CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthi movement declared plans to form a new central government overseen by its “Revolutionary Committee.” The al Houthis, who receive Iranian support, announced the new government after political negotiations collapsed. Nearly all political factions in Yemen rejected the al Houthis’ plan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council called it a “coup.” The political crisis is ongoing, and regional factions appear to be taking actions to distance themselves from the central government and the al Houthis.
2. Iran asserted the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable and that it will install new centrifuges if the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team returns to its previous position. Iranian officials continue to push for sanctions relief as a non-negotiable condition for a nuclear deal.
3. There appears to be increasing cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan forces in the fight against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The head of the TTP’s Jamatul Ahrar splinter group, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was severely injured in fighting with Afghan security forces in Nangarhar province.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. ISIS forces in Sirte, Libya, violently put down local resistance to its presence and consolidated control over the city and its environs. Ferjani tribesmen rose up against ISIS following the death of a prominent sheikh. ISIS responded by killing over 37 people. It now has control of the city.
2. Anti-al Houthi forces, including Saudi and Emirati troops, continue to roll back the al Houthis’ gains in Yemen, but al Houthi leadership is describing their forces’ withdrawals as tactical. The al Houthis will probably respond with a counteroffensive.
3. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continued to hold back from fully endorsing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, calling the deal “still unsettled” as neither the Iranian Parliament nor the U.S. Congress “has adopted it yet.”
1) AQAP is partnering with local tribes in Yemen's eastern Hadramawt governorate to consolidate control of territory.
2) Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif introduced a four-point peace plan to end the crisis in Yemen, though the plan was rejected.
3) Al-Murabitoun claimed responsibility for an SVBIED attack against MINUSMA forces in Mali.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Hostilities are escalating in Yemen after Saudi-led coalition airstrikes killed civilians in Sana’a, which scuttled a planned humanitarian ceasefire and provoked a response from al Houthi-Saleh forces. Coalition airstrikes killed approximately 155 civilians and wounded more than 500 others at the funeral for an al Houthi-Saleh military commander on October 8. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired ballistic missiles toward Taif city, Saudi Arabia and Ma’rib governorate, Yemen in retaliation. Al Houthi-Saleh forces may have also fired two missiles toward a U.S. Navy destroyer north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9, six days after an al Houthi-Saleh missile struck an Emirati ship in the same region.
2. Al Qaeda is exploiting the current counterterrorism focus on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) to build up a resilient Salafi-jihadi base in Libya. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emir Abdelmalek Droukdel gave an audio speech, titled “Benghazi and the Battle of Patience,” in which he frames jihad as the alternative to foreign invasion and destruction in Benghazi. AQIM, along with al Qaeda-linked groups currently operating in Libya, seeks to exploit conflict between secular forces and Islamist militants in Benghazi to position itself as a defender of the Libyan people and establish strong relationships with local armed groups. International attention remains focused on the U.S.-backed counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte.
3. ISIS may attempt to resume an offensive campaign against the Algerian state. The pro-ISIS Amaq News Agency claimed on October 9 that ISIS Wilayat al Jaza’ir (Algeria) conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an Algerian army convoy near Tamalous in northeastern Algeria. This is ISIS’s first claimed attack in Algeria since August 2016. Counterterrorism operations have limited ISIS’s ability to attack in Algeria, but the return of Algerian fighters from Syria and Libya may allow the group to increase the frequency and impact of its attacks in the country.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda may resume an attack campaign targeting the U.S. homeland, based on recent intelligence. U.S. intelligence uncovered a possible al Qaeda plot to carry out attacks in New York, Texas, and Virginia on November 7. Al Qaeda maintains external attack planning cells in its safe havens like Syria and Afghanistan, where U.S. airstrikes killed high-level al Qaeda operatives on November 2 and October 23. Al Qaeda seeks to exploit local conflicts to cultivate and facilitate a global insurgency against the West.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may resurge during a pause in U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations in central Libya. The U.S. has not conducted airstrikes in Sirte since October 31, citing the high risk of civilian casualties in ISIS’s final stronghold in the city. ISIS views the Sirte fight as ongoing and has signaled that recruitment networks into Libya are still active. ISIS may seek to exploit the operational pause by deploying explosive capabilities that were previously suppressed by U.S. air support. Escalating competition between rival Libyan factions, including brewing conflicts in Tripoli and Benghazi, will limit Libyan forces’ ability and will to continue the fight against ISIS.
3. Al Shabaab is expanding its territorial control in Somalia as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition weakens. Al Shabaab has re-occupied a series of strategically significant towns following the withdrawal of Ethiopian AMISOM troops, which are redeploying in response to widespread civil unrest in Ethiopia. Al Shabaab also conducted a series of attacks targeting Burundian AMISOM forces in the Middle Shabelle region that may be designed to both exacerbate the Burundian contingent’s grievances with AMISOM and advance al Shabaab’s encirclement of Mogadishu.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A ceasefire between the Saudi-led coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance may have limited effects. It will help to de-escalate the national conflict in Yemen, but will not resolve local fights or the conflict between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s alliance. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced on November 15 that the coalition and an al Houthi-Saleh delegation agreed to a cessation of hostilities to begin on November 17. The agreement also includes a framework for negotiations. Previous ceasefires have not translated to progress in negotiations. Hadi’s administration did not participate in the talks and has voiced opposition to the agreement. The cessation of hostilities will likely include the coalition’s air campaign and al Houthi-Saleh attacks on southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts, including the battle for Taiz city, will likely continue despite the elite-level agreement. Southern Yemenis lack representation in the peace process and will likely resist it.
2. A brewing fight for control of oil ports in eastern Libya may reignite Libya’s civil war. A coalition of eastern Libyan leaders that opposes Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the dominant military force in eastern Libya, is reportedly rallying forces for an offensive to recapture oil ports controlled by Haftar’s forces. The anti-Haftar forces include Mehdi al Barghathi, the Minister of the Defense in the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). An offensive lead by Barghathi, who is widely seen as the GNA’s chosen alternative to Haftar in eastern Libya, risks opening a new front in Libya’s dormant civil war. A battle for eastern Libya’s oil would provide an opportunity for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, which have suffered recent losses in Sirte and Benghazi, to reconstitute and possibly regain control of terrain.
3. The Sahel region and southwestern Libya will be a critical front in the fight against Salafi-jihadi groups in 2017. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurgent in the Sahel region of West Africa, and there are early indicators that ISIS may develop ties with a militant group in the region. AQIM maintains a safe haven in southwestern Libya, where airstrikes targeted a senior AQIM leader on November 15. ISIS may also be making inroads into southwestern Libya. Salafi-jihadi groups use these regions to support attacks in neighboring states, as well as train recruits and exploit lucrative smuggling and trafficking routes.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran is using the Yemeni civil war to extend its reach and further entangling internal Yemeni conflicts with regional tensions. Missiles fired from al Houthi-Saleh territory targeted the USS Mason just north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9 and October 12. The U.S. Navy destroyed three radar sites in Yemen in response. Senior U.S. administration officials stated that there is “no doubt” of al Houthi involvement in the attacks, which al Houthi-Saleh leaders have repeatedly denied. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has since released two American prisoners to Omani custody and agreed to resume the peace process, likely indicating efforts to de-escalate tensions with the U.S. Operatives from Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah may have conducted or facilitated the attacks on the USS Mason.
2. Security may breakdown in Tripoli, Libya, after an attempted coup against the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Political leaders from the General National Congress (GNC), a rump Islamist parliament, attempted to seize the headquarters of a pro-GNA governmental body in Libya’s capital with the support of armed groups. The GNA remains in control of Libya’s state institutions, but powerful militias opposed to the GNA and its supporters are now rallying in support of the attempted coup in Tripoli. Competition between rival militias could erupt into open fighting in Tripoli. The collapse of security in Tripoli would further undermine the already weak GNA and draw resources away from the unfinished fight against ISIS in central Libya.
3. American citizens remain a target for Salafi-jihadi groups operating in the Sahel region of West Africa. Militants based in Mali abducted an American aid worker from his home in Niger on October 15. No group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, though the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) was likely involved. MUJAO is affiliated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM is resurgent in the Sahel and will continue to conduct attacks designed to impel the U.S. and its allies to withdraw from the region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Afghan Taliban appointed a new leader after confirming the death of Mullah Omar. The leadership change introduces a new set of challenges for the Taliban, which had already factionalized, and for al Qaeda. Mullah Omar had led the Taliban since its inception and had received a pledge of allegiance from al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri.
2. Freshly trained Yemeni troops supported by an Emirati brigade and Saudi special forces have led an offensive that has driven back the al Houthi movement in Yemen. The recent victories against the al Houthis may be setting the stage for successful political talks to reach a negotiated solution in the country.
3. The Iranian regime reframed its rhetorical stance on military site inspections into a more mollified assurance to domestic audiences that Iran will not reveal any military or national security-related secrets as a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. The Critical Threats Project of the American Enterprise Institute has set up these pages to help clarify the hyper-complex language of sanctions relief and to provide additional information about some of the entities that will be freed of international restrictions.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthi movement declared plans to form a new central government overseen by its “Revolutionary Committee.” The al Houthis, who receive Iranian support, announced the new government after political negotiations collapsed. Nearly all political factions in Yemen rejected the al Houthis’ plan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council called it a “coup.” The political crisis is ongoing, and regional factions appear to be taking actions to distance themselves from the central government and the al Houthis.
2. Iran asserted the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable and that it will install new centrifuges if the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team returns to its previous position. Iranian officials continue to push for sanctions relief as a non-negotiable condition for a nuclear deal.
3. There appears to be increasing cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan forces in the fight against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The head of the TTP’s Jamatul Ahrar splinter group, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was severely injured in fighting with Afghan security forces in Nangarhar province.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. ISIS forces in Sirte, Libya, violently put down local resistance to its presence and consolidated control over the city and its environs. Ferjani tribesmen rose up against ISIS following the death of a prominent sheikh. ISIS responded by killing over 37 people. It now has control of the city.
2. Anti-al Houthi forces, including Saudi and Emirati troops, continue to roll back the al Houthis’ gains in Yemen, but al Houthi leadership is describing their forces’ withdrawals as tactical. The al Houthis will probably respond with a counteroffensive.
3. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continued to hold back from fully endorsing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, calling the deal “still unsettled” as neither the Iranian Parliament nor the U.S. Congress “has adopted it yet.”
1) AQAP is partnering with local tribes in Yemen's eastern Hadramawt governorate to consolidate control of territory.
2) Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif introduced a four-point peace plan to end the crisis in Yemen, though the plan was rejected.
3) Al-Murabitoun claimed responsibility for an SVBIED attack against MINUSMA forces in Mali.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Hostilities are escalating in Yemen after Saudi-led coalition airstrikes killed civilians in Sana’a, which scuttled a planned humanitarian ceasefire and provoked a response from al Houthi-Saleh forces. Coalition airstrikes killed approximately 155 civilians and wounded more than 500 others at the funeral for an al Houthi-Saleh military commander on October 8. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired ballistic missiles toward Taif city, Saudi Arabia and Ma’rib governorate, Yemen in retaliation. Al Houthi-Saleh forces may have also fired two missiles toward a U.S. Navy destroyer north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9, six days after an al Houthi-Saleh missile struck an Emirati ship in the same region.
2. Al Qaeda is exploiting the current counterterrorism focus on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) to build up a resilient Salafi-jihadi base in Libya. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emir Abdelmalek Droukdel gave an audio speech, titled “Benghazi and the Battle of Patience,” in which he frames jihad as the alternative to foreign invasion and destruction in Benghazi. AQIM, along with al Qaeda-linked groups currently operating in Libya, seeks to exploit conflict between secular forces and Islamist militants in Benghazi to position itself as a defender of the Libyan people and establish strong relationships with local armed groups. International attention remains focused on the U.S.-backed counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte.
3. ISIS may attempt to resume an offensive campaign against the Algerian state. The pro-ISIS Amaq News Agency claimed on October 9 that ISIS Wilayat al Jaza’ir (Algeria) conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an Algerian army convoy near Tamalous in northeastern Algeria. This is ISIS’s first claimed attack in Algeria since August 2016. Counterterrorism operations have limited ISIS’s ability to attack in Algeria, but the return of Algerian fighters from Syria and Libya may allow the group to increase the frequency and impact of its attacks in the country.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda may resume an attack campaign targeting the U.S. homeland, based on recent intelligence. U.S. intelligence uncovered a possible al Qaeda plot to carry out attacks in New York, Texas, and Virginia on November 7. Al Qaeda maintains external attack planning cells in its safe havens like Syria and Afghanistan, where U.S. airstrikes killed high-level al Qaeda operatives on November 2 and October 23. Al Qaeda seeks to exploit local conflicts to cultivate and facilitate a global insurgency against the West.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may resurge during a pause in U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations in central Libya. The U.S. has not conducted airstrikes in Sirte since October 31, citing the high risk of civilian casualties in ISIS’s final stronghold in the city. ISIS views the Sirte fight as ongoing and has signaled that recruitment networks into Libya are still active. ISIS may seek to exploit the operational pause by deploying explosive capabilities that were previously suppressed by U.S. air support. Escalating competition between rival Libyan factions, including brewing conflicts in Tripoli and Benghazi, will limit Libyan forces’ ability and will to continue the fight against ISIS.
3. Al Shabaab is expanding its territorial control in Somalia as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition weakens. Al Shabaab has re-occupied a series of strategically significant towns following the withdrawal of Ethiopian AMISOM troops, which are redeploying in response to widespread civil unrest in Ethiopia. Al Shabaab also conducted a series of attacks targeting Burundian AMISOM forces in the Middle Shabelle region that may be designed to both exacerbate the Burundian contingent’s grievances with AMISOM and advance al Shabaab’s encirclement of Mogadishu.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A ceasefire between the Saudi-led coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance may have limited effects. It will help to de-escalate the national conflict in Yemen, but will not resolve local fights or the conflict between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s alliance. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced on November 15 that the coalition and an al Houthi-Saleh delegation agreed to a cessation of hostilities to begin on November 17. The agreement also includes a framework for negotiations. Previous ceasefires have not translated to progress in negotiations. Hadi’s administration did not participate in the talks and has voiced opposition to the agreement. The cessation of hostilities will likely include the coalition’s air campaign and al Houthi-Saleh attacks on southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts, including the battle for Taiz city, will likely continue despite the elite-level agreement. Southern Yemenis lack representation in the peace process and will likely resist it.
2. A brewing fight for control of oil ports in eastern Libya may reignite Libya’s civil war. A coalition of eastern Libyan leaders that opposes Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the dominant military force in eastern Libya, is reportedly rallying forces for an offensive to recapture oil ports controlled by Haftar’s forces. The anti-Haftar forces include Mehdi al Barghathi, the Minister of the Defense in the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). An offensive lead by Barghathi, who is widely seen as the GNA’s chosen alternative to Haftar in eastern Libya, risks opening a new front in Libya’s dormant civil war. A battle for eastern Libya’s oil would provide an opportunity for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, which have suffered recent losses in Sirte and Benghazi, to reconstitute and possibly regain control of terrain.
3. The Sahel region and southwestern Libya will be a critical front in the fight against Salafi-jihadi groups in 2017. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurgent in the Sahel region of West Africa, and there are early indicators that ISIS may develop ties with a militant group in the region. AQIM maintains a safe haven in southwestern Libya, where airstrikes targeted a senior AQIM leader on November 15. ISIS may also be making inroads into southwestern Libya. Salafi-jihadi groups use these regions to support attacks in neighboring states, as well as train recruits and exploit lucrative smuggling and trafficking routes.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran is using the Yemeni civil war to extend its reach and further entangling internal Yemeni conflicts with regional tensions. Missiles fired from al Houthi-Saleh territory targeted the USS Mason just north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9 and October 12. The U.S. Navy destroyed three radar sites in Yemen in response. Senior U.S. administration officials stated that there is “no doubt” of al Houthi involvement in the attacks, which al Houthi-Saleh leaders have repeatedly denied. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has since released two American prisoners to Omani custody and agreed to resume the peace process, likely indicating efforts to de-escalate tensions with the U.S. Operatives from Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah may have conducted or facilitated the attacks on the USS Mason.
2. Security may breakdown in Tripoli, Libya, after an attempted coup against the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Political leaders from the General National Congress (GNC), a rump Islamist parliament, attempted to seize the headquarters of a pro-GNA governmental body in Libya’s capital with the support of armed groups. The GNA remains in control of Libya’s state institutions, but powerful militias opposed to the GNA and its supporters are now rallying in support of the attempted coup in Tripoli. Competition between rival militias could erupt into open fighting in Tripoli. The collapse of security in Tripoli would further undermine the already weak GNA and draw resources away from the unfinished fight against ISIS in central Libya.
3. American citizens remain a target for Salafi-jihadi groups operating in the Sahel region of West Africa. Militants based in Mali abducted an American aid worker from his home in Niger on October 15. No group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, though the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) was likely involved. MUJAO is affiliated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM is resurgent in the Sahel and will continue to conduct attacks designed to impel the U.S. and its allies to withdraw from the region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Afghan Taliban appointed a new leader after confirming the death of Mullah Omar. The leadership change introduces a new set of challenges for the Taliban, which had already factionalized, and for al Qaeda. Mullah Omar had led the Taliban since its inception and had received a pledge of allegiance from al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri.
2. Freshly trained Yemeni troops supported by an Emirati brigade and Saudi special forces have led an offensive that has driven back the al Houthi movement in Yemen. The recent victories against the al Houthis may be setting the stage for successful political talks to reach a negotiated solution in the country.
3. The Iranian regime reframed its rhetorical stance on military site inspections into a more mollified assurance to domestic audiences that Iran will not reveal any military or national security-related secrets as a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. The Critical Threats Project of the American Enterprise Institute has set up these pages to help clarify the hyper-complex language of sanctions relief and to provide additional information about some of the entities that will be freed of international restrictions.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthi movement declared plans to form a new central government overseen by its “Revolutionary Committee.” The al Houthis, who receive Iranian support, announced the new government after political negotiations collapsed. Nearly all political factions in Yemen rejected the al Houthis’ plan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council called it a “coup.” The political crisis is ongoing, and regional factions appear to be taking actions to distance themselves from the central government and the al Houthis.
2. Iran asserted the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable and that it will install new centrifuges if the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team returns to its previous position. Iranian officials continue to push for sanctions relief as a non-negotiable condition for a nuclear deal.
3. There appears to be increasing cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan forces in the fight against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The head of the TTP’s Jamatul Ahrar splinter group, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was severely injured in fighting with Afghan security forces in Nangarhar province.
The document provides an overview of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria from November 2012 to November 2013. For Afghanistan, it summarizes that NATO and the Afghan government are working to improve security and develop the Afghan security forces ahead of the planned transition of security responsibilities by the end of 2014. It notes some improvements in security but also continuing challenges, including from insurgent safe havens in Pakistan and increasing tensions between ISAF and Afghan forces resulting in more "insider attacks". For Syria, it briefly states that the conflict involves insurgents fighting the government with varying external assistance to all sides.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance may conduct additional attacks against vessels in Yemeni territorial waters, potentially disrupting shipping routes and routine maritime traffic in the Bab al Mandab Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance fired a missile at an Emirati vessel off the coast of Mokha port city in western Yemen on October 1. A video shows the destruction of the vessel. The UAE foreign ministry described the attack as an “act of terror.” Separately, al Houthi-Saleh forces are probably using American citizen Peter Willems as a human shield against Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Sana’a. Al Houthi-Saleh forces detained Willems on September 20 after an airstrike hit an intelligence headquarters in the capital.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is reconstituting its combat capabilities in central Libya despite the imminent loss of its stronghold in Sirte to U.S.-backed Libyan forces. ISIS militants who fled Sirte as the U.S.-backed offensive began have conducted multiple attacks behind the Sirte frontline since mid-September, including an ambush that caused dozens of casualties on October 2. The U.S. air campaign is entering its third month.
3. Political and military tensions escalated between the Indian and Pakistani governments in the contested Kashmir region. Tensions rose when India blamed a Pakistan-based militant group for attacks on Indian security forces. The Indian and Pakistani militaries have since exchanged fire across the Line of Control. India is preparing fortifications for a possible military escalation.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The takeover of four eastern Libyan oil ports by a militia coalition may ignite armed conflict between Libya’s rival governments. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition led by General Khalifa Haftar, seized four oil ports in eastern Libya from militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) on September 11. The seizure scuttled the GNA’s efforts to resume oil exports from eastern Libya, undermining a major effort to secure legitimacy for the fragile unity government. The LNA’s advance threatens the interests of western Libyan militias aligned with the GNA. These militias fought against the LNA in central Libya in the past and may resume hostilities in response to LNA aggression in the oil crescent. Libyan actors will prioritize the unresolved civil war over the fight against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya.
2. Escalating economic protests in Tunisia may incite a government crackdown and draw limited security resources away from counter-terrorism operations. Protests broke out in Fernana, northwestern Tunisia on September 7 after a café worker named Wisam Nisrah set himself on fire. Nisrah’s self-immolation and the subsequent protests mirror the event s that sparked Tunisia’s Arab Spring uprising in December 2010. Similar protests began in Ben Guerdane, eastern Tunisia on September 5. Growing protests could destabilize Tunisia’s new unity government. Civil unrest strains limited security resources and provides opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisian affiliate and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), to conduct attacks.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to continue the fight against the U.S. and to reject ISIS’s ideology in a video commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Zawahiri emphasized al Qaeda’s role as a defender of the oppressed. He urged black Americans to turn to shari’a and al Qaeda for justice. Zawahiri also emphasized al Qaeda’s power as a unifying “message” rather than a physical group, like ISIS, that imposes its will on Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to reinforce al Qaeda’s position as the leader of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
Pak-National Security: Internal and External dimensionsDr Shahzad Aslam
The document outlines the composition and agenda of working groups formed as part of a national security workshop in Pakistan. It discusses increasing militarization of internal security and its implications. The working groups will evaluate issues such as the impact of militarization, devising border security strategies, and handling proscribed organizations. They will propose recommendations to strengthen civilian law enforcement and reduce excessive reliance on armed forces for domestic security matters.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Competition over Libya’s oil wealth risks reigniting armed conflict between rival governments and distracting from the unfinished counter-ISIS fight. Rival militias clashed over contested oil ports in central Libya as efforts resumed to export oil. Some of these competing militias, backed by the UN-brokered unity government and U.S. airstrikes, are also fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the central Libyan city of Sirte. They may prioritize the fight for control of Libya’s oil wealth over the counter-ISIS fight. Continued conflict would strengthen ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya, including al Qaeda.
2. Southern Yemeni officials and powerbrokers renewed a call for a unified voice to represent the region in what may be a fissure between them and the internationally recognized government of Yemen under President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi does not have a strong constituency and has relied on southern leaders for support for his government, currently based in Aden. Southern Yemenis frequently cite political and economic marginalization by the central Yemeni government as a grievance. Calls for secession from the Yemeni state have been growing since late 2007. The frontline of Yemen’s civil war runs generally along the former boundary between North and South Yemen, re-dividing the country.
3. Ongoing civil unrest in Tunisia may weaken the country’s new unity government and create opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to strengthen in the country. Popular anti-government demonstrations began spreading after September 5, and Tunisian government concessions briefly held off additional demonstrations. Mass protests resumed in multiple locations, however, and labor strikes are expected to begin within days. The Tunisian government deployed additional security forces to protest sites. Salafi-jihadi militants based in Tunisia and also Libya may be positioned to infiltrate popular demonstrations or conduct attacks in Tunisia if civil unrest grows or protests turn violent.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) group may be growing stronger in Somalia, but its ability to compete with al Shabaab remains limited. The U.S. Department of State designated Abdul Qadir Mumin, a pro-ISIS cleric, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on August 31. Al Shabaab militants reportedly attacked Mumin’s forces in Bay region, Somalia on September 4. Mumin is an al Shabaab defector, and al Shabaab has eliminated pro-ISIS members from within its ranks. It is also possible that the attack indicates that Mumin’s group has grown stronger and that al Shabaab considers it a threat. ISIS may seek to develop networks in Somalia now that its African hub in Sirte, Libya is under pressure by U.S.-backed militias. ISIS is unlikely to dedicate significant resources to the Horn of Africa at this time, however.
2. The UN-brokered political process in Libya may be breaking down. The collapse of the UN-backed Libyan government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), could have an impact on U.S. counter-terrorism operations against ISIS in Libya. The UN convened an emergency meeting in Tunis on September 5 to address rising tensions between eastern and western factions. The U.S. extended its airstrike mission in Libya for an additional month at the request of the GNA. Rising challenges to the GNA’s legitimacy threatened to undermine future operations against ISIS or other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
3. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance’s September 2 announcement of a new missile in Yemen may be in response to increasing military threats from Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s coalition. The missile, the Borkan-1, is a modified Scud missile. The capability may have been transferred through the Iranian network. A political resolution to Yemen’s civil war remains unlikely despite both sides’ willingness to participate in a U.S.-backed peace plan. Yemeni factions expressed conditional support for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s plan, but unresolved disagreements over representation in the transitional government will likely continue to hinder talks. Saudi Arabia may pursue talks to de-escalate conflict in the Saudi-Yemeni border region but will continue to support efforts by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government to oust the al Houthi-Saleh alliance from Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is conducting a campaign to seize strategic positions vacated by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces in central and southern Somalia. Ethiopian AMISOM forces are withdrawing from Somalia. The forces are probably re-deploying inside Ethiopia to quell spreading anti-government protests by the Oromo and Amhara people. The Tigray minority dominates the Ethiopian government. Al Shabaab’s recapture of key towns is a setback for AMISOM and Somali forces allied against the group and sets conditions for al Shabaab to resurge in central Somalia.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be developing a relationship with a militant group in the Sahel, signaling ISIS’s intent to continue expanding in Africa. A pro-ISIS media outlet disseminated a pledge of bayat (allegiance) from a former al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) militant leader, Abu Walid al Sahrawi, to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi on October 30. Al Sahrawi had first pledged bayat to al Baghdadi in 2015 but recently claimed responsibility for a series of attacks in Niger and Burkina Faso that may have earned recognition from the ISIS network. ISIS will continue to expand in Africa despite the loss of its regional hub in Sirte, Libya.
3. The combatants in Yemen’s civil war remain focused on military objectives in order to improve their negotiating positions for a political resolution to the conflict. Both President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance rejected a UN-proposed peace plan after alleging that it favored their rivals. The Hadi government and its backer, the Saudi-led coalition, continued efforts to advance on key frontlines and degrade al Houthi-Saleh leadership and military capabilities. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a ballistic missile toward Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on October 28.
This document discusses defining success in Afghanistan. It argues that success is establishing a stable political order, security situation, and indigenous security forces that can prevent Afghanistan from being a safe haven for terrorists with reduced international support. While progress has been made in security, political progress has been slower. Improvements to Afghan governance through greater local participation are needed. Challenges include corruption, Pakistani sanctuaries for insurgent groups, and the seasonal nature of the conflict means the true test of progress will come in summer 2011. Continued support for the current strategy is recommended.
SECCON 2014 - Terrorism Dimensions – Countering the threat of terrorism ‘Stra...MesseIntl
Terrorism Dimensions – Countering the threat of terrorism ‘Strategies - Achieving nation security’
Sardar Shoukat Popalzai
President, Balochistan Economic Forum
Topics Covered:
• Terrorism Dimensions
• Global Insight on Terrorism
• Domestic Dimensions of Terrorism
• Countering Terrorism
• Terrorism: A Challenge to Political Government
• Terrorism Economic impact
• Terrorism & Media
This document summarizes a presentation on Boko Haram and the risk of mass atrocities in northeast Nigeria. It defines mass atrocities and discusses how terrorism relates to mass fatality attacks. An overview of Boko Haram outlines its history under different leaders and increasing violence. Risk factors for mass atrocities in northeast Nigeria are assessed, including armed conflict, human rights violations, state weakness, and others. While Boko Haram remains a risk, the presentation notes that other state and non-state actors could also perpetrate mass atrocities.
Pakistan: the political, economic, security and trade control context relevant to defence, security and dual use exporters, clarifying what are the main areas of opportunity and risk
The document summarizes the history and phases of the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) political party. It describes the party's origins in the All India Muslim League before partition. It then outlines the party's three phases of achieving and holding power in the national government of Pakistan from 1990-1997, 1997-1999, and 2013-2017. However, on each occasion Nawaz Sharif's term as Prime Minister was cut short due to conflicts with other institutions like the President and military. Despite facing challenges, the PMLN under Nawaz Sharif accomplished significant infrastructure projects including the Metro bus network and supported the military's counterterrorism operation Zarb-e-Azb.
Nawaz Sharif served 3 terms as Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1990-1993, 1997-1999, and 2013-2017. His first term focused on economic reforms but was cut short due to tensions with the president. In his second term, he carried out nuclear tests in 1998 in response to India but was ousted by a military coup in 1999. His third and longest term saw both successes like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as well as failures to resolve political tensions that led to his disqualification and end of his political career in 2017.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.“Operation Golden Arrow,” supported by an Arab coalition, may be stalling in its offensive against the al Houthis after initial successes in regaining control of Aden city. The offensive secured much of Aden city last week and forces have pushed northward from there, but have not recaptured al Anad military base along the road north. Forces in Taiz have also not been able to defeat the al Houthis.
2. Al Shabaab lost two strongholds in Dinsoor in Middle Jubba region and Bardhere in Gedo region in southern Somalia that may limit its ability to support operations in Kenya. Dinsoor and Bardhere control points of access to a major route into northern Kenyan. The loss is territorial, however, as al Shabaab fighters moved into the countryside.
3. Iranian officials downplayed the significance of UNSC Resolution 2231’s Annex B, which calls for an extended halt to certain ballistic missile activity, in order to assuage domestic concerns that the resolution infringes upon Iran’s weapons capabilities.
Nawaz Sharif was born in 1949 in Lahore, Pakistan. He received his law degree from Punjab University. Sharif served as Finance Minister of Punjab province and later became the Chief Minister of Punjab in 1985. Sharif was elected Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1990 and 1997, but his governments were dismissed in 1993 and 1999 via judicial rulings and a military coup respectively. As Prime Minister, Sharif reformed the constitution to limit presidential powers and prevent lawmakers from changing parties.
Terrorism and political violence in South East AsiaGraeme Cross
While the threat of a terrorist attack is still very real in certain areas of the Asia Pacific, the region has seen several key country risk levels drop or remain low for 2016, according to Aon’s Terrorism and Political Violence Map, created in collaboration with The Risk Advisory Group.
This year Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar all reported a decrease in risk from high to moderate while Australia’s risk level remained low. Terrorism is cited as the main concern in Australia and Thailand and while the political environment in both Philippines and Myanmar has stablished somewhat, civil unrest and political violence are still the principal threats the countries face.
This document provides an overview of the geography, society, and governance structures of Pakistan's northwestern tribal areas that have been impacted by militancy. It describes how the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA, also known as Malakand) are governed separately, with FATA under federal control and PATA falling under provincial rule. It also outlines the recent peace deal signed for Malakand and the ongoing military operation there, noting how the situation in PATA differs from that in FATA despite involvement of the same major actors - the Taliban and Pakistani government.
- Pakistan is an important Islamic country located in South Asia between India and Afghanistan. It has a population of over 200 million people and significant natural resources.
- However, Pakistan faces many challenges in the 21st century including a severe energy crisis, poor education and healthcare systems, high levels of corruption, terrorism, inflation, political instability, and widespread poverty and inequality.
- To overcome these issues, Pakistan needs strong leadership to improve governance, encourage economic development through industries and infrastructure projects, better distribute resources, and empower the population through education. With proper planning and unity, Pakistan has the potential to overcome its current problems.
1. The document outlines various indicators that can suggest the development of an insurgency, including the discovery of insurgent documents, caches, and training areas; recruitment efforts; dissent against the government; and increased criminal activities like theft, smuggling, and kidnapping for ransom to fund insurgent operations.
2. Specific indicators mentioned are things like unexplained aircraft flights or air drops, increased small arms demand, disappearance of classified documents, and new radical faces appearing in organizations to spread insurgent ideologies.
3. Detecting these indicators through intelligence networks in the early stages of insurgency development is important to disrupt insurgent activities before they become fully established.
In today's world most of the nations are suffering with this issue. This PPT. is prepared keeping in view of the present circumstances and will be of immense use of the students and personnel who are in job are involves in security related issues.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthi movement declared plans to form a new central government overseen by its “Revolutionary Committee.” The al Houthis, who receive Iranian support, announced the new government after political negotiations collapsed. Nearly all political factions in Yemen rejected the al Houthis’ plan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council called it a “coup.” The political crisis is ongoing, and regional factions appear to be taking actions to distance themselves from the central government and the al Houthis.
2. Iran asserted the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable and that it will install new centrifuges if the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team returns to its previous position. Iranian officials continue to push for sanctions relief as a non-negotiable condition for a nuclear deal.
3. There appears to be increasing cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan forces in the fight against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The head of the TTP’s Jamatul Ahrar splinter group, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was severely injured in fighting with Afghan security forces in Nangarhar province.
The document provides an overview of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria from November 2012 to November 2013. For Afghanistan, it summarizes that NATO and the Afghan government are working to improve security and develop the Afghan security forces ahead of the planned transition of security responsibilities by the end of 2014. It notes some improvements in security but also continuing challenges, including from insurgent safe havens in Pakistan and increasing tensions between ISAF and Afghan forces resulting in more "insider attacks". For Syria, it briefly states that the conflict involves insurgents fighting the government with varying external assistance to all sides.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance may conduct additional attacks against vessels in Yemeni territorial waters, potentially disrupting shipping routes and routine maritime traffic in the Bab al Mandab Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance fired a missile at an Emirati vessel off the coast of Mokha port city in western Yemen on October 1. A video shows the destruction of the vessel. The UAE foreign ministry described the attack as an “act of terror.” Separately, al Houthi-Saleh forces are probably using American citizen Peter Willems as a human shield against Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Sana’a. Al Houthi-Saleh forces detained Willems on September 20 after an airstrike hit an intelligence headquarters in the capital.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is reconstituting its combat capabilities in central Libya despite the imminent loss of its stronghold in Sirte to U.S.-backed Libyan forces. ISIS militants who fled Sirte as the U.S.-backed offensive began have conducted multiple attacks behind the Sirte frontline since mid-September, including an ambush that caused dozens of casualties on October 2. The U.S. air campaign is entering its third month.
3. Political and military tensions escalated between the Indian and Pakistani governments in the contested Kashmir region. Tensions rose when India blamed a Pakistan-based militant group for attacks on Indian security forces. The Indian and Pakistani militaries have since exchanged fire across the Line of Control. India is preparing fortifications for a possible military escalation.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The takeover of four eastern Libyan oil ports by a militia coalition may ignite armed conflict between Libya’s rival governments. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition led by General Khalifa Haftar, seized four oil ports in eastern Libya from militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) on September 11. The seizure scuttled the GNA’s efforts to resume oil exports from eastern Libya, undermining a major effort to secure legitimacy for the fragile unity government. The LNA’s advance threatens the interests of western Libyan militias aligned with the GNA. These militias fought against the LNA in central Libya in the past and may resume hostilities in response to LNA aggression in the oil crescent. Libyan actors will prioritize the unresolved civil war over the fight against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya.
2. Escalating economic protests in Tunisia may incite a government crackdown and draw limited security resources away from counter-terrorism operations. Protests broke out in Fernana, northwestern Tunisia on September 7 after a café worker named Wisam Nisrah set himself on fire. Nisrah’s self-immolation and the subsequent protests mirror the event s that sparked Tunisia’s Arab Spring uprising in December 2010. Similar protests began in Ben Guerdane, eastern Tunisia on September 5. Growing protests could destabilize Tunisia’s new unity government. Civil unrest strains limited security resources and provides opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisian affiliate and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), to conduct attacks.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to continue the fight against the U.S. and to reject ISIS’s ideology in a video commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Zawahiri emphasized al Qaeda’s role as a defender of the oppressed. He urged black Americans to turn to shari’a and al Qaeda for justice. Zawahiri also emphasized al Qaeda’s power as a unifying “message” rather than a physical group, like ISIS, that imposes its will on Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to reinforce al Qaeda’s position as the leader of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
Pak-National Security: Internal and External dimensionsDr Shahzad Aslam
The document outlines the composition and agenda of working groups formed as part of a national security workshop in Pakistan. It discusses increasing militarization of internal security and its implications. The working groups will evaluate issues such as the impact of militarization, devising border security strategies, and handling proscribed organizations. They will propose recommendations to strengthen civilian law enforcement and reduce excessive reliance on armed forces for domestic security matters.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Competition over Libya’s oil wealth risks reigniting armed conflict between rival governments and distracting from the unfinished counter-ISIS fight. Rival militias clashed over contested oil ports in central Libya as efforts resumed to export oil. Some of these competing militias, backed by the UN-brokered unity government and U.S. airstrikes, are also fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the central Libyan city of Sirte. They may prioritize the fight for control of Libya’s oil wealth over the counter-ISIS fight. Continued conflict would strengthen ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya, including al Qaeda.
2. Southern Yemeni officials and powerbrokers renewed a call for a unified voice to represent the region in what may be a fissure between them and the internationally recognized government of Yemen under President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi does not have a strong constituency and has relied on southern leaders for support for his government, currently based in Aden. Southern Yemenis frequently cite political and economic marginalization by the central Yemeni government as a grievance. Calls for secession from the Yemeni state have been growing since late 2007. The frontline of Yemen’s civil war runs generally along the former boundary between North and South Yemen, re-dividing the country.
3. Ongoing civil unrest in Tunisia may weaken the country’s new unity government and create opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to strengthen in the country. Popular anti-government demonstrations began spreading after September 5, and Tunisian government concessions briefly held off additional demonstrations. Mass protests resumed in multiple locations, however, and labor strikes are expected to begin within days. The Tunisian government deployed additional security forces to protest sites. Salafi-jihadi militants based in Tunisia and also Libya may be positioned to infiltrate popular demonstrations or conduct attacks in Tunisia if civil unrest grows or protests turn violent.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) group may be growing stronger in Somalia, but its ability to compete with al Shabaab remains limited. The U.S. Department of State designated Abdul Qadir Mumin, a pro-ISIS cleric, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on August 31. Al Shabaab militants reportedly attacked Mumin’s forces in Bay region, Somalia on September 4. Mumin is an al Shabaab defector, and al Shabaab has eliminated pro-ISIS members from within its ranks. It is also possible that the attack indicates that Mumin’s group has grown stronger and that al Shabaab considers it a threat. ISIS may seek to develop networks in Somalia now that its African hub in Sirte, Libya is under pressure by U.S.-backed militias. ISIS is unlikely to dedicate significant resources to the Horn of Africa at this time, however.
2. The UN-brokered political process in Libya may be breaking down. The collapse of the UN-backed Libyan government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), could have an impact on U.S. counter-terrorism operations against ISIS in Libya. The UN convened an emergency meeting in Tunis on September 5 to address rising tensions between eastern and western factions. The U.S. extended its airstrike mission in Libya for an additional month at the request of the GNA. Rising challenges to the GNA’s legitimacy threatened to undermine future operations against ISIS or other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
3. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance’s September 2 announcement of a new missile in Yemen may be in response to increasing military threats from Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s coalition. The missile, the Borkan-1, is a modified Scud missile. The capability may have been transferred through the Iranian network. A political resolution to Yemen’s civil war remains unlikely despite both sides’ willingness to participate in a U.S.-backed peace plan. Yemeni factions expressed conditional support for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s plan, but unresolved disagreements over representation in the transitional government will likely continue to hinder talks. Saudi Arabia may pursue talks to de-escalate conflict in the Saudi-Yemeni border region but will continue to support efforts by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government to oust the al Houthi-Saleh alliance from Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is conducting a campaign to seize strategic positions vacated by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces in central and southern Somalia. Ethiopian AMISOM forces are withdrawing from Somalia. The forces are probably re-deploying inside Ethiopia to quell spreading anti-government protests by the Oromo and Amhara people. The Tigray minority dominates the Ethiopian government. Al Shabaab’s recapture of key towns is a setback for AMISOM and Somali forces allied against the group and sets conditions for al Shabaab to resurge in central Somalia.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be developing a relationship with a militant group in the Sahel, signaling ISIS’s intent to continue expanding in Africa. A pro-ISIS media outlet disseminated a pledge of bayat (allegiance) from a former al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) militant leader, Abu Walid al Sahrawi, to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi on October 30. Al Sahrawi had first pledged bayat to al Baghdadi in 2015 but recently claimed responsibility for a series of attacks in Niger and Burkina Faso that may have earned recognition from the ISIS network. ISIS will continue to expand in Africa despite the loss of its regional hub in Sirte, Libya.
3. The combatants in Yemen’s civil war remain focused on military objectives in order to improve their negotiating positions for a political resolution to the conflict. Both President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance rejected a UN-proposed peace plan after alleging that it favored their rivals. The Hadi government and its backer, the Saudi-led coalition, continued efforts to advance on key frontlines and degrade al Houthi-Saleh leadership and military capabilities. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a ballistic missile toward Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on October 28.
This document discusses defining success in Afghanistan. It argues that success is establishing a stable political order, security situation, and indigenous security forces that can prevent Afghanistan from being a safe haven for terrorists with reduced international support. While progress has been made in security, political progress has been slower. Improvements to Afghan governance through greater local participation are needed. Challenges include corruption, Pakistani sanctuaries for insurgent groups, and the seasonal nature of the conflict means the true test of progress will come in summer 2011. Continued support for the current strategy is recommended.
SECCON 2014 - Terrorism Dimensions – Countering the threat of terrorism ‘Stra...MesseIntl
Terrorism Dimensions – Countering the threat of terrorism ‘Strategies - Achieving nation security’
Sardar Shoukat Popalzai
President, Balochistan Economic Forum
Topics Covered:
• Terrorism Dimensions
• Global Insight on Terrorism
• Domestic Dimensions of Terrorism
• Countering Terrorism
• Terrorism: A Challenge to Political Government
• Terrorism Economic impact
• Terrorism & Media
This document summarizes a presentation on Boko Haram and the risk of mass atrocities in northeast Nigeria. It defines mass atrocities and discusses how terrorism relates to mass fatality attacks. An overview of Boko Haram outlines its history under different leaders and increasing violence. Risk factors for mass atrocities in northeast Nigeria are assessed, including armed conflict, human rights violations, state weakness, and others. While Boko Haram remains a risk, the presentation notes that other state and non-state actors could also perpetrate mass atrocities.
Pakistan: the political, economic, security and trade control context relevant to defence, security and dual use exporters, clarifying what are the main areas of opportunity and risk
The document summarizes the history and phases of the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) political party. It describes the party's origins in the All India Muslim League before partition. It then outlines the party's three phases of achieving and holding power in the national government of Pakistan from 1990-1997, 1997-1999, and 2013-2017. However, on each occasion Nawaz Sharif's term as Prime Minister was cut short due to conflicts with other institutions like the President and military. Despite facing challenges, the PMLN under Nawaz Sharif accomplished significant infrastructure projects including the Metro bus network and supported the military's counterterrorism operation Zarb-e-Azb.
Nawaz Sharif served 3 terms as Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1990-1993, 1997-1999, and 2013-2017. His first term focused on economic reforms but was cut short due to tensions with the president. In his second term, he carried out nuclear tests in 1998 in response to India but was ousted by a military coup in 1999. His third and longest term saw both successes like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as well as failures to resolve political tensions that led to his disqualification and end of his political career in 2017.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.“Operation Golden Arrow,” supported by an Arab coalition, may be stalling in its offensive against the al Houthis after initial successes in regaining control of Aden city. The offensive secured much of Aden city last week and forces have pushed northward from there, but have not recaptured al Anad military base along the road north. Forces in Taiz have also not been able to defeat the al Houthis.
2. Al Shabaab lost two strongholds in Dinsoor in Middle Jubba region and Bardhere in Gedo region in southern Somalia that may limit its ability to support operations in Kenya. Dinsoor and Bardhere control points of access to a major route into northern Kenyan. The loss is territorial, however, as al Shabaab fighters moved into the countryside.
3. Iranian officials downplayed the significance of UNSC Resolution 2231’s Annex B, which calls for an extended halt to certain ballistic missile activity, in order to assuage domestic concerns that the resolution infringes upon Iran’s weapons capabilities.
Nawaz Sharif was born in 1949 in Lahore, Pakistan. He received his law degree from Punjab University. Sharif served as Finance Minister of Punjab province and later became the Chief Minister of Punjab in 1985. Sharif was elected Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1990 and 1997, but his governments were dismissed in 1993 and 1999 via judicial rulings and a military coup respectively. As Prime Minister, Sharif reformed the constitution to limit presidential powers and prevent lawmakers from changing parties.
Terrorism and political violence in South East AsiaGraeme Cross
While the threat of a terrorist attack is still very real in certain areas of the Asia Pacific, the region has seen several key country risk levels drop or remain low for 2016, according to Aon’s Terrorism and Political Violence Map, created in collaboration with The Risk Advisory Group.
This year Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar all reported a decrease in risk from high to moderate while Australia’s risk level remained low. Terrorism is cited as the main concern in Australia and Thailand and while the political environment in both Philippines and Myanmar has stablished somewhat, civil unrest and political violence are still the principal threats the countries face.
This document provides an overview of the geography, society, and governance structures of Pakistan's northwestern tribal areas that have been impacted by militancy. It describes how the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA, also known as Malakand) are governed separately, with FATA under federal control and PATA falling under provincial rule. It also outlines the recent peace deal signed for Malakand and the ongoing military operation there, noting how the situation in PATA differs from that in FATA despite involvement of the same major actors - the Taliban and Pakistani government.
- Pakistan is an important Islamic country located in South Asia between India and Afghanistan. It has a population of over 200 million people and significant natural resources.
- However, Pakistan faces many challenges in the 21st century including a severe energy crisis, poor education and healthcare systems, high levels of corruption, terrorism, inflation, political instability, and widespread poverty and inequality.
- To overcome these issues, Pakistan needs strong leadership to improve governance, encourage economic development through industries and infrastructure projects, better distribute resources, and empower the population through education. With proper planning and unity, Pakistan has the potential to overcome its current problems.
1. The document outlines various indicators that can suggest the development of an insurgency, including the discovery of insurgent documents, caches, and training areas; recruitment efforts; dissent against the government; and increased criminal activities like theft, smuggling, and kidnapping for ransom to fund insurgent operations.
2. Specific indicators mentioned are things like unexplained aircraft flights or air drops, increased small arms demand, disappearance of classified documents, and new radical faces appearing in organizations to spread insurgent ideologies.
3. Detecting these indicators through intelligence networks in the early stages of insurgency development is important to disrupt insurgent activities before they become fully established.
In today's world most of the nations are suffering with this issue. This PPT. is prepared keeping in view of the present circumstances and will be of immense use of the students and personnel who are in job are involves in security related issues.
NPA, The Worldwide Recruiting Network is a global network of 350 independent recruiting firms in 24 countries that work cooperatively to provide recruiting services locally, regionally, and internationally. Founded in 1956, NPA members leverage their collective expertise, resources, and networks to deliver superior results for clients, including access to passive candidates, specialists in various industries and locations, and effective negotiation. Clients benefit from working with a local recruiter while gaining connections worldwide.
Let us take care of the only one philippines god has given to usArnulfo Laniba
The document discusses how past civilizations destroyed their environments through greedy and abusive practices, turning fertile lands into deserts. It warns that similar forces now aim to exploit and degrade the Philippines. It argues that the nation must reject destructive chemical farming and industrial activities, and instead implement permaculture techniques to replenish soils and transform abandoned and forested areas into productive, self-sustaining food and fruit forests. This would help address issues like insurgency, unemployment, and land degradation, while allowing Filipinos to prosper from their land rather than working abroad.
The document discusses how insurgencies are evolving due to new technology and the decline of state sponsorship. Specifically, it notes that insurgencies are becoming more dispersed, networked, swarming, terrorism-focused and transnational in nature by leveraging the internet, social media and other technologies. While these new models are very difficult for states to counter, they are also unlikely to achieve decisive success without major outside intervention if the initial uprising fails. The document argues that much of the conventional wisdom about insurgency may no longer apply given these changes.
This document discusses power and politics in organizations. It defines power as the ability to influence another person or group's behavior. Power comes from various sources like the ability to reward or punish, legitimate authority, charisma, expertise, or information. Politics involves using power to influence decisions and achieve desired outcomes when the outcomes are uncertain. Organizational politics can be modeled as either rational, where goals are clear and decisions are logical, or political, where goals are unclear and power/influence are needed due to disagreement, conflict, and imperfect information. While power and politics often have negative connotations, they can also be used positively by managers to control resources and promote organizational goals.
The FBI's Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD) aims to prevent WMD attacks through domain awareness, pre-event planning, and a Threat Credibility Evaluation (TCE) process. The TCE process assesses threats and provides guidance to field offices. WMD Coordinators in each of the FBI's 56 field offices liaise with local, state, and federal partners on WMD issues and operations. The FBI also works closely with domestic agencies like DHS, DOD, and intelligence partners as well as international organizations on preventing WMD attacks.
This document discusses the importance of interagency cooperation across different government organizations. It notes that issues like counterterrorism, law enforcement, emergency response, border security, and cybersecurity require integrated responses from multiple agencies. The document outlines some key elements of effective interagency cooperation, including understanding different agency cultures, strategies, intelligence approaches, technology uses, third parties, and evaluations. It provides definitions and models of interagency cooperation at the global, national, and local levels for issues like counterterrorism and law enforcement.
The document summarizes the history and evolution of Maoist insurgency in India from 1967 onwards. It traces the formation of different Maoist groups like CPI-ML, CPI-Maoist and MCC and discusses their strategies, organization structure, funding sources, arms procurement, and areas of operation. It also analyzes the nature of Maoist insurgency in India and the areas impacted.
The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was founded in 1930 by Crisanto Evangelista and other labor leaders. In 1942, during the Japanese occupation, the CPP formed its armed wing called the Hukbalahap to fight the Japanese. After the occupation, the CPP laid down its arms and adopted legal struggle. In 1969, Jose Maria Sison and others founded the CPP's armed wing, the New People's Army, to continue armed revolution. There have been many attempts at peace talks between the CPP-NPA and Philippine governments over the decades, but an enduring peace agreement has remained elusive.
This document discusses the insurgency in Balochistan province of Pakistan and the role of foreign actors. It notes that the insurgency has faced 4 uprisings since independence related to autonomy, separatism, and sabotaging the government. Foreign actors like the US, India, and Iran may be supporting the insurgents due to strategic interests in the region including resources, ports, and countering other foreign influences. The document argues the government of Pakistan can counter these foreign hands through positive engagement of Balochistan, such as development projects and discussions with Baloch leaders.
Karl Marx believed that rebellions ultimately aim to overthrow the ruling class and replace the existing political and economic system with one better suited to a new ruling class. The United Nations defines insurgency as an organized movement that uses subversion and armed conflict to overthrow a constituted government. Rebellion refers to open resistance against established authority and has existed throughout history, with some of the most well-known rebels including George Washington, Spartacus, Pancho Villa, and Mohandas Gandhi.
Disarmament and arms control aim to reduce weapons and the threat of armed violence. Disarmament involves reducing or eliminating weapons, while arms control limits but does not necessarily reduce weapons. The United Nations and organizations like the Conference on Disarmament work to negotiate treaties on issues like nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons. Success has been seen in treaties like the Antarctic Treaty, but achieving full disarmament remains an ongoing challenge.
students presentation itroduction to cpp npa ndfDennis Cana
The document provides background information on the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), its armed wing the New People's Army (NPA), and political wing the National Democratic Front (NDF). It discusses the founding and history of the CPP/NPA/NDF, their organizational structure and policies, and examples of their violent and illegal activities over the years such as killings, bombings, extortion, and recruitment of minors and students. It also lists companies that were forced to close due to NPA harassment and violence.
This document discusses arms control, disarmament, and the relationship between the two. It provides definitions and comparisons of arms control and disarmament. Arms control refers to formal agreements that regulate military capabilities between states, with the goal of reducing risk of war. Disarmament envisions the elimination of all weapons and seeks to overturn the status quo, while arms control works to preserve it. The document also lists several historical arms control agreements and their key provisions.
The document discusses the importance of disarmament and arms control in reducing threats from nuclear weapons and achieving peace. It notes that we must choose between disarmament, a divided world, or total destruction. Over 30,000 nuclear weapons currently exist worldwide in the arsenals of 9 states. The document outlines the differences between disarmament and arms control, and various international treaties and organizations working on limiting weapons proliferation and reducing stockpiles. While progress has been mixed, continued cooperation on binding agreements is important for global security.
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Update Report on the GPH-CPP/NPA/NDF Peace Process GenPeace
- The peace talks between the Philippine government and the CPP/NPA/NDF have spanned 24 years over 4 presidencies and included over 40 rounds of talks and 13 interruptions. More than 10 agreements have been signed.
- Recent policy thrusts include the reconstitution of a new government panel in October 2010, chair-to-chair meetings in December 2010 that agreed to resume formal talks in February 2011, and preliminary talks in January 2011 that set the agenda.
- The preliminary talks achieved agreements on ceasefires during the formal talks, accelerating negotiations to complete remaining substantive agenda items within 18 months to 3 years, and establishing working groups on political reforms.
The document discusses the complex challenges of the Afghan-Pakistan war and strategy to address it through a "clear, hold, build" approach. It notes that the war involves six interrelated conflicts and the strategy must focus on clearing insurgent elements from key areas while maintaining security and implementing reconstruction. However, success is difficult due to threats from various insurgent groups and challenges like weak governance, corruption, and lack of public support for the war.
The document discusses various types and causes of global terrorism, including political and non-political terrorism, state terrorism, and terrorist groups operating in different countries like Sri Lanka, China, Pakistan, India, and others. It also outlines counter-terrorism strategies used by governments, such as intelligence agencies, paramilitary forces, and international cooperation. Emerging threats discussed include cyber-terrorism, biological warfare, nuclear threats, corporate hijackings, and other forms of terrorism.
The document discusses various types and causes of terrorism around the world. It outlines terrorist groups and their objectives operating in several countries like Sri Lanka, China, Pakistan, India, and how they threaten global security. It also discusses the roles of different government agencies in combating terrorism and improving intelligence sharing. The document predicts that threats may increase in the future from cyber terrorism, biological warfare, nuclear weapons, and corporate hijackings.
National defence ministries and armed forces to build integrity and reduce corruption. We collaborate with international organisations such as NATO, the UN, and the African Union to develop tools and approaches that reduce corruption risks.
We encourage defence companies to collaborate internationally to enhance the integrity of international tendering. We strengthen civil society’s ability to engage constructively on defence, and provide expertise for those playing a monitoring and oversight role. Through our research programme, we develop new tools to implement anti-corruption change and build knowledge and expertise on defence and security corruption.
http://www.ti-defence.org/
A Manchester graduate in Economics, Jeff had a business career as CEO in multi-national IT, Defence and Aerospace and M&A companies followed by working with NGO’s such as Global Witness (five years as a Director in this natural resource-related corruption NGO) and Transparency International (an advisor for 12 years at TI-UK) and as a CEO in a health-related charity.
He is now a Trustee of TI-UK, Chairs its international Defence and Security Programme, its Finance and Audit Committee and its Advisory Panel on the Corrupt Capital programme (focusing on money laundering). Jeff is also Chair of Future Brilliance, a Charity developing work and entrepreneurial opportunities in highly fragile states such as Afghanistan.
Jeff is currently writing a book on the interplay between faiths and beliefs in the nineteenth Century (religious, economic, political, artistic) that focuses on Manchester in the Industrial Revolution through the eyes and actions of men like Feargus O’Connor (Chartist), James Hull (Moravian Missionary to Manchester from 1835) and Hugh Hornby Birley (made infamous by Peterloo and a major civic leader in the Town thereafter).
Pakistan was founded in 1947 by Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and emerged as an independent state on August 14th, 1947. It has a total area of 796,095 sq km and a population of over 167 million people. Pakistan is divided into 4 provinces: Sindh, Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan. The country faces a governance crisis due to factors such as lack of competent leadership, political instability, corruption, weak institutions, fragile economy, terrorism, and nepotism. Key events that exacerbated the crisis include periods of martial law beginning in 1958 and the fall of Dhaka in 1971.
U.S. Central Command Posture Statement 2012Tisha Wright
1) The Central Command region faces significant challenges including political instability from the Arab Awakening, threats from terrorist groups and Iran, and lack of a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
2) As US ground troop presence decreases, naval presence will become increasingly important to maintain a light footprint, project power, reassure partners, and counter threats like Iran's growing naval capabilities.
3) Fiscal constraints may force the US to do less in the region, but the military will maintain quality and focus on strategic objectives like countering terrorism and supporting regional stability.
Boko Haram began as a local insurgency in Nigeria but has expanded its operations. While it poses minimal direct threat to the UK currently, its growing capabilities increase risks. Boko Haram seized the town of Chibok in 2014, kidnapping hundreds of girls and demonstrating its organization and arms. Continued instability along Nigerian and Cameroonian borders could lead to expanded foreign assistance for Boko Haram and a broadening of its strategy.
Indonesia's "Strategy, Doctrine of National Defense Posture" WhitepaperParivartin
Raw translation for “Strategi, Doktrin, Postur Pertahanan Negara” (or “Strategy, Doctrine, of National Defense Posture”) written by National Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Brigadier General Budiman in 2008.
This English Translation is for Educational & Non-Commercial Purposes Only.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network, including its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel.
This document summarizes key tactics used by the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. It discusses their use of snipers, RPGs, IEDs, intimidation/coercion, and propaganda. Sniper attacks peaked in 2010, while the Taliban effectively uses older RPG-7 launchers combined with deception. IEDs became more sophisticated after 2005, transitioning to remote-controlled bombs. Intimidating night letters are an effective low-cost tactic. Propaganda exaggerates Taliban victories and threatens those who aid the U.S. and government. While once common, suicide attacks have declined since their peak around 2005-2007 likely due to less supplies and personnel. Overall, the Taliban continues refining its tactics against U
Though the worst intelligence failure, the USA took maximum advantage of the 9/11 tragedy and embarked on the mission to accomplish the objectives set forth in the infamous neo-con paper, known as the American Century.
America employed all its -military, diplomatic and financial, to wage a war of terror on several countries besides Afghanistan-its starting point.
Whether it was a stellar success or a dismal failure, it has cost the world massively in terms of loss of human lives, financial losses, refugees crises, missed opportunities, and surprisingly, increased global terrorism
This presentation covers all these issues in greater detail
The document discusses the War on Terror that began after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It covers the introduction, aims, views, dimensions, costs and consequences of the war. While some view it as a stellar success for dismantling al-Qaeda and killing Osama bin Laden, others see it as a dismal failure for failing to achieve long-term strategic objectives and creating more terrorists. It led to huge human and financial costs as well as unintended consequences like increased terrorism and regional instability.
The document discusses small arms and light weapons (SALW), providing details on:
- Types of SALW and examples
- Estimates of the number of SALW currently in circulation globally and annual illegal arms trade figures
- Major exporters and importers of SALW
- Issues caused by SALW proliferation like impacts on children, development, and public health
- National laws and collection programs related to SALW in the Philippines
- Groups working to address SALW issues like PhilANSA and their advocacy efforts
EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AGAINSST INSURGENCYApewalen Samuel MBA, PFSO
The document discusses protecting critical infrastructure from insurgency in West Africa. It outlines that critical infrastructure is vital to any economy and must be protected from threats. Insurgent activity in West Africa, such as bombings and kidnappings, pose a risk to critical infrastructure. Effective protection requires collaboration between government security forces and private infrastructure owners, as well as risk assessments to determine how to apply resources.
This document provides a PESTEL analysis of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. It examines the region's politics, economics, socio-cultural factors, technology, environment, and legal systems. Key points include: the impact of the Arab Spring uprisings; high levels of corruption in many governments; the influence of religion; water scarcity issues; a historically oil-dependent economy; youth unemployment; and ongoing conflicts such as those in Syria, Iraq, and between Israel and Palestine. The analysis also discusses NATO's role in the region, the effects of the Iran nuclear program, and terrorism trends involving groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda.
The document provides additional examples of actions taken by the United Nations (UN) and NATO to resolve conflicts. It summarizes UN involvement in the Rwandan genocide and civil war in Liberia, noting the UN failed to prevent mass killings in Rwanda but helped bring peace to Liberia after sending peacekeepers. NATO actions in Afghanistan and against ISIS in Iraq and Syria aimed to combat terrorism but had mixed results, defeating opponents militarily but failing to fully establish stability.
Similar to Isaf State Of The Insurgency 231000 Dec (17)
ग्रेटर मुंबई के नगर आयुक्त को एक खुले पत्र में याचिका दायर कर 540 से अधिक मुंबईकरों ने सभी अवैध और अस्थिर होर्डिंग्स, साइनबोर्ड और इलेक्ट्रिक साइनेज को तत्काल हटाने और 13 मई, 2024 की शाम को घाटकोपर में अवैध होर्डिंग के गिरने की विनाशकारी घटना के बाद अपराधियों के खिलाफ सख्त कार्रवाई की मांग की है, जिसमें 17 लोगों की जान चली गई और कई निर्दोष लोग गंभीर रूप से घायल हो गए।
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Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
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projet de traité négocié à Istanbul (anglais).pdfEdouardHusson
Ceci est le projet de traité qui avait été négocié entre Russes et Ukrainiens à Istanbul en mars 2022, avant que les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne ne détournent Kiev de signer.
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Federal Authorities Urge Vigilance Amid Bird Flu Outbreak | The Lifesciences ...The Lifesciences Magazine
Federal authorities have advised the public to remain vigilant but calm in response to the ongoing bird flu outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza, commonly known as bird flu.
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Recent years have seen a disturbing rise in violence, discrimination, and intolerance against Christian communities in various Islamic countries. This multifaceted challenge, deeply rooted in historical, social, and political animosities, demands urgent attention. Despite the escalating persecution, substantial support from the Western world remains lacking.
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केरल उच्च न्यायालय ने 11 जून, 2024 को मंडला पूजा में भाग लेने की अनुमति मांगने वाली 10 वर्षीय लड़की की रिट याचिका को खारिज कर दिया, जिसमें सर्वोच्च न्यायालय की एक बड़ी पीठ के समक्ष इस मुद्दे की लंबित प्रकृति पर जोर दिया गया। यह आदेश न्यायमूर्ति अनिल के. नरेंद्रन और न्यायमूर्ति हरिशंकर वी. मेनन की खंडपीठ द्वारा पारित किया गया
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Slide deck with charts from our Digital News Report 2024, the most comprehensive exploration of news consumption habits around the world, based on survey data from more than 95,000 respondents across 47 countries.
1. State of the Insurgency Trends, Intentions and Objectives MG Michael Flynn Director of Intelligence International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan U.S. Forces, Afghanistan AS OF: 22 DEC, 2009 UNCLASSIFIED Classification of this briefing: UNCLASSIFIED
2. Purpose Provide an overview of the current capacity, capabilities and intentions of the insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan UNCLASSIFIED
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9. 2003 – 2006 Predominantly Military Ordnance Casualties: (04 – 16), (05 – 279), (06 – 1473) * No IED related casualty data available for 2003 UNCLASSIFIED IED Evolution in Afghanistan 2007 – 2009 Increasing use of Homemade Explosives (HME) (80 to 90 percent from Ammonium Nitrate) Casualties: (07 – 2293), (08 – 3308) Kinetic Events 01 Jan 09 – 15 Dec 09 1922 (2006) 2718 (2007) 4169 (2008) 831 (2005) 326 (2004) Events: 81 (2003)* Events: 7228 Casualties: 6037 (2009) Kinetic Events 01 Jan 05 – 15 Dec 05
22. Materials / IED Components The Improvised Explosive Device (IED) (The insurgent’s choice of a weapon and a tactic Insurgent Networks The Population is the Center of Gravity – not the IED Location Event Propaganda Casualties IED
23. How Do We Solve the Problem? IED Secure the Population Governance Development Afghan Population Training Material Organization Information Ops Ultimately, We Win by Doing COIN Better
Editor's Notes
How we did this: rigorous multi-disciplinary assessment my unprejudiced best military advice of what is required to succeed my personal experience and core beliefs. respect the environment in which we operate lesson learned from my experience in conventional and special operations the mission is inseparable from the situation derived from my own sense of the situation 02/08/10
improve confidence in GIROA population-centric counterinsurgency campaign risks no matter what we do not executing this strategy carries much more risk tweaking the status quo will only postpone failure unique moment in time time is of the essence believe that we can succeed must fundamentally change the culture change will be the crux – harder than the resources 02/08/10
The Afghan insurgency is comprised of multiple groups pursuing various short and longer term goals. The three major groups include the Taliban, Hezb-e Islami-Gulbuddin, and the Haqqani network. These groups cooperate and coordinate at times. Their area of operations tends to be geographically and demographically determined. They operate mainly in the Pashtun-majority areas of Afghanistan, in the south and east and in Pashtun pockets in the north. The common goals of these groups is to expel foreign forces from Afghanistan (although not foreign fighters allied with them or al-Qaeda) and to undermine the central government. Al-Qaida relies on insurgents for facilitation and safehavens. The insurgents cooperates at the tactical level—local commanders—to conduct attacks. The identities of insurgents groups are blurred. None of the organizations has a hierarchically, formal command structure comparable to Western military organizations. Commanders and fighters have, do, and will continue to shift loyalties from one insurgent group to another. The availability of logistics and resources often overlap. 02/08/10
02/08/10
Ammonium Nitrate Ammonium Nitrate is quoted as containing 34% Nitrogen – it does exist in lower concentrations which are less easy to weaponise but is just a matter of filtering off impurities. Unknown statistics on legitimate use of black market fertiliser. Banning of AN fertilizer would probably not impact on economy of fertiliser plants. There is a Fertiliser plant in MES – if that could be upscaled to supply all Afg fertiliser requirement the need to import (open to abuse) fertilised would be diminished. Ammonium Nitrate as an explosive Ammonium Nitrate and Aluminium powder (ANAL) s the most often seen explosive – has a rough 1:1 equivalency of TNT. It is mixed in the proportions of 11 Kg AN to 1 KG Aluminium powder (from metallic paint). AN and diesel is also explosive – similar power to ANAL. AN can be turned into a powerful with the addition of any fuel (e.g. sugar, sawdust etc…) With a sufficiently large booster, AN can be made to detonate in it’s pure form. 02/08/10
The trend for smaller main charges (less than 100lbs) is that the main charge size is increasing. There is no trend for large, armor defeating main charges (250 Lbs +). The use of large main charges is not new, and has been seen as far back as 2006. However, there has been an increase in the use of large main charge command wires in RC E and S. 02/08/10
improve confidence in GIROA population-centric counterinsurgency campaign risks no matter what we do not executing this strategy carries much more risk tweaking the status quo will only postpone failure unique moment in time time is of the essence believe that we can succeed must fundamentally change the culture change will be the crux – harder than the resources 02/08/10
improve confidence in GIROA population-centric counterinsurgency campaign risks no matter what we do not executing this strategy carries much more risk tweaking the status quo will only postpone failure unique moment in time time is of the essence believe that we can succeed must fundamentally change the culture change will be the crux – harder than the resources 02/08/10
dramatic change in how we operate. focus on the people as the center of gravity Change culture -- bring security and normalcy to the people shield them from insurgent violence, corruption and coercion. truly comprehensive partnership more integrated at every level. accelerate the rate of ANSF development build flexibility to grow the ANSF improving governance at all levels more discerning in partnering modify organizational structures operational-level headquarters new plan for civilian-military integration none of these are new change how we think the SOP is not sacred 02/08/10
02/08/10
(-) Success targeting of senior leadership and constant leadership changes has disrupted efforts to control and coordinate operations, especially in the South (-) Hekmatyar’s reported willingness to reconcile with the Afghan government causes concern that others may follow (+) Portrayed as increasingly capable and resilient, due to aggressive propaganda, and a steady increase in high-profile attacks each year (+) Maintain a robust access to funding sources, and safe-haven in Pakistan used for training and staging 02/08/10
How we did this: rigorous multi-disciplinary assessment my unprejudiced best military advice of what is required to succeed my personal experience and core beliefs. respect the environment in which we operate lesson learned from my experience in conventional and special operations the mission is inseparable from the situation derived from my own sense of the situation 02/08/10
[Anchor Slide: Defines problem and validates the problem as most see it - let’s them know that you understand. Follow on slides leads the viewer to the bigger picture and more comprehensive solution] This is the problem as we all tend to see it. An IED is an explosive event at a location. Its components consist of an insurgent network – made up of such entities as bomb makers, logisticians, lookouts, and emplacers; and materials – explosives, casings, wiring and initiative devices. When this network and the materials combine, the resultant effect produces casualties and propaganda. The difficulties in defeating the this threat cannot be understated. The IED – in many ways – IS the war. The IED is a tool of the Insurgent Network that exists in a complex social environment. Put another way, the IED is to Coalition Forces in Afghanistan what the submarine, machinegun, and tank was to military forces in WWI – a game changer. And yet despite the importance of this threat, the takeaway from this slide rests with the Insurgent Network – which exists within the complex social environment that is the population of Afghanistan. A population that actively or passively permits this network to exist and allows it the freedom to make and emplace IEDs. Therefore I have concluded that the IED is NOT the Center of Gravity; the population of Afghanistan is.
With our evolved understanding of what IEDs are we have made great steps in mitigating the threat. We are using everything at our disposal to defeat the network and protect lives. Our Counter IED efforts mitigate the problem, using Information Operations to shape an environment that is not conducive to IEDs; Materials such as MRAPs, FMV(ISR), and ECM; Training in country and at home station to identify and remove IEDs; and the creation of new and agile Organizations such as JIEDDO, Paladin, Focused Targeting Forces (FTF), Counter IED Platoons (CIAP), and Intelligence architectures that were unthinkable only a few years ago. But no amount MRAPs, FMV, training, or intelligence will solve the IED problem. They can’t. Because the problem is not the IED – or even the network. The problem, as alluded to on the first slide, is that the Afghan population actively or passively allows that IED to be emplaced. So the focus must be on getting the population to support GIRoA and deny the Insurgent Network the freedom to emplace the IED. The solution, therefore, is about securing the Afghan population, enabling good governance by the GIRoA, and supporting development projects that can provide sustainable jobs and a healthy economy. Attacking the IED network and mitigating its effects simply buys us time and space to create the conditions for a stabile Afghanistan. And that in turn produces a populace that is non-permissive to the IED network; a population that actively rejects those who assemble and emplace IEDs. Ultimately, the solution is found by doing better COIN.