2.  During the four decades following the WWII Russian’s position
chanced from being the main competitive structural power to
integrating within predominant “Western” structures in the
1990s.
 However, since the mid-2000s, there has been a resurgence
in Russian assertiveness on the international stage, even if
Russia is not yet competing as a global structural power
beyond its near abroad.
 The answer to the question of how to handle a newly
resurgent Russia has received contradictory responds
within the EU: Central and Easter Europe demanded a
more assertive attitude towards Moscow stressing the
principles of democracy and human rights in foreign policy
deliberations; other states decided to prioritize Moscow’s
strategic partnership.

3. Germany and France increasingly indulge towards Russia, for
example, the EU has repeatedly chosen not to criticize Moscow’s use
of violence in Chechnya; the only thing that the EP did was to
temporary delay the ratification of the EU-Russia PCA and put TACIS
funding on hold in the late 1990s.
Analysis of the actual EU-Russia relations within the International contest
 The EU ties relations with its neighbours trough what is called the
ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy)
 The ENP is the flagship of the EU’s policy towards its neighbours
with individual action plans but the ENP does not offer an effective
membership in the EU and it’s for this reason that it often becomes
difficult to promote changes in those countries.

4.  Russia asserted that it didn’t see itself part of the ENP because its particular
Status requires a different relationship with the EU.
 The legal basis of EU-Russia relation is the PCA ( Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement) of 1997 with the duration of 10 years.
It covers:
 Trade co-operation: liberalisation of trade based on most-favoured-nation (MFN);
legislative harmonisation; provision on the establishment and operation of
companies, services; current payments and the movement of capitals; co-operation
and intellectual policy.
 Co-operation in science and technology, energy, environment, transport and
space.
 Political dialogue: on international issues, democracy and human rights;
 Justice and home affairs: co-operation to prevent illegal activities.
Bilateral institutional contacts are at large extend regulated by the PCA
which expired in 2007 but it has been prolonged on an annual basis
pending on new negotiations with Russia.

5.  a new EU common strategy was created in 1990with the purpose to
inject a deeper coherence between the EU’s member states in their
policies towards Russia, however most of the observers saw it as a
failure.
 the EU member states have been unwilling to align their bilateral
agendas and programs with these of the EU. Especially France,
Germany and Italy have tried to establish closer bilateral and personal
ties to Russia, sometimes at the expense of agreed EU policies. For
example, in 2004, the Italian prime minister, while holding the EU
presidency, was not willing to support the EU policy on Chechnya’s
issue.
EU is lacking of a common policy in general and not just towards
Russia.

6. In May 2003 at St.Petersburg, partly because of the clear limitations of
the PCA, both sides agreed to work on a new sort of agreement focused
on four “Common Spaces”:
 Common economic space (the priority issues were the energy
dialogue, transport and environment).
 Common space of freedom, security and justice (the priorities in
here were to border management and immigration issues; EU was
unable to agree to Russian demand for a visa-free travel but it did
agree to set up a working party to examine the issues including a
better use of the flexibilities of the Schengen Agreement that
necessity to work together in crisis management and welcomed
practical cooperation in ESDP operations).
 Common space of cooperation in the field of external security;
 Common space of research and education.
These Common Spaces were further elaborated in 2005 through the
adoption of a detailed Road Maps. The difficulties in elaborating this
Road Map were a clear demonstration of the nature of the EU-Russia
power relationship.

7. in 2008, negotiations on a new ambitious bilateral treaty were launched and
have since made progress on economic, political and sectorial matters,
although the negotiation can’t be concluded until Russia joints the WTO (
World Trade Organisation). This partnership builds on the four Common
Spaces and complements bilateral partnerships for modernisation, among the
several EU member states and Russia.
EU and Russia economic relationship
Economic ties between Russia and the EU have grown substantially over the
past years if we consider that Russia is the third EU’S
Most important trade partner in goods after China and the USA.
 66 billion of euros in export towards Russia (the 6% of all EU exports)
 115 billion of euros imports of 2009( the 9.6% of all the EU imports, the third
place after China and USA).

9.  The EU is the largest markets for Russian goods.
 Energy represents the 65% of total EU import from Russia, nearly the
40% of gas import, the 27% of crude oil import and the 24% of coal
imports.
 Russia has been a reliable energy supplier to the EU and it’s just in the
last decade that there have been interruptions. From the Russian point
of view this problems are due not just to the EU-Russia relations but as
well to the adjustment linked to the creation of new transit states like
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova; all of them constitute an issue of supply
and demand.
 However, the economic crisis and the EU’s targeted policy of focusing
on the reduction of energy dependence on Russia undermined
Gazprom’s position in Europe (open market).
 Even the governments and companies of Italy, Germany and the
Netherlands bound by long-term contracts with Gazprom exerted
pressure on the Russian energy giant to cut prices or they would choose
another alternative – international arbitration

10.  The shale gas revolution in the U.S. and reorientation of liquefied gas
terminals from imports to exports can dramatically change the balance
of the EU’s gas imports at Gazprom’s expense.
 On 19 September 2007, the European Commission (EC) adopted the
third package of legislative proposals for electricity and gas markets. A
competitive and integrated energy market allows European consumers
to choose between different suppliers and all suppliers, irrespective of
their size, to access the market.
 The EU-initiated third liberalisation package (TEP) for the gas and
electricity sector had a significant impact on Gazprom’s interests in the
European markets as it weakened Gazprom’s position as a monopolist
in the EU’s domestic market. All this significantly curtailed and
complicates the EU-Russia relations in the gas sector, as it introduced
safeguards for access to the EU domestic market.

11. Where is this authoritarian trend come from?
In their book “The foreign policy of the European Union”, Keukeleire and
MacNaughtan believe that with its enlargement in 2004 and 2007 and its
growing influence through its ENPs with the former Soviet Republics, the EU
has undermined the Russia’s spheres of political and economic domination;
therefore, from this perspective, Moscow’s growing assertiveness and coercive
behaviour can be consider a kind of counter-offensive to recover lost ground.
 Now, it is clear how this authoritarian trends in Russia constitute a problem
for the EU, which is seeking to develop a values-based foreign policy
 There are huge differences in term of how to deal with neighbours; over
the past two decades, since the end of the Cold War, the EU has not been
able to offer any solution for its relationship with Russia that will encourage
Russia to adopt the European rules rather than resorting on the peculiar
“Russian model” for political and economic development (Chechnya
example).

12.  The EU is aware that Russia is a vital partner in terms of energy
supply and in resolving some sensitive international situations,
ranging from the Middle-East to Belarus and the Southern
Caucasus and although some progress have been made within this
complicated relations, still remains a considerable natural distrust,
partly because of ignorance of other’s side motives
 According to the analyst Jana Kobzova The EU should adopt the
radical solution to call a strategic pause since it lacks of good ideas
to force Russia to behave according to the European rules and
collaborating on international issues.

13. Where is the problem?
The problem is that the EU still tends to identify Russia as a strategic
partner and this is why, in my opinion, often the member states decide
not to practically act or use the force to solve some international issues
concerning Russia just because they are not willing to lose this
partnership ( case of Chechnya and Ukraine).
Europe and US as well are doing a lot to punish Putin for annexing Crimea and
invading eastern Ukraine, but they are not doing anything that will
physically force Putin to turn back his tanks, or return Crimea to Ukraine, which
means that if he wants to keep invading Ukraine, despite those punishments,
he can and will.

14. Economic sanctions
 EU nationals and companies may no longer buy or sell new bonds, equity
or similar financial instruments with a maturity exceeding 30 days
 EU nationals and companies may not provide loans to five major Russian
state-owned banks.
 Embargo on the import and export of arms and related material from/to
Russia, covering all items on the EU common military list.
 Prohibition on exports of dual use goods and technology for military use in
Russia or to Russian military end-users.
 Exports of certain energy-related equipment and technology to Russia are
subject to prior authorisation by competent authorities of Member .
These tough economic sanctions are meant as punishment and to deter
Russia from invading further.
The negative side of imposing these sanctions falls on the European Union,
which is heavily reliant on Russian natural gas exports and will hurt its own
economy by sanctioning Russia.

15. Diplomatic sanctions
 Instead of the G8 summit in Sochi, a G7 meeting was held in Brussels on 4-5
June. EU countries also supported the suspension of negotiations over
Russia's joining the OECD and the International Energy Agency.
 The EU-Russia summit was cancelled and EU member states decided not to
hold regular bilateral summits.
 Bilateral talks with Russia on visa matters as well as on the New Agreement
between the EU and Russia were suspended. In addition, a re-assessment of
EU-Russia cooperation programmes is currently ongoing with a view to
suspending the implementation of EU bilateral and regional cooperation
programmes.
 Projects dealing exclusively with cross-border cooperation and civil society
will be maintained.
And NATO has suspended all practical cooperation with the Russian military.
The US and Europe have made clear that they do not see any sort of military
response as an option;

16. Conclusions
The EU doesn’t have an effective common policy towards Russia, on the
contrary we can say that it actually have “on the paper” a policy which
regulates some aspect of its relationship with Russia but we can’t assert
with conviction that this is “common”.
Putting on the side the economic advantages and linkages, the EU should
try to create a real common policy towards Russia’s authoritarian attitude
especially when this attitude ends up violating the human rights and the
democratic principles which should be at the base EU existence.