Nazi Germany, 1933-45 by John Laver.pdf

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NAZI
GERMANY
1933-1945
John Laver

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NAZI
GERMANY
1933-1945
John Laver
Hodder & Stoughton
LONDON SYDNEY AUCKLAND TORONTO

The cover illustration is a poster designed by Felix Albrecht in 1 932.
The caption reads: 'We farmers are mucking out. We vote List 2
National Socialist'.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Laver, John
Nazi Germany 1933-45. - (History at source).
I. Germany, history, 1933-1945
I. Title II. Series
943.086
ISBN 0--340--54350--7
First published 1991
Second impression 1992
© 1991 John Laver
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher
or under licence from the Copyright Licensing Agency Limited.
Further details of such licences (for reprographic reproduction)
may be obtained from the Copyright Licensing Agency Limited, of
90 Tottenham Court Road, London WIP 9HE.
Typeset by Input Typesetting Ltd, London SWI9 8DR
Printed in Great Britain for the educational publishing
division of Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, Mill Road, Dunton Green,
Sevenoaks, Kent by Page Bros. Ltd, Norwich.

CONTENTS
Preface 1
Approaching Source-based Questions 2
1 The Nazi Rise to Power 5
2 The Consolidation of Power 1 933-4 9
3 The Nazi Party 1 5
4 The Economy 1 9
5 Propaga-nda 24
6 Education and Youth 40
7 Anti-Semitism 47
8 Culture 53
9 Social Policy 63
1 0 The Army and Rearmament 67
1 1 The SS State 7 1
1 2 Opposition 75
1 3 Foreign Policy 8 1
1 4 Personalities and Historiography 87
1 5 Dealing with Examination Questions 90
Specimen Source Question Answer 90
Approaching Essay Questions 92
Possible Essay Titles 93
Specimen Essay Answer 98
Bibliography 1 02
Acknowledgements 1 03
Index 1 04

PRE FACE
The history of Nazi Germany has long been a popular topic with
students studying at A Level, AS Level, Higher Grade and beyond.
Changes in the requirements of examination boards, involving
particularly the greater use of source-based questions, coursework and
personal assignments, have not decreased the popularity of the topic.
This book is intended for students, and hopefully teachers, who are
interested in the topic of Nazi Germany and who would welcome a
practical complement to existing textbooks and monographs. Several
topics are covered by an introduction and a collection of mainly
primary sources, together with questions of the type likely to be
encountered in examinations, or other exercises involving the use of
sources. Practical advice is proffered on the way to approach such
questions, and a specimen answer is included. Guidance is also offered
on the approach to essay questions. Sample essay titles are given along
with suggestions on relevant approaches; and again, a specimen answer
is included. Finally, a brief analytical bibliography is intended to give
guidance to teachers and students alike.
It is hoped that this collection will prove useful to students working
as part of an organised course or on their own.

APPROACH ING SOU RCE-BASE D
QUESTIONS
Source-based questions have become an important part of History
examinations at all levels in recent years. Students who have studied
History at GCSE and Standard Grade will be used to handling various
types of sources. The skills they have learned in handling evidence
will continue to be applicable at a more advanced level, but there will
also be more sophisticated skills to master and the sources themselves
may be more demanding.
During your studies you will encounter both primary and secondary
historical evidence. The distinction between the two is sometimes
artificially exaggerated: all sources have their value and limitations,
and it is possible to worry unnecessarily about a 'hierarchy of sources'.
The important thing for the student is to feel confident in handling all
sources. The majority of sources in this book are primary sources,
since they are the raw material from which historians work; and they
are mostly of a documentary nature, since that is the type most
commonly found in examinations. However, there are also statistics and
examples of visual evidence. The comments below will usually apply
to all types of evidence.
When a student is faced with a piece of historical evidence, there are
certain questions that he or she should always ask of that source; but in
an examination that student will be asked specific questions set by an
examiner, and, in the light of pressures, not least of which is time, it
is important to approach these questions in an organised and coherent
fashion. The following advice should be borne in mind when answering
source-based questions. Some of the advice may appear obvious in the
cold light of day, but, as examiners will testify, the obvious is often
ignored in the cauldron of the examination room!
1 Read the sources carefully before attempting to answer the questions,
whether there is one source or a collection of them. This will give you
an overview of the sources which will usually be connected and related
to a particular theme. You will study the individual sources in detail
when you answer specific questions.
2 Always look carefully at the attribution of the sources: the author
and date of publication; the recipient, if any; the context in which the
source was produced. All these will often give you an insight in addition
to that provided by the content of the source itself.
3 Mark allocations are usually given at the end of each question or
sub-question. Ignore the marks at your peril! The number of marks
2

Approaching Source-based Questions
will almost certainly give you some indication of the length of answer
expected. Length of answer is not an indicator of quality, and there
is no such thing as a standard answer, but it is commonplace for
candidates in examinations to write paragraph-length answers to
questions carrying one or two marks. A question carrying such a low
mark can usually be adequately answered in two or three sentences.
You do not have the time to waste your purple prose in examinations!
Similarly, a mark allocation of nine or ten marks indicates the
expectation of a reasonably substantial answer.
4 Study the wording of the questions very carefully. Some questions
will ask you to use only your own knowledge in the answer; some will
ask you to use both your own knowledge and the source(s) ; some will
insist that you confine your answer to knowledge gleaned from the
source(s) alone. If you ignore the instructions, you will certainly deprive
yourself of marks.
5 If there are several sources to be consulted, ensure that you make
use of the ones to which you are directed - candidates have been known
to ignore some or choose the wrong ones!
6 Certain types of question require a particular type of response:
a) Comparison and/or contrasting of sources: ensure that you do
consider all the sources referred to in the question.
b) Testing the usefulness and limitations of sources: if you are asked
to do both, ensure that you do consider both aspects. You may be
required to evaluate a source in relation to other information
provided, or in the context of your own background knowledge of
the subject.
c) Testing reliability. This is not the same as considering the utility of
a source, although students sometimes confuse the two concepts.
d) Phrases such as 'Comment upon', 'Analyse' or 'Assess'. Ensure that
you do what is asked. Do not be afraid of quoting extracts from a
source in your answer, but avoid over-quotation or too much direct
paraphrasing, since questions will usually, although not always,
be testing more than comprehension. You should therefore simply
be illustrating or amplifying a particular point. Always use the
sources and do not just regurgitate what is in front of you.
e) Synthesis: this is a high level skill which requires you to blend
several pieces of evidence and draw general conclusions.
7 If at all possible, avoid spending too much time on the sources
questions in examinations. Frequently candidates answer the sources
questions thoroughly but do not allow themselves enough time to do
justice to the rest of the examination paper, and essay answers
sometimes suffer in consequence if they are attempted last.
8 If possible, read published examiners' reports which will give you
3

Nazi Germany 1933-45
further indication as to the most useful approaches to particular
questions, and the pitfalls to avoid.
A Note on this Collection of Sources
It is the intention of this collection to give ideas to teachers and realistic
examples of sources and questions to students, either for use in schools
and colleges or for self-study purposes. However, they are intended to
be flexible. If it is found helpful, adapt the questions or mark
allocations, or devise new questions; or use the sources as part of
coursework or personal studies. You might even find it an interesting
exercise to put together your own sources and appropriate questions.
4

1
THE NAZI RISE TO POWER
The Weimar Republic enjoyed a brief life of only fourteen years before
Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in January 1 933 and the
subsequent establishment of the Third Reich. The Republic, born in
the aftermath of defeat in the First World War and suffering the
humiliation of having to sign the hated Treaty of Versailles, inspired
no widespread enthusiasm, despite a period of relative prosperity in
the late 1 920s. The onset of the Great Depression enabled opposing
parties of the Left and Right, particularly the Nazis and the
Communists, to exploit fears and resentments latent since the end of
the War. The economic crisis enabled the Nazis, in particular, to
develop into a mass party with considerable popular support. Hitler
managed to present the image of a dynamic, thrusting party, which
was able to appeal to different elements in German society - the young,
those with nationalist fervour or racial prejudice, anti-Communists, small
businessmen and farmers. The party could also play upon the fears of
Conservatives and big businessmen who disliked both Weimar
democracy and the perceived threat of a Marxist Revolution.
By 1 932 the Nazis formed the largest party in the Reichstag. The
Party itself was rapidly expanding, and contained sometimes
contradictory interests, making it not an easy organisation to control.
Hitler, however, had the confidence to hold out for the position of
Chancellor through the setback of the election of November 1 932 when
the Nazi surge faltered, and some of his supporters were urging a
compromise deal with the right-wing establishment. The dilemma of
how to achieve ultimate power was resolved by the offer of the
Chancellorship in January 1 933.
Hitler's attempt to seize power by force in 1 923 had failed. Thereafter
he had worked through the constitution he detested whilst his SA
created disorder in the streets. Although Hitler never received the
electoral support of the majority of the German people, he did generate
enough mass support at a time of political and economic crisis to
persuade the right-wing establishment to persuade the aged President
Hindenburg to appoint him as Chancellor, in the mistaken belief that
Hitler could be controlled in the interests of others.
A Motives for joining the Nazi Party
(i) I observed many things in Berlin which could not be noticed- or
only to a lesser degree- in small towns. I saw the Communist danger,
the Communist terror, their gangs breaking up 'bourgeois' meetings,
5

the 'bo u rgeois' pa rties being utterly helpless, the N azis bei ng the
only pa rty that broke terro r by a nti-terror. I saw the co m p l ete fa i l u re
of the 'bourgeois' pa rties to deal with the eco n o m i c crisis. . . O n ly
nati o n a l soci a l i s m offered a ny hope. Anti-Sem itism had a noth e r
aspect i n Berl i n : N a z i s m ostly d i d not hate J ews i n d ivid u a l ly, m a ny
had J ewish frie nds, but they were co ncerned a bo ut the J ewish
pro b l e m . . . N o body knew of a ny way to dea l with it, but they ho ped
the Nazis wou l d know. If they had g u essed how the Nazis did dea l
with it, not one i n a h u nd red wou l d have joi ned the party.
From a letter by the Headmaster of Northei m's G i rls' H igh School, 1967,
in W. Allen : The Nazi Seizure of Power(1984)
( i i ) It was the depressio n a nd business was bad. The Nazis u sed to
ask my father fo r contri butions a n d he refused. As a co nseq u ence
of this he lost busi ness. So he joi ned the Nazi Pa rty. But this lost h i m
oth er custo mers, s o he was disco u raged by t h e who l e situatio n . H e
probably wo u l d n't have joi ned o f h i s own choice.
By the Owner of a pri nting shop i n Northeim, i n W. Alle n : The Nazi Seizure
of Power(1984)
B Social Composition of the Nazi Party in 1930
Occu pati o n a l
category
Wo rkers
Wh ite-co l l a r workers
Self-em p l oyed
Civi l serva nts
Teachers
Peasa nts
Others
Nazi Germ a n
Pa rty society
% %
28. 1 45.9
25.6 1 2 .0
20.7 9.0
6.6 4.2
1 .7 0.9
1 4.0 1 0.6
3.3 1 7 .4
1 00 1 00
Com piled from various German statistics
C H itler Woos the Industrialists
I n d ex
(Germ a n soc= 1 00)
61 .2
2 1 3.5
230.0
1 57 . 1
1 88.8
1 32.0
1 8.9
It i s natu ra l that if the a ble m i nds of a nation, who a re a lways in a
m i no rity, a re g ive n a n eq u a l va l u ation with a l l the rest, the fi n a l
res u lt wi l l i n evita bly b e a n outvoti ng o f geni us, a n o utvoting o f a bi l ity
a n d perso n a l wo rth, a n outvoting which is then fa lsely descri bed as
the ru l e of the people. Fo r that is not the ru le of the peo ple, but i n
rea l ity the ru le o f stu p i d ity, of mediocrity, of i nco m p l eteness, of
6

The Nazi Rise to Power
cowa rd i ce, of wea kness, of i nadequacy. People's ru le is rather to have
a peop l e governed and led in a l l spheres of l ife by those i n d ividuals
who a re most ca pable a n d therefo re born to ru l e tha n to let every
sphere of l ife be a d m i n istered by a majo rity which is natura l ly a n d
i n evita b ly u nfa m i l i a r with the sphere o f l ife concerned .
Th u s dem ocracy wi l l lead i n practice to the destruction of the true
va l u es of a people.
From a speech made by H itler to the ' Industry Club' at Dusseldorf,
27 January 1932
D Sequel to the Election of 6 November 1932
Al low m e to express my speci a l co n g ratu lations o n the fi rm attitude
which you adopted i m mediately after the elections. Th ere exists in
my m i n d no dou bt that the development of events ca n o n ly have one
end and that is yo u r chance l l o rship. It looks as if o u r attem pt to
obta i n a row of s i g n atu res i n favo u r of it fro m eco n o m i c l ife wi l l not
be enti rely fru itless, a lthou g h I am i ncli ned to th i n k that heavy
i ndustry wi l l hard ly j o i n i n , fo r it rea l ly j u stifies its n a m e 'heavy
i n d u stry' by its ponderousness.
I hope that in the co m i ng days and weeks the sma l l u neve n n esses
wh ich necessa rily creep i nto propaganda wi l l not be so ma rked as
to g ive opponents an opportu n ity fo r j u stifiable i ndig nation. The
stronger you r position i ntri nsica l ly, the more gentl e m a n ly the form of
stru g g l e ca n be. The more events go yo u r way, the m o re you ca n
affo rd to d ispense with attacks on perso nal ities.
I am fi l led with o pti mism beca use the who l e p resent system is
certa i n ly dyi ng of exh austio n .
With German g reeti ng,
Yo u rs very sincerely,
Dr. Hja l m a r Schacht
From a letter by Schacht, Ex-President of the Reichsban k, to H itler,
12 November 1932
E The Eve of Power
8 Decem ber 1 932
The I n specto rs of the Pa rty a re gathered at the F u h rer's. Al l a re in a
very depressed mood . . .
Th e Fu h rer wa l ks u p a n d down with long strid es i n h i s hotel room
hour after h o u r. His featu res show that h is m i n d is powerfu l ly at
wo rk. . . O nce he sto ps and says o n ly : 'If the Pa rty brea ks u p, I wi l l
fi nish myself off i n th ree m i n utes with a pisto l . '
5 J a n u a ry 1 933
The d i scussion between the Fu h rer and Herr vo n Pa pen in Co logne
7

h a s taken pl ace. It was supposed to be kept secret, but, th ro u g h a n
i ndiscretion, h a s beco me p u b l icly known a n d Sch leicher is now
having it tru m peted up in a big way in the press. . . One th i n g the
govern ment now in office m u st know is that its overth row is seriously
o n the ca rds. If th is cou p su cceeds, then we a re no longer fa r removed
fro m power.
Excerpts from the Goebbels Diaries(1934)
F The Reaction of the Left
The bloody, barbarous terro r-reg i m e of fascism i s bei ng set u p i n
Germa ny. Masses, d o not a l l ow the deadly enem ies of the German
people, the deadly enem ies of the workers a n d poor peasa nts, of the
worki ng people in town and cou ntry, to ca rry out th e i r cri m e ! . . .
Out o n the streets !
Bring the facto ries to a h a l t !
R e p l y a t once t o the onsla u g ht o f the fascist bloodhou nds with
stri kes, with m ass stri kes, with the ge nera l strike !
From a Communist Party leaflet of 30 January 1933
Questions
1 a What information can be gleaned from Source B about the
composition of the Nazi Party in the years immediately before its
accession to power? (5 marks)
b How do you account for this composition? (5 marks)
2 What motives for supporting the Nazi Party can be deduced from
Sources A and B? (6 marks)
3 What do Sources C and D suggest about Hitler's political skills?
(6 marks)
4 Using your own knowledge, explain the reference to Hitler's 'firm
attitude' described in Source D. (3 marks)
5 Using your own knowledge, explain the change in Goebbels' and
Hitler's attitude between the dates of the two extracts, as revealed
in Source E. (5 marks)
6 a Account for the tone of Source F. (4 marks)
b How useful is Source F to an historian investigating Hitler's
accession to power? (4 marks)
7 To what extent do Sources A-F prove the assertion that Hitler came
to power by backstairs intrigue rather than popular support?
(10 marks)
8

The Consolidation of Power 1933-4
2
THE CONSOLI DATION OF POWER
1933-4
Hitler's appointment to the Chancellorship in January 1 933 was only
the prelude to the period known as 'Gleichschaltung' or 'Co-ordination',
during which most institutions in Germany were brought, to a greater
or lesser extent, under Nazi control. Although Hitler did not yet
possess supreme power - the Presidency and the Army, for example,
remained independent institutions - in the months after January most
institutions which might have harboured opposition to the Nazis were
undermined. The Reichstag fire was used to whip up anti-Communist
fears and the Enabling Law gave Hitler extraordinary powers. The
state governments were subordinated to Berlin; the trade unions were
dissolved and replaced by a Nazi organisation, the Nazi Labour Front;
the Nazi Party became the only legal party in Germany; even the Catholic
Church was compromised into signing a concordat with the
Government. The civil service was purged and Nazi ideas were
insinuated into schools and universities. Furthermore, cultural activities
were taken under Nazi control.
The reasons for the relative ease with which the Nazis achieved 'co
ordination' have been vehemently debated. The institutionalisation of
terror, signified by the arrest of real or potential opponents, and the
establishment of concentration camps were certainly important factors;
as was the insinuation of Nazi propaganda into all aspects of life.
Certainly dedicated opponents of the Nazis faced enormous problems
when attempting to focus their discontent. Yet it was also the case that
Hitler achieved much popular support through the dynamic urgency
of his patriotic slogans and apparent determination to 'get things done'.
The millions of votes Hitler received in the March 1 933 election were
certainly not all achieved through intimidation. Another factor in the
equation was the fact that the Nazis began to reap the benefits of an
economic recovery already under way before they came to power.
For all his success at 'co-ordination', Hitler faced problems from
within his own movement. The latent contradictions and conflicting
interest groups within the Nazi movement surfaced after the 'First
Revolution' ofJanuary 1 933. The SA leaders, for example, expected
to share the fruits of power and replace the professional German army
with a revolutionary people's militia. Nazis like Gregor Strasser, who
took the Socialist elements of the Nazi programme more seriously than
Hitler, were seen as a threat by the industrialists financing Hitler; and
many Nazi leaders had their own corners to fight and scores to settle
as they vied for positions of power under Hitler.
9

Nazi Germany 1 933-45
However, demands for a 'Second Revolution', a genuine
transformation of Germany into a radical society protected by a
people's army, could not be tolerated by Hitler, whose increasing
preoccupation was to expand the existing army. Any doubts Hitler
may have had were resolved by a pact with the Generals; by the
promptings of his own lieutenants, afraid of the SA (which had never
been fully integrated into the Nazi Party) ; and by the awareness that
conservative opposition also existed, as suggested in Vice-Chancellor von
Papen's speech at Marburg.
On the Night of the Long Knives (30 June 1 934) the SA leadership
and enemies of the regime, real or imagined, were bloodily removed.
This step, along with Hitler's absorption of the Presidency on
Hindenburg's death (I August) , effectively meant that military
expansion and order were to be the idols of the new Nazi State. There
would be no radical social and political transformation of Germany in
the way that some of the more naive Nazi supporters had hoped.
A The New Chancellor Appeals to the German People
. . . It is an a p pa l l i ng i n herita nce wh ich we a re ta ki ng over. The task
before us is the most difficult which has faced Germ a n statesmen
i n l iving m e m o ry. B ut we all have u n bou nded confide nce, fo r we
bel i eve i n o u r nati o n a n d i n its etern a l va l ues. Fa rmers, wo rkers, and
the middle cl ass m u st u n ite to contri bute the bricks wherewith to
b u i l d the n ew Reich .
The Nati o n a l G overn m ent wi l l therefore rega rd it as its fi rst and
supreme task to resto re to the Germ a n peo ple u n ity of m i nd a nd
wi l l . It wi l l p reserve a n d defend the fo u ndations o n which the strength
of o u r natio n rests. It wi l l ta ke u nder its fi rm protection Ch ristia n ity as
the basis of o u r m o ra l ity, a n d the fa m i ly as the n ucleus of o u r nation
a n d o u r state. Sta n d i n g a bove estates a n d classes, it wi l l bring back
to o u r peo p l e the consciousness of its raci a l a n d po l itica l u n ity and
the obl igatio n s a risi ng therefro m . It wishes to base the education of
Germ a n youth o n respect fo r o u r g reat past a n d pride i n o u r o l d
tra d itions. It wi l l therefo re decla re merci l ess wa r o n spi ritua l , pol itica l
a n d cu ltu ra l n i h i l is m . G e rma ny m u st not a n d wi l l not s i n k i nto
Co m m u n i st a n a rchy. . .
N ow, G e r m a n peo ple, g ive us fou r yea rs a n d then j u d g e us. . .
From H itler's 'Appeal to the German People', 31 January 1933
B A Nazi Election Appeal
Residents of North e i m !
You wa nt to conti n u e yo u r work i n peace a nd q u iet ! Yo u 've had
enough of the i m p u dent behavi o u r of the SPD a n d the KPD ! You
wa nt the red Senators, Cou nci l men, a n d Reichsba n n e r G enera ls with
1 0

a l l their a rmed fo l lowers to go to the Devi l ! . . . I n the ba rracks were
b ruta l ised Co m m u n ists, a rmed with m i l ita ry rifles . . . waiti ng fo r the
b l oody wo rk in the streets of N o rtheim . . . The NSDAP, the SA, the SS
a re fig hti ng fo r yo u , eve n here in N o rth ei m ! To mo rrow is the day of
t h e awa kened natio n ! At the bal lot boxes the Germa n Volk t h a n ks the
g reat Fu h rer fo r its sa lvati on i n the last h o u r ! A sto rm wi l l sweep
t h ro u g h Germany ! G e rm a ny Votes List 1 ! Heil Hitler!
Appeal by N S DAP, Local Group Northeim, 3 and 4 March 1933, quoted i n
W. Allen, The Nazi Seizure o f Power(1984)
C H itler Addresses German Industrialists
. . . Private e nterprise ca n not be m a i nta i ned i n the age of dem ocracy;
it is conceiva ble o n ly if the people h ave a sou nd idea of autho rity a n d
perso n a l ity... I reco g n ised . . . that new i deas m ust b e so u g ht
co nducive to reco n structio n . I fou n d them i n N ationa l ism, i n the
va l u e of perso n a l ity, in the denial of reconci l i ation betwee n nations,
in the stren gth a n d power of i n d ivi d u a l perso n a l ity. . .
N ow we a re faci n g the last el ectio n . N o matte r what the outcome,
t h e re wi l l be no retreat, even if the co m i ng el ection does not bri n g
a bout a decision . . . There wi l l , however, b e no i ntern a l peace u nti l
M a rxism is e l i m i nate d .
From a speech by H itler to about twenty i ndustrialists, 20 February 1933
D A Purge of the Civil Service
Officia ls who a re of n o n-a rya n descent a re to be pl aced i n
ret i rement. . .
Offici a l s whose past po l itica l activity does not fu rnish a g u a ra ntee
t h at they wi l l at a l l ti m es identify t h emse lves u n reservedly with the
nati o n a l state may be dismissed the service. . .
From the ' Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service',
7 April 1933
E The Destruction of the Trade Unions
The Government of the Nati o n a l Revo l ution has ra ised the 1 st of M ay
to the status of Festiva l Day of the N ati o n 's La bour. . . Fo r the fi rst
ti m e after d ecades of i n ner cleavage a n d disru ptive pa rty co nfl ict, the
i m morta l spi rit of G e rm a n fo l kdom is ra ising itself again a bove
wra n g l i n g a n d disco rd . . .
M a rxism l ies i n ru i ns. The org a n isatio n s of class co nfl ict a re
s h attered .
F rom a proclamation by Goebbels, M i n ister of Public Enlightenment and
Propaganda, 24 Apri l 1933
11

F The Abolition of the Parliamentary System
The so l e pol itica l party i n Germany is the N atio n a l Socia l ist Germ a n
Wo rke rs' Pa rty.
Wh oeve r attem pts to m a i nta i n the o rg a n i sed existence of a noth er
pol itica l pa rty, o r to fo rm a new po l itica l pa rty, s h a l l . . . be pu n ished
with h a rd l a bou r of u p to th ree yea rs or with i m p riso n m e nt of fro m
six m o nths to th ree yea rs' d u rati o n .
From the ' Law Against the Revival of Old or the Formation of New Parties',
14 July 1933
G Conflict Within the Nazi Movement
A tremendous victo ry h a s been wo n . But not a bsol ute victo ry ! . . .
I n the new Germany the d isci p l i ned brown sto rm batta l ions of the
Germ a n revo l ution sta n d side by side with the a rmed fo rces. . .
The SA a n d SS a re the fo u ndatio n p i l l a rs of the co m i ng Natio na l
Socia l ist State - their State fo r which they h ave fou g ht a n d which
they wi l l defend . . . The SA and SS wi l l not to l erate the Germ a n
revo l ution g o i n g t o s l eep o r bei ng betrayed a t the h a lf-way stage by
no n-co m bata nts . . . the brown a rmy is the last l evy of the nation, the
l ast bastion a g a i nst Co m m u n ism . . .
From a newspaper article by Ernst Rohm, June 1933
H H itler Justifies the 1934 Purge
. . . C h i ef of Staff Ro h m entered i nto rel ations with Genera l Schleicher
th ro u g h a n utterly co rru pt a n d d i s h o n est go-between . . . Genera l
Sch leicher . . . spelt o u t t h e secret a i m s of C h i ef o f Staff Ro h m . . .
(that is) :
1 The present reg i m e i n Germ a ny is not to be to lerated.
2 Above a l l, the Army and a l l nati o n a l associ ations m u st be u n ited
in a s i n g l e band.
3 The o n ly man to be co nsidered fo r such a position is C h i ef of Staff
Ro h m . . .
I n the State there is o n ly o n e bearer of arms-the Army; there is o n ly
o n e bearer of the pol itica l wi l l-the Nati o n a l Soci a l ist Pa rty. . .
From H itler's speech to the Reichstag, 13 July 1934
I Reactions to the Purge
The i m m ed i ate resu lt of the m u rders was g reat co nfusion, both as
rega rds the way they were viewed a n d as rega rds their futu re
po l itica l co nseq uences. On the whole, H itl er's cou rage i n taki n g
decisive actio n was stressed the m ost. He was reg a rded practica l ly
as a h e ro . . . O u r com rades report that Hitler h a s wo n stro ng a pprova l
a n d sym pathy fro m that part of the popu lation which sti l l places its
12

hopes i n h i m . To these peo ple h i s actio n is proof that he wa nts order
a n d decency. Oth e r sectio n s of the popu l ation h ave been g iven ca use
fo r t h o u g ht.
East Saxony: A sma l l busi nessman to l d me th at h e and h is
co l l eag u es had known fo r a l o n g time that H itler was g o i n g to stri ke
at Ro h m a n d h i s associates. He sti l l sees Hitler, even now, as a n
. ut� erly h o n o u ra b l e m a n w h o wa nts t h e best fo r the Germa n
peo p l e. . . When I tried to exp l a i n to h i m that Hitler a l o n e bore the
respo n s i b i l ity fo r a l l the m u rders, th ese a n d earl i e r o n es, h e said : 'Sti l l ,
t h e m a i n th i ng i s , he's got r i d o f the Ma rxists.'. . .
Bavaria: Fi rst report. By s l a u g htering h i s 'best fri ends', H itler has
fo rfeited n o n e of h i s mass su pport as yet; rather h e has g a i ned.
Repo rts fro m different parts of Bava ria a re u n a n i m o u s that people a re
expressi n g satisfaction that H itler has acted so d ecisively. He has
prod u ced fresh proof that h e wi l l not settle fo r seco nd- best and that
he wa nts decency in p u b l i c l ife.
From a report by the Germa n Social Democratic Party i n exile, following
the Purge of 30 J u ne 1934
J Hitler's Thanks
I n co nsideration of the g reat services re ndered by the SS, especia l ly
i n co n n ecti o n with the events of 30 J u n e 1 934, I ra ise it to the status
of an i ndependent o rg a n i sation with i n the fra m ewo rk of the NSDAP.
Decree concerning the SS, 20 July 1934
Questions
1 In what circumstances did Hitler issue the appeal outlined in Source
A? (2 marks)
2 Using your own knowledge and the Source, explain the significance
of Hitler's programme as outlined in Source A. (6 marks)
3 a Why was the Appeal in Source B issued at that particular time?
(2 marks)
b Comment on the content and tone of Source B. (5 marks)
4 Compare and contrast Sources A, B and C as types of Nazi propaganda.
(7 marks)
5 Using your own knowledge and Sources D, E and F, estimate the
importance of the measures outlined to the establishment of a Nazi
dictatorship. (8 marks)
6 Using Source G and your own knowledge, explain why Hitler
regarded the SA as a threat. (6 marks)
13

7 What are the uses and limitations of Sources H and I as evidence, of
the events surrounding the Purge of 30 June 1 934? (8 marks)
8 Explain the reference to 'the great services rendered by the SS' in
Source]. (3 marks)
9 Using only the evidence of Sources A-J, analyse the assertion that
'Hitler showed remarkable skill in establishing his dictatorship in
the eighteen months following his accession to the Chancellorship.'
(12 marks)
1 4

3
THE NAZI PARTY
Hitler's accession to power in 1 933 did not bring the Nazi Party quite
the rewards that many of its more zealous members had expected.
Certainly under the law of 14 Ju1y 1 933 Germany was declared a one
party state, but the Nazi Party never attained quite the degree of
authority that, for example, the Communist Party achieved in the Soviet
Union. Germany in 1 933 already contained a large and effective
bureaucracy and, although Nazis took over many leading positions, old
ideas and traditions died hard.
Another factor which inhibited the growth of a monolithic state was
the existence of different interest groups and sections within the Party
itself (for example the Hitler Youth) , which often appealed to different
sections of society. The Gauleiters, Hitler's regional governors,
frequently complained of the difficulty of organising and directing the
Party as a coherent whole within their areas of responsibility. Different
structures abounded, often with little co-ordination: for example, by
1 933 the SS was only nominally subordinate to the much larger SA. After
1 933 many Party leaders were absorbed into government positions,
which then occupied more of their attention than their Party posts.
The Gauleiters themselves often operated independently of other
authorities, recognising Hitler's power alone.
Hitler did express his own views on the role of the Party: it was
essentially the guardian of ideology, with the task of preparing the
German population psychologically for war and to accept Nazi racial
doctrines. Hitler tended to remain aloof from internecine Party
quarrels, whilst regarding the Party as his very 'own' instrument.
The Party carried out important but mundane tasks such as
supervising the political morality of German citizens, for example by
appointing block leaders to supervise groups of households.
Many rank and file Nazis detested the civil service and
administration, believing them to be elitist and claiming that they
typified the divisive class structure of pre-Nazi Germany and obstructed
the implementation of radical social policies. Yet not all Party
members were ideologically committed: much of the vast increase in
Party membership from 1 933 onwards was made up of opportunists,
who swamped the 'old fighters', many of whom became disillusioned
by the failure of the Party to deliver a radical revolution.
Members of the Nazi hierarchy itself often found their powers limited.
Even Bormann failed to dominate completely either state or Party. (Hitler
15

maintained personal channels of communication with individuals like
Goebbels, and by-passed 'official' channels.)
The Nazi Party undoubtedly played an important role during the
War, trying to sustain morale, and bearing the brunt of popular
dissatisfaction in the later stages; but the dilemma of trying to mould
a Party which was both an efficient administrative bureaucracy and a
dynamic political movement was never really resolved.
A H itler's Style of Leadership
In 1 935 H itler kept to a reaso n a b ly ordered d a i ly routi ne. . . G ra d u a l ly,
this fa i rly o rderly wo rk routi ne broke down . . . He d i s l i ked the study
of d ocu ments. I have sometimes secu red decisions fro m h i m , even
o n es a bout i m po rta nt m atters, with out h i s ever aski ng to see the
rel eva nt fi les. H e took the view that m a ny thi ngs sorted themselves
out on th e i r own if one d i d not i nterfere. . . But the q u esti on was how
d i d they sort themse lves out? The Pa rty leaders fou nd it easi est to
get so met h i n g out of h i m . If they belo nged to the to p ra n ks they
co u l d a lways co m e to l u nch . . . It was not s u rprising that the State
offices were outma noeuvred . . . He let people te ll h i m the t h i ngs he
wa nted to hea r, everyth i n g else he rej ected . One sti l l sometimes hears
the view th at Hitler wo u l d h ave done the rig ht th i n g if the peo p l e
su rro u n d i n g h i m had n o t kept h i m wro n g l y i nfo rmed . Hitler refu sed
to l et h i mself be i nfo rmed .
From the memoirs of Fritz Wiedemann, one of H itler's Adjutants (1965)
B Another View of Hitler's Leadership
In the twe lve yea rs of his ru le in Germ a ny H itler prod u ced the biggest
confusion i n g overn ment that has ever existed i n a civi l i sed state.
Du ri n g h i s period of g overn ment, he rem oved fro m the o rg a n isation
of the state a l l c l a rity of leaders h i p a n d produced a co m p l ete ly
opaque netwo rk of com pete nces. It was not a l l laziness o r a n
excessive degree o f to l e ra nce wh ich led the oth erwise s o energetic
and fo rcefu l H itler to to l e rate this rea l witch's ca u l d ro n of strug g les
fo r positio n a nd co nfl icts ove r com pete nce. It was i ntenti o n a l . With this
tech n i q u e h e systematica l ly d isorg a n ised the u pper ech e l o n s of the
Reich leadersh i p in order to develop and fu rth er the a utho rity of his
own wi l l u nt i l it beca me a despotic tyra n ny.
From Twelve Years With Hitler, the memoirs of Otto Dietrich, Hitler's
Press Chief (1955)
C The Tasks of the Party
The Fu h rer stressed :
The most essenti a l tasks of the Pa rty were :
16

The Nazi Party
1 To m a ke the peo p l e recepti ve fo r the measu res i ntended by the
G overnment;
2 To help ca rry out the measu res which h ave been ordered by the
G overn ment in the nati o n at l a rge;
3 To su pport the G overn ment i n every way. . .
The Fu h rer descri bed o u r m a i n i m m e d i ate task as the selection of
peo ple who were on the one h a n d able, a nd on the other h a n d
wi l l i ng , t o ca rry o u t the Government's measures with b l i nd o bedie nce.
The Pa rty m u st bri ng a bout th e sta b i l ity on wh ich G e rma ny's who l e
futu re depended . . .
There m u st therefo re be no su perfl uous discussions ! Problems n ot
yet decided by i n d ivid u a l offi cials must u nder no ci rcumsta nces be
d i scussed in p u b l ic. Oth e rwise, this wi l l mean passi ng the decision
o n to the mass of the peo ple. This was the crazy idea beh i n d
d emocracy. B y d o i n g th at, the va l u e o f a ny leadersh i p is sq u a ndered .
From H itler's address to a conference of Gau leiters, 2 February 1934
D The Party and the State
( i) The leaders h i p- state a lways has a nti-li bera l featu res ; a nd it ca n
a l so never be m o u l ded a nd fas h i o ned by the l i bera l type of m a n ,
b u t o n ly by t h e type o f m e n w h o a re eve r co nscious o f thei r i n ner
u n i o n with fo l k and state. . . The Germ a n lea dersh ip- state m u st
the refo re i m pri nt the N atio n a l Soci a l ist pol itica l ideol ogy on t h e whole
fo l k as its co m m o n attitude.
From Otto Koellreutter: The German Leader-State(1934)
( i i) . . . notio n s of l i a bi l ity . . . ca n not be a ppl ied to the Pa rty o r the
SA. N o r, eq u a l ly, m ay the co u rts i nterfere under any pretext in the
i ntern a l affa i rs a nd decisions of the Pa rty orga n isatio n a n d t h u s
i nfri nge its leader- p ri nciple fro m outside . . . T h e Pa rty, respo n s i b l e
o n ly t o itse lf, m u st deve l o p its own sta n d a rds from with i n .
Carl Schmitt, a Nazi legal expert(1933)
( i i i) Altho u g h the ide ntity of Pa rty a nd State m u st be o u r u l ti m ate
a i m , the rea l isatio n of t h i s a i m is at the mom ent a l o n g way off. . .
The i nfl ue nce of the Pa rty o n the State a n d the permeation of the
State with N atio n a l Socia l i st ideas does not co rrespo nd with the
sacrifices made by the movement. The l a st few months i n pa rticu l a r
s h ow a co nsidera b l e d ecrease i n the rate of growth o f Natio n a l
Soci a l ist i nfl ue nce u p o n the State.
From a memorandum by Hans Von Helms, a Nazi civil servant,
26 May 1934
17

( iv) Pa rty offices h ave no a utho rity wh ateve r to issue i n structions to
agencies of t h e State. These agencies receive thei r i nstructions solely
fro m their: su perio rs with i n th e State apparatus. . . People who
i nterpreted the F u h rer's we l l-known statement 'It is not the State
wh ich co m m a nds but rather we who co m m a n d the State' to mea n
that the Pa rty was thereby made su perior to the State, h ave
co m pl etely m is u n derstood h i m . Th is statement m erely i m p l i es that
the leaders of the Pa rty fi l l the top posts in the State a n d govern it.
Th e Pa rty org a n isation and the State appa ratus a re the two p i l l a rs of
the State. Th e State is, therefo re, the m o re a l l- em braci ng co ncept. The
relationsh i p between the two is defi ned even m o re clearly b y the fact
that the Pa rty offi ces have no d i rect executive power beca use oth erwise
a d isastrous d u p l ication and para l l e l g overn ment wou l d develop.
From a statement by the Reich M i n ister of the Interior, 1934
E Fuhrer Power
The positio n of the Fu h rer com bi nes i n itself a l l sovereign power of
the Reich ; a l l p u b l ic power i n the State, as i n the movement, is
derived fro m the Fu h rer power. If we wish to defi ne pol itica l power
i n the volkish Reich co rrectly, we m u st not spea k of 'State power'
but of ' Fu h rer power'.
From E. H uber : Constitutional Law in the Great German Reich, 1939
Questions
1 To what extent does Source B support Source A in its impression of
the system of government employed by Hitler in the Third Reich?
(6 marks)
2 How would an historian assess the reliability of either Source A or
Source B as evidence of the method of government in the Third Reich?
(4 marks)
3 What was Hitler's conception of the role of the Party in the Nazi
State, as outlined in Source C? (5 marks)
4 To what extent do the extracts in Source D support each other in
their view of the role of the Party in the Nazi state? (8 marks)
5 Using Sources A-E, and your own knowledge, assess the validity of
Neumann's claim that the Third Reich was 'a nonstate, a chaos, a
situation of lawlessness, disorder and anarchy.' (12 marks)
18

4
THE ECONOMY
It is difficult to be precise about the aims of Nazi economic policy since
the policy itself had never been coherent. It was really a collection of
prejudices (as expressed in the Twenty-Five Point Programme) and
(sometimes mutually antagonistic) ideas such as the creation of a self
sufficient economy, which implied rigorous controls, alongside a
reluctance to alienate working-class supporters which might follow the
introduction of rationing and other politically unpopular measures .
Not all of Hitler's economic policies were original. He continued,
admittedly on a grander scale, the policy of previous governments of
spending money on public works and subsidies in order to reduce
unemployment. Rearmament, public works, the discouragement of
female labour, and a general improvement in world trade, all helped
to abolish unemployment by 1 939.
Other hopes were less easy to fulfil. Attempts to give security to
peasants and farmers, for example, made it difficult to promote large
scale modern farming methods. Promises to prevent the encroachment
of big department stores on small traders and to prevent the
development of cartels and other manifestations of big business clashed
with Hitler's desire for business support and the rearmament drive.
Schacht, Hitler's President of the Reichsbank, introduced various
schemes to finance rearmament and achieve self-sufficiency. Such
schemes involved favourable trade deals with other countries and the
regulation of imports and currency. Hermann Goring introduced a
Four Year Plan, which was designed to prepare Germany for war by
making her self-sufficient. Some successes were achieved in the
development of synthetic materials which would obviate the need for
imports, but production targets were not met and bureaucratic
muddling and lack of coordinated direction undermined some of the
original hopes.
Although the State increased its powers over the economy, large
scale capitalism did not suffer. Some large firms even managed to
strengthen their monopoly position. Industry as a whole expanded,
profits increased considerably, and many firms profited from the initial
German successes in taking over foreign enterprises after the victorious
military campaigns of 1 940-l .
19

A The Nazi Economic Programme
We d e m a n d land a nd te rritory fo r the nou ris h m e nt of our people and
fo r sett l i n g o u r su rplus popu l ation . . .
We d e m a n d the a b o l ition of i nco m es u nearned by wo rk.
We d e m a n d that there sha l l be profit- sh a ri n g in the g reat
i nd u stries. . .
We d e m a n d . . . the pass i n g of a law fo r the co nfiscatio n without
co m pe nsatio n of l a n d fo r co m m u na l pu rposes . . . and pro h i bition
of all s pecu lation in l a n d .
From the Twenty-Five Point Programme of the Nazi Party, 1 920
B A Nazi View of Economic Priorities
Th is g reat a nti- ca p ita l ist l o n g i n g - as I ca l l it - which is g o i ng t h rough
our nati o n a n d which has g ri p ped perh a ps as m a ny as 95 per cent of
o u r peop l e is i nteresti n g a n d va l u a b l e . . . ( it is) p roof of the fact that
we a re on the th res h o l d of a g reat, a tremendous new epoch : the
overco m i ng of l i be ra l ism and the emergence of a new ki nd of
eco n o m ic th i n ki n g and a new attitude to the State. . .
G e rm a ny i s sti l l dependent on f o reig n cou ntries fo r the most
i m porta nt h u m a n n eed : namely foodstuffs. A natio n which is
dependent o n fo rei g n cou ntries is in the fi n a l a n a lysis never in a
positio n to so lve its fo re i g n pol icy pro b l ems, the p roblems of its
eco n o m i c freedom as it wou l d wish. I n other wo rds, we m u st enable
sufficient essentia l foodstuffs to be p rod uced o n German soi l to feed
the who l e popu lati o n . One s h o u l d h ave d o n e that befo re the p resent
l evel of u ne m p l oy ment was reached, as a response to the Treaty of
V e rsa i l les which reduced o u r l iving space a n d which shou l d h ave
a uto m atica l ly pro d u ced a response i n the fo rm of a reo rg a n isation
of a g ricu ltu ra l producti o n . I n addition, we need in Germ a ny an
a m biti o u s housing a n d pop u l ation po l icy, ie the resettlement of
peop l e away from the big cities.
From a speech by Gregor Strasser in the Reichstag, 10 May 1 932
C H itler's Economic Plans
Germa ny's eco n o m ic situati o n is . . . in the briefest outl i n e as fo l l ows :
we a re overpo p u l ated a n d ca n n ot feed ou rselves fro m o u r own
resou rces . . . the m ost i m po rta nt task of o u r eco n o m i c po l i cy is to
see that a l l G e rm a n s a re i ncorporated i nto the eco n o m i c process . . .
the yi eld of o u r ag ricu ltu ra l prod u ctio n ca n u ndergo no fu rther
su bsta nti a l i ncrease. It is eq u a l ly i m pos� i b l e for u s, at present, to
m a n ufact u re a rtificia l ly certa i n raw m ateri a l s which we lack i n
Germany o r t o fi nd other su bstitutes fo r t h e m. . . T h e fi n a l solution l i es
i n exten di ng o u r l iv i n g space, that is to say, exte n d i n g the sou rces of
raw m ate ri a l s a n d foodstuffs of o u r peo ple. . . There is o n l y one i nterest,
20

The Economy
the i nterest of the nati o n ; o nly o n e view, the bri n g i ng of Germany to
the poi nt of pol itica l a n d eco n o m i c self-sufficiency. . .
I t h u s set t h e fo l lowi ng tasks :
1 The Germ a n a rmed for ces m u st be operatio n a l with i n fou r yea rs.
2 The Germ a n eco nomy m u st be fit fo r wa r with i n fou r yea rs.
From a memorandum composed by H itler, August 1 936
D Economic Planning and Reality
Com modity Output (thousa n d to ns) Plan target
1936 1938 1942
O i l 1 ,790 2,340 6,260 1 3,830
Al u m i n i u m 98 1 66 260 273
Bu na rubber 0.7 5 96 1 20
N itrogen 770 9 1 4 930 1 ,040
Explosives 1 8 45 300 323
Powder 20 26 1 50 2 1 7
Steel 1 9,2 1 6 22,656 20,480 24,000
I ro n o re 2,255 3,360 4, 1 37 5,549
B rown coa l 1 61 ,382 1 94,985 245,91 8 240,500
H a rd coa l 1 58,400 1 86, 1 86 1 66,059 21 3,000
Figures from the Four Year Plan, launched in 1 936
E Complaints about Nazi Economic Policy
Th e sma l l b u si nessmen a re i n a state of g l oom a nd despondency.
These peo p l e, to whom the present system to a l a rge extent owes
its rise, a re t h e most d isappoi nted of a l l . The shortages of goods
restrict th ei r tu rnover, but th, ey ca n n ot respo nd by putting u p thei r
prices beca u se the price decr ees prevent them fro m d o i n g so. The
a rtisa ns co m pl a i n a bout raw m ateri a l shortages . . . one ca n say of
m a ny of t h e m (the sm a l l businessm en) that i nwa rd ly they have l o n g
si nce t u r n e d awa y from the system a n d wou l d welco m e its fa l l .
From a report by t h e Social Democratic Party o n the situation in central
Germany, J u ly 1 939
F The Attitude of Farmers
The E nta i l e d Farm Law has adva ntages as wel l as disadva ntages j u st
l i ke the co ntro l led ma rket. M a ny peasa nts fi nd it difficu lt to disti n g u ish
between a dva ntag es and d i sadva nta ges. Th ey g ru m b l e non-stop a n d
m a ny a re u nder h eavi er fi nanci a l pressu re t h a n befo re, b u t oth ers
a re better off. The peasa nts a re m o re u pset by the reg i m e's fight
a g a i n st Ch ristia n ity than by eco n o m i c d ifficu lties. . . They wa nted
noth i n g to do with Co m m u n ism - at least the peasa nts with med i u m-
21

sized fa rms d i d n 't. They were afra i d that Bolshevism wo u l d take
away t h e i r l a n d a nd they wo u l d prefer to come to te rms with the
N azis wh o o n ly d ispossess them of h a lf their p roperty.
From a report by the Social Democratic Pa rty on the situation in Bavaria,
August 1 937
G Statistics on Earnings
Average g ross h o u rly earn i ngs in i nd ustry
(a) In Reichspfennig
I n d u stry G ross h o u rly e a r n i n g s
( Reichspfe n n i g)
1935 1936
B u i l d i n g 72.4 72 . 1
Chemica l s 82.0 82. 0
I ro n a nd Steel 86.3
R u bber
Meta l-wo rki n g 83. 6 85.7
Qua rry i n g
C l oth i ng 53.8 54. 5
Text i l es 55.0 54.6
Boots and S h oes 62.3 63. 2
Al l i nd u stries 73.6 76.7
(b) Indexed at 1936 = 100
1 928 = 1 22.9 1 934 = 97
1 935 = 99.4
1 936 = 1 00
1 937 = 1 02.0
1 938 = 1 05.6
1 929 = 1 29 . 5
1 930 = 1 25.8
1 931 = 1 1 6.3
1 932 = 97 . 6
1 933 = 94. 6
From official German sou rces
Questions
1937
72.3
84. 6
93. 5
88.9
60. 1
55.7
55.8
64.7
78.2
1938
75.4
85.3
96. 1
87 .8
9 1 . 1
73.7
59.6
59. 1
66.5
81 .0
1 To what extent do Sources B and C reflect the economic concerns
expressed in Source A? (6 marks)
2 Using Source D, estimate the success of the Four Year Plan.
(4 marks)
22

The Economy
3 What are the uses and limitations of Sources E and F for an
understanding of the impact of Nazi economic policy? (6 marks)
4 How would an historian assess the reliability of the information in
Source G? (4 marks)
5 Using the Sources and your own knowledge, assess the validity of the
claim that 'By 1 939, an economic crisis was just around the corner
for Germany.' (10 marks)
23

5
PROPAGANDA
Propaganda was always an integral weapon in the Nazi armoury of
methods to gain and keep support. Hitler himself had been a
propaganda expert in the early days of the Party, and some of the most
interesting passages in Mein Kampf concern the nature and purpose of
propaganda. Josef Goebbels founded the Nazi Party Reich Propaganda
Directorate i)J 1 930, and headed the new Ministry of Public
Enlightenm�nt and Propaganda formed in March 1 933. Goebbels, a
propagandist of genius, saw propaganda as fulfilling a dynamic role
in mobilising support for the Nazis among the entire population, and
he also wished to control culture in its broadest sense.
A variety of propaganda techniques was employed by the Nazis to
get their message across to a literate, well-educated population. The
radio was regarded as an especially effective medium, although
Goebbels had to overcome resistance from within and without the
Party before he could establish effective control. Listening to the radio
was actively encouraged, and entertainment as well as direct political
propaganda was transmitted.
It proved less easy to first muzzle and then take over the German
press, because German newspapers were controlled by a variety of
parties, interest groups, individuals and companies. Laws were passed
to strengthen the role of editors which, at the same time, increased their
subordination to the State. The Reich Press Chamber enforced State
controls. The Nazis increased their holdings of newspapers, and by
the late 1 930s all aspects of newspaper ownership and publication were
strictly controlled by the Nazis.
Propaganda was often an intregral component of films, the school
curriculum, Nazi organisations like the Hitler Youth, rituals, and
movements like 'Winter Relief' . However, research in recent years
suggests that the effectiveness of propaganda in terms of directly
influencing the attitudes of the German people towards issues such as
anti-semitism may have been overestimated.
A Goebbels on the Role of the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and
Propaganda
I view the fi rst tasks of the new M i n i stry as bei ng to esta b l i s h co
o rd i nati o n betwee n the Government a n d the wh o l e people. If this
govern m e nt is determ i ned never and u nder no ci rcu msta nces to g ive
way, then it h a s no need of the l ifel ess powe r of the bayo net, and
24

Propaganda
i n the l o n g ru n wi l l not be content with 52 per cent beh i n d it and with
terro risi ng the rem a i n i n g 48 per cent, but wi l l see its most i m mediate
tasks as bei ng to wi n over that rem a i n i n g 48 per cent. . .
It i s not enou g h fo r peo p l e to be m o re or l ess reco nciled to our
reg i m e, to be persuaded to adopt a neutra l attitude towa rds us.
Rather we wa nt to wo rk o n peo p l e u nti l they h ave ca pitu lated to us,
u nti l they g rasp ideologica l ly that what is h a p pe n i n g i n Germany
today not o n l y must be accepted but a l so can be accepted.
Propaga nda is not an e n d i n iself, but a means to a n end. If the
mea ns achieves the end then the means is good . . . The new l'y'l i n i stry
has no other a i m than to u n ite the nati o n beh i nd the idea l of the
nati o n a l revo l ution . . .
The most i m porta nt tasks of th is M i nistry m u st be the fo l l owing :
fi rst, a l l propaganda ventu res a n d a l l i nstitutions of public
i nformation bel o n g i ng to t h e Reich a n d the states m u st be centra l ised
in one h a n d . Furthermore, it m u st be o u r task to i nsti l i nto these
propaganda facil ities a modern fee l i n g a n d bri ng them up to date . . .
the l eaders of today must be modern pri nces of the people, they
m u st be able to u ndersta n d the people but need not fo l l ow them
slavis h ly. It is thei r d uty to tel l the masses what they wa nt and put
it across to the masses in such a way that they u ndersta nd it too.
From a speech by Goebbels at his fi rst press conference, 1 5 March 1 933
B The Radio as Propaganda
I co nsider rad i o to be the most modern and the most crucial
i nstru ment that exists fo r i nfl uencing the masses. I a l so bel ieve
one s h o u l d not say that out l o u d - that radio wi l l , i n the end, rep lace
the p ress. . .
Fi rst princi p l e : At a l l costs avo id bei ng bori n g . I put that befo re
·everyt h i n g . . . Yo u must h e l p to bri n g fo rth a nati o n a l ist a rt and
cu ltu re wh ich is tru ly appropriate to the pace of modern l ife and to
the m ood of the ti mes. . . You m ust use you r i ma g i nation, a n
i m a g i nation which is based o n s u re fo u ndations a n d which employs
a l l means and methods to bri ng to the ears of the masses the new
attitu d e i n a way which is m odern, u p-to-date, i nteresti ng, and
appea l i n g ; i nteresting, i nstructive but not scho o l m a sterish.
From instructions by Goebbels to the controllers of German radio,
25 March 1 933
C The Press as Propaganda
. . . The press is not o n ly there to i nfo rm but m u st a lso i nstruct. . . I
am awa re of the sig n ifica nce of the press. I recog n ise what it mea ns
fo r a g overn ment to have a good press o r a bad press. . . You need
not be afra id of making statements with obvio u s bias. There is
25

noth i n g u n biased i n the wo rld. Anyth i n g u n bi ased is sexl ess a n d thus
wo rt h l ess. Eve ryth i ng has a bias whether acknowl edged o r
co n cea led. I n my view it is better fo r u s t o acknowledge o u r bias
rather t h a n co ncea l it. There is no a bso l ute obj ectivity.
From Goebbels' announcement at his fi rst press conference,
1 5 March 1 933
D Propaganda for the Followers ,
We h ave witnessed m a ny g reat m a rch-pasts a n d cere m o n i es. But
none of them was m o re th ri l l i ng , and at the sa m e ti m e m o re
i ns p i r i n g , t h a n yesterday's ro l l ca l l of the 1 40,000 po l itica l wa rdens,
who were a d d ressed by the Fu h rer at n i g ht, o n the Zeppe l i n Meadow
which flood l i g hts h a d made brig ht as day. It is h a rd ly possi ble to l et
wo rds d escri be t h e mood a n d strength of this h o u r. . .
A d ista nt roa r beco m es stronger a n d co mes even closer. The Fu h rer
is there ! Reich Org a n izati o n a l Leader, Dr Ley, g ives h i m the report
o n the m e n who a re sta n d i n g i n parade fo rmatio n . And then, a g reat
su rpri se, o n e a m o n g m a ny. As Ado lf H itler is e nteri ng the Zeppe l i n
Field, 1 50 flood l i g hts o f t h e a i r fo rce bl aze up. They a re d i stri buted
a ro u nd the entire s q u a re, a n d cut i nto the n i g ht, erecting a ca nopy
of l i g ht i n the m i d st of da rkness. . . The wide fie l d rese m b l es a
powerfu l G oth ic cathedral made of l i g ht. B l u ish-violet s h i ne the
flood l i g hts, a n d between their co ne of l i g ht hangs the d a rk cloth of
n ight. . . Twenty-five thousa nd flags, that mea ns 25,000 l oca l , district,
a n d factory g ro u ps a l l over the nation who a re g athered a ro u n d this
fl a g . Eve ry o n e of these fl ag bea re rs is ready to g ive h i s l ife in the
defen ce of every one of th ese pieces of cloth. There is no o n e a m o n g
them t o wh o m t h i s fl ag is n o t the fi n a l co m m a n d a n d the h i g hest
o b l ig ati o n . . . A d evotio n a l h o u r of the M ovem e nt is bei n g held here,
is protected by a sea of l i g ht a g a i nst the d a rkness outside.
Th e men's a rm s a re l ifted i n sa l ute, which at this m o m ent g oes out
to the dead of the M ovement and of the War. Th en the fl ags a re
ra ised aga i n .
Dr Ley spea ks : 'We bel i eve i n a Lo rd God, w h o d i rects u s a nd g u ides
us, a n d who has sent to us yo u , my Fu h rer.' These a re the fi n a l
wo rds o f the R e i c h Org a n izati o n a l leader; they a re u nderl i ned b y the
a p p l a use that rises fro m the 1 50,000 spectato rs and that lasts fo r
m i n utes.
From a description of the roll-call of Political Wardens (Heads of local Party
g roups) at the 1 936 N u remberg Rally, reported in Niederelbisches
Tageblatt, 1 2 September 1 936
26

E A torchlit parade in Berlin, 1938, celebrating the fifth
anniversary of the Nazi accession to power
27
Propaganda

F Photograph of Hitler, Goebbels and children
28

Propaganda
G 'National Socialism. The organised will of the nation.' 1932
election poster
29

H 'We farmers are mucking out. We vote List 2 National Socialist.'
Poster produced for the 1932 elections
30

Propaganda
I 'Loyalty, Honour and Order'. 1934 Nazi poster
31

J 'The entire people says "Yes" (on 10 April).' Produced for the
Plebiscite following the Austro-German Anschluss of 1938
32

<&nu-
ttlliAJiM
. �
Pommeen
bttUSDf11 .
'
'
Propaganda
.sttttin10.-12.3un1 1938
K Poster advertising the Pomerania District Rally of the NSDAP,
Stettin, 10-12 June 1938
33

L 'Building youth hostels and homes.' Poster designed in 1938 or
1939 for a street collection for youth hostels, organised by the
Association of German Youth Hostels (a subsidiary organisation
of the Hitler Youth)
34

Propaganda
M 'Service in the SA develops comradeship, toughness, strength!'
Produced in 1941 as part of a wall-newspaper to be displayed
in offices and schools
35

N 'Adolf Hitler is victory'. Poster designed in 1943 for display in
offices and schoolrooms
36

Propaganda
0 Poster designed to advertise the film 'The Wandering Jew'
during the Second World War
37

.L
.
_, ,•••o
•; ;_ ,.,UNICEIQUl
•.:..,.ouEN ·•�•
. -· ------<: .,..
,.0
I � -
• .,_.talJIIIE
MUS EL IClBTr ��L
T£�
,.0 . /

IWC�
,···I71J
�
EGAL •••• ...... .
FACHO� . �
)
I
. ''2'
--Ul/IE
l•••••• l'AI'gleterre fait couler le song francais.
Notre Palfs est devoate at demembre.
Jeanne d'Arc est brule• vivo ci Rouen.
L'Angleterre fait couler le sang francais.
Ill• s' empore de nos Colonies du Canada, de l ' lnde, de
I' Arabie, du Senegal, des Antilles, de Malta.
Napoleon agonise ci Sainte-Helene.
L'Angleterre ne cesse de loire obstacle a notre eapanolon
coloniale.
Elle nous humllie ci fachoda.
Ill• nouo evince de l'lglfpte.
AUJOURD.HUI
::::::: A Dunkerque, ie sacrifice de not bateaux et de noo oaldoh
permet I• reemborquement des troupal angloi....
l'Angleterre oaislt ou coule leo navireo qui nouo rovitoillent.
l'Angleterre fait couler le oang francaio ci Mars II Keblr.
l'Angteterre fait cauter le oang francais ci Dakar. ·
••••••• L'Angteterre fait cauter le oong francalo au Oobon.
L'Angleterre fait couler le oang francaio en Syrle.
l' Angleterre fait couler le tang froncalo a MadogOKar.
DE MAI N ?• • •
OU I'Anglete- ....._._.... couler le ...,.. francalt ?
Que viend,..t-elle ......,. novo prendre ?
P 'What awaits us next?' Nazi poster from 1944 listing defeats
inflicted on the French by the English between 1300 and 1942
38
/
I
(

Propaganda
Questions
What information can be gleaned from Sources A, B and C about
Goebbels' views on the aims and methods of Nazi propaganda?
(8 marks)
2 Identify the elements of propaganda that can be found in Sources D,
E and F. (6 marks)
3 Study Sources G-P. For each of these Sources:
(i) Identify the main theme of the Source;
(ii) Explain how the propaganda message is put across.
(10 marks)
(10 marks)
4 Select any three examples from Sources A-P and, for each example,
explain its uses and limitations to an historian of Nazi Germany.
(12 marks)
39

6
E D UCATION AN D YOUTH
Germany had long held a reputation i n Europe for high educational
standards. The Nazis did not therefore face the problem which
confronted the Communists in Russia, that of educating a largely
illiterate population in order to be receptive to the regime's
propaganda and to provide a modern, efficient work-force. In fact, the
Nazis made few drastic changes in the structure of the German
educational system, although they did revise syllabuses so that subjects
were given a Nazi ideological slant. Also, some subjects like sport and
biology received a special impetus, Girls recived fewer opportunities to
attend grammar schools, and some special schools were created to
train the future elite.
Educational standards almost certainly dropped during Nazi rule.
Not only was this due to the increasingly propagandist element in
education, but also to the fact that a climate of anti-intellectualism was
deliberately fostered, extra-curricular activities increasingly impinged
upon the curriculum, and organisations such as the Hitler Youth
exercised more appeal for some people than the classroom. Teachers
experienced a decline in prestige and recruitment to the profession fell.
Contemporary reports testified to the drop in educational standards.
The Nazi movement had always incorporated a substantial youth
following, attracted by the dynamic image, and the Nazi State
inevitably devoted considerable attention to the activities of the young.
Youth was regimented in a network of organisations for boys and girls.
These organisations, notably the Hitler Youth, inculcated propaganda,
sport, and a sense of 'belonging', whilst the girls' organisations devoted
more time to 'traditional' domestic skills.
Ironically, in view of the Nazi concern for youth, life for many young
people proved difficult in the 1 930s. Large numbers of children worked
in industry from the age of fourteen and the health of young people
appears to have declined. Reserves of youthful idealism were certainly
tapped by the youth organisations, but many young people appear to
have resented the regimentation which membership of these
organisations entailed.
40

Education and Youth
A 'Unity of Youth in the Hitler Youth'. A propaganda poster for
the Hitler Youth
41

B Hitler's Ideas on Youth
There were times, which now seem to us very fa r off a n d a l most
i nco m p re h ensi b l e, when the ideal of the you n g m a n was the chap
who co u l d hold h is beer a n d was good fo r a d ri n k. But now h i s day
is past a n d we l i ke to see not the m a n who ca n h o l d h i s d ri n k, but
the yo u ng m a n who ca n sta nd a l l weathers - the h a rdened you n g
m a n . Beca use what matters is n o t h ow m a ny g lasses of bee r he ca n
d r i n k, but h ow m a ny b lows he ca n sta n d ; not h ow m a ny n i g hts he
ca n spend o n the spree, but how m a ny ki lometres h e ca n m a rch . . .
What we look fo r fro m o u r Germ a n youth is d ifferent from what
peo p l e wa nted i n the past. I n o u r eyes the German youth of the
futu re m u st be s l i m and slender, swift as the g reyho u n d , tou g h as
leathe r, and h a rd as Kru pp steel .
From H itler's speech a t the N u remburg Party Rally, 1 4 September 1 935
C Membership of the Youth Movement
H itler German League of League of Tota l Tota l
Youth You n g German You n g population
( 1 4-1 8) People G i rls G i rls of 1 0-1 8
( 1 0-1 4) ( 1 4-1 8) ( 1 0-1 4) yea r olds
1932 55,365 28,691 1 9,244 4,656 1 07,956
1933 568,288 1 , 1 30,521 243,750 349,482 2,292,041 7,529,000
1934 786,000 1 ,457,304 471 ,944 862,31 7 3,577,565 7,682,000
1935 829,361 1 ,498,209 569,599 1 ,046,1 34 3,943,303 8,1 72,000
1936 1 ,1 68,734 1 ,785,424 873,1 27 1 ,61 0,31 6 5,437,601 8,656,000
1937 1 ,237,078 1 ,884,883 1 ,035,804 1 ,722,1 90 5,879,955 9,060,000
1938 1 ,663,305 2,064,538 1 ,448,264 1 ,855,1 1 9 7,031 ,226 9,1 09,000
1939 1 ,723,886 2,1 37,594 1 ,502,571 1 ,923,41 9 7,287,470 8,870,000
Adapted from official German sources
D Reasons for Joining the H itler Youth
There were boys fro m a l l cl asses of fa m i l ies, t h o u g h m a i n ly middle
class and wo rkers. There were no soci a l or class d i st i n ctions, which I
approved of very m uch. Th ere was no d i rect o r o bvio u s pol itica l
i ndoctri nation u ntil l ater - after H itler ca me to power. . . We did
m a rch i n parades a nd hated the SPD, but that was all genera l , not
specific - it was a l l a part of it.
From a recollection of a H itler Youth member, quoted in W. Allen, The
Nazi Seizure Of Power ( 1 984)
E Recollections of a BDM Leader
The H itler Youth was a youth org a n isatio n . Its m e m bers may have
a l l owed themselves to be d ressed i n u n iforms a n d reg i mented, but
they were sti l l you ng peo p l e and they behaved l i ke you ng people.
42

Education and Youth
Thei r cha racteristic s u r p l u s of energy a n d th i rst fo r action fou nd
g reat scope i n their progra m m e of activities, which co nsta ntly ·
req u i red g reat feats to be perfo rmed. It was pa rt of the meth od of
the N at i o n a l Soci a l i st Youth leaders h i p to arra n g e a l m ost everyt h i n g
i n the fo rm o f com petitio n s. . . Every u n it wanted t o h ave t h e best
g rou p 'home', the most i nteresti ng exped ition log, the biggest
co l l ecti o n for the Wi nter Re l i ef Fund, a nd so fo rth . . . There was
certa i n ly a g reat deal of good a n d a m b itious ed u cati o n in the H itler
Yout h . Th ere were g ro u ps who lea rned to act in a masterly way.
Peo p l e to l d sto ries, d a nced a n d practised h a nd icrafts, a nd in these
fi elds the reg i m entation was fo rtunately often less strict.
From M. Maschmann : Account Rendered ( 1 964)
F The Appeal of the H itler Youth
Yo uth is sti l l in favo u r of the system : the novelty, the d ri l l , the u n ifo rm,
the ca m p l ife, the fact that school and the parenta l home ta ke a back
seat co m p a red to the com m u n ity of yo u ng people - a l l that is
m a rve l lous. . . M a ny be l i eve t h at they wi l l fi nd job opportu n ities
thro u g h the persecuti o n of J ews a nd M a rxists. . . For the fi rst ti me,
peasant youth is associated with the State thro u g h the SA and the
H itler Youth . You n g wo rkers a l so j o i n i n : one day Soci a l ism may
co m e ; one is s i m ply try i n g to achieve it in a new way. . . The new
generatio n has neve r h a d m u ch use fo r education and rea d i n g . Now
noth i n g i s demanded of the m ; o n the co ntra ry, knowl edge is publ icly
co ndem ned . . .
It i s the you ng men who b ri n g home enth usiasm fo r the Nazis. O l d
men m a ke no i m pression n owadays. . . I am a l m ost i n c l i ned t o say
that the secret of N atio n a l Socia l ism is the secret of its youth. The
chaps a re so fa n aticised that they be l i eve in noth i n g but thei r H itler.
From reports by the Social Democratic Party in exi le, 1 934
G Further Recollections of the Youth Movement
( i) When I beca me a leader i n the Jungvolk the neg ative aspects
beca m e very obvious. I fou nd the com pu lsion a n d the req u i rement
of a bsol ute obed ie nce u n pl easa nt. I appreciated that th ere m u st be
order a nd disci p l i n e i n such a l a rge g ro u p of boys, but it was
exag g e rated. It was preferred that people shou l d not h ave a wi l l of
their own a nd shou l d tota l ly su bordi nate themse lves . . . when I
moved to Ba n n headq u a rters a nd acq u i red rather more i nsight I had
the fi rst serious dou bts. The H itler Youth was i nterferi ng everywhere
i n peop l e's private l ives. If o n e had private i nterests a pa rt fro m the
Hitler Youth people looked aska nce.
From A. Klonne : Youth in the Third Reich ( 1 982)
43

( i i) Yo u n g people a re m o re easi ly i nfl ue nced i n te rms of mood than
a re a d u lts. Th is fact made it easier fo r the reg i m e to wi n over yo u ng
peo p l e i n the fi rst yea rs afte r the seizu re of power. It a ppea rs that the
sa me fact is now m a ki n g it h a rd fo r the reg i m e to keep yo u ng people
in th ra l l . . . They were made pa rticu l a rly l a rge prom ises wh ich fo r the
most part we re i nca pable of fu lfi l ment. The g reat mass of yo u n g people
today ca n see that the we l l- payi ng posts i n public a d m i n istration and
the Pa rty apparatus h ave been fi l l ed by com rades who h a d the good
fortu ne of being a few yea rs o lder. . . I n the l o n g ru n yo u n g peo ple
too a re fee l i n g i ncreasi n g l y i rritated by the lack of freedo m a n d the
m i nd l ess d ri l l i ng that is custo m a ry i n the Nati o n a l Soci a l i st
o rg a n isations. . .
Both boys a n d g i rls a re trying by every mea ns possible to dodge
the yea r of La nd Service. . . There is a section of youth that wa nts
the ro m a ntic l ife. W h o l e bu nd les of trashy l iteratu re have been fo u n d
i n sm a l l caves. Apprentices too a re d isappea ring fro m h o m e m u ch
m o re freq uently. . .
From a report from the Social Democratic Pa rty i n exi le, 1 938
H The Teaching of History
The German natio n i n its essence and g reatness, i n its fatefu l stru ggle
fo r i ntern a l a n d exte rnal identity is the su bject of the teach i n g of
h isto ry. It is based on the natu ra l bond of the ch i l d with h i s nati o n
a n d , b y i nterpreti ng h i sto ry as t h e fatefu l stru g g l e fo r existen ce between
the nations, has the particu l a r task of educati ng yo u ng peo p l e to
respect the g reat G e r m a n past a nd to h ave fa ith in the m issio n a n d
future o f their own nati o n a n d t o respect the r i g h t o f existe nce of
other nations.
From official instructions on the teaching of history, issued by the German
Central I n stitute of Education, 1 938
I Some Maths Problems
The co nstructio n of a l u natic asyl u m costs 6 m i l l io n R M . H ow m a ny
houses at 1 5,000 R M each co u l d have been bu i lt fo r that a mo u nt?
A modern n i g ht bom be r ca n ca rry 1 ,800 i nce ndia ries. H ow l o n g ( i n
ki l o m etres) is the path a l o n g which i t ca n distribute these bo m bs if
it d ro ps a bo mb every seco nd at a speed of 250 km per h o u r? H ow
fa r a p a rt a re the craters fro m o n e a nother? . . . H ow m a ny fi res a re
ca used if V3 of the b o m bs h it thei r ta rgets a n d of these V3 i g n ite?
Questions from mathematics textbooks published i n the 1 930s
44

Education and Youth
J The Timetable in a Girls' School
Monday Tuesday VVednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
8. 00-8.45 G e r m a n G e r m a n G e r m a n Germ a n G e r m a n Germ a n
8. 50-9.35 G e o g raphy H i story S i n g i n g Geography H i sto ry S i n g i n g
9.40- 1 0.25 Race Race Race Ideology I d e o l ogy Ideology
Study Study Study
10.25- 1 1 . 00 B rea k, with Sports a n d S peci a l Annou nceme nts
1 1. 00- 12. 05 Dom estic Science with M athematics, d a i l y
12. 1 0- 12. 55 E u g e n i cs, a ltern ati ng w i t h H e a l t h B i o l ogy
K A 'Nazi Novel'
At least a t h o u s a n d youths were sta n d i n g a ro u n d a b u r n i n g p i l e of
woo d ; or perh a ps it was o n l y a h u ndred. But it was as thou g h this
ci rcle of yo u n g people stretched to the very edges of t h e wo rld. J u st
i n fro nt of h i m , m a rsh a l led i n l i nes, stood yo uths l i ke h i m self. Each
held a l o n g pole with a pen n a nt, rising vertica l ly to the sky, bl ack
pe n n a nts a n d bri l l ia nt red . . . Each of the youths looked l i ke a l l the
oth ers, with s h o rts, ba re knees, brown s h i rt, a kerch ief a ro u n d the
neck. . .
They were a l l looki n g i n s i l ence towa rds the fi re. A ta l l yo u ng m a n
h a d taken h i s sta nd beside it a n d w a s speaking t o them . . . H e i n i
co u l d m a ke out o n ly a few p h rases : he heard t h e wo rds 'movement'
a n d ' l eader', he heard part of a sentence - 'each g ivi n g h i s l ife fo r
the oth ers'. As h e l istened, wo ndering whether he m i g ht not creep a
l ittle closer to h e a r better, a g reat t h ri l l of fea r went th ro u g h h i m .
'Deutschland, Deutschland Ober Alles' swept over h i m , fro m a
th ousand voi ces, l i ke a sca l d i ng wave. I too am a G er m a n , h e
thoug ht; a n d h e was fi l l ed with profo u n d knowl edge, stronger a n d
more u nexpected t h a n a nyth i n g h e had felt i n h is l ife befo re . . . Th is
was Germ a n so i l , G erm a n fo rest, these were G erm a n youth s ; and h e
saw that h e stood apart, a l o ne, with no o n e t o h e l p h i m ; a n d he d i d
not know wh at t o m a ke o f this g reat a n d sudden fee l i n g .
From ' H itlerj u nge Ouex'
Questions
1 What information about the Nazi ideal of youth can be gleaned from
Sources A, B, D, E, and F? (10 marks)
2 What are the uses and limitations of Sources A, D and E to a social
historian of the Third Reich? (8 marks)
45

Nazi Germany 1933�5
3 What questions would an historian ask in order to assess the
reliability of Source C? (6 marks)
4 Compare and contrast Sources D, E, F and G as evidence of the
appeal of the Nazi youth movements to the youth of Germany.
(10 marks)
5 To what extent to Sources H, I and J prove that the Nazi education
system was ideological in conception? (8 marks)
6 Using your own knowledge, assess the extent to which Source K is
typical of Nazi propaganda aimed at youth during the 1930s.
(6 marks)
7 Using the Sources A-K and your own knowledge, assess the validity
of the claim that 'Indoctrination of youth was one of the most
important and successful planks of Nazi social policy during the Third
Reich'. (12 marks)
46

7
ANTI-SEMITISM
Jews had been quite well assimilated into German life before the First
World War, although there had been a wave of anti-semitism towards
the end of the nineteenth century, fuelled by economic jealousy and a
dislike of 'alien' intellectual influences with which Jews were popularly
associated. The Weimar Republic was tolerant, but was branded as
'Jewish' by opponents such as the Nazis. The fact that a small
proportion ofJews was prominent in political, economic and cultural
life, provided opportunities for anti-semitic propaganda.
Debates have arisen over the extent to which the Nazis believed in
their racial theories. To what extent were the latter a convenient
means of providing a scapegoat and of winning the support of social
groups like the lower middle classes, who felt threatened? Anti-semitic
measures were not uncontrolled: although a boycott ofJewish civil
servants and intellectuals was implemented within months of Hitler's
accession to power, measures against doctors and even some Jewish
businessmen were delayed because they performed a valuable role in
the economy. Nevertheless, a process of public discrimination against
the Jews and the deprival of rights under the Nuremberg Laws helped
to prepare the Aryan population for the idea of the complete removal
ofJewish influence from German life.
Reactions to the Pogrom of 1 938 were mixed, yet few Germans would
stand up for the Jews, even if most Germans were not as anti-semitic
as the Nazi leadership.
Despite Hitler's repeated threats against 'World Jewry', the Nazi
decision to eliminate Jews under their control was arrived at slowly.
Once at war, it became Nazi dogma that the Jews were the real motive
force behind Germany's enemies. Although the existence of
extermination camps was kept secret as long as possible, the killing of
Jews in occupied Europe had already begun in 1 94 1 , and detailed plans
for the elimination of Europe's Jews were approved at the Wannsee
Conference of 1 942.
Ironically, a racial policy which, despite Nazi rantings, was
implemented initially in a relatively controlled fashion, by the middle of
the War had become such an obsession that operations by the SS
against the Jews were even sometimes allowed to take precedence over
operations important to military success.
47

A An Anti-Semitic cartoon. From a German children's book, 1938
48

Anti-Semitism
B Anti-Semitic Propaganda in School
Little Ka rl ta kes the poi nter, goes to the bl ackboard a n d poi nts to the
sketches. 'A Jew is usu a l ly recog nised by h is nose. The Jewish nose
is crooked at the end . . . M a ny non- J ews have crooked noses too . But
their noses a re bent, not at the end, but fu rth er up. Such a nose is
ca l led a h o o k nose o r eag l e's beak. It has noth i ng to do with a J ewish
nose. . .
'The J ew is a lso recogn ised by h i s l i ps. His l i ps a re usua l ly t h i ck.
Often the l ower l i p h a ngs down . . . And the Jew is a l so recognised by
h i s eyes. H i s eye l i d s a re usu a l ly th icker a n d more fleshy than ou rs.
The look of the J ew is sly a n d sharp' . . .
l nge sits i n the J ew docto r's reception roo m . S h e has to wa it a long
time. S h e looks th ro u g h the magazi nes o n the ta b l e . But she is much
too nervo u s even to read a few sentences. Aga i n a nd a g a i n she
remem bers her ta l k with her m other. And aga i n a n d again her m i nd
dwe l l s o n the wa rn i ngs of the BDM leader: 'A Germ a n m u st not
co nsult a J ew docto r ! And pa rticu l a rly not a Germ a n g i rl ! M a ny a
g i rl who h a s gone to a J ew docto r to be cu red has fo u nd disease a n d
disg race ! ' . . .
The door opens. l ng e looks up. There sta nds the Jew. She screa ms.
She's so frig hte ned, she d ro ps the magazine. She j u m ps up i n terror.
Her eyes sta re i nto the Jewish docto r's face. His face is the face of a
devi l . I n the m i d d l e of this devi l's face is a huge crooked nose. Beh i n d
t h e spectacles two cri m i na l eyes. A n d t h e thick l i ps a re g ri n n i n g . A
g ri n that says : ' N ow I 've got you at last, l ittle Germ a n g i rl ! '
Excerpts from a Nazi schoolbook: The Poisonous Mushroom, 1 938
C The I mpact of Anti-Semitic Propaganda
The Jewish l aws a re not ta ken very serio usly beca use the popu l ation
has oth e r p roblems o n its m i nd a n d is mostly of the o p i n i o n that
the wh o l e fuss a bout the Jews is o n ly bei ng made to divert people's
atte nti o n fro m oth er t h i ngs a n d to provide the SA with someth i ng
to do. But o n e m u st not i m a g i ne that the anti-Jewish ag itati on does
not have the desi red effect o n m a ny people. On the co ntra ry, there
a re eno u g h peo p l e who a re i nfl uenced by the defa m ation of the Jews
a n d reg a rd the J ews as the o ri g i n ato rs of many bad th i ngs. They
have beco m e fa natica l oppon ents of the J ews. Th is e m n ity often fi nds
express i o n in the fo rm of spyi ng o n people and denou ncing them
fo r havi ng dea l i ng with J ews, probably in the hope of wi n n i ng
recog niti o n a n d adva ntages fro m the Pa rty. But the vast majo rity of
the popu l ation i g n o re this d efa m ation of the Jews ; they even
demonstratively prefe r to buy i n J ewish depa rtment stores and
adopt a rea l ly u nfri e n d ly attitude to the SA men o n duty there,
particu l a rly if they try a n d ta ke ph otog ra phs of peo ple going i n .
From a report by a Social Democrat supporter in Saxony, September 1 935
49

D Popular Reaction to Anti-Semitic Excesses
The broad mass of the peo p l e has n ot co ndo ned the destruction, but
we sho u l d neve rtheless not overlook the fact that there a re peo ple
a m o n g the wo rki n g class who do n ot defend the Jews. There a re
certai n ci rcles where you a re not very popu l a r if you spea k
disparag i n g ly a bo ut the recent i ncidents. . . Berl i n : the popu l ation's
attitude was not fu l ly u n a n i mous. . . If there has been a ny speaki ng
out in the Reich a g a i nst the J ewish pogroms, the excesses of a rson
and l ooti ng, it has been i n H a m b u rg and the neig h bo u ri n g E l be
district. People from H a m b u rg a re not genera l ly a nti- sem itic, a nd the
H a m b u rg J ews h ave been assi m i l ated fa r m o re than the J ews in oth er
pa rts of the Reich .
From a report by the German Social Democratic Party in Exile,
December 1 938
E A H itler Prophecy
If the i nternatio n a l J ewish fi na nciers i n a n d o utside E u rope s h o u l d
succeed i n p l u n g i ng t h e nations o n ce more i nto a wo rld war, then
the resu lt wi l l not be the Bo lshevi s i n g of the earth, a n d thus the victo ry
of J ewry, but the a n n i h i l ation of the J ewish race i n E u rope !
From a speech by H itler to the Reichstag, 30 January 1 939
F Goebbels Blames the Jews
The J ews wa nted thei r wa r. N ow they have it. But what is a lso com i n g
true fo r t h e m is the Fu h rer's p roph ecy w h i c h he voiced i n h i s
Reichstag speech o f 3 0 J a n u a ry 1 939. . .
I n this h isto ric co nfl ict every Jew is o u r e nemy, no matter whether
he is vegetat i n g in a Po l ish g h etto, o r sti l l suppo rting h i s pa rasitica l
existence i n Berl i n or H a m bu rg , o r blowi ng the wa r tru m pet i n New
York or Was h i ngto n . By reason of their b i rth a n d race, a l l J ews a re
mem bers of a n i nternati o n a l co nspi racy a g a i nst N ational Soc i a l ist
Germa ny. . . There is a d ifference between h u m a ns a n d h u m a ns,
j u st as there is a d ifference betwee n a n i m a l s and a n i m a ls. We know
good a n d bad h u m a ns, j ust a s we know good a n d bad a n i m a ls. The
fact that the J ew sti l l l ives a mong u s is no proof that he is one of us,
no more than the fl ea's domestic resi l ience ma kes him a d o mestic
a n i m a l . . .
So su perfl u o u s thou g h it m ig ht be, l et m e say once more :
The J ews a re o u r destruction. They provoked a n d bro u g ht a bout
th is wa r. . . Every Germ a n soldier's death in this wa r is the J ews'
respo n s i b i l ity. . . The J ews e njoy the protection of the enemy nations.
N o fu rther proof i s needed of thei r destructive ro l e among our people.
From J . Goebbels' a rticle 'The Jews Are to Blame' in Das Reich,
1 6 November, 1 94 1
50

Anti-Semitism
G The Final Solution
'The J ewish peo ple wi l l be exterm i nated', says every pa rty co m rade,
'It's clea r, it's in our progra m me. E l i m i nation of the J ews,
extermi nati o n a nd we' l l do it.' And then they co me a l o n g , the worthy
eig hty m i l l i o n Germa ns, and each one of them prod uces h i s decent
J ew. It's clea r the othe rs a re swi ne, but this one is a fi ne Jew. Not
one of those who ta l k l i ke that has watched it h a ppen i ng , not one of
them has been thro u g h it. M ost of you wi l l know what it means when
a h u n d red co rpses a re lyi ng side by side, or five h u n d red or a
thousand a re lyi ng there. To have stuck it out a n d - a pa rt from a few
exceptions d u e to h u m a n weakness - to have rem a i ned decent, that is
what has made us tou g h . . . We had the mora l rig ht, we had the d uty
to o u r peo ple, to destroy this peo p l e wh ich wa nted to destroy us.
But we h ave not the rig ht to enrich ou rselves with so m uch as a fu r,
a watch, a m a rk, a ciga rette or a nyth i n g else. We h ave extermi nated
a bacteri u m beca use we do not wa nt in the end to be i nfected by the
bacteri u m and die of it. . . All i n a l l , we ca n say that we h ave fu lfi l led
this most difficult duty for the love of o u r people. And o u r spi rit, o u r
so u l . O u r c h a racter has not suffered i nj u ry fro m it.
From a speech by Himmler to SS Leaders at Posen, 4 October 1 943
Questions
Using Sources A and B, and your own knowledge, explain the
methods by which the Nazis promoted anti-semitic propaganda in
Germany during the 1 930s. (8 marks)
2 Using your own knowledge, explain the reference to 'Jewish laws' in
Source C . (3 marks)
3 Using your own knowledge, explain the references to the 'recent
incidents' and 'Jewish pogroms' in Source D. (4 marks)
4 To what extent do Sources C and D suggest that anti-semitic
propaganda was effective in influencing the German population?
(6 marks)
5 What questions might an historian ask in order to evaluate the
reliability of Sources C and D? (4 marks)
6 What evidence of propaganda is contained in Sources E and F?
(6 marks)
7 Using your own knowledge, explain the role of Rimmler and the SS
in the Final Solution. (7 marks)
51

8 Using only the evidence of Sources A-G, assess the validity of the
statement that 'anti-semitism was less of a genuine belief of the Nazis
than a convenient weapon to support or excuse their policies.'
(8 marks)
52

8
CU LTU RE
As in Soviet Russia, culture was regarded not just as an expression of
aesthetic feeling but as a moralising, didactic force which existed to
serve the needs of the regime. Although Alfred Rosenberg had long
been the acknowledged Party 'expert' on ideology and culture, after
1 933 Goebbels fought to establish control of culture himself. Goebbels
succeeded chiefly because he controlled the Reich Chamber of Culture,
established in September 1 933. This position enabled him to promote
his views at a State as well as at a Party level. All professional actors,
musicians, artists and writers were obliged to belong to the Chamber
in order to practise their craft, and Goebbels could control their
admission on grounds of suitability.
Hitler also had his own dogmatic opinions on art and set the tone
for Nazi cultural policy, although some notable events like the burning
of the books (May 1 933) were semi-official in origin rather than being
directly organised by the regime itself. Hitler did proclaim art to be
an expression of the true German spirit and opposed modernism and
other 'unGermanic' tendencies.
Inevitably, cultural life in the Third Reich suffered. This was not just
due to censorship itself, but also to the fact that many great intellectuals
emigrated or kept silent. Nazi attempts to encourage their own or
'people's culture' met with little success in an already culturally
sophisticated nation, although the output of books in particular was
prodigious during the life of the Third Reich.
A 'The Burning of the Books'
Ag a i nst cl ass stru g g l e a nd materi a l is m .
For the nati o n a l co m m u n ity a n d a n i dea l istic outlook.
Marx, Kautsky.
Ag a i nst decadence a n d m o ra l decay.
For d i sci p l i ne and moral ity in fa m i ly and state.
H. Mann, Ernst Glaeser, E. Kastner.
Ag a i nst the fa l sificati o n of o u r h isto ry a n d the denigrati on of its g reat
fi g u res.
For awe fo r our past.
Emil Ludwig, Werner Hegemann.
Ag a i nst a l ien j o u rna l i s m of a dem ocratic- J ewish sta m p.
For respo nsible partici pation i n the work of nati o n a l reco nstruction.
Theodor Wolff, Georg Bernhard.
53

Ag a i nst l itera ry betraya l of the so l d iers of the Wo rld Wa r.
For the education of the natio n in the spi rit of m i l ita ry prepa red ness.
E. Remarque.
' F i re Spells' recited during the ' R itual B u rning of the Books' in Berlin,
1 0 May 1 933
B Unsuitable Literature
l i se- Lo re Da n ner, Susan Makes Her Way
Descri bes the sed u ction of m i no rs, a danger to Germ a n youth .
Fritz Sander, Fight For The City
The h e roes a re h o od l u m s a n d m u rde rers.
Some of the books listed by the M inistry of Propaganda d u ring one week
in J u ly 1 940
C German Physics?
In rea l ity science, l i ke everyth i ng created by m e n , is race-co n d itioned,
bl ood-co n d itio ned . An i l l usion of i nternatio n a l ity ca n a rise if peo ple
wro n g ly co n c l u d e fro m the genera l va l i d ity of the resu lts of n atu ra l
science that its o ri g i ns a re a lso genera l ; o r if they overlook the fact
that the peo p l es of va rious co u ntries who h ave h a nded down
knowledge of the same sort as the Germ a n peo p l e, or of a si m i la r
sort, have been a b l e t o do t h i s o n l y beca use a n d i n s o fa r as they a re,
o r were, at the sa m e t i m e of a predo m i n a ntly n o rd i c racia l m i xtu re.
Peo p l es of a diffe rent racia l m ixtu re h ave a d iffe rent way of p u rs u i n g
knowledge.
From 'German Physics', a n essay by the Nobel Prizewin ner, Professor
Philipp Lenard; 1 936
D Nazi Humour
It is easier to s h ow by p ractica l exa m p l e than by theoretica l d i scussion
where the ever n ecessary co nsideratio n of the i nterests of state a n d
nati o n h a s b e e n fo rgotten . If - without, fo r the time bei ng , m e ntio n i ng
n a m es - we g ive such exa m p l es of c l u msy editorial wo rk, we do so i n
o rd e r t o prevent s i m i l a r accidents i n futu re.
A Sad Joke
An i l l ustrated m a g az i n e recently ra n the fo l lowi ng 'jo ke' o n its
h u m o u r pag e :
The passengers o f a n ocea n l i ner a re wh i l i ng away t h e time with
s h i p boa rd g a m es . One g e ntl e m a n steps up to a noth er a n d says, 'We
a re having a race now between m a rried a n d u n m a rrieds. Yo u a re
'
m a rried, a ren't you?' ' No,' says the other, ' I o n ly look that way, I a m
seasick.'
54

Culture
Quid Pro Quo
A h u m o u r magazi ne h a d a s i m i l a r story to offer :
Fi rst g u est o f t h e h u nt : 'The devi l ! You nea rly h it m y wife, S i r ! '
Seco n d g u est : ' S o so rry ! Look, why do n't you h ave a shot a t m i n e ! '
Even if one is very broad m i nded, a n d h a s a g reat basic sense of
h u m o u r, o n e m u st be asto n i shed at how th ese magazi nes - at a
time of o u r vita l a n d bitterly serious stru ggle to strengthen the fa m i ly,
and to bri n g our enti re l ife i nto l i n e with the po l i cy on po p u l ation a n d
race - ca n co m m it s u c h a b l u nder.
The J ewish joke m u st disappea r, and be rep laced by a tru ly Germ a n ,
positive h u mo u r. A g o o d exa m p l e o f how i t ca n b e done was a
ca ricatu re we recently saw which showed the suffe ri ng s of the o n l y
bachel o r i n h i s block.
From confidential instructions issued by the M inistry of Propaganda to
Periodical Editors, May 1 939
55

E The Ideal Aryan Family: Poster issued by the Office of Racial
Politics of the NSDAP, 1938
56

Culture
F Ideal Aryan Types: Adolf Ziegler's painting 'The Judgement of
Paris'
G The Ideal German Girl: Paul Keck's painting, exhibited in 1939
57

H The German Hero: Arno Brecker's 'The Guardian'
I Active Youth: Mural by Jiirgen Wegener
58

J Nazi architecture: The house of German Art in Munich,
designed by Hitler's favourite architect, Paul Troost
59
Culture

K Nazi Spectacle: The Dietrich Eckart open-air theatre, used for
Nazi ceremonies
60

Culture
L The Fuhrer Myth: Herman Hoyer's painting of Hitler speaking
to his early followers, exhibited in 1937
61

Questions
1 What do Sources A and B tell us about the cultural and propaganda
concerns of the Nazi authorities? (8 marks)
2 Using your own knowledge, explain the extent to which Source C
was typical of Nazi philosophy. (4 marks)
3 Why did the Nazis object to the jokes in Source D? (5 marks)
4 Identify the cultural messages being conveyed in Sources E-L.
(10 marks)
5 Hitler declared, 'In this world human culture and civilization are
inseparably bound up with the existence of the Aryan. ' To what
extent do these Sources reflect this belief? (10 marks)
62

9
SOCIAL POLICY
Nazi social policy revealed a mass of contradictions which were never
resolved and in some cases were probably incapable of resolution.
This paradox reflected the evolution of the Nazi movement's ideology
as a hotch-potch of ideas and the fact that Nazism meant different
things to different people even within the movement itself. For example,
the appeal of Nazism to peasants and the lower middle classes, artisans
and professional people, implied a hostility to large-scale capitalism
which did not fit easily with Hitler's rearmament programme and the
desire for co-operation with German industrialists. An even more
glaring contradiction was the insistence of the Nazis on the unified
Germanic community of equals, at the same time as the deliberate Nazi
curtailment of any serious attempts at female emancipation, on the
insistence that the woman's place was in the home and her prime duty
was to produce sons for the Reich. In many instances women were
positively forced out of full-time occupations.
The Nazis did practise specific forms of social engineering. For
example, organisations like the Labour Front and Hitler Youth might be
seen as genuine attempts to mould a 'Folk Community' which would
overcome traditional class differences and weld together those lucky
enough to be classified as true Aryan members of the master race.
The impact of these policies varied. For example, attempts to
exacerbate anti-semitic feelings among the German population met
with mixed success except where the groundwork had already been
done. The history of Nazi Germany shows that totalitarian states can
attempt social engineering, but without clear objectives and careful
indoctrination over a long period, success is not guaranteed.
A Hitler On Women
( i ) The slogan ' E m a ncipatio n of Wom e n ' was i nvented by J ewish
i nte l l ectu a l s and its co ntent was fo rmed by the same spi rit. In the
rea l ly good ti mes of Germ a n l ife the G e r m a n wo man had no need to
ema nci pate herself. . .
If the m a n's wo rld is said to be the State, h i s stru gg le, h i s readiness
to devote h i s powers to the service of the com m u n ity, then it may
perha ps be sa i d that the wo ma n's is a sma l ler wo rld. For her wo rld
is her h usba nd, h e r fa mi ly, her c h i l d re n , a n d her home . . . The two
worlds a re not a ntagonistic. Th ey co m p lement each other, they
belong together j u st as m a n a n d wo m a n belong together.
63

We do not co nsider it correct fo r the wo m a n to i nterfere i n the
wo rld of t h e m a n , i n h i s m a i n sphere. We co nsider it natu ra l if these
two wo rlds rem a i n d i stinct. . .
The sacrifices which the m a n makes i n the strug g l e of h is nation,
the wom a n m a kes in the preservation of that nation in i n d ivid u a l
cases. What the m a n g ives i n cou rage o n the battl efie l d , the wo man
g ives i n eternal self-sacrifice, i n eterna l pain a n d suffe ri n g . Every
ch i l d that a wo m a n brings i nto the wo rld is a battle, a battle waged
fo r the exi stence of her peo ple.
From H itler's 'Address to Women' at the N u remberg Party Rally,
8 September 1 934
( i i ) I d etest wo m e n who d a b b l e in pol itics. And if t h e i r d a b b l i ng
extends to m i l ita ry m atters, it beco mes utterly u nend u ra ble. I n no
l oca l section of the Pa rty has a wom a n ever had the right to hold
even the s m a l l est post. It has therefo re often been sa i d that we were
a pa rty of m isogynists, who rega rded a wom a n o n l y as a m ach ine fo r
making ch i l d ren, o r else a s a playt h i ng. That's fa r fro m bei n g the
case. I attached a l ot of i m po rta nce to women in the fie l d of the
tra i n i ng of youth , and that of good wo rks. . . Everyt h i n g that enta i ls
co m bat is exc l usively men's busi ness. There a re so m a ny other fields
i n which o n e m u st rely upon wo men. Org a n is i n g a h o u se, fo r
exa m ple.
H itler speaking on 26 January 1 942, from Hitler's Table-Talk ( 1 988)
B The Fu nction of Women
( i ) Beyo n d the bo u nds of perh a ps oth erwise necessa ry bou rgeois law
a n d usage, a n d o utside the sphere of m a rriage, it wi l l be the sublime
task of German wo men a n d g i rls of good blood, acti ng not frivolously
but fro m a profo u n d mora l seriousness, to beco me m others to
ch i l d ren of so l d iers setting off to battle, of whom desti ny a l one knows
if they wi l l retu rn or die fo r Germa ny.
From an order by H immler to the SS
( i i ) The pa rents of g i rls e n ro l led in the Germa n G i rls' Lea g ue have
fi led a co m pl a i nt with the wa rdsh i p co u rt at H a bei-Bra n de n b u rg
co ncern i n g leaders of the Lea g u e who h ave i nt i m ated to their
d a u g hters that t h ey shol.J i d bear i l l eg itimate c h i l d re n ; th ese l eaders
h ave poi nted out that i n view of the preva i l i n g shortag e of men, not
every g i rl co u l d expect to get a h usba nd i n futu re, a n d that the g i rls
s h o u l d at least fu lfi l thei r task as Germ a n wo m e n and donate a ch i l d
t o the F u h rer.
From a report to the M i nistry of Justice, 1 944
64

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