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IFRS9 materially impacts lending economics, particularly for consumer credit and SME products where some segments will be significantly less attractive than today. Given all lenders are affected, this represents a challenge and an opportunity. Those who develop their responses early and optimise their actions stand a good chance of getting ahead of the competition.
The paper attached examines how IFRS9 impacts profitability, where the effects are most material, and how lenders can respond.
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Counterparty Credit Risk | Evolution of
the standardised approach to determine the EAD of counterparties
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Strategic implications of IFRS9 oliver wymanGeoff Holmes
IFRS9 will fundamentally change the level and dynamics of credit provisions, and will result in significantly diminished returns for some segments. To date, most banks have focussed on ensuring compliance, but with the 2018 implementation deadline approaching attention is turning to understanding and mitigating the impacts.
IFRS9 materially impacts lending economics, particularly for consumer credit and SME products where some segments will be significantly less attractive than today. Given all lenders are affected, this represents a challenge and an opportunity. Those who develop their responses early and optimise their actions stand a good chance of getting ahead of the competition.
The paper attached examines how IFRS9 impacts profitability, where the effects are most material, and how lenders can respond.
Liquidity Risk is normally a crucial issue in a banking crisis, however, during the 2007-2010 period, Liquidity has not been as difficult for us as we may have thought. There are many reasons for this, but number one is the fact that today’s community bankers simply have a better understanding of the various techniques for raising both retail deposits and wholesale funds. What does make this crisis a bit different is the relative pricing efficiencies in the wholesale or non-core funding arena these days and our session will focus on how bankers can avoid those difficult examiner discussions about the use of FHLB Advances and Brokered Deposits. It’s all about process and we will provide guidance on what needs to be in your ALCO Policy as it relates to wholesale funding. We will also explore the April 2010 Liquidity and Funds Management Guidance to ensure your bank is up to speed on those requirements. Finally, we will provide specific guidance on both Ratio Analysis and creating your Contingency Funding Plan and will review a sample CFP.
Counterparty Credit RISK | Evolution of standardised approachGRATeam
In this Article, we have made a focus on the new standard methodology (SA-CCR) for computing the EAD related to Counterparty Credit Risk portfolios. The implementation of a SA-CCR approach will become increasingly important for the Banks given the publication of the finalised Basel III reforms; in which it will require from financial institutions to compute an output floor to compare their level of RWAs between Internal and Standard approaches.
Counterparty Credit Risk | Evolution of
the standardised approach to determine the EAD of counterparties
This article focuses on Counterparty Credit Risk. The topic of this article is on the evolution and need of standardised method for the assessment of Exposure at Default of counterparties and their Capitalisation under regulatory requirements.
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Empirical Analysis of Bank Capital and New Regulatory Requirements for Risks ...Michael Jacobs, Jr.
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Modern credit risk modeling (e.g., Merton, 1974) increasingly relies on advanced mathematical, statistical and numerical echniques to measure and manage risk in redit portfolios
This gives rise to model risk (OCC 2011-16) and the possibility of nderstating nherent dangers stemming from very rare yet plausible occurrencs perhaps not in our eference data-sets International supervisors have recognized the importance of stress testing credit risk in the Basel framework (BCBS, 2009)
It can and has been argued that the art and science of stress testing has lagged in the domain of credit, vs. other types of risk (e.g., market), and our objective is to help fill this vacuum
We aim to present classifications & established techniques that will help practitioners formulate robust credit risk stress tests
It is not difficult to find situations of marked change in variables and with unpredictable event risk implies estimation problems. E.g.,
Credit spreads in 2008 rise to levels that could never have been forecast based upon previous history. The subprime crisis of 2007/8: credit spreads & volatility rise to unseen levels & shift in debtor behavior (delinquency patterns)
E.g., estimating the volatility from data in a calm (turbulent) period implies under (over) estimation of future realized volatility
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odd-Frank and Basel III Post-Financial Crisis Developments and New Expectations in Regulatory Capital. Following the recent global financial crisis of 2009, financial regulators have responded with arrays of proposals to revise existing risk frameworks for financial institutions with the objective to further strengthen and improve upon bank models. In this meeting, Dr. Michael Jacobs will discuss new developments and expectations in regulatory capital with particular reference to the definition of the capital base, counterparty credit risk, procyclicality of capital, liquidity risk management, and sound compensation practices. He will also explain the implications of the Frank-Dodd rule for financial institutions and will conclude by presenting the implementation schedule for Basel III.
This study provides a practical way to anticipate systematic LGD risk. It introduces an LGD function that requires no parameters other than PD, expected LGD, and correlation. This function survives testing against more-elaborate models of corporate credit loss that allow either greater or less LGD risk. Unless a significant improvement were discovered, the LGD function presented here can be used to anticipate systematic LGD risk within a credit loss model or to quantify downturn LGD.
In-spite of large volumes of Contingent Credit Lines (CCL) in all commercial banks, the paucity of Exposure at Default (EAD) models, unsuitability of external data and inconsistent internal data with partial draw-downs has been a major challenge for risk managers as well as regulators in for managing CCL portfolios. This current paper is an attempt to build an easy to implement, pragmatic and parsimonious yet accurate model to determine the exposure distribution of a CCL portfolio. Each of the credit line in a portfolio is modeled as a portfolio of large number of option instruments which can be exercised by the borrower, determining the level of usage. Using an algorithm similar to basic the CreditRisk+ and Fourier Transforms we arrive at a portfolio level probability distribution of usage. We perform a simulation experiment using data from Moody\'s Default Risk Service, historical draw-down rates estimated from the history of defaulted CCLs and a current rated portfolio of such.
1. Regulatory Frameworks for Market
Risk Capital
Michael Jacobs, Ph.D., CFA
Senior Manager
Audit and Enterprise Risk Services
Deloitte and Touche LLP
June 2012
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Deloitte and Touche LLP.
2. Regulatory Frameworks for Market Risk:
Introduction
• To address weaknesses in the existing capital framework that were
manifest during the recent financial crisis BCBS introduced a series of
revisions to the advanced approaches risk-based capital framework
• These include enhancements to the Basel II framework & Basel III, a
global regulatory framework for more resilient banks & bank systems
• Agencies are proposing to implement the BCBS enhancements in a
manner that is consistent with the requirements of section 939A of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
• This revises the agencies’ advanced approaches rules to improve and
strengthen modeling standards, the treatment of counterparty credit
risk and securitization exposures, as well as disclosure requirements
• Consistent with section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act, the proposed
rule would not include the BCBS enhancements to the ratings-based
approach for securitization exposures because it relies on the use of
credit ratings
3. Regulatory Frameworks for Market Risk:
Introduction (continued)
• The final rule modifies the existing risk-based capital requirement,
the 1996 Basel Committee Market Risk Amendment (MRA)
• Current market risk capital rule intended to provide risk-based
capital requirements for banks with material trading assets and
liabilities
• Regulators believe the modifications are warranted due to large
trading book losses suffered by banks during the recent crisis
• Accordingly, the final rule minimizes regulatory arbitrage by applying
an incremental risk charge (IRC) for credit risk in trading positions
• The final rule also removes references to credit ratings for calculating
standardized specific risk capital charges for certain assets,
consistent with Dodd-Frank the and the Consumer Protection Act of
2010.
• In place of credit rating-based approaches, the final rule provides
4. Regulatory Frameworks for Market Risk:
Covered Positions
• The final rule applies to bank’s covered positions (CPs) & specifies
how each bank must calculate its capital requirement for market risk
• The capital requirement for market risk is determined by calculating
capital requirements for general market risk and specific risk
• Additionally the final rule introduces several new requirements, such
as stressed-value-at-risk (SVaR) IRC & correlation trading capital
• Existing rule does not specify with sufficient clarity which positions
are eligible for treatment under the market vs. credit risk framework
• As a result banks can arbitrage the capital standards for market and
credit risk by calculating capital resulting in the lowest requirement
• The final rule addresses this concern by establishing specific criteria
that define which positions can be designated as CPs
5. Regulatory Frameworks for Market Risk:
Covered Positions (continued)
• In addition to all foreign exchange & commodity positions, CPs
include trading assets or liabilities held by the bank
– These are for the purpose of short-term resale or with the intent of benefiting
from actual or expected price movements or to lock in arbitrage profits
• To further reduce capital arbitrage opportunities, credit derivatives
used to hedge banking book exposures are not CPs.
• Under the final rule a bank is required to establish clearly defined
policies and procedures for identifying traded positions
– This should factor in the ability to hedge such positions with reference to a
two-way market & should also taking into account liquidity considerations and
procedures to ensure prudent valuation of less liquid-traded positions
• Finally, the final rule requires a bank to establish a trading & hedging
strategy, approved by senior management, which articulates the
expected holding period of the position & ensures sufficient controls
are in place to preclude the use of capital arbitrage strategies
6. Regulatory Frameworks for Market Risk:
General Market Risk
• General market risk is the risk that arises from broad market
movements, as changes in the general level of interest rates, credit
spreads, equity prices, foreign exchange rates, or commodity prices.
• Banks measure general market risk using a value-at-risk (VaR) model
• Under the Final rule, a bank must obtain approval from its primary
federal regulator (PFR) before using its VaR model to calculate capital
for general market risk, or before extending the use of its model to
additional positions
• The model is subject to ongoing validation requirements, and a
bank’s PFR has the authority to rescind its approval if the model no
longer accurately measures risk
7. Regulatory Frameworks for Market Risk:
Stressed-Value-at-Risk (S-VaR)
• The recent financial crisis demonstrated the need to have risk-based
capital requirements for market risk that capture risk during a period
of financial stress
• Under the final rule, the SVaR requirement is calculated using the
same VaR model used to measure general market risk, but using
inputs based on “historical data from a continuous 12-month period
of significant financial stress.”
• The SVaR requirement reduces procyclicality and ensure banks hold
enough capital to survive a period of financial distress
8. Regulatory Frameworks for Market Risk:
Specific Market Risk
• Specific risk is the risk that arises from factors other than broad
market movements and includes event risk, default risk, and
idiosyncratic variations
• Banks calculate their risk-based capital requirement for specific risk
using either an internal models approach or a standardized approach
• Under the final rule, a bank must receive approval from its PFR
before using an internal model to calculate capital for specific risk
• If a bank does not model specific risk it must use the standardized
specific risk approach to calculate the specific risk capital charge for
all debt positions and for all securitization positions that are not
correlation trading positions
9. Regulatory Frameworks for Market Risk:
Incremental Risk Charge (IRC)
• To address default and migration risks, the final rule establishes a
new capital requirement, the incremental risk charge
• Incremental risk is the default and migration risk that is not reflected
in a bank’s VaR-based measures
• A bank must receive approval from its PFR before using its
incremental risk model
• The incremental risk capital requirement must be consistent with a
one-year horizon and a 99.9 percent confidence level, the
measurement standard under the credit risk capital framework
• This capital requirement covers losses arising from defaults and
credit migrations in covered positions subject to specific interest rate
risk
10. Regulatory Frameworks for Market Risk:
Correlation Trading (CT)
• A correlation trading position is a securitization position in which the
underlying exposures are liquid & related to credit quality of a firm
– Hedges of CT positions are also considered CT positions
• Under the final rule a bank is required to model the market risk-
based capital charge for CT positions using a comprehensive model
– In particular, the model must capture “all price risks” at a 99.9% confidence
interval over one year
• If a bank is unable to develop a comprehensive model for its CT
portfolio, it would instead calculate the capital charge for CT using
the standardized measurement method (SMM)
• SMM is the maximum of the standardized specific risk charges for all
long correlation trading positions & the standardized specific risk
charges for all short correlation trading positions
• The final rule subjects the comprehensive risk model charge to an
11. Regulatory Frameworks for Market Risk:
Standardized Specific Weights
• The final rule does not reference credit ratings for the assignment of
standardized charges. The final rule implements non-ratings-based
standardized specific risk capital charges for:
– Government, agency, and government-sponsored entity positions;
– Depository institution and credit union positions;
– Public sector entities positions;
– Corporate positions; and
– Securitization exposures.
12. Regulatory Frameworks for Market Risk:
Simplified Supervisory Formula Approach
(SSFA)
• The final rule incorporates the SSFA for purposes of calculating
standardized capital charges for securitization exposures. The SSFA
uses the following inputs:
– The weighted average risk weight of the underlying assets, determined in
accordance with the general risk-based capital rules, as well as an adjustment
which reflects the observed credit quality of the underlying pool of exposures;
– The amount of collateral provided to the underlying asset pool, relative to the
amount of assets that have experienced delinquency or some other credit
impairment;
– The attachment point of the relevant tranche;
– The detachment point of the relevant tranche; and
– The securitization surcharge. This is a supervisory input which is set at 0.5 for
securitization exposures and 1.5 for resecuritization exposures.
13. Regulatory Frameworks for Market Risk:
Counterparty Credit Risk
• Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA): consistent with Basel III, the
proposed rule would require a bank to directly reflect CVA risk
through an additional capital requirement
• The CVA capital requirement is designed to address a potential
increase in CVA due to changes in counterparty credit spreads
• Under the proposed rule a bank may use one of two approaches
– The advanced CVA approach is based on the VaR model used by a bank to
calculate specific risk under the market risk rule
– In contrast, the simple CVA approach is based on the use of a supervisory
formula and internally estimated probability-of-default.
• Exposures to Central Counterparties (CCPs): to incentivize the use of
CCPs that satisfy internationally recognized standards for settling and
clearing processes (i.e., qualified CCP or QCCPs)
– Transactions conducted through a QCCP receives a favorable capital treatment
– Establish a capital requirement for a bank’s default fund contribution to a CCP,
with a more favorable capital treatment for such to a QCCP
14. Regulatory Frameworks Market Risk:
Wrong Way Risk & Margin Period
• Proposed rule would require a bank’s risk-management processes to
identify, monitor, and control wrong-way risk throughout the life of
an exposure using stress testing and scenario analyses
• Addition improves the internal models methodology (IMM) currently
used by a bank to determine its capital requirements counterparty
credit risk (CCR) under the advanced approaches rules
– Through additional requirements for the use of stressed inputs and enhanced
stress testing analyses
• With respect to CCR more generally, proposal also would increase
the holding period and margin period of risk that a bank may use to
determine its capital requirement
• Applies to for repo-style transactions, over-the-counter derivatives,
and eligible model loans to address liquidity concerns that arose in
settling or closing-out collateralized transactions during the crisis
15. Regulatory Market Risk Capital: Asset
Value Correlation (AVC) & Securitizations
• To recognize the correlation among financial institutions to common
risk factors, propose to incorporate the Basel III increase in the
correlation factor used to determine the capital requirement
• Applies for certain “wholesale” exposures: highly leveraged entities
(e.g., hedge funds, financial guarantors) and to regulated financial
institutions with consolidated assets greater than or equal to $100B
• BCBS enhancements amended the Basel internal ratings-based
approach to require a banks to assign higher risk weights to
resecuritization exposures than other, similarly rated securitizations
• Proposed rule would amend the supervisory formula approach in a
manner resulting in higher risk weights for resecuritization positions
• The proposed rule also would revise the definition of eligible financial
collateral to exclude certain instruments that performed poorly
during the crisis, such as resecuritization exposures.
16. Regulatory Market Risk Capital:
Securitizations
• Consistent with Section 939A of Dodd-Frank Act remove the ratings-
based and the internal assessment approaches from securitization
hierarchy under the existing advanced approaches rules
– Substitute in their place a simplified supervisory formula approach (SSFA)
• Agencies are proposing to remove the internal assessment
approaches because designed to produce results similar to, and for
supervisory purposes compared with, the ratings-based approach
• Consistent with BCBS enhancements, agencies proposing certain
other revisions to the framework under the advanced approaches
– Broaden the definition of securitization to include an exposure that directly or
indirectly references a securitization exposure
– Improve risk management by requiring banking organizations subject to the
advanced approaches to conduct more rigorous analysis prior to acquisition
• The proposed rule also would require enhanced disclosure
requirements related to securitization exposures
17. Regulatory Market Risk Capital:
Additional Coverage
• Consistent their new authorities under section 312 of the Dodd-Frank
Act, the agencies are proposing to revise the agencies’ market risk
rules to apply to State and federal savings associations, as well as
savings and loan holding companies
• The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) did not implement the market
risk capital rules for such institutions prior to its abolition under
section 313 of the Dodd-Frank Act because, as a general matter, such
institutions do not engage in trading activity to a substantial degree
• However, the agencies believe that any savings association or savings
and loan holding company whose trading activity grows to the extent
that it meets the thresholds should hold capital commensurate with
the risk of the trading activity and should have in place the prudential
risk management systems and processes required under the market
risk capital rule
18. Regulatory Market Risk Capital:
Supervision Under the New Capital Rule
• The supervisory review process emphasizes the need for banks to
assess their capital adequacy positions relative to risk, to review and
take appropriate actions in response to those assessments
– Actions include requiring additional risk-based capital or requiring a bank to
reduce its exposure to market risk
• The final rule requires banks to have an internal capital adequacy
program to address their capital needs for market & all material risk
• The final rule provides requirements for the control, oversight,
validation mechanisms, and documentation of internal models.
• However, the final rule also recognizes that models can be limited in
their ability to fully capture all material risks, so the use of any model
must be supplemented periodically by a stress test (ST)
• ST should emphasize risk concentrations, illiquidity under stressed
market conditions, and risks arising from the bank’s trading activities
19. Regulatory Market Risk Capital:
Disclosure Under the New Capital Rule
• Market discipline is a key component of Basel II
• The third pillar of Basel II establishes disclosure requirements to
allow market participants to assess key information about a bank’s
risk profile and its associated level of capital
• Increased disclosures are intended to allow a bank’s stakeholders to
more fully evaluate the bank’s financial condition, including its
capital adequacy.