The military balance 2013

contents
Indexes of Tables and Maps 4
Editor’s Foreword 5
Part One Capabilities, Trends and Economics
Chapter 1 conflict analysis and conflict trends 7
trends in defence capability 16
anti-access/area denial: Washington’s response 29
Global trends in defence economics 32
europe’s defence industrial base 37
Chapter 2 comparative defence statistics 41
Defence Budgets and Expenditure 41
Selected C-130H Hercules operators 43
Key defence statistics 44
IEDs and the rise of the MRAP 46
Sea-denial capabilities for selected countries in East Asia 47
Revamping China’s tactical air power 48
Chapter 3 north america 49
Chapter 4 europe 89
Chapter 5 russia and eurasia 199
Chapter 6 asia 245
Chapter 7 middle east and north africa 353
Chapter 8 latin america and the caribbean 415
Chapter 9 sub-saharan africa 477
Chapter 10 country comparisons – force levels and economics 543
Part Two Reference
Explanatory Notes 557
List of Abbreviations for Data Sections 567
Index of Country/Territory Abbreviations 571
Index of Countries and Territories 572

Chapter One
Conflict Analysis and ConflictTrends
Armed conflict continued around the world in 2012.
Many are captured on the 2013 Chart of Conflict
included with this volume, and further details can be
found in the IISS Armed Conflict Database. In a section
new to The Military Balance this year, the IISS exam-
ines the wars in Afghanistan and Syria, analysing
the course of both wars from November 2012 to
November 2013. Both involve conflict between insur-
gents and governments, but with varying degrees
of external assistance to all warring parties. A short
concluding analytical essay compares the role of
key military factors in both conflicts, offering some
general conclusions about modern insurgency and
counter-insurgency.
The war in afghanisTan
NATO and the Afghan government are racing
against the clock to improve security, grow the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), develop
the capacity of the Afghan state, reduce corruption,
and persuade ‘reconcilable’ insurgents to lay down
their arms, all in time to allow Afghan authorities to
assume the lead for security across the country and
for NATO to withdraw from combat operations by
the end of 2014. This does not require elimination of
the insurgency but it does need to be reduced suffi-
ciently so as to no longer pose an existential threat
to the Afghan state and to be containable by Afghan
security forces without NATO’s combat power.
security transition
At its May 2012 Chicago Summit, NATO declared that
‘the Afghan security forces are well on track to take
full security responsibility across the country by the
end of 2014’. Pledges of military and financial assis-
tance made at Chicago and subsequently at Tokyo
were designed to reassure Afghans that the country
would continue to receive political, development and
financial support after 2014. The additional 33,000 US
‘surge’ troops deployed from 2009 had withdrawn by
October, leaving 68,000 US troops alongside 28,000
troops from other nations. After Washington and
Kabul agreed thatAfghans would assume the lead for
special operations and would take over the US prison
and detainees at Bagram, a US–Afghan strategic part-
nership agreement was signed in May, which led the
US to designate Afghanistan a major non-NATO ally.
Since the surge began in 2009, security has
improved. Improved intelligence and special forces
capabilities caused significant attrition of insurgent
leaders inside Afghanistan. Three tranches of districts
and provinces across the country, including most of
Kabul, entered the security-transition process. Two
further tranches are due to do so next year. Transition
does not mean that NATO-led forces withdrew
from these areas, but rather that their role shifted to
providing mentoring and support.
Despite insurgent ambitions to stage a counter-
offensive, security gains made in the surge have not
been rolled back. In September 2012, the UN assessed
that ‘there has been no significant deterioration of
public order or security in areas in which the tran-
sition has taken place’. NATO claimed that violence
was being held at arm’s length from much of the
Afghan population, and displayed cautious opti-
mism that the improving confidence and capability
of the ANSF meant improvements in security would
endure. Evidence suggested that ISAF and the ANSF
were gaining an advantage over the Taliban: NATO
statistics showed an 8% reduction in insurgent attacks
during 2011, while the UN assessed a 30% decrease
in security incidents in the first nine months of 2012,
and NATO claimed a 38% drop in its casualties in the
same period. There was evidence that insurgents had
difficulties in acquiring IED components and credible
reports of local popular uprisings against the Taliban
in Ghazni Province and elsewhere. The Afghan rein-
tegration programme has persuaded over 5,000 insur-
gents to lay down their arms, although this has yet to
have strategic effect.
Countervailing trends
Targeted killings of civilians (especially Afghan
government officials) continued with, for example,
over 230 people killed between May and July 2012
alone. Most were believed to be victims of Taliban
assassinations. There were also reports of a small but
steady stream of defections from the ANSF to the
Taliban as well as indications of some local accom-

8 The MiliTary Balance 2013
modations between the ANSF and insurgents. And
there has been less military progress in southeastern
Afghanistan, including the provinces bordering North
Waziristan, the heartland of the Haqqani network
in Pakistan. US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told
Congress that ‘in eastern Afghanistan the topography,
the cultural geography and the continuing presence
of safe havens in Pakistan give the insurgents advan-
tages they have lost elsewhere in the country’.
Kabul was the location of only 1% of security inci-
dents, but it was the focus of concerted efforts by the
Haqqaninetworktolaunchspectacularattacks,mostly
by infiltrating from Pakistan into eastern Afghanistan,
through the border provinces of ISAF’s Regional
Command-East. NATO and Afghan forces claimed
to have pre-empted many attacks on the city; citing
the lack of any such successful attacks after April 2012.
Earlier attacks that got through were successfully
contained byAfghan forces and then counter-attacked
by Afghan commandos, with ISAF support limited
to helicopters and military advisers. But, as ‘propa-
ganda of the deed’, such attacks had some success in
portraying the transition as failing and eroding confi-
dence within NATO nations. Meanwhile, an attack
on Camp Bastion that destroyed six US Marine Corps
AV-8B aircraft showed that well-planned attacks by
determined insurgents are likely to continue.
Pakistan
In 2011 Congressional testimony, outgoing US
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mike
Mullen criticised support provided to the insurgents
by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI),
claiming that the Haqqani network acted as a ‘veri-
table arm of ISI’, though a January 2012 leaked NATO
report contained evidence that both parties distrusted
each other.
A deterioration in US–Pakistani relations, espe-
cially after the killing of Osama bin Laden and acci-
dental killing of 24 Pakistani troops by US forces,
halted cooperation and closed NATO’s supply lines.
Although Pakistan eventually re-opened these supply
lines, air-strikes against Pakistani targets from armed
US UAVs continued to stoke Pakistani resentment of
the US and contaminate attitudes towards ISAF.
It is not clear that Pakistan has sufficient civilian
and military security capacity to further suppress
Afghan insurgent safe havens, at the same time
as countering its domestic militants. But the chal-
lenge to the state posed by the Pakistan Taliban may
have changed attitudes of some securocrats who
see a Taliban victory in Afghanistan as encouraging
Pakistan’s insurgents. This may have been reinforced
by popular and military shock at the October Pakistan
Taliban attack on a teenaged schoolgirl.
The ansf
The planned expansion of ANSF strength to 157,000
Afghan National Police (ANP) officers and 195,000
Afghan National Army (ANA) personnel by the end
of 2012 was ahead of schedule. An estimated 146,000
police officers and 185,000 army personnel were in
place by October. NATO’s training mission, there-
fore, shifted its efforts from increasing force size to
building support and logistic capabilities. NATO
and Afghan initiatives sought to reduce attrition and
absence rates, including initiatives to improve troop
rotation and leave schedules.
By April 2012, some 40% of operations were led
by the ANSF, with only 10% conducted solely by
ISAF. Brigade-level operations were being mounted
in Helmand by the Afghan army with little ISAF
assistance, reflecting a considerable improvement in
its capability. NATO was especially confident about
the rapidly maturing capabilities of Afghan army and
police special forces.
Until the surge the ANP was a lower international
priority. But its capability development subsequently
received more international support. As a result, attri-
tion in the ANP fell below the 16.8% annual target.
However, delivering results to ordinary Afghans
depends on corresponding improvements in the
whole machinery of justice, including courts, lawyers
and prisons, as much as it did on bolstering police
capacities. These areas lagged even further behind,
as shown by NATO’s refusal to send detainees to
Afghan prisons betraying evidence of human-rights
abuses. The Afghan Local Police, small self-defence
forces in villages that have opted to resist the Taliban,
are mentored by embedded teams of US special-
operations forces. The UN assessed that ‘by mid-
August, more than 16,266 personnel were operating
at 71 validated sites. While these local security forces
have contributed to stability in several areas, concerns
remain about issues of impunity, vetting, lack of
clear command and control, and the potential re-
emergence of ethnically or politically biased militias.’
There are ambitious plans to provide the Afghan
Air Force with a robust fixed- and rotary-wing airlift
capability, as well as attack helicopters and light
turboprop attack aircraft. They may achieve an initial
casualty evacuation capability in 2013. But personnel

9Conflict Analysis and Conflict Trends
© IISS
KABUL
BADAKSHAN
TAKHAR
BAGHLAN
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
KHOST
PAKTIKA
GHAZNI
KANDAHAR
HELMAND
NIMRUZ
FARAH
HERAT
URUZGAN
DAY KUNDI
GHOR
FARYAB
JAWZJAN
BALKH
SAMANGAN
KUNDUZ
SAR-E PUL
WARDAKBAMIYAN
PANJSHIR
KAPISA
ZABUL
LOGAR
PAKTIA
NANGARHAR
PARWAN
NURISTAN
BADGHIS
4 (UK)
23 (GEO)
6 (US)
(DNK)
33 (ROM)
||
21 (ROM)
||
(TUR)
||
(TUR)
||
2 (FRA)
×
×
(US)
×
1 209 (AFG) 3 209 (AFG)
×
2 209 (AFG)
ISAF Provincial
Reconstruction Team
and troop nationality
(see above for key)
Now-withdrawn US
surge formations
Kunduz (GER)
||
Mazar-e Sharif (GER)
||
×
2 207 (AFG)
3 RAR (US)
||
×
2 215 (AFG)
(US)
101
25 3 USMC
12
Regional Command Air Assets
North
South
East
Southwest
×
×
×
×
||||
|||
|||
×
3 2 (US)
×
2 2 (US)
×
6 (ESP)
×
3 207 (AFG)
×
TAURINESE (ITA)
×
×
1 207 (AFG)
Sources: ISAF, IISS research. Military symbols depict unit/formations’ standard organisation, but many have been ‘re-roled’ for deployment to Afghanistan with protected
patrol vehicles and counter-IED equipment.
× ×
1 215 (AFG)
×
3 205 (AFG)
×
1 205 (AFG)
×
4 205 (AFG)
×
76 (US)
×
3 201 (AFG)
1 111 (AFG)
3 215 (AFG)
6 25 (US)
×
×
1 203 (AFG)
173 (US)
×
×
4 203 (AFG)
4 4 (US)
×
×
2 201 (AFG)
×
2 111 (AFG)
×
4 1 (US)
×
×
2 203 (AFG)
×
3 203 (AFG)
×
××
(US)
×
6 (POL)
1 201 (AFG)
×
(US)
×
(US)
Qal’eh-Now
Herat
Farah
Lashkar Gah
Kandahar
Qalat
Tarin Kowt
Ghazni
Pol-e Alam
Wardak
Pul-e Khumri
Sharan
Khost
Jalalabad
Mehtar Lam
Kunduz
Gardez
Shibirghan
Chaghcharan
Bamiyan
Kunar
Regional Command
Capital – Kabul
Regional Command West
Regional Command North
Regional
Command South
Regional
Command East
Regional Command
Southwest
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
POL
CZE
TUR
NZL
US
ITA
ESP
LTU
TUR
GER
HUN
US
UK
AUS
Albania 212
Armenia 126
Australia (AUS) 1,550
Austria 3
Azerbaijan 94
Bahrain 95
Belgium 283
Bosnia-Herzegovina 54
Bulgaria 572
Canada 950
Croatia 260
Czech Republic (CZE) 422
Denmark (DNK) 613
El Salvador 24
Estonia 155
Finland 136
France (FRA) 2,418
Georgia (GEO) 800
Germany (GER) 4,737
Greece 12
Hungary (HUN) 555
Iceland 3 (civilians)
Ireland 6
Italy (ITA) 4,000
Jordan 720
Rep. of Korea (ROK) 350
Latvia 40
Lithuania (LTU) 221
Luxembourg 10
Macedonia (FYROM) 168
Malaysia 46
Mongolia 88
Montenegro 41
Netherlands 500
New Zealand (NZL) 155
Norway 145
Poland (POL) 1,800
Portugal 141
Romania (ROM) 1,762
Singapore 39
Slovakia 343
Slovenia 77
Spain (ESP) 1,450
Sweden 506
Tonga 55
Turkey (TUR) 1,328
Ukraine 25
United Arab Emirates 35
UK 9,500
US 68,000
US (OEF-A) 7,000
Estimated troop contributions of ISAF/OEF-A nations – October 2012
Total 112,622
Map 1 afghanistan

shortages and presence of a criminal patronage
network in the air force make December 2017 the
earliest it can achieve full capability. The Border
Police are similarly challenged.
friction and insider attacks
2012 saw increasing friction between Afghans and
ISAF. A particular incident was the mistaken burning
of copies of the Koran by US forces at Bagram, reports
of which led to nationwide riots. In general, these
were successfully contained by Afghan police forces,
as were protests in September against the provocative
‘Innocence of Muslims’ web video.
Attacks on ISAF by Afghan troops and police have
occurred since at least 2006, but greatly increased
in 2012. Some 56 ISAF troops were killed between
January and October 2012, 40% more than in the
whole of 2011. NATO and the Afghan authorities
announced initiatives to improve security against
Taliban infiltration as well as drives to improve vetting
and counter-intelligence. A spike in these attacks in
late 2012, together with the tension resulting from
the ‘Innocence of Muslims’ video, led ISAF to order
a ‘reduction in low level tactical partnering with the
Afghan forces below battalion level’. As of October
2012, it was unclear when these restrictions would
be lifted, but the impending US election meant they
were unlikely to be relaxed in the short term. While
suspending partnering could affect security provi-
sion, some in the ANSF would welcome the increased
authority and responsibility this suspension provides
as long as their troops do not suffer major reversals in
combat, which could affect confidence.
Insurgents will have taken comfort from this.
It will reinforce the view that despite heavy attri-
tion, they should continue to attack ISAF in order to
exploit NATO and Western states’ casualty aversion.
Insider attacks were invariably claimed by the
Taliban. But evidence, including an analysis by the
Pentagon, suggested that a significant proportion
of these attacks is instead carried out by Afghans
who have unexpectedly ‘snapped’, often as a result
of an apparently minor grievance or provocation. It
is likely that war fatigue and accumulated Afghan
resentment of the NATO presence are major moti-
vating factors and, as a consequence, improved secu-
rity measures may not have a decisive effect; such
attacks will probably continue until NATO troops
withdraw completely. But they have become a major
threat to NATO’s strategic narrative and to the polit-
ical commitment of all troop-contributing nations.
Plans and prospects for 2013–15
From 2012–14, NATO plans to adjust its force ‘from
a combat force with advisors, to an advisory force
with combat capabilities’. In March 2012, US defence
official James Miller summarised plans for transition:
‘at some point in 2013, the ANSF will be in the lead
for providing security across Afghanistan. At that
time, US and Coalition forces will be in a support
role … This includes US and coalition forces part-
nered with Afghan units … and it will include the
smaller footprint associated with US and coalition
forces in a train, advise and assist role.’ While NATO
Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has made
great efforts to portray NATO nations as united in
the transition strategy, national approaches to force
reductions have diverged. Further US reductions will
probably be at least matched by similar troop reduc-
tions by other ISAF nations.
There is little evidence that military efforts are
having sufficient coercive effect to bring insurgents to
the conference table, let alone generate an acceptable
deal. Meanwhile, it is far from clear that there will be
sufficient improvement in Afghan governance and
reduction in corruption to neutralise the root causes of
the insurgency, even in areas that have been ‘cleared
and held’. Transition may have proceeded as planned
at the military level, but the UN assesses that, despite
improvements in the security situation, ‘these gains
have not … generated public perceptions of greater
security and do not reflect improvements to the insti-
tutional structures required for longer-term stability.
Little has changed in the underlying dynamics to miti-
gate a deep-seated cycle of conflict. Furthermore, a
diminished international presence will have a signifi-
cant financial impact in many areas that, at least in the
short term, may even exacerbate predatory behaviour,
withareducedflowofmoneyencouragingcriminality.’
On present trend, it is likely that the ANSF will
reach full strength and will improve its capability. So
as NATO reduces, they will, for example, likely hold
onto those areas in southern Afghanistan now clear
of insurgents. But the outcome most likely in 2015 is
a situation much like today – a security patchwork
with the ANSF suppressing much insurgent activity
in many areas. In these places, the insurgency would
probably have a residual presence, and an ability to
mount limited attacks. But, other areas, particularly
in eastern Afghanistan, will probably remain under
insurgent influence.
The end of the surge makes it unlikely that
further major offensive operations will be mounted

to clear more areas of Helmand and Kandahar. As
ISAF reduces in size, the troops available to train
and mentor the ANSF will reduce, unless contrib-
uting nations choose to reinvest in these areas. The
US drawdown makes it far less likely that Haqqani
network strongholds in southeast Afghanistan can
be cleared, let alone ‘held and built’. However, if
ISAF and the ANSF make insufficient military prog-
ress in eastern Afghanistan, the insurgents’ ability to
mount ‘spectacular’ attacks in Kabul will continue to
pose a strategic threat to NATO’s narrative, creating
in Afghanistan and internationally an impression of
un-governability and failure of the transition process.
syria
By the end of 2012, the conflict in Syria was a full-
fledged insurgency, showing increasing elements
of sectarian civil war. The UN estimated that as of
October 2012, 30,000 people had died, over 2.5 million
Syrians needed humanitarian assistance within the
country, and over 340,000 had fled into neighbouring
countries. The rebels sought to depose the regime of
President Bashar al-Assad through either military
defeat or forcing him to cede power. To prevent this,
Assad and his forces sought to contain the insur-
gency, then progressively neutralise the rebels, whilst
re-establishing political control.
The war so far
Civil protests erupted against the Assad regime in
March 2011. In the absence of meaningful reform,
protests increased and a ‘security solution’ was
implemented from July 2011. Syrian security forces’
heavy-handed efforts at repression were broadcast
internationally by traditional media as well as social
media and YouTube, rapidly giving the opposition
information dominance in Western and Arab media.
With both sides increasingly radicalising, and the
opposition joined by self-organising armed groups,
attacks on government forces gradually increased
throughout 2011. By early 2012, the ‘security solution’
had failed, as had anArab League peace initiative and
monitoring mission. The regime then pursued a ‘mili-
tary solution’.
The first major government offensive focused on
Homs, and particularly the Baba Amr district. The
army surrounded and then shelled the area, causing
significant destruction and loss of life. At the end of
the operation, the armed opposition and most civil-
ians had fled. This provided the model for subse-
quent government offensives: first, ring the area
with checkpoints, and then engage with coordi-
nated artillery, rocket and tank fire complemented
by attacks from helicopters and fighter aircraft. The
army appeared to forgo using combined arms tank/
infantry tactics to mount close assaults on rebel posi-
tions and it displayed no capability to counter impro-
vised explosive devices (IEDs). Once bombardment
was judged to have neutralised most opposition,
troops would enter, often accompanied by snipers
and the pro-government Shabbiha militia, to conduct
house-to-house searches, often detaining (and alleg-
edly executing many) young men of military age who
had not fled. There was no meaningful reconstruction
by the government.
Fighting intensified through the year with the
armed opposition increasing in strength and effective-
ness,andabsorbingsomedefectorsfromregimeforces.
The rebels increasingly employed all the methods of
modern insurgency including hit-and-run attacks,
ambushes, assassinations and suicide bombings. They
destroyed armoured vehicles using rocket-propelled
grenades, land mines and IEDs, and learned to shoot
down low-flying regime aircraft with small arms, anti-
aircraft artillery, and possibly man-portable missiles.
Weapons were largely seized from regime forces,
or purchased in Libya, Iraq, Lebanon and Turkey.
Attacks against air force bases sought to reduce regime
airpower and capture anti-aircraft weapons.
The Russian–Chinese veto of a UN Security
Council Resolution in February emboldened the
regime to increase repression in Homs, Aleppo and
Damascus. A subsequent UN peace plan, ceasefire
and monitoring mission was used by both sides as an
opportunity to regroup.
The regime’s strategy was to secure loyalists and
loyalist areas, and repress the opposition, while
keeping level of conflict below that which would
trigger international intervention. Assad’s narrative
was that the uprising was a conspiracy of dark forces
including al-Qaeda, Western states and other Arab
nations. At the operational level, the regime sought
to secure the Alawite heartland in western Syria, the
road from Aleppo to the Jordanian border and those
running southeast into Iraq, as well as the energy
infrastructure and agricultural areas in the eastern
Euphrates valley. But over time, the regime increas-
ingly abandoned efforts to control much of the coun-
tryside and withdrew from most of Syrian Kurdistan,
providing a significant boost to PKK insurgents
fighting in Turkey.

The only common objective of the opposition
groups was to remove the Assad regime. There was
no evidence of any effective higher-level command
or direction at the operational or strategic level. Some
groups operated under the umbrella of the Free Syrian
Army (FSA), some autonomously. In some provinces,
notably Idlib, rebel Provincial Military Councils coor-
dinated activities by disparate rebel groups. Tensions
emerged between the local population and the rebels,
and between military defectors and armed civil-
ians. Defectors brought military skills, but could be
resented by those who switched sides earlier. There
was some inflow of foreign fighters, many of whom
were jihadis, some claiming membership of al-Qaeda.
Home-grown radical factions such as Jabhat as-Nusra
embraced terrorist tactics. Rebel forces committed
atrocities, including killing prisoners, though in
response to resulting outrage in Syria and abroad,
prominent rebel brigades issued a code of conduct
and pledged to uphold international law.
Concurrent with an 18 July bomb attack on
Assad’s security council, there was a major uprising
in Damascus and attacks on government border posts
increased. But rebel limitations were exposed in the
summer fighting around Aleppo. This showed stra-
tegic overreach, as well as a lack of coordination
and tactical and logistical shortcomings. The rush to
liberate the city clashed with previously successful
guerrilla tactics aimed at securing the countryside,
harassing supply lines and complicating the move-
ment of regime forces. Aleppo residents, including
opposition sympathisers, failed to rally behind the
rebel operation.
On several other occasions, rebel groups took over
key urban areas, only to be subject to counter-attacks
forcing eventual withdrawal. Provided government
forces concentrated in sufficient strength, the rebels
could not avoid eventual eviction. But these offensives
caused such destruction that they reduced government
support,whileeachcounter-offensiveservedtoweaken
government control elsewhere. The rebels were waging
a modern guerrilla war – although less effectively
than if they had a unified political–military strategy,
campaign plan and a central military command.
Nonetheless, the rebels could, by October 2012,
move freely in much of the countryside. They
controlled significant parts of Idlib and Aleppo prov-
inces bordering Turkey, and part of Damascus prov-
ince, as well as several border-crossing points. The
regime controlled the Alawite heartland of Latakia
province and much of Damascus and Aleppo, but
they could not prevent repeated uprisings by the
rebels in and around those key cities.
By October, it also became apparent that the
government forces were over-extended and no
longer had the military capability to re-assert control
over the whole country. The regime lost control over
several army and air force installations. There was
evidence of exchanges of prisoners and of local cease-
fires between rebel and regime commanders, for
example in Ain al-Fijeh, a village with natural springs
that provided water to Damascus.
The Syrian Air Force and Navy suffered few casu-
alties, but the army’s combat power considerably
reduced, losing up to 20–30 killed daily, more during
intense fighting, with probably two or three times as
many seriously wounded. Strength was also sapped
by the steady stream of defections. Reserves were
mobilised, but only half reported for duty. Despite
its notional strength of 220,000 troops, the effective
strength of the army was by autumn 2012 probably
about half that. Perhaps half of these could be trusted
with routine security duties, such as guarding instal-
lations, manning checkpoints and escorting convoys.
In sum, the regime could only be certain of the loyalty
and fighting effectiveness of the mainly Alawite
Special Forces, Republican Guard, and the elite 3rd
and 4th divisions – perhaps 50,000 troops in total.
external factors
The government continued to receive military
equipment from Russia and there were reports of
Iranian expert, financial and material assistance,
including credible rebel claims to have captured
Iranian Revolutionary Guards posing as pilgrims.
Media reports suggested that at least one member
of Lebanon’s Hizbullah had been killed fighting for
the regime. Rebels, meanwhile, drew support and
recruits from the refugees in Turkey, Lebanon and
Jordan. Some groups benefitted from foreign exper-
tise, including from Libyans who fought against
Muammar Gadhafi, but the best financed and armed
appeared to be Islamist groups.
As well as providing financial support and report-
edly some material assistance of unknown type, Gulf
states and Saudi Arabia have allowed discreet fund-
raising on their soil. Western governments feared
that weapons would end up in the hands of radical
groups, including al-Qaeda affiliates, so they limited
assistance to non-lethal equipment such as commu-
nications sets. They also tried to vet Syrian groups
before providing assistance, and there were reports

that Western officials offered rebel groups modern
weapons on the condition that they unite under a
single leadership. There was evidence that Western
states provided intelligence to select rebel groups,
and encouraged regime defections. Covert coordina-
tion centres were established in Turkey to manage
foreign assistance, notably salary payments to FSA
fighters. But this effort suffered from infighting
among rebel groups and between donor countries,
especially Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
Syria sought to deter external intervention.
Politically, it relied on Russia and China to block UN
Security Council initiatives by the UK, the US and
France. Meanwhile, the regime was aware of foreign
concern over its conventional and unconventional mili-
tary capabilities, and sought to highlight uncertainty.
Regime officials declared that its hitherto unacknowl-
edged chemical and biological capabilities would not
be used against the rebels, but did constitute a deter-
rent against intervention or attack. Israel was deeply
concerned about surface-to-air missiles, chemical or
biological weapons and ballistic missiles falling into
the hands of Hizbullah or other extremist groups.
Neighbouring countries were all affected. As
of October 2012, Syrian refugees in Lebanon had
exceeded 100,000, while an estimated 170,000 were in
Turkey, 105,000 in Jordan and 42,000 in Iraq, placing
strains on the receiving governments. Syrian shells
fell on Jordanian territory. Lebanon saw regular
cross-border fire, shelling and incursions, as well as
abductions by Syrian intelligence. It suffered greatly
increased tension and outbreaks of inter-communal
fighting sparked by the conflict. In June, a Turkish
RF-4 jet, which may have been on a reconnais-
sance mission, was shot down by Syria after briefly
violating its airspace; in September and October,
Syrian shelling of Turkish territory prompted heavier
counter fire by Turkish artillery. This may have been
a deliberately disproportionate tactical response to
deter further incidents.
neither intervention nor peace deal likely
Citing its difficulties in handling Syrian refugees,
Turkey advocated a no-fly zone and safe areas, as did
France, though both countries may have calculated
the prospects of UN authority for such initiatives as
DAMASCUS
Deraa
HomsHoula
Hama
Deir ez-Zor
1,806
2,106
5,586
Tartus
Latakia
Idlib
Jisr al-Shughour
Aleppo
S Y R I A
Akcakale
Tall Abiaf
J O R D A N
LEBANON
AR RAQQAH
ALEPPO
RIF-DIMASHQ
DEIR EZ-ZOR
HAMA
HOMS
AL-HASAKAH
AS-SUWAYDA
DERAA
IDLIB
LATAKIA
TARTUS
I R A Q
T U R K E Y
QUINETRA
3,070
8,328
6,923
2,453
149
171
3,813
4,609
2,700
51
614
87
25
45,849
61,086
79,356
110,649
Refugees
Naval base Military air base Major road
Civilian deaths per
region since March 2011
Gas
reserves
Oil
reserves
Area of armed
rebel activity
Sources: Political Geography Now, Center for Documentation
of Violations in Syria, UNHCR, Economist, US Geological Survey
614
Israeli-
occupied
Golan
Heights
Map 2 Conflict in syria

remote. The practical challenges of a no-fly zone and
a ground ‘safe area’, the two most-discussed humani-
tarian options, not least those posed by Syrian air and
coastal defences, are considerable. Experts assessed
that Syria’s air-defence network still constituted a
credible threat.
Most Western countries showed little enthusiasm
for military intervention, though US President Barack
Obama indicated in August that the use or transfer of
chemical weapons would constitute a clear red line.
However, the complexity of the crisis, its potential
regional repercussions, deadlock at the UN and the
projected costs of any military operations deterred
other states. A UN mandate for action seemed impos-
sible to obtain given Russian and Chinese refusal to
accept the premise of Western and certain regional
states that Assad should cede power.
In late 2012, ethnic and sectarian faultlines were
deepening, with pro-government fighters sympa-
thetic to the ruling Alawite minority ranged against
mainly Sunni rebels. Although the regime retained
the loyalty of a significant number of Sunnis and non-
Alawite minority groups, and the armed opposition
included many Sunni secular and non-Sunni fighters,
the sectarian narrative was increasingly shaping
perceptions and actions. The increasingly bitter
fighting served to increase polarisation and mutual
hatred, making the chances of a peace deal remote, as
shown by the collapse of UN efforts to broker a late
October ceasefire during the festival of Eid.
If both sides continued the approaches employed
up to October 2012, rebel capability and internal
and external support would probably grow, whilst
government capability and support would reduce.
Short of using chemical weapons against rebels, with
attendant risk of international intervention, it was
difficult to see how Assad could reverse this trend.
So the balance of forces would, over time, likely shift
to the rebels. However, should they abandon their
guerrilla approach and attempt to permanently hold
urban areas before such a tipping point is reached,
government forces could tactically defeat them: if
Assad could not win, the rebels could still lose. And
without authoritative political and military leader-
ship, competition between rebel groups over terri-
tory and resources could increase, carrying with it
the potential for inter-factional fighting. This could
see the country descend into a civil war with the
government just the strongest faction amongst
many, increasing the chance of regional destabilisa-
tion.
ConTrasTing aPProaChesTo
insurgenCy and CounTer-insurgenCy
The wars in Afghanistan and Syria are both contests
between insurgents and government forces, and
in each case both sides are supported by a variety
of external actors. Insights can be derived from
comparing both conflicts against two key principles
of all military operations: unity of effort; and legiti-
macy and operating in accordance with the law.
Further insights can also result from comparison
against two key principles of counter-insurgency:
intelligence and focusing on the population’s needs
and security.
unity of effort
Both wars reinforced the value of unity of effort, both
politically and militarily. In Syria, the Assad regime
directly controlled its political strategy and its secu-
rity forces. Meanwhile, the Syrian rebels were greatly
handicapped by an almost complete lack of unified
political authority and strategy; they also lacked a
single overall military command and displayed only
partial local tactical military coordination. All this
greatly reduced their military effectiveness.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban-led insurgency
achieved a degree of political and military unity of
effort, although it was unclear if there was sufficient
common ground between the various groupings that
share the Taliban’s banner for an over-arching cease-
fire to be implemented. On the government side,
achieving unity of effort within the Afghan polit-
ical arena appeared to be a major part of President
Hamid Karzai’s approach in balancing various power
brokers and factions, though as a result, some egre-
gious corruption may have been tolerated.
At the strategic level, there appeared to be limited
effective international coordination of reconstruction
and development, but at the tactical level, Provincial
Reconstruction Teams had some effect in achieving
unity of international civilian effort at provincial and
district level. Security operations gained unity of
effort from a single NATO–Afghan campaign plan:
Operation OMID. At the tactical level, considerable
unity of effort was achieved by NATO’s ‘partnering’
of Afghan units and formations, and by embedding
teams of advisers. This means that combinedAfghan–
NATO tactical operations had become well coordi-
nated, providing few opportunities for the insurgents
to exploit boundaries or seams between Afghan and
NATO units.

Legitimacy and the law
Both wars also showed the importance of achieving
legitimacy and operating in accordance with the law.
Syrian government forces, through repeated human-
rights abuses including torture, rapidly forfeited their
legitimacy with the civilian unarmed opposition,
with the Sunni majority and with many Arab and
Western states. This was reinforced by the pursuit of
a military solution which saw overwhelming force
used against rebel strongholds, with no apparent
constraints on the use of force or attempts to reduce
civilian casualties. Indeed, the overwhelming use
of indiscriminate force appeared to be a deliberate
attempt to intimidate actual and potential opposition
supporters.
Despite international legal legitimacy conferred by
numerous UN Security Council resolutions, NATO
and Afghan government operations in Afghanistan
have sometimes struggled to achieve legitimacy,
particularly at a local level, where NATO found it
difficult to understand complex tribal dynamics. But
recognising that collateral damage and civilian casu-
alties both eroded legitimacy and acted as powerful
recruiting sergeants for the insurgents, NATO sought
to use force with precision and discrimination. This
has included highly restrictive rules of engagement
and increased use of precision weapons, including
guided missiles and precision artillery.
In both wars, legitimacy has also been an issue
for anti-government forces. Taliban propaganda
and statements have emphasised the importance
of minimising Afghan civilian casualties, although
the conspicuous contradiction between these senti-
ments and the many civilian deaths from IEDs and
suicide attacks rendered this message almost irrel-
evant. Credible evidence of human-rights abuses
sufficiently threatened the credibility of Syrian rebel
forces to cause several rebel groups to issue codes of
conduct.
intelligence
Both wars have emphasised the importance of intel-
ligence. During the Syrian government’s security-
solution phase, state security forces enjoyed some
success in disrupting networks of protesters through
arrest and detention operations. This probably bene-
fitted from extensive background information gath-
ered over many years, as well as tutelage by Iranian
experts who had learned from the experience of
repressing civil protest in 2009. But the Syrian Army’s
subsequent operations appeared to be indiscrimi-
nate, whilst some rebel attacks, such as the July 2012
bombing of the security headquarters, appeared to be
very well-informed, possibly by insiders.
Security operations in Afghanistan, by contrast,
have been increasingly well-informed by intelligence.
A decade-long international effort to develop the
Afghan National Directorate of Security is bearing
fruit. And following the winding down of the Iraq
War, large numbers of US intelligence and surveil-
lance systems were shifted to Afghanistan. Combined
with new techniques of data fusion and analysis, this
greatly increased the effectiveness of intelligence-
led operations, particularly the attack of insurgent
networks by special forces.
focus on the people
This allowed NATO and Afghan forces to increas-
ingly focus on the security and other needs of the
general population. In security terms, this saw them
implement the direction of former US General David
Petraeus, borne of experience in Iraq, to ‘protect the
population’.And as security improved, civilian devel-
opment efforts increasingly sought to meet the needs
of the Afghan population, connecting the govern-
ment to the people at village and precinct level.
In Syria, by contrast, the government appeared
to have effectively abandoned efforts to protect the
majority Sunni population, providing opportuni-
ties for the rebels to gain legitimacy. It attempted to
protect its core Alawite supporters, but it appeared
that extensive use of irregular militias stoked the
flames of ethno-religious sectarian tension. And the
government seemed to largely abandon efforts to
provide government services to the majority of the
Syrian population.
Both wars can be compared against many other
principlesofwar,andspecificprinciplesofinsurgency
and counter-insurgency. But the greatest contrast is
in the attitude to the use of force. NATO and Afghan
operations in Afghanistan seemed overwhelmingly
conditioned by a desire to use force proportionately
and precisely, minimising unintended casualties and
damage, and in conjunction with all the other levers of
state governance. The Syrian government’s approach
appeared to be the antithesis of NATO’s, apparently
regarding force as a means and end in itself and a
tool of repression and deterrence, accepting that this
would result in considerable civilian casualties and
collateral damage. In doing so, they conceded many
opportunities to the rebels that NATO and Afghan
forces seek to deny to the Taliban.

Trends in defence capability
Future intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance
For Western armed forces, the dilemmas highlighted
in recent editions of The Military Balance continue.
Budget pressures are forcing states to conduct defence
reviews that in many cases are leading to reductions
in military organisations, inventories and capabili-
ties. A key element of this challenge will be to decide
which capabilities to keep, and in what scale and
number, and even whether these should be retained
on a national basis.
Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR) capacities, sometimes costly and in recent years
often procured by using funding for specific mili-
tary campaigns, are central to this debate. At the
same time, a reduction in overseas operations and a
consequently smaller global ‘footprint’ will test the
effectiveness of ISR-relevant ties established in recent
campaigns with allies, other partner states and even
other national agencies. The requirement to maintain
deployable armed forces is unlikely to diminish in
the near future. The places into which these forces are
deployed might not, however, resemble the theatres
of operation of recent decades. Judging what ISR
capabilities and organisations to maintain, both tech-
nically and operationally, will be the challenge.
In the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan,
joint operations have increasingly been enabled
by advanced ISR capabilities. Including mid- and
low-tier unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and the
accompanying command-and-control networks that
integrate these and their output into force structures,
these capabilities have developed beyond recognition
since the 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted the Western
intervention in Afghanistan. The use of ISR capabili-
tiesrangingfromspace-basedandunattendedground
sensors, as well as sensors on manned and unmanned
aircraft, combined with pre-existing capacities such
as signals, electronic and human intelligence, have
given Western armed forces key information advan-
tages in later stages of these recent campaigns.
After early failures in information collection,
analysis and intelligence dissemination, the picture
improved in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was particu-
larly true for US forces, after then-defence secretary
Robert Gates, in April 2008, expressed his frustra-
tion at failures in intelligence collection, analysis and
dissemination in Iraq and Afghanistan, and moved
to fast-track innovative approaches to fielding new
capabilities. For British forces in Iraq’s Multi-national
Division South East, until Operation Charge of the
Knights in Basra in March 2008, there had not been
enough available ISR capabilities to support intelli-
gence-led strike operations or maintain a counter-IED
roadwatch.
Many of these new technical capabilities are
now filtering down to non-Western armed forces.
Differences between Western states and newer users
lie more in the scale and ambition of use and coordi-
nation, and the technological complexity of the capa-
bilities employed. New users will have to be mindful
of the challenges ISR capabilities bring, such as the
supply of ever greater amounts of information, as
well as the benefits. That said, the effect on new users
of the challenges identified by Western states may be
limited by the range of capabilities they can afford.
isr matures, slowly
In their broadest sense, ISR capabilities have been
used by armed forces for centuries: intercepts of
written communications would have been familiar to
the armies of antiquity, while technical means rapidly
developed in response to advances in telegraphy,
telephony and wireless communications from the late
nineteenth century. It was during the Cold War that
their use was considered to have matured.
However, the ‘persistence’ of present-day ISR plat-
forms is a new development. Designed to loiter for
hours, days, or longer in the case of some space-based
systems, such platforms conduct an ever-expanding
amount of persistent surveillance (perhaps better
termed data accumulation and assisted by technical
advances in computer storage and processing power)
on the ground and in cyberspace, and in both civilian
and military domains.
Information-gathering capabilities used in Iraq
ranged from strategic-level satellite reconnaissance

17Trends in defence capability
and U-2 over-flights to, after the situation received
top-level attention in the spring of 2008, rela-
tively low-cost airframes fitted with ISR suites like
the MC-12 Liberty, as well as ground sensors. The
campaign also saw ISR capabilities devolve down to
small-unit levels: hand-launched UAVs, such as the
Raven, Desert Hawk and Skylark, gave ground troops
direct access to real-time imagery without the rela-
tively time-consuming need to route tasking orders
through a higher formation, and thus presumably
waiting for other assets to be deployed, in the midst of
a fast-moving environment. Though equipment such
as this did improve timeliness, troops had first to be
on the ground in sufficient numbers to either launch
such assets, develop ‘local knowledge’ and language
skills, or gather information from interactions with
local communities.
As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan evolved
into counter-insurgency campaigns, Western armed
forces rediscovered the value of cadres of linguists
and analysts capable of liaising with the local popu-
lation or extracting information from prisoners.
Information gathered from these multiple sources,
including human intelligence and from ISR platforms
or other methods such as email and mobile intercepts,
was often combined in an analytic process termed
‘fusion’. In this, analysis centres would use sophisti-
cated methodologies to fuse different kinds of intel-
ligence into actionable mission packages that would
then be disseminated in a timely manner, as noted
in IISS Strategic Survey 2012 (pp. 36–7). This could
then enable, where required, targeting by assets such
as aircraft, ground troops or special-forces teams.
Persistent surveillance from UAVs and improvements
in communications also permitted real-time moni-
toring of such operations, with damage assessments
carried out near-concurrently.
too much information?
As the amount of information requiring analysis has
increased, so too have the challenges of aggregating,
collating and analysing it. This problem is exacer-
bated in ‘conditions of high operational tempo such
as exist in Afghanistan [where] huge volumes of data
… need to be analysed and packaged in something
close to real time. At present the capacity to do this
is severely limited’ (Ibid.). If anything, this is still a
growing problem. Greater volumes of information
are now accessible, for instance through cyberspace,
giving the collection agencies ever more targets and
potential sources to assess, and likely more collection
priorities. Additional analytical complications arise
from the increased likelihood of circular reporting
in digital sources (where a story is repeated by many
sources creating a false impression that informa-
tion has been corroborated) – something clear to any
regular Internet user.
Inoperationaltheatres,onewaythatWesternstates
have sought to overcome challenges to collation and
analysis is by increasing intelligence staffs. Another is
by formalising fusion centres and putting these at the
disposal of commands in peacetime, as well as war.
In these centres, all-source analysis and information
exploitation (and sometimes collection) is carried out
by co-located civilian and military staff from a range
of countries and agencies in a bid to avoid duplication
of the collection and analysis effort, and in an attempt
to enable more effective command and control of
friendly forces and targeting of hostile forces. These
groups are working in addition to national and multi-
national intelligence cells and command-and-control
networks. Meanwhile, the means that national and
multinational organisations employ to analyse data
have also evolved, with the emergence of technical
tools to filter and analyse information. But still, ‘the
ability of intelligence agencies to collect data far
outstrips their capacity to analyse it’ (Ibid.). While
using technical means can help in tasks like filtering
large amounts of data, making sense of the informa-
tion still requires analysts exercising reasoned judge-
ments.
operations draw down, and budgets
contract
NATO forces in Afghanistan are to withdraw from a
combat role by the end of 2014, with the transition to
Afghan security control. This reduction in resources,
coupled with the increasing pressure on Western
defence budgets because of the financial crisis, means
that many Western armed forces now see themselves
at a turning point, where reassessments of defence
priorities and armed-forces structures and holdings
will be necessary.
In relation to ISR, defence ministries will be
considering which capabilities will form part of
future military structures. This process is fraught
with problems, as it requires states to make choices
on national defence priorities and attempt to predict
likely strategic challenges. Western armed forces
will need to retain sufficient flexibility to respond to
unforeseen crises, possibly including international
disputes which might precipitate armed conflict

between states. Changes in the strategic landscape,
such as in the Middle East and North Africa, may
also make it more difficult for Western states to
assume that they will be able to rely on the assis-
tance of regional partners in the same way as before.
Meanwhile, the ability to field theatre- and tactical-
level technical ISR assets may also be limited by
factors such as a lack of launching sites or sensitivity
about overflights.
operating in new environments
Difficult decisions about which ISR capabilities to
reduce and which to retain, while ensuring a similar
level of coverage, analytical capability and timeli-
ness, are unavoidable for Western armed forces.
Though the operational environments of both Iraq
and Afghanistan were eventually information-rich,
the more recent Libyan campaign provided a rather
different experience in ISR terms.
The NATO-led Operation Unified Protector imple-
mented a no-fly zone and arms embargo over Libya,
and NATO-led forces conducted air- and naval strikes
against regime forces judged to be threatening to
attack, or attacking, Libyan civilians. In October, rebel
forces finally ousted Colonel Muammar Gadhafi
from power. NATO deemed its operation a success,
but it was a campaign generated from a cold start in
terms of the availability of ISR assets, as well as up-to-
date intelligence on Libyan force structures, disposi-
tions and capabilities. A key challenge for NATO-led
air forces and targeting staffs was the adaptation
by Gadhafi’s forces to their loss of airspace control.
They went on to use camouflage and dispersal to
their advantage. The gradual development of rebel
forces’ combat capability, the provision to them of
secure communications devices and the incremental
development of allied ISR coverage – together with
a suitable array of low-yield air-launched weapons –
helped in targeting and dismantling Gadhafi’s forces.
However, the campaign highlighted the difficulties
that Western forces would face in entering a fresh
environment without an adequate understanding of
it or the mature ISR architecture to which they have
become accustomed.
In information-poor environments such as these,
forces looking to intervene can of course generate
new information sources or deploy whatever ISR
assets are at their disposal. However, given recent
experiences in coalition warfare, in which forces
from NATO states have become used to operating in
multinational environments and drawing on multi-
national ISR assets and analytical capacities, another
approach may be to try to replicate these institu-
tional partnership networks using differing groups
of states. This could be one way of maintaining more
comprehensive ISR capacities, but trusted networks
suitable for high degrees of information exchange –
like NATO’s fusion centres – are likely to take a long
time to establish, if they are at all feasible, given the
levels of classification probably applied to some ISR
output.
Widening the availability of low-level ISR capa-
bilities to friendly nations – such as the small hand-
launched RQ-11 Raven UAVs provided to Uganda
and Burundi by the US in 2011 – could also help to
maintain ‘visibility’, or ‘access without presence’,
though doubts over whether such states would have
the technical capacity to combine the output of each
system into an effective information-sharing network
might mean some residual involvement for Western
states; this is, of course, assuming that states remain
on friendly terms and that classification levels permit
effective collaboration. That said, a number of non-
Western states, such as Brazil, India, South Korea and
Singapore, possess or are purchasing theatre-level
UAV assets that could feed information into such
networks or even assume command-and-control
functions for themselves.
Cooperation could also include common procure-
ment or operation of ISR assets. Discussions continue
among NATO and EU member states over the
pooling and sharing of assets, and there has been
progress on NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance
initiative. Cooperation is easier among countries with
established military-to-military ties, but concerns
over sovereign control of capabilities and intelligence
mean that it is not straightforward.
enduring truths
With the withdrawal from relatively benign ISR
environments in Iraq and Afghanistan, limitations
on information obtained through technical methods
mean that, unless the information gathered is judged
sufficiently reliable, human intelligence will remain
vital in discerning intent. It is also apparent that
Western armed forces’ platforms will be fewer in the
future and personnel numbers will also decline. So
as well as assessing what lessons should be learned
from joint operations over the past decade, Western
military planners will be keen to examine which ISR
capabilities represent the best value and are discrimi-
nate in terms of the level of information they generate,

so that smaller teams of analysts are not swamped
by information. The risk remains that any capabili-
ties shelved now may be precisely those required
in the future. Specialist analysts will also have to be
retained, even if in smaller numbers, as will deploy-
able intelligence specialists from military and civilian
agencies. Useful capabilities are not simply military
ones. Developments in civilian forensic technology
have been applied in tracking bomb-makers, while
biometrics technology – widely fielded by US forces
– enables the effective collection of security-relevant
information on civilians or prisoners that is capable
of integration with database systems.
Meanwhile, defence establishments, and security
authorities more broadly, will need to be far-sighted
in maintaining their investment in language training
for intelligence specialists and other force members
who are likely to come into day-to-day contact with
locals, along with core training for military intelli-
gence staffs down to battalion level, to ensure that the
skills accumulated in past campaigns do not atrophy.
While financially attractive, focusing language
training on a core set of ‘approved’ languages runs
the risk of limiting both the pool of current expertise
as well as the capacity to ‘surge’ the training provi-
sion in minor languages as required. Civilian agen-
cies, meanwhile, need to consider how to retain the
links with armed forces that have further developed
in the past decade, and to remain aware of these
forces’ intelligence requirements in large- and small-
scale contingencies, while ensuring that the support
they can offer is scaleable, and can be increased in
size if required. Above all, the lessons learned from
campaigns relating to useful assets, analytical tech-
niques and capabilities need to be institutionalised
within armed forces, at the tactical as well as opera-
tional levels, so that capabilities endure even as forces
may shrink. Developing assets, information and anal-
ysis into an effective ISR architecture takes time; the
challenge lies in keeping that time to an affordable
minimum.
Though the barriers to accessing certain parts of
the world may well rise, the requirement for Western
armed forces to exert influence and perhaps estab-
lish a presence internationally will remain; doing so
will require accurate and timely information, within
an increasingly information-rich environment. For
states wishing to preserve the ability to project force
at speed in unfamiliar environments, the shape of
future ISR capabilities will remain a key preoccupa-
tion.
land: countering the threat oF
improvised explosive devices
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been the
weapon of choice for insurgents in the recent wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan. With the raw materials often
costing less than $20, these devices are cheap, often
‘home-made’, simple to use and effective, serving as
an asymmetric counter to advanced armies’ techno-
logical advantage.
Initially overlooked by many Western military
planners and advocates of the ‘Revolution in Military
Affairs’, these devices are now estimated to have
been responsible for nearly 70% of military casualties
in Iraq and Afghanistan. By sowing fear, lowering
troop morale, limiting freedom of movement and
undermining public support, they have high impact
at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Tens
of billions of dollars have been spent in trying to
neutralise the IED threat. Yet, they remain likely to
create further problems in future.
IEDs are not new, and in recent decades have been
used by non-state groups in Colombia, India, Iran,
Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia and
Thailand. During its conflict with the UK, the IRA
made extensive use of IEDs, which greatly restricted
the mobility of security forces, nearly succeeded in
killing then-prime minister Margaret Thatcher and
inflicted the majority of military, police and civilian
casualties.
The unexpectedly heavy casualties inflicted by
IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan greatly contributed
to the growing unpopularity of these wars in the
US and other NATO countries. This was a strategic
shock that had significant consequences for Western
policy, tactics and procurement. As the operation in
Afghanistan winds down, the US and its allies may
find it difficult to retain expertise in countering IEDs.
However, the increasing use of IEDs elsewhere means
that the counter-IED capabilities developed in recent
years will remain vital for armies and police forces.
challenge in iraq
Following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, insur-
gents used large amounts of ammunition abandoned
by the disbanded Iraqi Army in order to manufacture
IEDs. Aided by Internet-based learning, their capabil-
ities improved rapidly and by August 2003, US casu-
alties caused by IEDs overtook those caused by small
arms and rocket-propelled grenades. By the end of
the year, IEDs were responsible for two-thirds of US

deaths. UK forces in southern Iraq quickly applied
the tactical approaches that they had used to counter
IEDs in Northern Ireland, though the British Army
was slow to recognise the vulnerability of its lightly
armoured Snatch Land Rovers, with the resultant
British casualties undermining popular support for
the war.
US forces did not have the benefit of this
experience, but the problem was quickly recog-
nised by commanders in Iraq. In December 2003,
CENTCOM’s commander at the time, General
John Abizaid, asked Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld to commission a major cross-govern-
mental response to the threat, along the lines of the
Second World War Manhattan Project to develop
the atomic bomb. The Pentagon’s initial response
was slow and under-resourced. But by 2006, the
12-strong Joint IED Defeat Task Force had evolved
into Joint IED Defeat Organisation (JIEDDO) with
several thousand dedicated government, military
and contract personnel. Countering the new threats
not only required an array of armoured vehicles,
electronic jammers and remote-controlled robots,
it also required close cooperation between intelli-
gence and operations staff, scientists and industry,
placing demands on the flexibility and agility of
armies, military-procurement bodies and defence
ministries of all the coalition nations.
Initially, much of the US response focused on
improving physical protection, such as personal
body armour, and reinforcing existing tanks and
armoured fighting vehicles. But support and logis-
tics units had few, if any, armoured vehicles. So in
the first two years of the war, these troops resorted
to desperate expedients, such as adding makeshift
armour, made from scrap metal, to ‘soft-skinned’
vehicles. Although many armoured high-mobility
multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (or ‘humvees’) were
fielded in 2004–05, they were quickly overmatched
by improved insurgent IEDs and it was not until
November 2006 that the requirement was identi-
fied for the more heavily armoured mine-resistant
ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicle. Some 28,000
MRAPs had been procured by US and NATO forces
by August 2012.
But despite the application of sophisticated intel-
ligence, scientific, industrial and military resources to
the problem, an ‘action–reaction’ relationship evolved
between insurgent bombers and coalition troops,
scientists and engineers. The many ways of config-
uring bombs and the complex technology required to
counter them meant that it could often take six to 12
months between the emergence of a new type of IED
and the fielding of a sufficient technical countermea-
sure by trained troops.
operational approach
In Iraq, the US military moved from a strategy of
addressing the IED itself and its consequences (more
armour and better medical care) to preventing insur-
gent networks from building and laying IEDs in
the first place. Based on British doctrine, a common
counter-IED approach was applied by all coali-
tion troops in Iraq and, later, in Afghanistan. This
case study: explosively formed projectiles
An example of the IED challenge and response was the
fielding of explosively formed projectile (EFP) devices
against British forces in southern Iraq from 2005–09.
There was nothing new about the technology, in which
explosives detonating behind a disc-shaped charge
mould it into a high-energy metal slug that is capable of
punching through even tank armour with lethal results.
Indeed, during the ColdWar the British stockpiled French-
manufactured EFP mines for use against Warsaw Pact ar-
mour. But drawing on expertise from Hizbullah and with
a supply of EFP components from Iran, Shia militias used
EFP devices to great effect against coalition vehicles.
Initially the British had no technical countermeasures
and could only reduce the threat by adapting tactics. This
included rigorous control of road movement and devot-
ing considerable resources to force protection. This so re-
duced the available combat power of the British brigade
that both its operational effect and its ability to train Iraqi
forces were reduced. It was months before additional ar-
mour and other countermeasures to protect against EFPs
were fielded. It was only in the aftermath of the 2008 Iraqi
forces’surge in Basra, OperationChargeoftheKnights, that
the level of security forces on the streets in Basra City was
sufficient to disrupt the emplacement of EFPs.
In the UK, the issue had political significance as many
British lightly armoured Snatch Land Rover 4×4 patrol
vehicles were destroyed by EFPs, causing well-publicised
casualties. This produced considerable criticism that the
reaction of the government, Ministry of Defence and
army had been too slow.

saw three lines of action: ‘defeat the device’; ‘attack
the network’; and ‘train the force’ at all levels of
command. All needed to be integrated by rapid infor-
mation exchange across forces, so that counter-IED
action could quickly be initiated.
Defeat the device
Detecting technologies included hand-held devices,
sniffer dogs and sophisticated search techniques and
equipment, while electronic jammers were fitted to
vehicles and carried by troops, to block trigger signals
sent to bombs. Considerable effort was also devoted
to the development of explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) technologies that would help in neutralising
devices detected before detonation and recovering
them for forensic analysis.
These measures were complemented by attempts
to disrupt the laying of IEDs, principally by imposing
more rigorous control over road movements and with
more patrols on the ground, though these depended
on there being sufficient troops to dominate an area.
Air movement alleviated the threat, although some
transport aircraft and helicopters struck IEDs placed
on landing sites. And while many countries bought
more helicopters and isolated units were supplied
by parachute, not even the US could move sufficient
troops and supplies by air. Therefore, previously
soft-skinned trucks also had armour and jammers
added.
Attack the network
In Iraq, extra intelligence resources were deployed
to identify insurgents involved in IED construction
and supply, as well as those planning attacks and
planting and operating the devices. Airborne surveil-
lance, particularly from long-endurance manned
and unmanned aircraft, proved particularly useful
in identifying insurgent teams planting devices.
These could then be attacked, or in the case of those
making or moving bombs, followed. The prefer-
ence was to detain insurgents and seize devices and
bomb-making material for forensic and technical
analysis and the development of further intelligence.
Biometric technology fielded by US forces greatly
improved their ability to link bomb components to
bomb-makers.
Train the force
Troops would ideally train with the specialist counter-
IED equipment they would use in theatre. However,
there was often insufficient equipment for pre-oper-
ational training, and troops had to learn on the job,
with all of the attendant risks. In the case of British
forces in Iraq, casualties tended to be suffered during
the first weeks of tours of duty as troops learned on
operations, until sufficient equipment was provided
for pre-deployment training.
ieds in afghanistan
The dominant IED in Iraq was the explosively formed
projectile (see box, p. 20), which coupled a highly
engineered warhead with civilian infrared control
technology, optimised against armoured vehicles.
The typical IED in Afghanistan has been a much
simpler home-made bomb initiated by a so-called
‘victim-operated’ pressure plate. But these IEDs have
been laid even more widely. In the southern prov-
inces of Helmand and Kandahar, the density of IEDs
has approached that of minefields previously laid in
state-on-state warfare. In 2009, 9,304 IED explosions
were recorded, but this rose to 15,225 in 2010 and
peaked at 16,554 in 2011.
Techniques used to attack IED networks in Iraq
have been refined. Combined with improved counter-
measures and pre-tour training, these techniques
have resulted in fewer troops being killed or injured
by roadside bombs; the US has claimed a 40% reduc-
tion in IED casualties in Afghanistan during 2011–
12. JIEDDO assesses that with adequate numbers of
UAV-borne sensors to detect IEDs, the number of
bombs found before they explode has increased to
64%, after stubbornly hovering around 50% for years.
However, experts repeatedly say that the best tools
remain sniffer dogs with handlers, a well-trained
soldier’s eye and information from a supportive local
population. Using these tools, NATO foot patrols in
Afghanistan currently achieve an average 80% detec-
tion rate. But insurgent IEDs remain the single-largest
source of civilian deaths inAfghanistan, killing nearly
1,000 in Afghanistan in 2011, according to the United
Nations.
In early 2010, at the height of Operation Moshtarak
in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces, US and British
forces used heavy engineer tanks to clear routes
through these dense belts of IEDs by firing rocket-
propelled explosive hoses. Later that year, the British
Army fielded its Talisman system: a dedicated group
of armoured vehicles and expert personnel with
powerful surveillance systems, small UAVs/ground
robots and the Buffalo, an armoured vehicle with a
remotely operated arm. The US has similar ‘route-
opening detachments’. Both teams also include high-

mobility JCB armoured excavators to repair damage
caused by IED blasts. Dedicated surveillance systems
have been fielded, including specially modified
surveillance aircraft.
Increased protection has saved lives, but has
reduced the effectiveness of NATO forces. Soldiers
have to carry heavy loads – body armour, jamming
equipment and mine detectors – meaning that their
mobility is correspondingly reduced. In addition, the
large numbers and types of protected vehicles create
logistical challenges, reducing both operational flex-
ibility and NATO troops’ ability to interact with the
Afghan people.
Beyond iraq and afghanistan
In 2011, almost 600 IED incidents per month occurred
in countries outside Iraq and Afghanistan. Anti-
government forces have made increasing use of them
in Syria, in roadside bombs and suicide car bombs,
and in assassination attempts. The Syrian govern-
ment claimed that there were over 700 IED incidents
in May 2012 alone. By August 2012, it was clear that
not only were Syrian rebels successfully destroying
government tanks and armoured vehicles with IEDs,
but also that government forces appeared greatly
handicapped by an apparent lack of tactical counter-
IED capability.
Armed forces of countries that may have to fight
Western forces will have observed the advantages that
IEDs have given to insurgents in Iraq andAfghanistan.
They are likely to see the overlapping characteris-
tics of IEDs and conventional sea- and landmines. So
countering both IEDs and conventional landmines
will remain a core requirement for land forces.
In an age of austerity, the absence of major opera-
tions will make keeping knowledge and expertise
alive difficult. A relevant example is British tactical
intelligence in Iraq, where hard-won tactical intel-
ligence skills and capabilities that had been devel-
oped in Northern Ireland and used to great effect
against IRA bombers were allowed to atrophy as
the campaign there wound down, to the consequent
disadvantage of operations in Basra. The British
managed to regenerate these capabilities in time
to have an impact in Afghanistan. This shows how
difficult it can be to retain the intellectual capital and
understanding to regenerate idle military capabili-
ties. The recently announced ‘Army 2020’ reorganisa-
tion of the British Army provides for the retention of
sniffer dog, search and EOD capabilities in a specialist
brigade.
Speaking at IISS in February 2012, the JIEDDO
chief argued that the threat is an ‘enduring and
global’ one that cannot be solved by any single ‘silver
bullet’. JIEDDO has proposed that institutionalising
counter-IED capabilities requires continued invest-
ment in relevant research and development as well
as forensic capabilities, retaining current techniques
to fuse operational information and intelligence,
continuing to train service personnel in counter-IED
tactics, and a ‘whole-of-government’ response as part
of wider security efforts. To counter this widening
threat, greater national and international cooperation
will be required among intelligence agencies, police
and security forces, scientists and the defence and
security industries. However, funding for such efforts
could be under pressure as NATO troops withdraw
from Afghanistan: future armies may well, therefore,
merge counter-IED efforts with broader counter-
mine capabilities.
maritime: suBmarine capaBility
improvements
A key trend in maritime procurements is the rapid
development of submarine fleets. States with existing
fleets are developing the capabilities of their vessels
while a number of states, particularly in the Asia-
Pacific, are fielding submarines in their inventories
for the first time.
Submarines offer the ability to project power at
range and with stealth. They are the most expensive
type of naval vessel, tonne for tonne, but are afford-
able for an increasing number of states. Most states
opt for conventionally powered submarines, but
even the list of countries operating nuclear-powered
submarines (SSNs) is expanding: India commissioned
its first SSN in more than 20 years in April 2012, while
Brazil is developing an SSN capability.
Submarine capabilities are also developing.
Air-independent propulsion systems have been
widely adopted in conventionally powered subma-
rines; these systems increase cruising times and
reduce acoustic signatures. Weaponry has also
improved: many submarines now have the capacity
to launch varying types of missiles beyond the
ballistic systems long seen in nuclear ballistic-missile
submarines, while torpedoes have become faster and
more accurate, with better guidance systems and
on-board sensors. This will only heighten the imper-
ative for states to improve anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) capabilities.

expanding conventional fleets
While fleets are being developed in Europe, the
Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America,
a raft of submarine purchases in the Asia-Pacific has
provoked more concern, given that Asian defence-
modernisation programmes often reflect efforts to
hedge against the assumed motives of others. As
noted in The Military Balance 2012 (p. 208), ‘this risks
destabilising interaction between defence strategies,
doctrines and capability-development programmes.’
It means that there is increased potential for action–
reaction procurements.
The growth in China’s submarine fleet has encour-
aged this view. Over the past two decades, its fleet has
grown from 46 to 66. In 1992, the majority comprised
outdated, 1950s-era Romeo-class diesel-electric
submarines. Twenty years later, and particularly after
the creation of the South Sea Fleet’s 72nd submarine
flotilla in the early 2000s, China could boast 12 Kilos
imported from Russia, and the indigenously designed
and constructed Song- and Yuan-class, with the older
Ming-class now slowly being decommissioned.
Other regional states are ordering new boats,
some for the first time, others are updating ageing
fleets, and still others are increasing the number of
hulls in service in a concerted effort to expand their
sub-surface capabilities. Countries such as Malaysia,
Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, South Korea,
Australia, Japan, India and Pakistan are all expanding
their existing fleets or creating new ones. For states
surrounding the South China Sea – the location of a
number of disputes over territory or maritime bound-
aries–orthoseperceivedaspotentialregionalrivals to
China, these procurements are a reaction to Beijing’s
growing surface and sub-surface fleet. Procurements
of these advanced capabilities may also spring from a
desire to improve military capabilities in the wake of
economic growth, while there are a number of sub-
regional rivalries and military competitions that also
go some way to explaining procurements.
Beyond East Asia, other states are also expanding
or improving their fleets of conventional submarines,
particularly in the Middle East. Israel took delivery
of its fourth Dolphin-class (German Type-212 variant)
submarine in May 2012, as part of its plan to double
the size of its three-boat fleet. Algeria similarly
doubled its two-boat fleet with two improved Kilos
in 2010. Iran continues to maintain its three-vessel
Kilo-class fleet, with one of the boats having been
repaired after a lengthy refit in early 2012, but it is
also expanding its midget submarine fleet through
the indigenous Qadir-class to offer asymmetric sub-
surface capabilities in the crowded and often shallow
Persian Gulf.
Table 1 germany’s type-209 submarine and successor types: world operators
209/1100 209/1200 209/1300 209/1400 209/1500 214
Argentina 1 (1)
Brazil 5
Chile 2
Colombia 2
Ecuador 2
Egypt 2 (in negotiation)
Greece 3 (1) 4 4 (2)
India 4
Indonesia 2 3 (Chang Bogo)
South Korea 9 (Chang Bogo) 3 (6)
Peru 2 4
Portugal 2
South Africa 3
Turkey 6 8 6
Venezuela 2
Total 6 (2) 25 6 18 (3+2) 4 9 (14)
The Type-209 submarine is the most popular exported boat in the sub-surface sector. Thus far, the 209, in its various guises, has been exported to 13 countries, with a 14th
in negotiation, while its successor the 214 has already been exported to four with a fifth contracted. The remarkable success of German manufacturer HDW’s submarine
types, which have now seen 68 vessels exported, is owing to a number of factors: their modular designs allow for incremental improvements and various options tailored to
the client; their size and adaptability makes them appealing to a wide range of countries; and the initial development of the 209 occurred as many countries were looking
to update ageing pre-Second World War submarine designs. The above figures do not include the six Type-210 (Ula-class) supplied to Norway, the four Dolphin-class boats
delivered to Israel and the Type-212A design that has also been procured by Italy.

In LatinAmerica, Chile received two Scorpene-class
boats in 2005, adding to its existing fleet of two Type-
209s, while Brazil has ordered four Scorpene-class
boats to be received in the latter half of this decade.
In Europe, a number of replacement programmes
are currently in train. Germany has commissioned
four modern Type-212 submarines – two are in
build – and has exported four of the class to Italy, of
which two are already in service. Greece has received
four Type-214s (the export variant of the 212), and,
despite its financial troubles, has agreed to complete
a six-boat deal with Germany. Turkey has ordered a
further six Type-214s, to replace the six oldest Type-
209s in its 14-boat fleet.
After a long hiatus, Russia has once again started
to produce conventional submarines, with two
classes, the Lada and the Varshavyanka, being separate,
improved variants of the original Kilo design. One
Lada was commissioned in 2010 and two more are
in build, while six Varshavyanka are apparently to be
built and transferred to the Black Sea Fleet.
improved technological capabilities
The proliferation of air-independent propulsion
(AIP) systems signifies a substantial improvement
in conventional submarine stealth. Originally, AIP
systems were confined to Europe and Russia, but
these are now in use in Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore,
South Korea, Japan and China. The Vietnamese Kilos
and Indian and Brazilian Scorpenes will all have AIP
technology.
AIP allows boats to remain submerged for
extended periods, perhaps up to three weeks, without
the need to ‘snorkel’ for air, making it more difficult
for surface and aerial forces to track them. A benefit
of current AIP systems is that some can be retrofitted
into existing vessels; the Swedish Stirling cycle AIP
system, for example, can be inserted into a boat by
extending the hull. Until recently, conventional AIP
technology was produced exclusively by Germany,
France, Spain, Sweden and Russia. However, with
the Yuan-class submarine, China has also begun
to produce and deploy AIP-equipped vessels, and
will co-produce with Pakistan AIP technology for
Islamabad’s future submarines.
For countries with relatively poor ASW capa-
bilities, AIP-equipped submarines compound the
problems raised by submarine proliferation more
generally; that is, assuming that the countries in
possession of these systems are able to operate them
to best effect. So the decision in various East Asian
capitals to purchase submarines can be seen from
two perspectives. On the one hand, as a tacit admis-
sion that some states are unable to compete with the
modernisation of China’s surface fleet and as a result
are adopting sea-denial rather than sea-control capa-
bilities. On the other hand, these submarine procure-
ments can be viewed as an attempt to exploit the
People’s Liberation Army Navy’s perceived weak-
ness in ASW. The corollary of this is, of course, that
it will only encourage China to develop its ASW
capabilities to counteract this perceived weakness,
as evidenced by an increased focus on improving
ASW capabilities in, for instance, the new Type-
056 corvette. These requirements will only increase
now that China has commissioned its first aircraft
carrier, where ASW escorts will be crucial to ensure
its survival. The development of the Y-8X maritime
patrol aircraft, currently in service, and in particular
the prototype ASW variant with a magnetic anomaly
detector, will be another significant step forward for
China’s ASW capabilities.
Weapons are also improving. Torpedoes have
become quieter, faster and able to operate at greater
depths. Like submarines, torpedoes are manufac-
tured by a relatively small number of countries,
meaning various states will use the same type. In
the heavyweight torpedo market, for example,
Raytheon’s Mk 48 is now in service in 29 countries
officially (and unofficially in China as the unlicensed,
reverse-engineered Yu-6/Yu-7) and Atlas Elektronik’s
DM2A4 is in service in Germany, Spain, Pakistan,
Turkey, Greece and Israel.
Propellers have largely been phased out in favour
of quieter propulsors, while sound-isolation tech-
niques, exhaust muffling and ‘body damping’ have
all aided acoustic quieting. Sensors and guidance
systems have improved, notably in terms of target
acquisition and discrimination. Torpedoes are also
increasingly incorporating active/passive sonars to
detect and track targets, while wake-homing torpe-
does, a technology developed in the 1960s in the
Soviet Union, are now utilised in Atlas Elektronik’s
DM2A4. Supercavitation, the technology that allows
torpedoes to greatly increase their speeds up to
250 miles per hour, remains limited to the Russian
VA-111 Shkval, in service since the early 1970s; torpe-
does reportedly exported to China lacked fire-control
systems, limiting their utility. In the US, a programme
funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency is examining the uses of supercavitation,
though the noise created by the process, as currently

understood, limits its attractiveness. An Iranian claim
that it tested its first supercavitating torpedo in 2006
has not been verified.
Television images of Tomahawk land-attack cruise
missiles (LACM) exiting US and UK submarines
in recent campaigns, such as against Muammar
Gadhafi’s regime in Libya in 2011, highlight another
developing sub-surface capability: to launch an
increasing number of guided weapons from subma-
rines. Though only six states can currently launch
LACM from submarines, shorter-range submarine-
launched guided missiles are proliferating. France
has supplied the Exocet to Pakistan and India, while
the US submarine-launched Harpoon is in service with
11 navies. Introducing such technology is not simply
a matter of fitting missiles to existing torpedo tubes.
Some boats have bespoke vertical launch systems
fitted to enable missile-launch capability, while others
have specially widened torpedo tubes or the ability
to launch missiles from canisters. But while costly
complications may thus be introduced in design,
manufacture and also on-board weapons storage and
handling, these are outweighed by the resulting capa-
bility improvements.
more nuclear power
Though the first operational nuclear-powered subma-
rine, USS Nautilus, was launched in 1954, until 2009,
only the five members of the UN Security Council
had constructed and launched SSNs. While the cost
and expertise required to operate nuclear submarines
has hitherto proven an effective barrier to entry, this
situation is now changing. India and Brazil are both
developing SSNs, in moves that some have ascribed
as much to each state’s great-power aspirations as to
military necessity. India previously operated a Soviet
Skat-class (Charlie I) SSN from the late 1980s until
1991, and has recently taken delivery of a Russian
Akula-class boat, christened INS Chakra. India also
launched, in 2009, a nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarine, INS Arihant, though this boat has yet to
enter service, and its missile complement is unclear.
Brazil’s aspirations are rooted in nuclear-powered
boats. France’s DCNS, involved in the construc-
tion of Brazil’s four Scorpenes, is also assisting in the
design and construction of the non-nuclear portions
of Brazil’s nuclear submarine.
SSNs are attractive due to their duration, range
and speed relative to conventional counterparts.
The largest SSNs in the world, the Russian Typhoon-
class ballistic-missile boats, can theoretically remain
submerged on patrol for six months. As such,
nuclear power is necessary for an effective contin-
uous at-sea nuclear-deterrent capability. However,
nuclear submarines tend to be noisier than conven-
tionally powered boats as certain systems such
as reactor pumps must constantly operate; a situ-
ation exacerbated as conventional boats become
quieter. Furthermore, substantial technical exper-
tise is required to maintain and sustain SSNs, with
land-based infrastructure also required for fuel
management and storage. Decommissioning nuclear
submarines is also problematic and costly because of
the need to dismantle and store the reactor safely.
Future submarine market
Developments in submarine technologies, as well
as a wider set of operators, will likely encourage
further investment in ASW capabilities, from depth
charges to sonar, frigates to ASW aviation. This will
only be reinforced if other technological advances
make submarines and their weapons systems more
effective. At the same time, submarines are likely to
be used for a wider range of roles. Intelligence gath-
ering, special-forces insertion, mine-laying and land-
attack are but four, while it should not be forgotten
that submarines are also a key part of ASW capa-
bilities themselves. The North Korean attack on the
Cheonan in 2010 demonstrated the difficulties that
even advanced navies can have in tracking and
sensing potentially hostile submarines. Given this
inherent advantage, submarine proliferation is likely
to continue as more navies seek to exploit the range of
capabilities that these boats offer.
military aerospace: Faster target
engagements Beckon
Advances in guidance technologies are providing
world air forces with the capacity to engage targets
with a high degree of accuracy in all weathers, day
or night. In the West, precision-guided air-launched
munitions have been broadly adopted in the last ten
years. The 2011 NATO-led operation in Libya under-
scored the ability of certain participating air forces to
engage targets with near sub-metric accuracy. Now,
if a static target can be found and identified, and it
is determined that it falls within the rules of engage-
ment, an air force can, if it has the material resources,
almost always hit the target. This does not eliminate,
however, the possibility of air-strikes having unin-
tended consequences: hardware or software failures

can occur, as can human error, and civilian deaths
and friendly-fire casualties still occur as a result of
target misidentification.
To use airborne munitions effectively, targets have
to be identified and, if multiple targets present them-
selves, discriminated amongst, while complying with
the rules of engagement. But achieving military effect
is not just reliant on hitting a specific target; timeli-
ness is also an issue. Some targets may only offer
fleeting engagement opportunities or may be time-
sensitive, such as engaging a hostile ballistic-missile
launch, disrupting an air-defence command-and-
control centre, or defeating a mobile surface-to-air
missile system.
For targets like these, there is a desire to compress
the engagement cycle. To reduce the ‘sensor-to-
shooter’ time, improvements can be made to ISR
technologies, command-and-control systems, guid-
ance technologies, as well as weapons payloads.
Air-launched munitions can also be made faster.
While not a panacea, using faster munitions to reduce
launch-to-strike times offers decision-makers more
time for their deliberations. They can also deliver
advantages in terms of penetration, either through
surface-to-air missile defences, or in attacking hard
and deeply buried targets.
the impetus of velocity
Research and development work is taking place into
both supersonic (Mach 1-5) and hypersonic (Mach
5+) cruise-missile technology. High-speed weapons
research is not new. During the Cold War, research
into hypersonic ‘air-breathing’ weapons was driven
by concerns over the survivability of existing, slower,
air-launched nuclear-capable systems. Research now
continues on air-breathing technologies. Relying on
the intake of air for fuel combustion, these can operate
with lighter fuel loads and over greater ranges than
munitions relying solely on solid rocket propellants.
However, complex technological issues and high
costs have so far limited hypersonic research, while
the same factors mean potential operators will likely
be restricted to a handful of nations.
Research into high-speed air-breathing propulsion
has mainly been carried out by the US and Russia.
France, China, India and Brazil have also funded
hypersonic-propulsion research, as has Japan, with
an eye to space launch. Washington is principally
interested in using conventionally armed hyper-
sonic cruise missiles in the tactical role. High-speed
weapons could potentially be of use in strike missions
in anti-access/area-denial environments. Steven
Walker, deputy assistant secretary for science, tech-
nology and engineering in the US Department of the
Air Force, said in February 2012 that ‘we are planning
to initiate a technology demonstration effort in Fiscal
Year 2013 to demonstrate a high speed capability
option. If successful, this High Speed Strike weapon
technology demonstration will be representative of
an air-breathing hypersonic missile system with the
capability to engage fixed and relocatable targets at
extended ranges and survive the most stringent envi-
ronments presented to us in the next decade.’
Two of Washington’s most recent efforts are the
air force’s X-51A Waverider and the HIFiRE project,
which also involves Australia’s Defence Science and
Technology Organisation. The X-51 programme,
managed by the Air Force Research Laboratory, is
an air-launched vehicle intended to explore hyper-
sonic propulsion in free flight. Test results are so far
mixed, with one out of its three flights seeing its air-
breathing supersonic combustion ramjet (scramjet)
take the vehicle to speeds over Mach 5. HIFiRE uses a
ground-launched vehicle to examine basic technolo-
gies required for hypersonic flight.
The attraction of hypersonic cruise missiles can
be gauged by considering the approximate fly-out
times of a subsonic and a Mach 5-class weapon. Most
land-attack cruise missiles fly at around Mach 0.7
and would take approximately an hour to travel 500
miles. By comparison, a Mach 5 missile would cover a
similardistanceinundertenminutes.Thetimeadvan-
tage is considerably less against a comparatively
high-speed supersonic missile, though with a higher
velocity hypersonic weapon the gap widens. Along
with hypersonic work, Washington is also supporting
technologies applicable to supersonic cruise-missile
development: Walker also noted the ‘Supersonic
Turbine Engine for Long Range’ project intended to
develop propulsion technology for a next-genera-
tion cruise missile. The US Navy’s ‘Revolutionary
Approach to Long Range Time Critical Strike’ project
explored a turbojet-powered missile capable of cruise
speeds in excess of Mach 3.
russian efforts
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin has
lamented the US ‘lead’ in hypersonics, and in 2012,
moved to create a ‘national competitor’ by further
consolidating Russia’s guided-weapons industry:
NPO Mashinostroyenia is being folded into the
Tactical Missile Corporation (which already includes

most Russian guided-weapons manufacturers
including the Raduga design bureau).
Rogozin delivered his comments during a visit
to the Raduga design bureau in Dubna, north of
Moscow. Towards the end of the Soviet era, Raduga
had started developing the Kh-90 high-speed stra-
tegic cruise missile, which may have had an intended
design speed of Mach 5. Flight hardware was tested
using a Tu-95 Bear as the launch aircraft, though with
mixed results. The collapse in Russian defence expen-
diture during the 1990s led to the programme being
shelved.
Raduga and NPO Mashinostroyenia had both
previously conducted high-speed cruise-missile
research, though Raduga is likely to lead any work
on hypersonic cruise-missile technology within the
Tactical Missile Corporation, given its experience on
the Kh-90. NPO’s general director,Aleksandr Leonov,
suggested in February 2012 that the company was
working on a hypersonic weapon for naval applica-
tions. He indicated the project was part of the Russian
defence ministry’s 2011–20 funding programme.
Leonov did not say whether this effort was related
to joint work between Russia and India to develop a
successor to the supersonic BrahMos missile (BrahMos
is a variant of the NPO Mashinostroyenia 3M55
Onyx [SS-N-26 Strobile]). BrahMos II, as the project is
dubbed, is intended to develop a scramjet-powered
missile capable of hypersonic flight. BrahMos uses
ramjet propulsion, engine technology best suited to
flight between Mach 2 to around Mach 5. Beyond
Mach 5, ramjets face increasing problems in slowing
the intake of air to the subsonic speeds required in the
combustion chamber. Conversely, scramjet propul-
sion requires speeds of Mach 5 and above for effi-
cient combustion. In parallel to its work with Russia,
India is also pursuing independent research into
hypersonic systems through its Defence Research
and Development Organisation. Its hypersonic tech-
nology demonstrator vehicle is intended to begin to
explore scramjet propulsion at Mach 6.5.
european ambitions
Russia features in one of Europe’s main hyper-
sonic demonstrator projects: MBDA France’s LEA
programme. France dominates European research
into air-breathing hypersonic technology, which is
in part a legacy of its strategic air-launched cruise-
missile programmes. Paris has been cultivating its ties
with Moscow over the past two decades, motivated by
a pragmatic interest in using Russian research infra-
structure. In the case of LEA, an MBDA-designed air
vehicle and engine will be dropped from a Tu-22M
Backfire bomber; the test item will then be boosted
to the required transition speed for scramjet propul-
sion using a modified Kh-22 (AS-4 Kitchen) missile.
Telemetry support from the Russian test range will be
provided by an Il-76PP telemetry aircraft. A key aim
of the LEA programme is to examine aero-propul-
sive balance: the drag environment of the hypersonic
flight regime is such that there is a risk that, even if the
engine operates, it will not generate positive thrust
and the missile will slow, even with an operational
engine. Flight tests are planned for 2013 to 2015, with
the air vehicle being flown at speeds between Mach
4 and Mach 8. The flight trials are also intended to
support the predictive methodology MBDA is using
with regard to the performance of the LEA.
France and the UK also began study work at
the end of 2011, looking at technology options for
a next-generation cruise missile. Initially, up to a
dozen design alternatives were to be considered
before selecting perhaps three for fuller exploration.
Subsonic and supersonic designs will be looked at,
though whether the study will also encompass any
hypersonic candidates is uncertain. The UK Ministry
of Defence had earlier shelved its own sustained
hypersonic flight experiment.
technical challenges
There are substantial engineering challenges to
sustained hypersonic flight. These include the design
and close integration of the airframe and engine,
guidance and control, and the thermal environment.
The heat from air friction can result in surface
temperatures of 1,200 degrees Fahrenheit at Mach 4,
more than double this temperature at Mach 6, and
near four times at Mach 8. At speeds up to Mach
6, the use of advanced materials alone may not be
enough to provide the required structural integ-
rity. At any greater speed, active cooling would also
likely be required, such as using fuel as the airframe’s
heat-sink. Airframe control is a challenge given the
stresses of the air environment, exacerbated by high
speeds, while effective terminal guidance at hyper-
sonic speeds could also pose problems. Technologies
currently used for both radio frequency and infra-
red transparency are not capable of withstanding the
thermal stresses of sustained flight in excess of Mach
4.5. Research is under way into a range of ceramic
materials that could meet sensor window require-
ments, possibly in combination with an active cooling

system. Another possibility could lie in minimising
the time the window is also directly exposed to the
air flow, while providing adequate time for the inputs
needed for high accuracy.
The promise of air-breathing high-speed weap-
onry has remained simply that for several decades.
Though criticism continues that these systems are
perhaps more driven by the demands of research
laboratories than battlefield practicalities, the nature
of future threat environments seems to have led to a
redoubling of interest, as well as efforts, mainly in the
US and Russia. The effect of Chinese efforts remain
unknown. To fully exploit the benefits of hyper-
sonic technologies, however, the weapons-targeting
process needs to be more responsive. Hypersonic
weapons will need to be nested within a networked
environment capable of supporting a rapid targeting
cycle from target search and identification, planning,
and engagement; one which could also include near
real-time battle-damage assessment.

The military balance 2013

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The military balance 2013