Del último número de Journal of Democracy, dedicado al resurgimiento autoritario. Artículo de Javier Corrales dedicado al caso venezolano. Corrales escribió, junto a Michael Penfold "Un dragón en el trópico", definiendo a Venezuela como un autoritarismo competitivo. Años después publicó un artículo donde señalaba que, luego de 2010, el régimen venezolano estaba tornándose cada día más autoritario y menos competitivo.
2010 Sais Russias Battle Against Corruption Updated April 3Ethan Burger
1. Dmitry Medvedev has launched reforms aimed at combating corruption in Russia, including overhauling the Interior Ministry, requiring officials to declare their incomes and assets, and increasing penalties for bribery.
2. However, some experts argue these efforts are still "toothless" without proper enforcement and oversight. Medvedev has replaced officials from power structures more aligned with Putin with his own appointees.
3. By expanding the role of the Audit Chamber, led by his ally Sergei Stepashin, Medvedev may be building an independent power base to curb corruption while circumventing bodies like the Investigative Committee. However, it remains unclear if this signals a
The Constriction of Civil Society Under Semi-Authoritarian RegimesEmily Bayens
1) At the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, many Middle Eastern and North African countries transitioned to semi-authoritarian political systems that combined some democratic elements with authoritarian control in order to appease citizens and reduce accountability.
2) While these semi-authoritarian regimes allowed more civil society organizations focused on human rights, they also sought to constrain these groups' activities in order to maintain power.
3) Egypt provides an example, enacting laws that gave the government broad control over NGO funding, activities, and leadership in order to limit threats to state power and national unity.
The document discusses the evolution of the US Criminal Justice System from the mid-1940s to present day. Key events that shaped the system include the civil rights movement, Vietnam War protests, rising crime rates, and 9/11 terrorist attacks. These events eroded public confidence in law enforcement and led to reforms aimed at restoring order while balancing civil liberties and safety. Federal programs in the 1960s and 70s provided funds to improve policing and courts but also imposed standards around issues like racism and use of force. While reforms helped reduce crime, new threats like terrorism continue to test the balance of safety and individual freedom.
1) The document discusses state and local law enforcement's role in enforcing immigration laws. It notes that while the federal government is responsible for immigration enforcement, they lack the resources to do so effectively.
2) It examines how some state and local law enforcement agencies have taken on immigration enforcement duties through programs like 287(g). This allows them to identify and detain undocumented immigrants.
3) However, taking on immigration enforcement can be problematic as it diverts resources away from other law enforcement responsibilities and may damage relationships with immigrant communities. Effective policies and oversight are needed.
Egypt fiw201final Relation Sandro Suzart SUZART GOOGLE INC United Stat...Sandro Suzart
relationship between Sandro Suzart SUZART GOOGLE INC and United States on Demonstrations 2013 and Impeachments of 22 governments Relation, Sandro Suzart, SUZART, GOOGLE INC, United States on Demonstrations countries IMPEACHMENT GOOGLE INC
President Rafael Correa has concentrated power in Ecuador by strengthening the executive branch and weakening congress and the judiciary through constitutional reforms. He has dismissed political opponents and rules by decree when he sees fit. Correa has been accused of violating civil and political rights through intimidating critics in the media and imposing new restrictions on press freedom. He does not respect the land rights of indigenous peoples or obtain their consent before allowing resource extraction on their traditional lands, contradicting Ecuador's constitution. These actions pose challenges to Ecuador's democracy by diminishing basic human rights and shifting power away from the people.
European Council on Foreign relations Policy Memory Ukraine after the Timoshe...Fund for Good Politics
The trial and sentencing of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko generated criticism and placed agreements between Ukraine and the EU in doubt. The memo argues the EU should pursue a dual approach: keep the agreements alive but don't formally sign them until Ukraine meets democratic standards, while also imposing sanctions on those responsible for democratic backsliding. President Yanukovych has rolled back democracy in Ukraine to consolidate power through tactics like tax intimidation and abusive trials of political opponents including Tymoshenko. The EU needs to both maintain pressure through red lines and sanctions, while also keeping agreements that matter for Ukraine's long term reform.
2010 Sais Russias Battle Against Corruption Updated April 3Ethan Burger
1. Dmitry Medvedev has launched reforms aimed at combating corruption in Russia, including overhauling the Interior Ministry, requiring officials to declare their incomes and assets, and increasing penalties for bribery.
2. However, some experts argue these efforts are still "toothless" without proper enforcement and oversight. Medvedev has replaced officials from power structures more aligned with Putin with his own appointees.
3. By expanding the role of the Audit Chamber, led by his ally Sergei Stepashin, Medvedev may be building an independent power base to curb corruption while circumventing bodies like the Investigative Committee. However, it remains unclear if this signals a
The Constriction of Civil Society Under Semi-Authoritarian RegimesEmily Bayens
1) At the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, many Middle Eastern and North African countries transitioned to semi-authoritarian political systems that combined some democratic elements with authoritarian control in order to appease citizens and reduce accountability.
2) While these semi-authoritarian regimes allowed more civil society organizations focused on human rights, they also sought to constrain these groups' activities in order to maintain power.
3) Egypt provides an example, enacting laws that gave the government broad control over NGO funding, activities, and leadership in order to limit threats to state power and national unity.
The document discusses the evolution of the US Criminal Justice System from the mid-1940s to present day. Key events that shaped the system include the civil rights movement, Vietnam War protests, rising crime rates, and 9/11 terrorist attacks. These events eroded public confidence in law enforcement and led to reforms aimed at restoring order while balancing civil liberties and safety. Federal programs in the 1960s and 70s provided funds to improve policing and courts but also imposed standards around issues like racism and use of force. While reforms helped reduce crime, new threats like terrorism continue to test the balance of safety and individual freedom.
1) The document discusses state and local law enforcement's role in enforcing immigration laws. It notes that while the federal government is responsible for immigration enforcement, they lack the resources to do so effectively.
2) It examines how some state and local law enforcement agencies have taken on immigration enforcement duties through programs like 287(g). This allows them to identify and detain undocumented immigrants.
3) However, taking on immigration enforcement can be problematic as it diverts resources away from other law enforcement responsibilities and may damage relationships with immigrant communities. Effective policies and oversight are needed.
Egypt fiw201final Relation Sandro Suzart SUZART GOOGLE INC United Stat...Sandro Suzart
relationship between Sandro Suzart SUZART GOOGLE INC and United States on Demonstrations 2013 and Impeachments of 22 governments Relation, Sandro Suzart, SUZART, GOOGLE INC, United States on Demonstrations countries IMPEACHMENT GOOGLE INC
President Rafael Correa has concentrated power in Ecuador by strengthening the executive branch and weakening congress and the judiciary through constitutional reforms. He has dismissed political opponents and rules by decree when he sees fit. Correa has been accused of violating civil and political rights through intimidating critics in the media and imposing new restrictions on press freedom. He does not respect the land rights of indigenous peoples or obtain their consent before allowing resource extraction on their traditional lands, contradicting Ecuador's constitution. These actions pose challenges to Ecuador's democracy by diminishing basic human rights and shifting power away from the people.
European Council on Foreign relations Policy Memory Ukraine after the Timoshe...Fund for Good Politics
The trial and sentencing of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko generated criticism and placed agreements between Ukraine and the EU in doubt. The memo argues the EU should pursue a dual approach: keep the agreements alive but don't formally sign them until Ukraine meets democratic standards, while also imposing sanctions on those responsible for democratic backsliding. President Yanukovych has rolled back democracy in Ukraine to consolidate power through tactics like tax intimidation and abusive trials of political opponents including Tymoshenko. The EU needs to both maintain pressure through red lines and sanctions, while also keeping agreements that matter for Ukraine's long term reform.
The document summarizes key aspects of the Philippine government system and presidency. It outlines that the Philippines has a presidential, unitary, and republican system of government with separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. It provides details on the qualifications, election process, terms and powers of the President and Vice President. It also discusses checks on presidential power and summarizes some notable recent Philippine presidents.
Initially published on 25th June 2008 in AfroArticles, American Chronicle and Buzzle
Republished on 8th March 2013 here:
https://kafaforfreedom.wordpress.com/2013/03/08/liberate-the-shekacho-nation-from-the-abyssinian-tyranny-stop-the-shekacho-genocide-now/
The document outlines several key media policies in the Philippines, including:
1. Foreign media ownership is prohibited under the Constitution and limits media ownership to Philippine citizens only. This has been a controversial issue given concerns about owner interference in reporting.
2. Defamation laws include criminal libel charges carrying prison time of up to 6 years as well as large civil damages, though some high court rulings have reversed large damages awards.
3. Privacy is protected under the Constitution and laws, with provisions against violations by government or private individuals, though no officials have been charged under the relevant penal code article.
This document discusses four major events that helped shape the US criminal justice system: 1) The Civil Rights Movement, 2) The Vietnam War, 3) Rising crime rates in the 1960s and 1970s, and 4) The 9/11 terrorist attacks. It provides historical context around these events, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and protests against the Vietnam War, and how the government responded through initiatives like President Johnson's War on Crime and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. The document also covers legal principles that govern criminal laws and procedures, such as due process, rules of evidence, and limits on criminal laws.
Law, Politics, and Morality in the Philippines (Follow me on Twitter@setectiv...Dr. Vivencio (Ven) Ballano
This presentation is based on Chapter I of the E-book of the author, "Juricial-Sociological Approach to Law, Politics, and Constitution in the Philippines
This document discusses freedom of speech and expression under Malaysian law. It begins by outlining the relevant constitutional provisions protecting freedom of speech, then discusses limitations on this right that are permitted by law, such as restrictions relating to security, public order, morality and contempt of court. Several laws that place restrictions on speech are examined in detail, including the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 and the Sedition Act 1948. Key cases interpreting and applying these laws are also summarized. The document concludes by restating the definition of "seditious tendency" under the Sedition Act.
The document discusses the three inherent powers of the state: police power, power of eminent domain, and power of taxation. It provides the following key points:
1. These three powers are essential to effective governance and rest on necessity, as governments cannot function without the ability to regulate citizens, expropriate private property, and collect taxes.
2. They are similar in that they interfere with private rights and property, require compensation, and have a legislative character.
3. Police power involves laws and regulations that promote public health, safety, morals, and welfare. Eminent domain allows expropriation of private property for public use with just compensation. Taxation allows the state to impose charges to fund itself
Seri Webinar: Memahami dan Mengurai Impunitas di Indonesia
Memahami Impunitas di Indonesia: Suatu Pengantar
Impunitas – secara singkat didefinisikan sebagai 'pembebasan dari hukuman' - mewabah di Indonesia. Artinya, pelanggaran hak asasi manusia pada umumnya dibiarkan begitu saja dan tidak berusaha dibenahi oleh negara dan institusi-institusi hukumnya. Di Indonesia, situasi ini telah ada selama beberapa dekade, dengan konsekuensi bencana bagi supremasi hukum dan masyarakat pada umumnya.
Banyak individu maupun organisasi yang terlibat aktif dalam upaya penguatan rule of law di Indonesia melihat fenomena ini sebagai masalah yang mendesak dan kompleks. Dengan latar belakang ini, Sekolah Tinggi Hukum Indonesia Jentera, Amnesty International Indonesia, Kelompok Kerja Indonesia-Belanda untuk Keadilan dan Pembangunan, dan Institut Van Vollenhoven dari Leiden Law School berinisiatif untuk menyelenggarakan lima seri webinar berjudul: Memahami dan Mengurai Impunitas di Indonesia.
Untuk mendiskusikan hal tersebut, mari bergabung dalam seri webinar pertama bertajuk “Memahami Impunitas di Indonesia: Suatu Pengantar”. Pada agenda ini, para pemateri akan berdiskusi secara interaktif perihal bagaimana akademisi hukum dan aktivis HAM mendefinisikan apa itu impunitas, serta menjelaskan bagaimana konteks sosial, politik, dan sejarah berkelindan di dalamnya.
Pembicara
Adriaan Bedner - Head of Department of the Van Vollenhoven Institute for Law, Leiden University
Usman Hamid - Direktur Eksekutif Amnesty International Indonesia dan Pengajar STH Indonesia Jentera
Moderator
Dian Rositawati - Peneliti Lembaga Kajian dan Advokasi untuk Independensi Peradilan dan Pengajar STH Indonesia Jentera
Acara diselenggarakan pada:
Kamis, 27 Januari 2022
Pukul 16.00-18.00 WIB
1. The document discusses Colombia's new "Law of Impunity" and the classification of paramilitary crimes as political offenses. This classification aims to exonerate paramilitaries from proportionate sentences, protect them from international justice, and allow their participation in politics.
2. The proposal to classify paramilitary crimes as political offenses originally came from paramilitary attorneys, not the government. Its inclusion in the law suggests the process prioritized paramilitary interests over justice.
3. Classifying these violent crimes as political contradicts the government's previous stances and results in absurdities within the legal system. It institutionalizes paramilitarism rather than dismantling it, as the paramilitary leader had announced was the goal
This document summarizes key issues regarding election systems in New York and the United States, focusing on campaign finance, access to voting, and voter eligibility. It provides a brief history of laws and debates around each issue area. For campaign finance, it discusses the history of expenditure limits, contribution limits, disclosure requirements, and public financing. For access, it examines voting methods and identification requirements. For eligibility, it outlines who is allowed to vote. The document also summarizes current debates around strengthening enforcement of campaign finance laws in New York State.
Non party caretaker government in bangladesh (1991-2001)Alexander Decker
This document discusses the concept and history of non-party caretaker governments, specifically analyzing Bangladesh's system from 1991-2001. It provides context on caretaker governments being established in other countries like the UK, India, and Pakistan to oversee elections. The document then analyzes the workings of Bangladesh's three caretaker governments during this period and argues that the system became a dilemma for democracy over time due to growing mistrust between political parties.
The document discusses how the rule of law is foundational to Western democracy. It defines the rule of law and democracy, noting that in democracies, laws are established by the people to serve the people. The rule of law allows societies to function by setting boundaries and punishing unlawful behavior. This establishes order without a higher authority like a dictator. Examples from the Great Depression and Recession show how governments used laws to reform financial systems and preserve stability. The absence of rule of law can lead to anarchy or authoritarian rule, as seen in conflicts like Syria. Overall, the rule of law is essential to democracy by allowing government to rule within set boundaries while keeping power with the people.
The document summarizes key aspects of the Philippine constitution and government based on the 1987 constitution. It outlines that the Philippines has a democratic and republican form of government where sovereignty resides with the people. It describes the bill of rights and individual freedoms guaranteed in the constitution. It also discusses the purpose and structure of the Philippine constitution.
Our fourth Impact Forum was held on January 27, 2016 at Soho House in NYC on the topic of Immigration & Borders. Our brief aims to inform the Impact community on key questions on the subject from a political & social impact perspective: What makes a sensible immigration policy? How should borders define citizenship, residency, and rights? 26% of the U.S. population is either a first- or second-generation immigrant. It is estimated that 30% of New York residents are born outside of the United States. The Impact community joined a panel of top experts on immigration-related policy and social justice for a dialogue on the future of the US immigration system, hosted at the Soho House.
Learn more about Impact Borders here:
https://impactborders.splashthat.com
The document summarizes key aspects of Colombia's constitutions over time. It discusses how Colombia's constitutions have addressed the division of powers, the strength of the chief executive, and the role of the Roman Catholic Church. The constitutions also settled debates around central versus federal government systems. Key amendments strengthened executive powers and allowed the president to declare states of emergency or siege to deal with economic or social crises. The constitution establishes three branches of government with separation of powers and checks and balances.
Freedom of expression & censorship in thailandgcanavati
This document summarizes IFEC's findings on freedom of expression and censorship in Thailand. It notes that Thailand has harsh censorship laws that have led to accusations of human rights violations. After a 2006 coup, censorship increased, especially online, due to criticism of the king. New laws like the Computer Crime Act of 2007 and stricter enforcement of lèse-majesté further restricted expression. The document analyzes several cases where individuals received long prison sentences for insulting the royal family. It concludes by urging Thailand to reform its laws to comply with international standards and protect freedom of expression.
This document contains lecture materials from a political science course covering various topics related to US government and federalism. It includes 10 course topics, such as American federalism, pressure groups in California, and civil rights movements. It also discusses the distribution of powers between national and state governments in the US system of federalism and how powers have centralized over time. Additionally, it addresses elite control of the policy process and how protest movements have achieved civil rights goals.
An introduction to what social media is, how it differs from traditional media, what social networks really share, and the implications for organizations who want to use them.
The marginal impact of ENGOs in different types of democratic systemsYsrrael Camero
This document summarizes a research article that examines how the impact of environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) on policymaking may depend on the type of democratic political system. The authors develop a theoretical framework arguing that ENGOs are likely to have a larger marginal impact on environmental public goods provision in parliamentary systems using proportional representation, compared to presidential systems using plurality voting. They find empirical support for this hypothesis in an analysis of 75 democracies and their ratification of 250 international environmental agreements between 1973-2002.
This short document promotes the creation of presentations using Haiku Deck on SlideShare. It contains a stock photo and text prompting the reader that they may be inspired to create their own Haiku Deck presentation. A call to action is given to get started making a presentation.
Water molecules are made of two hydrogen atoms bonded to one oxygen atom (H2O). Water molecules form weak hydrogen bonds between the slightly positive hydrogen of one molecule and the slightly negative oxygen of another molecule. This cohesion allows water molecules to stick together, while adhesion allows water to stick to other surfaces.
The document summarizes key aspects of the Philippine government system and presidency. It outlines that the Philippines has a presidential, unitary, and republican system of government with separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. It provides details on the qualifications, election process, terms and powers of the President and Vice President. It also discusses checks on presidential power and summarizes some notable recent Philippine presidents.
Initially published on 25th June 2008 in AfroArticles, American Chronicle and Buzzle
Republished on 8th March 2013 here:
https://kafaforfreedom.wordpress.com/2013/03/08/liberate-the-shekacho-nation-from-the-abyssinian-tyranny-stop-the-shekacho-genocide-now/
The document outlines several key media policies in the Philippines, including:
1. Foreign media ownership is prohibited under the Constitution and limits media ownership to Philippine citizens only. This has been a controversial issue given concerns about owner interference in reporting.
2. Defamation laws include criminal libel charges carrying prison time of up to 6 years as well as large civil damages, though some high court rulings have reversed large damages awards.
3. Privacy is protected under the Constitution and laws, with provisions against violations by government or private individuals, though no officials have been charged under the relevant penal code article.
This document discusses four major events that helped shape the US criminal justice system: 1) The Civil Rights Movement, 2) The Vietnam War, 3) Rising crime rates in the 1960s and 1970s, and 4) The 9/11 terrorist attacks. It provides historical context around these events, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and protests against the Vietnam War, and how the government responded through initiatives like President Johnson's War on Crime and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. The document also covers legal principles that govern criminal laws and procedures, such as due process, rules of evidence, and limits on criminal laws.
Law, Politics, and Morality in the Philippines (Follow me on Twitter@setectiv...Dr. Vivencio (Ven) Ballano
This presentation is based on Chapter I of the E-book of the author, "Juricial-Sociological Approach to Law, Politics, and Constitution in the Philippines
This document discusses freedom of speech and expression under Malaysian law. It begins by outlining the relevant constitutional provisions protecting freedom of speech, then discusses limitations on this right that are permitted by law, such as restrictions relating to security, public order, morality and contempt of court. Several laws that place restrictions on speech are examined in detail, including the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 and the Sedition Act 1948. Key cases interpreting and applying these laws are also summarized. The document concludes by restating the definition of "seditious tendency" under the Sedition Act.
The document discusses the three inherent powers of the state: police power, power of eminent domain, and power of taxation. It provides the following key points:
1. These three powers are essential to effective governance and rest on necessity, as governments cannot function without the ability to regulate citizens, expropriate private property, and collect taxes.
2. They are similar in that they interfere with private rights and property, require compensation, and have a legislative character.
3. Police power involves laws and regulations that promote public health, safety, morals, and welfare. Eminent domain allows expropriation of private property for public use with just compensation. Taxation allows the state to impose charges to fund itself
Seri Webinar: Memahami dan Mengurai Impunitas di Indonesia
Memahami Impunitas di Indonesia: Suatu Pengantar
Impunitas – secara singkat didefinisikan sebagai 'pembebasan dari hukuman' - mewabah di Indonesia. Artinya, pelanggaran hak asasi manusia pada umumnya dibiarkan begitu saja dan tidak berusaha dibenahi oleh negara dan institusi-institusi hukumnya. Di Indonesia, situasi ini telah ada selama beberapa dekade, dengan konsekuensi bencana bagi supremasi hukum dan masyarakat pada umumnya.
Banyak individu maupun organisasi yang terlibat aktif dalam upaya penguatan rule of law di Indonesia melihat fenomena ini sebagai masalah yang mendesak dan kompleks. Dengan latar belakang ini, Sekolah Tinggi Hukum Indonesia Jentera, Amnesty International Indonesia, Kelompok Kerja Indonesia-Belanda untuk Keadilan dan Pembangunan, dan Institut Van Vollenhoven dari Leiden Law School berinisiatif untuk menyelenggarakan lima seri webinar berjudul: Memahami dan Mengurai Impunitas di Indonesia.
Untuk mendiskusikan hal tersebut, mari bergabung dalam seri webinar pertama bertajuk “Memahami Impunitas di Indonesia: Suatu Pengantar”. Pada agenda ini, para pemateri akan berdiskusi secara interaktif perihal bagaimana akademisi hukum dan aktivis HAM mendefinisikan apa itu impunitas, serta menjelaskan bagaimana konteks sosial, politik, dan sejarah berkelindan di dalamnya.
Pembicara
Adriaan Bedner - Head of Department of the Van Vollenhoven Institute for Law, Leiden University
Usman Hamid - Direktur Eksekutif Amnesty International Indonesia dan Pengajar STH Indonesia Jentera
Moderator
Dian Rositawati - Peneliti Lembaga Kajian dan Advokasi untuk Independensi Peradilan dan Pengajar STH Indonesia Jentera
Acara diselenggarakan pada:
Kamis, 27 Januari 2022
Pukul 16.00-18.00 WIB
1. The document discusses Colombia's new "Law of Impunity" and the classification of paramilitary crimes as political offenses. This classification aims to exonerate paramilitaries from proportionate sentences, protect them from international justice, and allow their participation in politics.
2. The proposal to classify paramilitary crimes as political offenses originally came from paramilitary attorneys, not the government. Its inclusion in the law suggests the process prioritized paramilitary interests over justice.
3. Classifying these violent crimes as political contradicts the government's previous stances and results in absurdities within the legal system. It institutionalizes paramilitarism rather than dismantling it, as the paramilitary leader had announced was the goal
This document summarizes key issues regarding election systems in New York and the United States, focusing on campaign finance, access to voting, and voter eligibility. It provides a brief history of laws and debates around each issue area. For campaign finance, it discusses the history of expenditure limits, contribution limits, disclosure requirements, and public financing. For access, it examines voting methods and identification requirements. For eligibility, it outlines who is allowed to vote. The document also summarizes current debates around strengthening enforcement of campaign finance laws in New York State.
Non party caretaker government in bangladesh (1991-2001)Alexander Decker
This document discusses the concept and history of non-party caretaker governments, specifically analyzing Bangladesh's system from 1991-2001. It provides context on caretaker governments being established in other countries like the UK, India, and Pakistan to oversee elections. The document then analyzes the workings of Bangladesh's three caretaker governments during this period and argues that the system became a dilemma for democracy over time due to growing mistrust between political parties.
The document discusses how the rule of law is foundational to Western democracy. It defines the rule of law and democracy, noting that in democracies, laws are established by the people to serve the people. The rule of law allows societies to function by setting boundaries and punishing unlawful behavior. This establishes order without a higher authority like a dictator. Examples from the Great Depression and Recession show how governments used laws to reform financial systems and preserve stability. The absence of rule of law can lead to anarchy or authoritarian rule, as seen in conflicts like Syria. Overall, the rule of law is essential to democracy by allowing government to rule within set boundaries while keeping power with the people.
The document summarizes key aspects of the Philippine constitution and government based on the 1987 constitution. It outlines that the Philippines has a democratic and republican form of government where sovereignty resides with the people. It describes the bill of rights and individual freedoms guaranteed in the constitution. It also discusses the purpose and structure of the Philippine constitution.
Our fourth Impact Forum was held on January 27, 2016 at Soho House in NYC on the topic of Immigration & Borders. Our brief aims to inform the Impact community on key questions on the subject from a political & social impact perspective: What makes a sensible immigration policy? How should borders define citizenship, residency, and rights? 26% of the U.S. population is either a first- or second-generation immigrant. It is estimated that 30% of New York residents are born outside of the United States. The Impact community joined a panel of top experts on immigration-related policy and social justice for a dialogue on the future of the US immigration system, hosted at the Soho House.
Learn more about Impact Borders here:
https://impactborders.splashthat.com
The document summarizes key aspects of Colombia's constitutions over time. It discusses how Colombia's constitutions have addressed the division of powers, the strength of the chief executive, and the role of the Roman Catholic Church. The constitutions also settled debates around central versus federal government systems. Key amendments strengthened executive powers and allowed the president to declare states of emergency or siege to deal with economic or social crises. The constitution establishes three branches of government with separation of powers and checks and balances.
Freedom of expression & censorship in thailandgcanavati
This document summarizes IFEC's findings on freedom of expression and censorship in Thailand. It notes that Thailand has harsh censorship laws that have led to accusations of human rights violations. After a 2006 coup, censorship increased, especially online, due to criticism of the king. New laws like the Computer Crime Act of 2007 and stricter enforcement of lèse-majesté further restricted expression. The document analyzes several cases where individuals received long prison sentences for insulting the royal family. It concludes by urging Thailand to reform its laws to comply with international standards and protect freedom of expression.
This document contains lecture materials from a political science course covering various topics related to US government and federalism. It includes 10 course topics, such as American federalism, pressure groups in California, and civil rights movements. It also discusses the distribution of powers between national and state governments in the US system of federalism and how powers have centralized over time. Additionally, it addresses elite control of the policy process and how protest movements have achieved civil rights goals.
An introduction to what social media is, how it differs from traditional media, what social networks really share, and the implications for organizations who want to use them.
The marginal impact of ENGOs in different types of democratic systemsYsrrael Camero
This document summarizes a research article that examines how the impact of environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) on policymaking may depend on the type of democratic political system. The authors develop a theoretical framework arguing that ENGOs are likely to have a larger marginal impact on environmental public goods provision in parliamentary systems using proportional representation, compared to presidential systems using plurality voting. They find empirical support for this hypothesis in an analysis of 75 democracies and their ratification of 250 international environmental agreements between 1973-2002.
This short document promotes the creation of presentations using Haiku Deck on SlideShare. It contains a stock photo and text prompting the reader that they may be inspired to create their own Haiku Deck presentation. A call to action is given to get started making a presentation.
Water molecules are made of two hydrogen atoms bonded to one oxygen atom (H2O). Water molecules form weak hydrogen bonds between the slightly positive hydrogen of one molecule and the slightly negative oxygen of another molecule. This cohesion allows water molecules to stick together, while adhesion allows water to stick to other surfaces.
The document provides an overview of the BOLT trading system used by the Bombay Stock Exchange. BOLT allows for online screen-based trading and features order types like limit orders and stop loss orders. It provides tools for traders like real-time market data feeds, trade confirmations, and downloadable reports. BOLT aims to increase transparency, liquidity, and efficiency in the Indian stock market through its online nationwide trading network.
Este documento repite la misma dirección URL varias veces, posiblemente con el fin de promover un sitio web de informática educativa que parece ser gratuito. La URL lleva a un sitio que podría ofrecer recursos de informática para la educación.
Este documento proporciona un enlace a un sitio web sobre informática educativa. El dominio del sitio web contiene letras y números aleatorios que no parecen formar una dirección web válida. El contenido o propósito del sitio web no pueden determinarse a partir del enlace proporcionado.
This document is the introduction to the 12th edition of the World Bank Group's annual Doing Business report. It provides an overview of the report, which measures regulations affecting 11 areas of business across 189 economies. Specifically, it measures regulations on starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. The introduction emphasizes that while fiscal and monetary policy receive more attention, the business regulatory environment is equally or more important for economic success. It positions the Doing Business report as an important resource for understanding the business regulations that underlie economic development.
An introduction to web customer interaction tools and applications, discussion of the dilemma of offering web interaction, fundamentals of balancing cost of interaction with anticipated value of web customer, and lessons learned.
Sentencia de la Sala Constitucional del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia que modifica el Reglamento Interior y de Debates de la Asamblea Nacional, colocando al Parlamento bajo control irregular del Ejecutivo, destruyendo su autonomía institucional.
The document summarizes a project called Lashing@Sea that evaluated cargo securing practices on various vessel types. It found that:
1) While incidents are generally too high, operational and design factors sometimes lead to "unfortunate combinations of factors" that cause incidents.
2) Crew surveys found human and environmental conditions sometimes cause securing loads to increase unexpectedly.
3) Testing revealed row interactions in container stacks can dramatically increase loads, particularly in off-design conditions, and this is likely a major cause of multiple container losses.
4) Recommendations include improving declared container weights and maintenance of securing equipment, and developing tools to help crews handle extreme conditions and avoid nonlinear events.
This document provides a summary of global and regional employment trends and social outlook. It finds that while the global economy is recovering, significant challenges remain. An estimated 60 million jobs need to be created to keep up with new entrants to the labor market between 2014-2019. Youth unemployment remains high in many areas and gender gaps persist. Income inequality is rising in many advanced and developing economies. Population aging and changing occupational patterns will also impact labor markets and economies in the medium term. Overall, the recovery remains uneven across regions and renewed turbulence could loom over the employment horizon.
EEUU: relaciones económicas con América LatinaYsrrael Camero
Informe de la Comisión Económica para América Latina y El Caribe de las Naciones Unidas sobre las relaciones económicas de Estados Unidos con la región, entre los años 2013 y 2014.
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In a 3 page essay, address the following· Provide a summary of .docxwilcockiris
In a 3 page essay, address the following:
· Provide a summary of the vignette's key points as related to the social movements it represents. Identify and describe the concepts from this module that can be applied to the vignette to describe human behavior (i.e., cultural framing).
· Identify and discuss the effects of the identified social movement on the individual described in the vignette.
· Provide a summary of service methods or options that could be used to support this person. You can use examples you have identified in your own community as well.
Here are some notes down below to help out
Three major perspectives on social movements have emerged out of this lively interest. I refer to these as the political opportunities perspective, the mobilizing structures perspective, and the cultural framing perspective. There is growing agreement among social movement scholars that none of these perspectives taken alone provides adequate tools for understanding social movements (Buechler, 2011; Edwards, 2014). Each perspective adds important dimensions to our understanding, however, and taken together they provide a relatively comprehensive theory of social movements. Social movement scholars recommend research that synthesizes concepts across the three perspectives. The recent social movement literature offers one of the best examples of contemporary attempts to integrate and synthesize multiple theoretical perspectives to give a more complete picture of social phenomena.
Political Opportunities Perspective
Many advocates have been concerned about the deteriorating economic situation of low-wage workers in the United States for some time. After Republicans regained control of Congress in 1994, advocates saw little hope for major increases in the federal minimum wage. The federal minimum wage was increased slightly, from $4.25 an hour to $5.15 an hour in 1996, with a Democratic president and a Republican Congress. However, under the circumstances, advocates of a living wage decided it was more feasible to engage in campaigns at the local rather than federal level to ensure a living wage for all workers. A shift occurred at the federal level when the Democrats regained control of Congress in November 2006. After being stalled at $5.15 for 10 years, the minimum wage received a three-step increase from Congress in May 2007, and Republican president George W. Bush signed the new wage bill into law. The law called for an increase of the federal minimum wage to $5.85 in the summer of 2007, to $6.55 in the summer of 2008, and to $7.25 in the summer of 2009 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2014). In early 2014, Democratic president Barack Obama recommended an increase in the federal minimum wage to $10.10, but this proposal was given little chance in a highly polarized Congress. In the meantime, state and local governments continue to consider the issue of fair wages. These observations are in line with the political opportunities (PO) perspective, whose main.
Democracy originated from the Greek words "demos" meaning people and "kratein" meaning to rule. The key principles of democracy include rule of law, separation of powers, fundamental freedoms and rights, and free and fair elections. For a democracy to function properly, power is divided among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches; and citizens are guaranteed civil liberties like freedom of speech, religion, press, and political participation. The document also discusses concepts like pluralism, the role of opposition parties, and the importance of an independent media to hold governments accountable in a democracy.
Reagan's image as a likable president helped him politically. He was nicknamed the "Teflon president" as bad press did not stick to him. On domestic policy, Reagan cut taxes and regulations for businesses but faced pushback trying to cut welfare programs. His economic policies increased budget deficits. His focus was more on foreign policy where he took a hardline anti-communist stance against the Soviet Union.
This article examines the challenge that corruption poses to democracy. The author defines corruption as a government official using their position of authority to serve their personal interests rather than the public interest. This undermines democratic legitimacy by weakening the idea that government is accountable to citizens. The article argues that curbing corruption through accountability mechanisms is necessary to preserve democracy, as corruption can delegitimize democratic regimes and contribute to their failure.
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DEMOCRACY OR LIBERAL AUTOCRACY; THE CASE OF AFRICAJohn1Lorcan
The state of democracy in Africa continues to be one of the most controversial and difficult questions facing
the continent today. While African regimes are more liberal than their authoritarian predecessors, they
have a profound flaw. The African governments have increasingly adopted important aspects of
constitutional liberalism necessary for democracy to flourish and includes rule of law, private property
rights, separation of powers and free speech and assembly. However, the results of such democratic
initiatives have not bored the intended fruits as the continent continue to witness outright reversals of
democracy. For instance, elections are becoming a means of power preservation and a large number of
countries have very low levels of democratic quality. This paper, therefore, seeks to examine this dire state
of democracy in Africa to inform discussions on why African governments should be regarded as a Liberal
Autocracies and not democratic.
A PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE RIVERS STATE CASE STUDYNicole Heredia
Civil disobedience involves deliberately breaking an unjust law through non-violent protest to enact social or political change. It has been used throughout history in notable movements like the Boston Tea Party, Indian independence movement, and US civil rights movement. While some argue all laws must be obeyed, others believe it is morally justified to disobey laws seen as draconian or harmful. In a democracy, civil disobedience is generally viewed as a better mechanism for challenging unjust policies than violent means. The document then discusses the concept of civil disobedience in more detail.
KAFKAS ÜNİVERSİTESİ/KAFKAS UNIVERSITY
SOCIOLOGY
Course
LECTURE NOTES AND POWER POINT PRESENTATIONS
Prof.Dr. Halit Hami ÖZ
Kars, TURKEY
hamioz@yahoo.com
This document provides an overview of key concepts related to government and politics. It defines power as the ability to exercise one's will over others. There are three main types of authority: traditional authority which is accepted because it has been long established, charismatic authority which comes from personal qualities, and legal-rational authority which comes from holding an official position. Government power shapes social dynamics and influences local, national and global issues in ways that can affect different groups unequally based on status and class.
Gore clearly shows the evidence that the increase in global temperature over the last 100 years is, to a large extent, due to greenhouse gas emissions from human activity. He then presents the three ‘causes’: population, technology and barriers to new thinking
This document provides an overview of a study on democratic governance. It discusses democracy from theoretical, research, and application perspectives. The objectives are to examine democratic governance and discuss democracy theoretically, review contemporary research, and analyze applications. It aims to create a knowledge area module on theories of democratic governance and research.
Some analysts worry that the U.S. may be at risk of democratic backsliding similar to other countries. Democratic backsliding involves leaders weakening democratic institutions and norms. Historically, common forms included coups, executives consolidating power, and election fraud. However, the frequency of such actions has declined in recent decades. Instead, democratic backsliding now often involves more gradual, legal actions that undermine democracy over the long term. The main factors protecting against backsliding are respect for democratic norms and institutions.
The Purpose Of Government
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The document discusses different aspects and forms of democracy. It begins by defining democracy as a form of government where supreme power is vested in the people and exercised directly or by elected representatives. It then discusses direct democracy versus representative democracy. The document also outlines several other forms of democracy, including presidential democracy, parliamentary democracy, and participatory democracy. It provides examples of different countries that exemplify these various forms. Overall, the document provides a broad overview and comparison of the key forms and characteristics of democratic systems of government.
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Legalismo autocrático en Venezuela (Javier Corrales)
1. April 2015, Volume 26, Number 2 $13.00
The Authoritarian Resurgence
Lilia Shevtsova on Russia Javier Corrales on Venezuela
Abbas Milani/Alex Vatanka on Iran Frederic Wehrey on Saudi Arabia
Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement
Michael C. Davis Victoria Tin-bor Hui
The Freedom House Survey for 2014
Arch Puddington
Zoltan Barany on Transitions from Military Rule
Yun-han Chu & Bridget Welsh on East Asia’s Millennials
Elisabete Azevedo-Harman on Mozambique
Pierre Englebert on Zimbabwe
Harley Balzer on Vladimir Putin
Transitional Justice and Its Discontents
Duncan McCargo
3. 38 Journal of Democracy
take place. My argument focuses on the use, abuse, and non-use of the
rule of law.
Second, what were the causes of Venezuela’s rapid move toward
greater authoritarianism, especially in the last five years of chavismo?
Drawing from my previous work (often in collaboration with other
authors), I offer two basic arguments. One focuses on domestic fac-
tors: The ruling party’s declining electoral competitiveness since the
late 2000s, together with path dependence, helps to explain Venezu-
ela’s turn toward greater authoritarianism. The other focuses on for-
eign policy: By 2010, Venezuela had succeeded in creating a foreign
policy that shielded it from international pressures. Although other
factors were no doubt at play, these two served as the most essential
drivers.
During Chávez’s presidency, Venezuela became the paradigmatic
Latin American case of competitive authoritarianism. The ruling party,
known since 2007 as the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV),
competes in elections against a legal multiparty opposition, as one would
expect in a democracy. At the same time, the PSUV helps the executive
branch to weaken checks and balances, treat the opposition unfavorably,
and reduce the autonomy of civil society. Over the years, the regime’s
autocratic practices have become more pronounced.
Three Key Elements
The primary mechanism facilitating Venezuela’s increasing authori-
tarianism could be termed “autocratic legalism.” Autocratic legalism
has three key elements: the use, abuse, and non-use (in Spanish, desuso)
of the law in service of the executive branch.
Let us begin with the use of autocratic laws. Since it first came
to power, the ruling party has taken advantage of its dominance in
the country’s legislative bodies (the 1999 Constituent Assembly, the
1999–2000 “small congress” or congresillo, and the 2000–present na-
tional legislature), in conjunction with its total control of the Supreme
Court since 2005, to enact laws that empower the executive branch
at the expense of other branches of government. By the time of Hugo
Chávez’s death in March 2013, there were many such autocratic laws
on the books:
1) The 1999 Constitution, despite many democratic innovations, in-
creased the power of the president: It eliminated the Senate (an important
veto player); banned public funding for political organizations (which
is interpreted to mean political parties); and empowered the president to
call for referendums to recall legislators, dissolve the legislature under
certain conditions, and propose constitutional amendments and rewrites.
2) Enabling laws grant the president the right to rule by decree. The
chavista-dominated legislature passed enabling laws four times under
4. 39Javier Corrales
Chávez—in 1999, 2000, 2007, and 2010—and one time (so far) under
Maduro—in 2013.
3) The Organic Law of Telecommunications (2000) allows the gov-
ernment to suspend or revoke broadcasting concessions to private out-
lets if it is “convenient for the interests of the nation, or if public order
and security demand it.” This law was modified in 2011 to include all
audiovisual production (including cable TV) and to reduce concessions
to radio networks from 25 to 15 years.
4) The Law for Social Responsibility (2004) bans the broadcasting
of material that could incite or promote hatred and violence. It was ex-
tended in 2010 to apply to the Internet. Accordingly, electronic media
may not transmit messages that “foment anxiety in the public or disturb
public order,” “incite or promote disobedience to the current legal or-
der,” “refuse to recognize legitimately constituted authority,” or “incite
or promote hatred or intolerance.”
5) The 2005 penal-code reform expanded the desacato (insult) law,
which makes it illegal to be “disrespectful of government officials,” to
cover an even greater number of officials to whom this law applies. It
also seriously restricted the use of public spaces for protesting.
6) Laws governing “communal councils” (the Organic Law of Popu-
lar Power [2010], the Organic Law of Public Planning [2010], the Or-
ganic Law of Social Auditing [2010], and the Organic Law of Com-
munes [2010]) provide public funding and legal prerogatives to these
ill-defined bodies, which are required to work with the state to offer
services, carry out public works, and participate in community develop-
ment. In doing so, they often supersede the roles of elected mayors and
municipal councils. None of these laws requires the councils to hold
competitive elections for their representatives.
7) The Law for the Defense of Political Sovereignty and National
Self-Determination (2010) blocks Venezuelan human-rights defenders
from receiving international assistance. Nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) that “defend political rights” or “monitor the performance of
public bodies” are barred from receiving any foreign funding. Foreign-
ers invited to Venezuela by such groups can be summarily expelled from
the country if they express opinions that “offend the institutions of state,
top officials or attack the exercise of sovereignty.” The NGOs could
face stiff fines, and their directors could lose their right to run for public
office for up to eight years.
8) The Law Against Illicit Exchange Transactions (2010) grants the
government a monopoly over all currency trades, including government
bonds. Foreign currency from exports must be sold to the Central Bank
of Venezuela (BCV) at the official exchange rate. The law also bans
“offers” in foreign currency made between Venezuelan entities or indi-
viduals for the sale of goods and services.
9) The Law of Partial Reform of the Law of Political Parties, Meet-
5. 40 Journal of Democracy
ings and Protests (2011) bans deputies from any conduct that departs
from the “political orientation and positions” adopted by their party dur-
ing election times. This law is intended to deter legislators from voting
in opposition to the party line.
10) The Organic Law of Fair Prices (2014) is an update to the 2011
Law of Fair Costs and Prices, which legalized the regime’s broad sys-
tem of price controls and essentially did away with the price system.
The 2014 version stiffened the earlier law, expanding the number of
infractions to include the reselling of “essential” merchandise and the
commission of acts causing “economic destabilization.” It also bans
profits over 30 percent. Sanctions include fees, imprisonment, confis-
cation of assets, and the like. Furthermore, with the addition of “eco-
nomic destabilization”—which can be interpreted to mean even the
spreading of a rumor—the law expands the subjective justifications
that the state can invoke in order to sanction private agents. Since
2011, this law has also been one of the main causes of shortages and
informal markets, and an often used justification for cracking down on
the private sector.
Venezuela’s arsenal of autocratic laws exhibits two features. First,
the autocratic aspect of these laws is not always overt. It is often bur-
ied among an array of clauses or articles that empower citizens or other
political groups, and these surrounding clauses encourage empowered
groups to support these laws, at least initially. But there is always one
clause that ends up empowering the executive branch far more than other
actors, which is what makes these laws so autocratic. Second, these laws
have been enacted in a constitutional manner, at least insofar as they have
been duly approved by constitutionally sanctioned processes. This para-
dox poses a twofold problem for the opposition: 1) Such laws bolster the
state’s capacity to control nonstate actors, and 2) they cannot be easily
challenged because they have emerged through constitutional channels.
Abusing the Law: “Communicational Hegemony”
The second element of autocratic legalism is the abuse of the law,
meaning the inconsistent and biased implementation of laws and regula-
tions. In Venezuela, this has occurred in many domains, but is especially
salient in the media world, and it helps to explain how, under Chávez, the
balance between private independent media and government-controlled
media shifted in favor of the latter. Today, an ordinary Venezuelan with
little access to the Internet is more likely to be exposed to public or pro-
PSUV media, which is usually more easily available and economically
accessible than private independent media. The consequence has been
a significant decline in press pluralism. This shift in the media, known
locally as “communicational hegemony,” has been a deliberate strategy
of chavismo.1
6. 41Javier Corrales
By 2014, through the use and abuse of the law, communicational he-
gemony was extensive in both print media and television. For instance,
in 1998, there were 89 newspapers in Venezuela.2
All were private and
independent. By 2014, Venezuela had 102 newspapers, of which 56
percent were privately owned; 8 percent were state-owned; 15 percent
were “not independent,” meaning that they systematically leaned pro-
PSUV; and 22 percent were “undetermined,” meaning that they were
either too small or unavailable online to determine their orientation.3
State-owned newspapers are atypical in democracies. In Venezuela,
they are also overtly biased. While the private press is often criticized
for being too prone to denuncias (accusations)—seen as both a sign of
its non-neutrality and proof of the presence of democracy in Venezue-
la—a state-owned press that systematically censors positive information
about actors other than the state is no indication of democratic vitality.
The Maduro administration is committed to continuing the policy of
expanding the public press. It has already established public newspapers
in the cities of Valencia, Maracay, Cojedes, Guárico, and Petare, and
in 2014 the president stated that he wanted to have one in every town.
The shrinking of independent media is even starker in the realm of
television. In 1998, there were 24 television channels nationwide, of
which only 3 were public (and they were nonbiased). In 2014, there
were 105 TV channels, but only 46 percent were private. (If one looks
at local channels alone, the decline in the share of independent media
is steeper, from 80 percent in 1998 to 39 percent in 2014.) State-owned
channels now account for 17 percent of all television channels (14 per-
cent if one looks only at local and regional television channels). In
addition, under chavismo a new category emerged—“communitarian
channels,” located mostly in smaller cities, accounting for 37 percent
of television stations in 2014. Communitarian channels technically
are supposed to be independent, and many of them struggle to assert
some autonomy vis-`a-vis the state.4
But only progovernment channels
receive state funding and support. Given that there are few other fund-
ing sources, communitarian channels inevitably end up complying with
state directives.
1998 2014
Print
All newspapers nationwide 100% 56%
Of which, local and regional newspapers 100% 49%
Television
All television channels nationwide 88% 46%
Of which, local and regional channels 80% 39%
Note: Independent means 1) privately owned; 2) covering politics; 3) not communitar-
ian; and 4) not systematically censoring information that is favorable to the opposition.
Source: See endnote 2.
Table 1—Independent Print and TV Media (Percentage)
7. 42 Journal of Democracy
Venezuela’s rising communicational hegemony has come about as
a result of both the use and abuse of the law.5
The government has
used existing regulations to set up public newspapers. Several of these
circulate free of charge, easily displacing private competition—a prac-
tice that is within the law, but is meant to crowd out the independent
media. The state also abuses the law by harassing many independent
newspapers, imposing legal fines based on allegations of corruption
or violation of the media law, or arbitrarily denying access to foreign
exchange, which is necessary to buy paper. According to Reporters
Without Borders, at least 37 newspapers have had to reduce circula-
tion due to lack of paper.6
Other tactics have included preventing state
agencies from buying ads in targeted private newspapers; informally
pressuring editors to publish the “right” stories; and banning reporters
from covering government events. The regime’s goal is to abuse the
law to force private independent newspapers into financial distress,
thereby encouraging cutbacks (as in the case of the daily Tal Cual,
which had to scale back to weekly publication in early 2015) or even
the sale of a paper to new owners (as with El Universal). If a newspa-
per’s editorial line changes, the government will forgive the fines and
grant it foreign exchange.
The same use and abuse of the law has been applied to television. The
big decline in pluralism started in 2003, when Diosdado Cabello, the sec-
ond most powerful chavista politician today and president of the National
Assembly, took charge of the National Telecommunications Commission
(Conatel), the agency that regulates broadcast television and radio, and
restructured media regulations. Conatel is now in charge of determining
whether a station qualifies as a communitarian channel (and thus also
whether it is eligible for state funding). Conatel has also targeted private
television channels by arbitrarily refusing to renew their licenses (as with
RCTV in 2007) or by levying excessive fees for supposed violations of
the media law (as with Globovisión until 2013). In Venezuela, the only
way that a television station can guarantee its financial survival is by stay-
ing out of politics—that is, by self-censoring (as Globovisión has done
since it was sold to new owners in 2013) and refraining from coverage of
political events (as Venevisión and Televén normally do).
This rise of state-owned and nonindependent media has had a clear
effect on information availability. In January 2015, for example, the
opposition held a major march in downtown Caracas. No television
channel broadcast the march or speeches, continuing instead with
regular programming. Later that day, Globovisión reported on the
opposition leaders’ statements, but for no more than five minutes.
In contrast, most public television stations broadcast the one-hour-
plus speech that Maduro delivered the same day. Globovisión showed
Maduro’s speech live for fifteen minutes. Venevisión and Televén did
not televise Maduro’s speech, due to their tacit agreement with the
8. 43Javier Corrales
state not to cover politics.
The Non-Use of the Law: Electoral Irregularities
The third element of autocratic legalism is, paradoxically, reliance
on illegality. This has been especially significant in electoral politics.
One of Chávez’s most important authoritarian legacies is an electoral
environment plagued by irregularities and governed by a biased reg-
ulatory agency, the National Electoral Council (CNE). Indeed, in the
sixteen elections held during the chavista era, by my count there have
been more than 45 types of electoral irregularities, usually involving
biased enforcement of electoral laws and often outright violations—
for example, the government allows the PSUV to exceed spending or
airtime limits; allows polling centers to stay open past their scheduled
hours; arbitrarily bans candidates or observers; manipulates voting rules
to the ruling party’s advantage; cajoles state employees or welfare re-
cipients to vote a certain way; harasses voters at the polls; threatens to
deny funds to districts that elect opposition candidates; and conducts
cursory audits of results.7
Over time, some irregularities get corrected
for good—often due to pressure from the opposition—but other types
persist, and new irregularities tend to emerge with each new election.8
This irregularity-prone electoral environment has only deteriorated
since Chávez’s death in March 2013, beginning with the election for
his successor the following month. In that contest, Maduro, who was
then acting president, prevailed over his opponent, Henrique Capriles
Radonski, by a mere 235,000 votes (a 1.5 percent margin). The opposi-
tion claimed that, in the run-up to the election and on election day itself,
there were repeated and new irregularities (for example, PSUV sympa-
thizers were seen escorting voters to polls under the pretense of assisting
them; harassing electoral observers and voters; paying citizens to bring
people to the polls; and maybe even engaging in fraud at a few poll-
ing centers), which gave Maduro his narrow victory. After the results
were announced, protests broke out in Caracas and several other cities.
The government put down the demonstrations; in the end, seven people
were killed and dozens were injured. The opposition called for a full
audit, which was refused (although the CNE did conduct an audit of the
electronic tallies versus the paper ballots), and then—for the first time
since 2005—the opposition challenged the election, formally calling for
the election either to be annulled or done over in roughly 5,700 voting
tables (in Venezuela, each voting table or mesa electoral is associated
with a particular touchscreen voting machine).
That request was also denied, so the opposition made a futile attempt
to take its fraud complaint to the Supreme Court. Venezuela’s courts
are a key element in the regime’s non-use of the rule of law. High-
level judges have been overtly partisan since the government packed the
9. 44 Journal of Democracy
courts in 2004, and many lower-level judges are untenured and are often
penalized for ruling the wrong way. Furthermore, according to a recent
study, not one of the 45,474 rulings issued by the Supreme Court since
2005 has gone against the government.9
So it was no surprise that the
Court dismissed the opposition’s fraud suit.
While municipal elections the following December saw fewer cases of
irregularities at the ballot box, they did see the full force of state power
being leveraged in favor of PSUV candidates during the campaign period,
including overspending and the illegal use of public funds and state me-
dia. Moreover, at the time of the election, the terms of three of the five
members of the CNE—a body with only one nongovernment representa-
tive—had expired. With the 2013 elections, the Maduro administration
showed that it had not only inherited Chávez’s semi-authoritarian legacy,
but was building on it.
The heightening of autocratic legalism under Maduro has proved de-
stabilizing.10
To begin with, in early 2014 the opposition split over how
to respond to the faulty electoral process and the government’s refusal
to address irregularities, with one faction calling for and carrying out
street protests. The outbreak of popular demonstrations led to the worst
repression ever under chavismo, and perhaps under any elected govern-
ment in the country’s history.
Between February and April 2014, Venezuela was engulfed in dem-
onstrations, first launched by university students in the small western
cities of San Cristóbal and Mérida. The government harshly repressed
the initial round of protests, which only triggered more—this time coor-
dinated via social media, using the hashtag “#lasalida” (“the way out”).
Opposition hard-liners, including Leopoldo López (a former mayor of
the Chacao municipality of Caracas), María Corina Machado (an MP at
the time), and Antonio Ledezma (the mayor of metropolitan Caracas),
soon joined the fray, and the protest issues broadened to include the
economic slowdown, food shortages, and unreliable public services, as
well as rampant crime.
All told, roughly 800,000 people in at least sixteen states and 38
cities participated in protests for at least three months. Protesters set up
street barricades in mostly middle-class neighborhoods; some demon-
strators threw bottles, stones, and petrol bombs. The government sent in
the National Guard and the national police to put down the demonstra-
tions, and may have encouraged armed progovernment civilians (known
as colectivos) to intimidate protesters.11
According to a report by leading
human-rights organizations, the government forcibly broke up 34 per-
cent of these protests, far more than the most intense repression under
Chávez (7 percent in 2009), and detained more than 3,100 people.12
More surprisingly, the government went after opposition leaders, not
just ordinary protesters. López was arrested for “inciting violence,” de-
spite a lack of any evidence other than his writings in support of a change
10. 45Javier Corrales
in government, which allegedly had “subliminally” incited the protesters.
Machado was accused of treason for speaking at the OAS about human-
rights abuses in Venezuela and was subsequently expelled from the Na-
tional Assembly. She and other opposition leaders have even been ac-
cused of plotting to kill the president, and in December 2014 Machado
was officially indicted for conspiracy and treason. Ledezma was arrested
in late February 2015 on charges of plotting to overthrow the government.
Domestic and International Factors
If the use, abuse, and non-use of the law account for the mechan-
ics of Venezuela’s shift toward greater authoritarianism, what are the
causes behind it? The main domestic driver is a combination of path
dependence and declining electoral competitiveness, as Michael Penfold
and I argue in our forthcoming second edition of Dragon in the Tropics.
By path dependence, we mean that once sufficient domestic institutions
are established to permit the state to govern in authoritarian ways, these
institutions become the preferred instruments for making policy choic-
es. Given that Chávez had already erected the framework and acquired
the tools to facilitate government repression, the Maduro administra-
tion—because it had the necessary institutions, legal instruments, and
a political ideology—naturally used them to crack down harder on the
opposition.
But a second important reason for the heightening of authoritarian-
ism is more systemic—namely, the decline in the ruling party’s elector-
al competitiveness. In the 2006 presidential election, Chávez defeated
the opposition overwhelmingly with 63 percent of the vote. Since then,
however, the opposition has been steadily gaining ground on the PSUV
at the polls. The PSUV’s electoral decline slowed in the 2012 presiden-
tial election, the last one in which Chávez competed (he won 55 per-
cent of the vote), but intensified immediately after Chávez’s death. In
the April 2013 presidential election, Maduro won just 51 percent of the
vote. Even though the PSUV performed much better in the December
2013 municipal elections, its gains were not substantial: If the votes for
all the opposition parties are tallied together, the PSUV’s margin of vic-
tory was a mere 2.7 percentage points, a far cry from the double-digit
margins that it enjoyed in the mid-2000s.
As the ruling party in a competitive authoritarian regime loses its
ability to compete electorally, it has greater incentives to stress its au-
thoritarian side as a means of survival. It should come as no surprise
that a hybrid regime would opt to become more authoritarian when the
traditional voter enticements that it needs to compete for the vote (ideo-
logical appeal, economic resources, policy innovation, and competent
governance) are unavailable or are becoming exhausted. Together with
the availability of the tools of autocratic legalism, the PSUV’s electoral
11. 46 Journal of Democracy
decline is the most important cause for the intensification of repression
under Maduro.
The second reason that Venezuela has managed to turn more authori-
tarian is the creation of an international shield.13
During Chávez’s presi-
dency, Venezuela began using its foreign policy to build an “alliance of
tolerance”—that is, an alliance of countries unwilling to criticize Ven-
ezuela, let alone join any international effort to sanction it for domestic
wrongdoings. In essence, Venezuela used its oil resources to expand this
alliance across Latin America and beyond. Between 2003 and 2012, the
country’s oil revenues vastly exceeded those of any other country in the
region—accounting for more than 30 percent of Venezuela’s GDP dur-
ing that time.14
But Venezuela has also experienced a steep decline in oil
production since 2000.15
Consequently, since then Venezuela has been
one of the two OPEC members that have most strongly advocated maxi-
mizing oil prices, much to the frustration of oil-importing countries. In
order to improve its reputation among oil importers and build Venezu-
ela’s “soft power,” Chávez expanded foreign aid, which he touted as
promoting a more pro-poor form of development than Western aid.16
Building an “Alliance of Tolerance”
Chávez’s best-known foreign-aid program is Petrocaribe. Formed in
2005, this trade deal allows seventeen small Caribbean and Central Ameri-
can countries to purchase subsidized oil from Venezuela under favorable
financial terms. Compared to similar earlier agreements, Petrocaribe in-
creased the number of country beneficiaries as well as the volume of oil
that they receive, raised the price subsidy, and made repayment terms even
more favorable for recipient countries. By 2013, Petrocaribe was supply-
ing 59 percent of Cuba’s total oil consumption, 93 percent of Haiti’s, 70
percent of Nicaragua’s, and 13 percent of El Salvador’s.17
Venezuela has
similar oil-subsidy and soft-finance agreements with Argentina.18
Chávez’s expansive economic aid extended beyond Petrocaribe in at
least four additional domains: 1) allowing debt retirement, forgiveness,
or tolerance for countries that have trouble paying their debts; 2) making
Venezuela a major importer of goods and services (to the great benefit
of Brazil and Colombia); 3) opening the oil and energy sectors to allied
countries such as China, Brazil, Russia, and Iran; and 4) expanding in-
ternational information services (namely, Telesur).
The flow of petroproducts, petrosubsidies, petrodollars, and petro-
contracts from Venezuela to foreign countries won Chávez remarkable
diplomatic support. Even though many countries disliked Chávez’s
policy of keeping oil prices high and frowned on the restriction of civil
liberties inside Venezuela, his generous foreign economic aid was wel-
comed by recipients as well as ideologues who saw the aid policy as
another example of the regime’s commitment to anticapitalism.
12. 47Javier Corrales
Venezuela has also been known to threaten cutting economic ties
with developed nations as a way to secure support. For example, in 2014
Venezuela was rumored to have pressured the Netherlands into blocking
the extradition of Hugo Carvajal, the former head of Venezuelan mili-
tary intelligence, from Aruba (a Caribbean-island country that is part
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands) to the United States by threatening
to ban Royal Dutch Shell and Unilever from operating in Venezuela.
In February 2015, a Spanish daily reported that the Venezuelan gov-
ernment officially threatened several large Spanish multinationals with
expropriation if they did not pressure the Spanish government to adopt
a more pro-Venezuela policy.19
The establishment of Venezuela’s alliance of tolerance was facilitated
by the reluctance of Latin American governments, despite their com-
mitment to human rights, to censure sitting presidents for their failings.
Due in part to this regional reticence, the United States decided to take a
stronger stand, declaring Venezuela a “national security threat” in March
2015, thereby paving the way to put sanctions on seven key Venezuelan
officials. But Maduro will probably use this so-called U.S. aggression to
his advantage in order to justify further state encroachments.
Not all of Venezuela’s foreign-policy aims have been achieved. With
Venezuela’s foreign largesse, Chávez set out to do more than just establish
an alliance of tolerance. He wanted not only to preempt foreign critics,
but also to expand the number of like-minded regimes in the region. Ven-
ezuelan foreign aid has contributed directly to the electoral campaigns of
chavista-like movements across Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Co-
lombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and El Salvador) and even outside the region
(Spain), often with success. A recent study of Venezuela’s influence in El
Salvador shows how this petrodiplomacy works. Venezuelan aid helped El
Salvador to establish Alba Petróleos, a state-owned company that distrib-
utes oil within the country. Alba Petróleos, which is run almost entirely by
El Salvador’s ruling party and therefore rarely audited, provides funding
mostly to municipalities governed by ruling-party mayors and also spends
heavily on social projects during electoral campaigns. The company does
not always pay back its debts to Venezuela, which Venezuela condones
(the alliance of tolerance works both ways).20
Despite some early successes (notably in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nica-
ragua), the strategy of using foreign aid to create clone regimes has back-
fired. In recent years, Venezuelan efforts to support particular political
factions abroad have generated virulent counterreactions in countries such
as Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Honduras, and Paraguay. Anti-chavista lead-
ers became all the more popular, and leftist candidates began to disavow
ties to chavismo. Furthermore, a number of Latin American notables, in-
cluding five former Latin American presidents, have criticized Maduro’s
2014–15 crackdown. In sum, Venezuela’s effort to mold clone regimes
has had mixed results at best, but its attempt to create an alliance of toler-
13. 48 Journal of Democracy
ance has been a major success, enabling Chávez to rule more autocrati-
cally without having to face much international criticism.
Beyond the Neighorhood
One of Chávez’s most important foreign-policy initiatives was the cre-
ation of the television news channel Telesur. Founded in 2005, Telesur is
based in Caracas but broadcasts internationally. Its mission is to compete
with “imperialist” news sources such as CNN and provide a “Latin Amer-
ican” and “south-oriented” perspective. Telesur offers a free-to-air signal,
which means that it can be picked up by anyone with the appropriate
equipment. According to the Venezuelan government, the channel is in-
terested in acquiring a mass audience, not profits. Telesur, whose annual
operating budget is estimated to be in the range of US$10 to 15 million,
claimed to have 7.7 million “subscribers” worldwide in 2014.
Like Chávez’s other foreign-policy initiatives, Telesur has a mixed
record. On the one hand, Telesur has secured international partners who
have helped to fund the enterprise, including Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba,
Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Uruguay. In addition, Telesur has information-
sharing agreements with numerous organizations including Al-Jazeera,
the BBC, Russia’s RT, Iran’s IRIB, and China’s CCTV, among others.
Initially launched solely as a Spanish-language channel, it began broad-
casting in Portuguese in 2008 and in English in 2014.
On the other hand, Telesur’s actual viewership is probably low. Ven-
ezuela’s information minister recently admitted that he does not know
how many people are actually watching the channel, claiming that Telesur
lacks the resources to collect data on viewership.21
The private firm AGB
Nielsen, which does collect viewership data in Venezuela, reports that be-
tween 2008 and 2012 Telesur had an average share of 0.48 percent, making
it one of the least-viewed channels in the country (by comparison, Venev-
isión’s share ranged from 23 to 36 percent).22
Although there are no data on
Telesur’s international viewership, we can use Twitter to get an idea of the
channel’s popularity. Compared to its competition, Telesur is enormously
aggressive on Twitter, at least in terms of tweets posted per month (see
Table 2). At the same time, however, Telesur is significantly underper-
forming in terms of Twitter followers: Its average increase in number of
followers per month pales in comparison to that of CNN en Espa~nol.
Telesur is emblematic of the Venezuelan regime’s efforts to dis-
seminate its worldview as widely as possible: The government pushes
hard for modest returns, but seems not to be too worried about this
poor investment-to-return ratio. In the battle against “imperialism,”
Venezuela is committed for the long haul.
Venezuela’s active foreign policy extends well beyond its neighbor-
hood. The regime has established fairly close ties with nondemocracies
across the globe, including China and Russia, as well as such pariah states
14. 49Javier Corrales
as Iran, Syria, and Libya under Qadhafi. These extrahemispheric partner-
ships have been motivated by general goals as well as specific bilateral
ones.23
In terms of the former, the regime has sought to forge opaque (and
therefore insulated from public scrutiny) economic and business relation-
ships, something that is easier done with nondemocracies, and to create
more diplomatic complications for the United States by teaming with
its adversaries. It is widely known that Venezuela’s regime under both
Chávez and Maduro has partnered with countries such as China, Russia,
Iran, and Syria on lucrative deals and economic investments.
The specifically bilateral goals are numerous. Venezuela hopes to find
a reliable alternative market for its oil in China, and to further increase
the more than $50 billion that China has already invested in the Venezu-
elan economy. Meanwhile, the regime is a huge buyer of Russian weap-
onry; Venezuela is estimated to have purchased about three-quarters of
the $14.5 billion that Russia earned from arms sales in Latin America
between 2001 and 2013.24
Finally, Venezuela had hoped that Iran would
join it in a subgroup within OPEC to counterbalance Saudi Arabia’s ef-
forts to keep oil prices down. The United States feared for some time
that the Venezuelan-Iranian partnership would lead to nuclear projects
in Venezuela as well as Iran-sponsored terrorism across Latin America,
though Western concern over Iranian influence in the region appears to
have subsided somewhat since 2012.
Today, with Venezuela facing a severe economic crisis that makes
it a less lucrative business partner and a less attractive role model, the
regime’s ability to project power globally is dwindling. So Maduro has
had to change tactics. Rather than trying to reshape the outside world,
his main goal now is to convince Venezuela’s global partners that, in
terms of their economic interests in Venezuela, a change in the status
quo is likely to be harmful to them. This is just another way of using
economic ties abroad to promote regime survival at home.
During sixteen years of chavismo, and especially since 2006, Venezu-
ela’s regime has steadily moved toward harsher authoritarian practices.
This trajectory was not preordained. Not all hybrid regimes move in this
direction. Many factors contributed to Venezuela’s rising authoritarian-
ism: high oil prices in 2003–2008 and 2010–2012, which gave the state
vast resources with which to coopt and repress opposition; the decline
in Western democracy-promotion initiatives; the growing influence of
Account Joined Twitter
Avg. No. of
Tweets/Month
Avg. Increase
in Followers/Month
CNN en Espa~nol April 2009 794 165,038
BBC Mundo November 2007 698 15,316
Telesur June 2009 8,570 16,236
NTN24 (Colombia) April 2010 2,602 47,254
Table 2—Telesur and Competitors on Twitter
Source: Tabulated by author based on www.twitter.com.
15. 50 Journal of Democracy
new nondemocratic powers such as China and Russia; the intensifica-
tion of U.S. unilateralism between 2001 and 2008, which provoked Ven-
ezuela’s nationalist impulses; the global shift toward greater tolerance
for statism after two decades of neoliberalism; and even the errors and
weaknesses of the Venezuelan opposition.
All these factors no doubt played a role. But in hybrid regimes, state
officials also have at their disposal the necessary instruments to steer
their countries toward deeper forms of authoritarianism. In the case of
Venezuela, such instruments have included the clever use of electoral
majorities at home and petrodollars abroad. Now that both of these are
scarcer, the regime is under unprecedented strain. It is facing newer
pressures from international critics (though still too few from Latin
America) and from a reenergized domestic opposition determined to re-
verse the regime’s course. Economics and elections have left Maduro
cornered to a far greater degree than Chávez ever was. Will Maduro
yield to these pressures or will he counterattack? Based on his presi-
dency so far, Maduro appears to be confident that he has enough insti-
tutional control at home and support abroad to stay the course. So it is
entirely possible that one of Latin America’s most politically restrictive
regimes could turn even more restrictive in the years to come.
NOTES
1. See “Grandes Objetivos Históricos y Objetivos Nacionales,” Programa de la Patria
2013–2019, http://blog.chavez.org.ve/programa-patria-venezuela-2013-2019/idependen-
cia-nacional/#.VPmcVuGLiJ8.
2. This figure for Venezuelan newspapers is based on Juvenal Mavares’s annual media
directory, Directorio de relaciones públicas y medios de comunicación social (Caracas:
J&M Asociados, 1998); see also Prensa Escrita’s list of Venezuelan newspapers at www.
prensaescrita.com/america/venezuela.php.
3. I am grateful to Franz von Bergen and Juan Gabriel Delgado for their research assis-
tance. In order to determine if a private newspaper was independent, we checked whether for-
mer staff reporters or other news media reported cases of censored information in the cover-
age of news that was favorable to the opposition. No doubt, some qualitative judgments were
employed. But leaving aside my count of nonindependent print media, the evidence is still
clear: The size of private independent print media has declined considerably under chavismo.
4. See Sujatha Fernandes, Who Can Stop The Drums? Urban Social Movements in
Chávez’s Venezuela (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).
5. Philip Bennett and Moisés Naím. “21st
-Century Censorship,” Columbia Journalism
Review, 5 January 2015, http://moisesnaim.com/columns/21st-century-censorship.
6. “Unos cuarenta periódicos, afectados por la escasez de papel en Venezuela,” Re-
porteros Sin Fronteras, 12 September 2014, http://es.rsf.org/venezuela-unos-cuarenta-
periodicos-afectados-12-09-2014,46951.html.
7. Javier Corrales, “Electoral Irregularities Under Chavismo: A Tally,” Americas Quarter-
ly, 11 April 2013, www.americasquarterly.org/electoral-irregularities-under-chavismo-tally.
16. 51Javier Corrales
8. Miriam Kornblith, “Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift: Chavismo After Chávez?”
Journal of Democracy 24 (July 2013): 47–61.
9. Edgar López, “En nueve a~nos el TSJ no ha dictado ni una sentencia contra el gobi-
erno,” El Nacional, 1 December 2014, www.el-nacional.com/politica/anos-TSJ-dictado-
sentencia-gobierno_0_529147208.html.
10. This section draws from Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold, Dragon in the Trop-
ics: The Legacy of Hugo Chávez, 2nd
ed. (Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming).
11. International Crisis Group, “Venezuela: Dangerous Inertia,” Latin America Brief-
ing, No. 31, 23 September 2014.
12. Programa Venezolano de Educación-Acción en Derechos Humanos (PROVEA),
“Venezuela 2014: Protestas y derechos humanos,” Informe, February–May 2014, www.
derechos.org.ve/pw/wp-content/uploads/Informe-final-protestas2.pdf; “Maduro supera a
Chávez en represión,” Hoy (Quito), 8 July 2014, www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/madu-
ro-supera-a-chavez-en-represion-609719.html.
13. Javier Corrales and Carlos A. Romero, U.S.-Venezuela Relations Since the 1990s:
Coping with Midlevel Security Threats (New York: Routledge, 2013).
14. Francisco J. Monaldi, “Oil and Politics: Venezuela Today,” paper presented at the
Latin American Studies Association Congress, Washington, D.C., 2013.
15. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Venezuela: Country Analysis Brief
Overview,” availiable at www.eia.gov/countries.
16. Javier Corrales, “Using Social Power to Balance Soft Power: Venezuela’s Foreign
Policy,” Washington Quarterly 32 (October 2009): 97–114.
17. Andres Schipani and John Paul Rathbone, “Oil Price Rout Forces Venezuela to
Rethink Petro-Diplomacy,” Financial Times, 14 January 2015.
18. For a more precise look at Venezuela’s petro-aid in its neighborhood, see the
table “Venezuela’s Petro-Aid: Subsidized Oil Shipments Within Latin America” at www.
journalofdemocracy.org/articles/supplemental-material.
19. See “Amenazan con expropiar a empresas espa~nolas,” El Nacional (Caracas), 16
February 2015, www.el-nacional.com/economia/Amenazan-expropiar-empresas-espano-
las_0_575342576.html.
20. Agustín E. Ferraro and Juan José Rastrollo, “¿Clientelismo político en El Salva-
dor? Estudio de caso de Alba Petróleos y sus empresas relacionadas,” Salamanca Univer-
sity, www.slideshare.net/FUSADESORG/clientelismo-poltico-en-el-salvador-estudio-de-
caso-de-alba-petrleos-y-sus-empresas-relacionadas.
21. See “Telesur celebra cinco a~nos de vida ‘haciendo mejor periodismo que CNN,’”
Correo del Orinoco (Caracas), 1 August 2010, www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/comunica-
cion-cultura/telesur-celebra-cinco-anos-vida-haciendo-mejor-periodismo-que-cnn.
22. See AGB Nielsen Media Research, “Share por canal inter anual 2008 al 2012: To-
tal individuos,” www.agbnielsen.com.ve/libro2012/SHARE/TOTAL_INDIVIDUOS.html.
23. Corrales and Romero, U.S.-Venezuela Relations, 162.
24. Ilan Berman, “Russia Pivots Toward Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua,” Washington
Times, 26 March 2014.