 Republic of Moldova 373 / 22 221844 phone 373 / 22 245714 fax office@viitorul.org www.viitorul.org

3. Moldova’s Foreign Policy Statewatch 3
containing commitments to Russia ammunition and withdrawl of troops from Transnistria by the end of
20026.
Adapted Treaty was ratified by Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, but the first has not
withdrawn troops and ammunition from Moldova and Georgia, also, not respecting the imposed limits
of military equipment in the North Caucasus. U.S. and the European partners have refused to ratify the
treaty, insisting on having the «package» approach of the Istanbul Summit, respectively, conditioning the
ratification with the withdrawl of Russian weapons and military contingent from Transnistria and Georgia. On
12 December 2007, Russia established the Moratorium on the Treaty and submited new complaints from
Europeans and Americans, including NATO expansion and the existence of “Baltic gap” through non-
participation of the Baltic States in the Treaty, although the Baltics declared their intentions to join the
CFE, and NATO expansion was not accompanied by a massive movement of troops and military equipment
(provided in the treaty) to the east.
Moldova and risks of decoupling
The CFE Treaty provisions, especially the host country provision, and its connection with the Final
Act and Declaration of the OSCE Summit in Istanbul, represented maybe the only efficient tools that can
force Russia to honor its commitments towards the Republic of Moldova. Thus, Russia’s Moratorium of the
suspending participation at the CFE reduces greatly the perspectives for withdrawal of Russian troops and
ammunitions and respectively of settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.
Republic of Moldova is obviously interested in activating of the CFE and along with it; Euro-Atlantic
world is interested for a stable and secure Europe, governed by treaties that are respected by all signatory
states. U.S., for example, appointed in February 2010 a special officer to the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe with the mission to start consultations with European allies and Russia on the future of the CFE, and
in September, H. Clinton have been calling NATO members and Russia to intensify negotiations on Treaty7.
At the same time, Russia is not less concerned with balance / parity of the conventional arms in Europe,
since NATO’s potential in terms of technical / conventional military capability is far superior in comparison
with Russia, while its military expenditures are difficult to compare with euroatlantic Members8.
Paradoxically, but the risks of Moldova are related namely to the “unanimous” desire of the CFE
activation or rather the possibility of signing a new treaty on conventional forces in Europe, that would be
disconnected from the Final Act and the OSCE Summit Declaration from Istanbul in 1999. Russia is not
willing to return to Istanbul package and calls for “purification” of the treaty by decoupling of the commitments
of the demilitarization of Transnistria and/or remodeling of the overall European security system. Moreover,
Russia claims that it has no military equipment in Moldova provided by the CFE and refers to paragraph 4
of the Joint Declaration of D. Medvedev, V. Voronin, I. Smirnov, of March 18, 20099, through which, some
influential Russian researchers say, that Russia has the host state agreement on stationing military troops
and amunistions in Transnistria10.
Some European countries are becoming more flexible in this regard and it could happen that “in
the name of European security” to accept a part of Russia’s proposals. Also, the United States, interested
in advancing negotiations on certain issues related to the missile shield, Afghanistan and Iran’s nuclear
program, could reduce the intransigence that has treated Russia’s Istanbul commitments. Reduction of
missiles and tactical nuclear warheads (with short-range action) extends this probability. The experts
6 ISTANBUL SUMMIT DECLARATION, OSCE, Istanbul Summit 1999, ISTANBUL DOCUMENT 1999, January 2000,
PCOEW389, p. 50. [On-Line]. 2000. http://www.osce.org/mc/39569. (accessed 15.01.2011).
7 US calls for reviving conventional forces in Europe treaty. [On-Line]. 2010. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/
ALeqM5hRb-BzBIy6NTNgmpzKtvGvhSS50g. (accessed 20.01.2011).
8 Stockholm International Peace Researche Institute. Yearbook 2010 – Military Expenditure. [On-Line]. 2010. http://www.sipri.org/
media/media/pressreleases/pressreleasetranslations/storypackage_milex. (accessed 20.01.2011).
9 Совместное заявление, принятое по итогам переговоров Президента Российской Федерации Д.А.Медведева с Президентом
Республики Молдова В.Н.Ворониным и главой Приднестровья И.Н.Смирновым, Барвиха, 18 марта 2009 года. [On-Line]. 2010. http://
www.moldova.mid.ru/press-slujba/pr_09_13.htm (accessed 20.01.2011).
10 Арбатов A., Ознобищев С. Сокращение обычных вооруженных сил в Европе: на пороге нового этапа? [On-Line]. 2010. http://
nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-07-09/1_pushki.html (accessed 20.01.2011).
Str. Iacob Hîncu 10/1, Chişinău MD-2005 Republic of Moldova 373 / 22 221844 phone 373 / 22 245714 fax office@viitorul.org www.viitorul.org

4. 4 Moldova’s Foreign Policy Statewatch
community and American administration wants a treaty to address this type of weapons, since Russia has
about 2 200 tactical nuclear warheads and the U.S. only 500, of which 200 located in Europe (Germany,
Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and Turkey)11. However, several European countries led by Germany, calls US
to pull out this type of weapon from the continent, while the U.S. can not allow a withdrawal of these nuclear
warheads in the absence of a treaty with Russia, which contains similar obligations to the last. Russia, in
turn, is vulnerable to conventional military capabilities, and sees in its own tactical nuclear warheads the
only counter-argument to conventional weapons of NATO in Europe. As a result, U.S. willingness to start
negotiations with Russia on reducing tactical nuclear weapons, increases probability that Washington might
make some concessions to Russia on Conventional Forces in Europe.
Conclusions
Profound transformations in the global contemporary economy and (geo)politics are accompanied
by the remodeling of the international security system, and the European continent is “the calculation
zone” for re-assessing of the capabilities of the world’s powers. Geographical position and interconnection
of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (whose fulfillment depends on the withdrawal of Russian
munitions and troops from Transnistria) with other projects and military-strategic treaties, includes Moldova
in a complicated negotiation process, which requires taking attitude.
Republic of Moldova should make sure, including through bilateral and collective agreements with
NATO member states, that any treaties signed with Russia in military-strategic terms, are not “canceling” its
commitments to withdraw troops and munitions from Transnistria, and a new treaty on Conventional Forces
in Europe, if it will be signed, should maintain the contact with the Final Act and Declaration from Istanbul.
However, the Moldovan diplomacy should correct “the electoral error” of the ex-President V. Voronin,
ensuring NATO partners and reminding Russia that “The host State agreement” in the Republic of Moldova
means signing of a classical interstate treaty which contains terms of the stationary, subsequently ratified
in the Parliament, and not obscure declarations signed in electoral campaigns. Moreover, this unfortunate
statement from Barviha stipulates (at the 4th point) standing (only) of the Russian peacekeepers until the
resolution of the conflict and does not refer to all soldiers and munitions from Transnistria.
About the peacekeepers, Republic of Moldova must formally request from European Union and
Russia, the replacement of the Russian troops from Transnistria with a civilian mission of the European
monitoring from Common Security and Defence Policy, such as were recommended in different conflict
regions of the world, from Macedonia to D. R. Congo and Indonesia. Otherwise, the OSCE does not have
such mechanisms, the result of the mandate of UN peacekeepers in Kosovo may not be relevant from
many points of view, and two decades of confrontation have shown that Moldova will never be unified as it
has in the East, without her will, Russian troops.
11 Арбатов A. (ред.). Ядерное распространение: новые технологии, вооружения и договоры. Москва: Российская политическая
энциклопедия, 2009, p. 133-155.
This publication was produced by IDIS “Viitorul” with the financial support of Soros Foundation
Moldova and the National Endowment for Democracy. The opinions expressed in this publicati-
on reflect the author’s/authors’ position and don’t necessary represent the views of the donors.
Str. Iacob Hîncu 10/1, Chişinău MD-2005 Republic of Moldova 373 / 22 221844 phone 373 / 22 245714 fax office@viitorul.org www.viitorul.org
Str. Iacob Hîncu 10/1, Chişinău MD-2005 Republic of Moldova 373 / 22 221844 phone 373 / 22 245714 fax
office@viitorul.org www.viitorul.org