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Novetta Cyber Analytics 
Scott Van Valkenburgh 
Manager, Product Marketing 
svanvalkenburgh@novetta.com 512.284.4091 11.24.2014
NETWORK 
BREACHES 
novetta.com 2 
Everyone is Being Breached 
NETWORK 
BREACHES 
66% 
Undiscovered for 
months 
70% 
Discovered by people 
outside your network
IPSs, IDSs, Firewalls Network Capture Tools 
novetta.com 3 
Why? 
Too rigid and have 
serious blind spots 
Too slow and/or doesn’t 
make the right data 
available to analysts 
SIEMs 
LOG 
BOOK 
Captures and analyzes 
inherently untrustworthy 
data
A Complete Picture of the Ground Truth 
Cyber Analytics Hub 
Batch Ingest Module 
Pre-Processing Module 
Metadata 
Analysts Web Interface API Interface 
SIEM 
novetta.com 4 
Internet 
Router 
Firewall 
SIEM 
IDS/IPS 
DLP 
ATP 
Network 
Ingestion and 
Analytics Engine 
Meta 
Data 
Custom Workflows 
PCAP 
Archive 
Packet Capture 
Legacy 
Sensor 
PCAP* 
Sensor 
Sensor 
Sensor 
PCAP* 
PCAP* 
PCAP* 
* PCAP is stored at sensors and is instantly retrievable when needed for deeper inspection
 See threats as they occur. 
 Choose which ones to go after 
before the damage is done. 
 Developed for agencies within the 
Leading Security 
Analytics Solution 
(Good for Forensics) 
novetta.com 5 
Why We’re Different 
A Complete Picture in Near Real-time 
Novetta Cyber Analytics 
Common Netflow 
Based Solutions 
Sampled Net Flow Intelligent & Selective 
Metadata Extraction 
US government. 
Content Unraveling 
NOT ENOUGH OPTIMAL FOR ANALYSIS TOO MUCH 
Team & Infrastructure 
Effectiveness
4 
Analytics Engine 
novetta.com 6 
How it Works – System Summary 
1 
Sensors 
70+ pre-built analytical 
searches that look for 
suspicious behaviors or 
build your own queries. 
3 
Security-specific 
MetaData 
For a clean and consolidated 
view of the network 
Internet 
Router 
Firewall 
SIEM 
IDS/IPS 
DLP 
ATP 
Network 
2 
PCAP Data 
For preprocessing
novetta.com 7 
How it Works – At the Core 
1 
Sensors 
4 
Analytics Engine 
Security-specific MetaData 
For a clean and consolidated view 
of the network 
Internet 
Router 
Firewall 
SIEM 
IDS/IPS 
DLP 
ATP 
Networ 
k 
2 
PCAP Data 
For preprocessing 
1% 
of total 
PCAP 
data
Role 
novetta.com 8 
How it Works – Contextualization 
Third Party 
Forensics 
Session Details 
Port 
Protocol 
1.2.3.4 5.6.7.8 
Export Selected PCAP 
Searchable 
Content 
Related Sessions and IPs 
Port 
Duration 
Extract Content 
Role 
ftp-prod2.largeco.com 
Role 
Client 
4754 
RuVPS123.com 
Private.RuVPS.com 
21 
Role 
Server 
Overlapping sessions 
Common IPs 
Associated IPs (hopfinder) 
Bytes to/from server, 
TCP flags, Packet counts 
Service 
FTP 
Traffic Analysis 
Taps network traffic 
TCP 
47 sec 
Geo 
DC, USA 
Geo 
Moscow, RU
novetta.com 9 
How it Works – Top 10 Analytics 
Of 70+ and always growing 
Beacon Distant Admin HTTP(s) 
Exfiltration 
Protocol Abuse RDP Keyboard 
Layout 
Relay Finder 
Suspicious 
Admin 
Toolkits 
2 Degrees of 
Separation 
Unknown Service 
Analysts get the whole picture 
Port Scanners
See threats as they occur 
Developed for agencies 
within the US government. 
Leading Security 
Analytics Solution 
(Good for Forensics) 
novetta.com 10 
Results 
Choose which ones to go after 
before the damage is done 
NOVETTA Cyber Analytics 
Common Netflow 
Based Solutions 
Sampled Net Flow Intelligent & Selective 
Metadata Extraction 
Content Unraveling 
NOT ENOUGH OPTIMAL FOR ANALYSIS TOO MUCH 
Team & Infrastructure 
Effectiveness
novetta.com 11 
Results 
Estimated 30x gain 
for incident response 
Near real-time ability 
to respond to attacks 
Drastically improved 
security team effectiveness
novetta.com 12 
Demonstration 
A Real World Scenario
novetta.com 13 
Proven Effectiveness 
DEVELOPED TO SECURE 
the largest and most attacked networks on earth
SIEM Analytics 
novetta.com 14 
Case Study – US DOD Agency 1 
Problem: Constant Ongoing Breaches 
• Wanted to stop attacks. 
• Leading security tools could not provide the visibility, 
speed, and flexibility they needed to respond quickly to 
incidents or discover malicious behavior. 
Solution: Novetta Cyber Analytics 
• Uncovered known malicious activity 
• Discovered unknown attacks 
• Queries that had taken hours were now taking seconds 
• Estimated 30x the number of incidents-responded-to 
IPS 
Overview: 
 Sensors: 4 
 Analytics Hub: 32 nodes 
 Users: 200+ 
 PCAP Analyzed: 13 TB 
 Metadata Stored: 1.5 TB 
Now the cornerstone tool for their threat response team
novetta.com 15 
Case Study, US DOD Agency 2 
Problem: Known Breaches 
• Wanted to know WHO was attacking their network, WHY, 
and WHAT methods used. 
• Leading security tools could not provide the visibility, 
speed, and flexibility they needed to respond quickly to 
incidents or discover malicious behavior. 
Solution: Novetta Cyber Analytics 
• Uncovered known malicious activity 
• Discovered unknown attacks 
• Queries that had taken hours were now taking seconds 
Now the cornerstone tool for their threat response team 
Overview: 
 Sensors: 4 
 Analytics Hub: 32 nodes 
 Users: 200+ 
 PCAP Analyzed: 13 TB 
 Metadata Stored: 1.5 TB
novetta.com 16 
Summary 
Novetta Cyber Analytics 
The cornerstone tool for the largest and most attacked 
networks on earth 
 
Near real-time analysis: 30x incident response 
 
Respond to attacks as they occur 
 
Figure out what and why 
 
Dramatically improve overall security team effectiveness
novetta.com 
Novetta Cyber Analytics 
The Truth is in Your Network 
Thank you!!
novetta.com 
Backup 
Novetta Cyber Analytics
Attacker Infrastructure Contractor Infrastructure Enterprise Infrastructure 
Internal 
Server 
novetta.com 19 
A Real World Breach Story 
With enough time, an attacker will find a way in—and out 
Attacker 
Local 
Machine 
Email 
Server 
Contractor 
Laptop 
Compromised 
Internet Hosts 
Attacker Drop Sites 
Anonymous 
Internet 
Sharing Sites 
Logs changed to 
bypass high priority 
SIEM alerts 
Windows 
File Server 
Contractor 
Maintenance 
Web Server 
Database 
Server 
Internal 
FTP Server 
Performs active 
and passive 
reconnaissance 
Slow randomized 1 
port scanning 
avoids real-time 
IDS port scanning 
Spear phishes third 
party contractor to 
steal login credentials Finds database 
server and dumps 
sensitive records 
Sends stolen data to 
external drop sites 
7 
Moves laterally to 
increase privileges 
and search for 
valuable data 
Uses cracked 6 
passwords from 
Maintenance Server 
to gain access 
5 
Executes SQL 
injection attack to 
gain admin-level 
access 
4 
9 
Sends stolen data 
here for staging 
8 
Uses stolen login 
credentials to 
access Maintenance 
Web Server 
3 
Anonymously 
retrieves data from 
drop sites 
10 
2 
alarms 
Not covered by 
Contractor’s employee 
training or security 
technologies 
Perimeter defenses 
bypassed with 
Username and 
Password 
SIEM alerts 
dismissed by 
overwhelmed 
security team 
Low priority SIEM 
alerts again ignored 
Further increase in 
privileges enabled 
bypass of DB 
perimeter 
NetFlow-focused 
tool triggers alerts, 
but analyst doesn’t 
have enough detail 
Contents encrypted 
by attacker and 
external sites not 
blacklisted 
Customer informs 
company about 
breach, and 
becomes viral news 
story
Same Story with Novetta Cyber Analytics 
Anomalous behavior detected at almost every step 
Attacker Infrastructure Contractor Infrastructure Enterprise Infrastructure 
Internal 
Server 
novetta.com 20 
Attacker 
Local 
Machine 
Email 
Server 
Compromised 
Internet Hosts 
Spear phishes third 
party contractor to 
steal login credentials 
Attacker Drop Sites 
Anonymous 
Internet 
Sharing Sites 
Protocol Abuse 
analytic detects 
anomalous lateral 
movement and tags 
Windows 
File Server 
Contractor 
Maintenance 
Web Server 
Database 
Server 
Internal 
FTP Server 
Contractor 
Laptop 
Finds database 
server and dumps 
sensitive records 
7 
Moves laterally to 
increase privileges 
and search for 
valuable data 
Uses cracked 6 
passwords from 
Maintenance Server 
to gain access 
5 
Executes SQL 
injection attack to 
gain admin-level 
access 
4 
Sends stolen data to 
external drop sites 
9 
Sends stolen data 
here for staging 
8 
Uses stolen login 
credentials to 
Maintenance 
Server 
3 
Anonymously 
retrieves 
data from drop sites 
10 
2 
Performs active 
and passive 
reconnaissance 
1 
Port Scanner 
analytic identifies & 
tags suspicious IP 
addresses 
Occurs on the 
Contractor’s network 
outside the end-target 
enterprise 
Geolocation analytic 
detects foreign server 
access or interactions 
out of subnet 
HTTP analysis can 
reveal attack 
attempts by volume 
Unknown Service 
analytic detects 
anomalous lateral 
movement 
Traffic Summary 
analytic reveals 
connections between 
unrelated internal 
hosts 
Traffic Summary 
analytic again 
reveals uncommon 
connections 
HTTP Exfil analytic 
detects data moving 
to known anonymous 
drop sites 
Attack would never 
get this far
novetta.com 21 
Network Security Landscape 
Post-Compromise Forensics 
Real Time and Near Real Time 
Analysis 
Network Traffic (e.g. websites and 
email) 
What: Forensics, DPI 
Who: RSA, Blue Coat 
What: Netflow analysis 
Who: Lancope, Arbor 
What: Security-specific 
metadata analysis 
Who: Novetta 
Traffic Payloads (e.g. attached files) 
What: Sandboxing 
Who: FireEye, McAfee, Check 
Point 
Endpoints (e.g. user machines and 
servers) 
What: Forensics, Host-level 
change monitoring 
Who: Bit9, Carbon Black 
What: Application whitelisting, 
monitoring 
Who: Bromium, Sandboxie 
WHERE 
WHEN
Current Solutions | Incident Response 
novetta.com 22 
Reaction  Investigation  Analysis  Conclusion 
Tedious labor-intensive investigation 
• Days of wrangling data for multiple people 
Has enough been done? 
Attackers may have covered their tracks 
• We don’t know because of the manual tools used for 
analysis and the incomplete data 
Output 
• Best-effort timeline of events 
• Incomplete findings report with recommendations 
• Partial list of external actors and impacted machines 
CISO Confidence: Low 
Analyst Job Satisfaction: Low
Novetta Cyber Analytics | Incident Response 
novetta.com 23 
Reaction  Investigation  Analysis  Conclusion 
Thoughtful, interesting investigation 
• Handful of hours for single Tier 1 analyst 
Complete high-level visibility 
Detailed low-level information on activities 
High confidence in analysis 
Output 
• Complete timeline and Full report 
• Lists of all external actors 
• Complete, exhaustive list of impacted machines 
• Full packet capture 
• New custom analytics, enhanced tribal knowledge 
CISO Confidence: High 
Analyst Job Satisfaction: High

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Novetta Cyber Analytics

  • 1. Novetta Cyber Analytics Scott Van Valkenburgh Manager, Product Marketing svanvalkenburgh@novetta.com 512.284.4091 11.24.2014
  • 2. NETWORK BREACHES novetta.com 2 Everyone is Being Breached NETWORK BREACHES 66% Undiscovered for months 70% Discovered by people outside your network
  • 3. IPSs, IDSs, Firewalls Network Capture Tools novetta.com 3 Why? Too rigid and have serious blind spots Too slow and/or doesn’t make the right data available to analysts SIEMs LOG BOOK Captures and analyzes inherently untrustworthy data
  • 4. A Complete Picture of the Ground Truth Cyber Analytics Hub Batch Ingest Module Pre-Processing Module Metadata Analysts Web Interface API Interface SIEM novetta.com 4 Internet Router Firewall SIEM IDS/IPS DLP ATP Network Ingestion and Analytics Engine Meta Data Custom Workflows PCAP Archive Packet Capture Legacy Sensor PCAP* Sensor Sensor Sensor PCAP* PCAP* PCAP* * PCAP is stored at sensors and is instantly retrievable when needed for deeper inspection
  • 5.  See threats as they occur.  Choose which ones to go after before the damage is done.  Developed for agencies within the Leading Security Analytics Solution (Good for Forensics) novetta.com 5 Why We’re Different A Complete Picture in Near Real-time Novetta Cyber Analytics Common Netflow Based Solutions Sampled Net Flow Intelligent & Selective Metadata Extraction US government. Content Unraveling NOT ENOUGH OPTIMAL FOR ANALYSIS TOO MUCH Team & Infrastructure Effectiveness
  • 6. 4 Analytics Engine novetta.com 6 How it Works – System Summary 1 Sensors 70+ pre-built analytical searches that look for suspicious behaviors or build your own queries. 3 Security-specific MetaData For a clean and consolidated view of the network Internet Router Firewall SIEM IDS/IPS DLP ATP Network 2 PCAP Data For preprocessing
  • 7. novetta.com 7 How it Works – At the Core 1 Sensors 4 Analytics Engine Security-specific MetaData For a clean and consolidated view of the network Internet Router Firewall SIEM IDS/IPS DLP ATP Networ k 2 PCAP Data For preprocessing 1% of total PCAP data
  • 8. Role novetta.com 8 How it Works – Contextualization Third Party Forensics Session Details Port Protocol 1.2.3.4 5.6.7.8 Export Selected PCAP Searchable Content Related Sessions and IPs Port Duration Extract Content Role ftp-prod2.largeco.com Role Client 4754 RuVPS123.com Private.RuVPS.com 21 Role Server Overlapping sessions Common IPs Associated IPs (hopfinder) Bytes to/from server, TCP flags, Packet counts Service FTP Traffic Analysis Taps network traffic TCP 47 sec Geo DC, USA Geo Moscow, RU
  • 9. novetta.com 9 How it Works – Top 10 Analytics Of 70+ and always growing Beacon Distant Admin HTTP(s) Exfiltration Protocol Abuse RDP Keyboard Layout Relay Finder Suspicious Admin Toolkits 2 Degrees of Separation Unknown Service Analysts get the whole picture Port Scanners
  • 10. See threats as they occur Developed for agencies within the US government. Leading Security Analytics Solution (Good for Forensics) novetta.com 10 Results Choose which ones to go after before the damage is done NOVETTA Cyber Analytics Common Netflow Based Solutions Sampled Net Flow Intelligent & Selective Metadata Extraction Content Unraveling NOT ENOUGH OPTIMAL FOR ANALYSIS TOO MUCH Team & Infrastructure Effectiveness
  • 11. novetta.com 11 Results Estimated 30x gain for incident response Near real-time ability to respond to attacks Drastically improved security team effectiveness
  • 12. novetta.com 12 Demonstration A Real World Scenario
  • 13. novetta.com 13 Proven Effectiveness DEVELOPED TO SECURE the largest and most attacked networks on earth
  • 14. SIEM Analytics novetta.com 14 Case Study – US DOD Agency 1 Problem: Constant Ongoing Breaches • Wanted to stop attacks. • Leading security tools could not provide the visibility, speed, and flexibility they needed to respond quickly to incidents or discover malicious behavior. Solution: Novetta Cyber Analytics • Uncovered known malicious activity • Discovered unknown attacks • Queries that had taken hours were now taking seconds • Estimated 30x the number of incidents-responded-to IPS Overview:  Sensors: 4  Analytics Hub: 32 nodes  Users: 200+  PCAP Analyzed: 13 TB  Metadata Stored: 1.5 TB Now the cornerstone tool for their threat response team
  • 15. novetta.com 15 Case Study, US DOD Agency 2 Problem: Known Breaches • Wanted to know WHO was attacking their network, WHY, and WHAT methods used. • Leading security tools could not provide the visibility, speed, and flexibility they needed to respond quickly to incidents or discover malicious behavior. Solution: Novetta Cyber Analytics • Uncovered known malicious activity • Discovered unknown attacks • Queries that had taken hours were now taking seconds Now the cornerstone tool for their threat response team Overview:  Sensors: 4  Analytics Hub: 32 nodes  Users: 200+  PCAP Analyzed: 13 TB  Metadata Stored: 1.5 TB
  • 16. novetta.com 16 Summary Novetta Cyber Analytics The cornerstone tool for the largest and most attacked networks on earth  Near real-time analysis: 30x incident response  Respond to attacks as they occur  Figure out what and why  Dramatically improve overall security team effectiveness
  • 17. novetta.com Novetta Cyber Analytics The Truth is in Your Network Thank you!!
  • 18. novetta.com Backup Novetta Cyber Analytics
  • 19. Attacker Infrastructure Contractor Infrastructure Enterprise Infrastructure Internal Server novetta.com 19 A Real World Breach Story With enough time, an attacker will find a way in—and out Attacker Local Machine Email Server Contractor Laptop Compromised Internet Hosts Attacker Drop Sites Anonymous Internet Sharing Sites Logs changed to bypass high priority SIEM alerts Windows File Server Contractor Maintenance Web Server Database Server Internal FTP Server Performs active and passive reconnaissance Slow randomized 1 port scanning avoids real-time IDS port scanning Spear phishes third party contractor to steal login credentials Finds database server and dumps sensitive records Sends stolen data to external drop sites 7 Moves laterally to increase privileges and search for valuable data Uses cracked 6 passwords from Maintenance Server to gain access 5 Executes SQL injection attack to gain admin-level access 4 9 Sends stolen data here for staging 8 Uses stolen login credentials to access Maintenance Web Server 3 Anonymously retrieves data from drop sites 10 2 alarms Not covered by Contractor’s employee training or security technologies Perimeter defenses bypassed with Username and Password SIEM alerts dismissed by overwhelmed security team Low priority SIEM alerts again ignored Further increase in privileges enabled bypass of DB perimeter NetFlow-focused tool triggers alerts, but analyst doesn’t have enough detail Contents encrypted by attacker and external sites not blacklisted Customer informs company about breach, and becomes viral news story
  • 20. Same Story with Novetta Cyber Analytics Anomalous behavior detected at almost every step Attacker Infrastructure Contractor Infrastructure Enterprise Infrastructure Internal Server novetta.com 20 Attacker Local Machine Email Server Compromised Internet Hosts Spear phishes third party contractor to steal login credentials Attacker Drop Sites Anonymous Internet Sharing Sites Protocol Abuse analytic detects anomalous lateral movement and tags Windows File Server Contractor Maintenance Web Server Database Server Internal FTP Server Contractor Laptop Finds database server and dumps sensitive records 7 Moves laterally to increase privileges and search for valuable data Uses cracked 6 passwords from Maintenance Server to gain access 5 Executes SQL injection attack to gain admin-level access 4 Sends stolen data to external drop sites 9 Sends stolen data here for staging 8 Uses stolen login credentials to Maintenance Server 3 Anonymously retrieves data from drop sites 10 2 Performs active and passive reconnaissance 1 Port Scanner analytic identifies & tags suspicious IP addresses Occurs on the Contractor’s network outside the end-target enterprise Geolocation analytic detects foreign server access or interactions out of subnet HTTP analysis can reveal attack attempts by volume Unknown Service analytic detects anomalous lateral movement Traffic Summary analytic reveals connections between unrelated internal hosts Traffic Summary analytic again reveals uncommon connections HTTP Exfil analytic detects data moving to known anonymous drop sites Attack would never get this far
  • 21. novetta.com 21 Network Security Landscape Post-Compromise Forensics Real Time and Near Real Time Analysis Network Traffic (e.g. websites and email) What: Forensics, DPI Who: RSA, Blue Coat What: Netflow analysis Who: Lancope, Arbor What: Security-specific metadata analysis Who: Novetta Traffic Payloads (e.g. attached files) What: Sandboxing Who: FireEye, McAfee, Check Point Endpoints (e.g. user machines and servers) What: Forensics, Host-level change monitoring Who: Bit9, Carbon Black What: Application whitelisting, monitoring Who: Bromium, Sandboxie WHERE WHEN
  • 22. Current Solutions | Incident Response novetta.com 22 Reaction  Investigation  Analysis  Conclusion Tedious labor-intensive investigation • Days of wrangling data for multiple people Has enough been done? Attackers may have covered their tracks • We don’t know because of the manual tools used for analysis and the incomplete data Output • Best-effort timeline of events • Incomplete findings report with recommendations • Partial list of external actors and impacted machines CISO Confidence: Low Analyst Job Satisfaction: Low
  • 23. Novetta Cyber Analytics | Incident Response novetta.com 23 Reaction  Investigation  Analysis  Conclusion Thoughtful, interesting investigation • Handful of hours for single Tier 1 analyst Complete high-level visibility Detailed low-level information on activities High confidence in analysis Output • Complete timeline and Full report • Lists of all external actors • Complete, exhaustive list of impacted machines • Full packet capture • New custom analytics, enhanced tribal knowledge CISO Confidence: High Analyst Job Satisfaction: High

Editor's Notes

  1. [Hi, I’m ________, <enter job title>, from Novetta Solutions. Thanks for attending. For over 10 years, Novetta has specialized in applying advanced analytics to solve organizations’ most complex problems. Our customers benefit every day from making better data driven decisions.   In the next few minutes, you’re NOT going to see just another of the latest and greatest cyber security tools. What you will see is a completely unique approach to pro-actively responding to suspicious traffic on your network…a solution that’s already being used on the front lines by many government agencies today.   If you have any questions during the presentation, I’ll be happy to answer them as they arise. But first, let’s get to real reason we’re all here.]
  2. [Let’s be honest, while the current generation of network security tools have been effective stopping known threats that are signature based, they have NOT been effective at stopping advanced persistent threats. We see evidence of this in newspaper headlines nearly any given day at this point. And it’s why I am here today. So why is that? [NEXT SECTION] To begin, 2/3rds of network breaches still go undiscovered for months! [NEXT SECTION] And when they are finally discovered, fully 70% are reported by people outside the network. (Optional) No one wants to find out about a breach from someone else…especially not a customer?   Yet the industry’s response thus far has been to improve on the tools you already have. Has there been success here? Yes. Is there still room for improvement?   “Absolutely”. Current tool sets haven’t worked against the kind of advanced persistent threats commonplace today. Our goal here today is for you to leave with an understanding of why this is the case, and how we’re different.
  3. [Your perimeter defenses, IPSs IDSs, Firewalls…have a job to do. And they do that job well. Identify and protect against known threats. But when it comes to the scale and complexity of identification and protection against unknown, non-signature-based, advanced persistent threats – there solutions fall short. They are too rigid and have blind spots. Hackers have access to these solutions and simply design ways to get around them. [NEXT SECTION]   SIEMs can fill some of the gap. Problem is, they capture and analyze only inherently corruptible event and log data. Bad actors simply edit the events and logs to make it look like they were never there. Like a burglar wiping his fingerprints from the door knob.   [NEXT SECTION] Then there’s network based tools – the ones that capture the ground truth. Basically, the big problem here is twofold. First, most of these tools are really forensics tools. So the data – while extremely useful – takes too long to become available to respond to while an incident is underway. They’re too slow to be useful outside of targeted investigation scenarios.   The second class while fast enough, are too high level to be of significant value to analysts. To fully understand this particular problem, we need to take a closer look at sensor placement: (Intro New Slide)]
  4. [Strategic Sensor Placement is the name of the game. Like I said, to fully understand the problem, we need to jump ahead a minute to show you how we’re doing it.   Novetta Cyber Analytics can be deployed in three different configurations.   The first and most common configuration is for us to deploy Novetta sensors within your organization’s network – these are sensors you see here. They’re made of commodity hardware running Novetta’s packet capture and pre-processing software. They serve to passively collect network traffic, extract metadata from the traffic, and push the metadata to a centralized Analytics Hub. Within the Analytics Hub the system executes analytical searches on the metadata. Analysts interact with the system using our web interface, and external applications such as SIEMs can interact directly with the Analytics Engine via our APIs. When interesting behavior is found within the metadata, the analyst or external application can get immediate and direct access to the original packet capture stored on the sensors. [CLICK]  The second option is to leverage existing “legacy” packet capture devices that are already in place. Some organizations have existing traffic monitoring tools, both in the purchased and do-it-yourself categories, so it makes sense to reuse this capability. Using our Batch Ingest Module, the Cyber Analytics Hub can bring in live streams of packet capture from other devices. We extract metadata from this traffic and merge it with the other data in the Analytics Engine.
  5. [Let me repeat. Today’s tools have some effectiveness:    Mostly Forensics tools on the far side of the curve here. But on the front side of the curve, here, the netflow-based solutions falter. For analyzing network data and network performance issues they’re great. But the biggest problem is that most of these aren’t purpose-built for security. It’s at best a secondary utility.   So, you end up with information that’s inadequate or too high level – they may point in the right direction, but generally just do not provide enough information to actually do complete analysis, forcing an analyst to look to other tools, systems and databases to piece together what is actually happening. So, most analysts and incident responders spend most of their time wrangling data … an extremely time consuming and tedious process.   While the forensics based tools fall here on the other side. Here the issues is the sheer volumes of data that they collect is simply too much to do real-time analysis on to find attacks as they’re in progress. They're doing a great job on the whodunit but a not so great job on who’s-doing-it-now. If an analyst has to wait hours for a result set, they are nowhere near working at the speed of thought and can’t get the information they need.   In fact, most analysts find themselves spending more time gathering data from different sources than analyzing it. They simply can’t do a whole lot to detect attackers when it matters…while it’s happening.   So where’s that leave you? Well, you’ve read the headlines. It’s leaves you cleaning up the mess. With overwhelmed analysts and incident responders. And the damage already done.     What you need is a tool that directly monitors your nearly all network traffic – capturing enough data to give you the intelligence to respond while an attack’s underway…so forensic-like in it its scale and depth but with a netflow-performance tools speed.    That’s where Novetta Cyber Analytics fits in. Novetta captures nearly all the information running across a network, so you can see threats in near real-time, and choose which ones to go after before the damage is done.   How do we provide the scale and speed needed? For now, let me explain that fundamentally, Novetta is not trying to force fit yesterday’s solution to today’s problem. Our solution was purpose built to analyze massive quantities of network data. We sessionize, instrument, and create intelligent meta-data from the raw packet capture, maximizing team infrastructure and effectiveness. (We can review our architecture in detail in a follow-up meeting as needed.)   We like to think of it as getting the ground truth.   And this isn’t more pie in the sky promises: it’s already a proven. It’s a central tool being used by various departments within the US government. We originally developed this FOR these agencies and it’s made them more effective and efficient as a result.   Now, we’re making it available to private enterprise so you can benefit the same.]
  6. [So what are we doing different? In its simplest form, we put in place sensors that will tap the traffic from your different locations on your network. These sensors then capture all the PCAP data for preprocessing.   This captured data becomes the foundation of the Novetta Cyber Analytics hub. The raw data feeds a data model that supports high-end analytics. [CLICK] Basically, we then extract key metadata and attributes from that capture traffic – the data that will be most valuable for large scale analysis. Analysts receive a clean and consolidated view of all network conversations with key fields that will be most useful to them. It’s really an act of translation where we’re making the conversations between hosts understandable to humans. The original PCAP is retained, indexed, and stored for later analysis.   [CLICK] The pre-processed information is then made available to analysts using our Analytics Engine with more than 70 pre-built analytical automatic and manual searches that can be executed to look for suspicious behaviors. It’s worth nothing, these searches have been created by some of the top minds in the field today – the people on the frontlines of the industry. ]
  7. So, at the very core of what we do, we are simply taking raw PCAP data and enabling humans to understand it and run queries against in near real-time. Put more simply, we enable analysts to ask and receive answers to subtle questions at the speed of thought.
  8. [So you can see the important role Novetta Cyber Analytics near real-time analysis plays for analysts and incident responders. Your current infrastructure still provides value. But we provide an added layer of security.] Need to unhide. Adapt text from the old deck for this slide. Here’s the text: The following is an example of how traffic analysis is performed within Novetta Cyber Analytics. We’ll see how Cyber Analytics anticipates the needs of an Incident Responder and provides them the contextual information they need to perform network traffic analysis.   [Step in – show IP addresses]   Traffic analysis starts as a conversation between two IP addresses. In this example we have two example IP addresses 1.2.3.4 and 4.5.6.7.   [Step in – show ports]   First we show port information. We see here that the host on the right is using the standard File Transfer Protocol (FTP) command port 21 and the host on the left is using a non-standard port 4754.   [Step in – show service]   Next we show the service being used for the session. In this case it is indeed FTP. Cyber Analytics uses proprietary service decoders and parsers, built starting from RFCs, then customized based on real-world observation and adversary-specific traffic patterns.   [Step in – show protocol]   We show the protocol being used (TCP, UDP, etc.). The FTP service would always occur over TCP, but for other services (e.g. DNS) the protocol is more relevant.   [Step in – show session duration]   Next we show the duration of the session in seconds to tell the analyst how long the session between these hosts remained active.   At this point we’ve shown the analyst generally to what NetFlow provides – high level information about the bi-directional conversation. Unfortunately NetFlow typically only gets an analyst to the point of frustration when they need more information or even the raw packet capture to understand the context of the exchange.   [Step in – show client/server designations]   Next we show client/server designations for the hosts. We determine these roles by performing proprietary statistical analysis to decide, based on the communication and behavior, which host is acting more like the client and which is acting more like the server. This distinction helps to immediately orient the analyst to show which host is making requests and which is responding.   How does this simulate what the Incident Responder has to do already? The analyst normally has to review the traffic and make their own determination about client and server based on source and destination information, traffic pattern, the volume of data being exchanged, and the service.   [Step in – show domain names]   Next we show the domains that have been linked to these IP addresses. Cyber Analytics links IPs to both passively collected DNS and subscription domain information to make the picture as complete as possible for the analyst. This passive DNS capability is very powerful and not commonly found in network security solutions.   How does this simulate what the Incident Responder has to do already? The analyst would normally have to manually map IP addresses to domain names, either via ‘nslookup’ or by using a DNS look-up utility. They would miss the 1-to-N DNS mappings that we provide by passively collecting DNS. So for example, if the external host IP address changes domains frequently, we would show the analyst that the IP address is associated with multiple domains, which would provide additional context for their investigation.   [Step in – show Geolocation]   Another augmentation source we add is Geolocation data, which enables the system to add city, state, and country location data to domains and IP addresses. So we learn that our server is in Minnesota and our client is in the Moscow district of Russia.   How does this simulate what the Incident Responder has to do already? Incident Responders don’t normally do this, but if they do they are likely using a free online utility for performing IP geolocation. By automatically adding this to the interface we reduce that manual look-up that they would have to perform.   [Step in – show distance in nautical miles]   Geolocation data in the form of latitude and longitude also enables the calculation of distance between the client and server. This is very useful for analytical queries, such as finding all high privileged or administrative traffic where the client and server are further apart geographically than one would expect.   Why nautical miles? In order to provide a universal distance measure between two points on the globe, we chose to measure in nautical miles as the crow files.   How does this simulate what the Incident Responder has to do already? Incident Responders don’t normally have this capability. If they wanted to calculate distance between two geographic points they would likely have to use Wolfram Alpha or a similar online tool. By automatically adding this to the interface we reduce that manual look-up that they would have to perform.   [Step in – show IP block owners]   Another source of augmentation data is IP block owners, which in addition to domain names helps nail down the owner of IP addresses.   How does this simulate what the Incident Responder has to do already? An Incident Responder would have to run a manual command line ‘whois’ query to get this information. They would likely then copy and paste the information they find into their scratchpad for the investigation.   [Step in – show Threat Lists]   If an IP address or domain is identified as a known threat or is on one of our threat lists, the interface will reveal this to the analyst. This would be an immediate indication that this traffic merits investigation.   How does this simulate what the Incident Responder has to do already? An Incident Responder might search their internal spreadsheets of known threats or might search through free online open source databases. Since neither of these are complete sources of threat information (versus a paid subscription to a threat list) that manual look-up will only yield partial information at best.   [Step in – show custom tags]   Through the use of custom data tags, sessions and IP addresses (and more data elements later) can be tagged with custom tags or labels that persist in the Analytics Hub. The web interface shows these tags, which in this example would reveal that the server is a website FTP that is part of the IT department.   How does this simulate what the Incident Responder has to do already? For enterprise assets, the Incident Responder likely has a separate asset inventory list or a spreadsheet of information that they reference during the day. By tagging IP addresses with labels the system brings that asset inventory into the analytical system so they don’t need to manually look up the subnet or department for a particular host.   For threats, the Incident Responder likely has a spreadsheet or shared wiki page where known threats are tracked. By tagging known bad IP addresses the system fuses that intelligence into the network traffic, both enabling greater sharing of that information and empowering analysts to easily execute searches on categories of known bad actors. [Pause and summarize]   So pausing here for a moment, if we zoom out a bit and look at the current session details and augmentation data, we see a corporate FTP server in the US communicating with what appears to be a Russian Virtual Private Server client that is on an Emerging Threat list. This is a turning into an alarming scenario, but we’re not done with our analysis yet.   [Step in – show session details]   We provide session-level details such as bytes transferred, exact TCP flags used, packet counts, and more. This allows for deeper analysis and greater awareness of what occurred during the session.   How does this simulate what the Incident Responder has to do already? The Incident Responder normally doesn’t have access to this level of information. It may be available in a NetFlow collection tool, but is rarely meaningful without any other contextual information.   [Step in – show related sessions and IPs]   The analyst is also able to pivot in multiple ways as they investigate. Network traffic analysis often branches in multiple directions as leads are followed, and Cyber Analytics anticipates this need by making it easy to bring up overlapping sessions, common IP addresses between the client and server, and associated IPs that may have been hops from one host to the other.   How does this simulate what the Incident Responder has to do already? The Incident Responder normally doesn’t have access to this level of information.   [Step in – show packet capture]   In addition to all these details, Cyber Analytics retains the original packet capture indexed and compressed on the sensors. So when the analyst finds something of interest they can reach back to the network edge to get the PCAP with a single click on the interface. Then they can review the PCAP in Wireshark or forensic analysis tools.   How does this simulate what the Incident Responder has to do already? The Incident Responder normally doesn’t have access to this level of information. Or if they do, it takes a very long time to find the relevant packet capture because their existing system does not perform well at scale.   [Step in – show traffic analysis]   When there is a large timespan of traffic to analyze the interface provides a visualization for network traffic over time. This means that analysts can quickly identify spikes in traffic, outliers, and suspicious patterns of behavior just by looking at traffic volume.   [Step in – show searchable content]   If the analyst is interested in finding files within the session data, such as executables, documents, or images, they can use tools provided in the web interface to extract this content and search through it. They could then move these files to a sandbox or forensic analysis tool for deeper investigation.   How does this simulate what the Incident Responder has to do already? The Incident Responder normally doesn’t have access to this type of capability. If they did it would likely be on a separate access-restricted machine that they would need to access. Cyber Analytics brings this capability to them.   [Step in – show export selected PCAP]   Finally, when the analyst has found activity that definitely merits further investigation they can export the packet capture and have it sent to third-party forensics tools. Alternatively, third-party tools could integrate with Cyber Analytics using one of our APIs to access information from the Analytics Hub directly.   How does this simulate what the Incident Responder has to do already? The Incident Responder normally doesn’t have access to packet capture.   [Conclusion]   So looking at the scenario as a whole we can see how the analyst is able to move beyond NetFlow-level information and gain insight into network traffic by analyzing session metadata and the related contextual information added by augmentation data sources. An analyst would really struggle to pull together all this information on their own, so Cyber Analytics anticipates this need and brings the contextual information and traffic visibility to the analyst.  
  9. [Through the interface, analysts get the whole picture. Here’s a sample of what these queries can do: 1. Find beacons from infected hosts. Beaconing is the practice of sending short and regular communications to an external host to inform the external host that the client is alive, functioning, and ready for instructions. This analytic is useful because beaconing behavior is one of the first network-related indications of a malware infection. 2. Uncover remote, unauthorized ‘admin like’ or Distant Admin access. This is where network ¬-sessions between two end points where (a) the service/application being used is administrative in nature and (b) the end points are geographically far apart. (optional) The purpose of the analytic is to uncover remote unauthorized access to enterprise servers and workstations. An example of network behavior found by this analytic is Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) traffic between a client in Japan and a server in Canada. If there is no administrator living or traveling in Japan, then there should be no remote access from that location. 3. Retrace an attacker’s path between host and relays. With Hop Finder, you can find internal and external hosts that were used by attackers while attacking a network. (optional) It takes as input a known hop point and finds other hop points based on the assumption that hop points are used concurrently. The purpose of the analytic is to connect retrace the path an attacker took by analyzing relationship between hosts in network traffic. 4. Find large uploads to remote servers, including data exfiltration. See, normal web browsing traffic has more traffic being provided to the client by the server than vice versa – large uploads to servers are uncommon. The HTTP(S) Exfiltration analytic finds unencrypted (HTTP) and encrypted (HTTPS) web traffic where the traffic ratio between the client and the server indicates a data upload to the server. An example of network behavior found by the analytic is stealth data theft using internet file sharing sites as drop points. Attackers commonly use free file sharing or dump sites such as Dropbox to anonymously transfer stolen files out of corporate networks. 5. Find slow, randomized port scans. The purpose of the analytic is to identify network scanning, which is part of an attacker's active reconnaissance activities. (optional) Attackers look for open ports and exposed/vulnerable services that they can exploit. If an analyst is able to identify port scanning early they will benefit by (a) identifying potential attackers as early as possible and (b) seeing what responses are sent back to the scanning attempts as this will help the analyst identify weaknesses. 6. Discover Protocol Abuse from traffic utilizing backdoor access/pathways. The purpose of the analytic is to uncover covert communication channels created by attackers. (optional) After a successful intrusion into a machine, attackers routinely set up backdoors or hidden access paths that give them direct and undetected access. A common technique is to tunnel communication through a common service port, such as port 80 (HTTP), because these ports are allowed by firewalls and other network security devices. An example of network behavior found by the analytic is reverse shell activity. A reverse shell is created when an attacker opens a command line shell connection from the victim machine to the attacking machine. It is called a reverse shell because the normal direction is usually the opposite – the client creates a connection to the server. This is effective because firewalls typically focus on blocking incoming traffic and allow all outbound traffic. If an attacker manages to compromise a machine and starts a reverse shell, especially on a common port (port 80 for web traffic), this activity often goes unnoticed since it is lost within the network noise. 7. Then there’s sessions run by unexpected keyboard types. Administrators of corporate resources typically use keyboard layouts (e.g. US English) that are consistent with the primary locations for the enterprise. If non-standard keyboard layouts are observed, this could indicate unauthorized access to infrastructure by a foreign attacker. The RDP Keyboard Layout analytic summarizes Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) sessions by the layout of the keyboard being used by the client. 8. Find suspicious sessions where the client is using a Remote Administration Toolkit. This is where Remote Administration Toolkit (RAT) to interact with the server. There are many RATs that are often used by attackers to streamline or automate malicious actions. (optional) An example of activity found by the analytic is traffic related to the Poison Ivy RAT. Poison Ivy bypasses normal security mechanisms to secretly control programs, computers, and network connections. It gives an attacker nearly complete control over the infected computer and enables the following functionality: file upload and modifications, Windows registry changes, current process control, service control, remote shell execution, keylogging, screen grabbing, and password dumping. The tool is popular because it makes controlling a compromised machine easy. 9. Or find out more about suspicious behavior, such as using unknown services against servers that are responding with known services. (optional) This type of behavior is suspicious because within a single session clients and servers typically interact using the same service, such as HTTP (web browsing) and FTP (file transfers). If a server uses a known service to respond to a client's unknown service request, this merits investigations. 10. And finally, find unknown services. An unknown service means that an application-specific service is being used or the traffic is abnormal and doesn't match a known application. The purpose of the analytic is to give the analyst visibility of network traffic that is uncommon, suspicious, and potentially malicious. Remember, this is just a small sample of the queries you’ll have access to. Your analysts can even run their own queries using our powerful Query Builder. Analysts can tag sessions, IP addresses, and domains with free text tags and have those persistently stored in the system. This empower analysts to share and augment their teams’ collective tribal knowledge. They’ll finally have a complete near real-time toolset to respond to threats as they occur. That’s what we mean by getting the ground truth.]
  10. [But let’s get back to the big picture for a moment. So what do you get that other security systems on the bell curve can’t offer?]
  11. A 30X gain in efficiency for your analysts. The near real-time ability to respond to attacks. And drastically improved security team effectiveness. So you’re finally at the peak of the efficiency and analysis curve.]
  12. [Now let’s take a direct look via this demonstration…]
  13. [So we mentioned earlier this was developed for the US government. Here’s an example of the types of departments we support. Within each of these, we support various 3-to-4 letter alphabet soup agencies, including some with the most attacked networks on the planet. We can’t tell you which ones, But, our contracts are public record, so if you’re so inclined you could look up all the different agencies we’re doing business with, but it wouldn’t tell you specifically what we’re doing with them. What I can tell you is that beginning with a very core DoD agency, due to its effectiveness our Novetta Cyber Analytics is now being used as the main cyber defense tool in multiple DoD agencies, most if not all of whom you would know if I were to tell you who they are. ]
  14. [So, let’s talk a bit about the experience one agency within the DoD has had with our solution. Basically, in 2007, an agency was getting extremely frustrated with all of their tools after purchasing the leading SIEM, leading IPS, and leading analytics tools. After constant breaches, they knew they needed something new. The major theme? Scale and Speed with raw PCAP data. They presented this problem to Novetta, and we developed and deployed Novetta Cyber Analytics. [CLICK] Within days of implementation, they discovered breaches they didn’t know existed, and within minutes they were able to triage and remediate these breaches. The solution dramatically reduced their team’s time to investigate incidents. Queries that had taken hours (if they completed at all) were now taking seconds. They estimate that their teams are now handling to 30 TIMES the number of incidents per analyst, significantly improving their overall security posture.   Since then multiple other DoD agencies have deployed our solution, it’s worked so well improving the cyber security efforts of the DoD.
  15. [Remember how we mentioned Novetta Cyber Analytics utility as a forensics tool as well? Here’s an example.   Another ABC agency had wanted to know who was attacking them and why. They had years of PCAP data available. But traditional tools left them with more questions than answers.   [CLICK] Within the first week of deploying Novetta Cyber Analytics, they uncovered the known cases of malicious activities…and many previously unknown attacks. [CLICK] The tool is now the cornerstone for their threat response team. (Feels thin on details – can’t share any more details – it’s secret…..)]
  16. [So, as you can see, there’s nothing in the cyber security space like Novetta Cyber Analytics. It’s the best way to dramatically increase events responded to by analysts by as much as 30x. Substantially reduce or eliminate damage from breaches. And create an overall far more effective and efficient security team. Which brings us to our next step. Let us prove how good this works with your own data. Let us demo our solution using our test data or yours – we’ll even be happy to employ a proof of concept system within your network. The choice is yours.
  17. Slow & randomized port scanning and banner grabbing avoids automated IDS port scanning alarms Not covered by employee training or security technologies With a username and password, any / all perimeter defenses bypassed. Low priority SIEM alerts ignored. Changed logs that would have triggered high priority SIEM alerts. Low priority SIEM alerts again ignored. Further increase in privileges enabled bypass of db perimeter Netflow-based and a leading PCAP security analytics query triggers alerts, but analyst can’t complete investigation. Overall defense assumed perimeter solid. Nothing monitoring for exfiltration. A customer tells the company they’ve been breached. Then it hits the press. Which brings us to our next step. Let us prove how good this works with your own data. Let us demo our solution using our test data or yours – we’ll even be happy to employ a proof of concept system within your network. The choice is yours.
  18. Port Scanner query identifies & tags suspicious IP addresses before breach Nothing even we can do about this – it is outside the enterprise. Rely on contractor’s security systems and user training. Geolocation query detects foreign server access OR interactions outside the Contractor’s defined subnets HTTP analysis can reveal attack attempts by volume Protocol Abuse query detects anomalous lateral movement AND tags show uncommon connections between unrelated internal hosts Protocol Abuse query or Unknown Service query detects anomalous lateral movement Traffic Summary query reveals uncommon connections between unrelated internal hosts Traffic Summary query again reveals uncommon connections between unrelated internal hosts HTTP Exfil query detects data moving to known anonymous drop sites They never would have gotten here Which brings us to our next step. Let us prove how good this works with your own data. Let us demo our solution using our test data or yours – we’ll even be happy to employ a proof of concept system within your network. The choice is yours.
  19. [So, as you can see, there’s nothing in the cyber security space like Novetta Cyber Analytics. It’s the best way to dramatically increase events responded to by analysts by as much as 30x. Substantially reduce or eliminate damage from breaches. And create an overall far more effective and efficient security team. Which brings us to our next step. Let us prove how good this works with your own data. Let us demo our solution using our test data or yours – we’ll even be happy to employ a proof of concept system within your network. The choice is yours.
  20. First, let me say that this is a single summary chart taken from a much longer deck on a before Novetta after Novetta analysis. I’ll just briefly summarize here, but if you’re interested in the details, I’d be happy to take you through the other deck another time. Or, you can see a video version of it online at novetta.com/cyber-analytics. This is the typical result for a scenario whereby a CISO has asked if an analyst’s network has been breached by a recently publicized zero day attack. This analysis would generally take both a senior and a junior analyst about 3 days to complete their investigation. Their findings would based on incomplete information because their data sources did not have enough logging to paint a complete picture of what happened on the network. And since this zero-day attack did not trip any monitoring or alerting on their existing tools, they have no intelligence to gather from those tools. If they had been breached, the threat would have gotten by all of their existing defenses.   The output of their efforts was a best-effort timeline of events, a report containing everything they could find, a recommendation for creating a new signature based on the ISAC alert, a list of external actors that connected to their network, and a list of impacted machines that may or may not be exhaustive.
  21. Now with Cyber Analytics, analysts can gain both complete high-level visibility and detailed low-level information about the activities on a network.   Analysts can be much more efficient with incident response activities, running analytic queries, pivoting to other queries, running quick traffic intersections, saving results, and exporting packet capture for later analysis.   Full investigations can take a few hours, not a few days, to investigate, analyze, report, and then move on to containment and recovery.   Output now takes the form of the following:   - An exhaustive and detailed timeline of events - A complete list of external bad actors - A complete list of affected organization machines - Information that can be used to generate new signatures for his signature-based tools - The full packet capture for all network activity related to the attacks - New custom queries that can be used to identify this type of behavior in the future It is now much easier to find all the relevant information because the data is all in one place and all the tools are there to perform analysis. Analysts have much higher confidence because Cyber Analytics operates at the network traffic level, so attackers have nowhere to hide. This new capability increase the satisfaction of analysts and CISOs alike.