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On the Role of Assumptions
in Engineering Smart Systems
Ivan Ruchkin
PRECISE Center
Computer and Information Science
University of Pennsylvania
Smart Designing of Smart Systems Workshop
Society of Design and Process Science
November 20, 2020
2
Position statement
Engineering
assumptions
enable
Intelligible
complexity
enables
Smart behavior
Smart design
3
Position statement
Engineering
assumptions
enable
Intelligible
complexity
enables
Smart behavior
Smart design
4
Defining assumptions
●
“Statement [...] taken for granted to be true” [1]
●
“Needs or decisions [...] not yet validated” [2]
Many taxonomies:
Problem- vs solution-oriented [3]
Implicit vs explicit [4]
Whether invalidation leads to defects [2]
[1] Marincic, Mader, Wieringa. Classifying Assumptions Made During Requirements Verification of Embedded Systems, REFSQ 2008.
[2] Bulandran. An Exploration of Assumptions in Requirements Engineering. PhD thesis, University of Western Australia, 2012.
[3] Dewar. Assumption-Based Planning A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises, RAND, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
[4] Saqui-Sannes, Ludovic. Making Modeling Assumptions an Explicit Part of Real-Time Systems Models, ERTS 2016.
5
Defining assumptions
●
“Statement [...] taken for granted to be true” [1]
●
“Needs or decisions [...] not yet validated” [2]
●
Many taxonomies:
– Problem- vs solution-oriented [3]
– Implicit vs explicit [4]
– Whether violation leads to defects [2]
[1] Marincic, Mader, Wieringa. Classifying Assumptions Made During Requirements Verification of Embedded Systems, REFSQ 2008.
[2] Bulandran. An Exploration of Assumptions in Requirements Engineering. PhD thesis, University of Western Australia, 2012.
[3] Dewar. Assumption-Based Planning A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises, RAND, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
[4] Saqui-Sannes, Ludovic. Making Modeling Assumptions an Explicit Part of Real-Time Systems Models, ERTS 2016.
6
Intuition about assumptions
7
Intuition about assumptions
From: Hehenberger, Egyed, Zeman. Consistency Checking of
Mechatronic Design Models, DETC 2009
8
Intuition about assumptions
From: Hehenberger, Egyed, Zeman. Consistency Checking of
Mechatronic Design Models, DETC 2009
●
Define a scope:
– Component
– Model
– System
Assumptions:
fixed expectations
of the scope’s inside
from its outside
9
Intuition about assumptions
From: Hehenberger, Egyed, Zeman. Consistency Checking of
Mechatronic Design Models, DETC 2009
●
Define a scope:
– Component
– Model
– System
●
Assumptions:
– fixed expectations
– of the scope’s inside
– from its outside
10
11
Canonical role: “ticking bomb”
●
An assumption can be violated, leading to undesired
consequences
Long history of critical failures due to unmet assumptions:
Mars climate orbiter: assumption about metric/imperial system
Challenger space shuttle: assumption about O-rings in cold
temps
GM ignition switch: assumption about mechanical/electrical
interaction
12
Canonical role: “ticking bomb”
●
An assumption can be violated, leading to undesired
consequences
●
Long history of critical failures due to unmet assumptions:
Mars climate orbiter: assumption about metric/imperial system
Challenger space shuttle: assumption about O-rings in cold
temps
GM ignition switch: assumption about mechanical/electrical
interaction
13
Canonical role: “ticking bomb”
●
An assumption can be violated, leading to undesired
consequences
●
Long history of critical failures due to unmet assumptions:
– Mars climate orbiter: assumption about metric/imperial system
– Challenger space shuttle: assumption about O-rings in cold
temps
– GM ignition switch: assumption about mechanical/electrical
interaction
14
Response to “ticking bombs”
Document, model, and manage [1, 4, 5]
Validate at design time [2]
Monitor [6] and adapt [3] at run time
[1] Marincic, Mader, Wieringa. Classifying Assumptions Made During Requirements Verification of Embedded Systems, REFSQ 2008.
[2] Bulandran. An Exploration of Assumptions in Requirements Engineering. PhD thesis, University of Western Australia, 2012.
[3] Dewar. Assumption-Based Planning: A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises, RAND, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
[4] Saqui-Sannes, Ludovic. Making Modeling Assumptions an Explicit Part of Real-Time Systems Models, ERTS 2016.
[5] Fu. A Framework for Managing Unspecified Assumptions in Safety-Critical Cyber-Physical Systems, PhD thesis, UChicago, 2020.
[6] Cimatti, Tian, Tonetta. Assumption-Based Runtime Verification with Partial Observability and Resets, RV 2019.
15
Response to “ticking bombs”
●
Document, model, and manage [1, 4, 5]
Validate at design time [2]
Monitor [6] and adapt [3] at run time
[1] Marincic, Mader, Wieringa. Classifying Assumptions Made During Requirements Verification of Embedded Systems, REFSQ 2008.
[2] Bulandran. An Exploration of Assumptions in Requirements Engineering. PhD thesis, University of Western Australia, 2012.
[3] Dewar. Assumption-Based Planning: A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises, RAND, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
[4] Saqui-Sannes, Ludovic. Making Modeling Assumptions an Explicit Part of Real-Time Systems Models, ERTS 2016.
[5] Fu. A Framework for Managing Unspecified Assumptions in Safety-Critical Cyber-Physical Systems, PhD thesis, UChicago, 2020.
[6] Cimatti, Tian, Tonetta. Assumption-Based Runtime Verification with Partial Observability and Resets, RV 2019.
16
Response to “ticking bombs”
●
Document, model, and manage [1, 4, 5]
●
Validate at design time [2]
Monitor [6] and adapt [3] at run time
[1] Marincic, Mader, Wieringa. Classifying Assumptions Made During Requirements Verification of Embedded Systems, REFSQ 2008.
[2] Bulandran. An Exploration of Assumptions in Requirements Engineering. PhD thesis, University of Western Australia, 2012.
[3] Dewar. Assumption-Based Planning: A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises, RAND, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
[4] Saqui-Sannes, Ludovic. Making Modeling Assumptions an Explicit Part of Real-Time Systems Models, ERTS 2016.
[5] Fu. A Framework for Managing Unspecified Assumptions in Safety-Critical Cyber-Physical Systems, PhD thesis, UChicago, 2020.
[6] Cimatti, Tian, Tonetta. Assumption-Based Runtime Verification with Partial Observability and Resets, RV 2019.
17
Response to “ticking bombs”
●
Document, model, and manage [1, 4, 5]
●
Validate at design time [2]
●
Monitor [6] and adapt [3] at run time
[1] Marincic, Mader, Wieringa. Classifying Assumptions Made During Requirements Verification of Embedded Systems, REFSQ 2008.
[2] Bulandran. An Exploration of Assumptions in Requirements Engineering. PhD thesis, University of Western Australia, 2012.
[3] Dewar. Assumption-Based Planning: A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises, RAND, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
[4] Saqui-Sannes, Ludovic. Making Modeling Assumptions an Explicit Part of Real-Time Systems Models, ERTS 2016.
[5] Fu. A Framework for Managing Unspecified Assumptions in Safety-Critical Cyber-Physical Systems, PhD thesis, UChicago, 2020.
[6] Cimatti, Tian, Tonetta. Assumption-Based Runtime Verification with Partial Observability and Resets, RV 2019.
18
Position statement
Engineering
assumptions
enable
Intelligible
complexity
enables
Smart behavior
Smart design
19
Position statement
Engineering
assumptions
enable
Intelligible
complexity
enables
Smart behavior
Smart design
20
Position statement
Engineering
assumptions
enable
Intelligible
complexity
enables
Smart behavior
Smart design
21
Another role: “enabler of complexity”
Often, assumptions are made for simplification
E.g., braking deceleration bounds simplify the analysis by limiting the state space
But assumptions can also lead to intelligible complexity
I.e., complexity understandable enough to serve as a foundation of complex design
As opposed to unintelligible complexity: “anything can happen”
Examples:
“All samples is i.i.d” → sequential probability ratio test
“Preemption is deadline-monotonic” → CPU frequency-scaling analysis
“Gaussian error in sensors” → probabilistic analysis of false positives in monitors
“Power consumption is a polynomial over the durations of robotic tasks”→ power-based planning
22
Another role: “enabler of complexity”
●
Sometimes, assumptions are made for simplification
– E.g., bounds on braking deceleration simplify the state space
But assumptions can also lead to intelligible complexity
I.e., complexity understandable enough to serve as a foundation of complex design
As opposed to unintelligible complexity: “anything can happen”
Examples:
“All samples is i.i.d” → sequential probability ratio test
“Preemption is deadline-monotonic” → CPU frequency-scaling analysis
“Gaussian error in sensors” → probabilistic analysis of false positives in monitors
“Power consumption is a polynomial over the durations of robotic tasks”→ power-based planning
23
Another role: “enabler of complexity”
●
Sometimes, assumptions are made for simplification
– E.g., bounds on braking deceleration simplify the state space
●
But assumptions can also lead to intelligible complexity
– I.e., complexity understandable enough to serve as a foundation of complex design
– As opposed to unintelligible complexity: “anything can happen”
Examples:
“All samples is i.i.d” → sequential probability ratio test
“Preemption is deadline-monotonic” → CPU frequency-scaling analysis
“Gaussian error in sensors” → probabilistic analysis of false positives in monitors
“Power consumption is a polynomial over the durations of robotic tasks”→ power-based planning
24
Another role: “enabler of complexity”
●
Sometimes, assumptions are made for simplification
– E.g., bounds on braking deceleration simplify the state space
●
But assumptions can also lead to intelligible complexity
– I.e., complexity understandable enough to serve as a foundation of complex design
– As opposed to unintelligible complexity: “anything can happen”
– Examples:
●
“All samples are i.i.d” → sequential probability ratio test
●
“Preemption is deadline-monotonic” → CPU frequency-scaling analysis
●
“Gaussian error in sensors” → analysis of false positives in perception
●
“Power consumption is a polynomial over the durations of robotic tasks”→ power-based planning
25
Complexities enabled by assumptions
26
Complexities enabled by assumptions
●
Usage of multiple models
– A formalism may require certain assumptions
A variety of analyses
Fault-related and model-based
Certain system behaviors
Responses to violations of assumptions
27
Complexities enabled by assumptions
●
Usage of multiple models
– A formalism may require certain assumptions
●
A variety of analyses
– Fault-related and model-based
Certain system behaviors
Responses to violations of assumptions
28
Complexities enabled by assumptions
●
Usage of multiple models
– A formalism may require certain assumptions
●
A variety of analyses
– Fault-related and model-based
●
Certain system behaviors
– Responses to violations of assumptions
29
Position statement
Engineering
assumptions
enable
Intelligible
complexity
enables
Smart behavior
Smart design
30
Position statement
Engineering
assumptions
enable
Intelligible
complexity
enables
Smart behavior
Smart design
31
Position statement
Engineering
assumptions
enable
Intelligible
complexity
enables
Smart behavior
Smart design
32
Smartness enabled by complexity
●
Smart: “capable of making adjustments that resemble those resulting
from human decisions” (The Free Dictionary)
– Smartness arises when intelligence meets context
Complexity allows for adjustment
Smart systems can adjust their assumptions
Smart design can adjust its assumptions
E.g., the same robot used for delivery tasks and disaster relief
Different response to human behavior, mechanical/software breakdowns, ...
33
Smartness enabled by complexity
●
Smart: “capable of making adjustments that resemble those resulting
from human decisions” (The Free Dictionary)
– Smartness arises when intelligence meets context
●
Complexity allows for smart adjustment
– Smart systems can adjust their assumptions
– Smart design can adjust its assumptions
●
E.g., the same robot used for delivery tasks and disaster relief
– Different response to human behavior, mechanical/software breakdowns, ...
34
Smart design via assumptions
●
Not only document/model/validate, but also
automatically evaluate and choose assumptions
Example: a design environment that helps find an
appropriate assumption for sensor errors
“All independent” → safe system but mismatch w/ data
“Sequentially dependent” → better data fit but lower safety
“All dependent” → best fit but intractable analysis
35
Smart design via assumptions
●
Not only document/model/validate, but also
automatically evaluate and choose assumptions
●
Example: a design environment that helps find an
appropriate assumption for sensor errors
“All independent” → safe system but mismatch w/ data
“Sequentially dependent” → better data fit but lower safety
“All dependent” → best fit but intractable analysis
36
Smart design via assumptions
●
Not only document/model/validate, but also
automatically evaluate and choose assumptions
●
Example: a design environment that helps find an
appropriate assumption for sensor errors
– “All independent” → safe system but mismatch w/ data
– “Sequentially dependent” → better data fit but lower safety
– “All dependent” → best fit but intractable analysis
37
Smart behavior via assumptions
●
Not only monitor/plan for violations, but also dynamically
adapt assumptions
E.g., an autonomous car notices that pedestrians in this
area are not consistent with the usual model
A database of plausible assumptions: “a sports game ended”
Quantification of assumption fit to perceived situation
Effect analysis for changing assumptions: “new assumption
increases commute time; old assumption increases crash chance”
38
Smart behavior via assumptions
●
Not only monitor/plan for violations, but also dynamically
adapt assumptions
●
E.g., an autonomous car notices that pedestrians in some
area act inconsistently with the usual model
A database of plausible assumptions: “a sports game ended”
Quantification of assumption fit to perceived situation
Effect analysis for changing assumptions: “new assumption
increases commute time; old assumption increases crash chance”
39
Smart behavior via assumptions
●
Not only monitor/plan for violations, but also dynamically
adapt assumptions
●
E.g., an autonomous car notices that pedestrians in some
area act inconsistently with the usual model
– A database of plausible assumptions: “a sports game ended”
– Quantification of assumption fit to the perceived situation
– Effect analysis for changing assumptions: “new assumption
increases commute time; old assumption increases crash chance”
40
Remaining challenges
●
Difficult-to-specify/validate/monitor assumptions
●
Vast pools of potential assumptions
●
Limited data and computing capacity at run time
41
Summary
●
Assumptions are usually interpreted as
potential causes of system failure
– Need to be managed, validated, and monitored
●
A complementary viewpoint:
Engineering
assumptions
enable
Intelligible
complexity
enables
Smart behavior
Smart design
42
References
[1] Marincic, Mader, Wieringa. Classifying Assumptions Made During Requirements Verification
of Embedded Systems, REFSQ 2008.
[2] Bulandran. An Exploration of Assumptions in Requirements Engineering. PhD thesis,
University of Western Australia, 2012.
[3] Dewar. Assumption-Based Planning: A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises, RAND,
Cambridge University Press, 2002.
[4] Saqui-Sannes, Ludovic. Making Modeling Assumptions an Explicit Part of Real-Time
Systems Models, ERTS 2016.
[5] Fu. A Framework for Managing Unspecified Assumptions in Safety-Critical Cyber-Physical
Systems, PhD thesis, University of Chicago, 2020.
[6] Cimatti, Tian, Tonetta. Assumption-Based Runtime Verification with Partial Observability and
Resets, RV 2019.

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On the Role of Assumptions in Engineering Smart Systems

  • 1. 1 On the Role of Assumptions in Engineering Smart Systems Ivan Ruchkin PRECISE Center Computer and Information Science University of Pennsylvania Smart Designing of Smart Systems Workshop Society of Design and Process Science November 20, 2020
  • 4. 4 Defining assumptions ● “Statement [...] taken for granted to be true” [1] ● “Needs or decisions [...] not yet validated” [2] Many taxonomies: Problem- vs solution-oriented [3] Implicit vs explicit [4] Whether invalidation leads to defects [2] [1] Marincic, Mader, Wieringa. Classifying Assumptions Made During Requirements Verification of Embedded Systems, REFSQ 2008. [2] Bulandran. An Exploration of Assumptions in Requirements Engineering. PhD thesis, University of Western Australia, 2012. [3] Dewar. Assumption-Based Planning A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises, RAND, Cambridge University Press, 2002. [4] Saqui-Sannes, Ludovic. Making Modeling Assumptions an Explicit Part of Real-Time Systems Models, ERTS 2016.
  • 5. 5 Defining assumptions ● “Statement [...] taken for granted to be true” [1] ● “Needs or decisions [...] not yet validated” [2] ● Many taxonomies: – Problem- vs solution-oriented [3] – Implicit vs explicit [4] – Whether violation leads to defects [2] [1] Marincic, Mader, Wieringa. Classifying Assumptions Made During Requirements Verification of Embedded Systems, REFSQ 2008. [2] Bulandran. An Exploration of Assumptions in Requirements Engineering. PhD thesis, University of Western Australia, 2012. [3] Dewar. Assumption-Based Planning A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises, RAND, Cambridge University Press, 2002. [4] Saqui-Sannes, Ludovic. Making Modeling Assumptions an Explicit Part of Real-Time Systems Models, ERTS 2016.
  • 7. 7 Intuition about assumptions From: Hehenberger, Egyed, Zeman. Consistency Checking of Mechatronic Design Models, DETC 2009
  • 8. 8 Intuition about assumptions From: Hehenberger, Egyed, Zeman. Consistency Checking of Mechatronic Design Models, DETC 2009 ● Define a scope: – Component – Model – System Assumptions: fixed expectations of the scope’s inside from its outside
  • 9. 9 Intuition about assumptions From: Hehenberger, Egyed, Zeman. Consistency Checking of Mechatronic Design Models, DETC 2009 ● Define a scope: – Component – Model – System ● Assumptions: – fixed expectations – of the scope’s inside – from its outside
  • 10. 10
  • 11. 11 Canonical role: “ticking bomb” ● An assumption can be violated, leading to undesired consequences Long history of critical failures due to unmet assumptions: Mars climate orbiter: assumption about metric/imperial system Challenger space shuttle: assumption about O-rings in cold temps GM ignition switch: assumption about mechanical/electrical interaction
  • 12. 12 Canonical role: “ticking bomb” ● An assumption can be violated, leading to undesired consequences ● Long history of critical failures due to unmet assumptions: Mars climate orbiter: assumption about metric/imperial system Challenger space shuttle: assumption about O-rings in cold temps GM ignition switch: assumption about mechanical/electrical interaction
  • 13. 13 Canonical role: “ticking bomb” ● An assumption can be violated, leading to undesired consequences ● Long history of critical failures due to unmet assumptions: – Mars climate orbiter: assumption about metric/imperial system – Challenger space shuttle: assumption about O-rings in cold temps – GM ignition switch: assumption about mechanical/electrical interaction
  • 14. 14 Response to “ticking bombs” Document, model, and manage [1, 4, 5] Validate at design time [2] Monitor [6] and adapt [3] at run time [1] Marincic, Mader, Wieringa. Classifying Assumptions Made During Requirements Verification of Embedded Systems, REFSQ 2008. [2] Bulandran. An Exploration of Assumptions in Requirements Engineering. PhD thesis, University of Western Australia, 2012. [3] Dewar. Assumption-Based Planning: A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises, RAND, Cambridge University Press, 2002. [4] Saqui-Sannes, Ludovic. Making Modeling Assumptions an Explicit Part of Real-Time Systems Models, ERTS 2016. [5] Fu. A Framework for Managing Unspecified Assumptions in Safety-Critical Cyber-Physical Systems, PhD thesis, UChicago, 2020. [6] Cimatti, Tian, Tonetta. Assumption-Based Runtime Verification with Partial Observability and Resets, RV 2019.
  • 15. 15 Response to “ticking bombs” ● Document, model, and manage [1, 4, 5] Validate at design time [2] Monitor [6] and adapt [3] at run time [1] Marincic, Mader, Wieringa. Classifying Assumptions Made During Requirements Verification of Embedded Systems, REFSQ 2008. [2] Bulandran. An Exploration of Assumptions in Requirements Engineering. PhD thesis, University of Western Australia, 2012. [3] Dewar. Assumption-Based Planning: A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises, RAND, Cambridge University Press, 2002. [4] Saqui-Sannes, Ludovic. Making Modeling Assumptions an Explicit Part of Real-Time Systems Models, ERTS 2016. [5] Fu. A Framework for Managing Unspecified Assumptions in Safety-Critical Cyber-Physical Systems, PhD thesis, UChicago, 2020. [6] Cimatti, Tian, Tonetta. Assumption-Based Runtime Verification with Partial Observability and Resets, RV 2019.
  • 16. 16 Response to “ticking bombs” ● Document, model, and manage [1, 4, 5] ● Validate at design time [2] Monitor [6] and adapt [3] at run time [1] Marincic, Mader, Wieringa. Classifying Assumptions Made During Requirements Verification of Embedded Systems, REFSQ 2008. [2] Bulandran. An Exploration of Assumptions in Requirements Engineering. PhD thesis, University of Western Australia, 2012. [3] Dewar. Assumption-Based Planning: A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises, RAND, Cambridge University Press, 2002. [4] Saqui-Sannes, Ludovic. Making Modeling Assumptions an Explicit Part of Real-Time Systems Models, ERTS 2016. [5] Fu. A Framework for Managing Unspecified Assumptions in Safety-Critical Cyber-Physical Systems, PhD thesis, UChicago, 2020. [6] Cimatti, Tian, Tonetta. Assumption-Based Runtime Verification with Partial Observability and Resets, RV 2019.
  • 17. 17 Response to “ticking bombs” ● Document, model, and manage [1, 4, 5] ● Validate at design time [2] ● Monitor [6] and adapt [3] at run time [1] Marincic, Mader, Wieringa. Classifying Assumptions Made During Requirements Verification of Embedded Systems, REFSQ 2008. [2] Bulandran. An Exploration of Assumptions in Requirements Engineering. PhD thesis, University of Western Australia, 2012. [3] Dewar. Assumption-Based Planning: A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises, RAND, Cambridge University Press, 2002. [4] Saqui-Sannes, Ludovic. Making Modeling Assumptions an Explicit Part of Real-Time Systems Models, ERTS 2016. [5] Fu. A Framework for Managing Unspecified Assumptions in Safety-Critical Cyber-Physical Systems, PhD thesis, UChicago, 2020. [6] Cimatti, Tian, Tonetta. Assumption-Based Runtime Verification with Partial Observability and Resets, RV 2019.
  • 21. 21 Another role: “enabler of complexity” Often, assumptions are made for simplification E.g., braking deceleration bounds simplify the analysis by limiting the state space But assumptions can also lead to intelligible complexity I.e., complexity understandable enough to serve as a foundation of complex design As opposed to unintelligible complexity: “anything can happen” Examples: “All samples is i.i.d” → sequential probability ratio test “Preemption is deadline-monotonic” → CPU frequency-scaling analysis “Gaussian error in sensors” → probabilistic analysis of false positives in monitors “Power consumption is a polynomial over the durations of robotic tasks”→ power-based planning
  • 22. 22 Another role: “enabler of complexity” ● Sometimes, assumptions are made for simplification – E.g., bounds on braking deceleration simplify the state space But assumptions can also lead to intelligible complexity I.e., complexity understandable enough to serve as a foundation of complex design As opposed to unintelligible complexity: “anything can happen” Examples: “All samples is i.i.d” → sequential probability ratio test “Preemption is deadline-monotonic” → CPU frequency-scaling analysis “Gaussian error in sensors” → probabilistic analysis of false positives in monitors “Power consumption is a polynomial over the durations of robotic tasks”→ power-based planning
  • 23. 23 Another role: “enabler of complexity” ● Sometimes, assumptions are made for simplification – E.g., bounds on braking deceleration simplify the state space ● But assumptions can also lead to intelligible complexity – I.e., complexity understandable enough to serve as a foundation of complex design – As opposed to unintelligible complexity: “anything can happen” Examples: “All samples is i.i.d” → sequential probability ratio test “Preemption is deadline-monotonic” → CPU frequency-scaling analysis “Gaussian error in sensors” → probabilistic analysis of false positives in monitors “Power consumption is a polynomial over the durations of robotic tasks”→ power-based planning
  • 24. 24 Another role: “enabler of complexity” ● Sometimes, assumptions are made for simplification – E.g., bounds on braking deceleration simplify the state space ● But assumptions can also lead to intelligible complexity – I.e., complexity understandable enough to serve as a foundation of complex design – As opposed to unintelligible complexity: “anything can happen” – Examples: ● “All samples are i.i.d” → sequential probability ratio test ● “Preemption is deadline-monotonic” → CPU frequency-scaling analysis ● “Gaussian error in sensors” → analysis of false positives in perception ● “Power consumption is a polynomial over the durations of robotic tasks”→ power-based planning
  • 26. 26 Complexities enabled by assumptions ● Usage of multiple models – A formalism may require certain assumptions A variety of analyses Fault-related and model-based Certain system behaviors Responses to violations of assumptions
  • 27. 27 Complexities enabled by assumptions ● Usage of multiple models – A formalism may require certain assumptions ● A variety of analyses – Fault-related and model-based Certain system behaviors Responses to violations of assumptions
  • 28. 28 Complexities enabled by assumptions ● Usage of multiple models – A formalism may require certain assumptions ● A variety of analyses – Fault-related and model-based ● Certain system behaviors – Responses to violations of assumptions
  • 32. 32 Smartness enabled by complexity ● Smart: “capable of making adjustments that resemble those resulting from human decisions” (The Free Dictionary) – Smartness arises when intelligence meets context Complexity allows for adjustment Smart systems can adjust their assumptions Smart design can adjust its assumptions E.g., the same robot used for delivery tasks and disaster relief Different response to human behavior, mechanical/software breakdowns, ...
  • 33. 33 Smartness enabled by complexity ● Smart: “capable of making adjustments that resemble those resulting from human decisions” (The Free Dictionary) – Smartness arises when intelligence meets context ● Complexity allows for smart adjustment – Smart systems can adjust their assumptions – Smart design can adjust its assumptions ● E.g., the same robot used for delivery tasks and disaster relief – Different response to human behavior, mechanical/software breakdowns, ...
  • 34. 34 Smart design via assumptions ● Not only document/model/validate, but also automatically evaluate and choose assumptions Example: a design environment that helps find an appropriate assumption for sensor errors “All independent” → safe system but mismatch w/ data “Sequentially dependent” → better data fit but lower safety “All dependent” → best fit but intractable analysis
  • 35. 35 Smart design via assumptions ● Not only document/model/validate, but also automatically evaluate and choose assumptions ● Example: a design environment that helps find an appropriate assumption for sensor errors “All independent” → safe system but mismatch w/ data “Sequentially dependent” → better data fit but lower safety “All dependent” → best fit but intractable analysis
  • 36. 36 Smart design via assumptions ● Not only document/model/validate, but also automatically evaluate and choose assumptions ● Example: a design environment that helps find an appropriate assumption for sensor errors – “All independent” → safe system but mismatch w/ data – “Sequentially dependent” → better data fit but lower safety – “All dependent” → best fit but intractable analysis
  • 37. 37 Smart behavior via assumptions ● Not only monitor/plan for violations, but also dynamically adapt assumptions E.g., an autonomous car notices that pedestrians in this area are not consistent with the usual model A database of plausible assumptions: “a sports game ended” Quantification of assumption fit to perceived situation Effect analysis for changing assumptions: “new assumption increases commute time; old assumption increases crash chance”
  • 38. 38 Smart behavior via assumptions ● Not only monitor/plan for violations, but also dynamically adapt assumptions ● E.g., an autonomous car notices that pedestrians in some area act inconsistently with the usual model A database of plausible assumptions: “a sports game ended” Quantification of assumption fit to perceived situation Effect analysis for changing assumptions: “new assumption increases commute time; old assumption increases crash chance”
  • 39. 39 Smart behavior via assumptions ● Not only monitor/plan for violations, but also dynamically adapt assumptions ● E.g., an autonomous car notices that pedestrians in some area act inconsistently with the usual model – A database of plausible assumptions: “a sports game ended” – Quantification of assumption fit to the perceived situation – Effect analysis for changing assumptions: “new assumption increases commute time; old assumption increases crash chance”
  • 40. 40 Remaining challenges ● Difficult-to-specify/validate/monitor assumptions ● Vast pools of potential assumptions ● Limited data and computing capacity at run time
  • 41. 41 Summary ● Assumptions are usually interpreted as potential causes of system failure – Need to be managed, validated, and monitored ● A complementary viewpoint: Engineering assumptions enable Intelligible complexity enables Smart behavior Smart design
  • 42. 42 References [1] Marincic, Mader, Wieringa. Classifying Assumptions Made During Requirements Verification of Embedded Systems, REFSQ 2008. [2] Bulandran. An Exploration of Assumptions in Requirements Engineering. PhD thesis, University of Western Australia, 2012. [3] Dewar. Assumption-Based Planning: A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises, RAND, Cambridge University Press, 2002. [4] Saqui-Sannes, Ludovic. Making Modeling Assumptions an Explicit Part of Real-Time Systems Models, ERTS 2016. [5] Fu. A Framework for Managing Unspecified Assumptions in Safety-Critical Cyber-Physical Systems, PhD thesis, University of Chicago, 2020. [6] Cimatti, Tian, Tonetta. Assumption-Based Runtime Verification with Partial Observability and Resets, RV 2019.